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Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
 Assistant to the President for National
 Security Affairs
 Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, July 22, 1975
 9:45 - 10:38 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
 The White House

SUBJECTS: Soviet grain; Mike visit; SALT; Middle East;
 CSCE

President: Hartmann says he wasn't asked a thing about Solzhenitsyn at Bohemian Grove. I think it is a Washington story.

Kissinger: Dobrynin told me they had already bough 10.2 million tons. On top of that they want another 10 million tons. I think we will pay for it; this is bigger than the previous deal, which was 17-18 million tons.

President: I told him we wanted to spread out anything over 10.

Kissinger: Dobrynin said this he saw as in the spirit of what you told him.

President: How can we do it?

Kissinger: Can't we dribble it out some way? Butz doesn't pay any attention--like so many others--to his orders, except in a legalistic way.

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President: It is a chicken-and-egg problem. I could go to Dobrynin and then to Butz and the grain traders. Or visa versa.

Kissinger: Let's do it that way. I will find out first from Butz what is technically possible.

President: Good.

Kissinger: Miki. We must entertain Mrs. Miki. I suggest we do it the same way as Mrs. Rabin.

President: I agree. Betty will be tired.

Kissinger: SALT. The working people agreed yesterday to a joint options paper, then Schlesinger forbade it. They also took a tough line -- pocketing the [Soviet concessions on] verification. There was no move on cruise missiles or Backfire. They didn't like the missile limit and wanted it based on throw weight, not volume. I think we have to have a VP and NSC meeting on Thursday or Friday morning at the latest.

President: I think we have to get something to talk about. There is no way to get more through Congress. I want in writing what, if there is no agreement, what they would propose in terms of money, weapon systems and capability.

Kissinger: He wants to reject a ban on land mobiles.

President: You can't sell land mobiles in the U.S. Tell him I want that paper.

Kissinger: Now to our problem child -- the Israelis.

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I must tell you I think the Israelis are out to defeat you. Last Saturday I asked where we would go if Egypt rejected their proposals. Look at the tone of this Allon reply to me. [He hands the President the Allon message]. They shoot down with insolence every idea I threw out. Yesterday they said Egypt was mobilizing

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so they had to take defensive measures. That's arrant nonsense. [There was discussion of the Egyptian counterproposal]. The Israelis will turn it down. I think all they want is to be able to say they moved and to prevent you from claiming they were intransigent. If so, I think we must coldly move to an overall settlement. Not angrily--just say it didn't work.

President: What is the next step?

Kissinger: I will call Dinitz in and say that the tone of the notes is unacceptable. That you are unhappy with their maneuvering on the Jordan deal. And then give them the Egyptian position. They'll turn it down, but they may come back with their fallback.

We are in trouble on Jordan. Case and Javits will probably let six batteries go through now and when the other eight are ready, give the Congress another crack at it.

President: How about Jordan?

Kissinger: It may rip it with Jordan.

President: I think you must be firm with them. Tell them they have got to settle and by a specific time.

Kissinger: Their timing is great. We are going away [to Helsinki]. In September is Rosh Hashanah and Ramadan. I think we must insist on a solution in August.

President: I agree. It has gone on too long. Let me reiterate on how we can counter. We offered three stations; they asked for nine. We are willing to put them where they do good.

Kissinger: I'm beginning to think that if this isn't settled in August, you go on TV saying you must defend American interests. We tried our best but couldn't get common strategy with Israel.

If you get an agreement, you will get 25% of Jewish vote. If not, they will go wild against you, but you will get other votes.

President: We have dragged things out long enough.

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Kissinger: I regret ever entertaining the six stations.

President: We agreed to the three stations, not those other six. Someone brought this in -- a Baltic World Conference.

Kissinger: There is this story that CSCE sanctifies the borders in East Europe. It doesn't sanctify anything that was not already sanctified, and it provides for peaceful change. We will get good press briefings.

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