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The Department of State BULLETIN a weekly publication issued by th Office of Media Services, Bureau o Public Affairs, provides the public an interested agencies of the governmen with information on developments i the field of U.S. foreign relations an on the work of the Department an the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selecte press releases on foreign policy, issue by the White House and the Depar ment, and statements, addresse and news conferences of the Presiden and the Secretary of State and othe officers of the Department, as well a special articles on various phases o international affairs and the function of the Department. Information i included concerning treaties and inter national agreements to which th United States is or may become party and on treaties of general inter national interest.

Publications of the Department o State, United Nations documents, an legislative material in the field o international relations are also listed

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Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Harvard October 15

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger on October 15 at Cambridge, Mass., where he participated in the Harvard East Asia Conference.

Press release 518 dated October 15

Professor Fairbank: Ladies and gentlemen, I am John Fairbank, representing Harvard University.

Harvard has called this press conference and is extremely glad that Secretary Kissinger is able to come here today, because we have an interest in East Asia that we think is absolutely essential to develop in the public interest. The Secretary is helping us in this way at our request. We appreciate it very much. I hope each of you will identify your paper as you ask questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is this Administration doing at this moment to secure a final accounting of American servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia, and also a comment from you on the cooperation of the present government in Vietnam on this matter?

Secretary Kissinger: We have made it clear to the Government of Vietnam that progress toward normalization and progress toward better relations with the United States absolutely depend on an accounting for the missing in action. We are prepared to discuss this with the Vietnamese. We've had diplomatic exchanges in Paris, and we expect to start some discussions with them in the near future on that subject.

Now, so far, the Vietnamese Government has not been particularly cooperative. They have been feeding out just a few names to influence particular decisions. But we think that as a question of principle we cannot let the Vietnamese Government blackmail American families with an anguish that has been going on for years in order to do something that they should have done under the armistice agreement to begin with.

So we hope that in the future that we will get a complete accounting for the missing in action, and that will then permit progress toward normalization.

Q. Just a followup on that: Is this Administration prepared to veto the entrance of the Government of Vietnam into the United Nations until this matter is resolved?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have vetoed it before. We have made it clear that we would veto it before, and the President has stated that this is a precondition.

Cuba's Statement on Hijacking Agreement

Q. Mr. Secretary, how is the State Department responding to Fidel Castro's statement [on Oct. 15] that his country is canceling the 1973 skyjacking agreement with the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: First, in my speech to the United Nations I condemned terrorism as an instrument of national policy pursued by any nation, for whatever cause. The United States is not engaged in any activity of this kind, and the charge by Fidel Castro that the United States or its government or any agency of the government had anything to do with the explosion of that airliner is totally false.

Secondly, we think that it is an act of complete irresponsibility to encourage hi-

jacking at this moment at a time when the —when one of the biggest of human problems is the taking of hostages that cannot possibly influence political decisions or foreign policy decisions.

And we have stated today, and I repeat again, that we will hold the Cuban Government accountable for any actions that result from their decision.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, the Democratic Presidential nominee, Jimmy Carter, says that when it comes to foreign policy that you, in fact, are the President of the United States in that particular area, that you really have the responsibility, that President Ford apparently has very little input in foreign policy matters. Could you respond to that?

Secretary Kissinger: I will respond to that question. But could I ask you to—in your other questions to leave them out of the partisan areas. You can mention criticisms and ask me to comment on criticisms, but don't get me into specific references to personalities. In this particular case I think I would have to say that this shows that Mr. Carter has more experience as a Governor than at the Federal level.

There is no such thing—Dean Acheson used to say that there can be a strong President and a strong Secretary of State as long as the Secretary of State knows who is President.

The final decisions are always made by the President. I see the President three or four times a week. I am on the telephone with him constantly. There is no major decision that is taken which is not made by the President.

In the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy every President has to delegate certain tactical decisions to somebody—to his security adviser, to his Secretary of State—and that, too, has happened with every President in the postwar period. President Ford and I have had a very close working relationship, and it is in the nature of such a relationship that the points of view of the two partners merge.

But it is always clear who is the senior partner and who is the junior partner.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that in a sense when President Ford admittedly made a blunder during the second debate with Jimmy Carter on the Eastern European situation, that that indicated that he was not on top of the situation, that he wasn't aware fully of certain foreign policy issues?

Secretary Kissinger: No. That indicated that under the pressure of a debate he did not make a point as felicitously as he might have made it, as he has since admitted.

Nobody who knows his record could believe that on this particular issue he did not know exactly what the facts were. He had one thing in mind and he expressed it in a manner that created the wrong impression, and he has stated that publicly and has clarified it.

But there was no misapprehension in his mind as to the presence of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe. And we have been negotiating for years to reduce the number of those divisions. And he has personally visited three East European countries.

Q. Mr. President—

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate the promotion, but [laughter] there's a constitutional provision against it.

Negotiating New Panama Canal Arrangements

Q. Mr. Secretary, what was your reaction to Carter's remarks on the Panama Canal, and has that affected the negotiations in any way?

Secretary Kissinger: Could you leave names out of these questions? [Laughter.]

It has not affected the negotiations, which are just on the verge of resuming.

We have stated repeatedly that with respect to the Panama Canal it is not an issue between the United States and Panama. It is an issue of the U.S. position with respect to the Western Hemisphere and ultimately

with respect to all of the new nations in the world.

If there is a consensus in the Western Hemisphere on any point, it is that the existing arrangements in Panama are to be changed. And if the United States relies simply on the physical assertion of its power—which we have, and of course we are stronger than Panama—then we are going to mortgage the possibilities of a more creative relationship in the Western Hemisphere.

So therefore the problem is whether we can assure access through the canal, free and unimpeded access through the canal, by arrangements different from those that now exist.

This is the essence of the negotiation, and I do not think it helps to make extreme statements in this regard.

Any agreement that we make—first of all, there's no doubt—not one line of an agreement exists at this moment. Once a concept of an agreement is agreed to, it will be discussed with the Congress. Once the treaty exists, it will have to be approved by two-thirds of the Senate.

So there is plenty of opportunity for a full debate, and it will take an overwhelming majority to pass it. And we believe that the negotiations are in the national interest, and I believe that any President will come to the same conclusion that every President has come to since 1964; namely, that these negotiations should be continued and that all possibilities should be explored.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us a little bit about the East Asia Conference and why it is important for you to be meeting with businessmen? Will you give us a little bit of your concept of the role of multinationals in East Asia?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, I am meeting with this conference primarily because my friend John Fairbank has asked me to meet with it. And I did not call the conference, nor did I have anything to do with the membership of the conference.

As I understood it, Harvard is calling a conference of Americans with interests in Asia and attempting to bring that group together with faculty members that have been studying the problems of Asia.

Now, I believe that this is an excellent idea. I think that Americans who are active in Asia ought to understand the cultural, political, and economic conditions of the area. And I believe that professors who are studying the area can benefit from some of the practical experiences which some of these corporations and others who are interested in the area have. I have always believed that one of the problems in our society is to bring together those who have an opportunity to reflect about the problems with those who have to be active in the area.

So I have welcomed this opportunity and, as you know, I am speaking off the record. I am not using it to make any public pronouncement. I am doing it to help my former colleagues at Harvard and my old institution to engage in a worthwhile program.

Impact of Change of Leadership in China

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us if you or President Ford have plans for visiting the new Chinese leader at any time in the near future? And could you also give us your assessment of the kind of relations we are likely to have with the new government?

