THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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For index see inside back cover

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Laying the Foundation of a Long-Term Policy

Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at a National Press Club luncheon at Washington on January 10 and the transcript of the questions and answers which followed.[1]

Press release 3 dated January 11

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

In these last few weeks many of you have asked me how I would sum up the successes and failures of our foreign policy. As you know, my hearing consistently fails during the second part of that question. But since I shall soon settle that issue conclusively in my memoirs, let me confine myself today to some general principles.

I have participated in the conduct of American foreign policy during a period of fundamental change. As always in such times, that policy emerged from an amalgam of factors: objective circumstances, domestic pressures, the values of our society, and the decisions of individual leaders. The relative weight to be given to each can be left to historians. But their mix shaped a profound transition in our nation's foreign policy. The trauma of Vietnam transformed our international perceptions; the nightmare of Watergate brought into question the validity of our domestic institutions. These upheavals coincided with radical alterations in the international environment. We have had to cope, over the past decade, with an increasingly complex and turbulent world in which America must seek to achieve its principles and its purposes under circumstances greatly at variance with traditional attitudes.

Through the greater part of the past two centuries America defined and justified its role in the world in terms of abstract principles. Our isolation, vast margins of safety, and a preoccupation with developing our own continent produced a sense of American uniqueness and a conviction that our power and the uses we made of it were but the physical expression of our moral purpose. We tended to believe that in foreign affairs our involvement or noninvolvement was a matter of our own choice and that we needed to act only when our democratic principles bade us to do so.

In the early years of this century we found ourselves, alone among the democracies, sufficiently powerful to maintain the precarious world balance. But then, shunning the claims of security and alliance, we fell back on our traditional isolationism; we sought, repeatedly and unsuccessfully, to substitute law for politics and to legislate solutions to international conflicts.

After World War II we finally accepted the responsibilities of world leadership. But the great exertions we undertook were based on the premise that they would be temporary—that at some point our allies would need us no longer; that poor nations would embrace democracy and move toward self-sufficiency; that our adversaries would change or that their systems would collapse. We applied abroad policies and programs modeled after our domestic experience of the New Deal and wartime mobilization; we acted as if any political problem anywhere could be solved by overwhelming it with our resources, as if the revolutions of our time had primarily economic, rather than political and even spiritual, causes.

[1] Introductory and closing remarks by Robert Alden, president of the National Press Club, and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's remarks are not printed here.

The sixties were the last full flowering of these impulses—the belief in our omnipotence, in our self-sufficiency, in our ability to remake other societies in our image. To be sure, temptations remain with us and occasionally surface in our domestic debate or in our legislation.

But as the decade drew to a close, we began to learn that we cannot legislate our own moral preferences upon the world at a time when we no longer enjoy physical predominance. We came to see that abstract principles are not self-fulfilling; they can lead to an overinvolvement as pernicious as our earlier isolation. We live today in a world of many centers of power and contending ideologies; a collection of some 150-odd nations sharing few agreed legal or moral assumptions; an international economic system in which the well-being of all peoples is inextricably intertwined—in short, a set of new historical realities in which the challenges of peace, prosperity, and justice have no terminal date and are unending.

Seldom before has foreign policy had to be conducted against the background of such vast ideological divisions; never before has it been conducted in the knowledge that miscalculation could mean the end of civilized life. The need for a global structure has long been evident, but the gap between developed and developing countries—a constant challenge to tranquillity—has continued to widen. The growing reality of our interdependence is in constant tension with the compelling trends of separatism and intense nationalism.

At the turn of the decade, our cardinal task was to disengage from a war that had placed 550,000 Americans on the mainland of Asia in a way that preserved our ability to design and to influence the development of a new international order. Newly conscious of our limits, we sought to put into place a foreign policy of the kind less favored nations had to conduct throughout history—a foreign policy that depended on the perception of priorities, a feeling for the importance of nuance, and a realization that there could be no terminal date to our efforts. Our traditional predisposition for moral, legal, and clear-cut solutions was not abandoned, but we attempted to reconcile them with a new understanding of the geopolitical realities of our time. Above all, we needed to rally and maintain the support of the American people for the long haul.

It is in the nature of foreign policy that problems of world structure cannot be concluded in one Administration. I believe that we have emerged from one of the most trying decades in our history with new maturity, with the foundations of a long-term policy in place, with the world and America more tranquil than we found them, and with considerable opportunities for constructive achievement before us. We are no longer innocent, but neither have we grown cynical. We have reconfirmed our historic responsibility to contribute to the eternal quest of all peoples to live in security and peace, free from fear, oppression, or foreign domination. We must never forget that no other free nation is strong enough or cohesive enough to replace us. If we falter, no one can step into the breach, and hostile purposes and incompatible values will then shape the future of mankind. Without our commitment there can be no security; without our contribution there can be no progress. This is America's inescapable burden, its incontestable glory.

So, as the Administrations change, let us dedicate ourselves to the task of insuring that our common purposes transcend our differences. No matter how strong the foundations we have laid, the challenges confronting the next Administration will be complex, difficult, and painful. There will continue to be, as there have been in the past, many complicated choices to make; and there will continue to be intense dispute over the wisdom of the choices made and the courses that have been set. Achievement will inevitably fall short of hope and expectation, as it has in every Administration. The new Administration may avoid some of the mistakes we made; it will surely make some new ones of its own. But all of us owe those who carry the burden of responsibility the benefit of the doubt, a healthy understanding for the magnitude of their problems and compassion for the narrow range of choices available.

