

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
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FOLDER TITLE December 5, 1973 - Kissinger,
Schlesinger
DATE WITHDRAWN 08/20/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

Sanitized 12/6/04

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, December 5, 1973
8:05 a.m. - Breakfast

PLACE: The Pentagon

Secretary Schlesinger: Let's talk about the Cambodian Air Force
improvement plan. It will require help from CIA and State.

What about the hotline to Peking?

Secretary Kissinger: Early warning too?

Secretary Schlesinger: It can be added to this plan easily.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's add the warning element. But hold it close.
It would start a war if it got out.

Secretary Schlesinger: Can I tell Carrington about the British Ambassador
in Egypt?


Secretary Kissinger: It wouldn't do any good.

Secretary Schlesinger: The French are getting into giving arms to the
Saudis and we have to move out.

Presidential Library Review of NSC and DOS Equities is Required

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AUTHORITY SAC Decision 12/6/04 j state visit 3/24/04
BY mla NLF, DATE 4/12/07



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Secretary Kissinger: No problem. I just don't want Clements and Moorer going over.

We must not overwhelm them with an ardent embrace. Why don't I raise this when I am in Jidda? Clements just can't be low profile. I suspect he has something else in mind when he gets there.

Secretary Schlesinger: He is enthusiastic.

Secretary Kissinger: We shouldn't have anyone running around there in light of these messages. [He had given Schlesinger the messages earlier.]

It is important what we say to Yamani. I think they are afraid of being left alone with the radicals.

The abject behavior of the Europeans has had just the opposite effect. The Japanese told the Arabs not to give us oil. They're giving the Arabs all kinds of aid.

Secretary Schlesinger: It's too bad we can't get the oil turned on for us first.

Secretary Kissinger: I probably will go to Algeria also. I'll have to drop two hours off Cairo.


Show Jim the President's letter to Faisal. Yamani is bright but not influential. He must not know what Fahd is doing.

Secretary Schlesinger: Clements is inclined to apologize to the Saudis.

Secretary Kissinger: The Europeans have nothing to offer the Arabs. They have no threats. Try to keep Clements under control, but you see Yamani so if Clements goes off the reservation, you can straighten it out.

Tell Yamani that they are blowing their best opportunity. The U. S. is now willing to do something in the Middle East.

Let me tell you about Sadat. I was gloomy when I went there. I told him that Nasser was a fool because he confronted the United States. I said, "You can get the October 22 line if you want a brawl, but then the Israelis

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will be able to mobilize opposition." He finally bought it, then fell off last week. I wrote him, and he fell off again. We'll have a tough time with the Israelis at the conference.

Secretary Schlesinger: Less than you would think. Israel realizes they had a hard time strategically.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should increase a presence in the Indian Ocean.

Secretary Schlesinger: I want to withdraw the amphibious group to refit.

I think we should think about putting 5-6000 Marines in Bahrein.

Secretary Kissinger: They will never agree.

Now about Europe.

I will be very tough at NATO. I will say we are for European unity and NATO but things are tough. The energy crisis proves our point -- we can operate alone, they can't. We will make no other proposal.


Heath gave two statements. In the second speech he said if the Europeans hadn't been united they couldn't have withstood the United States. Heath knew every detail of our plans except the timing. He says we object to negotiating with the Dane. That is crud. We object to an instructed delegate.

Secretary Schlesinger: The biggest problem is with the U.S. -Soviet nuclear war agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: You tell Carrington we are fed up because Brimelow drafted the nuclear agreement and then didn't back it. The French want a statement about the nuclear agreement in the declaration. I refused because it indicates a question about it.

There should be no difference between the Nine and NATO. Why should they be different as a group than their initial positions?

We should stand back to back on this though. They have to understand we are tough.

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Secretary Schlesinger: My theme has been that we take NATO security seriously and they must take it seriously.

Secretary Kissinger: The French theme that we have to defend Europe no matter what is crap.

Will you send me a message of what you pick up?

Secretary Schlesinger: They are contradictory -- they say we are bound to protect them but that we are deserting them.

Secretary Kissinger: I sent Walters to Galley. I told the Ambassador that after leaning over backwards, we would reluctantly have to take them on. They said we screwed them on nuclear cooperation. We don't want to let loose yet, but if we give them negative guidance, is that increaseable?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, but we can give it out bit by bit.

That is crap that they turned on us because of a refusal on negative guidance. It was the other way around.

Secretary Kissinger: I regret about the French because theirs is the only serious defense effort. Once the Europeans face the defense problem it will drive them against the Soviet Union. Once the Europeans realize they can't get our cooperation if they attack us.

Only the French have the guts to stand up against us -- but they don't have de Gaulle, a special relation to the Soviet Union, etc. But I would like to back them down without breaking them.

Secretary Schlesinger: I am planning to extemporize mostly.

Secretary Kissinger: I have refused to give a lead-off speech at NATO.

Secretary Schlesinger: Remember that most of the countries are for us.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. I want our friends to go to the French to say look what you have done to us. I will have bilaterals only with the ones who have been good.

Secretary Schlesinger: I would not see the Germans.

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Secretary Kissinger: If Scheel asks, I will have to, but only then.

Secretary Schlesinger: Jackson-Nunn: If OMB can do its job, the German offset already covers the deficit. But we have to keep Treasury and Commerce in line.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's draw a NSSM on offset. Have an SRG on it. Work it out with Jim.

Secretary Schlesinger: The balance of payments impact is not so dependent on where the forces are.

I do not want acquisition policy in the interagency process.

Secretary Kissinger: No, we will do it directly with you.

Secretary Schlesinger: It is based on Dulles' view of China.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's review it, but we can't expose one real reason for our forces in Asia, that is, China policy.

Secretary Schlesinger: We need to have a long word with Canada. They are doing nothing in NATO, nothing in NORAD, free import of cars.

Secretary Kissinger: What do we want?


Secretary Schlesinger: We want them to put a brigade back in NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: They'll never do it. But I believe in putting our policy on reciprocity. But there we have to have objectives which are attainable. You can take a run at the brigade but he has domestic problems.

Secretary Schlesinger: That was Trudeau's decision.

Secretary Kissinger: Politicians always go after the incremental 10 percent and lose their whole constituency. The whole European political scene is this. This is Brandt's problem. Only the British have been firm and they are the same now.

Did you give Mahon the cuts?

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Secretary Schlesinger: I got that money back.

Secretary Kissinger: I just don't want SALT-related items jeopardized.

Secretary Schlesinger: Only Trident, and we don't need it. Zumwalt agrees. We are fat.

McClellan said he would cut us \$3 billion but would agree to a supplemental for that much.

I want to fly an SR-71 over Cuba rather than a U-2 because we don't need the protection.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay.

Brezhnev said, "Can't we stop deploying new systems?" If we are willing to pay Trident, we need a price which is commensurate. I don't think they will give up MIRV testing.

Secretary Schlesinger: We shouldn't air the price we pay throughout the community.

Secretary Kissinger: Let Lodal circulate his papers. It is useful, but not my view.

Secretary Schlesinger: Trident is an albatross.

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TYPE OF MATERIAL Note

DESCRIPTION Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes of
Kissinger and Schlesinger meeting

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