Secretary Kissinger: There are no plans now for either President Ford or myself to visit China, because while we have no doubt about the election, there is a certain decorum about making plans [laughter] until the results are clear.

It has been more or less an annual event that the Secretary of State would visit China at some point during the year, and that could happen, although no plans exist now.

There are no plans whatever for the President to visit China. And there is something to be said for perhaps having a return visit at some point or to meet at some other place. But this, I think, has to be decided after the election.

As for the impact of changes in leadership on policy, the long-term policy of any country, and especially of a country that moves with the care and thoughtfulness of the People's Republic of China, doesn't depend so much on personalities as on a perception of their interests and of their values.

I think that the basic factors that brought the United States and China into contact with each other are still operating and are likely to continue.

Of course personalities affect the style of diplomacy and may affect how certain things are carried out, but I do not expect a fundamental change in the relationship, and it is too early for us to tell what differences of style might emerge.

Southern African Liberation Movements

Q. Mr. Secretary, in reference to South Africa, why do you refuse so far to meet with key African liberation organizations, particularly the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress? And why do you schedule meetings excluding these legitimate organizations, spokespersons for the African people in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: Let's separate the liberation movements in Rhodesia—Zimbabwe—from those in Namibia, for a moment.

When I visited Africa in April, I met with the Presidents of the so-called frontline states. They all felt at the time that the experience of Angola should not be repeated; that is to say, they did not want any of the outside powers to back one particular liberation movement and thereby get a fight started among the liberation movements.

I then agreed with President Nyerere [of Tanzania] and President Kaunda [of Zambia] and President Khama [of Botswana] that the United States would not get in touch directly with the liberation movements, in order to permit the African problems to be dealt with by Africans. And we agreed to deal with these liberation movements through the frontline Presidents provided that all other countries did the same.

They have seen to it that these liberation movements would not become the plaything of great-power rivalry. And it is not failure to recognize these movements; it is, rather, our attempt to insulate the problem from superpower rivalry.

Now that they are going to Geneva, we will of course deal with them, and our whole policy has been to put these liberation movements into a position where they could negotiate directly for the future of their own country.

With respect to the liberation movement in Namibia, which is to say SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], I have met with [Sam] Nujoma and my representatives have met with Nujoma. In that case, we do not have the special conditions of many movements, since as one movement he deals also with Communist countries. And we deal with him and we have recognized him as an important factor, as a key factor, in the negotiations. In fact we are just now waiting for him to come back to New York from Africa, before I have another meeting with him.

With respect to, again, to the Rhodesian movements, I want to repeat: we recognize them; we accept them; we do not want to choose among them. That is to say, we want the African Presidents and the leaders themselves to determine their own relationships, but we will recognize them and we support them.

Q. Well, is it not a fact that the State Department has had a preference for Joshua Nkomo in Zimbabwe?

Secretary Kissinger: That is not a fact.

Q. That is not a fact?

Secretary Kissinger: No. Nkomo was recognized by all of the movements as the chief negotiator at the last negotiation, in February, which broke down.

At this moment, we are meticulously staying away from indicating any preference. And when Mr. Schaufele [Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William E. Schaufele, Jr.] visited Salisbury he was in touch with [Bishop Abel] Muzorewa as well as with Nkomo, as well as with representatives of [Robert] Mugabe.

Aircraft Hijacking

Q. Mr. Kissinger, on the hijacking question, do you feel at this point that these incidents of skyjacking will increase? And also, what can the United States do about it now that Castro has canceled the arrangement?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to speculate what exactly Castro intends to do with this arrangement and what it means with respect to his actual performance.

Theoretically he could carry out the same obligations, which is to say to return the skyjackers without having the formal obligation to do so. If he, however, deliberately encourages skyjackings to Cuba, it would be an act of extraordinary irresponsibility. Because I think whatever the disputes between countries may be, no country should use the suffering of innocent people who, I repeat, have absolutely no possibility of affecting events for the sort of rivalry that now exists.

Q. What can the United States do about that?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I said we will hold them accountable. What we will do we will have to study.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, because you are returning to help Harvard for the East Asia Conference, would you give any thought to returning to Harvard in any capacity after you leave office?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this won't be a problem before 1981, so we will have many opportunities to discuss this. [Laughter.]

Q. Dr. Kissinger, last night the President said that Jimmy Carter had slandered the name of the United States when he criticized American foreign policy under yourself in the Ford Administration. How far can a Democratic candidate go in his criticism before the President has to go run and hide behind the American flag to defend against it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I consider the office of the Secretary of State essentially a nonpartisan office, and I think the candidates have to determine for themselves how far they should go and what they can say.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your answers you gave before about staying on until 1981—

Secretary Kissinger: That was a joke. [Laughter.] That was to demoralize my staff.

Q. Does that mean you are prepared to stay with President Ford if he is reelected?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I've said repeatedly that eight years is a long time—especially eight years as turbulent as these have been—that I did not want to state before the election was over what I would do before the President has talked to me, but that on the whole I thought that eight years is a long time. So I have not made my final decision. I want to wait until the President has talked to me.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, aren't you in fact saying you'd prefer to leave, although you will serve at his request if he's reelected?

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't really stated what I will do, because I want to look at it under the conditions that then exist and I owe the President the opportunity to discuss it with me.

Q. Is there any other job you prefer to take?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you, is it true that—is it possible that recent arms sales by the United States to Israel were motivated by political considerations before the election?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the President has answered this yesterday. These items have been before the Administration for several months. They come up for an almost monthly review. And the President decided to act because he thought, as he pointed out yesterday, that it was in the best interests of the United States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to follow up on Mr. Krimer's question of before, since you said your answer to that was a joke. Taking for granted that you will at some point leave the State Department, would you at that point consider returning to Harvard? And if so, have you at any time discussed that possibility with any member of the Harvard administration?

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't discussed it with any member of the Harvard administration, and I have really not given any systematic thought to what I'm going to do when I leave this position. I have taken the view that after I've announced my resignation, or after the voters announce my resignation for me [laughter], I can then make the decision on what I might want to do. But I think it's inappropriate for somebody in my office to discuss his future with anybody until he's resigned.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, I understand the United States is investigating the cause of the crash of the Cuban plane off Barbados.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. Can you tell me who is doing the investigating, what the investigation has learned so far?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my information, we have asked the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] to check into it. I don't know whether the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] is making a formal investigation of it.

We have offered the governments concerned any assistance that they might request, since it did not occur on American soil. But I can state categorically that no official of the U.S. Government, nobody paid by the American Government, nobody in contact with the American Government, has had anything to do with this crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this totally reprehensible.

The Issue of Chile

Q. Mr. Secretary, speaking of the CIA, the CIA has been accused by some Southeast Asia observers of more or less manipulating the recent military takeover in Thailand. Now, have the U.S. interests gone so far as to try to emulate the type of military dictatorship that was set up in Chile? Are we talking about that topic?

Secretary Kissinger: "Emulate," you mean? We have had absolutely nothing to do with the upheaval in Thailand, and therefore there's no point comparing it with Chile. We had absolutely nothing to do with it. We didn't know about it beforehand.

Q. Is Chile still an issue?

Secretary Kissinger: That depends with whom.

Q. With the United States, with the recent car blowup in Washington, D.C.?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we of course totally condemn the murder of former Ambassador [of Chile to the U.S. Orlando] Letelier, whom I knew personally and respected even when we had our differences. We have seen no evidence yet as to who was behind this assassination. But whoever was behind it, it is an absolutely outrageous act.

