

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~ / X6DS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME:

Monday - August 4, 1975

PLACE:

Kissinger: This is the old map. Sadat accepts this line but wants it out of the passes. It still leaves them the high ground. Here you must be as ruthless as necessary.

President: You mean off the crests?

Kissinger: No, only in the passes themselves.


He accepts the north line but wants a few hundred yards on the curve.

South of the passes he accepts whatever line we can get him. He accepts the whole coast road provided his people don't have to go through Israeli checkpoints. But I am going to block off the two stretches as UN or something so the line is continuous.

Rabin's actions make it look like Israeli-U.S. collusion, which will drive the Egyptians wild. Sadat says he needs a token two kilometers past the UN line. They want two stations in the north. They will give them Umm Khisheiba if we supervise it. They won't let Israel man the south station but they will let the U.S. or UN do it. In the next round I will say that Egypt wants all the stations American and that they rejected all six stations. We could get two stations in the Giddi under the guise of checking access to Umm Khisheiba.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY Imp. To Det.  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON \_\_\_\_\_



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 16, NARA, DATE 5/24/04  
*State Review 3/10/04*

Basically this negotiation is done unless Rabin is setting us up for a fall. Here is his letter. I think we should go back to him and say we won't pursue the matter further; that the European briefings contradict what he says, and that the President promised they would get out of the passes.

I would propose leaving the 18th or 19th, and hope to wrap it up by the 28th or 29th.

We couldn't have done it without you either.

President: We couldn't have done it without your strategy. No one else could have done it.

Kissinger: On SALT, we made no progress. And for him to say October is busy because he is seeing Giscard... We should move now to the Chinese. I could go there around the middle of October. We could announce after my trip. Announce your trip after mine. I would call Dobrynin in and lay it on the table. Ask him what their intention is. They held us off in '71 and we moved to China. We could do the same thing again.

President: We have the grain thing too.

Kissinger: Yes. I see Butz says he stopped the sales. Can't he just shut up?

President: It's my thought exactly. DOD should prepare a program to present to the Congress on the assumption there is no SALT agreement -- a five-year projection. I want it in writing in a week. Send it through OMB.

Kissinger: I don't think Brezhnev is so strong any more that he can do what he did at Vladivostok.

President: That is what Tito and Ceausescu said.

Kissinger: So if they just say, "Hang tough, it's just Kissinger," they are just making you the fall guy. Defense has to get out ahead, not go along grudgingly.

President: The Senate vote should have scared Defense.

Kissinger: The Democrats can't hurt you from the right. But if SALT blows up they can hurt you from the left, which is where they would then move.

All those guys talking about Helsinki; what frontiers have been recognized? All the frontiers but the German one were signed in '47-'48 -- with participation by a Democratic administration. West Germany agreed to the German one.

President: We had more overtures from East European countries than ever before, I think.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

President: Why did the East Europeans want CSCE? To keep the Soviet Union off their backs.

Kissinger: Of course. And whose frontiers have been violated? And by whom?

President: If we lost SALT, etc., shouldn't we make a speech saying the borders were approved by the Democrats, and the East Europeans wanted inviolability to protect against the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: How about a 15 minute report to the Nation Thursday?

President: That has some merit. Let's think about it.

Didn't Tito go farther than ever before?

Kissinger: I wanted to mention that. Tito is a bellweather of European politics. He obviously liked you -- he hasn't gone to the airport for years. His assessment has to be that you are dominant in world affairs.

[There was more discussion of Tito.]

President: Let's make sure we deliver on the military equipment for Tito.

I have no hesitancy speaking up for CSCE and the whole thing.

Kissinger: Everything on this trip went right. Not a thing wrong. The Brezhnev problem is not your doing; something is going on. But our SALT position is a disgrace. [Describes Backfire and cruise missiles.]

President: Give me what we have agreed, what is outstanding and what the issues are.

Kissinger: The Soviets don't know how to tackle the issues remaining. I don't either, but the Soviets have never come up with any idea to break a deadlock.

You have never seen Brezhnev the way he really was. Vladivostok was the last glimmer, but there he wanted an agreement.

President: On the international economic situation. Wilson, Giscard, Schmidt are concerned about their economic problems and the impact. I get the impression my economic advisors are too carried away with our program. I would like an EPB meeting to describe the European situation. Would you prepare a briefing paper on my talks, so I can explain, indicate my sympathy and desire for closer cooperation. If we recover and Europe's economies don't, we could be in big trouble.

Kissinger: I want to tell Dobrynin the Soviet oil isn't enough. It amounts to about 100,000 a day. The Iranian thing is set, but we don't know how to make it legal.

President: Give me a paper on it so I can see it in writing.