Long before I had any expectation that I

would be leaving office, I emphasized, perhaps self-servingly, the vital importance of a nonpartisan foreign policy. I repeat that plea now with equal fervor. The divisions that have characterized the last decade in this country must finally end. The deeds demanded of America in the decade ahead can only be accomplished by a united people and government acting with boldness, perseverance, and vision.

This is the time to build a new foreign policy consensus similar in scope though different in content than that which sustained the post-World War II generation. Americans must once again conduct their foreign policy debates with a recognition that we are, after all, partners in a vital national endeavor on which depends our future and that of the rest of the world. Let us behave during these years so that we shall remember them as the time when the American people rediscovered their unity. For my own part, I wish my successors well. I will do my best to contribute to an informed, constructive, and supportive public dialogue.

You ladies and gentlemen of the Fourth Estate have a stake in this enterprise. If I may make a parting request it is to look upon my successors' challenges with some sympathy—to remember that what appears to an outsider as lack of candor may in reality be the best judgment of serious people grappling with events emerging from a fog of confusing reports and putting forward policies which they believe to be right, but which they cannot know to be right until the time for decision is past.

The profound alterations over the past decade in our perceptions of morality and political propriety have affected every aspect of our public life, and they have had a dramatic impact upon the relationship between the government and the press. The days when statesmen and journalists coexisted in an atmosphere of trust and shared confidences have given way to a state of almost perpetual inquest which, at its worst, can degenerate into a relationship of hunter and hunted, deceiver and dupe.

But in its best sense these new attitudes have been, and will be, centrally important to the health and vitality of our democracy. What public servant who bears that title with pride and integrity ultimately will not be grateful for a press that relentlessly holds its officials to high standards of truth and integrity? Can one ever forget the sinking feeling of being asked a question at a press conference by a reporter who already knows the answer from an earlier background session? What official has not been aged by the panicky knowledge that some journalist is seducing another source to confirm what he has been told on an off-the-record basis? And who can avoid the special anguish of knowing that if the reporter succeeds, one has gotten exactly what one deserves?

You and I have been reasonably good protagonists. The jokes and the conflicts, the cooperation and the pain that we have had over the past eight years reflect the fact that under our system the press and the government are natural sparring partners that nevertheless need each other. Both are powerful institutions attempting to serve the public interest by their own lights and according to their own legitimate purposes. The aim of the executive branch is to govern and lead and to implement public policy; yours is to illuminate, question, and analyze. The fact that we are generally right and you are generally wrong does not change the basic elements made up on both sides of respect, fear, deference, and the attempt by each side to get the better of the other.

Nor can it avoid the difference in perspective inherent in the two points of view. I know how exciting it is for reporters to be given access to arcane classified documents, even though they are usually appallingly written and generally incomprehensible. I, of course, hold the view that the real essence of our foreign policy was to be found in the series of speeches I have given around the country. These, of course, have often been slighted (I consider anything except running the full text as being slighted)—I suspect because they were unclassified. But I have one consolation. If you had had all the classified documents that were available to me, you would be as confused as I was.

We shall not settle this debate here—all

the less so since after January 20 I hope to profit from the leaks which you print. This may be the occasion to say that for all my needling, I have admired the objectivity, the honesty, and the fundamental fairness of the press corps which covers the Department of State and the White House. They are the most amusing and perceptive collection of outrageous individualists that I have known. They have, at times, left me breathless with exasperation. But they have sharpened my wits as well. They have even made me concede, in sentimental moments, there may be something in Thomas Jefferson's claim that were it left to him to decide between a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, he would prefer the latter. Luckily for us all, Jefferson never had to pronounce himself regarding television.

We have had, to put it mildly, an intense experience, and we are now at the end of our time together—at least until late January 1981. [Laughter.] As a result of the extraordinary record of discourse between us, we understand each other better. And if I may be so bold, I believe that our discourse has also served the American people, for they know more, as a result, about the role and responsibilities of this nation in the world—perhaps more at times than I wanted them to know.

This nation has never lost its spirit or its faith in its destiny. Even in the difficult times through which we so recently passed, we kept our balance and showed the world the resiliency of our free institutions. And we should forever thank the fates that watch over us for the steady hand of the President it has been my honor to serve for more than two years. His strength and his honesty calmed our troubled land and restored our pride, our integrity, and our sense of decency. President Ford leaves to Governor Carter a nation recovered, a nation confident in the progressive fulfillment of the American dream.

Our new President and Secretary of State deserve the understanding and the support of all Americans, for today our relations with other nations affect every citizen. The search for peace is—in this age of nuclear weapons—a moral and practical imperative. The pursuit of well-being, a traditional concern of nations, becomes now, in an age of interdependence, one that can only be realized in cooperation with others. The problems of justice take on fresh urgency and complexity when the future of democracy rests in the hands of a dwindling number of countries. Today America's leaders must address the familiar goals of peace, prosperity, and justice in a global landscape that has been transformed and for which our historical experience offers little guidance. Let us, for the first time in over a decade, chart our future as a united people.

Three and a half years ago, I, a naturalized citizen, was sworn in as Secretary of State of my adopted country. The responsibilities once borne by such men as Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Marshall, and Acheson were temporarily bequeathed to me. In no other country in the world would this have been possible. Because of my origin, I have perhaps had a unique perspective of what America means to the cause of freedom and human dignity. And I have had no higher aim than to repay in some small measure my debt to this country which saved me from totalitarianism and the world from slavery.

I leave to you, for a time, the great domain of public policy. I would be hypocritical if I pretended that to part is easy. I envy you the excitement, the responsibility, the opportunities that will be yours. I shall never forget how hard you tested me. I shall always cherish the experiences we enjoyed together. And I will think of you with affection tinged with exasperation.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. What do you believe will be regarded as your most enduring achievement in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Occasionally making a decision that was not recommended by the Foreign Service. [Laughter.]

