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Moral Promise and Practical Needs

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

Americans are today in the midst of the quadrennial debate about our past, our present, and the future we hope to create. It is a dramatic demonstration of the strength of our democracy and the greatness of our nation. Whatever the outcome, Americans should take pride that they have once again shown the vigor of a free society which gives hope to the countless millions around the world who are dominated by oppressive regimes and intolerant ideologies.

It is also, let us be frank, a time of confusion and of exaggeration. Some tell us we are weak; others tell us we are strong. Some tell us that our prestige is declining; others assert that our global influence for peace and progress has never been greater. Some tell us we are in retreat around the world; others tell us we have never been more respected, more successful abroad than we are today.

As Secretary of State I am of course detached from partisan debate, although I seem to find my sympathies, for some reason, lying with "others" rather than the "some."

But no matter how strongly Americans may disagree on specific issues, the history of the postwar period has left no doubt about the nature of our global responsibility. Without America's commitment, there can be no real security in the world. Without our dedication, there can be no progress. Without our strength, peoples all over the world will live in fear. Without our faith, they will live in despair.

America's contribution to world affairs has derived from our conviction that while history is often cruel, fate can be shaped by human faith and courage. Our optimism has enabled us to understand that the greatest achievements were a dream before they became a reality. We have learned through experience, as few people have, that all that is creative is ultimately a moral affirmation—the faith that dares in the absence of certainty; the courage to go forward in the face of adversity.

All of us here are deeply concerned about the survival and security of Israel. But we also know that the fate of even our closest friends cannot be assured in a vacuum. Peace, progress, and justice will not be securely won for America or Israel unless they are embedded in a peaceful, progressive, and just international order. The task of building such an order is the fundamental challenge of our time.

No people has experienced more of man's exaltation—and man's depravity—than the Jewish people. The Jewish people know that survival requires unending struggle. But they know, as well, that peace, if it is to be more than a prophet's dream, must rest on the conscience of mankind made real by the concrete efforts of all peoples and all nations.

America, because of its own heritage, is perennially engaged in such a search of

[1] Made before the Synagogue Council of America at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 19 (text from press release 519).

its conscience. How does our foreign policy serve moral ends? How can America carry forward its role as a humane example and champion of justice in a world in which power is still often the final arbiter? How do we secure both our existence and our values? How do we reconcile ends and means, principle and survival?

These questions have been asked throughout our history; they are being posed again today, as they should. But they require more than simple answers and easy slogans.

There is no doubt that policy without moral purpose is like a ship without a rudder, drifting aimlessly from crisis to crisis. A policy of pure calculation will be empty of both vision and humanity. It will lack not only direction but also roots and heart. Americans have always held the view that America stood for a moral purpose above and beyond its material achievements.

But we must recall, as well, that policy is the art of the possible, the science of the relative. We live in a world of 150 sovereign states, profound ideological differences, and nuclear weapons. Our power is enormous, but it is still finite. A truly moral policy must relate ends to means and commitments to capabilities. America, to be true to itself, must keep its eyes on distant horizons; we must also keep our feet planted firmly in reality. We must learn to distinguish morality from moralizing. We must remember that the invocation of lofty principles has led, in our history, as frequently to abdication as to overcommitment. Either tendency would be disastrous for international order and our well-being.

The challenge of American foreign policy is to live up to America's moral promise while fulfilling the practical needs of world order. How we meet it will determine the peace and progress of America and of the world.

This is the subject I would like to discuss with you today.

American Ideals and American Foreign Policy

Americans always have believed that this country had a moral significance that transcended its geographic, military, or economic power. Unique among the nations of the world, America was created as a conscious act by men dedicated to a set of political and ethical principles they believed to be of universal applicability. Small wonder, then, that Santayana concluded that: "Being an American is, of itself, almost a moral condition."

But this idealism has also been in constant tension with another deep-seated strain in our historical experience. Since Tocqueville, it has been frequently observed that we are a pragmatic people, commonsensical, undogmatic, and undoctrinaire, a nation of practical energy, ingenuity, and spirit. We have made tolerance and compromise the basis of our domestic political life. We have defined our basic goals—justice, liberty, equality, and progress—in open and libertarian terms, enlarging opportunity and freedom rather than coercing a uniform standard of conduct.

America has been most effective internationally when we have combined our idealistic and our pragmatic traditions. The Founding Fathers were idealists who launched a new experiment in human liberty. But they were also sophisticated men of the world; they understood the European balance of power and manipulated it brilliantly to secure their independence.

For a century thereafter, we devoted our energies to the development of our continent, content to influence the world by moral example. Shielded by two oceans and the British Navy and blessed by a bountiful nature, we came to believe our special situation was universally valid, even for nations whose narrower margin of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited than our own. We disparaged power even as we grew strong; we tended to see our successes as the product not of fortunate circumstances but of virtue and purity of motive.

As our power grew, we became uncomfortable with its uses and responsibilities and impatient with the compromises of day-to-day diplomacy. Our rise to the status of a great power was feared and resisted by many Americans who foresaw only a process of deepening involvement in a morally questionable world.

In the early decades of this century we sought to reconcile the tension between ideals and interests by confining ourselves to humanitarian efforts and resort to our belief in the preeminence of law. We pioneered in relief programs; we championed free trade and the cause of foreign investment. We attempted to legislate solutions to international conflicts—we experimented with arbitration, conciliation, judicial arrangements, treaties to abolish war, neutrality legislation, collective security systems.

These efforts to banish the reality of power were aborted by our involvement in two World Wars. While we had a clear security interest in a Europe free from domination by any one power, we clothed that interest in assertions that we would do battle for universal moral objectives—"a war to end all wars" or the unconditional surrender of the aggressor.

Disillusionment set in as the outcome of both World Wars necesssarily fell short of expectations. After the first war, a tide of isolationist sentiment rose, in which moral proclamations were coupled with an unwillingness to undertake concrete commitments. We were loath to face a world of imperfect security, alliances of convenience, recurrent crises, and the need for a political structure that would secure the peace.

We undertook our first sustained period of peacetime world leadership in the decades after World War II with a supreme self-assurance fortunately matched by overwhelming material superiority. And we faced an antagonist whose political system and actions on the world scene explicitly threatened the very existence of our most cherished principles.

In a period of seemingly clear-cut, black-and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our traditional approach. We saw economic problems around the world—which we had solved successfully in our own country—and sought to overwhelm them with the sheer weight of resources, often with startling success. We projected our domestic experience overseas and assumed that economic progress automatically led to political stability. And in the process, without making a conscious decision to do so, we were trying to shape the world to our design.

The Complexities of the Contemporary World

Our postwar policy was marked by great achievements: the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, the resistance to aggression, the encouragement of decolonization.

But we no longer live in so simple a world.

We remain the strongest nation and the largest single influence in international affairs. For 30 years our leadership has sustained world peace, progress, and justice. Our leadership is no less needed today, but it must be redefined to meet changing conditions. Ours is no longer a world of American nuclear monopoly, but one of substantial nuclear equivalence. Ours is no longer a world of two solid blocs and clear-cut dividing lines, but one of proliferating centers of power and influence. Ours is no longer a world amenable to national or regional solutions, but one of economic interdependence and common global challenges.

Thus, for the first time in American experience, we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. Rather we, like all other nations in history, must now conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, persistence, and imagination if we are to preserve and forward our national goals.

We can no longer impose our own solutions; yet our action or inaction will influence events, often decisively. We cannot banish power from international affairs,

but we can use our vast power wisely and firmly to deter aggression and encourage restraint. We can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation. We can help construct more equitable relations between developed and developing nations and a wider community of interest among all nations. And we must continue to stand for freedom and human dignity in the world.

These are worthy goals. They can be achieved. But they summon a different dimension of moral conviction than that of a simpler past. They require the stamina to persevere amid ambiguity and endless exertion, the courage to hold fast to what we believe in while recognizing that at any one time our hopes are likely to be only partially fulfilled.

We must always keep in mind that it was precisely under the banners of universal moralistic slogans that a decade and a half ago we launched into adventures that divided our country and undermined our international position. It is only in the last few years that we have finally begun to bring our commitments into line with our capabilities.

Clearly we must maintain our values and our principles; but we risk disaster unless we relate them to concepts of the national interest and international order that are based not on impulse but on a sense of steady purpose that can be maintained by the American people for the long term.

This is not a choice between morality and pragmatism. We cannot escape either and still remain true to our national character or to the needs of the world community. Our cause must be just, but it must prosper in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills. We can achieve no positive ends unless we survive, and survival has its practical necessities. Neither moralistic rhetoric nor obsession with pure power politics will produce a foreign policy worthy of our opportunity or adequate for our survival.

The Morality of Ends and Means

America, and the community of nations, today faces inescapable tasks:

—We must maintain a secure and just peace.

—We must create a cooperative and beneficial international order.

—We must defend the rights and the dignity of man.

Each of these challenges has both a moral and a practical dimension. Each involves important ends, but ends that are sometimes in conflict. When that is the case we face the real moral dilemma of foreign policy: the need to choose between valid ends and to relate our ends to means.

Peace

In an age when nuclear cataclysm threatens mankind's very survival, peace is a fundamental moral imperative. Without it, nothing else we do or seek can ultimately have meaning. Let there be no mistake about it: averting the danger of nuclear war, and limiting and ultimately reducing destructive nuclear arsenals, is a moral as well as political act.

In the nuclear age, traditional power politics, the struggle for marginal advantages, and the drive for prestige and unilateral gains must yield to an unprecedented sense of responsibility. History teaches us that balances based on constant tests of strength have always erupted into war. But common sense tells us that in the nuclear age history cannot be permitted to repeat itself. Every President, sooner or later, will conclude with President Eisenhower that there is no alternative to peace.

But peace, however crucial, cannot be our *only* goal. To seek it at any price would render us morally defenseless and place the world at the mercy of the most ruthless. Mankind must do more, as Tacitus said, than make a desert and call it peace.

There will be no security in a world whose obsession with peace leads to appeasement, but neither will there be security in a world in which mock tough rhetoric and the accumulation of arms is the sole measure of competition. We owe our people a convincing justification for their exertions; we can spare no effort to bequeath to future generations a peace more hopeful than an equilibrium of terror.

