

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

President Nixon
Ismail Fahmi, Foreign Minister of Egypt
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

April 18, 1974
11:35 a. m.

PLACE:

The Oval Office
The White House

President: This is a busy time for you.

Fahmi: Yes, I must leave tomorrow. Willy Brandt is coming to Egypt.

President: Yes. He told me. He will be very sympathetic.

Kissinger: He became Foreign Minister in this room the last time he was here. He was only Minister of Tourism before.

President: I appreciate the statesmanlike role that you and President Sadat have played. We now have the Syrian problem. It is very troublesome at the moment. It will depend in part on our influence with Israel, which we will use. You know what the arguments are about. It's difficult with the fighting now.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *State Reviews 3/8/04*
NARA DATE *4/5/04*

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

Fahmi: Don't worry about the fighting. It's not serious. It may be a prelude to real disengagement. I told Henry yesterday about the Security Council. There is a discussion going on now. You vetoed a previous resolution because it was not balanced. My fear is if you veto now, there will be a critical reaction. Henry's mission will become almost impossible, and the extremists and the Soviet Union will use it in a devastating way. They will try to prove that Sadat is wrong and there is no change in U.S. policy. I would advise changing the resolution first so you can support it and pull the rug from the Soviet Union. If you can't change it that much, at least abstain or don't participate in the vote. If you speak to Lebanon, nobody can force the Lebanese Foreign Minister to move to a stronger position.

Kissinger: We have a draft which we could live with.

President: Will the Lebanese buy it? Overriding all this is our ability to deliver the Israelis. To do this we have to maintain some "stroke" with them. If there can be some reference to the attacks and that Lebanon didn't approve.... If it is a straight condemnation of Israel, we would be in trouble. I think they did overreact, but we would jeopardize our ability to move them on disengagement.

Kissinger: Next week we are asking the Jewish leaders to put pressure on Israel to move behind Kuneitra. But if we get in a brawl over this incident -- and Israel is not wholly wrong -- my mission will be jeopardized.

Fahmi: I agree. But Israel is only one part of it. But if all the Arabs and the Soviet Union are against you, you will embarrass Sadat. All you have done until now will be erased. I am very worried. Even consider some Machiavellian ways -- even to postpone it.

Kissinger: The French and the Soviet Union are impossible.

Fahmi: Jobert is unbelievable. He attacked us for dealing with the U.S.

Kissinger: He said you could have dealt directly with Israel.

Fahmi: The best thing is to postpone it.

Kissinger: That would be fine with us.

Fahmi: Or if you don't succeed, maybe a message to Frangie on what you could do. He could get a balanced resolution.

Kissinger: Do you agree?

President: Postponement would be the best. But a compromise you would try that we could sell to Lebanon would be helpful. A resolution solely condemning Israel would be tough for us.

Fahmi: That is only one side. Sadat may even revoke the Soviet treaty today.

President: We don't want him embarrassed. You two work it out.

Fahmi: Don't say I am involved in the compromise. You know that leak.

Kissinger: Some SOB in State leaked that the reason for hope was a more reasonable Egyptian position compared to Syria.

President: We are with you. We can't embarrass Sadat. It cannot appear he is compromising his principles.

Fahmi: We want a change, but on our basic principles. We want a relationship. One we are not ashamed of, I speak each time with you about future strategy. I hope your visit, Mr. President, will be the end of May. The Soviet Union is acting in a positive way around us.

Kissinger: They have even approached the Jordanians.

President: This has to be handled carefully. Gromyko is sensitive. We must not leave the impression the Soviet Union is being left out. The problem is tactics.

It gets back to Israel. We are the only ones who can move them. We understand you need to pay attention to the Soviet Union.

Fahmi: We are not worried about the Soviet Union. They know our relations are deteriorating. I spent three hours here with Gromyko, 20 in Moscow, four with Brezhnev. I am trying to blame them but it is tough. I am not worried about what they can do in Egypt, but they can move quickly to support Asad and stop everything sent to us. I am sure Sadat will abrogate the treaty. Gromyko begged Sadat for hours not to do it. I know Sadat will blow it up. When they see part of the American fleet in Port Said and they are not involved, when they have a port in Alexandria, a super power can't forget this. If Sadat moves, it will cause a repercussion against them in the Arab world. We expect that at the proper time you will help Sadat.



President: In bilateral relations, outside the USSR, we are subject to the whim of Congress. I think we will be successful, but not as much as we want. Clearing the Canal, hopefully PL-480, some economic assistance. You have talked with Henry about arms. All this has my total support.

If you push them out too fast, you become worried about their reaction.

Fahmi: I am worried about the political support from you when the time comes.

President: I promise. That is what it is all about. We must do this subtly -- the Soviet Union is very worried. You do have our diplomatic support and whatever aid we can give.

Kissinger: And we are trying to work out military equipment through Kuwait.

Fahmi: We are Russian-equipped. Our Army must know they won't be out of equipment. The nuclear thing is a symbol now.

President: I want to move out on this right away.

Kissinger: I will bring something with me.