In general, before I appear totally evasive

in my last appearance with the press [laughter], let me confess that I will be evasive [laughter]. I don't think this is the time for me to assess my contribution—particularly since I have referred in the beginning to my well-known humility [laughter]—I don't want to raise any questions about that subject.

But as I pointed out in my remarks, the merit of individual policies will have to be assessed over an extended period of time.

The fundamental problem that America faced in the late sixties and early seventies was how to move from a foreign policy that was conducted by analogy to domestic policy to a foreign policy that other nations have had to conduct throughout most of their history—in which interests had to be assessed in relation to values, in which priorities had to be established among objectives that could not all be achieved simultaneously, and in which we realized that our international role would be unending.

This was the fundamental task that had to be begun in this Administration and that will now have to be carried forward in the next.

Q. What was your greatest disappointment in office, apart from losing your job? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the disintegration of executive authority that resulted from Watergate prevented us from exploiting fully the situation that existed in the early seventies—and, indeed, it created a rather dangerous international environment for a limited period of time. It led to needless disputes about the relative role of the executive and the legislative branch, and it consumed too much of our energies on procedural and peripheral issues.

Q. Did you have a more free hand in conducting foreign policy under President Ford or under President Nixon?

Secretary Kissinger: No matter how I answer that question I will ruin myself. [Laughter.]

In the relationship of the Security Adviser or of the Secretary of State to the President, one cannot measure the relative role of either by the degree to which they may have differed with their President or the degree to which the President may have overruled them. Any strong Secretary of State has had the necessity of a close relationship with the President. No Secretary of State can conduct foreign policy without the full support of the President, and any Secretary of State who understands the nature of our system will not make a major move without the fullest discussion and guidance by the President.

The personalities of Presidents Nixon and Ford were substantially different, and therefore the nature of the relationship and the nature in which they made decisions was substantially different. But as for my own relationship with them, I had a relationship of confidence with both, and I had the backing of both, and I had the guidance of both in the conduct of foreign policy.

Q. Former President Nixon had indicated that he was the primary idea man behind the Kissinger policies. What is your comment? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: My comment is that I'll write my book after he completes his. [Laughter.]

Prospects for Middle East Progress

Q. You have been photographed often in embrace with Sadat [*Anwar al-Sadat, President of Egypt*] *and have been widely hailed for your shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. Is the Middle East really any closer to solution of the Israeli, Palestinian, and other issues that have so long plagued it? Has the Middle East been eliminated as a likely area of Soviet-American confrontation and conflict?*

Secretary Kissinger: The Middle East has obviously not been eliminated as a source of conflict. It's important to look at the situation in 1973 and the situation today. In 1973, the Arab world and Israel were engaged in a war, at the end of which the danger of a new flareup was extremely great. We had no diplomatic relations with the key Arab countries, except Saudi Arabia and Jordan. We

often sent messages to Cairo or to Damascus via Moscow. What was needed was to reestablish some relationship with the Arab world, to maintain our traditional friendship with Israel, but to move the area toward peace initially by a step-by-step approach, which we have always believed would emerge in an overall solution.

We are now approaching the point where the conditions in the Middle East for significant progress seem to us propitious. Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan are all committed to a progress toward a peace which recognizes the existence and legitimacy of the State of Israel. The radical elements in the area no longer have the influence that they possessed some years ago.

I believe the negotiations will be extremely complicated and they may take some time. But I do believe that the conditions for progress are better than they have been in many years.

Q. According to Murrey Marder, in his comprehensive survey of your career that appeared in the Washington Post two months ago, you have acknowledged duping the press on only one occasion. You were reported seeking from Syria a list of Israeli prisoners, and the list was in your pocket all the time.

How many other times have you duped the press, and are you prepared to acknowledge any of those occasions today?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we only have two minutes [laughter], and if I give a partial answer to that question, you will accuse me of duping you again.

On that particular occasion that Mr. Marder mentioned, we had a profound humanitarian problem, which is that we had been given the list on a confidential basis. We had told of the fact that we had this list to only the highest leaders on the Israeli side, and we were afraid that the prisoners would not be released if we did not follow the sequence that had been suggested to us.

Maybe it could have been handled in a different manner, but as soon as we had been given the go-ahead to release the list, we explained to the press exactly the circumstances in which it had been obtained. But we could not do it before we had complied with the sequence of events that had been suggested to us.

Debate on Nuclear "Supremacy"

Q. As a result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks under your stewardship, have you put the Soviet Union into a position to achieve world nuclear supremacy?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is time that we conduct a rational debate on the issue of nuclear strategy. It is too important and vital a subject to be made the subject of partisan and doctrinaire political debate.

First, with respect to the first SALT agreement: The limitations that were established at the first SALT agreement resulted from the force levels that had been decided upon in the 1960's. There was no American program that was stopped as a result of the first SALT agreement. And 210 Soviet missiles had to be dismantled, and several Soviet programs were stopped.

I have never understood the argument why an agreement that ratified a balance that we had unilaterally accepted and that we had unilaterally established should threaten our security when it was simply a reflection of the existing reality that no one had proposed to change without the agreement.

With respect to the negotiations that are now going on, the American people must understand that strategic nuclear weapons confront all of mankind with a new circumstance; namely, that for the first time in history, mankind can literally destroy itself.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union is achieving military supremacy over the United States. I do not believe that any American Administration would permit a situation to arise in which the Soviet Union could achieve strategic superiority over the United States.

