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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, April 21, 1975
Evening

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

Kissinger: I said how can anyone vote against it. If it does some good, it will ease human suffering; if not it won't be spent.

It wasn't an unfriendly session, but basically it didn't make any difference what I said. They must know I was right, but.....

President: How do you analyze the Thieu speech?

Kissinger: The longest version I saw was reasonable. He said he warned me in '72 that leaving North Vietnamese troops in the South was dangerous. He said we said we would cut off aid if they didn't sign. Both of these are true, but to ask them to withdraw when the North had agreed not to reinforce or add equipment, would have been impossible. I don't think Congress would have stood for continued fighting under these conditions.

President: I will get a question on did we force him out.

Kissinger: Say no.

I would not get into details. I said a new government was not even formed. [Point out it happened in the evening and so nothing has happened since.]



~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp to Det

Henry A. Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guide-lines
By lit, NARA, Date 1/24/02

Why give aid? The most humane solution requires as controlled a condition as possible. That requires a government with control and some self-confidence. The change of government already indicates a new situation. We should assist in this.

We are exploring with several parties. I wouldn't want to say more in this sensitive situation.

We have reduced our numbers without panic. We are at the bare minimum now for essential functions, but we will continue to cut back as functions become superfluous.

We can't blame the Soviet Union. This is not contradiction. We are talking two different things. The Soviet Union and the Chinese have to know when they introduce arms into dangerous areas they must assume the consequences. They know they would be used for aggressive purposes. But if we had done our part, the parties would have been balanced and the GVN wouldn't have collapsed.

All our commitments are on the public record. It was always understood.

President Nixon's correspondence is perfectly normal and reflects his intentions as President. Where they involve national commitments, they must go to the Congress.


The Saudi bilateral: we are working on a long-term agreement on economic relations.

On the Middle East, we said each side would study the options, stay in the dialogue and try to coordinate our positions. We were disappointed with the lack of Israeli flexibility. When the negotiation was suspended, we faced a new situation where from being the mediator we are now only one of several countries, and we change from dealing with only two of them to dealing with all the parties.

The aid issue is not "do we want to pressure Israel?" but "do we want to underwrite a stalemate or force progress to peace?"

North Vietnam has said that Thieu was the obstacle to a negotiation. If so, his departure should help.....

DeGaulle turned his back on Algeria and was a hero.



P/K



21 Apr (Evening)

Monday
9:25 - 10:20 AM '68

75

2 said
RP How can anyone vote against it if it does some good, it will ease human suffering, if not it won't be spent.

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P How do you analyze their speech.

K Longest session I saw was reasonable. Said he would see in 12 NVN troops in South was dangerous. Said we would cut off aid if we didn't sign. Both times, but to ask them to do what they had agreed not to renounce or add equip. I don't think Cong could have stood for continued fighting under those conditions.

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K Say no.

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Why give aid?

~~That~~ The most humane solution requires controlled condition as possible. That requires a govt w/ control & some self conf. The change of govt already indicate a new sit. We should assist in this.

We are playing w/ several parties. I wouldn't want to say more in this session yet.

We have released amt's w/o prices. Can create base minimum now for essential functions, but we will continue to cut back on functions because of surplus.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

me 01-39, # 11; of the recd 7/30/01

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

By dal NARA, Date 7/25/01

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary
of State and Assistant to the
President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft,
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, April 21, 1975

PLACE:

The Oval Office

Kissinger: Vietnam will be off our backs in two weeks, and Congress will be on our backs to give aid to Communist Vietnam and we will be resisting.

The President: I am glad you feel that way. I see no reason to give money to Waldheim to keep the bleeding hearts off our backs.

Kissinger: The Americans are down to 2,000 now. We will be able to pull the remaining out because it takes two waves to do it. We have done it well. Had you led the charge for evacuation, we would have had chaos.

Schlesinger, after a lecture to me, agreed to send the batallion in if it's for reinforcement not for a signal.

I think we should reassert our aid request to the Congress.

The President: I agree. I don't think we will even get the \$200 million, though.

[There was a discussion of Portugal -- Scowcroft left the room for a minute.]

Kissinger: If we do something, it would be worse to do something and fail than to do nothing.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1 - 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

The President: Will the April election be a signal?

Kissinger: Maybe. It depends how honestly they count. The Communists control the counting and the media. The problem is not the Portuguese regime itself but its impact elsewhere and for us.