President: We will help. We want a strong and prosperous Egypt. On the Army thing, we will do our best so your Army can have something to point to.

Kissinger: I will be going next weekend. I will see Gromyko in Geneva.

Fahmi: Don't bring him with you! I told him "You couldn't get disengagement; the U.S. could, so you should meet with Kissinger in Geneva and get the appearance." What I wanted today was your political support and a red light to the Soviet Union.

President: You have it. It's your hole card; don't turn it up now, but it is yours.

Fahmi: That is all I wanted.

President: Let's see. We will try to work out a balanced resolution.

Kissinger: This whole terrorism was planned to sabotage the peace. It was a moderate response by Israeli standards.

Fahmi: Sorry, but you know I had to support Lebanon.

President: We understood.

Kissinger: We have agreed with Egypt on the Syrian line. The Israeli position is impossible. We are not delivering things but we're not saying anything. The problem is if we get in a fight on the resolution, it will remove pressure on the disengagement.

The British are trying to line up support, but the French are sabotaging us.

Fahmi: Why? They all ran after you.

President: They don't have a government. When are their elections?

Kissinger: May 5 and 19. Unless Mitterand wins by a majority.

[There was further discussion of the French election]


Fahmi: Rumors are the U.S. is supporting Mitterand.

President: Total nonsense.

Kissinger: The French are putting that out to the Arabs.

President: Tell President Sadat I admire him greatly and I won't let down someone who has been a great leader against great odds. Rely on me and let me work it out my own way.

We understand why you must use Lebanese and the Soviet Union.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Ismail Fahmi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, April 18, 1974
12:20 p.m.

PLACE: Secretary Kissinger's Office
The White House

Kissinger: This we could support.

Fahmi: There was a previous one which went through.

Kissinger: We are having a massive problem with Israel because
Golda and Dayan are on their way out. If we get into a fight on the
resolution, I am lost with the Jewish community.

We are asking the Saudis to postpone the detente. We are
getting the Lebanese down here.

Fahmi: On arms, only Sadat and I know, and Marwan who we use as
a messenger. The Minister of War doesn't know. The Soviet Union is
now offering more arms than we are asking. I said: "Why don't you
give us the replacements you already promised?"

Kissinger: You could get arms from India and we could make it up in
economic aid.

Fahmi: When will you deal with us openly?

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.1
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
 BY NARA DATE 3/5/04



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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Kissinger: The end of the year. First there has to be a Syrian disengagement. Then a next step with you. You can't afford a separate peace -- or can you? I will talk to Sadat. Then we will start a military program.

If you get F-4's into Saudi Arabia, you can train your pilots there.

If Israel had a Sadat, it would be a joy to work on this issue. The Israelis aren't so bright; they are minor league politicians. If I were Israel I would give Syria most of what they ask, and get Syria out of the war.

Fahmi: You would have a revolution in Iraq in a minute.

Kissinger: Can you get Syria to agree to Quneitra?

Fahmi: Yes. Asad hates the Russians.

Kissinger: Shihabi said they would try to overthrow the Iraqis.

Fahmi: If we can get a disengagement, then Sadat will move a little against the Soviet Union. But a disengagement must come first.

Don't even circulate your draft informally.

✓ Puro/Fahmi/HAK

1135 18 April '74

- P This busy time for you
- F Yes, must leave tomorrow, Brandt coming
- P Yes, He told me, He will be very sympathetic.
- K He became FM in this room, but this was the
- P Opposite statement like role of you + Sadat.
We have Syrian problem - very troublesome at a
moment, will depend in part on our
influence w/ I, which we will use. You
know what arguments are about - difficulty
w/ fighting war.
- F Don't worry about fighting. It's not serious.
May be possible to reach disengagement. Told
K yesterday about S.C. Is a discussion going
~~on~~ on now. You vetoed previous resolution
because not balanced. Try from it if you
veto now, it will be critical mistake. ~~for~~
K mission become almost impossible +
ephorotic + S U will use it in devastating
way. They will try to pressure Sadat saying
a no change in US policy. Advised changing
resolution 1st to you can support it
+ pull any from S U. If you can't change
it that much, at least veto or don't
participate in vote. If you speak & behave,
nobody can force Lebanon FM to move
to stronger position.
- K We have a draft which we would like w/.
- P Will he be forced by it? Overarching all this
is our ability to deliver I. To do this
we have to enter some "stake" w/ them. If
there can be some w/ to attacks + behavior
don't approve. . . . If it straight
credibility of I, we would be in trouble.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state review 3/9/04

BY ld, NARA DATE 8/5/04

I think they did overreact, but we could ~~do~~ ^{lose} ~~lose~~ ^{lose} our ability to move them on doing.

K kept work out asking Jewish leaders to put pressure on I to move behind Demeter. But if we in a broad case this merit - I not ethically wrong - my mission will be jeopardized.

F Delayed. But I do only see part of it. But if all Arab & SU are against you, you will embarrass Sadat. All you have done till now will be erased. I very worried - even consider backhanding ways - even to postpone.

K From to SU impossible.