But the essence of the contemporary problem in the military field is that the term "supremacy"—when the casualties on both

sides will be in the tens of millions—has practically no operational significance, as long as we do what is necessary to maintain a balance.

The military danger we face is with respect to regional conflicts. Those forces must be modernized and strengthened.

But no Administration, neither ours nor our successors', will ever permit the Soviet Union to achieve supremacy. And those who are talking as if in the strategic field we could still talk about a meaningful conduct of military operations are not doing this country a service and they are not doing mankind a service.

The War in Vietnam

Q. Mr. Secretary, in retrospect, could you, or would you, have developed other diplomatic initiatives that might have ended the war in Vietnam in 1969? Was the price of four more years of war worth what we achieved otherwise?

Secretary Kissinger: In 1969 we found 550,000 Americans in Vietnam suffering hundreds of casualties a week. Those of you who remember the difficulty of extricating 10,000 Americans in 1975 will understand the complexity of the problem that we confronted in 1969.

It was our belief that as a country on which many others relied for their security and for their commitments, we had to extricate the American forces from Vietnam in a manner that maintained a belief in our capacity to keep our word and that did not throw into question our own international role.

And if you look over the debates that existed in 1969, '70, and '71, there were no significant proposals to withdraw all our forces; the differences concerned tactical issues of the terms under which they might be withdrawn.

I think the issue of whether it could have been done more rapidly will undoubtedly always be open. We would not have done what we did if we had not believed it to be the right course.

We had one condition: that we would not overthrow—as a price of leaving Vietnam—a government which our predecessors had established. We did this because of our perception of what the honor and the word of the United States required.

As soon as that condition was met, we terminated the war. But it will require a long and detailed analysis of all of the negotiations in order to be able to determine what other opportunities existed. Obviously, if I had believed other opportunities existed, we would have seized them.

Relations With People's Republic of China

Q. It is almost five years since the signing of the Shanghai communique. Why has China not been recognized? Why has there been no resolution of the Taiwan question, and what are the prospects for U.S.-China trade?

Secretary Kissinger: The Shanghai communique set no deadline for the normalization of relations.

Our relations with China have two aspects. There is the aspect of our assessment of the international situation, and the common objectives that the People's Republic of China and the United States have in preventing what we have jointly called hegemony.

Secondly, there is the commitment in the Shanghai communique to the achievement progressively of the normalization of relations. This commitment remains and will no doubt be also pursued by the new Administration.

The timing, the conditions, under which it can be achieved will have to be negotiated between the United States and the People's Republic of China. And we have not previously achieved a meeting of the minds on this. But we also believe that in the other areas, in the area of our perception of the world situation, we have had fruitful talks with the Chinese throughout the whole period since the Shanghai communique was signed and those talks can continue even before normalization is concluded.

Secretary Kissinger Emphasizes Need for Nonpartisan Foreign Policy

The Foreign Policy Association of New York held a dinner in honor of Secretary Kissinger at New York, N.Y., on January 11. Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at the dinner.[1]

Press release 5 dated January 12

I appreciated particularly that Ambassador Murphy agreed to preside over these proceedings. I do not think that the average American understands the ambivalent relationship between the Foreign Service and the Secretary of State. The Foreign Service is the most dedicated, slightly supercilious, devoted, and able group of professionals that serves any nation.

From the point of view of the Secretary of State, there is only one problem. They are opposed to what they call lateral entry, and deep down they are convinced that if it were not for this unfortunate device whereby people are moved in sideways from the outside, no Secretary of State would really have been qualified to join the Foreign Service. [Laughter.] This accounts for the combination of deference, slight feeling of superiority, and exhausting bureaucratic procedures founded on superior knowledge and dedication which is the hallmark of the Foreign Service.

Almost every Secretary of State has entered the Department convinced that he would break through this awesome machinery that he found in place; and every Secretary of State sooner or later has been conquered by this group of outstanding professionals, specialists, presenting options that contain no choices [laughter and applause], always prepared to rewrite their papers as long as the change is confined to punctuation and who yet in a marvelous, mysterious, and devoted way carry out the business of our government.

Since I have been Secretary of State I have been present when the bodies of three Foreign Service officers were returned. In each case they had been the victims of assassination and in each case a large number of volunteers stepped forward, without being requested, to take their place. I believe this symbolizes what this country owes to this extraordinary group of men and women.

I have harassed them because I believed, and still do, that they are the ablest group of people that any government has ever assembled and because I believed it was my duty to make them perform at their top performance. I have been rewarded, as all my predecessors have before me and as my successors without question will be, by men and women who served their country and not a party, who worked for peace and not for an individual. And I hope that the nonpartisan, professional character of our Foreign Service will always be recognized and will always be preserved. I want to take this opportunity, in what is my last public appearance as Secretary of State, to pay tribute to this remarkable group that has never been more important in our country's history as our foreign policy becomes more complicated, as the decisions grow more complex.

We must have a group of men and women who represent continuity. We cannot pretend to ourselves that the foreign policy of a great nation can change every four or eight years, and that pretense itself is a factor of instability in the world. We must have, with all the tactical alterations that are inevitable, a large element of continuity that is required, a great degree of technical knowledge, and I know that my successor, Mr. Vance, whom I admire and who deserves our support, will find in the Foreign Service a dedicated, able, and brilliant instrument in the conduct of our foreign policy. I would like also to say that Ambassador Murphy represents the best qualities in the Foreign Service.

