

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, July 8, 1975  
10:15 - 10:55 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

**DECLASSIFIED**  
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**del NARA DATE 8/14/06**


The President: I asked Brent to get a DOD answer on the Laird article, signed by Schlesinger.

Kissinger: He may confirm it.

The President: Yes, but we have to know whose side he is on.

Kissinger: I wanted to talk at a quiet moment and this isn't it. You shouldn't have to police leaks. There are two major problem areas -- one is the White House Staff which is as undisciplined as I have seen. The other is in the Departments. Schlesinger and Simon are off on their own. They don't have their alternatives, but it just makes it look like you -- or usually I -- are not doing our own jobs just right. Kraft was impressed with you, but he met with others who talked again about the April speech and how you beat down my draft.

The President: That's right. Did you see Hartmann's statement of my candidacy this morning? It was changed 40 percent, and it is not a matter of who won or lost. I will lay down the law at the Cabinet meeting next week.



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Kissinger: I met with some Congressmen who just returned from the USSR. They were very supportive of detente and what we are doing. But they said the Laird article and Schlesinger statements are very damaging.

The President: I was so God damned mad when I read the Star article last night about the "unnamed Defense sources." I want Schlesinger to put it down in writing.

Kissinger: Let me show you the Dinitz proposal.

- The line in the south has been changed but it is still not satisfactory.
- The shift in the line north and south of the passes puts the passes in a bag.
- They want the Israelis to be left at Umm Khisheiba.

If they move the line west from what Egypt has already seen, I think it would be hopeless. How would it look to the Egyptian masses? What can Sadat say he got?

The President: I think we have to tell them we can't buy it. If they want to do it, that's it.

Kissinger: I am getting to the point of thinking it can't be done, that we tried and we have to move to a comprehensive proposal.

The President: I think we have to demonstrate we offered the four warning points, to show the American people we made an effort.

Kissinger: They will say they did everything we asked, got out of the passes, and it still didn't work.

I think you should go on television and lay out the situation. Don't blame Israel. Say we will give military support to Israel, but not enough to sustain them in this position.

The President: Did Dinitz ask about aid?



Kissinger: Yes. I mentioned at Caneal Bay that they could get under \$2 billion with a satisfactory settlement. I mentioned maybe \$1.7 billion. He said yesterday that was unsatisfactory.

The President: I was thinking in terms of \$1 billion.

Kissinger: If there is nothing, I would go with \$700 million.

The President: I would say it is unsatisfactory and they must do better.

Kissinger: I will see Rabin on Saturday in Germany.


On the CSCE trip, we could slip Miki to the 7th and 8th. We could meet Asad on the 4th of August and come home on the 5th. Another alternative would be to slip the Conference to August 28.

The President: I was planning to be at Vail between the 10th and 25th of August, so that would work fine.

Kissinger: On the Chinese, I met with Huang Chen. He was obviously under orders to be charming. I discussed the world view. He had no bilateral views to raise, but he had plenty to say about your visit. He called attention to the Teng statement and said it would be good for you to come regardless of the outcome. It reminded me of the Mao statement to Edgar Snow. They want a date for the visit.

The President: Fine. Have Brent work it out.

Kissinger: You know we have been talking with Cuba. We have a meeting tomorrow at the UN. We will have to lift our third country embargo anyway, but I would tell them we will do it after the San Jose meeting as a concession.



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