

MEMORANDUM

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

BY del NARA DATE 11/6/08

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, November 10, 1974

PLACE: Camp David

SUBJECT: Vladivostok Summit with Brezhnev

[Secretary Kissinger read the Ash memo on food aid.]

Kissinger: I agree with it. But we will not get the credit for it. One of the real problems is the State of this country in the world. A President and Vice President hounded out, what we have been doing to ourselves.

Asad asked me: Why did we cut off aid to Turkey? He couldn't understand it.

President: The American people are wallowing.

Kissinger: I believe the country is moving to the right while the Congress is moving to the left.

President: I had lunch with Tom Braden, Charles Bartlett, Scotty Reston and one other. Did you see the Reston column today? I feel we must make strong decisions, whether they're supported by Congress or not.

Kissinger: The country needs you to assert national leadership. You won't get anywhere being a nice guy.

If you defend the national interest, with the Democrats fragmented, you can hold it together and win in '76.



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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
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The Vladivostok meeting is very important. You can't be too nice to him -- be tough and confident.

The liberals will scream foul when you attack; but when you don't, you won't get any kudos.

President: I think we must bite the bullet and let the chips fall where they may. If we are right, we will win some and lose some.

If the Congress doesn't keep up with us.... They have to be a partner now, and if they don't measure up....

Kissinger: We have to have a team, not a bunch of prima donnas.

President: I agree. Where do we start?

Kissinger: Let me start with mood. Brezhnev is very upset by some of the things which have happened. He thinks we are trying to make them look weak. I think we must show the three Senators the Gromyko letter [warning of a repudiation of MFN]. We had this for a year -- except for Brezhnev's personal assurance to you. This looks like a humiliation to them. And for what? They get \$300 million in credits in 2 years, when Schmidt gave them \$360 million at one crack. And even if they do it, they get MFN for only 18 months. They think we let them down on the corn deal because Butz led them on.

On the other hand, they are eager to have a good relationship with you. But they can't figure us out -- Rockefeller, my position, etc. They must ask themselves how many chips they can put in their pot.

In '72, I could kick them around because we were strong -- I could give or withhold a billion in credits and clobber North Vietnam. Now what can we do?

I asked to see Brezhnev alone Friday, and I said to him this will be the third meeting in Moscow this year. If it is a failure, Ford is not tied to detente -- I am. I can go home and say I tried and failed and my course doesn't work. He called a Politburo meeting the next day.

But we know it's a bluff.



While we have detente, the Democrats can't get together between the Jacksons and the Kennedys. If we fail, we will be back like '69 where the Democrats will push for unilateral concessions and they will follow. [He described the Soviet SALT proposal].

President: What about throw weight?

Kissinger: There are no limits on throw weight. But that is a fraud because we can build a bigger missile legally, under the agreement, and put them in the same silos.

Brezhnev asked for 180 SS-18's to be MIRVed.

I think we could manage the proposal by getting a disparity in our favor in MIRV'd missiles while they have a disparity in their favor in overall numbers, but by the date of 1 January 1984.

We would give them 180 SS-18's MIRVed and they won't count our missiles or bombers.

[He argued the futility of the B-1]

I think you can't let the Defense Budget be prepared on the basis of interservice bargaining.

To go the Schlesinger route on SALT is I think impossible. You would have to put SALT on ice for two or three years and go on a building program. I think if you are tough at Vladivostok and we give them my counterproposal, I think we can get a deal. It won't be a glorious deal. The danger is we won't be able to get from 2200 to 2400. But we would have that problem anyway.

The Soviets are already committed to their program. We aren't.

President: Can I see the counterproposal?

Kissinger: By Tuesday.

President: This would be for signing in June 1975?

Kissinger: Yes. You will get flak from the right and the left. The right will say they can build up their MIRVs; the left will say that it is no arms control agreement at all because it requires us to keep building. But you can say that they can otherwise MIRV everything, and this will put a cap on it.



President: I want to be fully briefed and up to speed on everything.

Kissinger: Yes. I need to tell you about Brezhnev also. At Vladivostok we could announce that we have agreed to reach an agreement by June based on equal aggregates and equal MIRVs. The JCS may just want equal aggregates, but then they could MIRV everything.

As a practical matter, the Soviet Union couldn't MIRV more than about 8-900 on ICBM.

It will be a bitch of a negotiation, because he hasn't focused on the fact that if any missile is tested as MIRV'd, all of them must be counted as MIRVed.

My impression is they want the SS-18 against China. I think we should ask for 12 Tridents so as to keep the production lines open.

For us to get to 2400 and keep within 1300 on MIRV's is tough, because all our systems are MIRV'd. But you can make an announcement. I would leave the heavies out of it for now.

Schlesinger will complain, but you can say that his way would take a heavy program for two to three years and we can't get the money for it. Schlesinger asked today for my support to keep a \$95 billion budget for '76.

We must project an image of brutal toughness. Your misfortune is that you are paying the price for Watergate.

President: We have to plan what is the vehicle to get the Turkish aid thing repealed. Better do this next week.

Kissinger: Brezhnev has made us a proposal of, in effect, an alliance. If either one of us were attacked by nuclear weapons, or one of our allies, the other would come to our aid. It is really directed against China.

President: What if Israel launched a nuclear attack on Syria?