We also had nothing to do—as the

Church committee [Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities] said—with the overthrow of the Chilean Government. We had nothing to do with the military junta that overthrew it.

Q. Despite some of the evidence to the contrary?

Secretary Kissinger: The Church committee made clear that we had nothing to do with the military junta. What we were attempting to do was to strengthen the democratic parties, who in turn had nothing to do with the overthrow, for the 1976 election. That was a different matter.

Q. Can we say without a doubt that the United States had nothing to do with the recent bombing in Washington, D.C.?

Secretary Kissinger: You mean of Letelier?

Q. Exactly.

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely.

Q. Thank you.

Q. You mentioned earlier that you're going to consider your fate following the election, and perhaps that fate might be decided by the voters. How much of an impact do you yourself feel your performance during the last eight years will have on this election?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, foreign policy is inevitably an issue in any election, and that's inevitable. These have been eight turbulent years. I believe that they were the period in which we had to make the change from a belief in American omnipotence, in which we could overwhelm every problem with our power, to a period in which we have had to conduct foreign policy the way other nations have had to conduct it throughout history—with a consciousness of a national purpose, a choice of means—where we have had to establish new relationships with old allies, open new relationships with old adversaries, liquidate vestiges of a war which we found, and deal simultaneously with a revolution that is represented by the new nations.

I don't want to judge myself how effectively all of this has been done, and I don't frankly believe that candidates are in the best position to judge that either, although obviously they must make their cases.

We will leave to history what the ultimate assessment is. But without doubt, an eight-year record in foreign policy will be subject to discussion.

Q. Will you be an asset to Gerald Ford on election day, or a liability?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't go into the public opinion or polling business, and I can't judge it. My obligation is, under the direction of the President, to conduct foreign policy and to advise the President as to what I believe to be in the best interests of the United States and world peace.

Now, I understand that most polls show that I have an adequate public support, but this is not the ultimate test of a Secretary of State.

China and World Equilibrium

Q. Secretary Kissinger, do you think that at some point the United States should or might sell arms to China, provide any kind of defense equipment to China?

Secretary Kissinger: We have never had any request for the sale of arms to China. We have never had any discussions with China about the sale of arms.

We believe that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China is very important to the world equilibrium, and we would consider it a grave matter if this were threatened by an outside power. But we have never had any defense discussions with China. I don't foresee any, but I do have to state our general view that it would not be taken lightly if there were a massive assault on China.

Q. Is it correct, as former Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger has said, that

the State Department withheld invitations for him to visit China?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe that Secretary Schlesinger said this; and the only formal invitation to Secretary Schlesinger that was issued happened to coincide with his departure from the government, so that the problem of withholding it did not arise.

Q. He said that two invitations were extended previously.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, with respect to the first—I don't think he said it. I think a member of his party must have misunderstood. There was no formal invitation the year before.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if this does turn out to be your last year in office, could you look back and think about what might be the major disappointment and major accomplishment during your period as Secretary of State?

Secretary Kissinger: You know, when you are in this sort of a position, you perform almost like an athlete, in the sense of reacting to the series of situations that develop very rapidly. I would think that I would be much more reflective about it after I'm out of office than while I'm in office.

I would think that the major accomplishment would be the attempt to shift American foreign policy from a perception that we could do everything simultaneously to an attempt to relate our commitments to our means and our purposes and to our possibilities. This involved recasting our relationships with allies, developing new relationships with adversaries, and beginning new approaches to the new countries.

The disappointment has been that in the period after 1973, the executive authority of the United States was so weakened by a series of crises that many of the building blocks that were in place in 1973 could not be used as rapidly as I would have hoped and that perhaps more energy had to be spent on preserving what existed than on building what might have been possible.

I could list specific things that were disappointing, as you would expect in an eight-year period, but if you want it on a general plane, these would be what I consider the accomplishments and what I consider the sadnesses.

Q. More specifically, Mr. Kissinger, are you disappointed that the United States did not establish full diplomatic relations with mainland China before Mao Tse-tung's death and that perhaps now this period is going to be a longer period because of the transition that mainland China is going through?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the process of normalization is one to which we're committed and which we intend to carry out. I don't think it is tied, nor has it ever been tied by the Chinese, to a personality or to a specific leader. And I believe that that process can continue.

Q. When will it be completed, or what's holding it up now?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what has held it up is to discuss the modalities about the future of Taiwan, which will have to be discussed with the new leadership.

Q. I'll give a scenario to you. Suppose that you do get your walking papers from the electorate in November. You say you don't know what job you're going to take. But most of us, I think, would concede in all probability you will receive an offer to write your memoirs or write a book on your eight years. On balance, given equal office space and background, would you rather write that on the banks of the Potomac or the banks of the Charles? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: Almost certainly not on the banks of the Potomac. [Laughter.] Where else, I don't know, but almost certainly not on the banks of the Potomac.

Q. Recently I have read that Mexico was going to communism, quoting from one declaration of one of the Senators of the United States. What is your point of view about that? Do you think Mexico is really going to the Communists?

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely not. I know Mexico a little. I know its leaders very well. I know its incumbent President well. I know the President-elect well.

Of course, Mexico is given to heroic rhetoric, which may not always be literally understood in the United States. [Laughter.] But Mexico is not going toward communism, and I know no leader in Mexico who has any Communist biases, though of course the Mexican Revolution produces a certain sympathy for Third World causes. And, inevitably, when a country has as powerful a neighbor as the United States, there are going to be many points of friction. But the fact is we usually solve our points of friction. And we have repeatedly rejected this accusation that has been made by several Congressmen and Senators.

Q. A few minutes ago you said that public opinion polls are not the ultimate test for a Secretary of State.

Secretary Kissinger: Of a Secretary of State.

Q. Yes. If they are not, what is the ultimate test?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the ultimate test of a Secretary of State—the obligation of a Secretary of State is to give his best judgment to the President as to what is in the national interest. And if he is responsible, he'll understand that the national interest cannot be separated from the world interest. The President then has to make the political decision as to how this judgment can be carried out within the American political context. It's the President who has to make that decision.

I don't think a Secretary of State should take his own public opinion polls as to his own popularity. The Secretary of State ought to be expendable and usually is expended [laughter], but he should not worry about his own popularity primarily. He should advise the President. Then the President has to make the judgment. And eventually he'll be judged by history and whether he's left the world somewhat more peaceful and perhaps more progressive than he found it.

The press: Thank you very much.

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

White House press release dated October 12

President Ford announced on October 12 the appointment of three individuals to serve as executive branch Commissioner-Observers to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Those individuals represent the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce.

MONROE LEIGH, Legal Adviser, Department of State
JAMES G. POOR, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
MANSFIELD SPRAGUE, Counselor to the Secretary of Commerce

The purpose of the Commission is to monitor the acts of the signatories as they affect compliance with or violation of the articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in particular regard to the provisions relating to cooperation in humanitarian fields.[1] The Commission is also authorized to monitor and encourage the development of programs and activities of the U.S. Government and private organizations with a view toward taking advantage of the provisions of the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation.

[1] For text of the Final Act, adopted at Helsinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.