I have been Secretary of State during an extremely turbulent period in our history. Its surface manifestations were the war in Vietnam, the tragedy of Watergate, and the disputes between the executive and the legislative branches of our government, which on too many occasions paralyzed action and confused other nations. But in its deeper sense,

[1] Introductory and closing remarks by Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Carter E. Burgess, chairman of the association, and others and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's remarks are not printed here.

we were going through a period of transition. For the first time in our history the United States has had to conduct foreign policy the same way less favored nations have had to conduct it in all their experience.

Throughout most of our history we could pursue one of several strands: either an assertion that our moral principles were automatically applicable in every part of the world or a belief that we could stand apart from the rest of the world and wait till the crisis occurred and overwhelm it with resources—or else we acted as if our domestic experience could be applied automatically on a global scale.

As long as the United States was protected by two great oceans, as long as our resources were infinite in relation to the problems with which we had to deal, we could choose any one of these approaches and generally be successful. But today we face the dilemmas that other nations have experienced throughout their history. Today we must choose among our priorities. We cannot do everything simultaneously. Today the nature of the world we imagine will determine importantly the kind of world which we are able to build.

It is the dilemma of the policymaker that at the time that he must act he does not have the knowledge on which to base such action. When he has the knowledge, it is usually too late to affect events. A great deal therefore depends on judgment, on confidence—psychological confidence on the part of the policymakers and confidence between the policymakers and the public.

The United States for the last decade has consumed itself in a civil strife which is bound to have the most profound consequences on our international affairs.

While I was Secretary of State I constantly preached the importance of a nonpartisan approach to foreign policy. Now that I leave office I want to reiterate this need. The new Administration must be given an opportunity to conduct its policies without the bitterness and rancor, without the strife between the branches of our government, that have been so characteristic of the last decade.

Now, if I am correct in the needs of our foreign policy, this Association has played a crucial and honorable role. I have traveled, as Ambassador Reinhardt [John E. Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs] has pointed out, to 35 cities in this country to speak, to meet with leaders, to exchange ideas, and to explain what we were trying to do. All of these trips have been taken under the auspices of the various World Affairs Councils, and I am particularly moved that so many who have heard me in cities across the country have done me the honor of coming here tonight, probably in order to find out for how many minutes I can go without placing a verb. [Laughter.]

Nothing is more important than to give our public a correct appreciation of the foreign policy issues that they confront. The simplifiers, the people who believe that there are some easy slogans that produce final answers, are as pernicious as those who profess total indifference to the problems of foreign policy.

We must face the fact that, for as far ahead as we can see, the peace of our citizens and the well-being of our citizens depends crucially on our performance in international affairs. And for as far ahead as we can see, the peace of the world and the well-being of the world is inseparable from the American performance.

Ours is a tremendous responsibility. The world has become interdependent; but, alone among the free nations, we are capable of giving expression to that interdependence on a global scale. The world's security can no longer be divided; but, alone among the free nations of the world, we can form a global conception of security. Therefore freedom and prosperity everywhere depend on the sophistication of our policy and the depth of our commitment, and no group has done more to bring about informed nonpartisan citizenship than this group that is meeting here this evening.

As idealists, as perfectionists, we constantly come to debate our faults; but, for somebody who came to this country as a young man, I can never forget what America has meant to people who were not born to freedom. When I came here in 1938 I was asked to write an essay at George Washington High School here in this city about what

it meant to be an American. I wrote that of course I missed the people with whom I had grown up and the places that were familiar to me. But then I thought that this was a country where one could walk across the street with one's head erect and therefore it was all worthwhile.

What America means to the rest of the world is the hope for people everywhere that they shall be able to walk with their heads erect, and our responsibility as Americans is always to make sure that our purposes transcend our differences.

I have tried to make a contribution to this, and your organizations have organized the meetings and, beyond this, have contributed to the education and commitment of the American people. And therefore I would like to take this opportunity to thank you from the bottom of my heart.

America's Continuing Concerns in the Middle East

The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations held a luncheon in honor of Secretary Kissinger at New York, N.Y., on January 11. Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at the luncheon.[1]

Press release 4 dated January 12

You and I have gone through a great deal together in recent years, and I thought that if this meeting made any sense, it would be if I spoke to you from the heart about some of the considerations on my mind.

We have had, of necessity, a very complicated relationship. From my point of view, probably no criticism has hurt me more than if it came from this community. And probably from your point of view, it was especially painful if disagreements occurred between the Jewish community and the first Jewish Secretary of State in American history.

I like to believe, with my friend Simcha [Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz], that the disagreements never went to the heart of our relationship; that they usually concerned tactics by which to achieve fundamentally agreed objectives. But I thought it was important for the future of Israel and for the future of the Jewish people that the actions that the U.S. Government took were not seen to be the result of a special personal relationship; that the support we gave Israel reflected not my personal preferences alone but the basic national interests of the United States, transcending the accident of who might be in office at any particular period.

I have never forgotten that 13 members of my family died in concentration camps, nor could I ever fail to remember what it was like to live in Nazi Germany as a member of a persecuted minority.

I believe, however, that the relationship of Israel to the United States transcends these personal considerations. I do not believe that it is compatible with the moral conscience of mankind to permit Israel to suffer in the Middle East a ghetto existence that has been suffered by Jews in many individual countries throughout their history.

The support for a free and democratic Israel in the Middle East is a moral necessity of our period to be pursued by every Administration and with a claim to the support of all freedom-loving people all over the world.

So, we begin in our concerns with the moral and the human dimension. Beyond that, any nation has a right to live in security and not to be dependent for its survival on the good will of its neighbors. It must be a basic principle of American policy that Israel must be strong enough so that its decisions are made by free choice and are not imposed on it by a combination of outside factors or by its neighbors. And therefore it must be a principle of American policy that Israel must always be strong enough to defend itself and that the United States must see to it that Israel is strong enough, because only then can a peace that is negotiated be lasting and only then can peace be perceived to be just.

