



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 09-78, # 14

State Rev 7/19/01; CIA Rev 8/18/10

By dal NARA, Date 10/13/10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, March 24, 1975  
9:21 - 9:54 a.m.

PLACE: Oval Office

Kissinger: To sacrifice peace for half of the passes -- you told Allon the passes were now essential. At Vladivostok you could have sold Geneva for a good price. If they had said this wouldn't work earlier, we could have made other arrangements.

President: We told them that all along.

Kissinger: Sadat is willing to say in several different ways there will be no use of force. He agreed to renewal of the UN force.

President: I am afraid if this gets out, Sadat would be in trouble.

Kissinger: All of my party is outraged at the Israelis. They have decided that to trade territory for assurance, is disastrous.

President: I think the letter shows strength and initiative. I'm not afraid of the letter at all.

Kissinger: I think you should tell the leaders about the letter. Don't release a text, but explain it. The Israelis think they can use it against you.

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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.



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2.

[Dr. Kissinger then showed the President the chronology of how many times we had said that non-belligerency was impossible and the passes were essential.]

President: Your cables indicated that Rabin and Allon are okay.

Kissinger: I am no longer sure. Look at the record -- Allon was here in July. Rabin was here in September and you told him progress was essential. Our fatal mistake was all the equipment we gave them. We did it to strengthen Rabin's position and as a gesture of support and good will.

Allon came over twice and you told him. All this time Sadat has stuck with us. Faisal said he didn't agree with separate settlements. They argue they couldn't get non-belligerency. Sadat said he couldn't do non-belligerency with 180 kilometers of his territory still in Israeli hands. But he gave all the military components of non-belligerency: Cargoes through the Canal, relaxation on the boycott. They got 90% of what they asked. Israel made no serious effort. They kept haggling over details but they showed no serious purposes.

They never showed us a map so we never knew what they meant by the middle of the passes.

[More discussion.]

On oil, Israel agreed first to leave it an Egyptian enclave surrounded by Israel. Sadat said no because it would force his people to go through Israeli control.


The effect on our policy in the Middle East is devastating. The radicals are vindicated; Sadat is jeopardized. He will either go radical or be left. Either way, Israel will say "we told you so."

President: What should we do? I haven't thought it through.

Kissinger: They are sure they can outbest you militarily. But we should say: The F-15 team can't come. Peres shouldn't come. Every Department should put Israeli activities at the bottom of the list. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I would instruct Schlesinger to slow the LGB and Lance. [25]

President: How about an NSC meeting so I can tell everyone?

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3.

Kissinger: I am Jewish. How can I want this? I have never seen such cold-blooded playing with the American national interest. Every Arab was looking to us; we had moved the Soviet Union out of the Middle East; even Iraq was being moved. What they have done is destroy this.

President: What do they think they have gained?

Kissinger: It could be Rabin wanted to do this and couldn't get it through, but the treatment of this letter makes me wonder. They are leaking it so they want a confrontation. Why? Because they see this as a never-ending process -- Syria coming next -- so they would rather throw down the gauntlet now. They will play the Jackson game with the Soviet threat. If you don't give arms, you weaken an ally; if you give them arms, they get total freedom.

They think they can get from Congress what they want and by-pass you.

But I wouldn't take them on at the meeting. Everything gets right back to them. I could give a rundown without assessing the blame. If we put out facts, we are ahead. At the end, you should say the Middle East is heading towards an explosion and a risk of war and a confrontation, and you have under these circumstances to reassess our policy.

President: And I can mention the letter in this context.

Brent and I talked every day while you were there, and I have no hesitancy to bite the bullet.

Kissinger: This is terribly painful to me. First of all we have to go to Geneva. Second, we have to put forward a global plan, which will inevitably mean close to the '67 borders. Callaghan offered to make a joint effort on his own. Sadat will renew the UNEF only for three months. Asad will renew not at all or only in such a way that both of them expire at once. Sadat will open the Canal but will say it is too dangerous to transit. He will ask for resumption of Geneva. There we will face an immediate and massive problem. The PLO will be the first issue raised and Israel will try to tie us up for months. The Soviet Union will put forth the '67 borders. We can put out ideas about special zones, and so on, but there is no need to do that immediately.

President: We must do that?

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4.

Kissinger: We are stopped on the step-by-step. I think there is a high chance of a war before 1976. Israel would rather have a war before 1977.

President: Rabin wasn't as forthcoming?

Kissinger: They weren't forthcoming at all. They couldn't have been under any illusion as to what was needed. If they couldn't give it, they could have said so in October and we could have sold Geneva. If I could have told Sadat in November we couldn't do it because of Rabat, he wouldn't have been happy but he wouldn't have been made a fool.

