

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
 Mr. Max Fisher
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs
 Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
 Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
 President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, February 5, 1975
 12:00 Noon

SUBJECT: Mr. Fisher's Report on His Talks in Israel

Fisher: Let me give you a feeling for my visit. I met with Rabin, Peres, Allon, Rabinovitch and Dayan. (He will be a power again, I know). All of them have a great deal of confidence in Henry. [to Kissinger:] I know you get aggravated, but you should know that.

This feeling of urgency -- Rabin is committed to the step-by-step approach, but he was badly shaken by Percy's statement on the PLO. Something should be done about that.

Kissinger: They are stupid to make us keep reaffirming that. Our position is firm. To repeat it makes us look insecure. But I'll do it again.

Fisher: You don't have to convince me.

Kissinger: Percy was totally on his own. None of us even talked to him.

President: We didn't even know he was going.

Rumsfeld: This problem comes from Percy's comments to the Jewish group that the Administration supports him.

Fisher: There is no doubt in my mind about your policy. Rabin is still worried about Golda and Dayan in the background.



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 BY: [initials] . NARA DATE 5/13/04

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ XGDS (3)
 CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

He does feel that Egypt will keep its word. That is an important confidence factor.

If you would see Golda... I didn't. I told Dayan that in 1970 he asked me to convey a step-by-step proposal to you [Kissinger].

Kissinger: Three or four months ago he felt strongly that way. He is changing now that he is going back into politics.

Fisher: The issue is the quid pro quo. They desperately need time. I told them on the oil thing they should look for an assured supply from the U. S. They mentioned the Shah. If it is possible to break the economic boycott by having Egypt keep selling the oil to Israel after the return of the fields, that would be a big move. They feel this boycott badly.

On the issue of aid and the letter from Nixon, I told them that there is a much better chance to get it, with the present Congressional attitude, in the euphoria of a settlement. I expressed the the urgency to move. And they are shaken by the economic circumstances in the U. S.

Rabin is playing his cards close to the vest but he is okay. Peres is a tough nut to crack. He won't back Rabin. He said he would be willing to go all the way with Egypt if Israel could get what it wants. He won't oppose a move but he will put himself into a position where if it fails, he will look good.

Allon is fine.

Kissinger: Will Dayan oppose it?

Fisher: He wants to get back into power. But I told him this program was his idea in '70. I wish he was in the government.

Kissinger: He would be terrific in the Cabinet. He was before.

Fisher: The opposition is not too bad because the Sinai doesn't involve the religious problems.

Kissinger: I will see Dayan and Golda in Israel.

Fisher: They are very sensitive on several things: One is Percy; two is the need for continued aid.

President: There is no question that if there is no movement, selling aid to the Congress will be difficult if not impossible.



Kissinger: Dupont told me the first thing he wants is to cut Israeli aid in half.

Fisher: I think it is important that the arms promised be delivered on time. That confidence is important.

Kissinger: Everything has been.

Fisher: On Geneva, it is those out of government or those who want to gain time who are pushing it.

They have confidence in the President. They are reluctant to show their hand. I said both of you are friends, but that they better grab any opening.

President: You are convinced that all of them but Peres are convinced something has to be done and they are willing to move?

Fisher: Yes. They understand. They will be tough bargainers but they feel the U. S. is their friend.

President: Do you think they may just be trying to create a favorable attitude but then they won't move and say they tried?

Fisher: No. They are defensive. But the people are now more willing to follow Rabin.

Kissinger: That depends on what Dayan does. Golda I can get under control. I can strengthen Dayan too.

Fisher: With this, there is a feeling that Egypt has kept its word. I don't know what you can do with Dayan, but he is key.

Kissinger: I better see him before he gets set. If he were Prime Minister, we would be all set.

President: Is he in the Knesset?

Kissinger: Yes. But he is the leader of the Rafi, which is the right wing of the governing party. If it hadn't been for '73, he would have replaced Golda. He has great imagination and courage. But he's mercurial and wild -- like the others in their domestic politics. He said to me last fall that Israel had to do whatever was necessary in the Sinai to get Egypt off its back.

Fisher: They feel they made a mistake on the West Bank. Now they are hoping the situation will drop back toward Jordan. If you could see Dayan....

Kissinger: I will.

Fisher: The American Jewish community is more tense than the Israeli community. Henry needs to meet with the leaders after his trip. But the Israeli leaders know it is important; they have an economic problem....