I have believed that an effort must be made to advance the prospects of peace in

[1] Introductory and closing remarks by the chairman of the conference, Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, and others and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's remarks are not printed here.

the Middle East. And no people can have a greater interest in it than those who for thousands of years have been subjected to the arbitrary will of many host countries—for a nation that in its existence has never known recognition and acceptance by its immediate neighbors.

Historians will have to judge the methods that were appropriate. But that the relations between countries divided by distrust and suffering for a generation could not be repaired easily and quickly, that the attempt to solve everything at once involved the risk of catastrophe as well as the prospects of success, can never be overlooked.

The difference between statesmen and those who observe from the outside is that there are some experiments that statesmen cannot try, because the consequences of their failure would be too profound.

I believe now that there are some prospects for peace in the Middle East. The influence of hostile outside powers is less than at any time in decades. The influence of radical elements within the Middle East has been reduced. But it is an effort that requires patience and wisdom and, above all, a profound understanding for the dilemma of a people like Israel, which cannot afford to make a mistake and which cannot entrust itself simply to abstract declarations of good will. Because if a mistake is made, it is likely to be irrevocable.

Rabbi Schindler pointed out that maybe I am glad to be rid of this group, but I do not believe I will ever be rid of this group. [Laughter and Applause.] And frankly, I do not want ever to be rid of this group, though I may retract this in a few months. [Laughter.]

The problems of security and of peace in the Middle East will be with us for as long as we can see. I will remain dedicated, as a friend of Israel and as a friend of this group, for as long as I live. And I want you to know that this meeting has meant a great deal to me.

Throughout their history, Jews have been saying to themselves, "Next year in Jerusalem." I would like to think that sometime soon we can say this in its deepest sense—in an Israel that is secure, that is accepted, that is at peace. And it will always mean a great deal to me to have worked with this group, and with my friends in Israel, to achieve this objective.

Lebanese Delegation Discusses Rehabilitation Needs

Department Statement [1]

In response to an invitation extended by Secretary Kissinger, President Sarkis of Lebanon sent H.E. Ghassan Tueini as his personal emissary to Washington as head of a delegation to discuss specific ways in which the United States can be helpful to the Lebanese Government in rebuilding its national institutions and economy in the aftermath of a year and a half of civil strife.

Since his arrival on December 14, Mr. Tueini has met twice with the Secretary. He and members of his delegation have also held discussions with Deputy Secretary Robinson, AID Administrator Parker, as well as other high-ranking officials of the Department and AID. Mr. Tueini has also met with Mr. Robert McNamara, the President of the World Bank; Mr. Witteveen, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and several members of Congress while in Washington and with officials of the United Nations in New York. He concludes his mission to Washington with a meeting tomorrow [December 23] with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Habib and Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Atherton.

The United States steadfastly supports the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of Lebanon; we welcome recent progress under the leadership of President Sarkis toward the reestablishment of security and the revitalization of political and economic processes in Lebanon following the tragic events of recent months. Mr. Tueini has informed us that Lebanon has suffered an estimated $3 billion in destruction. He has described the Lebanese Government's

[1] Issued on Dec. 22 (text from press release 616).

priorities: to meet immediate humanitarian needs, while pressing forward rapidly to restore productivity and jobs, and beginning the massive long-term task of physical reconstruction in ways that will promote social justice and assure a sense of opportunity for all of Lebanon's citizens.

Lebanon possesses significant human and material resources for the job ahead, but the United States recognizes that it will require assistance from the international community. The United States will very shortly be sending to Lebanon a small team of experts in key aspects of relief and rehabilitation. This will lay the groundwork for an expansion of our present program of emergency assistance in coordination with the Lebanese Government and other international donors.

We have indicated to Mr. Tueini and his delegation that we are planning a Public Law 480 title I food aid program of $20 million, subject to appropriate consultations with the Congress. The Lebanese Government will also be developing priority programs in housing both to effect emergency repairs to existing shelters for the winter months and, eventually, to restore or replace damaged structures. We already are engaged in efforts through voluntary organizations to assist in meeting these immediate needs. We have considered with the Tueini delegation the question of the longer term needs of Lebanon. We have agreed to examine possible ways in which we can be helpful, including the provision of technical and managerial expertise, in restoring on an emergency basis the remaining Beirut port facilities to support the relief and rehabilitation process. We are already at work on one possibility: the immediate provision of surplus heavy equipment for interim use in the port. These mobile cranes and other equipment would also assist in priority programs to remove rubble and hazardous structures and maintain vital road links in mountainous regions in the face of winter snows.

We are agreed that progress in these spheres is both important and possible.

These efforts are in addition to the assistance we have already made available. Specifically, we have provided thus far a total of $19 million in humanitarian aid through the International Committee of the Red Cross, the American University Hospital in Beirut, the Catholic Relief Service, and the U.N. program for Lebanon. These funds have provided medical supplies and services and other emergency assistance for those in need; we are, for example, providing commodities under a Public Law 480 title II program to feed 300,000 persons in Lebanon.

We will continue our close consultations with the Lebanese Government as it lays the foundations for the country's long-term reconstruction program. Some funds for assistance to Lebanon are available in the current fiscal year 1977 budget. When we have a clearer picture of the contribution the United States can make to Lebanon's longer term needs, we will discuss with the Congress possible future programs and their funding. We will also be in regular touch with respected and experienced international institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations, to define further the role the United States can and should play in support of these efforts, which enjoy our sympathy and concern.

