THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the function of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Editorial Writers

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by a panel at the annual meeting of the National Conference of Editorial Writers (NCEW) at Hilton Head, S.C., on October 2. Members of the panel were Robert Barnard, Louisville Courier-Journal; Sig Gissler, Milwaukee Journal; Paul Greenberg, Pine Bluff Commercial; and Joseph Stroud, Detroit Free Press. John Zakarian, president of the conference, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, was the moderator.[1]

Press release 492 dated October 2

Secretary Kissinger: . . . I thought I could perhaps lead things off by making a few general observations about the conduct of foreign policy.

The basic foreign policy of the United States is determined by the objective conditions in which the United States finds itself, by the values of our people, and only to some extent by the views of the leaders. The foreign policy of a great nation cannot change every four or eight years. It must reflect some permanent characteristics. To the extent that other nations believe that the United States changes its fundamental policy at regular intervals—to that extent, we become a factor of instability and insecurity.

Of course there are practical differences. And of course it can be that mistakes are made of such magnitude that a radical shift is necessary. But sooner or later we must develop a consensus about our fundamental direction and our basic interests that is not in itself subject to partisan debate. I am not saying it isn't subject to debate, but not to partisan debate. The basic goals that any administration has to pursue concern the problem of peace, the problem of world order, and the problem of the relationship of our values to the values of other societies.

The problem of peace has, in our age, an unprecedented character. Throughout history it would have been inconceivable that any nation could accumulate too much power for effective political use. As late as the end of World War II, every increment of additional power would have been militarily useful.

Today we live in a period in which a nuclear war would mean destruction for all parties and in which the relative advantage of one side against the other pales compared to the destruction that is involved, which could well be the end of civilized life as we understand it. Therefore the traditional power politics, the accumulation of marginal advantages, the posturing vis-a-vis opponents, has to be carried out today, if at all, with a sense of responsibility and a degree of circumspection that is unparalleled. And every President will, sooner or later, be driven to the conviction which was first enunciated by President Eisenhower: There is no alternative to peace.

Therefore the problem of how to control nuclear arms, how to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, must be a paramount concern of American policy. And tough rhetoric is no substitute for the perception of this overriding necessity.

To be sure, we have to make certain that

[1] Mr. Zakarian's introduction of Secretary Kissinger and the opening paragraphs of the Secretary's remarks are not printed here.

the desire for peace does not lead other countries to try to seek unilateral advantages. And we have to be able to combine a concern with our values and our interests, and those of our allies, with a readiness to seek honorable solutions with adversaries. Where to strike this balance is one of the problems with which policymakers have to deal and which will no doubt come up in our discussions.

The second problem is the problem of world order. If it is true that conflicts cannot be settled by tests of strength, then we need an international system most of whose participants feel that they have a stake in it and are therefore not prepared to test it by military means.

This presents us with the problem of how to relate ourselves to our friends and allies; how to deal with opposing ideologies committed to revolutionary theories, if not always practice; and how to find a place in such a world for the hundred or so new nations that have come into being since World War II with experiences quite different and problems quite different from those of the older states.

And thirdly, there is the problem of the relationship of our values to the other goals of our foreign policy. Without security, there can be no peace. But pure pragmatism leads to paralysis; it makes every problem insoluble. Moral issues appear in absolute form. But in foreign policy, at any one time, only partial solutions are possible. And if every nation of the world insists on the immediate implementation of all of its principles, eternal conflict is inevitable.

Therefore the difficult aspect of foreign policy is that one constantly has to strike balances between conciliation and security, between order and progress, between values and what can be attained at any period. This is where the act of judgment comes in—an act that is compounded by the fact that when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action in foreign policy is at a minimum; when the knowledge is greatest, the scope for action has often disappeared.

Nobody can ever prove that an assessment is true until it is too late to effect it.

In 1936, when the Germans occupied the Rhineland, it would have been very easy for France to stop the advance of Hitler. But if they had done it, if France had done this, the world would still be debating today whether Hitler was a maniac bent on world domination or a misunderstood nationalist. By 1941 everybody knew that he was a maniac bent on world domination. It was a knowledge acquired at the cost of 20 million lives.

So the policymaker is always faced with the dilemma that when he can act, he cannot prove that he is right. And by the time he can prove that he is right, then he can no longer very often be creative.

Of course, not everything you cannot prove is right. And this is where the uncertainties in our debates arise and, frankly, where the credibility gap that our newspapers are so fond of emphasizing very often develops.

But I think I have explained enough perplexities to turn this over to the panel. And I see that all of our distinguished friends here have copious notes in front of them, so let me volunteer for assassination. [Laughter.]

Initiatives in Southern Africa

Mr. Barnard: Mr. Secretary, this is rather general [inaudible], typical of American editorial writers. You have just returned from your first African safari, I believe, and I wonder if Rhodesia's black-ruled neighbors agreed to the terms for a transitional government announced by Ian Smith. And there is still a question of funds for members of the white minority who choose to sell out and leave the country. What share of those funds, which I think we have seen estimated at perhaps $2 billion, would the United States, in your view, be expected to pay? And would you anticipate any difficulty in persuading Congress to put out the money?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me perhaps first

make clear one point. The terms that Mr. Smith announced were not terms he had originated and was putting to his neighbors. They represented a U.S.-U.K. distillation of months of consultations, of five missions—three American, two British—to Africa, of what we thought the best available compromise might be that would move matters toward majority rule under conditions in which the rights of the minorities would be protected and under conditions in which the transition would occur with moderation and yet with all possible speed. So it is not something that was originated by Mr. Smith.

On the whole, I believe that the program that is now being discussed has in many of its main elements been acceptable as a basis for negotiation. Of course there are many elements that were left open—the composition of most parts of the government. And of course every party at a negotiation is free to raise whatever issue it wishes. But much of what one reads today should be seen as a process by which the various parties establish their negotiating position.

Now with respect to the fund, the fund we are discussing is not designed to buy out the white population. The fund is more designed to enable the white population to stay by developing the Rhodesian economy, and only as its second function is a sort of insurance scheme for those who want relief. The fewer people, of course, the less has to be paid out of this fund for the purpose of the settlers.

Now, we are attempting to do this as an international project. The United Kingdom, France, and other European countries have already agreed in principle. We are discussing it also with Canada, Australia, and we hope to have a very wide base of support for it.

As far as the United States own contribution is concerned, we think that perhaps part of it can be contributed from private sources. Discussions as to the amount, of the total amount, will begin next week in Washington, and we don't have a figure to put before the public yet. When we do, of course, the part of it that has to come from public funds will have to go to the Congress.

Will we get support for it? I believe that the American public will understand that the cost of a moderate evolution in southern Africa is much less than the ultimate cost of an escalation of violence there. And therefore we hope that we can get support. We have briefed many congressional committees. And so far we haven't been able to give them any figures, but we have briefed them on the concept before we left and since we returned, and we have had very good and, I must say, bipartisan reaction on it.

Mr. Barnard: And what is your best guesstimate? The current uncertainty over whether black leaders will accept the terms announced [*inaudible*].

Secretary Kissinger: You see, some of the things that the black leaders have rejected are not central to the issue. For example, whether the conference should take place inside Rhodesia, which Ian Smith proposed —that was not part of the five-point program we recommended. And I think that this will have to find a solution by mutual agreement, because obviously a conference should take place at a place that is mutually acceptable.

I believe that, secondly, a lot depends on how some of the African nations sort out the relationship between the more moderate and the more radical elements.

Our impression is that, as of now, progress is being made toward assembling the conference and that the basic framework that they accepted in Lusaka, which is to say a conference which creates a transitional government which leads to a constitutional conference which drafts a constitution for full independence, that that framework is going to be implemented. It will take a few weeks to sort all of this out, but it is going about as we expected.

Mr. Gissler: Mr. Secretary, I have a perhaps personal question. Fatigue can often

lead to slips in judgment. If your style of diplomacy is marked by hectic activity, shuttling, jet lag, hopscotching, always with a briefcase full of explosive questions, I wonder, how do you deal with the inevitable stress and guard against diplomatic blunders occurring perhaps just through sheer exhaustion?

Secretary Kissinger: By beating my dog. [Laughter.]

Mr. Gissler: After the dog is dead, sir, what happens?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know how you can guard against blunder. One problem may be that there is a gap between the public perception of how diplomacy is conducted and how it is actually conducted.

Before I go on one of these trips, there are months of very careful preparation. I do not go on one of these trips unless I and my colleagues have made the judgment that we have carried matters to the maximum point they can be carried through the exchange of diplomatic notes.

The shuttle that concluded last week was started in April with the speech in Lusaka, was carried forward through a series of meetings and a series of missions to Africa. And what we have to balance is the stress of this type of diplomacy against the problem that we might not be able to carry it off at all if one circulated notes.

But I am not saying that this style of diplomacy is the way it must be conducted by every Secretary of State and every President.

We have faced a number of issues that tended to crystallize in a dramatic way and that required some intermediary to bring them to a point of decision, in Africa, for example. Now I would think that in the negotiation on the constitution that is now started, the role of high-level diplomacy would be very minimal.

So I would say one cannot make a general judgment as to how foreign policy should be conducted. And any style of diplomacy has its risk of failures, and ultimately it has to be judged by its record.

Mr. Greenberg: Mr. Secretary, you come out for majority rule in Rhodesia. Would you also be in favor of majority rule in South Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I am in favor of the principle of majority rule in South Africa, but I think one also has to understand that the situation in South Africa is infinitely more complicated than it is in Rhodesia, in the sense that the settlers have been there for hundreds of years and that a system has developed that is repugnant to us but that it will take some time to change. And therefore, while I believe strongly that the system must be changed —I have emphasized this in a number of public speeches—I also believe that it would be in the interests of all the people, black and white, if it occurs in an evolutionary manner and without violence.

Mr. Greenberg: How would you envision this process? Would one day you be making a similar shuttle for South Africa, say?

