

Scowcroft
(original given to Ed
for RN's D file)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Richard Nixon
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, May 28, 1974
12:45 p. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

Dobrynin: I just got a personal note from Brezhnev. [He reads:]

"The time of your visit is coming closer. We will exchange ideas. As it approaches, time may not permit much unless we begin preparations. Our meetings promise to be impressive. We will be able to reach agreement on ABM, a threshold test ban, long-term economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, energy, construction and artificial heart. We continue to proceed from the possibility of progress on other problems where our discussions have not reached the point of drafting but we expect to reach agreement. In human terms, I want to express some thoughts I have. We attentively follow events in the United States. Much of what is happening is not understandable to us, but it is clear that the forces which are up in arms against the President are not friendly and also these are matters which affect not only internal politics but also foreign policy as well. Foreign policy is the toughest issue for opponents to attack for those who want to undermine the important things in the US-Soviet agreement and the other things you and I have agreed upon."

"The best testimony that our joint course is correct is that detente is close to the hearts of the Soviet and American people. My colleagues and I do not identify the opponents with the majority of the American people. You, even with your domestic problems, are busy with foreign policy, including US-Soviet relations. That is the course for a statesman. Tenacity and firm spirit are needed, and these the President has. There are those who may think you may give way but we note with satisfaction that you will not give them such a pleasure."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

SECRET/XGDS

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINE, State Review 3/9/04
BY lan NARA DATE 8/5/04

"We are telling you this personally from the good relations enjoyed between us and believing in the success of our forthcoming meeting. Meanwhile we are looking forward to your visit and the visit of Dr. Kissinger."

President: I don't want you to think that domestic politics will affect my trip or our relations. Mansfield agrees. Jackson is just playing 1976 politics. The important thing is not my problems -- they will pass -- but the legacy of peace that we will leave. Brezhnev and I came up the hard way. Both of us believe deeply in our own systems, and we bargain hard. But we see overriding our interests in peace. We must overcome our domestic problems. Tell Brezhnev not to worry about me and my health.

As you know, Kissinger's visit has been delayed. I hope he settles it so we don't have to talk about it -- just the general area of the Middle East.

As I told your Parliamentarians, the idea the U.S. is playing a role to force out the Soviet Union is baloney. As you know, right now we are the only ones who can handle the Israelis. As I told a group the other day, only the U.S. and the Soviet Union can resolve the big issues of peace in the world. We won't always agree, but we must have close contact. As for the Kissinger trip, I hope we can meet with you first to iron things out to see if a trip is required.

Dobrynin: Kissinger and I are having lunch on Thursday.

President: The main problem is MIRV. It's tough for you and for our military.

Dobrynin: When Kissinger was with Brezhnev last time, Brezhnev was very outspoken on the situation.

President: As you know, I may visit the Middle East. It depends on the negotiation. The main point is we must announce the Soviet trip before my Middle East trip. Since I have to be here in July, I probably would have to go in June or postpone it to November. The Soviet trip comes first. A Middle East trip doesn't take preparation.

Dobrynin: It will be good that the Soviet trip will be announced first.

President: Yes, let's try to do it Thursday or Friday. I understand Brezhnev will go to the Middle East. That is good. We both must play a role in the Middle East. We don't want to push you out at all. The Middle East requires the participation of us both.



I told Boumediene the Soviet Union has a relationship there and so do we. We may compete at times, but we cannot try to push each other out. There are differences, yes, but in final analysis we must be able to get a common interest which overrides these differences. When you study Potsdam and Yalta, we made mistakes and you out-negotiated us. We won the war because we kept our eyes on winning the war. Now we must win the peace. We will have tough talks -- but we must deal as equals and we don't paint over our problems. That is a good part of the Nixon-Brezhnev relationship.

On the announcement, Friday would be good.

Dobrynin: What city would you like to visit in the Soviet Union? Brezhnev has asked me.

President: He knows the country. You and he figure it out.

Pres/Doherty 28 May 74 ✓

D I just got personal with from B.

