

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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BY HR NARA DATE 9/4/07

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, January 10, 1975
9:30 - 10:08 a.m.

PLACE: Oval Office
White House

President: Burns is enthusiastic.


Kissinger: One has to despair about the moral attitude of the Europeans.

President: What now?

Kissinger: They will come along, but we will have to browbeat and cajole them. What is the difference between our plan and the Witteveen plan? The Witteveen plan gives the Arabs the chance to strangle us not only with oil but financially. Now a German paper says Europe will be strangled, not us, and since the Europeans are not worried, why should we?

We are heading in with Israel. I spoke to Dinitz Sunday. He said why not go to the Middle East? I said maybe I should. By Tuesday, Israel put out that I should go to the Middle East to get concessions from Sadat. Today Gwertzman has our whole plan laid out.

President: What do they gain?



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Kissinger: You and I may be unhappy about Rabat, but they aren't. Now they are relieved from facing a negotiation with Jordan and the PLO. Sadat is one step from blowing up.

We also have a Schlesinger problem. Technically he is the best Defense Secretary I have seen. But he lacks loyalty and there is something mentally wrong. He should not see the Jewish leaders -- he would pose as the last resort of the Israelis.

President: I will call Max Fisher.

Kissinger: I think we have to tell Allon that they have to get out of the passes and the oil fields, and we will get them the best terms we can. It makes no strategic difference. Since 1940, the side with the most desert has always lost.

You may pay a heavy price -- they may unleash the Jewish Community.

President: There was a good editorial on your statement.

Kissinger: The press has been pretty good. It helps the moderates -- because it gives them an argument against easing an embargo.

You need to say two things to Allon: One, that you can't talk with the Israeli Government any more because everything leaks. And two, that they have to give up the passes and the oil fields. We have two choices: Do this, or go for an overall.


They have done another thing -- they've asked for \$2.5 billion in 1976. I think we must say they won't get a thing until they move.

President: I agree 100%.

Kissinger: For another little gem, this is the Elliot Richardson statement. [He reads what Richardson wanted the White House to announce on his appointment as Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

One other thing -- Defense plans to deploy 50 Minuteman III at Malmstrom. I think we have to hold that up until we sort out this verification issue.

President: How much time is needed?



Kissinger: Until we have an NSC meeting. We can be ready in about two weeks.

I would like to put out an order from you that there is to be no briefing on the negotiations, and on weapons characteristics.

I am no longer certain we will get these negotiations. They can put up a million obstacles, and if they think there is no threat from the right, they may think you have no option.

President: But if Jackson gets killed on the Trade Bill, won't that happen?

Kissinger: No, because he is on the left of Vladivostok.

On PL-480, there is no way we can do it without eliminating Chile, or Indonesia, or cutting Korea. I would like to go to Humphrey and ask for 35% not 30. It is just a sense of the Congress resolution.

Scowcroft: I think it is in the bill.


Kissinger: If it is, we are in trouble.

President: What if we went to the higher level?

[Max Fisher calls]

Kissinger: We will check on the PL-480.

President: Also, the Agriculture assessment of availability was a problem last month. How does that stand?



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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

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