Secretary Kissinger: I have to tell you quite candidly that I have no blueprint for the future of South Africa. I believe that the first, the major steps must be taken by the Government of South Africa, and that to the degree that it can be handled in the South African context, to that extent it would be to everybody's benefit.

If the problem becomes internationalized it means it has almost certainly already gone out of control. They now have some little time to consider the consequences of the internal situation in South Africa. And we hope that it will move in a—that they will take advantage of this period.

Diplomatic Process in the Middle East

Mr. Stroud: Mr. Secretary, what reason do you have now to believe that the reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East would be productive? And isn't there the danger now that the critics who said that the step-by-step process would deal away some of your trump cards too early may be proven right?

Secretary Kissinger: You always have to compare the—of course you have to remember that it is unlikely, despite my well-known objectivity, that I will agree with my critics. [Laughter.]

But you always have to compare the alternatives that were in fact available. In 1973 the United States had no diplomatic relations with any of the key Arab countries. The Soviet Union was acting as the lawyer of the Arab countries. Israeli armies were confronting the Arabs along dividing lines that were extremely unstable.

To attempt a comprehensive solution under those circumstances involved—if an oil embargo was still in force, to attempt a comprehensive solution under those circumstances involved a high risk of an explosion. And a step-by-step approach enabled the parties to get used to the process of negotiation, to gain confidence that progress could be made.

It was always envisaged that the step-by-step approach would sooner or later lead to a more comprehensive approach. It was never conceived as an alternative to a comprehensive solution, but as a step toward a comprehensive solution.

I think now the conditions are approaching where comprehensive solutions can result. Whether it has to be one grand solution, or whether a series of stages within a larger framework, that will have to be seen as the negotiations begin.

I do not believe that we have given away any key bargaining chips that will be needed later. On the contrary, I think we created conditions from which comprehensive solutions can now be attempted without the risk of an explosion and without the risk of an alienation of some of the major countries involved.

Mr. Stroud: What is the leverage from this point on?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what was the leverage in 1973? In 1973 we were all subject to an oil embargo. We had no diplomatic relations with any of the key countries. And it is an illusion to believe that we had a leverage in 1973 that we have lost in 1976.

The leverage that we have now is that we are the only country that is in friendly relations with all of the chief actors in this process. We are the only country without whose help progress simply is not possible. And that leverage is the chief contribution we can make to the process.

The basic leverage as to the Israelis and the Arabs is about what it was in 1973; that is to say, the Israelis have territory which the Arabs want, and the Arabs have legitimacy which the Israelis want. Now, how to balance off the tangible return of territories, which has to be part of the settlement, against the Arab commitment to peace, which is certainly more revocable than is the giving up of territories, that has been the essence of the negotiation all along. And the Israelis have not given up so much territory that this problem has changed.

This is the essential issue in the negotiation. What has improved is the readiness of the Arab countries to accept the existence of Israel. What has improved also is the greater confidence Israel has acquired in the process of negotiation. What has fundamentally changed is the diplomatic position of the United States in the Middle East, which is a dramatic reversal of what it was in 1973. And this is why the conditions now, either for a Geneva Conference or some other diplomatic process, seemed to us better now than they have been at any period since the end of the war.

The Conflict in Lebanon

Mr. Barnard: While we are on the Middle East—enormous supplies of arms seem to have poured into Lebanon and complicated the problem there. Can you tell us whether the United States or Israel has given either overt or covert support to any faction there, particularly the Christians? And if not, where do you think all those arms have been coming from?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has

not given any arms to any of the factions. We have no official knowledge of what Israel may have done. But the majority of arms, the overwhelming majority of arms in Lebanon, come from the Soviet Union one way or the other, either through Libya or through Syria.

The chief conflict is between the Syrians and the Palestinians, both of which are armed by the Soviet Union and come directly from Soviet sources.

Mr. Greenberg: Mr. Secretary, there would seem to be at least one part of the Middle East where American policy would seem to have been very ineffectual, and that would be in Lebanon, where we seem to have adopted a policy of just waiting for the blood to settle. I wonder if that doesn't raise the larger question of morality in foreign policy. A recent poll by the State Department indicates that Americans feel—to quote one of its findings—that Washington simply has not appeared to be animated in the last decade or so by the same root sense of right and wrong as the American people. How would you respond to that kind of feeling?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let me make clear what the poll is.

The State Department—we have started in the last year, in order to find out what the public is concerned about, to hold a series of town meetings around the country in which we have invited concerned citizens to state their criticism. And we are sending senior officials to sessions which are entirely devoted to the public expressing their concerns. Our officials then write reports to me about what they consider to be these concerns, and we distribute these reports, also, to the newspapers in the towns where the town meetings were held. So this is not a very secret operation. Now, somebody leaked one of these reports in Washington that had already been distributed to the hometown newspapers of the people concerned.

I just want to make clear all of these reports are going to be critical, because the town meetings are organized to elicit concerns and not elicit approvals.

Now, let me get to your question of morality last and deal with Lebanon first.

Whatever our moral convictions may be, we cannot carry them to the point where the United States must settle every conflict in every part of the world in order to be cured.

We have in Lebanon passions that have been built up over centuries. We have armies that have been built up over decades.

For the United States to attempt to impose peace by our own forces would make us the policeman of the world. We have attempted to do our best to prevent outside intervention. We have sent a special envoy there. We have lost an Ambassador, who was murdered there on a peace mission.

We have stopped short of military intervention, because that would require a massive degree of an American commitment that we do not feel is warranted in these circumstances. But we also believe that the evolution in Lebanon, painful as it is, could lead to a situation in which the overall peace process can be resumed under conditions where all of the parties have learned how tenuous and fragile the situation is.

This does not mean that we would not want to have the war ended as quickly as possible. And we have offered repeatedly our good offices. The only thing we have refrained from doing is to send in American military forces.

Now, on the basic question of the roots of American morality and its relationship to American foreign policy.

The United States for the greatest part of our history, or at least for the greatest part of our modern history, could live with the conviction that we could dip in and out of foreign policy as we chose. And we could be both isolationists and interventionists on the principle that we were morally superior to the rest of the world, partly caused by the fact that we never had to make the hard choices of security that countries that did not have two great oceans had to confront.

Now, in the sixties and the seventies—

the late sixties and seventies—we have suddenly come up against the limitations of our power. And we now have to conduct foreign policy the way most other nations have had to conduct it throughout their history, where we cannot do everything we want, where we cannot implement all our preferences, and where we cannot impose all our values. And this produces a certain resentment, and it produces the illusion that, somehow or other, we could go back to an earlier pattern if only those in power were more morally committed.

Now, I am not saying that security considerations have to be dominant. In fact, I believe that without moral convictions to serve as a compass point, foreign policy becomes entirely practical and entirely irrelevant. But the role of our moral values in foreign policy is to give us the strength to approach our goals in stages and to set a general direction which we hope is compatible with the values of our society.

But what the American people will be learning in the years ahead, as we have already learned in Vietnam and elsewhere, is how to reconcile our needs with our limits and how to be moral without being able to be absolutists. That is a very tough problem, and it is one of the uncertainties in our foreign policy.

Mr. Greenberg: Mr. Secretary, earlier you quoted President Eisenhower approvingly. Would you consider his intervention in Lebanon to have been a failure?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I think that President Eisenhower, under the conditions that then existed, with the forces that were then at work in Lebanon, conducted an operation that was a marginal success. A similar [inaudible] the United States today would require many divisions, would involve us in all the inter-Arab disputes that you now see in Lebanon, and could not be justified to the American people by American purposes that we could explain afterward.

After all, what is the conflict of Lebanon? You have the Christian community and the Moslem community that have coexisted side by side for many decades, but not always. You have within the Moslem community, the splits between the radical factions and the moderate factions. And you have the presence of the Palestinians, who constitute almost a state within a state. All of this overlaid by Arab rivalries in which the Libyans and the Iraqis back the radicals and the Syrians have backed the moderate Arabs and have cooperated with the Christians.

For the United States to inject American military power into such a situation, under present circumstances, would lead us into a morass.

I think there are certain situations which, tragic as they are, we cannot overcome with military power. And that is the only thing that we have not done in Lebanon.

Public Discussions on Foreign Policy Issues

Mr. Gissler: Mr. Secretary, your remarks about the moral core of American foreign policy suggest that certain widespread public understanding or an agreement on certain objectives is essential, yet some very thoughtful critics say that you have done relatively little, especially after the collapse in Vietnam, to stimulate the kind of great debate necessary in this country to achieve that kind of understanding.

I wonder if the hard truth is that top policymakers, even in a democracy, are fearful of taking really tough questions to the people for thorough free-swinging discussion?

Secretary Kissinger: When I was in private life, nothing used to infuriate me more than a public official who, when being questioned at my university, would explain that nothing he had ever done could possibly have been wrong. Well, I am here to tell you that nothing I have ever done could possibly have been wrong. [Laughter.]

There are two problems. Did I try to explain American foreign policy to the American people? I think I have made a major effort. I have gone to 28 cities in the last 18 months. Wherever I have gone, I have

given a speech. I have subjected myself to a question period from the audience. I have met with leaders of the community. I have met with the newspaper editors and publishers. I have spent a whole day in order to explain some aspect of foreign policy, as I understood it, and to respond to questions. And we have had these town meetings which I described.

There is, however, inherent in high office the problem that almost all of the problems one deals with are imposed on one and that the time for reflection, with the best will in the world, is limited. And obviously—and I think this panel and this discussion prove it—it stands to reason that I have to believe that what we did was right or we wouldn't have done it.

Now, obviously, in retrospect one can change one's mind about something. But on the whole, if one has been serious and thoughtful, one will tend to believe that one was right.

So as you go through eight years, you tend to accumulate a certain vested interest in the policies that have been carried out inevitably, and as you go through eight years, the times available for reflection are limited. This will be true of any possible successors as well as of any possible incumbent.

So in the process of government it may not always be possible, even with the best intentions, to put everything before the public. But I have attempted to make a serious effort, and I think—I have spent a lot of time on the speeches that I have given publicly, but I am sure that there is always a lot more that could be done.