Negotiations Held on Imports of Meat to the U.S. for 1977

Department Announcement, December 15

Press release 605 dated December 15

The United States has reached substantive agreement with the governments of major meat-exporting countries on arrangements to govern trade in meat, mainly beef, during 1977.

The overall system of arrangements with supplying countries will provide assurance that aggregate imports into the United States will not exceed 1,281.9 million pounds next year, an increase of 4 percent over imports in 1976. In the case of some of the countries, the arrangements are agreed on an *ad referendum* basis, subject to final approval by their governments. Formal arrangements are expected to be concluded shortly.

Canada, which has not been a participant in previous restraint programs, will be covered by the 1977 arrangement. However, the

precise terms of Canada's participation which will cover the two-way U.S.-Canadian trade in meat are still under discussion.

Undertaken at the direction of President Ford, the negotiations commenced December 6 in Washington with the United States represented by officials of the Departments of State and Agriculture and the Office of the Special Trade Representative, working under the general supervision of the Agricultural Policy Committee.

THE CONGRESS

Seventh Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

This report is the seventh in a series of messages pursuant to Public Law 94–104 through which I have informed the Congress of my Administration's efforts to encourage progress toward a resolution of the problems of Cyprus. In addition to reviewing those efforts, this report will offer several conclusions with regard to the role the United States can and should play in settlement of the Cyprus dispute.

I know the Congress shares my views that a just and early settlement of the Cyprus issue is essential both for humanitarian reasons and to preserve peace in an area of great importance to the United States. For more than two years my Administration has actively sought to help the Cypriot communities find the basis for substantive and sustained negotiations. We have given the UN Secretary General our full and active support in the negotiations conducted under his auspices, negotiations which I believe continue to offer the best possible forum for progress.

I also know the Congress shares my deep regret that progress in the negotiations has been extremely slow. Inconclusive procedural disputes have diverted the parties from pressing issues of substance. Domestic pressures and international rivalries have detracted from the will and commitment that are essential to progress.

In an effort to break this impasse, my Administration has sought over the past several months to develop a set of basic principles that might provide a framework for continued and fruitful intercommunal negotiation. These principles are based on the concepts which I set forth in my sixth report to the Congress and which Secretary of State Kissinger expressed in his September 1976 UN General Assembly address. These concepts rest on a fundamental premise which I believe all concerned parties continue to share—that any settlement must preserve the independence, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Cyprus. These concepts emphasize the importance of territorial adjustments to reduce the area controlled by the Turkish side, while taking into account the economic requirements and humanitarian concerns of the two Cypriot communities, including the plight of those who remain refugees. Constitutional arrangements are of equal importance in providing conditions under which the two communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs. Finally, security arrangements which would permit the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under international agreement are essential for a lasting settlement.

Based upon these concepts, the United States has engaged over the past several months in extensive consultations on the Cyprus issue with the nine member states of the European Community, seeking their support for a new and accelerated approach. Through these consultations we are jointly developing the basic principles which we hope will stimulate the negotiations. We have been greatly impressed and encouraged by the extent to which there is a consensus in these consultations on both the principles and the urgent need to reopen substantive intercommunal negotiations.

[1] Transmitted on Jan. 10 (text from White House press release dated Jan. 10).

I remain convinced, however, that neither the United States nor any other outside country or group of countries should seek to impose a settlement on Cyprus. The principles we are developing should serve only as a basis for negotiation. It is the Cypriot communities themselves who must ultimately decide their relationship and final territorial arrangements.

In addition it is clear that a final solution must also have the support of the Greek and Turkish governments. It is my firm conviction that we must seek to maintain the trust and friendship of both these NATO allies. Thus my Administration has sought to strengthen through negotiation our security ties with both Greece and Turkey. We have consistently sought to follow a balanced course in strengthening our relations throughout the area. We therefore welcomed the steps taken by the Congress to relax the arms embargo on Turkey so that Turkey can better meet its NATO obligations. We have demonstrated through tangible assistance our support for Greece. We have worked actively, both directly and through the United Nations Security Council, to defuse recent tensions between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean. These two countries have now agreed to a negotiating process called for in the U.S. sponsored Security Council Resolution which I hope will lead to a settlement of their dispute.[2]

It is essential to the success of an equitable and lasting Cyprus settlement that the United States maintain a balanced relationship among all concerned parties. It would be a mistake to place undue pressure on any one party for the sake of what appears to be a quick settlement. I believe the Congress would agree that such a path would neither promote lasting progress on Cyprus nor serve the cause of stability in the Mediterranean.

I am not pessimistic about the future of the Cyprus negotiations. I continue to believe that a way can and will be found to achieve a just and equitable settlement which will enable all of the people of Cyprus to shape a harmonious and prosperous future.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 10, 1977.*

[2] For a U.S. statement and text of Security Council Resolution 395, adopted on Aug. 25, 1976, see BULLETIN of Sept. 25, 1976, p. 374.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

United States Policy on Angola. Hearing before the House Committee on International Relations. January 26, 1976. 45 pp.

United States Commodity Policies. Joint hearings before the Subcommittees on International Resources, Food, and Energy; on International Economic Policy; on International Organizations; and on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations. April 7–27, 1976. 343 pp.

Foreign Policy and Defense Requirements. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. April 29, 1976. 28 pp.

Investigation Into Certain Past Policies of Genocide and Exploration of Policy Options for the Future. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the House Committee on International Relations. May 11–August 30, 1976. 275 pp.

Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador: Implications for U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. June 8–9, 1976. 253 pp.

Human Rights in Uruguay and Paraguay. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. June 17–August 4, 1976. 228 pp.

Congressional Review of International Agreements. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. June 22–July 22, 1976. 416 pp.

Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. Part II. June 22–September 30, 1976. 87 pp.

Human Rights in India. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. June 23–September 23, 1976. 233 pp.

Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. August 4–6, 1976. 138 pp.

Namibia: The United Nations and U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. August 24–27, 1976. 258 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. Withdraws From Convention on Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Statement by Charles W. Robinson
Deputy Secretary [1]

In April of last year, President Ford signed into law the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, extending U.S. fishery jurisdiction to 200 miles as of March 1, 1977. Since that time, the United States has been moving steadily toward domestic management of our fishery resources.

As a consequence of our extended domestic jurisdiction, and in keeping with the intent of the act, the President has decided that the United States would withdraw from the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) effective December 31, 1976.

The United States has been an active member of ICNAF since its inception 26 years ago. That convention has made significant contributions to fishery conservation in the Northwest Atlantic area. We have benefited from decisions taken by convention members. The scientific research and management of fisheries of the area which have been carried out under ICNAF are outstanding examples of the benefits which can be achieved through international cooperation. The President has therefore concluded that as we move toward implementation of our legislation the United States should take into account, in developing our 1977 management plans, the management proposals developed at the last meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.

The expertise developed within ICNAF will provide a sound basis for the establishment of a successor organization which will provide for international cooperation in joint research, even though fisheries management within our 200-mile zone will now be a domestic responsibility of the United States. The United States will actively support efforts to continue international consultation and cooperation in dealing with fisheries problems in the Northwest Atlantic and will participate in the conference of plenipotentiaries in early 1977 to consider the drafting of a new convention.

[1] Issued on Jan. 1 (text from press release 1).

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.[1]
Signatures: Morocco, United States, December 22, 1976.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.
Accessions deposited: Kenya, January 11, 1977; Uruguay, January 12, 1977.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973.
Accessions deposited: Ecuador, January 12, 1977; Kenya, January 11, 1977; Uruguay, January 12, 1977.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Ratification deposited: Panama, January 13, 1977.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, December 29, 1976.
Accession deposited: Bulgaria, January 6, 1977.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect

[1] Not in force.

to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, January 12, 1977.

BILATERAL

Iran

Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of multiple-entry nonimmigrant visas. Effected by exchange of letters at Tehran December 13 and 16, 1976. Entered into force December 16, 1976; effective January 1, 1977.

Sri Lanka

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 29, 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo December 15, 1976. Entered into force December 15, 1976.

Switzerland

Agreement amending the agreement of October 13, 1961, concerning the reciprocal acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft (TIAS 5214). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 7, 1977. Entered into force January 7, 1977.

United Kingdom

Memorandum of understanding concerning the transfer of technical data relating to the JT–10D jet engine collaboration agreement to third countries. Signed at Washington December 30, 1976. Entered into force December 30, 1976.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Selected Documents No. 4, U.S. Policy in the Middle East: November 1974-February 1976. Documents covering the overall U.S. Government approach to promoting peace in the Middle East and to strengthening our relations with individual nations of the region. Near East and South Asian Series 86. Pub. 8878. 126 pp. $1.75. (Cat. No. S1.86:8878).

Restrictive Business Practices. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 8291. 10 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8291).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with El Salvador. TIAS 8324. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8324).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with Nicaragua. TIAS 8325. 8 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8325).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with Guatemala. TIAS 8326. 8 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8326).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with Haiti. TIAS 8327. 8 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8327).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with Honduras. TIAS 8328. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8328).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with the Dominican Republic. TIAS 8329. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8329).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with Panama. TIAS 8330. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8330).

Long Range Aid to Navigation (Loran-C) Station at Williams Lake, British Columbia. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8331. 12 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8331).

Technical Assistance in Tax Administration. Agreement with Trinidad and Tobago amending and extending the agreement of June 20, 1968, as amended and extended. TIAS 8332. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8332).

Protocol to the Social Progress Trust Fund Agreement. Agreement with the Inter-American Development Bank. TIAS 8333. 2 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8333).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with New Zealand. TIAS 8334. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8334).

Thermal Power Plant Near Ismailia. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8335. 13 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8335).

Technical and Feasibility Studies. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8336. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8336).

Nutrition/Health Early Warning System and Access Road Construction. Agreement with Ethiopia. TIAS 8337. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8337).

United States Naval Communication Station in Australia. Agreement with Australia amending the agreement of May 9, 1963, as amended. TIAS 8338. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8338).

Drought Recovery and Rehabilitation Program. Agreement with Senegal. TIAS 8339. 20 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8339).

Atomic Energy—Technical Information Exchange and Development of Standards. Arrangement with Sweden. TIAS 8340. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8340).

Name Index

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: January 10–16

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
3	1/11	Robert Alden, Secretary Kissinger: National Press Club, Jan. 10.
4	1/12	Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, Rabbi Israel Miller, Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Yehudi Hellman, Secretary Kissinger: Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, New York, Jan. 11.
5	1/12	Carter E. Burgess, Robert D. Murphy, John E. Reinhardt, Richard Valeriani, Secretary Kissinger: Foreign Policy Association, New York, Jan. 11.
*6	1/12	Study group 1, U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee, Feb. 15.
*7	1/13	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on radiocommunications, Feb. 17.
*8	1/13	Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Study Group on Hotelkeepers' Liability, Feb. 17.
*9	1/13	Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee meeting rescheduled for Mar. 15–16.

* Not printed.