The Foundation of U.S.-Japan Ties: Common Interests and Shared Values

Address by Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs [1]

I am pleased to be your guest this evening. The Japan-America Society has long been a consistent and sensible advocate in this town of the importance of Japan to the United States and the need to maintain in good repair our ties with that country. There have been periods in the last decade when the priority of our relations with Japan has been temporarily obscured—by our concerns elsewhere in Asia or the world or, conversely, by a tendency to impute to the relationship a degree of automaticity, to assume that because Japan and the United States share so many common interests our relations are bound to proceed smoothly.

None of us wants the U.S.-Japan relationship to dominate the headlines, since headlines ordinarily highlight problems rather than accomplishments. Nor do we necessarily believe that the central preoccupation of policymakers in either government should be the bilateral relationship. In fact, for so complex an organism it does run remarkably smoothly. On the other hand, because it is so large, so successful, and so complex the U.S.-Japan relationship should be both a source of great satisfaction and a focus of our continuing intense attention. The Japan-America Society and other similar groups around the country help us in insuring that our Japan connection receives the recognition and the attention it deserves.

One problem which those of us who deal with Japan and speak about Japan constantly face is that the American people, and most particularly groups such as this one, are increasingly knowledgeable and sophisticated observers of U.S.-Japan relations. The broad outlines of our respective policies are known and understood, and in attempting to review them it is difficult to avoid what seem to be cliches. Quite correctly, people tend to challenge cliches. Even people in government.

I would say that our ties with Japan, and our policies toward it, are examined as constantly and as critically as is any other relationship this country maintains. We think we are on the right track. We do not believe that, simply because our approach toward Japan has achieved a certain maturity, sharp new departures are called for. We do not expect our present policies, or those of Japan, to prove immutable in every respect. Policies must reflect circumstances, and circumstances change. But we do think that the essential foundation of the U.S.-Japan relationship, constructed of common interests and shared values, will endure.

In other words, many of those cliches about Japan and the United States are true. At the risk of repeating a few of them I want to sketch briefly how we currently see our relations with Japan, as we near the end of what has been a very eventful year.

I think a useful way to approach a discussion of U.S.-Japan ties is to examine

[1] Made before the Japan-America Society at Washington on Oct. 19.

them in three broad categories, separate but interrelated—the economic, security, and political dimensions of our relationship.

Bilateral and Multilateral Economic Spheres

First, the economic. Despite the major challenges both our economies have faced in the last two years in restoring noninflationary growth, our bilateral economic ties have been remarkably trouble-free, in pleasant contrast to the situation of the early 1970's. The bilateral problems of those years—a massive trade imbalance; difficult textile negotiations; the need for Japan to eliminate import restrictions, liberalize foreign investment regulations, and revalue the yen—were largely resolved by 1974 to the satisfaction of both sides.

This was achieved through a process of continuing consultations at all levels and reflected both governments' awareness of the reality and the necessities of interdependence. And as that process went forward, I believe people on both sides of the Pacific came to understand better the importance of sustaining sound economic ties and to recognize that bilateral problems, however difficult they may appear, can indeed be resolved.

Today our bilateral economic ties are healthy and growing again after the 1974–75 recession. There are problems on specific trade issues, ranging from citrus fruits to specialty steel, and negotiations are now underway in two areas where we have significant differences—civil aviation and fisheries. In addition, as always, there is a need to keep an eye on the overall health of our trading relationship. Huge surpluses on one side tend to exacerbate protectionist sentiments on the other. In an economic relationship of this magnitude and complexity, there inevitably will be problems. But recent experience has demonstrated convincingly that those problems need not become contentious issues between our two countries. Where there is a will, there is a way.

As our techniques for resolving bilateral economic problems have become more refined and effective, both governments have been able to focus increasingly on the broader multilateral aspects of the U.S.-Japan economic relationship—e.g., questions of trade expansion, monetary reform, energy, food, and law of the sea—which have a pervasive influence on the prosperity of both countries and the world as a whole. The United States and Japan share a common approach to most of these global issues, and our two governments have cooperated effectively in seeking solutions to them.

For example, we have worked with Japan in the new International Energy Agency to strengthen cooperation among oil-consuming countries and coordinate our positions vis-a-vis the producers on price and supply questions. Our respective approaches toward the myriad North-South economic issues are similar, and we consult closely with Japan in this area. Japan is an increasingly weighty factor in world monetary affairs and has given important support to our initiatives in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] for reform of the international monetary system. Prime Minister Miki participated in the economic summits at Rambouillet and San Juan, which sought to improve the overall coordination of the economic policies of the major industrial nations. We consult closely with Japan on law of the sea issues, where major interests of both nations are at stake, i.e., with respect to a deep seabeds regime, continental shelf jurisdiction and the concept of an economic zone, and fisheries regulation. We are actively engaged with Japan in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN); and in fact many formerly bilateral economic questions—e.g., liberalization of import quotas, standardization of antidumping codes, et cetera—are now treated in the MTN context.

There are of course important differences in the economic circumstances of Japan and the United States, the most obvious being Japan's virtually total dependence

on outside sources of supply for its energy and raw materials needs; and these differences compel differing approaches toward certain specific multilateral economic issues. Nevertheless, U.S. and Japanese interests in the multilateral economic sphere are fundamentally alike: we wish to sustain conditions which are conducive to a stable world economic environment, in which the economic needs of our societies—and those of other industrialized and developing nations alike—can be fulfilled. Close cooperation between our two governments is essential if those interests are to be preserved and an equitable world economic order sustained. I have no doubt that such cooperation will continue to be forthcoming from both sides.

Cooperation on Security Issues

Secondly, let me touch upon the security dimension of our relationship. The U.S. alliance with Japan is a keystone of our security policy toward East Asia, an essential factor in the maintenance of the peace and stability of the region, and a crucial element in our worldwide security strategy. For Japan the alliance is a major pillar of the nation's foreign policy, providing a strategic foundation from which it can pursue with confidence its relations with potential adversaries. Both our governments are determined to preserve and strengthen cooperation on defense issues, based on a common recognition of the benefits to both nations of this constructive alliance.

Within the framework of the alliance, Japan's own security role remains limited, focusing on the defense of its home islands. We think this is appropriate and wise. The United States is not urging Japan to undertake a larger role. However, I believe both our governments would agree that while a major quantitative expansion of Japan's security responsibilities is inappropriate, there is room for qualitative improvement —particularly in the areas of antisubmarine warfare and airborne early-warning systems—and the Japanese Government is addressing this issue. There can also be, within established limits, more effective cooperation and coordination between U.S. and Japanese defense elements. One new instrumentality for that purpose has already been created—the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation—and other approaches are being discussed.

During the past year and more, we have noticed in Japan a new tendency toward a more realistic, and less emotional, consideration of defense issues. Out of this has emerged a broader public awareness and understanding of the security environment in Northeast Asia and Japan's place in it. The essentiality of a Japanese defense role, albeit limited, and of Japan's security relationship with the United States, has become more broadly accepted. We think this is a healthy development; we also believe it is one that must proceed at its own speed. So long as this country continues to demonstrate steadiness in its approach to the security issues of East Asia, and sensitivity toward the particular political and historical characteristics of Japan and its people which shape Japan's approach toward those issues, the U.S.-Japan security relationship will remain strong, as it must.