Mr. Gissler: Do you have any suggestions as to how we can raise the level of serious public discussions on questions like for whom and for what we might be prepared to fight in the world if necessary?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not sure that that is a question that can be answered in a serious public discussion by senior officials in this way. I think we can ask, in a serious public discussion, what we take to be our basic purposes in the world, what kind of a world we are trying to bring about, what our overall conception is of the nature of the security, of the nature of peace. Those are questions, I think, that we can and should debate.

I think to ask a question in the abstract—are we prepared to fight, say, for Korea—without having answered these other questions first is going to lead to a rather bitter debate that may not be very meaningful.

Relations With Vietnam

Mr. Stroud: Speaking of the debate about foreign policy issues, there is still great concern among many Americans about the Americans missing in action in Vietnam. And I am curious, is this a real impediment now to the normalization of relations with Vietnam? Or is the election the real impediment to the normalization of the relations with Vietnam?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the missing in action are a real impediment to the normalization of relations with Vietnam.

Basically we have no conflict with Vietnam now. After our experience in Vietnam we are the one great power that can be guaranteed not to have any national objectives to achieve in Indochina. So eventually the normalization of relations between us and Vietnam will come.

On the other hand, we believe that the behavior of the North Vietnamese in not turning over to us lists which we are confident they must have is a cruel and heartless act and one for which we are not prepared to pay any price. If that is accomplished, normalization will follow very rapidly.

Mr. Stroud: Can you define what sort of response would be considered adequate?

Secretary Kissinger: We would feel that there is no reason for the North Vietnamese not to turn over all the information

they have on the missing in action. It would be a humane gesture. It is not something that does us any good as a nation, but it will help ease the minds of many hundreds of people.

We therefore believe that it should be done. It would wipe the slate clean. And we will certainly be prepared to normalize relations rapidly after that.

Mr. Barnard: Mr. Secretary, we know the Secretary of State and the American people endure a lot of election rhetoric—

Secretary Kissinger: So far it has not been as bad as the primary rhetoric. [Laughter.]

Mr. Barnard: Several weeks ago, you were quoted, I think, as saying that despite some of the things that Jimmy Carter was saying, you didn't see any substantial difference in the foreign policy. Since then, he has given the B'nai B'rith speech and has been quoted lustily in Playboy [laughter], referring again to you not only as "the Lone Ranger" but criticizing you for a number of your policies, including insufficient stress on morality and other assorted sins.

I notice it is creeping into the columns now, into at least one column, which presumably is a token of more to come, that there is some hope in the Carter camp that you can be hung around Ford's neck as some sort of albatross. Does this change your perception of how a Carter administration might operate in foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: I was asked on that occasion to comment on one speech, but that was before Governor Carter had developed the full complexity of his thought. [Laughter.] Now that he has developed his thinking in several directions [laughter], I would not necessarily make the same statement again. But the President will have an opportunity to debate foreign policy with Mr. Carter on Wednesday, and I don't want to preempt his preparations for this.

Mr. Zakarian: I see you're whetting your knife.

U.S. Arms Sales Abroad

Mr. Greenberg: There is one area of the foreign policy in which you might have a special knowledge or interest, and that is the arms sales abroad. The Democratic candidate for President has not been alone in deploring the size of American arms shipments abroad, on the theory that they will actually ignite wars and we will be drawn into them. Do you see any of that sort of danger in the amount of armaments this country is shipping to various nations abroad?

Secretary Kissinger: One has to analyze where the arms are going before one can judge whether they will ignite wars and, secondly, whether the United States will be drawn into those wars if they are ignited.

Many of the figures that are being used are vastly inflated. I see references, for example, to $7.5 billion of arms to Saudi Arabia. Of that $7.5 billion, the overwhelming part of it is going for construction by the Corps of Engineers, and it is not going for weapons. And it is technically in the military budget, but it is to build cantonments for the Saudi Army and has nothing to do, as such, with the arms race.

Another percentage goes to Iran. Now Iran has pursued a policy that has been very parallel to ours in the Middle East. It has not joined the embargo. It has declared that it wouldn't join the embargo. It has sold oil even to Israel during this period.

Countries that threaten it are countries like the Soviet Union and countries armed by the Soviet Union, such as Iraq. And therefore I cannot foresee—nor has Iran ever transferred arms to another country. So it is difficult to foresee any war that Iran would start that would draw us in. And to the extent that Iran is capable of protecting itself, we are less likely to be drawn in than we would be if it were defenseless.

On the other hand, I do agree that we should look at the question of arms sales more systematically, and we have created, now, a new group to make sure that the

question you put is being dealt with in a responsible manner.

It is my judgment that the arms sales have contributed much more to stability than to the opposite. But we are not pushing arms sales. We are responding to needs that countries feel—and most of which they would be in a position to get anyway from other sources.

Mr. Greenberg: But, Mr. Secretary, those figures on Saudi Arabia include something like 600–700 Sidewinder missiles. Now what possible defense justification could there be for a country like Saudi Arabia to have that many missiles, except perhaps to defend its interests against Iran, which we have also supplied with—

Secretary Kissinger: Much more to defend its interests against some neighbors it has that are armed by the Soviet Union. And of the Sidewinders, a large—a significant percentage is going to have to be used for training purposes. So that what will be left is a minimum defensive package. And if you look at the countries surrounding Saudi Arabia, you would not pick Iran as the most likely one to attack it.

Lesson of Vietnam War

Mr. Gissler: Mr. Secretary, your remarks addressed toward Lebanon as a potential policy quagmire bring to mind our tragedy in Vietnam. It is often said that one thing we can salvage from Vietnam is a lesson. Yet there seems to be continuing disagreement over precisely what that lesson is. Some say it shows the limits of American imperialism. Others, including, I think, the Republican platform writers, indicate that the lesson is that we should never again fight such a war unless we intend to fight it all out and win. I wonder if you could tell us what you feel the fundamental lesson of Vietnam is?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that a fundamental lesson of Vietnam is that before the United States gets itself militarily engaged in any war, it must make an assessment of what its fundamental interest is, and secondly, whether it can serve this interest by military means.

I do agree that when the United States becomes militarily engaged, it should prevail, and if it cannot prevail, it should not engage itself. But before the United States engages itself, it must have the perception—not in abstract slogans, but through the best analysis that can be made—of what the fundamental American interest is, what the nature of its engagement is, and what limits we want to set to that engagement.

Otherwise we are going to be drawn from one commitment to another in order to make good the previous commitment. But it is important also to understand what involves a commitment. I do not believe that selling arms to a country commits us then to the series of events that led to Vietnam.

Mr. Gissler: What about South Korea? We are not just selling arms. We also have combat troops stationed there.

Secretary Kissinger: South Korea—our interest in South Korea is produced by the confluence there of many power centers, by our historical relationship, and above all, by the fact that Japan considers that its security is closely affected by what happens on the Korean Peninsula. And therefore, for the United States to suddenly disengage from Korea would have drastic consequences in Japan and in all of Northeast Asia.

Mr. Stroud: Mr. Secretary, in the wake of the fall of Saigon, you were quoted a number of times with a fairly pessimistic appraisal of the world perception of the United States after Vietnam and the feeling we had a great need to reestablish the authority of the United States in the world, the credibility of the United States in the world. Do you feel that that perception has changed significantly?

Secretary Kissinger: We have to face the fact that it is a combination of the tragedies of the last four years. Many countries around the world were asking what the role of the United States—or to what extent it could rely on the United States as a stabilizing factor or as a factor for progress.

I believe that since the collapse of Vietnam, we have conducted a policy that has restored some of our credibility and resolved some of the doubts, but it continues to be, for several reasons, including some of our domestic debates, one of the challenges of American foreign policy.

Mr. Zakarian: Members of the panel, thank you. We shall receive questions from the floor. We have about 15 minutes, and questions are open only to members of NCEW. Please state your name and your newspaper, and then ask the question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, my name is Smith Hempstone, and I am a syndicated columnist.

You were described, I believe, in the Oriana Fallaci interview several years ago as a historian having a tragic sense of destiny.

In Admiral [Elmo R.] Zumwalt's book, while he may have confused Athens with the Theban League, he puts across the impression, in his view, that you feel that your role has been one of trying to get the best deal possible in a declining power situation.

I wonder if you could tell us precisely how you do view your role in the past seven and a half years, and how you foresee the shape of the world evolving in the next few years and America's role in it?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I have nominated Admiral Zumwalt on a number of occasions for the Pulitzer Prize for fiction. [Laughter.] I think it took him a while to realize that his opponent in Virginia was called Byrd and not Kissinger.

Anybody who has ever been on a train going to an Army-Navy game would think it is not the most suitable place for reflections on the philosophy of history [laughter]—or normally believe that the participants in any conversation necessarily would recollect exactly what was said, particularly what was said on the way home from the game [laughter].

Now, what did I conceive to be my role? I believe, seriously now, that I am likely to be more reflective about this out of office in 1981 than I am likely to be at this time. [Laughter.]

But I have served in Washington during a period of fundamental transition when the United States had to liquidate a war which we found when we got there. The first such experience in our history when we had to adjust our relations with our allies, when we had to find new ways of dealing with our adversaries, and when the revolution that is inherent in the process by which these new nations came into being is beginning to gather momentum.

It has been my conviction that we could not continue to operate by managing crises or by abstract declarations of political intent, but that we had to develop some perception of the national interest that could be maintained over an indefinite period.

Now, this is a difficult thing to put across in America, because we have almost no strand in our foreign policy thinking that is geared to this. We have an idealistic tradition. We have a pragmatic tradition. We have an international law tradition. But we do not have a tradition of thinking of the world as a political process with no terminal date in which whatever you do only buys you an entrance price to another problem.

So it is inevitable that there is a lot of debate. And it is inevitable that people who think that there should be neat and final solutions would believe that one preferred contingent solutions.