✓ P/K 4 Aug 75 (in Presidential <sup>Security</sup> file)

K This is a del. camp. Sabat accepts the line but wants it out of passes. It still leaves them a high ground. Here you must be ruthless or useless.

P You mean off the vests...

K No, only in the passes themselves. He accepts a north line but a few hundred yards on a curve.

South of a pass he accepts whatever line we can get him. He accepts a whole coast road provided we check points. But I am going to block off these 2 stretches as UN or something so a line is continuous.

Here is <sup>Rabin's actions</sup> ~~Rabin's actions~~. It makes it look like I-OS collusion, which will bring a E wild.

Sabat says he needs a token 2 km past a UN line. They want 2 stations in north. They will give them Uran Kishit if we supervise. They won't let I move south station but will US or UK.

In next round I will say <sup>E limits</sup> all stations US, and that they rejected all 6 stations. We will get 2 stations in Giddi under guise of checking access to Uran Kishit.

Be careful this negot is done unless Rabin is meeting us eye for a fall. Here is his letter. I think we should go back to him & say we won't pursue the matter further; that a E is briefing contradict what he says, & that I promised they would get out of a pass.

18-19  
27-28

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state Dep. on 3/10/04  
BY WJ, NARA DATE 5/24/04

(P) you promise now. to buy on assumption no salt  
5 yr project insuring in a week. Then  
OMB

I would propose leaving 18-19 and hope to  
wrap it up by 28-29. Couldn't have done it w/o  
you letter.

P Couldn't have done it w/o your strategy, we can else  
could have done it.

K Oa Salt. For ~~Buy~~ We would not pay. And for  
time to try Oa is busy cause he selling Caswell.  
We should travel now to Chinese. I could go  
around middle of Oct - we could announce  
my trip. Announce your trip after mine.

I would call Jerry in & say lay it on a table. Ask  
him what their intention is. They hold us off  
in 71 & we moved to China. We could do some-  
thing again.

P We have a grain thing too

K Yes. I see Burtz say he stopped table. Can't be  
just short up.

P My tht exactly. DoD should pay on prog (see above)

K I don't think Buy is so strong any more that he can  
do what we did at U.S.A.

P That what Tito & Gama said.

K So if they just say honey tough, its just it, they  
just making game fall guy. Def. has to  
get out ahead, not go along passively.

P The Soviet vote should have scared Def.

K The Demos can't hurt you from a world. But if  
Salt Haves by they can hurt you from left, where  
is where they would then move.

All these guys talking about Helsinki. What features

have been using. All frontiers into America are  
well served in 47-48 - w/ participation by Demo  
admin. US, Germany sep agreed to a American one.  
P US had more overtures for E Euro countries than  
ever before, I think.

K absolutely

P Why did E Euro want CSE - to keep CSU  
off their backs.

K Of course - whose frontiers had been violated?  
And by whom?

P If you had Salt, etc, shouldn't we make a speech  
saying a border was opened by Demo, +  
E Euro would immediately go to it against SC.

<sup>GATA</sup>  
X X (drop) K Has cabinet a firm view re to German Treaty?

P Has some merit. Let's think about it.  
Didn't Tito go further than ever before

R I don't want to mention that. Tito is a hell with  
E Euro politics. He obviously betrayed - he  
hasn't gone to any of the projects. His assessment  
leads to that you are dominant in world affairs.  
(this description Tito)

X X P Let's make sure we deliver one will begin  
for Tito.

I have no hesitation speaking up for CSE. The  
whole thing.

R Everything on this trip went right - not a thing  
wrong. Big job is not yet done, nothing is  
going on. But one Salt position is a legacy  
(Drouin's belief + cruise missiles)

X X P Give me what we have agreed, what is

M.H.L. Books

understanding + what's issues are.

K. The SD don't know how to tackle a series  
venues. I don't either, but a few have been  
~~considered~~ could say w/ any idea to help  
deadlock.

You have never seen Boy & crew he really was -  
Widows & last glimpse, but there he wanted an  
agreement.

P. Don't think you sit. Wilson, Oswald, Schmidt are  
concerned about their accounts & a major to  
get expression on my own advisors are to be carried  
away w/ our prog. I would like an EFB w/ a  
detailed E memo. Could you prepare briefing  
paper on my talks, so I can explain, include  
my agency & clear for clear exp. If we  
clear & E memo & memo don't, we could be in  
big trouble.

X 4

Revised  
with exp

K. ~~For~~ I want to tell Boy & Son oil isn't using. It  
costs about 100,000/day. The Iranian thing  
is set, but we don't know how to make it legal.

P. Give me a paper on it so I can see it in  
writing.