F Sadat is unshakable. He attacked us for dealing w/ US.

K He said could have dealt directly w/ I.

F Best is to postpone.

K Fine w/ us.

F do if you don't proceed, ^{write to} Frangji on what you could do. He could get a balanced resolution.

K Do you agree?

P Postponement would be best. But compromise you would try we could still to Johnson would be helpful.

Resolution solely examining I would be tough for us.

F That only I think Sadat may even make SU treaty treaty.

P We don't want him embarrassed. You 2 work it out.

F Don't say I musthead in compromise.

you know - look

K Some SOB in State backed that museum for
hugel was more reasonable E, certain way and
to Syria

P We are w/you. We can't embarrass Sadat.
It can't appear he is compromising his
principles.

F We want a change, but over on basic principles
of our relationship. One we not ashamed of.
I speak such time w/you of future strategy.
I hope your visit will be end of May.
SU are acting in positive way ~~that~~ around
us.

K They have done approached for concessions

P This has to be handled carefully. Gromyko
sensitive. We must not leave impression
SU being left out. The problem is Tactics.
It gets back to E - we only care who can move them.
We understand you need a time to SU

F We are not worried about SU. They know
our relations are deteriorating. Report 3 has
had w/Gromyko, 20 in the car, 4 w/B.
I trying to blame them but it is tough.
I not worried about what they can do in E, but
they can move quickly to support Assad & stop
everything to us. I sense Sadat will attempt
this. Gromyko begged Sadat for him not
to do it. I know Sadat will blow it up.
When they see part of US fleet in Port Said &
they not involved, when they have a port
in Alexandria - a super power can't
forget this. If Sadat moves, it will cause
a repression against them in Arab world



We expect that at proper time you will help submit

P ~~had~~ In bilateral relations, outside US & R, we subject to criticism of Cong. Think we will be successful, but not as much as we would want. Clearly crucial, hopefully P & K & S, some less so. You have talked w/ K about arms. All this has my total support.

If you push them out too fast, you worried about their reaction

F I worried about political support for you when a time comes

P I fear so. That is what it all about. Must do this subtly - S & I very worried. You all have our chip - support & what we can give.

K ~~But~~ we trying to work ^{out} ~~this out~~ ^{with} equip these Komars.

F We are Russ equipped. Our Army must know they won't be out of equip. Wanted a signaled arm

P I want it move out on this night away

K I will bring something w/ me.

P We will help. We want strong progressions F. On Army thing, we will do our best so your Army can have something to point to.

K I want to be going next weekend. I will see Gungor in Geneva.

F Don't bring him w/ you. I told him you could not get things - U1 could, so he should meet w/ K in Geneva & get approval. What I wanted today was your permission.



political support a real light to
SU

P You know it. It's your photo card. Don't turn
it my way, but it is yours.

F That is all I wanted.

P Lots all. We will try to make our behavior
resolution

K This whole mission was planned to sabotage
a place. It was marked resp. by I
standards

F Easy, but you know I had to ~~find~~ suggest
behavior

P We understand.

K We have agreed w/ F on a Syrian line. I
position is impossible. We not delivering
things but not saying anything. Problem is
if we get in fight or resolution, it will
remove pressure on chrisy.

Berks trying to give us support, but French
~~are~~ are sabotaging us.

F Why? They all ran after you

P They don't have a quest. ~~and~~ when elvith

K May 5 + 19. Under National was majority.
(Dismission of elvith)

F Rumors are US supporting National

P Total nonsense

K French are putting that out to Arabs.

P Tell Sadat I admire him greatly & I would let
down one who has been great under against
great odds. Rely on me & let me work
it out my own way.

We understand why you must work
as in the US O



Be subject w/ skills early next week

K/ T. Abrams

18 April 12 20 1974

✓ 4

R This we could support
F There was a previous one which cost them
K as having massive prot w/I because Golda
& Dayan are on way out, if we get in a fight
on resolution, I am lost as Jewish community.

~~F~~
K We asking Sadat to postpone debate. Getting Adomex
down here.

F ^{Hart Frank} First F to ever participate in resolution.
It was done before.

F On arms, only Sadat & I know, & Marwan
as major. Uran of was didn't know.
SO now offering more arms than we asking.
I said why don't you give us replacements
already promised.

R You could get arms from India & we could make
it up in local aid.

F When will you deal w/ us openly?

K End of year. First Syrian dring. There a
west step w/ you. You want open up
place - a case you - I will talk to Sadat.
Then we start visit program.
If you get it into S.A. you can train
your pilots there.

If I had a Sadat, would be a joy to work on this
issue - I can't so bright, they miss legal
provisions. If I were I would give Syrian
most of what they ask, & get Syria out of ^{war} ~~the~~ ^{zone}

F You would have revolution in Iraq in a minute

R Can you get Syria to agree to Qumbras

F Yes.



F Osoat hates Russians.

K Chelabi said they would try to overthrow Iraqis.

F If we can get drilling, then we can take
care of Osoat will move a little against
S.V. But disengagement first.
Don't even circulate your chuff informally.