Barely four years ago demonstrations in the streets demanded "peace" as overriding all other considerations; today policies of conciliation are frequently denounced as unilateral concessions. Both extremes falsify our challenge. In the search for peace we are continually called upon to strike balances—between strength and conciliation, between the need to defend our values and our interests and the need to take into account the views of others, between partial and total settlements.

The task of foreign policy is to find that balance between competing ends and between ends and means. The problems of timing, method, and feasibility impose themselves on any conscientious policy decision. There are certain experiments that cannot be tried, not because the goals are undesirable, but because the consequences of failure would be so severe that not even the most elevated goal can justify the risk.

The Middle East provides a vivid example. No people yearn for comprehensive peace more than the people of Israel, whose existence has not been recognized by any of its neighbors throughout its history. There are those who argue that in the aftermath of the 1973 war the entire complex of Arab-Israeli issues—borders, peace obligations, refugees—should have been approached simultaneously at one conference. But the proponents of this course ignore the fact that at the time it would probably have proved disastrous: the United States had no diplomatic relations with several of the key Arab countries; the Soviet Union was in effect the lawyer for the Arab cause; an oil embargo was still in effect; and hostility between the Arab states and Israel remained at the flashpoint. Under such conditions the chances for success of a comprehensive approach were slight and the penalties for failure were far-reaching: a continuation of the oil embargo, a prolonged freeze in U.S. relations with the Arab world, the corresponding growth of Soviet influence, strains with our allies in Europe and Japan, the increased isolation of Israel, and the likelihood, therefore, of a resumption of the Middle East war in even more difficult circumstances.

We chose to proceed step by step on those issues where room for agreement seemed to exist. We sought to establish a new relationship with the Arab world, to reduce the Soviet capacity for exploiting tensions, and to build a new sense of confidence in the parties directly involved so that overall solutions would someday be possible. We approached peace in stages but with the intention of ultimately merging individual steps into a comprehensive solution.

In the brief space of 18 months three agreements were reached, two between Egypt and Israel and one between Syria and Israel. As a result, the possibilities of achieving a genuine peace are greater today than they have ever been.

Deep suspicions remain, but the first important steps have been taken. The beginnings of mutual trust—never before in evidence—are emerging. Some Arab states for the first time are openly speaking of peace and ending a generation of conflict. The capacity of outside countries to exacerbate tensions has been reduced. The step-by-step approach has thus brought us to a point where comprehensive approaches are the logical next step. The decision be-

fore us now is not whether, but how, the next phase of negotiations should be launched. And we will engage in it, together with our Israeli friends, with new hope and confidence.

International Cooperation

America's second moral imperative is the growing need for global cooperation.

We live in a world of more than 150 countries, each asserting sovereignty and claiming the right to realize its national aspirations. Clearly no nation can fulfill *all* its goals without infringing on the rights of others. Hence, compromise and common endeavors are inescapable on some issues at least. The growing interdependence of states in the face of the polarizing tendencies of nationalism and ideologies makes imperative the building of world community.

We live in an age of division, division between East and West and between the advanced industrial nations and the developing nations. Clearly a world in which a few nations constitute islands of wealth in a sea of poverty, disease, and despair is fundamentally insecure and morally intolerable. Those nations that consider themselves dispossessed will become the seedbed of upheaval. But the tactics of confrontation with which some of the developing nations have pursued their goals are also both intolerable and unsafe.

The challenge of world community will require realistic assumptions and actions by North and South alike. The industrial nations should not be obsessed with guilt or wedded to the status quo. The developing nations should not seek to gain their objectives through extortion or blackmail. What is required all around is a serious dedication to the requirements of cooperation, without which neither group can achieve its goals.

The objectives of the developing nations are clear: they want economic development, a role in international decisions that affect them, and a fair share of global economic benefits. The goals of the industrial nations are equally clear: widening prosperity, an open world system of trade and investments with expanding markets for North and South, and reliable and equitable development of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw materials.

The goals of both sides can be achieved only if they are seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. The process of building a new era of international economic relationships will continue through the rest of this century. If those relationships are to be equitable and lasting, negotiation and compromise among diverse and contending interests will clearly be required. Above all, a moral act will be necessary: on the part of the industrial nations, a willingness to make, while there is still time for conciliation, the sacrifices necessary to build a sense of community; and on the part of the developing nations, a readiness to forgo blackmail and extortion, now, before the world is irrevocably split into contending camps, and to seek progress through cooperation.

For its part, the United States is committed to the path of cooperation, to build a stable and creative world which all nations—new and old, weak and strong, rich and poor—have a stake in preserving because they had a part in its shaping.

Human Values

Our third moral imperative is the nurturing of human values. It is the tragedy of our times that the very tools of technology that have made ours the most productive century in the history of man have also served to subject millions to a new dimension of intimidation and suffering and fear.

Individual freedom of conscience and expression is the proudest heritage of our civilization. All we do in the search for peace, in the struggle for greater political cooperation and for a fair and flourishing international economy, is rooted in our belief that only liberty permits the fullest expression of mankind's creativity. We

know that technological progress without justice mocks humanity; that national unity without freedom is a hollow triumph; and that nationalism without a consciousness of human community, including a concern for human rights, is likely to become an instrument of oppression and a force for evil.

It is our obligation as the world's leading democracy to dedicate ourselves to assuring freedom for the human spirit. But responsibility compels also a recognition of our limits. Our alliances, the political relationships built up between ourselves and other nations over the years, serve the cause of peace by strengthening regional and world security. If well conceived, they are not favors to others but a recognition of common interests. They should be withdrawn when those interests change; they should not, as a general rule, be used as levers to extort a standard of conduct or to punish acts with which we do not agree.

In many countries—whatever our differences with their internal structures—the people are unified in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries, our foreign policy relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces of change. And in others the process of American disengagement has eroded the sense of security, creating a perceived need for greater internal discipline while at the same time diminishing our ability to influence the domestic practices we criticize.

There is no simple answer to the dilemma a great democracy faces under such circumstances. We have a moral, as well as practical, obligation to stand up for our values and to combat injustice. Those who speak out for freedom and expose the transgressions of repressive regimes do so in the best American tradition. They can have—and have had—a dramatic and heartening impact. But there are also times when an effort to teach another country a moral lesson can backfire on the values we seek to promote.

This Administration has believed that we must bend every effort to enhance respect for human rights but that a public crusade is frequently not the most effective method. Our objective has been results, not publicity. We were concerned—and with good reason—that when such sensitive issues are transformed into tests of strength between governments, the impulse for national prestige will defeat the most worthy goals. We have generally opposed attempts to deal with sensitive international human rights issues through legislation, not because of the moral view expressed, which we share, but because legislation is almost always too inflexible, too public, and too heavyhanded a means to accomplish what it seeks.

Through quiet diplomacy, this Administration has brought about the release or parole of hundreds of prisoners throughout the world and mitigated repressive conditions in numerous countries. But we have seldom publicized specific successes.

The most striking example has been the case of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. The number of Soviet Jews who were permitted to emigrate in 1968 was 400; by 1973 that number had risen to 35,000. The reason for this quantum leap lies largely in persistent but private approaches to the Soviet Government and the parallel overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Hundreds of hardship cases were dealt with in quiet personal discussions by the President or his senior officials. No public announcement or confrontation ever took place. But the results were there for all to see.

When even greater advances were sought by confrontation and legislation, the result was tragic. Today Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has dropped to approximately 10,000 a year. I stress this not to score debating points against men whose seriousness of purpose and dedication to Jewish emigration I greatly respect. Rather it is to indicate that moral ends are often

not enough in themselves. The means used also have a moral quality and moral consequences.

And whatever honest differences of opinion may have existed between concerned individuals about the problem of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, this Administration remains dedicated to the objective. It will spare no effort to increase the flow of emigrants once again and will cooperate with the relevant organizations in that effort.

The issue of human rights is not, as I have said, an easy one, and it should be presented with a full awareness of its complexity. The experience of the last decade should have taught us that we ought not to exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let alone to shape, social and political change in other societies. With this painful lesson in mind, let me state the principles that guide the actions of the Ford Administration:

—Human rights are a legitimate international concern and have been so defined in international agreements for more than a generation.

—The United States will further the cause of human rights in appropriate international forums and in exchanges with other governments. We will use all our influence to encourage humane conduct within and between nations.

—We will be mindful of the limits of our reach; we will be conscious of the difference between public postures that satisfy our self-esteem and policies that bring positive results.

—We will never forget that the victims of our failures, of omission or commission, are human beings and thus the ultimate test of all we do.

We thus return to the central problem of ends and means. If every nation of the world presses for the immediate implementation of all of its values, hopes, and desires, eternal conflict is inevitable. If we insist that others accept all our moral preferences, are we then ready to use military force to protect those who do as we urge? And if those who refuse our prescriptions are deprived of our support, what will we do if the isolation of these governments tempts external pressures or attack by other countries even more repressive? Will we have served moral ends if we thereby jeopardize our own security?

If we back up universal moral claims with power, we take upon ourselves the role of the world's policeman, a role which the American people have rejected in a decade of turmoil. But if we fail to back up these claims, we will lose relevance and credibility; we will be conducting a policy of self-gratification without effectiveness and ultimately without stature. Is it more moral to attempt what cannot be accomplished and fail than to make only those commitments that we know we can keep?

There is nothing more essential for Americans today than the need to recognize the inevitable and inescapable tension between our moral aims, which of necessity are stated in universal terms, and the constant imperative of choice that is imposed upon us by competing goals and finite resources. The making and implementing of foreign policy is, like life, a constant effort to strike the right balance between the best we want and the best we can have, between the ends we seek and the means we adopt.

We need moral strength to select among often agonizing choices and a sense of ethical purpose to navigate between the shoals of difficult decisions. But we need, as well, a mature sense of means, lest we substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of survival. The ultimate test of morality in foreign policy is not only the values we proclaim but what we are willing and able to implement.

I have discussed the dilemmas of moral choice not to counsel resignation but as a

message of hope. Fond as we are of self-flagellation—especially in years divisible by four—Americans can take pride in the achievements of their foreign policy in recent years, which have both a moral and a practical foundation:

—We have ended the war we found and preserved the peace.