It is indeed my conviction that we cannot define a terminal date at which we can say all our problems have disappeared. We are now part of an international process which is unending insofar as I can foresee, which we can manage, which we can direct, and in which our purposes have to be

clearly defined, but in which we can no longer sell our programs the way we did in the immediate postwar period by promising the American people an end to exertion and an end to problems if only one more program were carried out.

And I think this explains some of the sort of criticism that Admiral Zumwalt makes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Stuart Loory of the Chicago Sun-Times.

Coming back to your quotation from President Eisenhower about there being no alternative to peace, the Congress, within the past couple of weeks, appropriated $104 billion for defense spending in the next year. There are reports that the Pentagon is going to request $130 billion in the authorization for next year. Are you satisfied that the United States is spending the least amount of money necessary for defense to further American foreign policy aims?

Secretary Kissinger: I am satisfied that we need, under present conditions, the amounts that have been requested. I am not satisfied that we can continue international relations indefinitely on the basis of an arms race. And therefore I have believed strongly that limitations of strategic arms and negotiations on the limitations of other arms are necessary.

I believe that the constant accumulation of armaments on both sides is going to lead to a situation that could have some of the characteristics that led to World War I, in which the political leadership at some point lost control over events. But I do not believe that we can achieve this unilaterally. Until we can negotiate an agreed limitation of arms, I am afraid we have to match what the other side is doing.

Q. Gil Cranberg of the Des Moines Register and Tribune.

Mr. Secretary, the Church committee [Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities] reported that the United States has an extensive covert propaganda operation abroad. This involves having hundreds of foreign journalists on the U.S. payroll and the planting of false and misleading information, some of which unavoidably is picked up and published in this country.

The Church committee complained about it. This organization is complaining about it. Our complaint was directed to the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. Since this activity presumably is in the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives, perhaps the complaint should have been directed to you. In any case, would you tell us why you think such covert propaganda activity is desirable, and whether you would consider having it discontinued?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't believe that putting misleading information out as news is ever justifiable. The problem arises that in many parts of the world the media are dominated by, or heavily influenced by, foreign powers that are hostile to us, and an attempt is made to get our point of view across.

But I would not accept this as saying that it is ever justified to put out misleading information. I would think that any information that is placed through any American governmental organization should be such that it could be published here without misleading the American public.

Q. So you disagree with the practice.

Secretary Kissinger: I disagree with the practice of placing misleading information into foreign newspapers.

Q. Do you have the power to order that?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not sure I have. If it was done in the past—I doubt very seriously that it is being done today.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am Fred Sherman of the Miami Herald.

You achieved great success in the Middle East in getting the Israelis to talk to the Arabs. You pulled off an apparent miracle in Africa getting the white minority and the blacks to talk. Do you think there is any Foreign Minister in the world with the same

measure of genius that could get Havana and Washington off the same way? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as to the first part of your question, the answer is obviously no. [Laughter.]

But as far as Havana and Washington are concerned, we were beginning to move toward normalizing relations when Cuba placed 15,000 troops into Angola. This cannot be justified on any Cuban grounds.

That made clear that either Cuba is acting as a surrogate for the Soviet Union or it is pursuing a revolutionary foreign policy in distant parts of the globe or, what is more likely, it was a combination of the two. That, plus the extremely aggressive Cuban policy vis-a-vis Puerto Rico, has made it very difficult for us to get into a sensible dialogue.

Q. Sir, in your concern over the Rhodesian situation, did you have any fear that the Cubans might move into Rhodesia?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that there is a danger that if the evolution in Africa is not channeled into a moderate direction, foreign intervention, whether Cuban or otherwise, would become more and more probable. As this accelerates, a race war becomes more and more inevitable. And if a major race war starts, it is bound to radicalize all of Africa and have serious consequences in other parts of the world.

And therefore we are trying very hard to return African—the evolution in Africa into African hands and to keep all foreign powers out, including ourselves.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am Tom Caulfield from Savannah Morning News.

Partly, you—I don't think anyone at all has had much to say about the Soviet Union, so I will ask a question about that. And this is a local question, because in Savannah, which is located 40 miles from here across the Savannah River, we had last week develop a situation in which an American company has announced intention to set up a redistribution headquarters in Savannah for the distribution of Russian-made automobiles. And this will employ about 150 people at the outset and 300 people ultimately.

We have an anomalous situation, therefore, a communistic government being involved in a capitalistic society. And some people at home have expressed misgivings because Savannah was captured by the British and captured by the Yankees [*laughter*], *and here perhaps is a good case for us to get captured again* [*laughter*].

But my question is, this is an obvious product of détente, and in such a trade-off of American jobs for dollars going to Russia, who is the net winner—the United States or the Soviet Union?

Trade With the U.S.S.R.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't believe that Savannah is going to be captured by Russian automobiles, unless they have developed a new one in the last few weeks. [Laughter.]

But to answer your question, who is the net winner in trade between the Soviet Union and the United States? It is a difficult question to answer in the abstract. I would think that an economy of the size of ours can afford to trade with the Soviet Union without any danger of our economy being in any way significantly influenced by the Soviet Union.

The second question is whether our trade with the Soviet Union strengthens the Soviet Union in any competition they may engage in with the United States.

Well, this depends on what sort of trade we engage in and also what moderation the Soviet Union shows in the conduct of its foreign policy.

If the Soviet Union conducts itself in an extremely hostile and aggressive manner, then I would think the possibilities for normal trade between our two countries would be very small. If relations over a period of years become calm, if the Soviet Union shows restraint in other parts of the world, then I think trade, especially in nonstrategic items, might contribute to giving

an additional incentive for this moderation.

We have always believed that trade should follow political accommodation. And therefore a great deal depends on the basic state of our relations with the Soviet Union as to whether it is beneficial or not.

President Ford Signs Ratifications of Conventions on Terrorism

Statement by President Ford[1]

Within the last few months we have witnessed a new outbreak of international terrorism, some of which has been directed against persons who carry the important burdens of diplomacy. Last summer we were grieved by the brutal murders of our Ambassador to Lebanon [Francis E. Meloy, Jr.] and his Economic Counselor [Robert O. Waring]. We also have seen a series of acts of violence directed against diplomatic missions in the United States for which we have host-country responsibilities. These acts cannot and will not be tolerated in the United States, nor should they be tolerated anywhere in the world. Preventing or punishing such acts is a prime concern of this government and one which I will pursue with all the force of this office.

Today [October 8] I am pleased to affix my signature to three documents which once again demonstrate the commitment of the United States to sustain its struggle against international terrorism. Through our efforts and with others in the United Nations, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, was adopted in 1972. A few years previously we had supported the adoption in the Organization of American States of the Convention To Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of both of these conventions, and implementing legislation was requested from the Congress which would enable us to discharge our obligations under them. I congratulate the Members of Congress whose prompt and effective efforts have made this bill available for my signature. The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (H.R. 15552)[2] will serve as a significant law enforcement tool for us to deal more effectively with the menace of terrorism, and it will assist us in discharging our important responsibilities under the two international conventions which I am today authorizing for ratification.

An important feature of this bill will be to give extraterritorial effect to our law in order to enable us to punish those who commit offenses against internationally protected persons, wherever those offenses may occur. With this law we will in many cases in the future have an improved basis to request extradition and, if granted, to prosecute such criminal terrorists as those who murdered Ambassador Meloy and Economic Counselor Waring.

I call upon all nations to join in this vital endeavor. I particularly urge those countries which have not become parties to these conventions to do so.

I hope that a new initiative against terrorism as it affects innocent persons and disrupts the fabric of society will be addressed at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. The full force of world opinion and diplomatic action must be brought to bear on this threat to world peace and order.

I pledge our full support to any constructive proposals to combat terrorism. I am therefore happy to sign this act and these instruments of ratification as a reaffirmation of the commitment of the U.S. Government to bring an end to terrorism.

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[1] Issued at Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 10 (text from White House press release).

[2] Public Law 94–467, approved Oct. 8.

The Western Hemisphere Relationship: Foundation for Future Efforts

Following is a toast by Secretary Kissinger at a luncheon at New York on October 7 in honor of Latin American heads of delegations to the 31st U.N. General Assembly and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations.

Press release 498 dated October 7

In this decade the cardinal objective of U.S. foreign policy—over all the world—has been to create a tradition of cooperative international relations based on equality, mutual respect, and shared benefit. We have done so in the recognition that the world would not operate according to an American design and that the world's problems would not be solved by prescription. But more importantly, we have done so in the firm conviction that the community of nations has before it now an opportunity for unprecedented progress toward building a better world—and that a new structure of peace and progress could be constructed in which other nations felt a sense of participation, so that in forming it they could make it their own.

Nothing has been more central to our hopes than the relationships of the nations of this hemisphere. They are a priceless foundation of past achievement, a vital and progressing process of present cooperation, and our brightest vision for the future of what like-minded nations can accomplish by working together.

We have sustained an awareness that our destinies are linked: by geography, culture, history, and shared ideals.

We have achieved the crucial elements of successful cooperative effort: ours is a hemisphere of peace, in which problems are solved not by resort to international conflict or rhetorical confrontation but by responsible discussion and negotiation conducted with a unique spirit of mutual regard and respect.

Our achievement is all the more durable and impressive because it has not been easily won. The United States, in its relationship with its sister republics in the Western Hemisphere, has gone through many cycles. There was a time when we unilaterally declared what foreign nations could do in the Western Hemisphere. Two generations ago we centered our relations around a Good Neighbor policy based upon the principle of nonintervention in the internal or external affairs of another. The 1960's brought the Alliance for Progress, in which, on the whole, the United States sought to develop a program for all of the Western Hemisphere.

In recent years we have, I believe, entered a new and exciting era in our relationships—bringing wider scope for diversity and openness. We are achieving a new and productive balance of responsibility and effort within the Americas. It is a time increasingly marked by consultation, cooperation, and brighter prospects for building stronger and more mutually beneficial relations in our hemisphere—and making our advancement a model for the wider international progress among nations that our times so clearly demand.

It is to these ends that the President and his Administration vent our best efforts to intensify and strengthen the cooperation beween Latin America and the United States.

