

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

MR 01-40 #1; At. Ltr. 2/13/02

By *del* NARA, Date 3/7/03

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
 Bipartisan Leadership
 Vice President Rockefeller
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President
 for National Security Affairs
 James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
 Gen. George Brown, Chairman, JCS
 Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
 to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, February 3, 1975
 7:30 - 8:45 a. m.

PLACE: The Family Dining Room
 The White House

President: The major subject is the budget, but there are some foreign policy issues I wanted to raise. All of you know my deep concern about Southeast Asia. You know I think the \$300 million supplemental is totally justified and if we don't get it I am worried about the consequences in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

I think in this crisis the Congress would be well advised to send a bipartisan joint committee to Southeast Asia to see for themselves. I hope the leadership would undertake such a mission and I would heartily endorse it. I will discuss this proposal with the leaders after the breakfast.

Jim [Schlesinger], can you fill us in?

Schlesinger: The situation in Cambodia is critical -- it's not that bad in Vietnam. We had been providing ammo at the budget request level until December. Congress cut it, and we will run out of ammo by the end of March, and Phnom Penh will fall. The ARVN has had to ration ammo; this has affected the casualties and the morale of the Regional and Popular Forces. Pacification has been set back. There is no immediate threat to the country,

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~~TOP SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

but there has been an erosion of morale and a threat to split the country. While there is no immediate threat, morale is sagging and each day makes it harder to recover.

No issue has been more dominated by cliches. Until the Tet offensive, the Administration's critics tended to be more right, but since then the critics have been very wrong.

Brown: The forces in Cambodia are fighting very valiantly. But they will be out of ammo this Spring and the country will fall. Remember, when the Communists took Hue they wiped out three levels of leaders.

In Vietnam, it is not so serious, but with ammo rationing the fighting and the initiative has passed to the North Vietnamese. That will encourage the North Vietnamese to try for a major victory. It is important that we provide enough help so that can't happen.

President: I feel very deeply about this and the necessity to move on my requests. With that I think the military situation can be changed from what was outlined by Secretary Schlesinger and General Brown.

This suggestion for a House-Senate committee to go there would help convince people of what the facts are and come back to report to the American people.

There is another acute problem. In two days there will be a cut-off of aid to Turkey unless I can certify that there has been substantial progress. Secretary Kissinger has been intimately involved since the Greek national guard tried to kill Makarios. Henry?

Kissinger: Before I start, I just want to add my strong endorsement of what Secretary Schlesinger and General Brown have said about Vietnam and Cambodia. Jettisoning these friends would represent another strong indication to the world of our inability in this country to conduct a unified foreign policy. I can't emphasize too much the crisis of our foreign policy.

The background of the Cyprus dispute is as the President has said, plus the fact that the Turkish Cypriots had been forced by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to lead a ghetto existence. I mention these aspects only to illustrate the complexity of the situation. We have not the painful situation of two NATO allies at loggerheads. We are working hard with both parties, but everyone knows a solution can come only through Turkish concessions.



At the request of the Greek government, we didn't push for negotiations before their elections and they asked that they not have to sign anything. We were working during that period on unilateral concessions or gestures by Turkey when Congress imposed its restrictions, and Turkey said they couldn't appear to be moving under Congressional pressure. That was the situation until the Greek elections [of November 17].

After the elections, Karamanlis indicated to us a package of concessions which would let him move rapidly toward a settlement. I communicated these to the Turks. But the Turkish Government had fallen and been replaced by a caretaker government which had only four total votes in Parliament. So they have to move carefully, because all the parties are in opposition and each would be happy to run on a platform of no concession to foreign pressure.

The threat of cut-offs has had disastrous effects. The Greeks don't want to move fast for fear they will be accused of supporting Turkish aid, and the Turks resist because of the implication that they were moving under pressure.

The first victim of an aid cut-off will be Karamanlis because Cyprus will be a running sore in Greek politics and give an issue to the Communists and Papandreou.

The second victim will be US-Turkish relations. Turkey is a loyal ally for decades, who among other things fought beside us in Korea -- which is hardly a vital Turkish interest. An aid cut-off will have the most serious impact in the context of NATO, the Middle East and the attitude toward the United States. The result will be a disaster -- and almost impossible to explain. At least Vietnam can be explained as the result of 10 years of national debate. The result could be a foreign policy collapse. How do you explain the cut-off of a loyal NATO ally under these circumstances?

President: I am as deeply concerned as Henry is of the net result where there is no benefit to anyone and we suffer a disaster.

Muskie: How much of what you have said can be made public?

Kissinger: Everything but the fact that Greece asked that there be no negotiations before their elections. I think we could get a settlement in six months, but not under the threat of pressure. A four-weeks reprieve won't do it because the implied threat gives a high incentive not to move.



It is my view that if we are left alone we can settle this in six months to one year on terms which will be worse than before the war for the Greek Cypriots but on terms which Karamanlis can accept. The problem is bringing Turkey to make concessions.

President: We looked at the concessions Turkey offered. They have withdrawn 1000 men. It was not enough for me to certify. They talked about Famagusta and Nicosia airport, but those were not enough for me to make a certification.

Kissinger: Our intelligence showed 40,000 Turkish troops on Cyprus. They didn't want to admit they were withdrawing troops so they said there were only 25,000 troops on Cyprus, and that number after the withdrawal of 1000. We can't certify that the airport and Famagusta are sufficient because Makarios can't accept publicly that these are adequate.

Burton: What is the level of conflict now in connection with the original reasons for the cut-off of aid? How can we negotiate if there is no Turkish Government with which to negotiate?


