

Scowcroft

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Richard M. Nixon
Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the UN
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. John Scali, U. S. Ambassador to the UN
Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft,
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Saturday - June 1, 1974
12:30 p. m. - 1:00 p. m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office
The White House



President: You're off on a trip?

Waldheim: Yes. I leave tonight.

President: I have followed closely what you have done on the Middle East matter. It's been difficult at times because of our Soviet friends. But we believe the UN has a useful and indispensable role to play in the Middle East. We count on you to get the forces in place. Dr. Kissinger will discuss this with you. In your discussions with Middle East leaders, they will want to discuss the details of what comes next. This was the most difficult negotiation I have seen in my life -- leaving Vietnam. Kissinger thinks maybe more so.

This is the beginning of a long journey. No one should assume we will solve it right away. We will continue as we have, with each playing a role -- the U. S. its special role. We need patience and perseverance. We trust no one will blow it up with some crazy action. If you would convey this to the leaders -- with my best wishes and desire for a peaceful settlement. Our role is not that of imposing a settlement but of mediating and bringing the people together. Secretary Kissinger will play the primary role. We also are going to the Soviet Union. Overriding Soviet-U. S. relations regarding the Middle East

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BY *lsh*

DATE 8/5/04

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is that whatever our differences in the Middle East -- this was proved in the UN -- it cannot draw us into conflict. To put it another way, I summarized publicly -- there will be no Middle East peace unless we are both for it. There can't be if the Soviet Union is actively against it. These countries are now looking more to the U.S. If the Soviet Union decided to torpedo the Middle East, it would be difficult. That is why our relations are so important. That is also why the U.S.-Chinese relations are so important.

Didn't Kissinger do a great job?

Waldheim: The whole UN is pleased.

Scali: It was, but you would have thought Gromyko did it.

Kissinger: That hurts them with the Arabs.

President: I don't want publicly to say we did it all to keep the Soviets out. Everybody knows it, but publicly we don't freeze them out.

Waldheim: Everybody knows. But it is important that tactically Dr. Kissinger gave the impression of Soviet participation. We must keep this great power cooperative. It is very important.

President: Our talks with Brezhnev are very frank and blunt, but friendly. We don't want to embarrass them. We want at least their reluctant acquiescence. Henry knows, I sent three reassuring messages to Brezhnev and told Dobrynin we don't want to go down the October road again -- that was too close.

Waldheim: We are interested in complementing what you and Kissinger are doing. It is not realistic to think that all problems can be solved in New York. Many complain about the Great Power role; I say they used to complain when the Great Powers weren't engaged. We must all work together, we with our role and you with yours. I appreciated Secretary Kissinger keeping me informed so I could dampen the criticism.

President: Ambassador Scali is in the Cabinet. We will keep you and him informed.

The important point is -- when the UN was formed there was a view among the naive that the UN could solve all the world's problems. It does solve many, and there are many unknown ones which could erupt into brush-fire wars. When the Great Powers' interests are involved it is hard for the UN to take over a dispute. But anytime the UN can handle a problem, we welcome it.

Kissinger: We are in closest touch with the Secretary-General. We kept him informed. We believe in the closest cooperation.

Waldheim: I couldn't agree more. There are so many problems that we need cooperation, and without American cooperation, we won't have a chance.

President: What matters is what works -- if it is right. Anything which works to avoid confrontations we should try.

Waldheim: Yes. I try to tell my people that. Success is what counts.

Let me raise the matter of assistance to developing countries. There was an unfortunate incident at the Special Session. Your proposal arrived the last day. I would be gratified if we could count on your support. The North-South confrontation will be the big future problem. I am most unhappy about what happened in the General Assembly.

It is the steamrolling of things which can't work because the countries that have to implement it don't support it. It is better to be more moderate and get something through. But some of these people have a different way of thinking. The U. S. can help if it cooperates -- wether multi or bilaterally.

Scali: The Secretary-General is aware that bilateral aid counts as much as multilateral aid.