The President: [Reads a cable from Indonesia on impact of Vietnam.]

Maybe we should go there rather than to India.

Kissinger: That's not a bad idea. Although we don't even need the trip to China, unless you do. We can focus on that later.

The President: Will I have some talking points tonight on Indochina?

Kissinger: I talked to Thurmond and quieted him for the moment on Panama. He praised us on Vietnam.

I think on the Middle east, you can say it is not sufficiently flexible. An article in the New York Times says that first we have to restore arms deliveries and U.S. -Israeli relations and then they will consider next steps. That means a blank check.

The President: They can't get a blank check now from the Congress.

Kissinger: Certainly not without you.

[Reads Rabin interview.]

I want to tell Allon they have no right to go to our public.

The President: If they want to take us on with the American public, I am ready. I would read the interview back to Allon. Tell him I have read it.

Are Lew Wasserman's reports of talks with Allon accurate?

Kissinger: Yes. Allon is not too bright. Rabin is a doer, but he is on this wicket and leading the charge. He is trying the same thing he did on Rogers, but the situation is different.

[There was a discussion of Rogers' relations with the President.]

The last Secretary of State who really ran the Department was Acheson. Dulles just ignored it -- which I would have done. But I moved my NSC people over there because I thought State needed revitalization. Rusk was a good Secretary, but he didn't really run the Department.

The President: Rusk has been good since. He hasn't spoken out at all.

Kissinger: He has been very supportive. He and McNamara are fine men and have been really noble.

The President: I agree. After the election I have some ideas. He would be great at HEW.

Kissinger: He is great. On the World Bank, he will support us even when he disagrees -- like on loans for Chile, even though Britain is violently opposed.

The President: Betty would like to go to Europe with us. Is that okay?

Kissinger: No problem. She would have a difficult schedule and there isn't planned much socially. But Sadat then would bring Mrs. Sadat. You have to go to NATO first, then Spain, Sadat and a brief stop in Berlin. That also has the advantage of not having Sadat the last event. You can't go to Berlin first, because of the charge we are provoking NATO. You can go to Berlin, stay in Bonn overnight on the 24, and come back the afternoon of the third. You just can't be in Spain on Sunday.

The President: I have to be at West Point for commencement on the 4th.

Kissinger: I will come back so we can discuss the trip on the 24th-25th.

Sadat has now given up on essentially an interim agreement. Eilts gave him several options, but he is focussing now on a comprehensive deal.

The President: Have we announced Toon?

Kissinger: I may tell Allon today -- it will show we are serious.

The President: Should we be doing anything on the Turkish thing?

Kissinger: I will have a paper for you in a day or so. There are two moves we can make in the Aegean. We come out under a treaty where Italy gave back Dodecanese and the Aegean Islands under the Treaty of Lausanne. This maybe taken to be anti-Greek. Maybe you could meet in Brussels with Karamanlis and Demirel. They maybe could give up to you.

The French were in on Friday. They saw the PRG Ambassador and had a boiler plate answer back on Saturday.

I asked Dobrynin Saturday for a two-week ceasefire and we would cooperate in the kind of government necessary.

I worried about Martin being Chinese Gordon and causing a panic to prove he had been right. So we have to treat him with care. I am afraid Martin accelerated Thieu's departure.

Scowcroft: His talk with Thieu must have been provocative because of his quick action and blast at you.

Kissinger: Then we heard from Dobrynin yesterday. The batallion was designed to strengthen Moscow's hand with Hanoi. Brown thinks we need only one lift now.

Martin should be told that our judgment is as soon as the airport comes under fire, the DAO personnel at Ton Son Nhut should immediately be taken out by C-130, not by helicopters. But reduce the non-essential personnel as soon as possible. He should not delay a move at Ton Son Nhut until it is irretrievably closed.

21 April 75



ab

K UN will be off our back in 2 wks, and Congress will be on our backs to give aid to Ernst UN & we will be resisting.

P I glad you feel that way. I see no reason to give money to Waldheim to keep a bleeding heart off our back

K Arms are down to zero now. We will be able pull a remaining out cause it takes 2 ^{weeks to do it.} ~~months~~ We have done it well - had you led the charge for more, we would have had chaos. Schles after a lecture to me, agreed to send a ban - if for replacement not a signal. I think we should reassert our aid against a long.

