

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
and Defense, Pakistan
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, October 17, 1974
3:40 - 4:33 p. m.

PLACE: The Secretary's Office
The White House

Ahmed: I have a couple of ideas about India.

Kissinger: I don't have any great illusions about making progress with India. I am trying to take away the image of tilting towards Pakistan. That is not helpful to you.

Ahmed: One way to make her less dependent on the Soviet Union would be to point out they don't need all the weapons. Another would be better contacts with the PRC. We think the breakup of India is inevitable. India is basically ungovernable. It is too diverse, and we don't see the leadership--everything following Nehru family charisma. Were India to split into territories, Assam, Bengal, etcetera, it would be natural and more governable. It would then pay more attention to the demands of its people. It is the only way to get a durable peace in the area. Her economic needs rise from its economic difficulties. Your whiz kids should think this over.

Kissinger: I can just see this in the newspapers.


Ahmed: Think about it.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state rev: cw 2/10/04
BY lsh, NARA, DATE 5/6/04



Kissinger: You are describing a historical process, and we wouldn't land troops to keep India unified.

Ahmed: During the POW talks we used to get heated talks and then we would go into the next room for tea. I told a confidant of the Prime Minister that if they went on spending on the military, in 10 years they would be bankrupt. He said "not even 10 years."

Kissinger: I have no illusions. In 1962 when I was in India, Pakistan fell into the Indian trap by the Pakistani papers all denouncing me. India won't get anything from my trip which they don't have. I want to create at least the impression, if not the actuality, of a move away from the Soviet Union. We will set up some sort of commission.

I don't disagree with your appraisal--except that I think they'll have a military dictatorship first. They are trying to convey the impression of close US-Indian relations right now. I will talk to them about nuclear proliferation but I don't anticipate making much progress.



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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defense, Pakistan
Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States

President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, October 17, 1974
3:40 - 4:33 p. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

[The press was admitted briefly to take photographs.]

The President: Thank you for the letter from Prime Minister Bhutto. How long have you been here now?

Ahmed: Three weeks, two of which I was in the hospital.


The President: Was it serious?

Ahmed: It turned out to be malaria.

[The press was ushered out.]

Kissinger: They say that death is nature's way of telling your husband to slow down.

The President: I am pleased to welcome you here and to assure you of my desire to continue the good relationship we have between us and Pakistan.



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CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY: [signature], NARA, DATE 5/10/04

Ahmed: We are proud of this relationship. It is our only guarantee of survival as an independent state. We thought that India would want to leave us alone after having reduced us in size. We don't think India's designs have changed, basically. What we didn't count on was the Soviet Union. The breaking-up of Pakistan whetted the Soviet appetite. The Soviet modus operandi is to have us join the Asian Collective Security pact. They are becoming more insistent all the time and they raise it incessantly.

India is five times as strong as us, but the Soviet Union continues to supply them with military equipment. The Indian budget is the highest ever.

Kissinger: If we didn't know they were pacifists, we would be worried.

Ahmed: We know that India is not planning to invade China, so they must be for us. Now they are arming Afghanistan. Our information -- and the information the Chinese have -- is that the Soviet Union had a hand in the Daoud revolution. Daoud has now for the first time come out with a territorial demand against Pakistan. Before they had only propagandized, inciting the tribes. Now they have publicly said they don't regard the North West Territory or Baluchistan as part of Pakistan. They have finally come out into the open -- and only because of Soviet encouragement. Otherwise they wouldn't have done it.

The President: What kind of capability do they have?

Ahmed: They are no problem by themselves. But in concert with India and with the backing of the Soviet Union, they are dangerous.

So we are in a jam. There is a pincer against us -- India with sophisticated weapons and a defense budget of \$ 2 1/2 billion. We ask them why do they need it? Who is it against? India's Foreign Minister said we would have to discuss that. I told him their actions don't match their profession. The Soviet Union has its eye on the Persian Gulf -- Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Of these, Iraq, Afghanistan and India are in the Soviet pocket. Only Pakistan stands in their way. Also we are friendly with the PRC, which they don't like, and also with you.

We think the Soviet Union doesn't want the disintegration of Pakistan but only to bend our will to their policies. Over the past years I have had the honor to meet your predecessor two times and Dr. Kissinger four times.