—We have restructured and strengthened our partnerships with the industrial democracies and our sister republics in this hemisphere.

—We have opened new relationships with adversaries.

—We have begun to curb the nuclear arms race.

—We have helped to sow the seeds of peace in the Middle East and begun the process of conciliation in southern Africa.

—We have put forth and begun to implement a comprehensive agenda for cooperation between the industrial and developing worlds to combat poverty, ignorance, disease, misery, and hunger.

—We have worked with others on new global challenges that transcend boundaries and ideologies: the problems of pollution, of sharing the resources of the sea, of the transfer of technology.

—We have defended our values and interests around the globe.

But an agenda of such scope inevitably remains unfinished. Great opportunities lie before us:

—The industrial democracies can usher in a new and dynamic period of creativity in their relations with each other and lay the foundation for a new approach to the developing world.

—We have an early opportunity to place a ceiling on strategic nuclear arsenals and move on from there to reduce them.

—We can build on the promising foundations of the new relationship with the People's Republic of China.

—We have the possibility of major progress toward peace in the Middle East while strengthening our commitment to the security and survival of Israel.

—We can help the peoples of Africa reach for conciliation, human justice, and development rather than violence and hatred.

—We can see to it that the atom is used for mankind's benefit, not its destruction.

—The developing countries can become true partners in the international community.

—All countries can work together to fashion a global community both on land and in the vast domains of the oceans.

In pursuing these goals, we must have the courage to face complexity and the inner conviction to deal with ambiguity; we must be prepared to look behind easy slogans and recognize that great goals can only be reached by patience, and often only in gradual stages.

A world of turmoil and danger cries out for structure and leadership. The times summon a steady, resolute, purposeful, and self-assured America. This requires confidence—the leaders' confidence in their values, the public's confidence in its government, and the nation's collective confidence in the worth of its objectives. It is time to remind ourselves that while we may disagree about means, as Americans we all share the same dreams: peace, prosperity, and justice in our nation and throughout the world.

Many years ago Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that no nation could long endure "half slave and half free" and touched the conscience of a nation. Today people the world over cry out for liberty, dignity, respect; and they look with hope and longing to America, for we have touched the conscience of all mankind. If we hold to our ideals, if we set our sights high but without self-indulgence, the generations that come after us may at last be able to say that no man is a slave and no man a master.

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger on the CBS television and radio program "Face the Nation" on October 24. Interviewing the Secretary were Henry S. Bradsher, Washington Star, and George Herman and Bob Schieffer, CBS News.

Press release 529 dated October 24

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, last July you said publicly what you had, I gather, been saying privately for some time—namely, that Jimmy Carter's policies to that point were fairly consistent with the policies of the Ford Administration. I believe you called the policies of the Carter and Ford people "compatible." Do you still think, these many months later, that the two policies are compatible?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first, I made that comment when Governor Carter had given exactly one speech on foreign policy, and he had not yet exposed the full complexity of his thought. I would say now that there are significant areas of difference between his statements and our policy.

Mr. Herman: Well, Mr. Secretary, I guess I'm in the position of a questioner whose next question has been pretty well determined by your first answer. You say there are a number of differences now between the Ford Administration policies and those enunciated by Governor Carter, and I guess the next thing to do is to fairly quickly list them.

Secretary Kissinger: We would have a difference in attitude toward Communist participation in the governments of Europe. We would have a difference with respect to arms sales to many countries, because our view would be that if we cannot be the world's policeman and if we cannot sell arms to threatened countries, then there is bound to be a vacuum that somebody is going to fill. There is a difference in the attitudes toward countries, for example, like Kenya and Zaire. There is a difference in the degree of explicitness with which we should state what we will or will not do in the case of certain contingencies, such as came up with respect to Yugoslavia. And there is a difference about the level of the defense expenditures.

Mr. Bradsher: Do you think that the suggestion of not being willing to defend Yugoslavia in case of a Soviet attack really increases the danger of an attack? You mentioned this as one of the problems. How can you draw a line around the world and say that we will stand at certain places, or not draw the line, as has been suggested—as Governor Carter did?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is dangerous to state that certain countries are outside the American defense perimeter if these countries are of a great strategic importance and when it is generally recognized that their change in alignment would have serious consequences.

In 1949, a number of then Administration officials were drawing a line this way which left Korea outside the perimeter. Whether that in fact contributed to the attack on Korea, we do not know. What we do know is that in 1950 when the attack occurred, the Administration had to change its view.

My concern is that no miscalculation arise. Six Administrations, starting with President Truman—three Democratic and three Republican—have declared that the independence and integrity and nonalign-

ment of Yugoslavia are major American interests. This is a view unanimously shared by all of our West European allies, and I believe that it is important that the other side understand that pressure on Yugoslavia would have grave consequences for the relationship with the United States, without spelling out what exactly we would do, and that the bipartisan consensus that has existed with respect to this issue be restored as rapidly as we can do it.

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. Secretary, are you suggesting then that by saying that an invasion of Yugoslavia would not directly threaten the security of the United States, that Governor Carter was issuing an invitation to the Soviet Union—

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Mr. Schieffer: —to take some action there?

Secretary Kissinger: I am sure that that was not his intention, and I'm positive that if he were to be elected and looked at the facts he would reconsider that statement. I believe that if the statement were left to stand it would raise serious ambiguities. It is inconsistent with the entire postwar policy of every Democratic and Republican Administration, incompatible with the views of our West European allies, and would be dangerous if it became American policy.

Mr. Schieffer: You're not suggesting that in some circumstance the United States would actually send troops to Yugoslavia if something like that arose?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm suggesting that for the United States to spell out exactly what it will do in circumstances which no one can yet foresee is unwise. I'm saying also that to declare a country of the geographic and strategic importance of Yugoslavia as lying outside an American security interest, however we may want to vindicate that interest, is dangerous, inconsistent with our NATO policies. In foreign policy—the art of foreign policy is to prevent crises from arising and not to create ambiguities which the opponent might be tempted to probe.

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about—you were going down a list of differences between the Ford Administration, as you see it, and in Governor Carter's positions. Two that are of some interest to me and that you had not mentioned were Governor Carter on preventing an Arab oil embargo and Governor Carter on using American economic leverage to get the Soviet Union out of places like Angola. Are those not—was that omission inadvertent?

Secretary Kissinger: No, but I wanted to keep my answer short.

On an Arab oil embargo, of course the United States should oppose it firmly.

I believe, in general, it is unwise to be excessively precise about everything that you might do—especially if the threat is one that, according to all the experts, is going to have extremely limited effectiveness. For almost all of the items in our trade, particularly as Governor Carter has specifically excluded grain, there are substitute sources in other countries.

Again, the art of foreign policy is to prevent an embargo from happening and not to stake everything on what you will do when the embargo in fact occurs.

So our policy has been to attempt to avoid an embargo, and we should also keep in mind that there are many things that the oil producers can do between doing nothing and a total embargo. And then we have to have policies to deal with those contingencies and not just for the most extreme one.

Encouraging Humane Values

Mr. Bradsher: Governor Carter has criticized your policies as lacking what he considers to be morality—that you've been willing to deal with dictatorships rather than deal with matters of principle and standing up for liberals in some countries. Does this really enter into your mind as a consideration in dealing with a country—whether it's dictatorial, whether it's accused of torturing people?

Secretary Kissinger: In foreign policy, the United States has two objectives—at least two objectives. One is to maintain our security and the security of our allies. The second one is to live in a world which is compatible with our values.

Both of these objectives are important. We therefore, wherever we possibly can, try to encourage political forces that represent the humane values and the democratic values for which we stand. And therefore, in Santiago, Chile, at an OAS meeting, I made an extended statement on the problem of human rights. I did so again before the United Nations.

At the same time, there are certain security requirements. And you cannot implement your values unless you survive.

In World War II, we supported Communist Russia against Nazi Germany—not because we agreed with its values, but because we considered it essential for our survival at the time. And there are governments around the world whose independence, the independence of whose countries, is essential for American security and which we therefore support. Wherever we can, we are trying to nudge them in a direction that is compatible with our values.

But to pretend that we can simply declare our values and transform the world has a high risk of a policy of constant interventionism in every part of the world and then sticking us with the consequences.

So we are trying to conduct a policy in which our commitments are put into some relationship with our capabilities.

Mr. Bradsher: We haven't really succeeded in nudging anybody though, have we?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I don't think that is correct. I think through quiet diplomacy we have managed in many—

Mr. Bradsher: Can you give an example, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I can. For example, in Chile, we have been responsible for the release of hundreds of prisoners.

Mr. Bradsher: Have we prevented the arrest of many more, though?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that, on the whole, we have contributed to an evolution that has not gone as rapidly as we would wish. But, again, we have to look at the alternatives of what happens if we throw our weight around too much. The end result will be that we lose all influence.

In the case of the Soviet Union, we managed to increase emigration of Jews from 400 to 35,000 a year as long as it was done by quiet diplomacy. As soon as it became a matter of confrontation and the national pride of the states was involved, it went down again to 10,000.

World Security and China

Mr. Herman: Let me try nudging you in a different direction, Mr. Secretary. A Soviet—I guess you'd call him a propagandist—Victor Louis said on the 15th of this month that unless China adopts a more conciliatory attitude within a month, it will face an irreversible decision in Moscow. It was taken by some people to be sort of a—kind of a Soviet indirect threat to the new government in China. And you responded in your statement, your news conference at Harvard, with a sort of a counterpressure.

How do you evaluate the situation? What was the meaning of that Soviet threat, if in fact it was a Soviet threat?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, we don't react to newsmen—at least, not to foreign newsmen. [Laughter.]

Mr. Herman: Even when they are arms of the government, if they are?

Secretary Kissinger: My statement at Harvard was made in the context, of which perhaps Victor Louis' statement was one relatively minor part, of a situation that might be interpreted as turmoil and might give rise to some temptation.

Now, it is clear that China—a country of vast historical and political importance, of large size—if it were the subject of a mas-

sive assault, that this would set a pattern for the security of the world that would be extremely unfortunate. And we therefore made more explicit what we had really said in a more guarded form earlier: that an attempt to upset the world equilibrium by a massive assault on China would not be taken lightly by the United States.

Now, I am not saying that this is likely, and I think, in any event, one shouldn't conduct foreign policy on the basis of an assessment of other countries' intentions. One has to create the obstacles in a preventive fashion.

Mr. Herman: Have you?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that we have made clear that it would be a matter of the most serious complications if such an event occurred. But I am not saying such an event is likely. But, insofar as our views affect other countries' calculations, we wanted to make that clear.

Mr. Schieffer: Well, Mr. Secretary, exactly what does that mean, though, and what does that entail when you say we would not take it lightly. Obviously there would be intense diplomacy, but does that mean that we would consider some sort of arms sales to China?

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, China has prided itself on its self-reliance, and we have never had any military discussions with China. We have never had any request for the purchase of arms from China. So that issue has never been formally considered by the U.S. Government.

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. Schlesinger, the former Defense Secretary, when he came back from China recently, said we should not reject out of hand any request for arms sales to China if that should come about. Would you agree with that?

Secretary Kissinger: This is one of those issues that is very difficult to answer in the abstract. It would depend on the circumstances, on the imminence of the threat, on how important we thought the threat was to our security.

But certainly we would take an extremely dim view of a military attack, or even military pressure, on China.

Mr. Schieffer: Well, do you really see any possibility of that, any real possibility of that coming about?

Secretary Kissinger: It is the task of foreign policy to prepare against contingencies and to lower temptations on the other side. I do not think it is a probability. I think that any American policymaker, given the importance of the issues that would be raised, would have to take it into account.

Mr. Bradsher: Is this the same category as Yugoslavia? Can you relate the two?

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are two kinds of American interests in the world. There are interests where we have a formal legal obligation, like in NATO. Then there are interests where the importance of a country is such that whether we have an obligation or not, we might feel our security affected.

I think the problem is comparable as between China and Yugoslavia in the sense that an attack, a successful attack on either, would affect the world equilibrium and would affect the calculations of other countries and therefore could in time affect American security even if it didn't do so immediately. And it is the task of our foreign policy not to plan now how we are going to conduct military operations, because that is what we are trying to avoid; nor have we ever said that that is what we would do. What we are trying to do is to prevent the situation from coming about.

Framework for Rhodesia Negotiations

Mr. Herman: Let me turn you toward one of your own more personal pieces of work, and that has been to negotiate a settlement of the struggle in Rhodesia. That matter is now in the forum at Geneva, and a number of comments have been made by one side or another that the Kissinger plan, as it has sometimes been called—I think you prefer to

call it the Kissinger-Callaghan, or the Callaghan-Kissinger—but in any case that the Kissinger plan is dead.

Is it? Have we lost out on that, whatever share or interest we had in it?

Secretary Kissinger: First, let us get clear what it is we were trying to do.

We were trying to stop the drift toward racial conflict. We were trying to bring about a peaceful transition toward majority rule that in the judgment of all knowledgeable people was inevitable in any event, except with much more bloodshed. We were trying to limit the influence of all outside countries, including our own, on the evolution in Africa.

I believe we have a good chance of achieving all of these objectives.

The particular terms that may have been worked out in order to get the process started could well be modified in the process of negotiations.

Mr. Herman: You do not take Mr. Smith [Ian D. Smith, of Rhodesia] at his word when he says it is the Kissinger plan, all or nothing?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that you have here five parties negotiating with each other that have been fighting each other for 11 years, between whom there is enormous distrust, each of which has a constituency to which they must appeal.

I believe that the negotiations haven't even started yet. It is clear that there must be some room for negotiation. There will be many exalted statements of an epic nature in the process of the negotiations. I think the chances are better than even that they will succeed unless some radical elements take over the process and make demands that cannot be met.

Mr. Herman: Let me ask you about one not so exalted set of statements that has been made; that is, the—well, I have to back into it a little bit.

You have told us that you consulted with the Presidents of the black countries on the borders of Rhodesia and that the plan was worked out in full consultation, at least as I understand it, with them. They are now saying—or some of them are now saying, their leaders are now saying—that that is not so, that the plan that you discussed with them is not the plan as outlined by Mr. Smith, and the question comes up as to who struck John? Who is telling the truth? Did you present them with a plan? Are they exaggerating the differences?

Secretary Kissinger: I think everybody is telling the truth. We had three American and two British missions in Africa before I went there on that last shuttle.

The main lines of the ideas to be presented to Smith were discussed with at least those African Presidents that were reached by these missions and that I had a chance to talk to personally.

In addition, Mr. Smith added a few considerations of his own which it seemed to us would be better for him to put forward formally and permit them to be the subject of discussion, rather than wait until the Geneva conference, or wherever the conference would have taken place, and then create the impression that there was some sort of secret understanding.

We did our best to check the framework of the proposals. And the essence of the framework has been accepted. There are several details about which there is dispute, as you would expect.

So I think that everybody is telling the truth and everybody has different constituencies to whom they must appeal in the process of reaching a settlement.

Mr. Schieffer: Dr. Kissinger, Governor Carter seems to agree with your efforts in Africa, but he suggested that perhaps the timing of your trip there and your shuttle had a little something to do with an election coming up in the United States. Is that a valid criticism to make?

Secretary Kissinger: When I first went to Africa in April, I think it is safe to say that it did not have the unanimous approval of many members of the Republican Party,

and it was in the middle of the primary campaign, and there was much criticism that we did this.

We did it because we thought it was in the national interest. If matters had been permitted to drift, it was our judgment—it was the judgment of every knowledgeable person—that things would be out of control by the middle of next year, which would have been the next time anybody could have gotten hold of it, or by early next year, since the time after the election, whoever wins, will have to be devoted in part to restructuring administrations and so forth. It had nothing to do with the election campaign. And it hasn't been used in the election campaign, either.

Mr. Bradsher: Mr. Secretary, six months or so ago, you used to make little jokes and quips about how your time to retire might be coming, that you were looking forward to relief from the job—the type of job you have held for about eight years now. More recently, your little quips seem to be going the other way. You talk about going on until 1981. Is this showing your loyalty to the President in assuming in your quips that he is going to be elected, or does this mean a change in your own personal attitude?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have to give a terminal date, or give some hope of a terminal date, to my colleagues in the State Department or their morale will break completely. Then, as that date approaches, I tend to push it a little bit more into the future, to spur them to new efforts.

I have not made a final decision. When the President is reelected, I will discuss it with him at that time.

Mr. Schieffer: The President has said that you can have the job as long as you want. He is on the record on that. How long do you want it, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to deprive my colleagues in the State Department of all hope of a termination of their suffering.

Mr. Herman: I guess that is what is called a diplomatic answer.

Let me ask you sort of a nondiplomatic question. We have been asking you for I don't know how many years to be a guest on Face the Nation, and you have always turned us down. Now, all of a sudden, a week before election day you accept us, and I am reminded of your many statements that the Secretary of State job is a nonpolitical job.

Was there any little element of politics in your accepting our offer this morning?

Secretary Kissinger: No. As you said, you have been asking me for several years, and I seem to have been doing one of these shows a year, and I don't consider a press conference in which I don't control the questions—have any idea what the questions will be—a political activity.

U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission Meets at Washington

The U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission met at Washington October 19–21. Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger and Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs Habib Chatty on October 22 at the signing of the minutes of the meeting, together with the text of the joint communique of the Joint Commission they signed that day.

REMARKS AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY

Press release 526 dated October 22

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Foreign Minister: It is not often that I meet a colleague who is engaged in shuttle diplomacy. Since I saw you last, two weeks ago in New York, you have been presiding over a meeting of the Ministers of the Arab League and, indeed, you had to postpone your return here because of your duties in the Middle East. I want to express my appreciation to you for the im-

portance that you obviously attach to our Joint Commission by returning here to sign together with me these documents and to give me the opportunity to benefit from your views on the bilateral relations between our two countries and developments in the Middle East.

In a world in which irrationality and passions are dominant, it means a great deal to the United States to have as a trusted friend a country like Tunisia. Throughout its history, Tunisia has stood for balance, progress, and good sense in its dealings with its neighbors with respect to peace in the Middle East and with respect to its own development. The United States attaches great importance to the independence of Tunisia and does what it can to encourage the progress and economic development of that country. We have had distinguished visitors from Tunisia here this year—the son of President Bourguiba. We have had visits of our 6th Fleet to Tunisia. We have contributed substantially to the economic development of Tunisia, and we have in this Joint Commission an instrument by which these ties are institutionalized.

Mr. Foreign Minister, I look forward to our talks. I am glad about the progress made by our Commission, and I welcome you here as a personal friend and as the representative of a country whose friendship we value, whose independence and progress we consider very important.

Foreign Minister Chatty [1]

Mr. Secretary: I was very touched by the words you have just expressed concerning my country. The relations between the United States and Tunisia are very good. They go back to the very first years of the independence of our country, and there have never been any clouds over those relations. Even before independence and in spite of the alliances in which the United States and France were engaged and in spite of the vicissitudes of the cold war, we enjoyed the benefit of the friendship and the sympathy of the United States.

Following independence you supported us greatly. Tunisia went through some very painful moments with the bombing of Sakiet. All of this was caused by the Algerian war then raging. During this very serious period, the United States stood by our side, and it was through the good offices of the United States that we were able to resolve the problem of the stationing of French troops on our territory. From an economic standpoint, the aid extended to us by the United States has been most significant, and it has been the most important aid of all of the assistance that we have received from other countries. As you yourself have stressed, Mr. Secretary, this aid has been well used. There are a number of major achievements in Tunisia that testify to this.

We could say that the relationship between the United States and Tunisia stands out as an example from the political as well as the economic standpoint. From the political standpoint the United States has always respected our positions on the Middle East and in other areas. The United States has never attempted to exert an influence upon any political decision taken by Tunisia. From the economic standpoint, the technological and economic aid extended has been most fruitful.

Tunisia is known for its moderation, its realism, and its spirit of conciliation. In this Mediterranean area which is so seriously beset by problems today, we have endeavored to be an agent of moderation, of dialogue, and to foster the settlement of differences through a dialogue. And in this we share many viewpoints with you personally, Mr. Secretary, because since you came to the Department of State you have brought with you a new spirit, a new style, in the Middle East—that of direct and indirect dialogue as a means to settle problems.

Concerning now the Joint Commission, I am satisfied with the results as stated. I want to thank you and all your associates for the welcome extended to our side and

[1] Foreign Minister Chatty spoke in French.

for the spirit of understanding that was extended to them on this occasion. But in spite of all that is being done, Tunisia is being forced to make very special efforts for its development, at a time of the economic takeoff of the country. We need the assistance of all of the friends that we have in the world, and the United States occupies a leading place among our friends. We know what problems you face, having to spread your assistance throughout the world, but as we near takeoff American assistance is truly indispensable. The experience we have had so far would be hampered if we were to fail to receive this assistance.

I hope that the Joint Commission has been helpful in enabling the United States to understand the meaning and significance of our fifth [development] plan and the projects which will be carried out in the coming years. Thus, aided by this fuller understanding, the United States, we hope, can make a more meaningful contribution to our fifth plan. And I look to the day, next year at the forthcoming meeting of the Joint Commission, when we shall have the pleasure to have you with us in Tunisia, Mr. Secretary, and to have you sign documents which will reflect a greater contribution of the United States to our plan.

Again, thank you for your welcome, for the spirit you are extending to me personally, to my President, and to my country. And I rejoice in this unbreakable friendship between the United States and Tunisia, a friendship of which we shall take very good care.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Press release 525 dated October 22

The U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission held its third meeting in Washington October 19–21, 1976. Minister for Planning Moustapha Zaanouni, for Tunisia, and Under Secretary of State William D. Rogers, for the United States, jointly presided over plenary sessions.

Unforeseen obligations prevented the planned participation of the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Habib Chatty, and consequently, that of U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. As Co-chairmen of the Commission, Minister Chatty and Secretary Kissinger reviewed and signed the Agreed Minutes of the meeting and held bilateral discussions on October 22.

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary welcomed this opportunity to review the excellent relations existing between Tunisia and the United States and to exchange views on a broad range of regional and global issues. In particular, Foreign Minister Chatty described the intensive efforts now being undertaken under the aegis of the Arab League to restore peace and tranquility in Lebanon. Secretary Kissinger appreciated the opportunity to hear about these efforts from the Foreign Minister and to reaffirm the support of the United States for all steps directed toward the objective of bringing an end to the fighting and assuring the political independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon. The Secretary reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. He also stressed the importance the United States attaches to the independence and national development of Tunisia as a factor of moderation and stability in the Mediterranean region.

The two Ministers noted with satisfaction the support extended to Tunisia by the United States Senate in a resolution on August 3, 1976, on the occasion of President Bourguiba's birthday. This resolution, which had a most favorable effect on the Tunisian people, expresses the sense of the Senate that: "The continuation of Tunisia's economic and social development in circumstances of peace, liberty and independent sovereignty is important for the stability of the Mediterranean area and for the interest of the United States." And: "The United States should continue to contribute to the maintenance of peace and the economic and social development of Tunisia through the provision of appropriate levels of economic and military assistance."

The U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission met in two plenary sessions and in a series of sessions of the Subcommission on Economic Development and the Subcommission on Trade and Investment.

The two delegations conducted a review of U.S.-Tunisian cooperation in trade, investment, development and cultural affairs and discussed areas of past and prospective cooperation in multilateral bodies dealing with international economic and political policy issues.

They reaffirmed their historic friendship and common commitments to work for peace in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Speaking for the United States, Under Secretary Rogers said Tunisia would continue to find the United States to be a willing partner. He praised the statesmanship of President Habib Bourguiba in both international affairs and in the achievement of a "model" system of economic and social development which nurtures democracy and private initiative.

Minister Zaanouni and other members of the Tunisian delegation presented and explained the Fifth Tunisian Plan for Economic and Social Development, for the years 1977–81, and invited U.S private investment and public technical and financial assistance. The plan requires a sharp increase in both domestic savings and foreign public and private investment in Tunisia. It is intended to achieve an economic growth rate of 7.5 percent, the addition of 48,000 jobs annually, and food self-sufficiency by 1981.

In keeping with the sense of the U.S. Senate noted above, the U.S. delegation stated the readiness of U.S. Government agencies to contribute significant assistance, within their legal and policy guidelines and resources, to the achievement of the new Plan. The U.S. delegation said that it expected U.S. Government agencies to make available to Tunisia as much as $65 million in grants, loans, and government-guaranteed private credits before the end of 1977 for financing food supply programs, projects in agriculture and rural development, health and family planning, housing, technical cooperation and training and military equipment purchases. In addition, private bank credits and private direct investment by U.S. enterprises are expected to grow in pace with Tunisia's broadly based economic development.

Subject to the development of mutually agreed projects, the U.S. delegation foresaw substantial increases in financing by the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the initiation of direct loans and loan guaranties on U.S. private investment projects by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

The U.S. delegation announced that a group of U.S. private businessmen who are members of the Agribusiness Council, with the support of OPIC and a representative of AID, will undertake project identification in the field of agribusiness during the month of November in Tunisia.

In order to assist in relieving a shortfall in Tunisia's wheat crop, the United States agreed to reprogram its Food for Peace allocations so as to provide 40,000 tons of wheat on liberal credit terms under Public Law 480 and an equal amount, if required, on shorter supply credits. Grants for school lunch and pre-school feeding programs will continue.

The Agency for International Development, which is currently required to concentrate its program in low-income areas, will nevertheless continue to provide capital assistance in selected priority areas and expanded technological assistance to Tunisia. AID will concentrate on science and technology transfers to enhance Tunisian development, rural health and family planning, housing and an expanded technical cooperation program including training.

AID announced at the Joint Commission meeting approval of a $20 million program of Housing Investment Guaranties, the first tranche of $10 million to be provided in the current fiscal year and the second half of next fiscal year. This year's program will finance construction and installment sale of about 1,500 low-income housing units in Tunis.

The total estimate of U.S. financial assistance includes $25 million in military equipment purchase credits during the 15 months which began July 1, 1976.

The two delegations also noted the effective contributions of the U.S. Peace Corps, especially in the field of public health and vocational training, and that of private voluntary U.S. organizations in these and other fields of development and social welfare.

The U.S. delegation outlined plans for an International Industrialization Institute, whose programs of research and analysis would be particularly useful to Tunisia and other countries well advanced along the course of industrialization. The Tunisian delegation asked for additional details.

The delegations agreed to expand and invigorate trade-promotion programs in both countries so as to diversify and enlarge commercial relations. They agreed to provide assistance to each party's market research efforts in the other country.

They expressed gratification at the growth of cultural relations, highlighted currently by the traveling exhibition in the United States of antique Tunisian mosaics and plans for Tunisian instructors to serve as French language teachers in Louisiana state and church schools.

The Co-chairmen agreed that the 1977 meeting of the Joint Commission would be held in Tunisia at a mutually convenient date to be arranged.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
Secretary of State

HABIB CHATTY
Minister of Foreign Affairs

October 22, 1976, Washington, D.C.

Secretary Kissinger Marks United Nations Day

Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger made at the United Nations Day concert at Washington on October 23.

Press release 528 dated October 24

Long ago, Sir Francis Bacon envisioned a new human community which would cause men's minds "to move in charity, to rest in providence, and to turn upon the poles of truth." In the more than three and a half centuries since then, men and nations

all too often have been vengeful rather than charitable, shortsighted rather than provident, mendacious rather than truthful. But the failings which have clouded mankind's hopes since the dawn of time have, in our era, a new and fearful dimension. For ours is an age of potential nuclear cataclysm and of wars that can afflict entire populations. Ours is a time when the hope of millions for a better life seems perpetually elusive, as the fortunate seem to prosper while the destitute founder. And ours is a world in which too often truth and those who speak it are the objects of repression and regimentation.

Our task and our necessity is to turn back the tides of hatred, discord, and fear and to weave from our effort a new story of shared human progress. The obstacles before us are massive, but the chance for achievement is great.

As the world organization we honor tonight dramatically symbolizes, the nations have become for the first time in history an almost universal community, and the shared experiences of the modern age have heightened our awareness of each other and of our common predicament.

We are coming to share an abhorrence of war, of the absolute injustice it brings to the innocent who are brutalized or uprooted, and of the catastrophe it could bring to civilization and, indeed, to all of life on our planet. We can recognize now that ours has become a single global economy, bringing complex problems but also the potentiality for the first time in history of eradicating poverty, hunger, and needless human misery. And we can perceive the need to strengthen the institutions and procedures of reason to form a bulwark between humanity and the crude and degrading applications of coercion.

But let us be honest. While the imperatives of community are emerging, the practices of confrontation persist. Too often we witness coercion rather than conciliation, the resort to pressure rather than the search for cooperation, and one-way morality rather than the universal conscience of humanity. Thus it is ours to choose how we will reflect our interdependence. It is ours to choose whether nations will make the last quarter of this century a time of spiraling conflict and chaos or the dawn of a true human community.

Surely, we have the means to surmount our problems. The reach of technology can conquer all but the most malevolent forces of nature; and our learning and our sense of history and place continuously advance. What we now have need of is the strength to persevere and the vision of where we are going. For success is a process, and not a final condition; and great achievements are dreams before they become realities. In the words of Homer: It is a thing possible to do if our hearts bid us to do it.

So let us learn to distinguish truculence from strength and build a peace more promising than an equilibrium of force. Let us reconcile the national interest and the world interest so that we may increase the bounty of our planet to the benefit of all. And in all our labors let us extend the horizons of liberty and thus unshackle the oppressed and the despairing.

Pablo Casals once said: "The first thing is to do with purpose what one proposes to do." No generation in history has had so much to do nor such noble purposes to fulfill. Striving together, we can harvest our hopes, shaping that community of which our ancestors dreamed and to which the United Nations is devoted, a human family in which all people can find peace, our children can pursue their dreams, and the human spirit can find a new day of freedom.

Trade and Investment: Another Dimension in U.S.-Africa Relations

Address by David B. Bolen
Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs [1]

I welcome this opportunity to be with you this evening, and to participate in your conference. Colloquia such as yours are essential if we are to have a basic understanding of American foreign policy and support for its purposes and goals. This is all the more meaningful in today's turbulent world.

No people understand better than the American people how to respond creatively to the demands of rapid change. And no people have been more successful at finding practical solutions to the conflicts which change inevitably creates.

Our own history is characterized by dramatic transformation. We have grown from a small to an immense country. We have developed from an agricultural to an industrial giant. And we have evolved from a country preoccupied with its own concerns to a nation burdened with the responsibilities of world leadership.

Beyond our borders, the world itself changes with extraordinary rapidity. We are all familiar with the revolutions of our century—in technology, in global communications, in the creation of weapons of mass destruction, and in the explosion of population growth. These have produced major challenges to our leadership.

Nowhere is this more vividly revealed than in the area of trade and investment.

I would like to approach the subject of trade and investment in the context of the broader issues that create the climate for U.S. business in Africa.

There is a tired cliche that until very recently we had no coherent African policy. I think it is accurate to say that we had not been as actively involved in African political matters as we are now, but the initiatives we have undertaken in southern Africa are grounded in principles and policies supported by four successive Administrations.

Foremost has been our opposition to all systems of racial discrimination and our support for majority rule. The other elements of our policy have been: recognition of our obligation to assist in African economic development and concern with keeping the continent free of great-power rivalry.

As I said, what is new about our policy is the level of U.S. involvement.

Two principal factors affect U.S.-Africa relations: southern African issues and problems of economic development.

Southern Africa is moving rapidly toward a confrontation that can have deep and incalculable implications for international stability. Rhodesia is under attack. Violence threatens to escalate in Namibia. In South Africa the unrest and flashes of violence may be a harbinger of worse to come unless some way can be found to ease racial tensions. Racial wars in southern Africa would have tragic consequences for all concerned and would poison the

[1] Made before the Conference on American Public Policy and Private Enterprise in Africa at the University of Houston, Tex., on Oct. 14.

atmosphere for international cooperation.

Because of the gravity of the situation, and in spite of the odds against success, the United States undertook to use its influence to start a process for a negotiated solution. We assumed this role with the open encouragement and active support of the parties involved.

We have not sought to impose remedies on the Africans. As the Secretary has repeatedly stated, we believe in African solutions for African problems. From the outset our goal has been to get a process started that would offer an alternative to violence. Within that context we have had three objectives. First, in Rhodesia, where the threat is most immediate, we have worked to establish a framework for negotiating the peaceful transfer of power to the black majority, at the same time protecting minority rights. In Namibia our aim has been to find a formula for negotiating the transition to independence. In South Africa we continue to press the whites to extend equality of opportunity and basic human rights to all South Africans.

Reality of Interdependence

This, in very broad brush, is the political background against which we must view U.S. economic relations with Africa. Here the key word is "interdependence," which best describes the increasing interrelationship of both industrial and developing nations. We are learning, sometimes painfully, that we can neither escape the world nor dominate it. International economic interdependence is a reality. Our prosperity is becoming more and more dependent on economic cooperation with other countries.

The aspiration of the less developed countries (LDC's) for a change in basic economic relationships with the United States and other industrialized countries is understandable. Both of our interests dictate compromise, based on the following elements: (1) self-regulating agreements with Third World suppliers of raw materials and other commodities that provide us with reasonable security of access and them with assured income; and (2) an arrangement that insures transfers of resources from the industrialized countries to the poorer less developed countries to provide for minimum human needs and an increment to underpin the economic potential of the poor countries.

The challenge of interdependence will be especially acute in the decade ahead. Few states will be able to meet their economic needs independently or to insulate their societies and economies from increasing dependence on external influences. Industrial countries will be unable to manage their national economies without one another's cooperation in regulating the international system of money, trade, and investment. Technological developments will reinforce the need for joint endeavors to deal with such problems as energy, food, raw materials, and environmental pollution.

While our interdependence will increase, we should all recognize that nationalism will remain the dominant ideology. And nationalist sentiment may well be further stimulated in those countries that find progress in economic development elusive or are confronted with deteriorating trade situations.

Africa's Problems and Potential

Unfortunately, poverty is still pervasive in most of Africa. Of the world's 29 least developed countries, 18 are African. Depressing social and economic indicators attest to the effect of poverty on the quality of life. In the least developed countries, life expectancy barely averages 43 years, compared to 53 years in the developing world and 71 years in the United States. A single physician serves an average population of 15,000—almost five times the number in the developing world. Only 28 percent of school-age children attend school, and the overall illiteracy rate exceeds 80 percent.

In addition to the burden of extreme poverty, Africa is heavily dependent on external economic forces over which it has little control. Many African states rely on a single commodity for their export earnings. Price fluctuations of raw materials in the international marketplace can have a drastic effect on African economies.

A case in point is Zambia, the world's fifth largest producer and one of the largest exporters of copper. Over 90 percent of Zambia's foreign exchange and one-third to one-half of the government's revenue, mainly through export taxes, are derived from copper. When the price of copper fell from a high of $1.50 a pound to as low as 55 cents, it posed major economic problems which the government has not yet resolved. Zaire faces similar problems.

Vulnerability to widely fluctuating commodity prices is only one of the obstacles to African development. Boundaries, many of them a legacy of the colonial era, are frequently arbitrary with little regard for natural economic regions. Agriculture, the mainstay of the majority of African states, is often a victim to the capriciousness of nature. A dramatic example is the Sahel, the chronically drought-ridden region on the southern edge of the Sahara, where the desert is steadily encroaching on once-fertile lands.

Most African countries lack an adequate infrastructure—the roads and railways and harbors essential for nationbuilding. Another serious handicap is Africa's lack of skilled manpower. African states place a high priority on education including vocational and management training. Foreign enterprises which are willing to provide training and opportunities for Africans for advancement to positions of responsibility are making a sound investment in terms of building a reservoir of good will in the host country.

The world recession and spiraling oil prices hit the poorest nations hardest. Caught between the rising costs of food and manufactured goods they needed to import and the lower prices they were receiving for their own commodities, many of them were forced to cut back on their development.

In spite of these problems, Africa has enormous growth potential. If you will bear with me for a few more statistics, they will demonstrate the extent of that potential. Africa possesses 96 percent of the world's known reserves of chromite, 42 percent of its cobalt, 23 percent of its manganese reserves, and 64 percent of its platinum-group metals. Africa's iron reserves are twice those of the United States and two-thirds those of the Soviet Union. The African Continent is estimated to have 16 percent of the world's waterpower. Africa's petroleum reserves have not yet been assessed; however, Nigeria for several years has been a major supplier of crude oil to the United States. And finally, there are still vast unused areas of arable land, pasture, and forest. With proper irrigation and modern agricultural techniques, every important crop in the world can be grown in some part of the continent.

These figures are of more than passing interest to the United States, which is the world's leading consumer. While Americans constitute 6 percent of the world's population, we consume approximately 27 percent of its production of raw materials. Projections indicate that by the end of this century the United States will be dependent primarily on foreign sources for 12 of the 13 basic industrial raw materials required to maintain a modern economy.

In more specific terms, how will this dependency relate to Africa? Nigeria is obvious. There are other examples. Zaire and Zambia are major producers of copper. Gabon has large reserves of uranium and manganese. Niger has large deposits of cassiterite, and Mauritania is rich in top-quality iron ore. Guinea has two-thirds of the world's known deposits of bauxite.

In spite of Africa's natural wealth there are great disparities. At one end of the scale, Nigeria, Liberia, Gabon, Botswana,

Angola, Zaire, and Zambia have good development prospects because they are mineral producers. Other African countries, as I have indicated, are much less fortunate.

Assistance, Trade, and Investment

The United States is not indifferent to the problems of the developing world. We are willing to explore measures to improve and stabilize markets. We seek satisfactory international arrangements to encourage investment, such as the International Resources Bank. We have received authority from Congress to make a greater contribution to the African Development Fund. We will make major efforts to stimulate the flow of modern technology to Africa to promote growth and diversify economies now excessively dependent on one or two commodities.

U.S. bilateral assistance to Africa has averaged $250 million a year over the past three fiscal years. In addition, we have provided multilateral assistance through such agencies as the International Development Association, where our share of credits last year was $140 million.

The Peace Corps is a "people-to-people" approach to development assistance. The Peace Corps program currently involves 2,100 volunteers in 25 different African countries at a cost this year of $23 million. Each host country contributes another $2–$3 million. The program is active primarily in the areas of education, agricultural and rural development, and health and social services.

While many African states will continue to need development assistance for some time to come, their eventual goal is to achieve an economy based on expanded trade and investment. The commercial dollar flow is substantially larger than the aid. Sub-Saharan African export receipts from the United States now reach almost $6 billion per year. New U.S. investment, which plays an important role in promoting sub-Saharan African exports, now totals between $100 million and $200 million per year.

Although many African states retain special trade relationships with their former metropoles, most of them are eager to diversify their sources of trade and investment. American technology and the widely recognized quality of our products make us an attractive alternative in African eyes.

U.S. trade with Africa is still relatively small, but growing rapidly. Total trade with sub-Saharan Africa was over nine times greater in 1975 than in 1960. Due to our petroleum imports, notably from Nigeria, the growth in imports from Africa has overshadowed that of U.S. exports. So while figures for exports from Africa do represent a sixfold increase over the past 15 years, our share of Africa's import market has remained at around 10 percent.

Because of its large oil exports, Nigeria accounted for 42.7 percent of U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa in 1975. Nigerian oil is also the reason why the United States continues to have an overall trade deficit with Africa in spite of a substantial increase in U.S. exports. Most of this increase was in manufactured products such as civilian aircraft and parts, automobiles and parts, and electrical machinery.

The principal market for American goods continues to be South Africa, although its share of U.S. exports to the region is declining. In 1975 the United States exported about 1.3 billion dollars' worth of goods to South Africa, which represented about 26 percent of our total exports to all of Africa.

Sub-Saharan Africa is also increasingly important to us as a source of imports. It supplied a significant percentage of the following imports to the United States in 1975: coffee, 28 percent; crude petroleum, 17 percent; gem diamonds, 34 percent; cocoa, 47 percent; manganese and ferromanganese, 32 percent; platinum-group metals, 48 percent; chrome and ferro-

chrome, 39 percent; cobalt, 57 percent; and bauxite, 22 percent.

U.S. direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa has risen dramatically to reach a book value of over $3 billion in 1975, over five times what it was in 1960.