President: Tomorrow I will open the meeting, turn it to you, then end up with this assessment.

Kissinger: I am truly sorry we couldn't spare you this. But the letter will help you with the Arabs. Fahmy broke down when he announced it.

President: How about your press?

Kissinger: They are in shock. 80% of them are Jewish and they are practically in tears. Marvin Kalb said, "Maybe Israel knows something we don't, but if they don't, it's awful." They have brought the Soviets back in, and could have given the American people a shot in the arm which would have helped them.


Rabin, when I talked to him alone, said it was a Greek tragedy. I said his proposals were not unreasonable, but they were disastrous.

You have been very kind to the Israelis; what I have done is beyond description. And they do this to us at a moment when we need this. It is a disaster for the United States. We had it won -- the Soviet Union was out of the Middle East. They are bringing the world to the edge of war for three kilometers in the Giddi and 8 kilometers in the Mitla. Sadat even would have given them six to eight months to move.

It is a really sad occasion. All of the people in my party are furious.

President: We won't let the Israelis through their usual apparatus get us into a confrontation with the Soviet Union, the Arabs and the Europeans.

Kissinger: I agree -- that is why we need a program near the '67 frontiers.

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5.

President: At the NSC we will put the emphasis on the reassessment and planning.

Kissinger: I would say you have ordered a reassessment and a cooling of relations with Israel -- which should be friendly, but correct. Each agency should, as if it were on its own, hold back --

(25)

Brent, have I exaggerated?

Scowcroft: You have bent over backward.

President: Did you ever get the feeling they wanted to settle?

Kissinger: I told Brent it didn't feel right. They just somehow didn't act like they wanted a deal.

President: The papers are talking about an American failure. I want to insure that the leadership has a correct impression.

Kissinger: I can say we went there in good faith and the two sides just couldn't bridge the gap. But that is not fair to Sadat. Sadat tried -- Eilts said he had given so much that it was dangerous.

President: A couple of other points. We had Brademas and that group in. They gave a lecture to us on principle. We were at loggerheads and Brent put out this idea: They wouldn't object to the Senate passage if then Turkey would offer concessions on troop withdrawals, Famagusta and something on territory. Then it would go through the House.

Kissinger: It can't work. No Turkish government could do that. Second, they won't agree to prior concessions. It will now be a package deal. Anything they give up they fear they won't have available for a final deal. And any concessions Turkey made, the Greeks wouldn't accept if they knew it would lift the embargo. Callaghan said that France wants to start a big arms program. It would never work. But if it got through the Senate, then maybe you could use a waiver and then get concessions.

President: Then there was a Schmidt phone call about Portugal.

Kissinger: I think Schmidt is wrong about telling a country how to compose its Cabinet. We are sending the Ambassador in in a general sense.

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6.

President: There are some encouraging signs. These four in the Revolutionary Council.

Kissinger: Soares had a rally today for 30,000. If we had mounted a campaign....

President: Should we do it now?

Kissinger: I would wait until the Cabinet thing sorts out, then if there is a chance, we should move.

President: Another cheery subject -- Vietnam.

Kissinger: It is not clear to me whether it's a collapse or it's an organized move.

Scowcroft: It started as the latter; it turned into the former.

Kissinger: We are responsible in large part. We cut them back to the point where they were clearly demoralized.

I think the American people don't realize. The Chinese -- how can they hold back on Taiwan if we are giving away everywhere else?

What the Israelis have done to us.... First on the trade acts, now on the Middle East. They knew exactly what was needed.

We should say all this is happening as a result of Congress. Faisal said you have let Cambodia go, Vietnam, Portugal, Turkey -- you will let Israel go also.


President: We went through another with the sub, but this turned out okay.

You have had your problems, but we have too.

Kissinger: You have behaved magnificently. The tragedy is that we had a good foreign policy. This is no reflection on you, but Israel doesn't think they have to be afraid of you.

President: They will find out.

END

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7.


Kissinger: [Brazil comments to Rogers.] I need to talk about the Latin American trip. I was supposed to go but is it a good time to be out of the country?

No one thought that the North Vietnamese would attack this year. They did it based on their assessment of American weakness. I think you should speak out on Vietnam.

The people will look back at the crisis created by eight lousy kilometers in a pass that nobody knows.

President: We made a massive effort I know of, on the invitation of the parties. I spoke to Allon, to Rabin, to Fisher, and to Golda. The sequence and timing was at the request of Israel. At the end, I will lay out the consequences. I should have a copy of the letter.

Kissinger: Step-by-step is dead. We have to consider whether we and the Soviet Union shouldn't make a global approach.

