

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

SECRET/XGDS

MR 01-161 # 5: at depts. 12/11/01

By dal NARA, Date 2/20/02

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Vice President Rockefeller
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, April 18, 1975

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[To review with the Vice President the results of his trip to Taiwan to attend the funeral ceremonies for President Chiang Kai-shek.]

The Vice President: The people really loved Chiang Kai-shek.

The President: I talked to Jim. There will be no firing. If he [General Cushman] wants to retire early, okay, but no firing.

Secretary Kissinger: He will find a way.

The Vice President: The impressive thing about ROC is the strength of the son.

The President: Is he a good man?

The Vice President: He was very subdued and quiet. He said he would follow his father's footsteps. He would follow the democratic states always and would be anti-communist, and not play one communist off against another. They would continue their economic development and they needed no help from us except moral and spiritual. I said you were going to the PRC but there is no commitment or preconceived plans.

SECRET/XGDS



~~TOP SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

I was impressed with the Japanese contingent. They had 100 people there. They were impressive.

They understand the inevitable but hope to hold it off as long as possible.

That is surprising about the Japanese.

The President: This is the old group which had the relations. But with the Japanese, as long as you are in the leadership, it doesn't matter so much whether you are in the government.

The Vice President: There was not a Britisher or a European there -- after all the wartime association. But the Japanese were impressive. The American colony was very pleased that you sent me.

The President: Who went with you?

The Vice President: Madame Chennault -- she is a powerful woman. Barry [Goldwater], Hiram Fong.

I saw the Premier of South Korea there. I had a good talk, and raised the issue of domestic repression.

Secretary Kissinger: I want to look at your Talking Points. We shouldn't now be raising that sort of thing.

The Vice President: I did it carefully. But your State guy was pretty bad. But I put it gently, in terms of Attica. The Premier explained that they were infiltrating in the same way as Mao had. Zurhellen said that was nonsense. They are rooting these people out and they won't take any nonsense.

The President: Did he make any comments about Southeast Asia?

The Vice President: Not really. You had reassured him and I reassured him. They think they can take care of themselves.

Secretary Kissinger: Since they are worried about us, it is in their interest not to do anything to . . .

The President: We are not going to withdraw troops from Korea.



Secretary Kissinger: I don't think you should visibly withdraw from anywhere -- not even nuclear weapons.

The President: How about Thailand?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't have any choice there. Jim wants to withdraw B-52's. I don't think we should do anything while this is unraveling.

The President: Put a stop on it. We shouldn't do it casually, but after careful study.

The Vice President: I spoke to Lam, who didn't want to talk to me in front of the State Department fellow. He said if Thieu would step down they would negotiate.

Secretary Kissinger: We are facing a problem on Armed Services Committee vote.

[It was agreed the situation was hopeless and we should get a vote on the floor.]

Secretary Kissinger: We should drive it into people's minds that the Congress is responsible. Reston said we are trying to appeal to the silent majority. They are trying to show a contradiction between us and the Soviets. We can hold them responsible for what they have put in, because they knew it would be used for aggression, but the situation could even then have been handled if we hadn't reduced what we put in.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSECRET/SENSITIVEMEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENTFriday, April 18, 1975
9:00 a.m. (30 minutes)
The Oval OfficeFrom: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*I. PURPOSE

To review with the Vice President the results of his trip to Taiwan to represent you at the funeral ceremonies for President Chiang Kai-shek.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

- A. Background: The Vice President has just returned from Taiwan, where he represented you at the funeral service for President Chiang Kai-shek on April 16. The funeral ceremonies proceeded smoothly, and the Republic of China (ROC) greatly appreciated the Vice President's attendance.

The Vice President on April 17 met with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK), who is the late President Chiang's elder son and to whom President Chiang had transferred effective power over the last several years. The Vice President reaffirmed the value the U.S. attaches to its close ties with the ROC, without specifically mentioning the security commitment to Taiwan. The Vice President also affirmed that no agreements on commitments have been undertaken with respect to your forthcoming visit to the PRC.

CCK said he intended no change in basic ROC policy toward the U.S. or in other aspects of the ROC's foreign policy. Specifically, he said there would be no ROC attempt to

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By *lit*, NARA, Date *1/24/00*

play Moscow off against Peking. He also invited you and the Vice President to visit Taiwan at your convenience.

Senator Goldwater, who was also on the delegation to Taipei, publicly made known his views on China policy both enroute to and while in Taipei. The Senator criticized to reporters your initial decision to send the Secretary of Agriculture to head the U. S. delegation to President Chiang's funeral. At a press conference in Taipei, Goldwater said:

-- He had urged you to visit Taipei in conjunction with your visit to Peking this year, and was told that you liked the idea and would consider it.

