

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, April 25, 1975

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

The President: How is our recalcitrant Graham Martin doing?

Kissinger: He got down within 1,150, but then 180 more Americans came out of the woodwork.

The President: He is doing all right, but keep the pressure on him.

Kissinger: We will. We sent him a message after the NSC meeting to get down to 800 by Sunday. But we are better off having a few Americans with the Vietnamese on each flight.


[Rockefeller calls]

The President: Nelson said he had Percy, Javits, Case, etc. to dinner. Percy was eloquent; Javits said we have to guarantee Israel; Case said this is the year to go for a comprehensive agreement.

Kissinger: Case has really been very good. I think it is better to hit the Jewish Community between the eyes once hard and get it over with. Nahum Goldmann says the same as Case -- a confrontation with Israel and the Jews is unavoidable; there will be two-three months of demonstrations until they know we mean business and then they will go along.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By let, NARA, Date 1/24/00

We sent a message to the Soviets yesterday. [He described the note.] This has two purposes -- to elicit an answer from the North Vietnamese and to gain time. In the meantime the PRG has approached us in Paris to establish direct contact with us. It is now worth our while -- there is nothing left in Saigon to demoralize, and it gives the hope of a somewhat divided Indochina.

There was a report of a coup in Hanoi -- a struggle between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. We could emerge as a balancer in the area. I would propose we let our DCM approach the PRG.

The President: This is encouraging and interesting. If it developed, would we keep the Embassy there?

Kissinger: It is difficult to say. Within a year, Hanoi would probably try to absorb South Vietnam.

The President: I notice the different factions struggling in Cambodia.

Kissinger: Yes. We do have some possibilities in Indochina if we work it right.

On the NATO trip, you can't arrive on the 2nd. But you could arrive at 11:00, have talks, a lunch, see the Pope, have a reception, depart about 9:00 p.m.

Would Mrs. Ford come?

The President: She would like to. She feels badly that she couldn't go to the Far East.

Kissinger: We will work out a special program for her.

The President: Did you see the criticism of CSCE?

Kissinger: Yes, in the Post. It is popular for the soft line to be tough on the Soviet Union. The Jews do it also, because polarization helps them make the Arabs look like Soviet stooges. When we came in, all the Europeans and American press pushed us hard for a Conference, and we didn't care about it. There is nothing in it for us. I think you must



go if there is a Summit. Then go to Berlin. I would also recommend Warsaw, Bucharest and Belgrade.

The President: I agree on these.

Kissinger: The 3rd will be a hard day for Betty. She will come to the Pope.

On AHEPA, I would be very tough.

The President: I plan to be.

Kissinger: It was their tactics which delayed a settlement.

The President: And there is now trouble in Greece.


Kissinger: One result of Art Hartman's trip will be the Foreign Ministers' meeting between Greece and Turkey in May. I think you should meet with them early at the Summit. You can tell AHEPA that you will meet with the leaders of Greece and Turkey at NATO. Don't say the Foreign Ministers will be meeting though. That will be about 15 May. Even Makarios is moving -- he is willing to give Turkey 25 percent of the Island. Turkey is now at 38 percent. The Greeks probably will go to 28 percent and Turkey to 32 percent. If Congress will stay out of it, I think we can have a deal this summer.

We maybe could get a sense of the Senate for the waiver. Brademas said he might buy it if talks started. If we don't get something going by May, I think the Turks won't hold off any longer.

The President: Can I say this started under the previous government?

Kissinger: Which AHEPA supported. Also, every move which has been made has been a result of American influence.

On Pacific strategy, I am bringing a group of academicians in to look at our policy. Then we should send emissaries around to reassure the countries there. Maybe also establish joint commissions with Indonesia and the Philippines -- it gives continuing contact.



I think we should ease up on MAP for Indonesia and the Philippines. Use our equipment from Cambodia and Vietnam. I would drop India and go to Indonesia, the Philippines, maybe Thailand and Australia.

The President: Even to Whitlam.

Kissinger: At the ANZUS meeting, the Foreign Ministers agreed with reestablishment of a strong policy in the Far East. If you agree, I will begin laying the ground work for a visit.

The President: I notice Saxbe is behaving well.

Kissinger: He is one of our better appointments. India is behaving disgustingly. To rejoice at the defeat of "imperialists" in Vietnam. But actually they are quaking in their boots.

Fahmy has reported to me on his Moscow trip. I think the Soviets think we are setting a trip with the Israelis. They can't believe we can't control a little country like Israel. They are being skittish about Geneva -- they said they only wanted to use it for an interim step. We will have to concert carefully with Sadat. I would not tell Hussein how you are tilting -- just talk about the options.

The President: Let me mention a couple of things Schlesinger said. He wants us to support the Navy on Elk Hills. He brought up nuclear weapons deployments. I told him I wanted a paper to come through the NSC. I told him we were keeping everything as is until we get a paper.

He also complained about Brent going to Brown and not through him and Weyand coming to California without his knowing about it.

Kissinger: You can ask Clements, Brown or Ellsworth. He is just impossible to manage in the WSAG in a crisis.



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
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Bertrams Hummer note are up to date

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