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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: PRESIDENT FORD
 Bipartisan Leadership
 Secretary Kissinger
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, September 9, 1975
 Cabinet Room

SUBJECT: Middle East -- Sinai Agreement

Kissinger : The events of 1973 show us that the Middle East conflict produces a danger of great power conflict, and also enormous economic dislocation. Also, our commitment to Israel produces our involvement in any conflict.

A comprehensive approach would have been easy to devise but it tends to put the radicals in the driver's seat ; it gives the Soviet Union a strong role, and it forces Israel to make many decisions all at once which it is not equipped to do. So we chose an interim approach.

Egypt is the largest Arab state and the leader of the Arab world. The problem has been to reconcile Egypt's concrete territorial needs as against the intangible political needs of Israel. The March negotiations failed when the gap between the these could not be bridged. Both Egypt and Israel preferred that we continue the interim approach.

This is the first agreement between Israel and Egypt execpt in the aftermath of a war. It makes far-reaching moves toward peace and a new relationship between the two countries.

[He describes the map, the zones of limited armaments, and the surveillance stations].


The Israelis insisted that unless there were purely Americans in the passes, they wouldn't withdraw. Egypt said she couldn't accept unless Israel withdrew, so we reluctantly agreed. The American technicians are in the UN zone. Their function is to reassure the two sides in time of peace. If conflict breaks out, their function is over, so we would have no problem withdrawing them in case of conflict--or on a joint resolution of congress to do this. Those people shouldn't be compared to Vietnam but to the UN forces in the neutral zone.

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E.O. 12065, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state rev. aw 3/10/04
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Bellmon: How about the danger of attack by terrorists?

Kissinger: It would be about impossible for them to get at them in the zone. It is within the UN zone and is uninhabited. There is more of a danger at their bases in Egypt than on duty, but any American anywhere in the Middle East is a target. It is almost impossible to guard completely against terrorism.

Sadat, himself, is in great jeopardy. He has taken risks for peace. But he is the only one who has thrown over the Soviet Union and the only one who has gained anything from this settlement. If we can make this work, it will be a good object lesson on cooperating with the U.S.

The aid package should not be looked at as payment for the agreement. Israel asked for \$2.6 billion before the agreement. The increment resulting from the agreement is slight, even though we will provide less than \$2.6 billion. We haven't arrived at a figure for Egypt, but it is important to show the benefits for cooperation with the U.S. It is essential that we show our interest in Egypt's economic development.

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Call Bill Sullivan → Robinson - Negot. instructions.

- Who goes/when
- Do we have release on 1-15, etc.
- Salt containing paper.
- 1500 w/eyeball.
- Report on what side has done for talks

Part
 includes
 9 Sept 75
 8:00 - 11:30 am

the extremely political needs of I. The Arab negotiators favored what a gap but these would not be bridged.

ART-Contact

R Events of 73 show less that MC conflict causes danger of AR conflict. Also an entire to I using an involvement is any conflict.

A comprehensive approach would have been easy, but it tends to put restraints in lines text, gives SD a strong role & force I to make very decisions all at once which it not equipped to do. ∴ an interim approach.

E is a large Arab state & a leader of Arab world. The prob has been to reconcile E concrete constraint members.

Both E & I preferred a comprehensive approach. This is a 1st agreement but I & E except in department of war. It enables for making moves toward peace & a new relationship between 2 countries.

(Describes a major zone of limited commitments, surveillance stations)

The I insisted that unless there were panels ones in a phase they wouldn't w/ draw. E tried and but accept unless I w/ draw, so we reluctantly agreed. US function is to reassure 2 sides in a time of peace. If conflict breaks out their function is clear and we would have no job w/ changing them in case of conflict - or on joint res. of large. These people shouldn't be downed to UN but a UN force in a neutral zone.

(Rebman) Hum about danger of attack by Communists

R. It would be almost impossible for them to get at them in a zone. It w/ in UN zone & is unminhabled. More damage at houses in E than on city, but any Am. anywhere in NLE is a target. Almost impossible to general completely against terrorism.

Sadat himself is under jeopardy. He has taken risks for peace. But he is the only one who has the man over the SC & the only one who has gained anything from this settlement. If we can make this work, it will be a good object lesson on Egypt/US.

The aid package should not be linked to a payment for a agreement. I asked for 2.6 before a agreement. The movement resulting from a agreement is slight, even tho we will provide less than 2.6. We haven't arrived at a figure for E, but it important to show a benefits of w/ US. It is essential that we show our interest in E even though.

points