-- Events have given you pause about visiting Peking, and you might postpone the visit.

-- He (Goldwater) thought that the initial contact with the PRC was a good idea, but not formal recognition. He sees no signs that the U. S. -PRC relationship will be expanded. He believes that Congress is going to be more attentive to the question of U. S. diplomatic recognition of the PRC.

-- On U. S. Asian policy generally, our policy in Southeast Asia basically has been correct, but we should and could have fought the Vietnam War to win. The U. S. will not, however, go back into South Vietnam under any circumstances. The return of Okinawa to Japan was a mistake. Peace in Asia depends primarily on U. S. willingness to keep its commitments.

The Vice President also met with South Korean Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil, and reassured him that the U. S. would stand by its security commitment to South Korea and would keep its forces there. The Vice President noted U. S. press criticism of President Park's handling of his internal political problems, and the Prime Minister explained Park's position on this.

B. Participants: The Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger.

C. Press Arrangements: The call will be announced routinely, and the press will be briefed following the meeting.



III. TALKING POINTS

1. I want to thank you for making this trip on such short notice.
2. I understand that ROC leaders greatly appreciated your presence.
3. I understand that you had a useful discussion with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, and that there were mutual reaffirmations of the desire for continued close ties between our two countries.
4. Did you in your conversations with ROC leaders perceive any apprehension of the future of Taiwan and in Taiwan's relations with the outside world now President Chiang is no longer on the scene?
5. Did you find any apprehensions about the ROC's future relationship with the U. S., particularly in view of my coming trip to Peking and in the light of recent developments in Indochina?
6. I appreciated your meeting with South Korean Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil, and your reassuring him that we would remain true to our security commitment and keep our forces there. What impressions did you gain from your discussion with him?



P/VP/R
18 Apr 75



VP. The people really loved Chicago
P I started to join. There will be no joining. After
we talk with early, OK, but no joining

X He will find a way

X

VP The impressive thing about ROC is a strength
for us

P Take a good one

VP Heron was subdued & quiet. Said he would
follow his father's footsteps. He would follow
a church, state always & would be center court,
not play a court off against another. They
would continue to be loyal & would do
needed no help from us except moral
support. I said you were going to PRC
but no intent or prearranged plans.

I was impressed w/ a Jap contingent -

They had 100 people there.

They were impressive. They understood &
inevitable but hope to hold it off as long as possible.

V That surprising about a Japs.

P This is a old gang, which had a relations. But a Japs,
as long as you in a leadership, doesn't matter
so much what you in a part.

VP Not a Britton or Frenchman there - after all
a wartime association. But a Japs were impressed.
I think a Gen Colby was very pleased you sent
me.

P who want us / you?

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AUTHORITY per ME 01-161 #5; State Ltr. 12/11/01

BY hh NLF, DATE 2/20/02



→ Cable on T.P. for S. Korea.
→ letter to P from ministers in Fed district.

VP Anne Chamberlain - she a powerful woman, Born,
Long, etc.

I gave Review of S. Korea. I had good talks, and
raised a few issues of domestic repression

K I want to look at your T.P. we shouldn't now
be raising that sort of thing

VP I did it carefully. But your State gov was
pretty bad. But I put it gently, in terms of advice.
The Perennials explained that they were infiltrating
in a same way as Mao had. Eisenhower
said that was nonsense. They are worthy good
people & they won't take any nonsense.

P Did he make any comments about SEA

VP Not really. You had reassured him & I re-assured
him. They ^{think they} can take care of themselves.

K Since they are worried about us, it is in their interest
not to do anything to

P We are not going to withdraw troops from Korea

K I don't think you should ~~or~~ ⁱⁿ withdraw from
anywhere - not even USSR.

P How about Thailand

K We don't have any choice there. Jim wants to withdraw
4-52's. I don't think we should do anything which
this resembles -

P Put a stop on it. We shouldn't do it casually,
but after careful study.

VP I spoke to Harmon, who didn't want to talk in
front State. He said if Thinn would step down
they would negotiate.



K We facing a prob. on SASC note.

(Decision & it was ~~complex~~ + we should
get a vote on a floor)

K We should drive it into people minds that
Cory is responsible. Keston said we trying to appeal
to a silent majority.

They are trying to show ~~responsibility~~ ^{contradicting} but no.

We can hold them ~~resp~~ ^{resp} for what they have put in
because this ~~has~~ ^{has} ~~will~~ ^{will} be used for ~~expression~~ ^{expression}
I don't ~~want~~ ^{want} to criticize them a site could

don't ~~have~~ ^{have} been ~~ruined~~ ^{ruined} if we hadn't
~~put~~ ^{put} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ what we put in.