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2

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 010800

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum of Conversation  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Ford/Kissinger/Scowcroft  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . handwritten version of memcon #010799  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/24/1975  
VOLUME . . . . . 8 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . . 036600106  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEORANDA OF  
CONVERSATIONS  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 10  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . March 24, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 02/01/2000  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . LET

*declassified with portions  
exempted HR 4/23/07*

*MR 01-140 #2*

*based on MR 01-39 #8*

Get a copy of a letter to Robin -

JPK 23 Mar 75

Sunday?  
Check with Tall  
Max, 24 Mar 75 met  
w/Pas. 9:21-9:54 AM

K To sacrifice peace for half passes -  
you told them a pass was essential.  
At least you could have sold them for  
your price. If they had said this would not  
work (a pass) ~~was~~ earlier we could have  
made other arrangements.

P We told them that all along  
K Sadat wanting to say several diff ways no  
use of force. Agreed to removal of UN force.

P I fear if this gets out, Sadat could be in trouble.

K All my party is outraged at a Israeli.  
They have decided:  
Trust treaty for occupation is disastrous  
(letter) shows this.

P I think the letter shows strength & initiative  
K I think you should tell a bureau about a letter -  
don't release a text, but explain it. The I  
think they can use it against you

P I not afraid of a letter at all.


K (Should list of how many times we had said  
non-belligerent, pass essential.

P Your cables indicated Robin & Allan ok  
K I no longer sure. has to be read. Allan has  
in July. ~~at~~ Robin has in Sept & you  
told him pass essential. Our fatal mistake  
was all a giving us gave them. We did it  
to strengthen Robin position & as a gesture  
of support & good will.

Allan came over twice & you told him  
all this time Sadat has struck us down - Fossil  
& not I don't agree w/ separate  
Their arguments - they could not get down -  
telling

DECLASSIFIED with portions  
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6 exempted

MR01-14043  
based on MR01-3948  
RAC 919104 Date 7/19/01  
BY HR NARA DATE 4/23/07



# NSC Notes


Sadat said he could hit us/180 km of his territory  
But he gave all the vital components, Cargos, then  
Cannal, relocation on bay with. They got 900.  
I made no serious effort. They kept buying  
over details but no serious purpose.  
(Get out way) They ~~never~~ showed us a map  
→ we never knew what they meant by a  
middle of a passes.

(Time discussion)

On oil, I agreed to an E endane surrendered  
by I. Sadat said no ~~not~~ because it  
would force his peers to go than I ~~was~~ control.  
But he proposed UN control

The effect on our policy in ME is ~~substantial~~ <sup>disastrous</sup>.  
The radicals are indicated, Sadat jeopardized -  
will either go eastward or westward - either way  
I will say we told you so

P what should we do  
K ~~Amend the treaty~~  
They are sure they can outlast you militarily  
But: F-15 can continue  
Paris should come  
Every Dept should put I a trustee at  
bottom of list

-  <sup>they</sup>  
I would instead strike to ~~both~~ <sup>the</sup> of L & B & Home.  
P How about an NSC so I can tell every one  
K I am Jewish - How can I want this. I have  
never seen such cold blooded playing w/ a  
US with interest. Every Arab was looking  
to us - we had moved SD out of ME, even  
Iraq was being moved. What they have  
done is destroy this.



Get Nixon letter.

P What do they think they have gained


K It could be Rubin wanted to do this + couldn't get it then, but treatment of this letter makes one wonder. They are looking at it as they want a confrontation, why? Because they see this as an unending process - Syria next so they rather put down pariah now. They ~~will~~ will play a Jackson game w/c Southeast. If you don't give arms, you weaken ourselves, if you do, they ~~get~~ get fudged. They think they can get from Congo what they want + by pass you.

But I wouldn't take them on at a party. Everything gets right back to them. I could give a rundown w/o assessing blame. If we put out facts and an agenda. At end, you should say  $\Delta$ ME is heading to explosion + risk of war + confrontation + you have under those circumstances to assess ~~the~~ the point.

✓ And I can mention the letter in the context

✓ Hunt + I talked every day + I have no hesitancy to hit a bullet.

K This terribly painful to me - First part we have to get to Geneva, 2nd we have to put forward a global plan close to 67 leaders. Callaghan offered joint effort on his own. Sabat will renew only for 3 mos. Assad will renew not at all or only so both expire at once. Sabat will open Council but say it is dangerous to transit. He will ask for Geneva. There we will have united +



\* Every thing stopped from any forward since  
Nov 73

\* No contacts of any kind before NSC meeting  
massive prov. PLO is 1st + I will try to tie  
us up for mes. I will put forth a? books.  
We can put out special press, etc, but no need  
to do that anymore.

P are must do that?

K We are stopped on step by step. I think there  
high chance of war before 76. I rather have war  
before 77.

