



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense  
William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence  
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint  
Chiefs of Staff  
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, December 28, 1973  
1:16 - 2:45 p.m. (lunch)

PLACE: The Map Room  
The White House

DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted  
AUTHORITY FR O, appeal 01-104, NS NARAT/2/10  
BY dal NARA DATE 8/21/10

[Cable on the Oriskany.]

Kissinger: I didn't say that.

Schlesinger: I know, but it must be corrected. How about the Bainbridge?

Kissinger: It is a good idea to vary it.

Schlesinger: Good. The Bainbridge is near Malacca now.

Kissinger: Can we let Moynihan know so he stays off my back?

Schlesinger: How come Madagascar cut us off from fishing?

Colby: They were flexing their muscles.

Moorer: They didn't want to part company with the rest of Africa.



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Kissinger: Kenya let us in.

Colby: He is tougher.

Schlesinger: On the Indian Ocean, we should move on Diego Garcia.

Moorer: The package is on its way to State.

Schlesinger: I told Sykes that we are not going to provide things free and then get nitpicked on Diego.

Kissinger: We sent a scorching letter to Faisal and Sadat and will send one to the Shah. We have said our ability to proceed in the peace talks depends on an end to the embargo.

Moorer: Two can play this. Maybe we should raise the price of our stuff to the Shah.

Schlesinger: We are. I am thinking of charging him 1.9 for the F-15 R&D.

Colby: The oil increase to us is \$10 billion.

Kissinger: Akins is tough. He told Yamani that the Saudis are the ogres of the civilized world.

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3.3(b)(1)(6)

Kissinger: A production increase helps more than getting the embargo lifted, but it is a political issue.

Colby: I think we must teach them a lesson.

Kissinger: Then we should hold up on the peace talks.

All: Yes. Refuse to pressure the Israelis.

Kissinger: I will show you the one kilometer withdrawal Dayan offered. That was the source of the story about me. He is coming here next week. I am agreeing in principle. [Discussed the zones of withdrawal.] But they can't separate the essential from the trivial. The key is can Egypt launch an attack across Sinai without mobilizing? We can't tie the embargo to progress in the talks.



Schlesinger: The embargo is not really hurting us. We haven't touched our reserves. Our marginal wells will start producing.

Colby: This is a blessing in disguise. In 1980, this would be a disaster.

Moorer: Tell us about Le Duc Tho and Portugal.

Kissinger: On Le Duc Tho, I think it's 60-40 against an offensive. He wanted a cease fire, delimitation of zones, release of civilian prisoners, and economic aid.

I could get lots if we could get aid through Congress. Could we?

Schlesinger: Yes. The tenor of the Hill has changed. Also the economy is going sour.

Kissinger: On a cease fire, they want another announcement. We said no unless there is demarcation prior to it.

He has now accepted the GVN 5,000 prisoner total. He dropped his political demands. All he wants is the third Vietnam which he already has. I told him I would send him a message in January and maybe we'd meet again -- but we wouldn't tolerate any nonsense. I think he is scared and we should put everything we can into the GVN. How about that boat?

Moorer: We don't have the money to do what they want and more is beyond the capacity of GVN.

Schlesinger: We got 1.26....

Colby: Getting a few bucks for North Vietnam is easier than a lot of bucks for the GVN.

Moorer: [REDACTED]

Kissinger: [REDACTED]

Moorer: [REDACTED]

Kissinger: What about the minelaying?

Moorer: It is all laid out. We get the school set up. We will have training going in six weeks.



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Kissinger: Can they get into Haiphong with A-1s?

Moorer: It is easier farther south, but they could get away with it the first time.

Schlesinger: Why can't we mine? That isn't hostilities. We could blockade also, because that is not hostile.

Kissinger: I like mines, because once they are laid, there is nothing we can do.

Schlesinger: Another thing is we could pick off some shipping as a reprisal, for example, for a shoot down.

Kissinger: Could we give them A-7s?

Moorer: There is a training problem. They can fill the channel with A-1s the first time.

Schlesinger: Are you going to get cozy with the Senate?

Kissinger: The minimum necessary to keep my franchise with the Foreign Relations Committee. Let's send all we can to GVN. The North Vietnamese are not holding to the restrictions; why should we?

Colby: Hussein wants to pull out his forces.

Kissinger: Okay, let him.

Colby: 

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Schlesinger: It is getting bad.

Kissinger: Portugal is hot for Hawks.

Moorer: They have two problems. There are MIGs in Africa and they are the only ones who don't have SAMs.

They have a lot of fears, real or not, and they think we are not helping. It is cosmetics, not military, but still real.



Kissinger: They are eager for Hawks. They gave me a list. [Passes out list to all.] They want protection for their oil fields. Can we give them boats and missiles?

Moorer: Their oil fields are in the northwest tip and are vulnerable.

Kissinger: Is it illegal?

Moorer: No -- just policy.

Kissinger: I will put it to the President but Brent, get a memo ready.

On the GVN, I think it is essential that there be no debacle -- especially anti-tank.

Schlesinger: We will look into anti-tank. The problem is we gave them more than they could use.

Moorer: They have a few TOWs.

Schlesinger: We will look into it.

Moorer: Everyone wants TOWs.

Kissinger: Why did we have to give 36 to the Jordanians?

Schlesinger: How should we treat the Aussies?

Kissinger: Aloof.

Schlesinger: We are scheduled to deactivate four squadrons of B-52s. We would leave them in the force structure but eliminate O and M.

There should be a directive to study the foreign policy implications of energy in the SRG format.

Colby: I sent you a memo on the Persian Gulf. We must upgrade the sheikhdoms' State representation.

Schlesinger: What about Abu Dhabi?

Colby: [REDACTED]

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3.3(b)(1)

Moorer: On Portugal, how do we go?

Kissinger: First a memo to the President, then we issue a directive.

Schlesinger: How about a base in Mozambique?

Kissinger: It gets us in trouble. But we need more bases.

Moorer: We are coming up with a study to send to you.

I have talked to Stennis.

Schlesinger: I have talked to Stennis, Mahon, McClellan, Hebert. Mahon is goosey but the rest are fine.

Kissinger: The Pakistanis want to give us a base.

Schlesinger: We couldn't use it against the Arabs. What's wrong with Mozambique?

Kissinger/Colby: No, the price is too high.

Kissinger: I'd rather be in South Africa.

Moorer/Schlesinger: Then let's start talking South Africa.

Schlesinger: The Cape Verdes shouldn't be allowed to fall into Soviet hands.

Kissinger: That is easy. But I think the Portuguese territories will be lost.

Is there an unpopulated island in the Cape Verdes?

Schlesinger: We have to look.

Kissinger: I'd rather look at South Africa than Portuguese territory.

Colby: How about the Spanish?

Kissinger: Not against the Arabs. How about Ethiopia?

Schlesinger: We have a memo to you on our air base.



Colby: How about promising help to the Spanish in Europe?

Kissinger: I don't think I want Spain in Europe. I'd rather have a bilateral relationship.

Colby: [REDACTED] EO 12958 3.3 (b)(1)(6)

Kissinger: [REDACTED] EO 12958 3.3 (b)(6)

Colby: What if the Hawks win?

Kissinger: We then push them right back.



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