P I agree. I don't think we will ever get 200 million.

(Discussion of Portugal - I left room for a minute)

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P Will a election be a signal.

K Maybe depends how honestly they count. The Ernst control a counting & a media. The prob is not a part require itself but what its impact elsewhere & for us.

P (Reads cable from Indrason on request of KAI). Maybe we should go there rather to Jordan not a bad idea. Altho we don't even need a trip to China.

K ~~same~~ unless you do. We can prove on that later.

P Will I have some T P for tonight on ~~the~~ ^{Indrason}

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY per ml 01-39 #11; 5/26/01

BY bb NLF, DATE 5/26/04



Get copy of TP for Allen

K I talked to Thurmond & promised him for a moment on Panama. He promised noon ON

T I think on ME you can say it not suff. feasible. Out in NY T says ^{it} we have to restrict arms delivery & US-T relations & then they will consider next steps. That means a blank check

P They can't get a blank check now from Cong.

K Certainly not w/o you.
(Reals Rabbin interview)

I want to tell Allen they have no right to get any public.

P If they want to take us ~~case~~ w/c own public, I would read a interview book to ^{Allen} ~~them~~. Tell him I have read it & haven't read it.

Are Wasserman's reports of talks w/ Allen accurate?

K Yes. Allen not too bright. Rabbin is a Jew, but he is on this cricket & leading a charge. He trying a something he did on Rogers but it is dif.
(Discussion of Rogers relations w/c Piro)

The last Secy who really ran a dept was Acheson.

Dulles just ruined it - which I could have done. But I moved my NSC people over there because I thought State needed reorganization. Rush was a good Secy, but he ~~wasn't~~ didn't really run a dept.

P Rush has been good since. He hasn't spoken out at all.

K He has been very supportive. He & Mc Namara are fine men & have been really able.

P Laguer, after election I have some ideas. He would be great at HEW.



Have books ready for NATO on 24-25.
Answer on I from ~~Europe~~ to State

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us even when he disagrees - like on loans for Chile,
^{even the} 1st is violently opposed.

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You have to go to NATO first, then Spain, Salaf
P shul up in Berlin. That also has advantage

of not having Sadat's last event. You can't go to
Berlin 1st, Council of Europe are are preparing NATO.

(Go to Berlin, stay in Bonn over night on 2nd +
come back on afternoon of 3rd), just can't be in Spanish
Country.

P I have to be at WP for commencement on 4th.

^{I will come back as}
K We can discuss trip on 24-25.

Salaf has now given up on essentially an interim
agreement. Fits your time several options, but
he ~~is~~ focusing now on comprehensive deal.

P Have we announced Iran.

K I may tell Allen today - it will show we know

P Should we be doing anything on Turkish thing?

K I will have a paper for you in a day or so. There

are 2 ways we can make in Aegean. We
can act under treaty where Turkey gave back

Dodecanese, + Aegean Islands under Treaty of

London. ~~On~~ This may be anti Greek. ^{taken to} Maybe

you could visit in Brussels w/ Hara + Amint

They might give up to you

~~Leadership Mtg~~ Cabinet Room

→ Kissinger / Schlesinger / Vietnam
30/45 minutes

→ Energy 30 minutes



K French were in on Friday. They ~~had~~ saw
RRC Orak ~~in~~ & had both plate covers
both on Sat.

2 ~~other~~ ^{other} Dely Sat for 2 with e+ & we would wrap
in a kind of part necessary.

I worried about Martin being Chinese Gordon & causing
panic. It proved to have been right. So we have to
test him w/ car. I fear Martin accelerated their
departure.

S It is talk w/ them must have been provocative
because of his quick action & blast at you.

K Then we heard from Dely yesterday. The bn was
designed to strengthen house border/Horri.

Brown thinks we need only 1 left now.

S The problem

From WSAE:

Martin - an independent is a son
or subject emerge under file, C DPO
personnel at TSN should remain be
taken out by e-150, ~~not~~ by helo.

But value non-essential As RP.

Do not ~~make~~ ^{make} a move at TSN
until it is instructively closed



Fr ⁴⁰ ~~initial~~ ^{initial}

We have ~~nothing~~
to do w/ - keep as
repaired

SV ~~that~~ more -

2 wtr @ F to save

during which we get
to go on.

