

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

BY dal NARA DATE 3/10/09

PARTICIPANTS:

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday - November 14, 1974
12:00 Noon

PLACE:

The Secretary's office
The State Department

Schlesinger: Rosenthal says he wants to be helpful and not destroy the American position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Can't we find something on Cyprus for Congress to recede? A withdrawal of some Turkish forces and a willingness to negotiate? Rosenthal will recede on the substance if he doesn't have to on procedure.

Kissinger: We can do that as soon as we get a Turkish base.

Schlesinger: Could we get a sovereign base for ourselves on Cyprus?

Kissinger: There would be massive screams from the Soviet Union. They have accused us of overthrowing Makarios to get a base. Let's keep it in mind.

Scowcroft: How about the Congress?

Schlesinger: Anything which seems to help Israel you can get.

Kissinger: Four lousy kilometers on the West Bank would have avoided Rabat. [There was some additional conversation about the Middle East]

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Schlesinger: Britain has been a shit. Hunt intimated that if we would help them in NATO they would be helpful on Diego. That was blackmail. They want to announce a 5000-man reduction in their NATO forces when MBFR permits. I think we should say we don't like reductions in Germany and in the Mediterranean.

How about Masirah? It is centrally placed.

Kissinger: Can we get it?

Schlesinger: The British get the use of it for Dhofar.

Kissinger: Let's talk to Oman about it at some point.

Schlesinger: We talked about moving the Enterprise to the Atlantic. It would give us more capability in the Mediterranean.

Kissinger: How about a flare-up in Vietnam? I would like a carrier within two days of the Tonkin Gulf. I don't mind the Enterprise being on the Egyptian coast if it doesn't get into the paper -- as a threat to the Arabs.

Schlesinger: We have 9 now, to enable us to keep three forward.

Kissinger: Really?

Schlesinger: There is a 50-mile prohibited zone along the North African coast.

Kissinger: I agree with the principle, but I don't want the Arabs to think we are harassing them. But I don't mind off Libya and Algeria.

Schlesinger: My trip to Germany was excellent. The SPD/CDU is ready to accept a reduction of our tactical nuclear weapons in Germany.

Kissinger: Once we get it into the public consciousness that we are willing to do it, we lose a lot of leverage with the Soviet Union.

Schlesinger: We have a letter of offer for the F-15 for Israel.

Scowcroft: That will be big news.



Kissinger: They must come across in the negotiation before they get anything else. The only way they will make concessions is to give them less than they need. If we give them a big credit we will get an oil embargo. We have three months to get an Egyptian dialogue. If we get one, it will take the pressure off. If we don't then Egypt will rejoin the other Arabs and we are in desperate shape.

Let's hear a few words about SALT.

Schlesinger: The President can't make a secret codicil restricting us to 200 less.

Kissinger: I think we can accept a differential for a while -- 'til the end of '83 -- as long as we could go up after that. I agree with your point three.

How do you feel about the airborne missile on the B-1?

Schlesinger: It's not the preferred way to go. It's the ALCM missile.

Kissinger: What is it?

Schlesinger: It is a long-range area weapon, as opposed to the SRAM. Its chief advantage is that it screws up their air defense problem.

Kissinger: Can you get accuracy with an airborne ICBM?

Schlesinger: Yes. But the problem is location. After we establish a space-borne navigation platform, we can -- though it will take 10 years. It's a waste of money to put a stand-off missile on the B-1.

Kissinger: Why do we need a penetrating bomber?

Schlesinger: Accuracy, use for our options, and it makes them spend money on air defense.

Kissinger: In a selective strike, wouldn't we use missiles? With bombers, wouldn't we have to have a massive air-defense suppression?

Schlesinger: It would pop up and launch a SRAM from a standoff position.



Kissinger: But you don't need the B-1 for that. Intellectually I have trouble with the B-1. Why does it have to penetrate? I would use missiles for a selective strike, and in a massive attack we would have leveled out their air defenses beforehand.

Schlesinger: Give me one minute on Iran. Where are we going?

Kissinger: The Shah is the one guy who has a strategic conception. He is with us on everything but oil and there he only wants money -- and he could put \$10 billion into the U. S. He would like to open the C-5 line for us.

Schlesinger: But he expects payments of \$12 million for any aircraft that anyone else buys.

Kissinger: I told him we were sympathetic on co-production and you would do it. He is also willing to refuel us in the event of a Middle East war.



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