THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET / NODIS / XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and

Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, July 9, 1975

10:02 - 10:40 a.m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office

The White House

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E.O. 12966 SEC. 3.6

DIAME LES 1/27/06

COS-28 410: OSD-123-10/23/1

MR 05-38 810, USD 2000 13

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<u>Kissinger:</u> I had Dobrynin in yesterday. He said if the harassing of the Soviet Union doesn't stop, the anti-U.S. forces in the Soviet Union will mount a major offensive against detente. He pointed out Schlesinger, the arrest of the spies....

<u>President:</u> We can and will take care of the FBI. I will talk to Schlesinger.

<u>Kissinger:</u> I think we have to have political things cleared through the NSC.

President: I agree. When is Schlesinger going to get that memo in?

Scowcroft: He just got back today.

<u>Kissinger:</u> Oil prices is another thing. We are moving along on the Iranian deal. If OPEC prices go up as estimated \$1 now and \$1 in January, we are in good shape.

President: How about the Saudis?

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ENTIMELION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DELLASS FIED ON Imp. to Det.

<u>Kissinger:</u> If we get to that point with the Saudis, we are in good shape. That is a problem we should want to have. Whether we give them the same deal or a different one is irrelevant. Of ir they make a deal with Europe.

Ted Kennedy says he really doesn't want to run. I believe him.

President: So do I. I still think it will be Humphrey.

Kissinger: We are okay on this Chile thing. There is a document which shows that I turned off contact with the group which was tied to the kidnapping.

President: If Nixon testifies, what will he say?

<u>Kissinger:</u> He is not entirely rational. He called me at Caneel Bay. It was vintage Nixon. [He described the records on Chile.]

I would like to go over the Israeli thing. De Borchgrave says we would be better going for an overall agreement. This thing looks like it is developing into something for which we will pay an exorbitant price. I don't think we can agree to shifts in the line to put the passes in a bag.

I also don't think we can concur to do nothing for 3-4 years without their agreement.

On the four American points, they can't be checkpoints, but just warning posts, with simple radar.

We also can't promise we won't push them on Syria. Informally we can agree to what you and Rabin discussed. If it blow up, we should not be bitter but just move to an overall.

If Rabin will agree not to bend the lines west, there is a chance. But there is still a problem with the south. If they acted with some generosity toward Sadat, they would have a real chance. For the Egyptians to have a road, with the Israelis on the heights looking down on them....

<u>President:</u> Make sure you tell them we will put our people into the warning station, so if we have to go public....

<u>Kissinger:</u> If it breaks down I would go on television and say it hasn't worked and we will go for an overall settlement. Don't describe it in detail then. I could the next day give a detailed briefing. Then four to six weeks later we can put out our plan.

I had Buckley and some conservative Congressmen in. There is some vicious briefing going on that we are getting soft on the Soviet Union.

I think we will have to give ground on cruise missiles and Backfire; they will have to give on verification.

I suggested to Dobrynin that you meet with Brezhnev twice at Helsinki, the first day and the last day. That is better than trying to drive to a conclusion in one meeting.

President: What about CSCE?

<u>Kissinger:</u> It is hung up on things that are out of our hands. The Finns are getting mad. It may have to be postponed until the end of August.

There was a demonstration in India against the USIS. The Indian police didn't intervene, and I want to make a stiff protest. Saxbe has been a great, tough Ambassador.

President: What about the Soviet wheat purchases?

<u>Kissinger:</u> They're buying some in Canada, but nothing we knew about here.

President: It's good. It's getting the farmers off my back.

<u>Kissinger:</u> We have gotten Venezuela to agree to our scheme for a consumer-producer conference. We are now in the driver's seat on the conference. The French are out of it and we have split OPEC by getting Iran, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia on board.

We have a UN Special Session in August. We will have to make another speech and we will have the usual interagency fight.

On Colonel Morgan, Arafat has condemned the kidnapping. The Lebanese think there is a good chance to get him released. I think we should agree only that after his release, we agree to carry their letter on VOA.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 018041

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Note
DESCRIPTION Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes for memcon
CREATION DATE 07/09/1975
VOLUME 4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031400589 COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations BOX NUMBER
DATE WITHDRAWN 06/01/2004 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG