

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
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By dal NARA, Date 9/15/09*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of
Defense
Amb. Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State
William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Adm. Thomas Moorer, Chairman, JCS
William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, October 13, 1973
10:45 a.m.

PLACE: Situation Room

SUBJECT: Special WSAG -- Principals Only

Kissinger: The President said if there are any further delays in carrying out orders, we want the resignation of the officials involved.

We had two objectives in the war; to maintain contact with both sides. For this the best outcome would be an Israeli victory but it would come at a high price, so we could insist that they ensure their security through negotiations, not through military power. Second, we attempted to produce a situation where the Arabs would conclude the only way to peace was through us. But during the war we had to show the Israelis they had to depend on us to win and couldn't win if we were to recalcitrant.

On Tuesday, we told the Israelis that we would give them the consumables they needed.

Schlesinger: That's wrong. We said they'd get the consumables that were available and they'd attempt to get charters.

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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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Kissinger: Okay, but we needed to get the stuff in when we needed an offensive. Now it is going in afterwards, when we want the diplomacy to work. We are in active diplomacy with all of them. Our thinking is that the bureaucracy is dragging its feet on the grounds that we are going in on the Israeli side. Now we are being forced to take actions which do run a risk.

Israel has been hurt. But can we hold the Arabs still, and can we cover our present high-profile operation?

Schlesinger: Where did we screw up?

Kissinger: We should have forced the charters.

Clements: I agree. But we didn't know it was urgent.

Kissinger: The Arabs may even be smelling a victory, not a stalemate. That means the Soviet Union has won. For us to have gone in to have saved the Arabs' ass would have been perfect. The Saudis, for example, want a situation where the Soviet Union is humiliated and the Arabs turn to the United States. An Arab victory, even with American acquiescence, will look like American weakness. The Israelis have now slowed because of the shortages; now they might crank up when we want them to stop.

Schlesinger: We weren't asked to get in until Thursday night. The Israelis never told us they had shortages.

Kissinger: I am sure the history books will show Israel was defeated by poor planning and lousy tactics. But right now, I have the diplomacy going, and I can't make it work unless the Arabs are sweating. It took me two days to line up Israel, and they are now starting to drag their feet. We might lose the Soviets. We hoped to have the Syrians and Egyptians at each other's throats because Israel would have captured Syrian territory.

Clements: How can we help now?

Kissinger: Let's fly in some US planes. Let's get the charter going.

I want the Arabs to think the Israelis may go wild when they get equipment.



Schlesinger: We are 5,000 miles away. For refueling, we are using Torrejon, and we can't do that massively without the Spanish.

Kissinger: How bad off are the Israelis?

Colby: They are slowing down. They are telling their pilots to conserve fuel and ammo.

Schlesinger: There is ammo on the way.

Kissinger: Golda was coming on Tuesday. I turned her off by providing the consumables.

What I am afraid of is if I kick off the diplomacy, and the Egyptians take the Mitla pass, we are in a mess.

Our problem is to get the war over in a way the Arabs have to come to us, and then turn on the Israelis. If Israel feels we have let them down and the Arabs think they have done it themselves, we are sunk.

Colby: Israel wanted to wipe out Syria and then turn on Egypt, and this can still work on the Arabs.

Clements: We should now go in with a massive airlift.

Kissinger: No, we will lose all our Arab friends.

Schlesinger: How much different is a US airlift from commandeered charter flights.

Clements: We are already pregnant with the C-5's.

Moorer: They have gotten 7,500 rounds of 105 mm ammo. Also 175's, chaff, LAW's.

Schlesinger: We can just use Lajes and let the Portuguese protest to us.

Kissinger: It has taken a week to get us to the point where this was jelling. I don't want to blow it all in a spasm. Doesn't it make a difference if it's charter versus an American airlift?

Colby: It gives them a face-saving device if they want to.

Kissinger: I agree. If they want to blow it up, they will. If they don't want to, this gives them the hope.

Moorer: The F-4's will blow them more than an airlift.

Colby: I think we should just use Lajes.

Kissinger: They want HAWK missiles. We can't lose all the Africans for Israel.

Schlesinger: We need a base. Either Lajes, Spain, or Italy.

Kissinger: In the next three days, Israel should be on the attack but without rupturing it with the Arabs.

Clements: That means consumables.

Schlesinger: The F-4's are moving. They will have 10 by Sunday night and 14 by Monday.

Kissinger: Our interests are not identical with Israel's. We want Israel to win so the Arabs will turn to us. Israel wants us locked in.

Let's use the C-5's to go in until we can get a charter going. That is at least fewer planes.

Schlesinger: The Chicago convention requires prior approval.

Colby: I think we should get some ships, too, so the Israelis will know we are working on it.

Kissinger: With luck we may have a ceasefire by Monday night. [He outlined the scenario.] I've got three Arab Foreign Ministers coming Tuesday to see the President.

Schlesinger: We have to have Lajes for a charter. We have the 141's at Lajes now. Let's move it in.

Kissinger: Okay.

Clements: The C-5's could have a salutary effect by going in.

Schlesinger: It is more complex. Henry's leverage with the Arabs depends on showing he can keep....

Kissinger: I need the flight times when they will get there. I will tell Ismail after they get there. Bill, will you organize the charter?

Schlesinger: We've got to get Lajes.

Kissinger: That is my problem. Get two ships loaded, too. Let Brent know when everything will arrive. I will send a note to Egypt that we have been restrained. If the Arabs see that things will get worse if they don't get a ceasefire, we may be okay. How bad off are the Israelis?

Colby: They are not too bad but they are rationing ammo.

Moorer: Israel seems to be turning south in Syria.

Clements: There are four divisions there. That will take time. Iran.

Kissinger: We'll tell them we have been restrained for four days in the face of a massive Soviet resupply. We are now providing only emergency items and we continue to seek the earliest possible ceasefire.



✓ WSA G 13 OCT 10.45⁷⁵ am

Planning only.

K. Pros since if any further delays in carrying out orders, we would worry of officials' approval. We had a objective in 3 months contract w/ both; great outcome would be Israeli victory but at high price - so we could insist on security then report not then and power; attempt to produce fit where Arabs would contribute only way to plan was there so but during a war we had to show Israelis they had a depend on us to win & confident if we were reluctant.

On Tues, we told ~~it~~ that we would ~~finish~~ ^{finish} ~~know~~ ~~months~~

J. W/ing, we said inscrutable avoidable & attempt to charter

K. R, but we needed to get a staff in whom we needed an experience, now it's going in after we would diplomatically to work we in actual diplomacy w/ all.

One problem is inscrutable dropping on grounds we going in on Israeli side. Now we being practical actions which do run a risk.

One objective is achieved - Israel has been bought. But can we hold Arabs still and can we save one present high profile operation. >

S. ~~What's the point of going up~~

C. ~~Should have been done~~ ~~but~~ ~~didn't~~ ~~know~~ it was urgent

H. Arabs may even be pulling a victory with a strategic. That means a SC has won. Future to have power in to have small Arab ops would have been perfect. Searchis, for example, would



it when SC humiliated + Arabs turn
to US. An Arab victory, even w/ US
assistance, will look like US weakness.
Israelis have never showed because of
strategies, even they might crack up
when we want them to stop.

S We cannot afford to get in until Thursday.
Israelis never told us they had strategies.

~~K Finally Arabs will back down~~

K I am history books will show I defeated
by poor planning + heavy tactics. But right
now I have diplomacy going + I can't
make it work unless Arabs are cooperating.
Took me 2 days to find my I, F, even
starting to drag their feet. We might lose
a SV. We agreed to have a separation + E
at each threat because I would have
captured Syrian territory.

Q How can we help them?

K I'd get fly in from US planes. Let's
get a charter going.
Want a Arabs to think that I may
go with them when they get agreement.

S We are 500 miles away. For refueling, we
using Torrejon, can't do that massively w/o
Spanish.

~~C Why not call~~

K How bad off are I

C They are slowing down, taking pilots to
concentration + ammo.

S There is ammo on the way.

K Golda was warning on Thurs. I turned her off
by promising commercial.

What I fear is if I back off diplomacy,
+ E take Middle East, we are in a mess.



R O our job is to get war out in a way Arabs
don't come to us + then turn on c I. If
I feel we have hit them down + Arabs think
they have done it themselves, we sunk.

C I wanted to wipe out Syria + then turn on,
+ this can still work on the Arabs

C We should never go in w/ massive airlift

R No, we will lose all our Arab friends.

S How much different is US airlift from a
covered charter flight.

C We already prepared w/ c C-5's

M They have gotten 2,500 bombs of 100 lb
or so. Also 175,000 chaff, HAW's.

S We can just use Hayes and do Portuguese
protest to us.

R Robert want it have taken a week to get us
to a point where this was getting. I don't want
to blow them all in a off arm. Robert it
make a different charter vs US

C It gives them a face saving device if
they want to.

R Hayes. If they want to blow up, they will.
If they don't want to, this gives them a high.

M The F-4's will blow them more than airlift

C I think we should just use Hayes.

R They want Hawk missiles. We can't believe
all the apreciation for Israel.

65 lines
24 lines
S We need a base. Either Hayes, Spain, Italy.
K In next 7 days, I should be on a attack but
w/o involving it w/ c Arabs.

C That means concessions.

S The F-4's are moving. They will have 10 by
Sunday night + 14 by Monday.

R Our interests are not identical w/ Israel
We want Israel to win + Arabs will then



to us. I would want to look in.

K Let's use 1-5's to get in until we can get a charter going. That is at least from plans.

S Chicago nomination requires prior approval

C I think we should get some ships to, so that I will know we are working out.

K W/leak we may have a CF by Monday night.

(Technical scenario.) Get 3 Arab FMs covering Tues to see how.

S Hard to find hedges for charter

We have 14-1's at hedge now. Let's work it in.

K OK.

C The C-5's could have a salutary effect by getting

S more complex. K leverage w/Arabs depends on showing he can help

K I used flight times when they will get there I will tell Samail after target time.

Bill, will you organize charter?

S Got to get hedges

K That's my problem

Get 2 ships loaded too.

Let Brent know when everything will arrive.

I will send note to F that we have been retained.

If Arabs see that ETrip will get worse if they don't get CF, we may be OK.

+ How bad off are F

C They not too bad but they rationing ammo.

M I seems to be turning South in Syria.

C These 4 divisions there. That will take time. from -



We have been retained for
four days in a place of unusual
small supply. We have
possibly only charging into
a container to seek a limit
for the C T