Kissinger: Technically, neither are allies of ours. But it would drive all of them to become allies to get the protection. It is rather clever. Obviously it is unacceptable, but you may not want to kill it at Vladivostok.

I think we may have to break the French.



President: How?

Kissinger: We could have a frosty meeting with Giscard. Our most consistent opponents are the Europeans. Only the Germans are reasonably solid.

Last summer Giscard told us to work in energy in a small group. We did it, and they turned on us without warning.

If the French prevail on the consumer-producer deal, Europe will be dependent on Riyadh like they were dependent on us in the Marshall Plan.

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Kissinger: On visiting India, which they want you to do, we can wait. Basically we straightened out our relations. You should probably go out there next year at this time.

The problem is weapons for Pakistan. I laid some groundwork on my trip. It is not right that India has total domination of the subcontinent. But we can talk South Asia later.

You should meet the Shah. He is one of the world leaders, He wants the C-5. He is willing to get the production lines open.

President: Shouldn't we get that decision so we can get it in the '76 budget? I think this is important. It won't mean much to us in '76 -- \$100 million or so, because he would be opening the line.

Kissinger: Also in our joint commissions, he is willing to send people here to spend \$10 billion -- for nuclear reactors, agricultural machinery, fertilizer, etc. He wants Iran to have the standard of living of Europe by 1983.

President: Why shouldn't we meet in January or February?

Kissinger: Let me say about our energy strategy: You are being told we have to break the Shah to get oil prices down. Simon will recommend that you cut the Shah off unless he cuts OPEC prices by 50%. It won't work, and it's based on a misconception. The Saudis tell everyone that they would reduce prices if Iran would -- because they know Iran won't. Without Iran, the Saudis wouldn't do it because of the radicals. For us to break Iran is insane. He is politically one of our best allies. If Turkey goes radical, we will need him.



He agreed to a cut of 20-25%, with an index for inflation.

You should write him confirming this. We must hold our consumption down, get our own production up, get consumer and financial solidarity with Europe and then we can work on the prices.

My prediction is that within two or three years we will have an oil glut.

President: With him we would get a 15% cut and \$10 billion in capital investment. Let's meet with him.

Kissinger: With luck we can announce the \$10 billion by April. We do not have the horsepower to take on the producers until we get the consumers financially consolidated in an energy program.

If we confront the Shah now, the Europeans will pick up the pieces. And we need him if there is a Middle East war.

In the Middle East, the Israelis are the villains. If Sadat and Hussein had had something to carry into the Rabat summit, it wouldn't have come out that way. We could have calmed Asad if we could have given him assurance of a kilometer or two. The key is whether we can get a separate Egyptian-Israeli negotiation going. The only alternative would be a negotiation on the Golan, or with the PLO, and that would require real blood.

If we block the PLO for a year, the Arabs may turn back to Hussein.

But to move with Sadat, we need to try to give him a firmer commitment. You may have to bite the bullet and give him some arms. I wouldn't do it through Saudi Arabia because we would have another Watergate. There could be cash sales, with an understanding that he wouldn't buy Soviet arms.

I told Rabin I would not agree to any economic aid for them [Israel] unless they would move with Egypt.

Sadat agreed to have a separate negotiation in secret. Israel will send Allon here. Rabin is willing to go back only 28 kilometers in the center because of an electronic installation they have there which covers all Egyptian airfields. But it would be 50 kilometers on each side of this and 100 in the south to give them the oil fields.



President: How soon would they be willing to start a negotiation?

Kissinger: Allon would come here early in December with a proposal, which we would then convey to Sadat. We wouldn't conclude it before the Brezhnev visit but we'd have it wrapped up by 15 February. So we should have Allon here December 2 or 3.

If we can get a movement in the Sinai, we will have six to nine months. By then we will see whether the PLO will moderate or whether we can turn it back to Hussein.

The question is whether a nation of three million Jews can hold the security of the U.S. and the world in their hands.

President: That's right.

Kissinger: I may have to go out to the Middle East because the Israelis are such bastards. There's no other way to get it done.

President: Isn't it that the Israelis think they can control the U.S. through their lobbies?

Kissinger: The Arabs are irresponsible too. They lie, they cheat -- they are romantic children.

The Israelis assess that you aren't strong enough. They think they can put through the \$4 billion and you won't dare veto it. If Sadat says he can't accept the Israeli proposals, we will have brutal decisions to make.

We ought to get Fahmi in for at least 15 minutes next week.

We had bad luck in Turkey. Ecevit has lost his coalition. He can't form a minority government because he would get the credit for making a deal. The only loss of prestige for him has been the Congressional vote. That has set things back two months. The biggest problem we have in the world is questioning whether we can deliver.

You must say you will be a candidate in '76, even if you won't.

President: I will be.



Kissinger: The Turkish thing we can pick up whenever they get a government. With luck we will get the Egyptian thing; the SALT prospect is fair; with the PRC we have a normalization problem; with oil and the Shah, we will have a price collapse in two years.

President: How is the OAS veto coming? We will even catch some hell here for abstaining.

Kissinger: OAS/South Africa.

President: [Discussed the election.]

Kissinger: You should do what Truman did after '46.

President: I agree.

Kissinger: Your meeting with Brezhnev is important. You must be tough and decisive.

President: I would like a summary of where we stand on the main issues.



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