President: We need both. We are urging the Japanese to do more. They may prefer bilaterally. We use both. In some cases bilateral is better -- it is preferred by the recipient and by Congress sometimes.

Waldheim: I appreciate this. Our role is a coordinating one. In the Sahel we did this. The wheat said "sent by the U. S.," which is fine, but we have to coordinate the distribution. This is our important role.

Are you going to the Middle East?

President: I am considering it. We will let you know.

Waldheim: I am happy that Kissinger succeeded. It makes my job easier.

Pres/Waldheim/K/Senthi

June 12 30-1300



P Offer a tip

W Yes I leave tonight

P I have followed closely what you have done on ME matter. ~~Been~~ diff at times because of few points. UK has respected & understandable role to play in ME. Count on you to get a factor in place - K will discuss w/ you. In your discussion w/ ME leaders - they will want to discuss details of what could next - this was most diff negotiator in my long life - having VN: K think enough more to

K Should in part of Song Gen - consistent

P This is beginning of long journey. As we should assume we will have set up army. We will continue as we have w/ each playing a role - a US to special role - we need patience & perseverance. We trust we ~~are~~ one will blow it up w/ some crazy action. If you would encourage this to a leader - w/ my best wishes & for peaceful settlement. Our role is not that of imposing a settlement but of mediating & bringing people together. K will play primary role. We also going to S-U. Obviously S-U-US relations regarding ME is that whatever our chf. in ME - ~~problem~~ UK - it cannot draw us into conflict. Put another way, I announced publicly - there will be no ME peace probes and for it & if SU actively against it.

Doesn't mean they are for it. These countries
now looking more to US. If SU decided to
together NE, it would be big. That why
our relations so important. That also why
US PRC relation so important
Didn't K do great job?

W The whole UN is pleased
Scah: It was, but you would have thought
Gomph did it

K That hurts them w/ Arabs

P Don't want publicly to say we did it all &
SU out - everybody knows - but publicly
out don't force them out

W Everybody knows. But important that
tactically K good impression of SU participation.
We must help this great power coop. It is
very important

P Our talks are very frank + blunt (Bey) but
friendly. We don't want to embarrass them -
we won't let him think about a government.

start
G & K know, I sent 3 reassuring msg to
Bey + told Dohy + we don't want to let down
O & end again - that to else

W We interested in complementing what you &
K doing. Not wish to think all prob
can be solved in UN. Many complain
about G P why I say you they need to
complain G's aren't engaged - we must
all work together, we w/ our eyes + you
w/ yours. I appreciate K keeping me
informed + I could danger certain

P Scah in cabinet. We will keep you
+ him informed.

P Important point is - when UN found a ~~way~~
way among nations - it thought UN could
take all world jobs. It does a ~~lot~~ many &
way unknown ones which could break into
break fire arms. When G.P. ~~is~~ is ~~more~~ contracts
are involved it hard for UN to take on contracts
But anytime UN can handle a job, we
welcome it.

K Was one in chest tank w/ Sag bar. We
bought him equipment. Christ Corp.

W Couldn't spell more. So many parts that
we need exp & w/o OS exp we won't
have a chance

P What matters is what works - if it is right.
Anything which works to avoid computations we
should try

W Yes. I try to tell my people that Success is
what counts.

Assistance to developing states - unfortunate
since that is special session. Your proposal
arrived that day. Would be grateful if we
could count on your suggest. 4-5 computations
will be big future jobs.

I must rejoice about what happened in G.A.
It is stressability of things which can't work
work because implementing countries don't
support. Better to be more workable &
get something done. But some of these
people have diff way of thinking. OS can
help w/ it exp - either must be intensely

Scale S.G. is more technical and counts as much
as units.

P We need both. We are using jobs - they may

paper submitted - we use both. In some
cases submitted better - prepared by Department
& Congress sometimes.

W B I appreciate this. One who is a coordinating
one. In Sahel we did this - what said
"funds" which fine, but we heard to
avoid a duplication

Are you going to ME?

I'm considering it. Will let you know

1300 W Happy K¹ forwarded. What's my job now