Your government has been sympathetic. But I think you don't think the threat is as great as we do -- but we are on the firing line. It also has been tempting to think that political action would take care of the problem. Your predecessor, I believe, spoke to the Kremlin leaders about this. It doesn't seem to have been effective. In 1948 and 1949 you agreed to give us equipment. That was cut off in 1964-65, and there has been nothing since we cut it off.

The President: There has been some aid.

Ahmed: On a descending scale.

The President: Congress has had almost a 180-degree change of heart on aid -- the first vote I cast was \$7 billion for the Marshall Plan.

Ahmed: That served Europe.

The President: So I am as concerned as others that Congress doesn't seem to see the importance of these tools for us. We struggle to get what we have. It is very disturbing to me.

Ahmed: We find it so to our cost. For nine years we have been shut off. We can't even buy it from another country. The Chinese have been good to us but they have no sophisticated weapons, and tanks are no good without missiles. We are at the mercy of India militarily, and also of Afghanistan if it is supported by the Soviet Union.

The next war can come easily whenever the Soviet Union, India and Afghanistan want it -- and we would be wiped out. The next time Afghanistan won't stay neutral.

We bought some things from France, but they fleeced us -- they skinned us.

We are getting weaker and weaker and in greater and greater peril. Your predecessor and the Secretary of State said, "Be patient, wait for our elections, don't embarrass us," and on and on. We have been patient, but the Prime Minister wanted me to tell you we are desperate.

I told our Parliament that President Nixon said the independence and integrity of Pakistan are a cornerstone of United States policy. The opposition



said, "Tell us another one." No one believes in the reliability of the United States. We leave what we can do to your judgment.

The President: I am personally very sympathetic. I don't want to reiterate a story you have already heard, but we do have a problem. To get the boost in economic aid, we have to take a beating on military aid. We took a terrible beating on the restrictive amendments on the aid bill. Our question is how best to distribute it when the pile is smaller. And the elections may make Congress even more against aid. We will do the best we can. We will review the military grant and sales. We will do what we can in economic aid. We have given 100,000 tons of wheat. When the crops are in, we will see what more we can do. We stopped a Soviet grain sale which would have made things even more difficult. We will do the best we can.

Ahmed: I thank you for what you have said.

Kissinger: There is distinction to be made on military assistance. On grants there is no hope, but we will try to permit cash military sales. We did, however, help in 1971. We are exploring a change which would permit third country sales. We will pursue that in the new Congress.

I will be prepared to make a public statement about the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. I would be glad to do that, and it would be even more useful if I do it in Pakistan.

Ahmed: I advisedly said military assistance, not military aid, because I understand. Even sales will be of considerable assistance.


The President: We won't skin you on any sales.

Ahmed: You know of our economic situation. We thought we would have a good harvest and break even. Unfortunately, we had a shortfall of 1.1 million tons of wheat. It was a great surprise and a blow to us. We need a minimum of 100,000 tons of oil. We thought we would earn \$1.5 billion on exports. But the cotton market has crashed and we earn only \$1 billion now. So, subtract \$300 million for oil and there isn't much left. We have already bought 650,000 tons of wheat and 60,000 (?) tons of oil. The 100,000 of oil will cost us about \$150 million, out of about \$300 million left.



The President: We will do our best. We didn't have as good a crop as we hoped. It is down about 15 percent. As far as oil goes, we have a real problem, but our friends will get what we have available.






Ed?

Very sensitive.

Peter?

file up here

and dictatorship 1st They trying to economy
invasion of China US - better relations right
now. I would talk to them about nuclear
~~weapons~~ - proliferation but I don't
anticipate making much progress



P/Ahmed/K/Yaqub Khan

170 of

Transcribed by PWR
10/21/77

Press in

P The ropes for the boats better
P How many you have here

A 3 weeks, 2 of which down in hospital

P Swims?

A Terminal to be malaria

(Press out)

R Death witness room of taking you hooked to
floor down.

P Please

A We proud of this relationship. Our only guarantee
of revenue ~~as~~ budget state. We think that
India would have went to come as done after
having helped us in size. We don't think
Indian designs had changed, basically.
What we didn't want or was S.U. Backing of Pote
what had our appetite. Some months of bank is
to have us for a Asian pact. They are
becoming more resistant of a time & they realize
it unnecessarily.

India is 5 times as strong as us, but S.U.
continues to supply military equipment.
Indian budget is highest ever.

R If we didn't know they were paupers we would
be worried.