Kissinger: There is no level of violence at all. This issue is a matter of law and we are not trying to play games. Turkey is trying now to scrounge up other military equipment from elsewhere and, incidentally, is talking with Libya and Iraq about getting funds. Despite the fact that Turkey has only an interim government, it is possible to make progress with Turkey, but only an inch at a time.

President: The Turks have between 25-40,000 troops on Cyprus. The Greeks have no capability to fight on Cyprus. They could not support an adequate force in a conflict there.

Kissinger: Makarios' interest is in a deadlock so he can bring the Soviet Union in and internationalize the issue. That will make him a Greek as well as a Cypriot politician. Any Cyprus settlement is bound to cut his power and he knows that.

Schlesinger: Turkey is the classic foreign aid case of mutual benefit. They have a big military burden. They have military forces disproportionate to their size and resources and they give us valuable installations.

Vice President Rockefeller: Can Henry give us a talking paper on this which we can use?



Leadership Breakfast (1)

3 Feb 75

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P Major subject is budget, but there are some P issues I wanted to raise. All of you know my deep concern about S&A. You know I think - 300 mil totally justified if we don't get it & worried about consequences in SVII & Cambodia.

I think in this crisis C. Long would be well advised to send a bipartisan joint note to S&A to see for themselves. I hope a leadership would ~~do so~~ undertake such a mission & I would be happy to endorse it. I will discuss this proposal at a leaders optm breakfast.

Sch The situation in Cambodia is critical - not that bad in VN. We had been providing arms at a budget request level til Dec. ~~then~~ Long cut it, ~~but~~ we will amount of arms by end March & P would fall. The RCM has had to ration arms & the RIF/PF have had morale affected. ~~There~~ Perception has been cut back. There is no moral threat to country but erosion of morale

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AUTHORITY perml 01-40, #1, 5/21/02

BY W NLF, DATE 5/26/04

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& a threat to split a country, which no serious threat, morale is sagging & each day makes it harder to recover. No issue has been more dominated by Chinks. Ted Tett Admin critics would be more right but send them where they belong.

B. The forces in Cambodia are fighting very valiantly, but they will be out of arms this spring & a country will fall. Remember, when Croats ~~took~~ took Hve they wiped out 3 levels of leaders.

In VN, it not so serious, but eroding fighting & initiative has passed to North. That will encourage NVN to try for major victory. It important that we provide help so that can't happen.

P I feel very deeply about this & necessity to move on my reports. W/ that I think a real sit can be changed from that outlined by Sch & B.

The suggestion for a H-S visit to get there would help convince people of what a parts are & move back to respect to Cambodia.

GERALD R. FORD

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There is another ~~news~~ ^{death} prob. In 2 days they will be cutoff of aid to S unless I can catch subs. prog. K has been intensely emotional since a Greek with Communist tried to kill Makarios. K -

K Before I sent, just write to all strong endorsement to S + B. Particular their friends would add another indication to level of an inability in this country to understand unified F.D. I want emphasize to make a crisis of our F.D.

The background of Cyprus is not good, the fact that T cyprists were looking a glacial system. I mention only to show complexity fact. We have a set of NATO alliance by perheads. Everyone knows solution concerns only them in Cyprus.

at request of Greek Govt, we didn't push for negotiations before their election & they asked that they not have to resign

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anything. We worked on unilateral cession by Turkey they imposed its restrictions & T said they could not move under my pressure. That was set until back election.

After election, Kona, indicated a package which would let him move rapidly. I commended these to T, but that Govt fell & was replaced by caretaker. So they have to move carefully cause all parties are in opposition & each would be happy to run on platform of no cession to foreign pressure.

The threat of cutoffs has had chattering effect. Greeks don't want to move fast for fear they will be accused of siding T and T make house of moving under pressure.

The 1st motion will be Kona because Cyprus will be a running free & give issue to Cretos & Papandreu

The 2nd will be US Turk relations

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T is a loyal ally who fought with us in Korea - not ~~an~~ a central T interest, ~~has~~ what this will do in context of NATO, ME, + PRC attitude. The result will be a disaster - and almost impossible to explain. At least VN can be explained. This will lead to a FR collapse. How explain ~~antagonism~~ of a loyal NATO ally under this circumstances.

P. So deeply concerned as he is of what would happen not just nothing and suffer a disaster

Moskoe - How much of this can be made public

K. Everything but fact Greece asked no negotiation before decision. I think we could do it in 6 mos, but not under threat of pressure. If who want do it ~~have~~ threats give high incentive not to move.

At my view that if ~~diplomatic~~ we can settle this in 6 mos - 1 yr or terms

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which will be worse ~~for~~ for G Cyprus but on terms which Cera can accept. The prob is bringing T along to make concessions.

P. We looked at concessions T offered. They have w/ draw 1000 men. Not enough for us to verify. Talked about Forwarder + Nucsee accept, but that not enough.

K. Intel should 40000 T troops. They didn't want to admit they w/ drawing to find only 25000 + get there by w/ drawing 1000. We can't verify to accept + forward because Makarios can't accept publicly other on adequate

Dutton What's a level of moderation now? How can we negotiate if we T govt w/ which to negotiate.

K. There is no level of existence. It a matter of how there & we not trying to play games. T trying to scrounge up other vital equip (money from Italy + Gray). We can move w/ T but only

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can make at a time.

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byzans.

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That will make him a Greek as well
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reserves, they give us valuable installations

* VP Can K give us a talking paper
this will be used in use.

Turkey crucial in ME war

