

*Scowcroft file*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Friday - June 13, 1975

PLACE: The Oval Office

SUBJECT: Rabin Visit; FRG-Brazil Nuclear Deal; Turkish Aid; Iranian Oil Deal

Kissinger: They are a bloody minded bunch. There could be some dispute about whether they said they would get out of the passes. There can be no dispute that we have been telling them for months that getting out of the passes was the sine qua non of an agreement. Of that there can be no doubt. [Rockefeller calls]

Kissinger: Then they raise duration and warning stations. We settled duration and I showed them Sadat's letter without saying he had brought it.

President: What was their reaction?

Kissinger: They slobbered. Then we gave them the warning stations. Last night I asked for precision about where they would be in the passes. He said they would be deep into the passes.


President: You tell him I understood they would have the eastern end and Egypt the western end.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NAC MEMO, 11/2/409, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Dev. cw 3/19/04  
BY ML, NARA, DATE 5/19/04

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)  
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

Kissinger: I am meeting him again at 5:00. If it turns out we get into another endless haggle...

On Syria, he said he would consider a unilateral move but he would never do it. Then there is the question of armaments and thinned-out zones -- again it was unsuccessful.

President: I thought last night we should start a specific proposal for an overall settlement.

Kissinger: We are well along on that. Let me meet with him and tell him that an interim arrangement won't work.

Scowcroft: [Described the Presidential statement.]

Kissinger: There just cannot be an Egyptian arrangement with nothing at all on Syria. We would be beaten to death and I think it would be better not even to go into it.

I don't think Sadat will accept each side being at the respective ends of the passes unless the positions are symmetrical. Much of this is pure Israeli domestic politics. He said publicly in February that he would give up the passes only for nonbelligerency; he can't wriggle off the hook now. I wanted just to have a line at the eastern end without defining it at the end of the pass -- so Sadat would say they are out of the pass and Israel would know they weren't, I didn't get that far.

President: Let's refine this, pass it to Sadat, and see his reaction. If it doesn't work, we will go to a comprehensive settlement.


Kissinger: That is probably the best. I think we should not spill too much blood for an interim settlement.

President: One argument is that it looks forthcoming if we put in the manned warning stations than if we go for an overall settlement.

Kissinger: They are almost irrational. It is 90 percent domestic politics.

President: Betty found Mrs. Rabin very demanding and aggressive.

Kissinger: Let's see where we are tonight. If they are close, you might think of making an American proposal, but not before we see Sadat's reaction.



You will see Max Fisher. They are constantly telling me they are getting to you. I say go ahead. They said a leading Jew told you that your place in history depends more on what you do for the Jews than for what you do for the Arabs.

I'll tell Max there has been some progress but there are still some issues on passes. Sadat has made some concessions.

President: Why not say I have ordered a comprehensive plan?

Kissinger: We have a problem on nuclear power and West Germany.

President: Yes. I raised the Soviet-German reactor with Brent.

Kissinger: There I would make an exception because it is power for Berlin, but absolutely insist on IAEA safeguards hereafter.

President: Okay.

Kissinger: We have another problem -- the German sale to Brazil. This is a real mess. We have leaked all over, we have a problem with Germany, and we have a problem with Brazil. And the Congress is upset. But we have absolutely no control over it and it tends to defeat efforts to get more suppliers' safeguards. I think we have to explain to the Congress what the situation is and what the dilemma is.

Then there is the Turkish embargo. The question is one of legislative tactics. Isn't it better to start in the House with the Senate Bill and fall back later, rather than begin with a compromise and be driven back to nothing?

President: I told you I spoke to Rosenthal. He is planning to come up with a compromise proposal, on his and the others' behalf.

Kissinger: That is the best way -- having it be their initiative.

On Greenspan and the Iranian oil deal: I would like to wait until Robinson returns, then the three of us will talk.

President: Fine. And only with Greenspan.



✓ P/K

13 June 75

K They are a bloody-minded bunch. There would be some objections about whether they said they would get out of the passes. There can be no objections that we have been telling them for months that getting out of the passes was a time given man of ~~disregard~~ of that there can be no doubt.

(Rouffé de curbs)

K ~~at 2:30~~ Then they raise duration & warning stations. We settle duration - I showed them Sabat letter w/o saying he had bought it.

P What was their reaction

K They shivered. Then we gave them warning stations. Last night I asked ~~for~~ for permission about when they would be in the passes. He said <sup>they</sup> would be deep in the passes.

P You tell him I understood they would have eastern end & E western end

K I wenty him again at 5:00. If it turns out we get into a rather endless haggling...

On Syria, he said he would consider a unilateral move but he would never do it. Then there is a question of armaments & technical art jobs - again it was unsuccessful

P That last night we should start a specific proposal for overall settlement.

K We are well along on that. Let me meet w/ him + tell him that interim arrangement won't work.

S (Described Pres statement)

K There just cannot be an E arrangement w/

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Rev. on 3/9/04

BY lv NARA DATE 5/19/04



nothing at all on Syria. We would be headed to death & I think it would be better not even to go in to it.

I don't think Salant will accept such <sup>high</sup> scale ~~of~~ ends of passes unless positions are symmetrical. Unworkable of this is pure domestic politics. He said in Feb he would give my passes only for non-belligerent countries except the Arab world. I wanted just to have a line at East end w/o dipping it at end of pass - so Salant could say they are out of pass & I would know they weren't. Didn't get that far.

P Let's refine this, pass it to Salant, see his reaction - if it doesn't work, we will go to congressional.

K Probably a bet. I think we should not spill too much blood for an interim settlement.

P One argument is it looks pathbreaking if we put one US manned warning stations than if we go for actual settlement.

K They are almost irrational. It is 90% domestic politics.

P Betty found Mr. Rubin very demanding and aggressive.

K Let's see where we are tonight. If they are close, you might think of making an own proposal, but not before we see Salant reaction.

You will see how Fisher. They are constantly telling me they are getting to you & say good deal. They said a leading Jew told you you plan in history depends more on what you do for Jews than for what you do for Arabs.

I'll tell you some things, tell some other  
things. Sadat has made some concessions.

P Why not say I have ordered a Congress plan

K We have a problem with the USSR & FRG.

P Yes, I advised the USSR - FRG matter w/ Beirut.

K There should make an exception because it is  
former for Beirut, but absolutely insist on IAEA  
safeguards hereafter.

P OK

K We have another part - FRG talk to Brazil. This  
is a real mess. We have talked all over, we  
have a problem w/ FRG, w/ Brazil, Congress is upset.  
But we have absolutely no control over it and  
it tends to defeat efforts to get some safeguards  
safeguards. I think we have to explain to  
Congress what the situation & dilemma is.

K Turkish embargo. Question is one of legislative  
tactics. Isn't it better to start in a House w/ the Senate bill  
and fall back later, rather than begin w/ a  
unanimous and be driven back to

~~nothing~~ nothing

P I told you I spoke to Rosenthal. He is planning  
to come up w/ a comprehensive proposal, on his  
& others behalf

K That's best way - having it be their initiative  
On Greenpan & a Iran oil deal. I would like  
to wait til Robertson returns, then a 5 of us will  
take

P Fair. And only Greenpan.