That is why I have attended every session of the General Assembly of the OAS held since I became Secretary of State, and

that is why I have traveled twice to Latin America this year, and that is why I have held meetings with the Presidents and chiefs of state of most nations of the hemisphere and with virtually all the Foreign Ministers.

I have done so out of the conviction that the long and close ties among the countries of the New World now provide an unprecedentedly sound foundation upon which our nations can come together to work to solve the most compelling issues of our time.

My visits to 10 of your countries this year have reaffirmed my conviction that we share that recognition, that we are moving ahead to adapt and advance our ties to meet the needs of our era.

We have done much in the last three years:

Bilaterally, we have made special efforts to accommodate differences, to find areas of common interest rather than attempt to dictate to each other's policies. We have shown through practice that trade and investment can be promoted to mutual benefit. Our commitment to conciliation has led us to unprecedented negotiations, with Panama, and, on particular bilateral concerns, with Peru.

These intensified bilateral contacts, both formal and informal, are laying the groundwork for important multilateral progress on pressing international problems, from corporate conduct to cooperation for development, from narcotics to law of the sea.

Regionally, we have reaffirmed our commitment to the Organization of American States and to efforts to make it responsive to the concerns of all its members.

In Costa Rica 15 months ago, we ratified our support for the Rio Treaty as an instrument of collective security. At the OAS General Assembly last June, we confirmed the important role of the OAS in protecting human rights and maintaining regional peace—and we began to develop positive new forms of cooperation on trade and technology.

Globally, our countries have shown growing awareness of the need for a new era of economic relations between the nations of North and South. We have brought more than our individual perspectives on commodities, trade, debt, and technology to the United Nations, UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development], and CIEC [Conference on International Economic Cooperation]. By drawing on our special experience with the complexities of interdependence, we of the Americas are helping to define new and workable approaches to these vital issues which require the best of our private as well as our public talents and energies. The United States is dedicated to cooperate in development throughout the world. But as we seek progress on a wider scale, we recognize our close and special ties to the nations of the Americas. We regard the concerns of this hemisphere as our first priority.

In all these areas, the record is one of practical case-by-case progress. We seek no sweeping solutions, we will not force our relations into a single mold or formula. It is a good record. It needs no flowery rhetoric to embellish it. The days of inflated claims and goals are over. Today, ours is a hemisphere of mutual confidence and growing cooperation for peace and progress.

Yet it is in the nature of the unending challenge of foreign affairs that we can never solve all problems. And in this present era, new issues constantly arise. We must therefore do all we can to insure that problems we face are dealt with constructively and that we work together to determine the future directions of our cooperation. This is why the processes of consultation we have recently emphasized among us are particularly important. Yet consultations without the broader framework of a shared vision could well become little more

than sterile recountings of our respective limitations and problems.

We in this hemisphere have that shared vision.

Far more than any like region of the world, we are bound together by a common heritage. And yet we are not European. Our traditions and institutions have something new in them. Men were searching for it before they were sure there *was* an America. Columbus wrote to Ferdinand and Isabella that:

> Your Highnesses ordained that I should not go eastward by land in the usual manner but by the *western way* which no one about whom we have positive information has ever followed.

Columbus found his new western way. We who now inhabit the lands he discovered 484 years ago next week similarly are finding ways to the future that are both new and western.

Thus our hemisphere has for centuries symbolized man's readiness to grasp his own destiny, to set out upon uncharted ways in search of a better world.

Today that spirit is more alive and more important than ever. But the challenges of our time require even more than boldness and readiness for tomorrow.

Ours is a time of complex uncertainty. We are called upon to reconcile fundamental philosophical dilemmas:

—We must pursue our commitment to great human equality without removing the incentives for individual initiative;

—We must preserve the security and independence of our nations without sacrificing the resources needed for economic development; and

—We must learn to balance our need for social order with our responsibility to individual freedom. We must vindicate our own commitment to human rights.

The tension between equality and initiative lies at the heart of our desires for a fair yet dynamic global system. In the United States, we emphasize the importance of a market economy based on an open play of economic forces. We believe growth depends importantly on individual entrepreneurship. Other nations emphasize the need for greater state intervention in their economies to insure more equitable distribution of the fruits of growth.

These differing emphases in economic policy can frequently be significant, but they are not a cause for ponderous ideological confrontation. Each of our countries, to be successful, will have to find a route to special progress that does not end individual incentive. Not to strive for equality is to risk violent revolution; not to provide incentives is to risk decay.

Our mutual dependence, furthermore, requires us to extend our economic cooperation beyond our national borders. That is why we have held intensive bilateral consultations on the Geneva trade negotiations. That is why the United States has ratified its participation in commodity agreements for wheat, coffee, and tin; why we have joined in producer-consumer consultations on copper in the past two weeks; and why we look forward to hemisphere consultations on sugar prior to the negotiations to take place next April.

Recent events have taught us all that global prosperity is indivisible; no nation can prosper alone. The challenge we face is to reconcile our often distinct but interacting dimensions of concern on the basis of respect and an openminded assessment that differing approaches can offer common benefits.

There is a tension as well between the demands of security and development. We in the Americas have done far better than most regions of the world in avoiding armed conflict. In Latin America as a whole, defense expenditures as a percentage of national income are the lowest of any region in the world. These records are enviable. To maintain them in the face of the spiraling costs and offensive potential of modern military technology will require increased cooperation among potential antagonists as well as friends.

This is easier said than done. The need to cooperate with perceived adversaries in the restraint of defense expenditures provides no emotional satisfaction. But vast domestic expenditures are needed if we are to hope to fulfill the positive aspirations of our peoples. None of us in this room will see a time when there are enough resources to enable us to forgo the necessity for choice.

And finally, the balance between freedom and order is inherently tenuous and constantly changing. It will vary for each of us, in accordance with national traditions and historical circumstances.

But all of our nations were founded to protect human freedom and dignity. Man is the measure of all our effort. This hemisphere is the world's laboratory of human freedom, the just and ultimate refuge of the rights of man. We must not turn away from what is best in our own tradition. If we deny these principles in the search for growth and stability, we hazard the very foundations of our national existence and what is most precious to our common experience.

There are tensions that no nation or group of nations can ever fully resolve, of course—tensions which are inherent in the conduct of public affairs. In our time, they pose special challenges. Each nation must find its own equilibrium. But there is much we must do together to enhance, protect, and further respect for human rights in the Americas.

And as we cooperate to resolve these discrepancies of the human relationship, we must also engage together the immediate material needs before us. Our concrete, common problems are real enough, and our cooperative response can do as much as anything to forward all our hopes for a dynamic, secure, and just future for all our peoples.

Several proposals made in the last General Assembly of the OAS in Santiago provide a basis for new forms of cooperation. These proposals establish our regional agenda for the coming year. They include mechanisms for:

—Financing basic resource development;
—Increasing agricultural productivity;
—Facilitating social and infrastructural projects in middle- as well as low-income developing countries; and
—Improving the development, adaptation, and transfer of technology.

Our best effort will be needed to develop these proposals in a manner worthy of our common potential in the next half year. We must insure that the Special General Assembly on development and the companion Special General Assembly on the structure of the OAS are the culmination of our common efforts.

The international scene today is marked by shifting constellations of problems, tensions, and opportunities. We in our hemisphere experience them in as great a range and intensity as any group of nations on earth.

In the last few years we have, I believe, astutely perceived the problems, the opportunities, and the foundations upon which we can build. And we have begun to go forward—not on the wings of inflated rhetoric and unrealistic goals, but maturely, responsibly, and practically.

The world is aware of our work. In a time when international cooperation is an imperative for each nation, we can be assured that all will closely monitor those from whom the most progress can be expected—those whose shared experience, values, and outlook are the moral origin of a unique intimacy and a unique potential for progress.

Let us resolve to continue to go forward, not just for this year and next—but to make our work together a model for the world for the rest of this century.

Gentlemen, I offer a toast to the future of inter-American cooperation.

Strengthening the Relationship Between the United States and Africa

Following is a toast by Secretary Kissinger at a luncheon at New York on October 8 in honor of African Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations.

Press release 501 dated October 8

I've been so much in Africa in the past year that I am filing an application to be an honorary member of the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. Then you will have to sit through even more of my speeches.

When we met here a year ago, I said that America's policy toward Africa was founded upon three principles:

—That self-determination, racial justice, and human rights spread to all of Africa;
—That Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a strong participant in the international economic order; and
—That the continent be free of great-power rivalry or conflict.

I think none of us could then have foretold the dramatic events which have taken place this past year in pursuit of each of these goals.

A year ago, events in Rhodesia seemed to be moving inexorably and swiftly toward war, a war that would have had devastating consequences for that country and its neighbors. There was every prospect of conflict that would leave a legacy of bitterness, division, and confrontation that could well set back the progress of southern Africa for generations.

Today, as a result of the resolute determination of the African people and the responsible and far-seeing decisions of their leaders, the situation has changed dramatically. A breakthrough has been achieved. A negotiation is about to begin; the framework of a settlement exists. An opportunity is now before us for a peaceful transition to a majority-ruled multiracial society in Zimbabwe.

A year ago the prospects were dim that the Namibian problem could be rapidly or satisfactorily resolved.

Today, the inevitability of Namibian independence is accepted by all parties concerned. More important, a way toward agreement among Namibia, South Africa, and the United Nations now appears open. Determined efforts are now underway to bring about a constitutional conference at a neutral location under U.N. aegis in which all authentic national forces, specifically including SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], will be able to fashion a design for the new state of Namibia.

And in the course of the year past, the forces of change have asserted themselves dramatically in South Africa. It is manifest that the internal political, economic, and social structure of that country must change. A system based on institutionalized injustice, and that brings periodic violence and upheaval, cannot last. The leaders of South Africa have taken responsible steps to help facilitate a process of change in Rhodesia. The world now looks to them to exercise the same wisdom to bring racial justice to South Africa.