A We know India not planning to invade China,
so they must be for us. Now they are coming
Afghan. Our info - CIA - is that S.U. had
a bond in a Soviet revolution. Dorend has
now for a 1st time come out w/ a ~~written~~
demand against SOB. Before they had only
propagandized for creating a ~~tribe~~ - bond

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BY 16, NARA, DATE 5/16/04



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they have publicly said they don't regard NW
Trusty or Baluch as part of Pak. They have
finally come out into open - & only because of
Sov encouragement. Otherwise they wouldn't do.

P What kind of cooperation do they have

R In part by themselves, but in concert w/ India
& w/ backing of SU, they are dangerous.

S We are in a jam. A prison against us - India
w/ explicit arms & dep budget of 2 1/2 bil. We ask
them why, who is it against? Indian FM
said we would have to discuss that. I told him
their actions don't match their professions.

SU has eyes on Persian Gulf. Iraq, Iran, Afghan,
& Pak, India. Of these Iraq, Afghan & India are in
Sov pocket. Only Pak stands in their way. Also we
are friends of PRC, which they don't like - also
w/ you. We think SU doesn't want disintegration of
Pak but only to bend our will to their wishes.

Over a past years I have had honor to meet you
pres. 2 times, & K &. Your govt has been
sympathetic, but I think you don't think - that
is a great - but we are on firing line.

Also has been tendency to think political action could
take care of a part. Your pres. I believe spoke to
a Kachhar leader. Doesn't seem to have been effective.
In 48-49 you agreed to give weapons. That
was cut off in 64-65 & nothing since we cut off.

P There has been some aid.

A On a diminishing scale

P Corg has had about 180° change of heart on aid -
1st vote I cast was 7 bil for Marshall Plan

A A small sum.

P So I am concerned & others that Corg doesn't seem

to see a importance of that task for us. we struggle
to get what we have. It is disturbing to me.

Q We find it so to our cost. For 7 yrs we shut off. We
can't even buy it from another country. Chinese
have been good for us but they have no surplus.
expensive. Tanks - no good w/o missiles. We are at
mercy of India militarily - also Afghan if supported
by USSR.

The east was concerned early whenever USSR, India,
Afghan comes to it - & we would be wiped out. ~~Just~~
time Afghan won't stay neutral.

We bought some things from France, but they pleased -
they skinned us.

We are getting weaker & weaker & in geostrategic
period. Your job - Sec St. said be patient, wait
for elections, but in business no, & on & on.

Cell have been patient but if it would be to tell you we
disagree.

I told parliament N said independent interests of Pak
a cross current stone of US policy. The opposition will
tell us another one. We are behaving in a minority
for US. We learn what we can do to your judge.

Q I am personally very sympathetic. Don't want to restrict
what you have heard, but we do have a prob. to
get a treaty in our aid and we have to take a beating
on our aid. We take a terrible beating as an un-

assisted on aid bill. Our position is how best
to restrict it when ^{bill} it is so small. And
the election may make any even more against
aid. We will do best we can. We will
review our aid grant & sub. We will do what
we can in our aid. We have given 100000
for wheat. When crops in we will see what

were we can do. We stopped a few grain
and which would have made things even more diff.
We will do a best we can.

A Thank you for what you have said

K There is restriction on rail export. Our present there
is no hope but we will try to permit each rail sale.
We did, however, begin in 71. We are exploring a
change which would permit 3rd month sales. We
will pursue that in near Corp.

I will be prepared for public statement about independence
& territorial integrity of Pakistan. I be glad to do that
& would be even more so if in Feb.

A I obviously said rail export, not rail and human
I am understood. Even sales will be of considerable
assistance.

P We want ship you on any sales.

A Our own, we that we would have good harvest
& back sales. Unfortunately we had shortfall
of 1.1 mil tons of wheat. A great surprise & blow
to us. We had ~~minimum~~ minimum of 1,000,000 tons of oil.
We that we would even ^{to} 1.5 bil can X. But entire
market has crashed & we earn only 1 now.
Subtract 300 mil for oil & there isn't much left.
We have already bought 600,000 tons of wheat & 600,000^(?)
of oil. The 1,000,000 of oil will cost us about 150 mil,
out of about 300 mil left.

P We would dream best. We didn't know you had a crop.
Down about 15%. For oil we have a real profit,
but our friends will get what we had available.