The principal recipients of U.S. investment are Angola, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Kenya, Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia, and South Africa. Approximately two-thirds of American investment is in the extractive sector. The only African countries currently receiving a significant investment in manufacturing are Kenya, Ghana, Zaire, and South Africa.

Two Problems in Pattern of U.S. Investment

Two elements in the pattern of American investment in Africa pose serious problems for our relations with Africa: the fact that about one-third of that investment is in South Africa and the heavy concentration of our investment in the extractive industries.

Let's take our investment in South Africa first. The majority of black Africans regard a $1.6 billion American investment in South Africa at best with suspicion, at worst as evidence of U.S. support for apartheid. American groups have joined with black Africans in urging that we discourage further American investment in South Africa. Some have gone so far as to urge American companies to withdraw completely as a sign of their disapproval of South Africa's racial policy. If violence escalates, demands that we sever our economic ties with South Africa may well increase.

In fact, our policy has been neither to encourage nor discourage American private investment in South Africa. We have placed restrictions on the extension of Eximbank lending facilities to South Africa. And we have urged American firms—there are over 350 of them doing business in South Africa—to improve the working conditions, wages, training, and opportunities for advancement of their black African employees.

The second problem is the heavy concentration of American investment in the extractive industries. These industries are most vulnerable to expropriation and nationalization as developing countries become more insistent on absolute control over their own natural resources.

While we recognize the right of foreign governments to nationalize industries within their territory, we insist that any nationalization of American firms be accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. There are legislative penalties attached to U.S. aid to any country that fails to meet this requirement.

Most African governments recognize the important contribution foreign investment can make to their development. They are aware that foreign private investment is the principal vehicle for the transfer of capital and technology and the urgently needed training for local manpower. For these reasons many African countries continue to welcome and provide incentives to encourage foreign investment.

Improving the International Economic System

Believing that trade and investment are the engines of development for Third World countries, and in particular for African nations, the United States has taken the initiative to propose improvements in the international economic system in these areas. Many of these proposals have been brought to fruition through the joint efforts of the developed and the developing nations. Other aids to trade and investment have been the result of unilateral U.S. decisions or policies.

One important U.S. proposal at the seventh special session of the United Nations General Assembly led to the expansion of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] compensatory financing facility. This facility helps to insure basic economic security against economic cycles in industrial countries that reduce export earnings and undermine development plans. This year IMF has disbursed more than $2 billion from this facility.

Another action concerning the IMF has been the establishment of a Trust Fund for poorer developing countries based on profits from the sale of IMF gold. As you know, three gold sales have been held. The Trust Fund lending is expected to begin in early 1977.

Another of Secretary Kissinger's proposals was to proceed with the establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Draft articles establishing the Fund have been negotiated, and pledges are still being accepted until the $1 billion target has been reached. The purpose of this Fund is to provide concessional financing to the developing nations to finance increased food production.

At the May UNCTAD Conference [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] in Nairobi, the United States proposed the establishment of an International Resources Bank. This new institution would promote more rational, systematic, and equitable development of resources in developing nations. It would help insure supplies of raw materials to fulfill the growing needs of the world economy.

In another aspect of the commodity situation, the final UNCTAD resolution called for consultations on 18 individual commodities. The United States is participating in these consultations without conceding our firm policy to consider commodity agreements only on a case-by-case basis. We feel that not all commodities are suitable for commodity agreements. The United States is a member of the International Coffee Agreement and the International Tin Agreement.

Both developed and developing countries are engaged in the multilateral trade negotiations underway in Geneva. Products of special interest to the developing countries are currently the subject of negotiations in the tropical products group. Tariff reductions would be a more binding concession and help integrate the developing countries into the world trading system.

In contrast to the multilateral nature of the negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. generalized system of preferences is a unilateral grant of duty-free entry to over 2,700 tariff items when produced in beneficiary developing countries. We believe this opportunity for LDC exports to enter the U.S. market duty free should help to encourage expansion and diversification of their exports.

While helping improve the U.S. trade balance with Africa, the Export-Import Bank also assists African development by making it possible for these countries to purchase U.S. technology equipment. The Export-Import Bank has an exposure of almost $1.5 billion spread among 32 sub-Saharan African countries. The Export-Import Bank participates to some extent in virtually all large sales of U.S. products to African countries. Many sales of U.S. products to Africa would not be made if it were not for Eximbank financing, since financing is a key factor in sales to most countries of Africa. Products which account for most of the Eximbank loans to Africa are aircraft, locomotives, mining equipment, industrial equipment, telecommunications, and electric power generating equipment.

The purpose of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation is to facilitate U.S. private investment in friendly developing countries. OPIC provides insurance against loss resulting from currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and war, revolution, and insurrection. It has been particularly active in Africa, where it has investment guarantee agreements with 35 sub-Saharan countries. Among the projects which OPIC has financed or insured are an aluminum refinery in Ghana, a hotel complex in Ivory Coast, and a dairy plant in Nigeria. OPIC leads investment missions to Africa, and it regularly holds seminars to acquaint businessmen with investment opportunities in Africa.

Doing business in the developing world requires patience and a special effort—an effort which sometimes may hardly seem warranted by the size of the market. However, looking beyond the immediate return to possible future benefits of expanded

markets and access to raw materials, the effort should be seen as well worthwhile.

Statistics are soon forgotten, but there are a few important points I hope will stay with you:

—We don't do business in a vacuum. Political issues have a direct bearing on the climate for trade and investment.

—In the increasing world competition for resources and markets, the United States will become more dependent on Africa.

—Dependence, however, is a two-way street. Africa needs American capital and technological know-how to fuel its economic development.

—American prosperity is tied to economic development in the poorer countries. Countries with a per capita income of under $100 offer little opportunity for trade and investment. However, they do provide fertile ground for instability, and they can change the character of international relations. Therefore, since our fortunes are inextricably linked, we must do what we can to build a community of interest and improve conditions in the poorer countries. Trade and investment are the principal means of achieving this end.

Sixth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to Public Law 94–104, I am submitting my sixth periodic report on the Cyprus negotiations and the actions which this Administration is taking to assist in the search of a lasting solution to the problems still facing the people of the Republic of Cyprus.

In my last report I reviewed recent steps taken by the Administration to bring about further progress in the Cyprus talks, and I emphasized the need for the parties to set aside procedural problems and move on to discussions of key substantive issues.

Our efforts during the past sixty days have been directed to encouraging the resumption of such negotiations. We have been in close contact with our major Western allies regarding new ideas which might contribute to progress in the Cyprus talks and have continued to work closely with United Nations Secretary General Waldheim. Secretary of State Kissinger met with Mr. Waldheim in New York in late August to discuss the Cyprus question. Following that meeting Secretary General Waldheim asked the chief Cypriot negotiators from both sides to come to New York for individual consultations with him on how the negotiations might best be resumed. These consultations developed into a series of joint meetings at which both sides discussed the issues which were blocking further progress. After these meetings, the two Cypriot negotiators agreed to continue their consultations in Nicosia, under the chairmanship of the Secretary General's Special Representative for Cyprus. It is my hope these talks will lead to resumption of meaningful discussion on the main issues.

In his meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey at the United Nations last week, Secretary Kissinger urged their strong support once again for a new round of talks. We will continue to work as closely as possible with the Governments of Greece and Turkey, with the UN Secretary General, with our Western allies, and with the parties themselves, to insure that every opportunity is seized in pursuing a just and lasting settlement on Cyprus.

To focus the world's attention on the need for rapid progress, Secretary Kissinger stated anew the position of my Administration in his speech before the UN General Assembly on September 30 when he emphasized that our overriding objectives remain the well-being of the Cypriot

[1] Transmitted on Oct. 4 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 11).

people and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. Calling upon all concerned to undertake a new commitment to achieve these ends, he underlined once again the position I have repeatedly voiced:

> A settlement must come from the Cypriot communities themselves. It is they who must decide how their island's economy and government shall be reconstructed. It is they who must decide the ultimate relationship of the two communities and the territorial extent of each area.

This Administration believes that in order to restore momentum in the negotiations a set of principles along the following lines might help the parties to resume talks on substantive issues:

—A settlement should preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

—The present dividing lines on Cyprus must be adjusted to reduce the area currently controlled by the Turkish side;

—The territorial arrangement should take into account the economic requirements and humanitarian concerns of the two Cypriot communities, including the plight of those who remain refugees;

—A constitutional arrangement should provide conditions under which the two Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large vote in their own affairs; and

—Security arrangements should be agreed that permit the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under international agreement.

It is my strong hope that these ideas may be given careful consideration by all concerned.

In addition to these steps, the United States also continues to provide financial assistance to the people of Cyprus so that they may overcome the burdens imposed on them by the events of 1974. I have just signed into law a bill authorizing $17.5 million in U.S. relief assistance for Cyprus in the coming fiscal year. Our assistance thus far, some $50 million over the past two years, has been a major factor in providing adequate homes for almost all of those unfortunate Cypriots uprooted in 1974, and, in addition, has made a substantial contribution toward the medical needs, emergency food aid and the general welfare of the many displaced from their homes. We will continue to offer our help wherever it is needed.

The United States also continues to be the largest financial contributor to the maintenance of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus, which has done such a highly effective job. We continue actively to support both the work of the UN Peacekeeping Force and the UN resolutions calling for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that island, and withdrawal of all foreign military forces not authorized by agreements. While I strongly endorse all of these precepts, the last is of special importance since the cause of peace can only be poorly served when men confront each other with arms. I was therefore gratified to hear of the withdrawal last month of a further portion of the Turkish armed forces from Cyprus.

In summary, during the past sixty days we have increased our efforts to bring the two sides together once more for discussions in any area which might contribute to a more secure and normal life for the people of Cyprus. We have reaffirmed our determination to continue direct bilateral assistance on a large scale. We have worked with other members of the international community to bring about the best possible set of conditions for resumption of the Cyprus talks at an early date.

My Administration will further intensify its efforts to bring both sides together again with the hope, based on their meetings in New York last month, that some further significant advances may occur.

The people of the United States remain keenly interested in promoting an equitable and lasting settlement on Cyprus. My Administration has been active at every opportunity in encouraging such a settlement.