Political Dimension of the Relationship

Finally, I would like to say a few words about a more intangible aspect of the interrelationship between Japan and the United States, but one which profoundly influences all the others. As one of the world's largest and most dynamic democratic societies, Japan shares with the United States a fundamental goal: that of preserving and strengthening democratic institutions and values in a world increasingly hostile to them. Japan is a strong and lively democracy. Its parliamentary system is firmly established, it has a free and highly irreverent press, and its people and government are second to none in their respect for human rights. These institutions and these values, and the importance both countries place on maintaining them, in themselves

constitute a strong bond between us in a world in which authoritarianism of left or right is all too prevalent in other countries.

I think I should mention in this context a problem with which both our governments contended earlier this year and which remains a difficult issue in Japan—the Lockheed affair—because to be seen in proper perspective it must be viewed in relation to the institutions and values which were brought to bear in resolving it.

Both Japan and the United States, their people and their governments, deplore corruption, whether private or public, and recognize the corrosive effects of bribery upon society. In both countries, public opinion, the media, and governments demanded a thorough investigation of the allegations which were raised. The United States proposed, and the Japanese Government agreed, that cooperative efforts to investigate the scandal and punish the guilty should insofar as possible be removed from the political arena and placed in a legal framework. To that end, an agreement was reached between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Japanese Justice Ministry for the exchange of all relevant information, in a manner which would at the same time protect the rights of individuals to the due process of law.

The agreement—which became a model for agreements with other nations touched by this scandal—has worked well. The Japanese Government has expressed its appreciation for the assistance our investigators have provided, and our two governments are pledged to work together in an international effort to devise a code of conduct which will prevent repetitions of this brand of corporate misconduct.

Despite its potential for doing so, the Lockheed affair has not significantly damaged U.S.-Japan relations. By treating the affair as a legal issue and placing it solely within the purview of law enforcement agencies, the bilateral political relationship was successfully insulated.

In a broader sense, the common political values which anchor our relations with Japan also mean that our approaches to major international issues—whether political, economic, or security—stem from a similar world view and tend therefore to be complementary. For example:

—Japan, like the United States, seeks improved relations with both the Soviet Union and China on a basis of equality and reciprocal benefit, while avoiding any involvement in Sino-Soviet differences.

—In Southeast Asia, Japan, like the United States, supports the desires of the non-Communist nations of the region to maintain their independence and identity and to develop their economies, and its economic and political policies toward the area are designed toward this end.

—Toward the Third World, Japan's policies are positive and constructive as, I hasten to add, are ours. It recognizes the legitimate aspirations of the developing countries and is seriously seeking ways to meet them.

—In the United Nations, Japan eschews flamboyant and meaningless rhetoric, while working quietly behind the scenes in support of rational and equitable solutions to the political, economic, and security issues constantly before the world community.

—In the area of science and technology, including questions of nuclear power, Japan has a well-developed sense of the benefits as well as the potential hazards of new applications and brings a reasoned and measured approach to technological issues.

In short, as this audience well knows, Japan's is an increasingly active and influential voice in world affairs. As Japan's role grows, so too does the importance of our bilateral relationship and its potential for constructive action. While perhaps a truism, it is nonetheless correct to say that our two nations can accomplish far more working together than could be achieved through the sum of our separate efforts.

In a speech last year to the National Press Club [at Washington], Prime Minister Miki spoke of the broad mutuality of

interests between Japan and the United States and termed Japanese-American amity "a powerful and positive force in the world." The U.S. Government fully shares that view. U.S. ties with Japan are indeed of vital importance to this country and to the peace and progress of mankind. I can report to you that they are in good shape. Our two countries can take pride in what we have achieved together, and we can face with confidence the challenges before us.

International Navigational Rules Act Vetoed by President Ford

Memorandum of Disapproval [1]

I have withheld my signature from H.R. 5446, a bill to implement the United States obligations under the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972.

The bill includes a provision which I believe to be unconstitutional. It would empower either the House of Representatives or the Senate to block amendments to the Convention's regulations merely by passing a resolution of disapproval.

This provision is incompatible with the express provision in the Constitution that a resolution having the force and effect of law must be presented to the President and, if disapproved, repassed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives. It extends to the Congress the power to prohibit specific transactions authorized by law without changing the law—and without following the constitutional process such a change would require. Moreover, it would involve the Congress directly in the performance of Executive functions in disregard of the fundamental principle of separation of powers.

I believe that this procedure is contrary to the Constitution, and that my approval of it would threaten an erosion of the constitutional powers and responsibilities of the President. I have already directed the Attorney General to become a party plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a similar provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act.

In addition, this provision would allow the House of Representatives to block adoption of what is essentially an amendment to a treaty, a responsibility which is reserved by the Constitution to the Senate.

This legislation would forge impermissible shackles on the President's ability to carry out the laws and conduct the foreign relations of the United States. The President cannot function effectively in domestic matters, and speak for the nation authoritatively in foreign affairs, if his decisions under authority previously conferred can be reversed by a bare majority of one house of the Congress.

The Convention—which has already been approved by the Senate—makes important changes in the international rules for safe navigation. It will enter into force in July of 1977. The United States should become a party to it. If the United States does not implement the Convention before it enters into force, there will be major differences between the navigational rules followed by U.S. ships and by the ships of many other countries. These differences will increase the danger of collisions at sea and create hazards to life and property at sea.

I strongly urge the 95th Congress to pass legislation early next year that will be consistent with our Constitution, so that the United States can implement the Convention before it enters into force.

GERALD R. FORD.

[1] Released at Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 10 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 18).

United States Reviews Progress and Problems in International Economic Development

Statement by Senator George McGovern
U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly[1]

This is an important occasion for me. I have followed many aspects of the work of the United Nations closely in the past, as a member of the House of Representatives, as Director of the Food for Peace Program under President Kennedy in 1961 and 1962, as a member of the Senate, and in recent years as a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

I am more directly familiar with the U.N.'s work in the area of food, which has been among my chief concerns throughout my public career. Because of that interest I regarded it as a special privilege to attend the World Food Conference in Rome in 1974.

But I am a newcomer to the work of the General Assembly. I am honored to have been asked by the executive branch of my government to serve as a delegate to the 31st session of the U.N. General Assembly and to share this forum with so distinguished a body of men and women, who not only represent 145 nations of the world but who themselves represent a significant and highly diverse range of talents. The distinguished chairman of this committee [Jaime Valdéz, of Bolivia] is but one example. I congratulate him and his colleagues on the bureau on their election, and I pledge to them and to all present the cooperation of my delegation.

Through most of its three decades the United Nations has been regarded primarily as a political organ—as indeed, in great measure, it still is. The organization is still deeply engaged in the historic process of decolonization, which ranks as one of the most important of this century. The challenge confronting the nations of the world, and this organization in particular, is to insure the enjoyment of basic rights by all the people of the world, such rights as my country has been committed to for 200 years.

We are all aware that the political process of decolonization—which will soon include Namibia and Zimbabwe—must be joined to a more balanced and equitable international economic order as well. Patterns of dependence must give way to a real interdependence, consistent with the needs and interests of all countries. As Secretary Kissinger pointed out before the plenary session of the General Assembly on September 30:

> Our mutual dependence for our prosperity is a reality, not a slogan. It should summon our best efforts to make common progress.

The work of the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly had as its theme the concept of interdependence. This same theme has been expressed in the

[1] Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) of the Assembly on Oct. 14 (text from USUN press release 114).

Declaration of Abidjan,[2] and it is the guidepost for continuing negotiations in the various fora of UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development], in the multilateral trade negotiations under GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] in Geneva, at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris, and elsewhere.