P Rabin wasn't as forthcoming?

K They weren't forthcoming at all. They couldn't  
have been under any illusion what was needed.  
If they couldn't give it, they could have said so  
in Oct & we could have sold America.

If I could have told Sadat in ~~Oct~~ Nov we couldn't  
do it because of Rabin, he ~~at~~ wouldn't have been  
happy but he wouldn't have been made a fool

P Tomorrow I will open, turn it & you, then  
end of this discussion.

K Sorry we couldn't spare you this. But a letter will  
help you w/c Arabs. Fakhri broke down when  
he announced it

P How about your press

K They are in shock. 80% are Jewish & they  
practically in tears. Lohr said maybe  
there's something ~~they~~ we don't but if they don't  
it's awful.

They have brought SC back in, given US  
people shot in a arm which would have  
helped them.

Rabin about said it was a Creek tragedy.  
I said his pupils were not unreasonable; they  
were desperate.



\* Clear every before sale & delivery in  
wff

You have been very kind to C.I.; what I have  
done is beyond description. And they do this  
to us at a moment when we need this. ~~But~~  
It is a disaster for US. We had it even  
the SO were out of C.M.E. They are bringing  
C. would to edge of canal for 3 km in India & 8  
km in India. Sadat even would give them  
six to 8 months to move.

It's a healthy succession. All my party is  
furious

\* We ~~would~~ would let C.I. then their best apparatus  
get us with cooperation of SO, Arabs, E. etc.

K. I agree - that why we need a prog near the  
67 frontiers

P. At NSC we will put emphasis on assessment  
& planning.

K. I would say you have checked a assessment  
& looking of relations w/I, formally, but correct.  
Each agency should, as in its own, hold back -

  
Brent, how I exaggerated?

S. You have bent over backward

P. Did you ever get a feeling they wanted to settle

K. I told Brent it didn't feel right. They just  
found how didn't act like they wanted a deal.

P. The papers talking a US failure, I want to insist  
that leadership has correct perspective.

K. I can say we went there in good faith & 2  
sides just couldn't bridge a gap - but that  
not fair to Sadat. Sadat tried - Eilat said he  
had given ~~to~~ so much it diverges.

P. A couple of other points, we had Brennan etc



in, they gave a lecture on principle. We were  
at loggerheads & Brent put out this idea.

They wouldn't object to Senate passage if  
then T would give concession on Trump of demands,  
Foreign aid, & something on territory. Then it would  
go thru House

K Can't work. In T govt, 2nd, they want eyes to  
prior concessions. It will now be a package  
deal. Anything they give up they fear they  
won't have market for final deal. And any  
concessions T made & Congress wouldn't accept of  
~~them~~ they know it would lift a embargo.  
Ballaghan said he want to start a big arms  
prog.

It would overwork. But if it got thru a Senate,  
then maybe you could use a waiver & then  
get concessions.

(More discussion)

P Then there was Schmidt phone call.

K I think Schmidt is wrong about telling a country  
how to organize its Cabinet. We sending Arab  
in in good sense.

P There are some encouraging signs. There of  
in a R.C.


K Soares had rally today for 2000. If we had  
mounted a campaign.

P Should we do it now?

K I would wait till a Cabinet thing gets out, then  
if there is a chance, we should move.

P Another chess subject - CN

K Not clear to me whether collapse & organized  
movement



On different session, can I do it or  
— doesn't have to be reported to Cong.

S started as latter; turned into former

K we are resp. in large part. We sent them back to  
point they demoralized.

I think Am. people don't realize. Chinese — how  
can they hold back on Taiwan if one going away  
everywhere else.

What — I have done to us . . .

(Back to I understanding what was needed)

It's on trade deal, now on ME.

W & should say all this is happening as result  
of Cong. Fiscal said you have let Cuba  
go, UK, Portugal, Turkey — you will let I go also.

P We want them another w/c subs, but this turned  
out OK.

H You have had your probs, but we have to  
you have behaved magnificently. The tragedy is  
that we had a good F.P. the reflection, but I <sup>don't</sup> ~~don't~~  
think they have to be a parcel of you.

P They will find out.

K (Brazil comments to Rogers). I need to talk about  
LA trip, supposed to go but it's a good time to be out  
of country.

No one that NOK would attack this year. They  
did it based on assessment of US weakness.

I think you should speak out on VNI.

K People will look back at a crisis created by & money  
here in a few nobody times.

(Talking paper for Pres.)



# Alan 2

Rabin

Fisher

Gallagher

A We made massive effort & from f, on  
mutation of part. The sequence &  
timing was at expense of I.

At end, David lay out a missequencing,  
I should have a copy of a letter.

K Step by step is good. We have to consider whether  
we & S V should not make a global approach.