The past year also has brought the beginnings of what could be a new economic

era for Africa. And it is clear that ultimately it is economic development which will determine whether the aspirations of the African people for progress and human dignity will be fulfilled.

Africa's great natural wealth and considerable potential for agricultural and industrial development have long been impeded by an array of problems:

—Recurrent drought and natural disaster;

—Heavy reliance by many nations on the production of a single commodity and, as a result, extraordinary dependence on the vagaries of the world economy; and

—A crushing historical burden of poverty.

In the past year the international community has laid the groundwork for an attack on all these problems. It is increasingly recognized that in place of sporadic relief efforts to ease the aftereffects of natural disasters, what is needed is comprehensive international programs to address fundamental conditions. Last May in Dakar I outlined one such program, a program for international cooperation to help the nations of the Sahel develop additional water resources, increase crop acreage through modern agricultural techniques, and improve food storage—all aimed at making the Sahel less vulnerable to crisis in the future.

Broad-based multinational cooperation has been accelerated to reform the global economic system for the benefit of the developing nations. In the past year—since the seventh special session [of the U.N. General Assembly]—major steps proposed at that session have been implemented and promising new measures discussed. Steps have not only been proposed but carried out—to expand agricultural production worldwide, to improve the earnings potential and market stability of key raw materials, to reduce trade barriers to tropical product exports into the United States, to help those hard hit by increasing energy costs, and to stimulate the flow of modern technology so as to promote growth and diversify economies now excessively dependent on a single commodity. Africa is a principal beneficiary of these reforms in the international economy.

Africa's trade with and investment from the United States and the industrial nations of the West are crucial and expanding. Africa wants to earn its way. But for some, particularly the poorest and least developed, trade and investment are not enough to overcome the legacy of pervasive poverty. U.S. bilateral assistance programs will therefore concentrate increasingly on these countries, and in sectors where the need is greatest.

The United States also believes that closer cooperation among the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan can mean a much greater contribution to the economic development of Africa. Therefore we welcome the proposal of President Giscard d'Estaing of France for a fund to organize and coordinate Western assistance efforts to Africa. We hope to move ahead on this proposal. And we are seeking to further strengthen coordination through the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to insure that the collective efforts of the industrial nations are efficiently organized to bring the maximum benefit to Africa.

Economic development is a painful and long-term process which depends most of all on the sustained and substantial efforts of the developing countries themselves. But this has been a historic year in the effort of the community of nations to narrow the gulf between North and South both economically and politically. All those who seek either order or progress are beginning to recognize that we can have neither unless the last quarter of this century is an era of international cooperation.

The advances made toward racial justice and economic progress, if they are maintained and built upon, can strengthen the basis of African unity and self-determination and thereby serve as a bulwark

against unwanted outside intervention in the affairs of the African people.

The United States is firmly committed to the concept of Africa for Africans. That is why, for example, we have agreed with the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia that non-African nations should not deal directly with the liberation movements of southern Africa. The United States seeks no bloc and plays no favorites among groups or leaders; we will not oppose any African faction or group, regardless of its ideology, if it is truly independent and African. We will continue our firm opposition to the extension of great-power rivalry or conflict to the African Continent.

Thus, in the course of the past year, Africa's drive for justice, for progress, for true independence, has been severely tested in every dimension. Africa has survived those tests and finds itself at a possible turning point in its history.

The statesmanship of Africa's leaders has won widespread recognition. The resilience of Africa's economies and the determination of its peoples to achieve racial justice have been amply demonstrated to the world.

But progress achieved will not continue automatically. Difficult decisions must be made, additional statesmanship must be shown, if just solutions are to be achieved.

Yet continued progress is crucial. For we are all aware that the important steps toward peace and justice in Rhodesia, steps to avert bloodshed and widening war, can easily be undone. And there are those who, for their own purposes, do not want to see a peaceful settlement in either Rhodesia or Namibia.

Together, African states, the United Kingdom, and the United States have fashioned an opportunity for peace and foundation for progress in southern Africa. Essential elements of a negotiated settlement have been achieved:

—The authorities in Rhodesia have accepted the principle of majority rule within two years.

—The parties have agreed that an interim government will be established immediately.

—Agreement has been reached on the time and place for a conference.

—A number of Western governments have agreed to participate in a fund to facilitate the transition to majority rule and to enhance the economic future of an independent Zimbabwe.

For the first time in 11 years, a rapid, satisfactory, and peaceful end to the Rhodesian crisis is within reach. To lose this opportunity would be monumental tragedy. To seize it can mean a new day of hope to southern Africa. History will not forgive a failure to seize the moment. Whether by neglect or design, such a failure will be tantamount to a decision to choose violence, chaos, and widening destruction over a rapid and peaceful solution. No country in southern Africa will be spared either the pain of warfare or the judgment of history.

Continued movement toward an accord for Namibia is also crucial. My talks with leaders of black African states, the South African Prime Minister, and Mr. Sam Nujoma of the South West Africa People's Organization lead me to believe that those involved want a peaceful solution and are willing to modify their positions in order to achieve it. As in Rhodesia, success is not assured. Nevertheless, with determination and a readiness to compromise, the parties are now in a position to end the dispute that has been a source of serious international discord for almost three decades.

The focus of the moment is on the southern part of the continent, but the U.S. commitment applies to all of Africa and to all the great issues I have mentioned: justice, progress, and independence.

Last year I said to the permanent members of the OAU who met with me that strengthening the relationship between the United States and Africa is a major objective of American policy. It was then, it is now, and shall continue to be so in the future. Africa can count on us.

There can no longer be any question that America is committed to Africa's goals and to working with the nations of Africa to solve the continent's problems. In return, we expect to find respect for our concerns and perspectives.

Let us set aside the suspicions of the past and work for our common future. Together we can reconstitute the community of man on the basis of mutual benefit and shared endeavor. We can show that races can live together, that there is an alternative to hatred.

If Africa succeeds, it will have much to teach the world, and so much to contribute to it.

I therefore ask you to join me in a toast:

—To the well-being of the peoples of Africa;

—To friendship and cooperation between the United States and Africa; and

—To peace, prosperity, and justice for peoples everywhere.

Secretary Kissinger Reaffirms Principles for Middle East Peace

Following is a toast by Secretary Kissinger at a luncheon at New York on September 29 in honor of Arab states' heads of delegations to the 31st U.N. General Assembly and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations.[1]

Press release 482 dated September 29

This is the fourth time I have met with you since I've become Secretary of State. I have just returned from Africa, and I don't want to say anything insulting to my Arab friends; but I must tell you that compared to the passions that exist in Africa the Middle East has almost Anglo-Saxon restraint. [Laughter.]

I have visited many of your countries, and I know we cannot compete in hospitality. With respect to hospitality, we are the underdeveloped region compared to our experiences in the Middle East.

But as I look back over the four meetings we have had, the first time we assembled here everyone wanted to know with great suspicion what we were going to do. And I said all the conventional things about Security Council Resolution 242.

You saw to it that, soon after, another Security Council resolution became necessary. But as I look back, I feel that despite all the ups and downs very great progress has been made toward peace in the Middle East. First of all, the traditional friendship between the United States and the countries of the Arab world has been restored with respect to at least very many of them. And we have had an opportunity to make a contribution to three agreements that have begun the difficult and complicated process toward peace.

When I met with you last year, I pointed out four principles which I would like to repeat today:

—The first was that the only durable solution is a just and comprehensive peace and that the United States remains committed to that objective.

—Second, we recognize that peace in the Middle East is not divisible. Each nation and people which is party to the Arab-Israeli problem must find a fair satisfaction of its legitimate interests.

—Third, it is in the nature of movement toward peace that all the key problems must be dealt with in a balanced way. The questions of territory, borders, military deployments, cannot be dealt with unless at the same time political and economic settlement are given equal attention.

—And fourth, any step taken must be judged in the light of the alternatives that are available.

We have proceeded on a step-by-step basis, but we believe that now conditions

[1] A toast by Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Chatty and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's toast, which are included in press release 482, are not printed here.

exist that make comprehensive solutions the most useful approach. And we believe also that conditions are coming about in which the search for peace can be resumed with energy and with conviction. And I want to assure you that the United States remains committed to this objective and that we hope that significant progress can be made in the months ahead.

Since we last met, also there has been the tragedy of the civil war in Lebanon. As we stated on the occasion of the inauguration of the new Lebanese President, the United States is committed to an independent, sovereign, and united Lebanon. We do not favor partition. We favor an opportunity for the people of Lebanon to live their own lives and to determine their own destinies. And we will be available to give any advice and assistance that the parties may request of us.

We can only express the hope now that this tragic conflict will soon come to an end, because it is the unity of the Arab nations that is an essential precondition to an effective policy of peace in the Middle East. And if we are to achieve the objectives of a just and lasting peace about which we have spoken so long, which we must strive to implement, then unity among the Arab nations is of the greatest importance.

Our countries are also concerned with many economic problems and the relations between the developed and developing nations. The countries of the Middle East are playing an increasingly important role. The oil-producing countries, because of their wealth and because of their influence on the global economy, have an unparalleled responsibility which must be exercised for the benefit of all. We are discussing it with them and other countries of the Middle East in the United Nations, in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation; and we are doing so with the attitude that the dialogue between the industrial and the developing world is perhaps the deepest challenge of our time.

We must solve it cooperatively. We cannot create a world community in which one party is condemned to permanent poverty. We cannot create a world community either through tactics of confrontation. So the United States is prepared to work cooperatively and constructively with the nations assembled in this room for the common benefit of all mankind.

Now, distinguished friends, let me conclude by saying that I know that we have not yet traveled except the beginning of the road toward peace. But I also believe that we have created conditions from which the rest of the distance can be traveled if we work on it with conviction and with confidence in each other.

I have personally valued the associations that have been formed with so many of you over the years. And I am grateful that you have done me the honor of joining me again for this meeting. So I would like to propose a toast to peace in the Middle East and to the lasting friendship between the peoples of the Middle East and the American people.

