

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

~~BY~~ dal NARA DATE 9/5/08

**PARTICIPANTS:** President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

**DATE AND TIME:** Thursday, January 30, 1975  
10:20 - 10:27 a. m.

**PLACE:** The Oval Office  
The White House

President: Milton Hoffman called me to say the Jewish leaders had told Allon and Dinitz that you and I were against Israel. Allon and Dinitz said it was not so, but that Rabbi Miller and others had said that was the case.

Kissinger: I saw a paper that the Jewish leaders -- Rabbi Miller -- were talking about when to lower the boom. And we have to get the military supply situation under control.

You saw the Sadat letter. Maybe I can do it in one trip, but we are safer this way. I think there is a 50% chance -- despite what Allon said -- that Israel is setting us up. If this is so, I think we must declare our independence from Israel.

[Letter of offer on LANCE/F-15]



President: What is it with Gromyko?

Kissinger: The Soviets are essentially shits. They are operating a spoiling operation.

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President: In my Chancellor interview, I thought I had to say the Soviets were playing a role.

Kissinger: That was fine. You are coming on very well with the public. As long as they say you are too aggressive.

President: The Republicans are with us on the energy.

Kissinger: On Portugal, there are rumors of a leftist coup. I think you should meet with the five leaders to talk about covert operations.

If foreign governments think the Congress will thwart every move we make, they will turn to the Congress and compound our problems. Chou En-lai, for example, will move to the Soviet Union if he thinks we are weak. You know what we are facing on Vietnam. We can't afford to lose.

On Cyprus, we may not have enough by February 5. If we cut off, it will be hard to start it up again.

President: Congress will go out for a couple of weeks. They will have to do something before then.

Kissinger: The Aegean issue is tough. The Greeks are thinking of going to ICJ. We will support that with the Turks. I could offer to meet with Bitsios and Esenbel on my trip, but that doesn't get us past February 5. The Greeks (Brademas, Sarbanes, Rosenthal) aren't being too tough but they need something to save face.

Let's defer a decision for now and see how the week comes out. I can meet with Humphrey, Brademas, and those people later this week.

President: Are they meeting twice this week?

Kissinger: Yes, but they are sunk in petty haggling on things like who will inspect customs at Nicosia. The Turkish Government is paralyzed. We could send Haig down to talk to the military.

Tomorrow we have an NSC meeting on SALT. There are no contentious issues now, but we will have to concede somewhere. We can't have SALT fail -- the Democrats would be happy to have detente fail. Harold Wilson is now trying to moderate between you and the Soviets. I think you should have your private meeting on the second day. On SALT, we just



shouldn't lock into any of these rules -- if you could indicate we must be flexible.

On Malmstrom, we were thinking about letting them inspect non-MIRV fields. We would lose 150 if we move Minuteman III in now. Losing 150 is the only issue.

President: What is the objection?

Kissinger: It is the principle of not having the Soviets dictate our deployment. It will work out by April.

The other issue is the cruise missile. Now suddenly the military think they need cruise missiles. Our compromise is that if the Soviets extend cruise missiles on bombers to 3000 kilometers, we would count them on everything else. You don't have to settle this one yet either -- just approve on the opening position.

President: Did we give Resor some guidance?

Kissinger: I am worried about the impact of the withdrawal of 40% of our nuclear weapons.

President: I agree.



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