We believe the people of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities share equally a desire for peaceful, productive and secure lives. We will continue to use every opportunity further to encourage the leaders of both sides toward a common solution which will achieve these goals.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 4, 1976.*

United States Encouraged by Progress at Preparatory Discussions on IFAD

Press release 510 dated October 12

The Preparatory Commission (Prepcom) of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) met in Rome September 27–30 to discuss the interim steps required to establish IFAD. IFAD was an OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] initiative at the November 1974 World Food Conference. It is a proposed $1 billion multilateral mechanism which will provide OPEC and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries with a unique opportunity to cooperate in the financing of increased food production in the developing world on highly concessional terms. IFAD will emphasize assistance to the poor food-deficit countries.

The United States is encouraged by the businesslike atmosphere which characterized the Prepcom discussions among OPEC, OECD, and non-oil LDC [less developed countries] governments. We were especially heartened by the considerable optimism among Prepcom participants that sufficient pledges would be forthcoming so that IFAD could be established soon. The United States has pledged $200 million, contingent on a total level of pledges of $1 billion and equitable burden-sharing among the categories of contributors.

At the Prepcom meeting the Iranian delegation announced that Iran has agreed to contribute $20 million in addition to the pledge it has already made to IFAD. Previous Iranian pledges totaling about $105 million have been made through the OPEC Special Fund. As of September 30, total IFAD convertible pledges were about $965 million, with $535 million from the OECD countries, $420 million from the OPEC countries, and $10 million from the non-oil LDC's.

The United States welcomes this significant additional Iranian contribution as an important step toward attaining the $1 billion target necessary to get IFAD established. This pledge further underlines the importance which the Government of Iran attaches to this initiative, which Iran has been involved in since its inception. It is another evidence of Iran's constructive role in international relations.

Report on World Weather Program Transmitted to the Congress

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

Weather and climate are at once familiar and sources of deep concern. Through technology, we have minimized the harmful effects of weather and have adapted our civilization to a wide range of climatic conditions. Yet, we now know how fragile is the balance between our activities and the environment. Understanding that balance is the key to the successful management of energy, food, and water resources and the beneficial application of technol-

[1] Transmitted on Sept. 28 (text from White House press release); the 73-page report, entitled "World Weather Program—Plan for Fiscal Year 1977," is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

ogy. Our national goals in improving weather predictions and warnings and coping with the vagaries of climate cannot be accomplished except in the context of a world-wide endeavor. All nations play roles; the United States can be truly proud of our contributions.

The World Weather Program is the U.S. commitment to an effort that will affect every one of us. I am pleased to report significant and continuing progress in furthering the goals of the World Weather Program. The following accomplishments are representative of the progress being made:

—There has been a smooth transition into the operational use of geostationary meteorological satellites. The Western Hemisphere, much of the Atlantic, and part of the Pacific are now observed continuously. A nationwide network of Satellite Field Service Stations has been implemented by NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] to capitalize on these new data. Hurricane and typhoon forecasting has been aided, for example, as has the observation, tracking, and warning of severe weather over the United States.

—The data processing system at the World Meteorological Center, Suitland, Maryland, has been expanded through the operational use of a third, fourth-generation computer. This system is essential to handle the improved forecast models and the increased volume of data being received from the World Weather Watch.

—Augmented environmental monitoring and climatic programs have been initiated at the South Pole, American Samoa, and Barrow, Alaska.

—Engineering tests have been completed on large meteorological and oceanographic buoys. The first prototype operational system was moored 240 miles off the Oregon coast. Others are scheduled for operation this summer.

—The initial data-processing phase for the Global Atmospheric Research Program's (GARP) Atlantic Tropical Experiment has been completed and scientific analysis is well underway.

—A series of Data Systems Tests have been completed as a dress rehearsal for the First GARP Global Experiment which starts in 1978.

—The Global Experiment received major impetus when over 40 nations met in February 1976 and agreed to commit ships, buoys, balloon systems, satellites, and other critical facilities for the observational period planned for 1977–1979.

It is with pleasure that I transmit this annual report describing current planned Federal activities contributing to the World Weather Program. The report details how the United States is following the intent of Senate Concurrent Resolution 67 of the 90th Congress to participate in this international program.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 28, 1976.*

President Signs Whale Conservation and Protection Study Act

Statement by President Ford [1]

I am pleased to sign H.R. 15445, the Whale Conservation and Protection Study Act.[2]

This bill authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to conduct comprehensive studies of all whales found in waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction and to report to Congress the results of these studies by January 1, 1980. The bill also provides that the Secre-

[1] Issued on Oct. 18 (text from White House press release).

[2] Public Law 94–532, approved Oct. 17.

tary of State will initiate negotiations with Mexico and Canada to develop appropriate bilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of whales.

Although much is known of the habits of whales, the vastness of the oceans and the mobility of these mammals make it very difficult to monitor adequately their many species. This legislation will allow the collection of scientific information that will permit us to determine the most appropriate means of preventing the exploitation of whales and thus avoid their extinction.

The United States has placed great emphasis on multilateral efforts with other nations through the International Whaling Commission to achieve effective conservation of whales throughout the world. The negotiations with Mexico and Canada directed by this bill will reinforce the efforts of our three nations within the Commission.

President Signs Bill Amending Bretton Woods Agreements Act

Statement by President Ford [1]

I have approved H.R. 13955, an act "To provide for amendment of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, and for other purposes." [2] This legislation authorizes U.S. acceptance of amendments to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and U.S. consent to a proposed increase in its quota in the Fund.

The reforms of the international monetary system which the United States accepts through these amendments are the culmination of years of debate and negotiation following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods par value system in 1971. This new international monetary system recognizes that development of stable underlying economic and financial conditions is an essential prerequisite to the achievement of international monetary stability. At the same time, the new system will provide the increased flexibility, resilience, and reliance on market mechanisms which today's monetary relationships require, replacing the exchange rate rigidity and gold emphasis of the Bretton Woods system.

In the post-World War II era, we have increasingly recognized the importance of a smoothly functioning international monetary system to American jobs, production, and growth and to the maintenance of a prosperous and stable world economy. The attainment of the international economic as well as political and national security objectives of the United States depends in large measure on our success in maintaining a strong and healthy world economy, and that in turn requires a sound, smoothly functioning, and equitable international monetary system.

For all these reasons, I am especially pleased to sign into law this act to provide for amendment of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act.

[1] Issued on Oct. 21 (text from White House press release).

[2] Public Law 94–564; approved Oct. 19.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions

The Vietnam-Cambodia Emergency, 1975. Hearings before the House Committee on International Relations and Its Special Subcommittee on Investigations. Part I—Vietnam Evacuation and Humanitarian Assistance; April 9–May 8, 1975; 240 pp. Part II—The Cambodian-Vietnam Debate; March 6–April 14, 1975; 291 pp. Part III—Vietnam Evacuation: Testimony of Ambassador Graham A. Martin; January 27, 1976; 89 pp. Part IV—Cambodia Evacuation: Testimony of Ambassador John Gunther Dean; May 5, 1976; 64 pp.

Shifting Balance of Power in Asia: Implications for Future U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the House Committee on International Relations. November 18, 1975–May 18, 1976. 236 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Ratification deposited: Barbados, August 6, 1976.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, Paraguay, October 11, 1976; Dominican Republic, Indonesia, October 14, 1976.
Notification of provisional application deposited: Gabon, October 11, 1976.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.
Ratifications deposited: Iran, August 3, 1976; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, September 9, 1976.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. Entered into force December 6, 1975.[1]
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, October 12, 1976.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Comoros, October 28, 1976.

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Kenya, September 17, 1976; Mauritania, September 21, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.[2]
Acceptance deposited: Ghana, October 18, 1976.

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.[2]
Ratification deposited: United States, October 26, 1976.

BILATERAL

Egypt

Agreement concerning claims of nationals of the United States, with agreed minute and related notes. Signed at Cairo May 1, 1976. Entered into force October 27, 1976.

Honduras

Arrangement for hydrographic and nautical cartography. Signed at Tegucigalpa August 30, 1976. Entered into force August 30, 1976.

Jamaica

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of April 16, 1975 (TIAS 8130). Signed at Kingston September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

Japan

Agreement concerning enrollment of Japanese employees of the Okinawa office of the Voice of America in the Employment Insurance Scheme of Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo September 30 and October 15, 1976. Entered into force October 15, 1976; effective April 1, 1976.

Mexico

Agreement regarding mutual assistance between the United States and the Mexican customs services. Signed at Mexico September 30, 1976. Enters into force 60 days after the date on which the parties notify one another by an exchange of diplomatic notes that they have accepted the terms of the agreement.

United Kingdom

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signature, and exchange of notes. Signed at London June 8, 1972.
Instruments of ratification exchanged: October 21, 1976.
Enters into force: January 21, 1977.
Extended to: Antigua; Belize; Bermuda; British Indian Ocean Territory; British Virgin Islands; Cayman Islands; Dominica; Falkland Islands

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[1] Not in force for the United States.
[2] Not in force.

and Dependencies; Gibraltar; Gilbert Islands; Hong Kong; Montserrat; Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands; St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla; St. Helena and Dependencies; St. Lucia; St. Vincent; Solomon Islands; Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the Island of Cyprus; Turks and Caicos Islands; Tuvalu.

Venezuela

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of August 14, 1953, as amended (TIAS 2813, 3117, 7549). Effected by exchange of notes at Caracas September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage are subject to change.

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Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: October 25–31

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*530	10/26	Kissinger: dedication of Dean Acheson Auditorium and Loy Henderson International Conference Room.
*531	10/27	Mrs. Dean Acheson, Loy Henderson: dedication ceremony, Oct. 26.
†532	10/27	"Foreign Relations," 1949, volume I, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, released.
†533	10/28	Kissinger: news conference, Hartford. Conn., Oct. 27.
*534	10/29	Charles A. James sworn in as Ambassador to Niger (biographic data).
*535	10/29	Entry into force of U.S.-Egypt claims agreement, Oct. 27.
*536	10/29	Ratifications of protocol to Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Oct. 12.
*537	10/29	Twelve foreign environmentalists to meet with U.S. counterparts.
*538	10/29	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Boston, Nov. 22.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.