United States-Spanish Council Holds Inaugural Session

Joint Communique [1]

The United States-Spanish Council, established by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which entered into force September 21, 1976, was formally constituted on October 1, 1976, at a meeting under the joint Chairmanship of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja Aguirre. The meeting was also attended by the permanent military representatives on the Council, General George Brown, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Lt. General Carlos Fernandez Vallespin, President of

[1] Issued following the meeting at Washington on Oct. 1 (text from press release 490).

the Council of Chiefs of Staff of Spain, by Ambassador Wells Stabler, United States Ambassador to Spain and permanent U.S. representative on the Council and, as participants in this meeting, by Spanish Ambassador to the U.S. Jaime Alba, Spanish Ambassador-at-Large Juan José Rovira y Sanchez Herrero and Mr. Juan Duran Loriga Rodriganez, Director General of North American and Pacific Affairs of the Spanish Foreign Ministry.

In fulfillment of its responsibility for overseeing implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the Council noted with approval the plans for early constitution of the various bodies under its aegis, and expressed confidence that these bodies will soon be operating effectively to achieve the aims and objectives of the Treaty.

The Council's review of the current world situation reaffirmed the value of the Treaty at this juncture in world affairs and its important contribution to the Western Community.

In the field of defense cooperation, the Council underlined the commitment of both governments under the Treaty to develop appropriate plans and coordination between their respective armed forces in order to enhance their own security and that of the Western World. The Council likewise confirmed the importance of establishing coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Council took note of preparations to establish the Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff in Madrid as provided in the Treaty, and requested the Joint Military Committee, with the assistance of the Combined Staff once it is established to develop a work program to carry out their responsibilities under the Treaty for review by the Council at its next meeting. The Joint Military Committee is also meeting on October 1 in Washington, D.C.

With regard to economic cooperation, the Council noted the importance of the Joint Economic Committee, which has been created under the Treaty to serve as the principal vehicle for bilateral economic consultations, and which will be convened in the fall. This Committee will also seek to coordinate the positions of both governments on questions of mutual interest, both bilateral and multilateral.

The Council similarly approved plans for early convening of the Joint Committee on Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, both of which will be expanding cooperative programs in their respective fields. The Council in particular took favorable note of preliminary discussion already held on the development of joint solar energy research programs.

In all of these fields, it is an objective of the two countries to contribute to closer European and Atlantic cooperation.

The Council, which is to meet at least semi-annually, will next be convened at the call of the Co-Chairmen.

Increase in Customs Duties on Sugar Announced

Statement by President Ford [1]

Since July the price of raw sugar has steadily declined and is now below the cost of production for most U.S. sugar producers. At current price levels many U.S. sugarbeet and sugarcane producers are unable to operate profitably. I have watched these developments with growing concern, mindful of the important contribution that our sugar industry makes to the national economy. Consequently, when prices plummeted in August, the interagency Task Force on Sugar Policy was reconstituted to update the supply, demand, and price outlook for the remainder of 1976 and to consider the policy implications of these projections. The task force has now completed

[1] Issued on Sept. 21 (text from White House press release).

its review and has reported to me its analysis of the problem and the policy options.

After reviewing the work of this task force and determining the views of members of Congress from the affected areas, I have decided to give my full support to the request of the Senate Finance Committee for an escape clause investigation by the U.S. International Trade Commission under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. I fully agree with the Finance Committee that this matter requires a full and complete examination by the USITC. Further, because of the urgency of the problem for America's sugar producers, I am asking the USITC to expedite its review and to report its findings as soon as possible.

In addition, in view of the depressed state of the sugar industry, I have decided, pending completion of the USITC investigation, to raise the duty on imported sugar from .625 cents per pound to 1.875 cents per pound effective immediately. Increased custom duties will offer domestic producers some protection from imports while the USITC investigation is underway. I emphasize that this is an interim measure which I will review following receipt of the findings of the USITC and that I am not prejudging the eventual findings and recommendations of the USITC with respect to the question of injury or possible remedial measures.

U.S. and German Democratic Republic Sign Fisheries Agreement

Joint Statement [1]

On October 5, 1976, representatives of the Governments of the United States of America and the German Democratic Republic signed an Agreement which will govern future fishing activity by vessels of the German Democratic Republic off the coasts of the United States. The Agreement will come into force upon completion of internal procedures by both governments.

Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, signed for the United States. Mr. Werner Lange, Head of the Department of International Relations of the Ministry for District Managed Industry and Foodstuffs Industry, signed for the German Democratic Republic.

Negotiations on the Agreement began on September 27, 1976, and were concluded this week. Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the new accord, and the hope that it will contribute to mutual understanding and cooperation between the two governments.

[1] Issued on Oct. 6 (text from press release 496).

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 2d Session

U.S. Policy Toward Africa. Hearings before the Subcommittees on African Affairs and on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 5–May 27, 1976. 336 pp.

Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1976. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee. Part 2. Executive sessions. May 24–June 15, 1976. 122 pp.

Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969. Hearings before the House Committee on International Relations; June 8–August 24, 1976; 809 pp. Markup sessions of the committee; August 26–September 1, 1976; 92 pp. Report of the committee, together with supplemental and additional views, to accompany H.R. 15377; H. Rept. 94–1469; September 2, 1976; 54 pp.

The Right-to-Food Resolution. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations. June 22–29, 1976. 632 pp.

Security Assistance to Spain. Communication from the President of the United States transmittting notice of his intention to exercise his authority under section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to waive the restriction of section 620(m) of the act as it applies to security assistance to Spain for fiscal year 1976. H. Doc. 94–549. July 19, 1976. 3 pp.

Revolution Into Democracy: Portugal After the Coup. A report by Senator George McGovern to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. August 1976. 111 pp.

United States Restates Position on U.N. Decade Against Racism

Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Jacob M. Myerson on October 6.

USUN press release 110 dated October 6

The subject before us—the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination—is one which my country and my government address with pride. Americans are this year consciously renewing the basic commitments made when our nation was founded 200 years ago. In particular, we recall the proposition in our Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal." Our nation and our society are based on the principle that freedom, equality, and dignity are inherent attributes of the individual and not a privilege accorded by the state. Our Constitution guarantees equality under the law. As is well known, the United States has struggled to sustain and improve the implementation of this principle, a struggle that has met with dramatic success in recent times.

Just as we have worked within our own borders, we have also joined in efforts on the international level aimed at ending the practice of racial discrimination wherever it is practiced. We believe that the United States has an important contribution to make in this area.

The statements and actions of Secretary Kissinger provide evidence of our determination to pursue these matters in relation to the African Continent. In a recent statement in Lusaka, the Secretary said: [1]

> Of all the challenges before us, of all the purposes we have in common, racial justice is one of the most basic. This is a dominant issue of our age, within nations and among nations.
>
> We know from our own experience that the goal of racial justice is both compelling and achievable. Our support for this principle in southern Africa is not simply a matter of foreign policy but an imperative of our own moral heritage.

Thus the United States firmly opposes apartheid and racism as those terms have been broadly understood over the years. We are speaking and acting in the interest of racial justice.

What I have just said, Mr. Chairman, is by way of background to the brief comments my delegation wishes to make as the General Assembly once again considers the progress achieved under the Decade for Action To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

In his report on the results of the 29th session of the Commission on Human Rights, held in 1973, the U.S. Representative described what was in his view the outstanding single event of that session. This was the unanimous adoption of a program for the Decade for Action To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. The consensus achieved in the Commission on Human Rights was manifested several weeks later in the Economic and Social Council. Finally, the General Assembly by consensus approved Resolution 3057 designating the period beginning December 10, 1973, as the Decade. In this same resolution the Assembly approved the associated program.

The genuine agreement embodied in Resolution 3057 was due, above all, to an aversion to racism that is common to members of this organization. It was also due to the skillful and devoted efforts of a number of individuals and delegations to find common ground in treating a malady that

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[1] For Secretary Kissinger's address at Lusaka, Zambia, on Apr. 27, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1976, p. 672.

has plagued mankind for centuries. The measures provided for in the program—at the national, the regional, and the international levels—gave us hope that by 1983 we would be able to look back with satisfaction to a record of significant progress.

My government joined wholeheartedly in supporting the Decade. Our national efforts, especially in the years just prior to 1973, had included the enactment of much new legislation with critical provisions for implementation. Steps taken at that time have led to significant advances in assuring true equality for all Americans. Our own history, as well as the history of other countries, has demonstrated the great difficulty of overcoming ancient prejudices and vested interests and the complexity of the measures needed. In particular, our experience has repeatedly demonstrated the necessity of a strong supporting consensus rising above differences of economic status, geography, or political affiliation.

My government remains eager to join in supporting all legitimate efforts, including those originally proposed in the framework of the Decade. But our present discussion takes place in an altered setting due to the adoption by the 30th General Assembly of Resolution 3379 purporting to equate Zionism with racism and racial discrimination.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to make clear that the passage of one year has in no way diminished the force or totality of our rejection of Resolution 3379 or the thinking that lies behind it. Not only was its adoption misguided and highly disruptive, but its effects have, as we all know, distorted the Decade and raised the most serious obstacles to carrying out its program. My government deeply regrets this state of affairs. We hope that men of good will can find ways and means to overcome the barriers raised by this resolution and to right the wrong that was done at the 30th General Assembly. We continue to hope that actions can be taken to restore the Decade's original objectives. Until that happens, however, the United States will maintain the position it announced last year: we shall neither participate in nor support the Decade for Action To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

Mr. Chairman, it is thus with regret but with equal confidence in the rightness of our views that we have today restated our position on the Decade, our rejection of the proposition that Zionism is a form of racism or racial discrimination, and our commitment to all genuine and sincere efforts to overcome racism and racial discrimination.

Agenda of the 31st Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly[1]

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Luxembourg.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the thirty-first session of the General Assembly:
   (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
   (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of the Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. General debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the International Court of Justice.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
18. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial Development Board.
19. Election of nineteen members of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme.

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[1] Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 24 (items 1–122) and Oct. 4 (items 123–124) (text from U.N. doc. A/31/251 and Add. 1).