It would be a delusion to ignore our differences on some issues. But let us also stress our common goals. The United States can subscribe to the statement of principle in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order[3] which affirms that:

> . . . the interests of the developed countries and those of the developing countries can no longer be isolated from each other, that there is a close interrelationship between the prosperity of the developed countries and the growth and development of the developing countries, and that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends on the prosperity of its constituent parts.

We agree, too, that:

> International cooperation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all countries.

Our objections to certain concepts and measures in the declaration and program of action passed at the sixth special session are well known. It is not surprising that differences should persist over matters of this magnitude. There is merit in being clear about where we stand. However, we are firmly convinced that the interests of all, developing and developed countries alike, will be served by building on areas of agreement and avoiding confrontation or ideological disputes.

A constructive approach has been suggested by Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, of the Philippines, one of the founders of this organization. In his speech before the General Assembly two weeks ago, General Romulo noted that our task was to seek and promote meaningful change in the lives of the majority of the world's people, "not through recrimination and confrontation but through the recognition and reconciliation of legitimate interests."

Progress Since the Seventh Special Session

At the seventh special session of the General Assembly, just over a year ago, an effort was made to begin that process of reconciling interests. Despite disappointments, progress was also made at UNCTAD IV at Nairobi.

The United States was pleased to have been able to join in the consensus on Resolution 3362 in the seventh special session.[4] When I studied that resolution, I was impressed not only by the scope and the seriousness of the text but also at how much has already been done to follow up on it since.

At the same time, much remains to be done. The fact that development is first and foremost a responsibility of the developing countries themselves has been widely recognized. Self-reliance is a concept we Americans understand and applaud. Thus it is only natural that we welcome the goal of enhanced cooperation among developing nations in the expectation that this goal will be approached in a manner consistent with the need for broad international cooperation.

As Secretary Kissinger has noted in his address to the General Assembly:

> The industrial democracies have sometimes been more willing to pay lipservice to the challenge of development than to match rhetoric with real resources.

I, too, as a U.S. Senator, regret these discrepancies. We Americans no longer claim, if ever we did, that our country—and its economic system—has all the answers to the problems of development. We also recognize the value of contributions made by states with different social systems. But by the same token the United

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[2] Economic and Social Council Resolution 2009 (LXI), adopted on July 9, 1976.

[3] General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S–VI), adopted by the sixth special session on May 1, 1974.

[4] For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1975, p. 558.

States is not prepared to agree with suggestions that the substantial efforts we have made and are making on behalf of development and economic cooperation are of limited or of little use.

One reason I am here, as a legislator, is to learn from you so as to bring back to the American Congress a better understanding of the problems of the forthcoming Third Development Decade. But it may nonetheless be worthwhile to review some of the progress we have made in this last year.

At the seventh special session, agreement was reached on the need to begin work on the restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations to make them more capable of dealing with the problems of international cooperation and development. The U.S. delegation has participated actively in the deliberations of the ad hoc working group established for this purpose. I am advised by my executive branch colleagues that, although they had hoped for more progress by now, they are nonetheless impressed by the seriousness of purpose shown during the working group's deliberations. There would seem to be grounds for hope that the working group will be able to develop action-oriented proposals.

An important portion of Resolution 3362 concerned world trade. On January 1 of this year my own country put into effect its system of generalized preferences. It is a system covering over 2,700 tariff items from nearly 100 countries. I would urge governments of developing countries concerned to study carefully the prospects for increased exports of industrial products which this measure offers.

Also of great longrun importance are the multilateral trade negotiations now underway in Geneva. All participating countries agreed in initiating these negotiations that one of their major objectives is to secure additional benefits for the international trade of developing countries through reductions in both tariff and nontariff barriers.

We agreed at the fourth conference of UNCTAD in Nairobi to take up, case by case, the problems of 18 key commodities. The United States will participate fully in this effort. We will be prepared to examine in depth the real problems confronting each market. We believe these preparatory meetings can be most helpful if they focus on the substantive and practical issues.

In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) we have agreed on an important extension of compensatory financing facilities to aid in stabilizing the incomes of producers of primary products. This year this facility will distribute some $2 billion, as compared with $1.3 billion for the first 13 years of its existence. In the same context, the IMF has established a Trust Fund, financed through sales of IMF gold, which will permit concessional balance-of-payments assistance to the poorest countries.

U.S. Assistance Programs

Another of the concerns of the seventh special session was the transfer of real resources. This is not a matter of words and expressions of solidarity—still less of rhetoric about moral obligations for sins of the past—but of concrete contributions. I would like to say a word on the efforts of my country.

During the course of the past month, the U.S. Congress passed and President Ford signed economic, security, and supporting foreign assistance legislation for our fiscal year 1977, which began October 1. These funds total $4.1 billion.

This legislation contains a number of features which I believe you will find of special interest.

In the U.S. bilateral aid program, the amount of money provided for the key sector of population and health has risen by 46 percent, funds allocated to food and nutrition have increased by 15 percent, while funds for education have risen by 18 percent. One hundred million dollars was earmarked for UNDP [U.N. Develop-

ment Program], $20 million for UNICEF [U.N. Children's Fund], $10 million for the U.N. Environment Program. The United States is making its first contribution to the U.N. Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration.

In fiscal year 1977 the United States will be providing $375 million to permit the continuation of the soft-loan facilities of the International Development Association, the World Bank's soft-loan window. The United States also intends to participate in a major way in the fifth replenishment of the International Development Association, which will be negotiated in the near future.

Provision has also been made for U.S. contributions to the Asian and Inter-American Development Banks, and to the African Development Fund, which I hope we in the Congress will soon authorize the United States to join.

In addition to our regular assistance activities in Africa, we have supported the African states which enforce economic sanctions against Rhodesia at great costs to their own economies. In the fiscal year just ending, for example, we concluded a $10 million grant agreement with the Government of Mozambique, and we have also provided Mozambique with significant food assistance. Moreover, the United States is providing over $30 million of assistance to Zambia. Let me express here my personal hope that the negotiations which are about to begin on both Zimbabwe and Namibia will result in a successful conclusion, so that the peoples of these countries may all benefit from international trade and economic assistance.

Finally, to permit all of these sources of assistance to be used in the most effective way possible, we hope to pass legislation which will permit the United States to join with other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in untying much of our assistance to developing countries so that purchases must be made in the most advantageous markets. Procurement of goods and services in developing countries is already authorized under U.S. economic assistance legislation.

Multilateral and Private Efforts

The Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris has passed to its active phase. The United States and the European Community have made a proposal to help meet the problems of nations facing severe debt burdens. We have raised again in this forum our proposal for an International Resources Bank (IRB).

This proposal will also be studied by a new working group on official capital flows established by the Interim Committee of the International Monetary Fund.

We believe that the IRB could make a significant contribution to the development of mineral resources. Under Secretary General Van Laethem [Gabriel Van Laethem, of France, U.N. Under Secretary General for Economic and Social Affairs] has signaled the massive demand for mineral and energy resources which projected levels of development will bring about.

We continue to urge other countries to heed the recommendation of the seventh special session for a replenishment of the capital of the International Finance Corporation, which we see as another means of helping to bring increased development capital to where it is needed.

It has been estimated that by the end of this decade, even conservative goals for economic growth in the developing countries will require transfers of some $40 billion a year from developed to developing countries. Official development assistance, whether bilateral or multilateral, cannot be expected to fulfill anywhere near this entire need. The development process must continue to have recourse to private capital as well.