Time of visit coming closer. As regards, time may not permit much.

Our meeting promised to be impressive. A B, M, TTB, Econ Corp, Energy, Construction, artificial heart. We continue to provide for possibility of progr on other prog when discuss with mutual agreement.

We attentively follow events in US. Much of what is happening not understandable to us, but there are phases which are not friendly. Also there are not why internal politics but also FP also. Interested are those who want to understand what has gone on bet our 2 countries.

We never doubted our course represented majority of US & are interested. From, even w/ domestic problems, focus on FP, incl US-SU relations. That is way to act. There are those who may think you may give way but we note w/ notes you will not do that. We look forward to your visit & that of K at end of Aug.

P Don't want to ~~think~~ think domestic politics will affect my trip or our relations. Mansfield agrees. Jackson playing 1976 politics. Important thing is not my job - they will jobs - but a legacy of peace we will leave. B & I could see hard way. Both of us believe deeply in our systems & bargain hard. But we see overriding interests in peace. We must do our domestic jobs. Tell I not to worry about me & my health.

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES: State Dep. aw 3/9/04

BY WA

NARS DATE 8/5/04

As you know K, been delayed, I hope
to settle it so we don't have to talk about
it - just good order of M.E.

As I told parliamentarian, a idea of is
playing a role to force out SU is voluntary.
As you know, right now we only one
who can handle it. As I told Jerry ^a other
day, only a UI + JV can resolve big
issues of procedure - overall. We ~~can't~~ want
always agree, but we must have ^{close} contact
As for K trip, I hope we can meet w/ you first
to iron things out to see if a trip is required.

D K + I coming back Thurs -

Y Main problem is M.R.U. Temp for you
+ our military.

D When K was w/ Berg last time, Berg was very
over-optimistic on situation.

P As you know, I may visit M.E. Depends
on negotiations, main point is we must
announce ~~that~~ our trip before any M.E.
Since I have to be here in July, I
prob would have to go in June or
postpone in Nov. Our trip comes first.
A M.E. trip doesn't take preparation

D Good that our trip announced 1st

P Yes, let's try to do it Thurs or Friday. ~~It's good~~ ^{unhappily}
B will go to M.E. That's good. We both
must play a role in M.E. We don't
want to push you out at all. M.E. requires
participation of us both.

I told Gornishman SU has relationship
that + would not.

As I may compete at times, but ~~was~~ we

cannot try to push each other out. Differences
yes, but in final analysis we must be able
to get common interest which overrides
those differences. When you study Potlauer &
Yalta - and make mistakes & you are not mythical
too - we were won because we kept our
eyes on winning a war. Now we must
win a peace. All will have tough tasks -
but we must as equals & we don't point
our fingers - that is good part of N-S
relationship.

On agreement, Friday would be good.
D What why would you like to all. B ahead
P He knows country, you + he figure it
out, would like

Brezhnev
letter May 28, 1971

There isn't coming close
we will exchange ideas
Meeting will be comprehensive
Areas in mind in particular, ABN
TTB, Long term Econ coop, Sci & Tech
coop, energy, construction, art. health
Other questions which we expect you
which not at point of drafting. Both expect
to reach agreement.

For human terms, some thoughts.

→ I have followed previous events in US.
Much but quite unbalanced, but
clear focus which is in areas against
USSR. Not only internal pol but FP involved
as well. He feels FP is to get some force
opponents to attack for those who want to
undermine important things in
- US-SU agreements & other things N-B
has agreed.

But, trusting that our joint course
is correct that debate is US & hearts
of US & SU people

He & colleagues don't identify of party
w/ majority of US
US still busy w/ domestic affairs, N busy
w/ FP & US-Sov relations. This is
- course for a statement.

↓
~~There are~~ for Treaty & firm spirit are
needed & P has. There are people
policy, entirely in US, who think N won't
stand it & strength will give way. We
write w/ so that you don't intend to give
them such a pleasure

As to the report, personally, for a
good relation I liked but not taking
in a success of our partnership meeting
inasmuch as being personal to K.