20. Election of twelve members of the World Food Council.
21. Election of twelve members of the Board of Governors of the United Nations Special Fund.
22. Election of seven members of the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination.
23. Election of the members of the International Law Commission.
24. Election of seventeen members of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
25. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
26. Admission of new Members to the United Nations.
27. Question of Palestine:
    (a) Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People;
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
28. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General.
29. The situation in the Middle East.
30. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
31. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
32. Preparation of an international convention on principles governing the use by States of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
33. Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: report of the Secretary-General.
34. Reduction of military budgets: report of the Secretary-General.
35. Incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons: report of the Secretary-General.
36. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
37. Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
38. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3467 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).
39. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.
40. World Disarmament Conference: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.
41. Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade.
42. Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.
43. Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of the Secretary-General.
44. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.
45. Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
46. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.
47. Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.
48. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
49. General and complete disarmament:
    (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;
    (b) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
    (c) Report of the Secretary-General.
50. Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament.
51. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.
52. Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa:
    (a) Report of the Special Committee against *Apartheid;*
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
53. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:
    (a) Report of the Commissioner-General;
    (b) Report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
    (c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine;
    (d) Report of the Secretary-General.
54. Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.

55. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.
56. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development:
    (a) Report of the Conference on its fourth session;
    (b) Report of the Trade and Development Board;
    (c) Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development;
    (d) Confirmation of the appointment of the Secretary-General.
57. United Nations Industrial Development Organization: report of the Industrial Development Board.
58. United Nations Institute for Training and Research: report of the Executive Director.
59. Operational activities for development:
    (a) United Nations Development Programme;
    (b) United Nations Capital Development Fund;
    (c) Technical co-operation activities undertaken by the Secretary-General;
    (d) United Nations Volunteers programme;
    (e) United Nations Fund for Population Activities;
    (f) United Nations Children's Fund;
    (g) World Food Programme.
60. United Nations Environment Programme:
    (a) Report of the Governing Council;
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General;
    (c) Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements: report of the Secretary-General;
    (d) Election of the Executive Director.
61. Food problems: report of the World Food Council.
62. United Nations Special Fund:
    (a) Report of the Board of Governors;
    (b) Confirmation of the appointment of the Executive Director.
63. United Nations University:
    (a) Report of the Council of the United Nations University;
    (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
64. Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator: reports of the Secretary-General.
65. Revision of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade.
66. Development and international economic co-operation: implementation of the decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its seventh special session:
    (a) Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United Nations System;
    (b) Reports of the Secretary-General.
67. Economic co-operation among developing countries: report of the Secretary-General.
68. Technical co-operation among developing countries.
69. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination:
    (a) Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;
    (b) Reports of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination;
    (c) Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;
    (d) Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*.
70. Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of political, military, economic and other forms of assistance given to colonial and racist régimes in southern Africa.
71. Human rights and scientific and technological developments.
72. World social situation: report of the Secretary-General.
73. Policies and programmes relating to youth: reports of the Secretary-General.
74. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
75. United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace: report of the Secretary-General.
76. Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights: report of the Secretary-General.
77. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance.
78. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: report of the High Commissioner.
79. National experience in achieving far-reaching social and economic changes for the purpose of social progress: report of the Secretary-General.
80. Freedom of information:
    (a) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information;
    (b) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information.
81. Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: report of the Secretary-General.
82. United Nations conference for an international convention on adoption law.

83. Preservation and further development of cultural values.
84. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73*e* of the Charter of the United Nations:
    (a) Report of the Secretary-General;
    (b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
85. Question of Namibia:
    (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
    (b) Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia;
    (c) United Nations Fund for Namibia: report of the Secretary-General;
    (d) Appointment of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia.
86. Question of Southern Rhodesia: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
87. Activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia and in all other Territories under colonial domination and efforts to eliminate colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in southern Africa: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
88. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations:
    (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
    (b) Reports of the Secretary-General.
89. United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa: report of the Secretary-General.
90. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report of the Secretary-General.
91. Financial reports and accounts, and reports of the Board of Auditors:
    (a) United Nations;
    (b) United Nations Development Programme;
    (c) United Nations Children's Fund;
    (d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
    (e) United Nations Institute for Training and Research;
    (f) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;
    (g) Fund of the United Nations Environment Programme;
    (h) United Nations Fund for Population Activities.
92. Programme budget for the biennium 1976–1977.
93. Medium-term plan:
    (a) Medium-term plan for the period 1978–1981 and revised plan for 1977;
    (b) Implementation of the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit: report of the Secretary-General.
94. Financial emergency of the United Nations: report of the Negotiating Committee on the Financial Emergency of the United Nations.
95. Review of the intergovernmental and expert machinery dealing with the formulation, review and approval of programmes and budgets.
96. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
97. Joint Inspection Unit:
    (a) Reports of the Joint Inspection Unit;
    (b) Question of the continuation of the Joint Inspection Unit.
98. Pattern of conferences: report of the Committee on Conferences.
99. United Nations accommodation:
    (a) Utilization of office accommodation in the United Nations system;
    (b) Utilization of office accommodation and conference facilities at the Donaupark Centre in Vienna: report of the Secretary-General.
100. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.
101. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary organs of the General Assembly:
    (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
    (b) Committee on Contributions;
    (c) Board of Auditors;
    (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointments made by the Secretary-General;
    (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
    (f) International Civil Service Commission;
    (g) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.

102. Personnel questions:
   (a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the Secretary-General;
   (b) Other personnel questions: report of the Secretary-General.
103. Report of the International Civil Service Commission.
104. United Nations pension system: report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.
105. Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force: report of the Secretary-General.
106. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-eighth session.
107. Conference of plenipotentiaries on succession of States in respect of treaties: report of the Secretary-General.
108. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its ninth session.
109. Report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country.
110. Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization.
111. Respect for human rights in armed conflicts: report of the Secretary-General.
112. Implementation by States of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961: report of the Secretary-General.
113. Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on International Terrorism.
114. Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations:
   (a) Resolution relating to the observer status of national liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and/or by the League of Arab States;
   (b) Resolution relating to the application of the Convention in future activities of international organizations.
115. Consolidation and progressive evolution of the norms and principles of international economic development law.
116. Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
117. One hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Amphictyonic Congress of Panama.
118. Question of Cyprus.
119. Observer status for the Commonwealth Secretariat at the United Nations.
120. Co-operation and assistance in the application and improvement of mass communications for social progress and development.
121. Situation arising out of unilateral withdrawal of Ganges waters at Farakka.
122. Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte.
123. Drafting of an international convention against the taking of hostages.
124. Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, Central African Republic, Ecuador, September 28, 1976.
Notifications of provisional application deposited: Dominican Republic, Ireland, Paraguay, Togo, European Economic Community, September 28, 1976; Angola, Honduras, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, September 30, 1976.

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. Enters into force September 6, 1977.[1]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: October 8, 1976.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Done at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.[2]
Ratification deposited: Nepal, June 23, 1976.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2,

[1] Not for the United States.
[2] Not in force for the United States.

1972. Entered into force December 6, 1975.[2]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: October 8, 1976.

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.[3]
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, October 4, 1976.
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976.[2]
Acceptance deposited: Surinam, October 4, 1976.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4, 1967; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Uganda, September 27, 1976

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.[3]
Acceptance deposited: Israel, September 23, 1976
Amendments to chapters II, III, IV, and V of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.[3]
Acceptance deposited: Israel, September 23, 1976.
Amendment to chapter VI of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.[3]
Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, September 23, 1976.

Seals

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 3948). Done at Washington May 7, 1976.
Acceptance deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 12, 1976.
Entered into force: October 12, 1976.

Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva on September 25, 1926, with annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force December 7, 1953, for the protocol; July 7, 1955, for annex to protocol.
Notification of succession: Barbados, July 22, 1976.

Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Signed at Washington February 2, 1971. Entered into force October 16, 1973.[2]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: October 8, 1976.

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly December 14, 1973.[3]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: October 8, 1976.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 23, 1972. Entered into force December 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.
Ratification deposited: Poland, June 29, 1976.

BILATERAL

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement on cooperation in the field of biomedical research and technology. Signed at Bonn September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

Israel

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of September 30, 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 12, 1976. Entered into force October 12, 1976.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of November 9, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 8152, 8301), concerning frequency modulation broadcasting in the 88 to 108 MHz band. Effected by exchange of notes at México September 9 and 15, 1976. Entered into force September 15, 1976.
Agreement relating to the provision of additional assistance by the United States to curb illegal traffic in narcotics and amending the agreements of August 9, 1976, and May 18, 1976. Effected by exchange of letters at México September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 7, 1975 (TIAS 8189), with minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad August 20, 1976. Entered into force August 20, 1976.

Spain

Treaty of friendship and cooperation, with supplementary agreements and exchanges of notes. Signed at Madrid January 24, 1976. Entered into force September 21, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: October 8, 1976, with declaration.

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[2] Not in force for the United States.
[3] Not in force.

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Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: October 11–17

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*505	10/12	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Nov. 4.
*506	10/12	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, Nov. 8.
*507	10/12	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on standards of training and watchkeeping. Nov. 10.
*508	10/13	Monteagle Stearns sworn in as Ambassador to Ivory Coast (biographic data).
*509	10/14	Wat T. Cluverius sworn in as Ambassador to Bahrain (biographic data).
†510	10/12	Recent developments on IFAD.
*511	10/14	Resolution of U.S.-U.K. civil aviation dispute.
*512	10/14	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs releases 12th annual report.
*513	10/15	Melissa F. Wells sworn in as Ambassador to Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau (biographic data).
*514	10/15	Kissinger: interview with Barbara Walters for ABC–TV Evening News, Oct. 14.
*515	10/15	Advisory Committee on "Foreign Relations of the United States," Nov. 12.
*516	10/15	SCC, SOLAS, working group on safety of navigation, Nov. 17.
*517	10/15	SCC, SOLAS, working group on radiocommunications, Nov. 18.
†518	10/15	Kissinger: news conference, Harvard University.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.