If private capital flows are included, I would note that in 1975 the countries of

the OECD did arrive at the goal of 1 percent of GNP [gross national product] in transfers to the developing countries. Moreover, this is not just a question of funds. Direct private investment is a powerful instrument for transferring technology, modern methods of organization, knowledge of markets, and other advantages.

To be sure, countries which import capital have every right to insist on terms which are in the greatest conformity with their national economic goals. What is most important, however, is the recognition by all parties that the only sound basis for investment is mutual confidence. Private capital has a major role to play. Generalized slogans about "capitalist imperialism" may serve the political aims of some. But they disserve the cause of economic development, and they inhibit efforts to solve the real problems multinational corporations pose for us all.

I cite these efforts not as a catalogue, but to stress the necessity of genuine international cooperation among governments, international institutions, and private entities. The record also underscores my contention that there has been a genuine renewal of commitment in my government to the second great mandate of the U.N. Charter: that true peace is not only the absence of war but the realization of economic and social justice as well.

Problem of Corrupt Practices

Now let me mention several areas which I believe require urgent attention.

If trade and investment is to make a maximum contribution to development, illegal or corrupt practices should be eliminated. We have recognized this in the United States, where the Congress has conducted well-publicized investigations of illicit practices.

This summer's meeting of ECOSOC [U.N. Economic and Social Council], under the Presidency of the able Ambassador of the Ivory Coast, Mr. [Siméon] Ake, passed one important resolution indicating that these practices are an international concern. The resolution created an intergovernmental working group to examine corrupt practices in international commercial transactions and, most important, to work out the scope and content of an international agreement to prevent and eliminate illicit payments. We look forward to the prompt organization of this group so that it can begin its working sessions this year.

World Food Situation

A problem with which I personally have been deeply concerned is that of feeding the world's people. In no other activity in this committee of the United Nations does our work touch more directly on the lives of the people we are representing here.

It has been estimated that between 300 million and 500 million people in developing countries do not now get enough to eat. The U.S. Congress has given a priority to the countries most seriously affected by food shortages in determining assistance programs. At least 75 percent of food sold under title I of Public Law 480 is to be provided to countries with an average per capita GNP of $300 or less, circumstances permitting.

We have also been greatly encouraged by the responses of many nations to the World Food Conference recommendation for the establishment of a new International Fund for Agricultural Development. The purpose of IFAD is to help finance programs and projects which support increased and more efficient agricultural production and, by so doing, to improve the nutritional level in the poorest food-deficit countries. The United States has made a pledge of $200 million to the initial budget of $1 billion set for this Fund. Good progress has been made toward reaching this target.

But the creation of this major new source of assistance should not make us in any

way complacent about the world's food and agricultural outlook. Despite successful harvests last year in the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, there are clouds on the horizon.

Little has been done to insure that when drought or floods or severe winters again become punishing in certain areas—this year's conditions in Western Europe are an example—there will still be adequate supplies and that needy nations will have access to them.

Beyond these seasonal dangers remains the grave problem of malnutrition. Governments and international organizations have been slow in adopting measures designed to reduce postharvest losses and gain maximum benefit from existing supplies. We have adopted a 10-year target for reducing losses by 50 percent, but how seriously are we pursuing it?

The United States pledges to intensify its approach toward a resolution of the world food situation, and we urge other nations also to increase their efforts. Thanks in part to the nearly 6 million tons of food grains provided by the United States, the 10-million-ton target [for food aid for the 1975–1976 season] established by the seventh special session appears attainable.

Likewise encouraging is the fact that for 1975–76 governments have far oversubscribed the World Food Program target of $440 million. For this period, pledges now total over $600 million. We think there is little doubt but that the 1977–78 target of $750 million also will be met. Toward this 1977–78 target, the United States has now pledged $188 million in commodities, shipping services, and cash. This represents a substantial increase in the U.S. contribution to this important program.

We have proposed and will continue to support an international system of nationally held grain reserves to improve world food security, and we hope very much that progress can be made in this area before calamity strikes again.

Technology Transfer

The third area of importance I would like to mention is the sharing of resources in science and technology. The United States believes it can make a particularly important contribution in the area of technology transfer. It has been our consistent intention to make as much of this great storehouse of knowledge as possible available to the developing countries.

The United Nations has begun to find means to facilitate these transfers of technology. We in the United States were very pleased at the fact that three resolutions in this field were passed at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi, providing for the strengthening of the technological capacity of the developing countries.

We wish also to commend the special interagency task force, and the group of experts who assisted, for their work leading to the Secretary General's report on "The Establishment of a Network for the Exchange of Technological Information." [5] We are pleased that the U.S. proposal made at the seventh special session to establish an International Center for the Exchange of Technological Information is among the suggestions melded into the task force's proposal. The network concept should enable all nations to make use of existing national and international capabilities for the transfer of technology, including both public and private sources of information. Where adequate capabilities dc not exist, we expect they will be built up. One component, for example, might be the Industrial Technological Development Bank, for which UNIDO [U.N. Industrial Development Organization] has been preparing a feasibility study.

The seventh special session resolution envisages a U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development. We support this proposal. We support the requests and recommendations made in Resolutions

[5] U.N. doc. E/5839, June 14, 1976.

2028 and 2035 passed at the 61st session of ECOSOC this summer. We intend to provide the U.N. Secretariat with whatever help we can in preparing the conference. We have called a meeting to be held in November of American scientists from industry, government, and the academic world so that we may review all the possibilities of applying research in the United States more closely to the needs of the developing countries.

Finally, we have extended an invitation for the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development to meet in the United States in 1979. I would urge all governments to give consideration to this invitation. In our view, holding the conference in the United States is the best means of assuring a maximum contribution of the American scientific community and a maximum opportunity for our scientists to get firsthand information on scientific and technical needs of developing countries.

Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates, this committee has a heavy load of work awaiting it. Our object, as before, will be to achieve a consensus on many positive resolutions.

We are seeking to improve economic relations between all nations and, above all, to find new means of relating world patterns of assistance, of trade, and of investment more closely to the needs of the developing nations.

But these words—consensus, economic relations—are the words of diplomacy. In the subjects we are discussing, they are means, but not ends in themselves. Let us always remind ourselves that the object of our effort is to help people. In the end, the success or failure of the 31st session of the General Assembly will not be judged only by foreign offices or by national legislators but by farmers and workers, by men and women whose expectations have been awakened and who are looking to us for practical steps toward realizing those expectations.

U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia in U.N. Security Council

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative William W. Scranton on October 19, together with the text of a draft resolution which was vetoed that day by the United States and two other permanent members of the Security Council.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON

USUN press release 119 dated October 19

The U.S. concern with the Namibian problem has been demonstrated dramatically by the continuing efforts of Secretary of State Kissinger to assist the parties involved in finding a peaceful solution to the problem. As you know, Secretary Kissinger outlined the U.S. position on the Namibian and Rhodesian negotiations in a speech two weeks ago to the General Assembly. On the question of Namibia the Secretary said:

> In recent months the United States has vigorously sought to help the parties concerned speed up the process toward Namibian independence. The United States favors the following elements: the independence of Namibia within a fixed, short time limit; the calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under U.N. aegis; and the participation in that conference of all authentic national forces including, specifically, SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization].
>
> Progress has been made in achieving all of these goals. We will exert our efforts to remove the remaining obstacles and bring into being a conference which can then fashion, with good will and wisdom, a design for the new state of Namibia and its relationship with its neighbors. We pledge our continued solicitude for the independence of Namibia so that it may, in the end, be a proud achievement of this organization and a symbol of international cooperation.