Kissinger: Whatever you can do with the American Jewish leaders. If we go to Geneva, the first question we face will be the PLO. If we go to Geneva with a success behind us, the Arabs will look to us. If we go after a defeat, it will be a bear-baiting exercise.

Fisher: I am getting a group together to do what I can. Do the Egyptians show signs of willingness to move?

Kissinger: Yes. But the key is the facts that another settlement produces; That is the real progress. We can get some other details, but a fixed time will be difficult for Sadat to accept. I haven't sat down with Sadat. I have to ask him what is the best he can do.



P/Fisher/K/Rumsfeld

5 Feb 75

2

F Let me give you a feeling for my visit. I met W/Rabin, Pines, Allon, Rabinowitz + Dayan. (He will be a prime candidate for all of them have a lot of experience in K. I know you (K) get acquainted, but you should know that.

This feeling feeling of urgency - Rabin is urged to step by step, but he badly shaken by Pines statement on P.D. Security should be done about that.

K They stayed to make is keep mapping that. One position is firm. To repeat ourselves but insistence, but I'll do it again.

F You don't have to convince me.

K Pines was totally on his own. None of us were talked to him.

P We didn't know he was going.

R This job comes from Pines comments to Jewish groups that a line try to him.

F No doubt in my mind about your going. Rabin is still worried about Golda + Dayan in the background. He has felt that E will keep its usual work. That an important confidence factor.

If you could see Golda ... I didn't. I told Dayan that in 20 he asked me to ensure a step by step process to you (K).

K 3 or 4 weeks ago he felt strongly that way. He changing now to going back into positive.

F Issue is good. They desperately need time. I told them on an oil thing they should look for essential supply from US. They mentioned Shik. If it possible to heating oil supply cut by weaken.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/18/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 3/10/04

BY lbg NARA DATE 5/13/04

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having E has selling oil to I of the situation of
pills, that would be a big move. They feel this
very cut hardly.

O on a issue of oil or better for Iraq, I told
them that much better chance to get it w/ present
Comp attitude in exchange of a settlement.
I expressed a message to them & they are
shaken by some circum in US.

Kabin playing cards else to visit but he K.

Parents trying to visit & crack. He want back Kabin.
He said he willing to go all way w/ E if I could
get what it wants. He want go to a man but
he will put himself in a position where if it
fails, he will look good.

All is in fine.

K Will Dagan oppose it?

F He wants to get back into power. But I told him
this job was his idea in 70. I wish he was in
power.

K He would be terrific in cabinet.

F The opportunity not too bad because Syria doesn't
understand a relig problem.

They are very sensitive on several things

(1) Peace

(2) Continued aid.

P No question that if no movement, selling oil to
Iraq would be big if not impossible.

K Dagan told me a 1st thing he wants if I was
to let I sell in 1/2.

F I think it important that arms program be
abolished on time. That experts is important

K Everything has been



* K see Dayan & Golda in I.

F On Geneva, it is those out of govt or those who want to give time who pushing it.

They have conf. in P. They reluctant to show their hand. I said both are, but that they better speak any opening.

P Justice convinced that all but Peres committed suicide - they must be done & they worthy to receive

F Yes, they understand. They will be tough bargainers but they feel it is their point.

P Do you think they may just be trying to create favorable attitudes but then want more & say they will.

F No. They are depressive. But people are more willing to follow Rabin

K That depression what Dayan does. Golda I can get under control. I can strengthen Dayan too.

F O/this, there is a feeling that E kept its word. I don't know what you can w/ Dayan, but he is key.

K I better see him before he gets set. If he were Peres we'd be all set.

P Is he in Kuwait.

K (Described Rabin, etc.)

If hadn't been for 73, he would have replaced Golda. He has great imagination & courage, but necessary & world-like attitudes in domestic politics.

He would not feel that I had to do whatever necessary ^{in Sinai} to get E off its back

F They feel they made mistake on W Bank. Now they hoping sit will allow look toward Jordan. If you could see Dayan...

K I will.

F The US Jewish community is more tense than it.

K needs to meet w/ a leader after his trip -
But ~~the~~ I leader know it is important; things
have an even part →

K Whatever you can do w/ US Jewish leaders. If
we go to Geneva, c/1st question we face will be
P.O. If go to Geneva w/ success, Arabs will look to
us. If as/a defeat, it will be a bear-baiting
exercise.

F I getting a group together & do what I can. Do
c/E show signs of willingness?

K Yes. But the key is the facts that our other
settlement practices. That is real progress. We
can get some other details, but a first time
will be dip for Salat. I haven't set down
w/ Salat, I have to ask him what is best he
can do. I wish