Mr. President, it is my firm belief that while the sensitive process of consultation is going on it does not serve a useful purpose for the Security Council to take new initiatives on the Namibian question. After

many years of frustration in trying to bring Namibia to independence, we have now for the first time the prospect of results. Substantial progress has been made toward reaching a peaceful settlement to the Namibian problem in consultation with South Africa and the interested African parties. We have in sight the possibility of independence for Namibia, which this Council has sought so persistently for so many years.

We do not feel that the measures called for in the resolution before us will improve the chances to gain a free and independent Namibia. In fact, they could just do the opposite. It would be tragic if the delicate fabric of negotiations were to be torn asunder by any precipitate move at this time. For these reasons, Mr. President, my delegation will vote against the draft resolution.

Mr. President, at this point I want to cover very briefly one element of the resolution. The United States has continued to enforce its own arms embargo toward South Africa. We initiated this embargo in 1962, even before the Security Council called for a voluntary embargo against South Africa in the following year.

In closing, I want to emphasize and emphasize strongly to this Council that the United States has made clear to South Africa the urgent need for unqualified independence for Namibia. We are keeping Secretary General Waldheim informed of the progress of our negotiations, and we will continue to do so and are in regular contact with the frontline Presidents. The United States will not flag in these efforts.

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION [1]

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

Having considered the statement by Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S–V) of 19 May 1967, which established a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular, resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975,

Recalling also Security Council resolutions 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972, 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974 and 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976,

Recalling further the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

Concerned at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

Gravely concerned at South Africa's efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, and its recent intensification of repression against the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights,

Gravely concerned by the colonial war which South Africa is waging against the Namibian people, its use of military force against civilian populations and by the widespread use of torture and intimidation by military forces against the people of Namibia,

Gravely concerned also at the utilization of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa to mount aggression against independent African States,

1. *Condemns* South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of Security Council resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976;

2. *Condemns* all attempts by South Africa calculated to evade the clear demand of the United Nations for the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control in Namibia;

3. *Denounces* the so-called Turnhalle constitutional

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[1] U.N. doc. S/12211; the draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of three permanent members of the Council, the vote being 13 in favor, 3 against (France, U.K., U.S.), with 2 abstentions (Italy, Japan).

conference as a device for evading the clear responsibility to comply with the requirements of Security Council resolutions, and in particular resolution 385 (1976);

4. *Reaffirms* the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia;

5. *Reaffirms* its support for the struggle of the people of Namibia for self-determination and independence;

6. *Reiterates its demand* that South Africa take immediately the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969), 366 (1974) and 385 (1976), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;

7. *Also demands* that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of Bantustans and so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;

8. *Reaffirms its declaration* that in order that the people of Namibia be enabled to determine freely their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity;

9. *Demands* that South Africa urgently comply with the foregoing provisions for the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, undertake to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia, and recognize the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;

10. *Demands again* that South Africa, pending the transfer of power provided for in the preceding paragraphs:

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connexion with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly Bantustans and so-called homelands;

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;

11. *Acting* under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,

(a) Determines that the illegal occupation of Namibia and the war being waged there by South Africa constitute a threat to international peace and security;

(b) Decides that all States shall cease and desist from any form of direct or indirect military consultation, co-operation or collaboration with South Africa and shall prohibit their nationals from engaging in any such consultation, co-operation or collaboration;

(c) Decides that all States shall take effective measures to prevent the recruitment of mercenaries, however disguised, for service in Namibia or South Africa;

(d) Decides that all States shall take steps to ensure the termination of all arms licensing agreements between themselves or their nationals and South Africa and shall prohibit the transfer to South Africa of all information relating to arms and armaments;

(e) *Decides* that all States shall prevent:

(i) Any supply of arms and ammunition to South Africa;

(ii) Any supply of aircraft, vehicles and military equipment for use of the armed forces and paramilitary or police organizations of South Africa;

(iii) Any supply of spare parts for arms, vehicles and military equipment used by the armed forces and paramilitary or police organizations of South Africa;

(iv) Any supply of so-called dual-use aircraft, vehicles or equipment which could be converted to military use by South Africa;

(v) Any activities in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply of arms, ammunition, military aircraft and military vehicles to South Africa and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa and Namibia;

12. *Decides* that all States shall give effect to the decisions set out in paragraph 11 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution, and that they shall notify the Secretary-General of the measures they have taken to comply with the aforementioned provision;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General, for the purpose of the effective implementation of this resolution, to arrange for the collection and systematic study of all available data concerning international trade in the items which should not be supplied to South Africa under paragraph 11 above;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Security Council on or before _____;

15. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Surinam, October 14, 1976.

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.[1]

Acceptance deposited: Finland, October 4, 1976.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, October 13, 1976.

Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Signed at Washington February 2, 1971. Entered into force October 16, 1973.

Ratification deposited: United States, October 20, 1976.

Entered into force for the United States: October 20, 1976.

United Nations Charter

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

Admission to membership: Seychelles, September 21, 1976.

Whaling

Amendments to paragraphs 1, 6(a)(4), (5), (6), 6(b)(3), 6(c)(2), 11–14, 15(c), 21, 23(1)(c), 23(2)(b) to the schedule to the international whaling convention of December 2, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at London June 25, 1976. Entered into force October 1, 1976.

[1] Not in force.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the loan agreement of May 28, 1976, relating to installation of a 50 megawatt hydrogenerating unit at Karnaphuli Power Station, Kaptai. Signed at Dacca September 17, 1976. Entered into force September 17, 1976.

Denmark

Agreement amending the agreement of July 7, 1960, concerning establishment and operation of certain aeronautical facilities and services in Greenland, with appendix (TIAS 4531). Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen March 26 and September 6, 1976. Entered into force September 6, 1976; effective January 1, 1976.

Sri Lanka

Agreement extending the agreement of May 12 and 14, 1951, as amended and extended (TIAS 2259, 4436, 5037, 7126), relating to facilities of Radio Ceylon. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo May 19 and October 1, 1976. Entered into force October 1, 1976.

Thailand

Loan agreement relating to a project for the establishment of modern sericulture technology in Thailand, with annex. Signed at Bangkok September 8, 1976. Entered into force September 8, 1976.

Agreement amending the loan agreement of December 11, 1975, to assist Thailand in financing an improved seed development program. Signed at Bangkok September 8, 1976. Entered into force September 8, 1976.

Correction

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following error which appears in the October 25 issue:

p. 500, col. 2, line 21: "with" should read "within."

Name Index

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: October 18–24

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†519	10/19	Kissinger: Synagogue Council of America, New York, N.Y.
*520	10/18	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, Nov. 23.
*521	10/18	Department receives portrait of Thomas Jefferson.
*522	10/22	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, Dec. 8.
†523	10/22	Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law, 1975, released.
*524	10/22	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Boston, Nov. 16.
†525	10/22	U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission communique.
†526	10/22	Kissinger, Chatty: remarks at signing of minutes of U.S.-Tunisian meeting.
*527	10/22	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on subdivision and stability, Nov. 18.
†528	10/24	Kissinger: remarks at U.N. Day concert, Oct. 23.
†529	10/24	Kissinger: interview on "Face the Nation."

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.