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Toward a New Understanding of Community

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

Let me first congratulate this body for electing Ambassador [Hamilton Shirley] Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka to preside over this 31st session of the General Assembly. He is a diplomat of great international stature who, among his many distinctions, has provided indispensable leadership to the crucial negotiations on the law of the sea.

I would also like to pay tribute to the Secretary General for his tireless efforts on behalf of the world community. He successfully embodies the charter's principles of fairness, impartiality, and dedication to the causes of global peace and human dignity.

The United Nations was born of the conviction that peace is both indivisible and more than mere stability, that for peace to be lasting it must fulfill mankind's aspirations for justice, freedom, economic well-being, the rule of law, and the promotion of human rights. But the history of this organization has been in considerable measure the gradual awareness that humanity would not inevitably share a single approach to these goals.

The United Nations has survived—and helped to manage—30 years of vast change in the international system. It has come through the bitterness of the cold war. It has played a vital role in the dismantling of the colonial empires. It has helped moderate conflicts and is manning truce lines in critical parts of the world. It has carried out unprecedented efforts in such areas as public health, development assistance, and technical cooperation.

But the most important challenge of this organization lies still ahead: to vindicate mankind's positive and nobler goals and help nations achieve a new understanding of community.

With modern communications, human endeavor has become a single experience for peoples in every part of the planet. We share the wonders of science and technology, the trials of industrialization and social change, and a constant awareness of the fate and dreams of our fellow men.

The world has shrunk, but the nations of the world have not come closer together. Paradoxically, nationalism has been on the rise at the precise time when the most serious issues we all face can only be resolved through a recognition of our interdependence. The moral and political cohesion of our world may be eroding just when a sense of community has become indispensable.

Fragmentation has affected even this body. Nations have taken decisions on a bloc or regional basis by rigid ideologies, before even listening to the debate in these halls; on many issues positions have been predetermined by prior conferences containing more than half the membership of the United Nations. The tendency is widespread to come here for battle rather than negotiation. If these trends continue, the hope for world community will dissipate and the moral influence of this organization will progressively diminish.

[1] Made before the 31st United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 30 (text from press release 485).

This would be a tragedy. Members of this organization are today engaged in a multiplicity of endeavors to find just solutions for complex and explosive problems. There is a fragile tranquillity, but beneath the surface it is challenged by fundamental forces of change—technological, economic, social. More than ever this is a time for statecraft and restraint, for persistence but also daring in the pursuit of peace and justice. The dogmas of perpetual strife produce only bloodshed and bitterness; they unleash the forces of destruction and repression and plant the seeds of future conflict. Appeals to hatred—whether on the basis of race or class or color or nationality or ideology—will, in the end, rebound against those who launch them and will not advance the cause of freedom and justice in the world.

Let us never forget that the United Nations benefits the smaller and weaker nations most of all. It is they that would suffer most from its failure. For without the rule of law, disputes would be settled as they have been all too frequently and painfully in history—by test of strength. It is not the weak that will prevail in the world of chaos.

The United States believes that this 31st General Assembly must free itself of the ideological and confrontational tactics that marked some of its predecessors and dedicate itself to a program of common action.

The United States comes to the General Assembly prepared to work on programs of common action. We will offer concrete proposals. We will listen to the ideas of others. We will resist pressure and seek cooperation.

The Problem of Peace

Let me now discuss the three principal challenges we face: the problem of peace, the challenge of economic well-being, and the agenda of global interdependence.

The age of the United Nations has also been an age of frequent conflict. We have been spared a third world war but cannot assume that this condition will prevail forever, or without exertion. An era of thermonuclear weapons and persistent national rivalries requires our utmost effort to keep at bay the scourge of war. Our generation must build out of the multitude of nations a structure of relations that frees the energies of nations and peoples for the positive endeavors of mankind, without the fear or threat of war.

Central to American foreign policy are our sister democracies—the industrial nations of North America, Western Europe, the southern Pacific and Japan, and our traditional friends in the Western Hemisphere. We are bound to these nations by the ties of history, civilization, culture, shared principles, and a generation of common endeavors.

Our alliances, founded on the bedrock of mutual security, now reach beyond the common defense to a range of new issues: the social challenges shared by advanced technological societies, common approaches to easing tensions with our adversaries, and shaping positive relations with the developing world. The common efforts of the industrial democracies are not directed at exclusive ends but as a bridge to a broader, more secure and cooperative international system and to increasing freedom and prosperity for all nations.

The United States is proud of its historical friendships in the Western Hemisphere. In the modern era they must be—and are—based on equality and mutual benefit. We have a unique advantage: the great dialogue between the developed and the developing nations can find its most creative solution in the hemisphere where modern democracy was born and where cooperation between developed and developing, large and small, is a longstanding tradition.

Throughout history, ideology and power have tempted nations to seek unilateral advantage. But the inescapable lesson of the nuclear age is that the politics of tests of strength has become incompatible with the survival of humanity. Traditional power

politics becomes irrational when war can destroy civilized life and neither side can gain a decisive strategic advantage.

Accordingly, the great nuclear powers have particular responsibilities for restraint and vision. They are in a position to know the full extent of the catastrophe which could overwhelm mankind. They must take care not to fuel disputes if they conduct their rivalries by traditional methods. If they turn local conflicts into aspects of a global competition, sooner or later their competition will get out of control.

The United States believes that the future of mankind requires coexistence with the Soviet Union. Tired slogans cannot obscure the necessity for a more constructive relationship. We will insist that restraint be reciprocal not just in bilateral relations but around the globe. There can be no selective détente. We will maintain our defenses and our vigilance. But we know that tough rhetoric is not strength, that we owe future generations more hopeful prospects than a delicate equilibrium of awesome forces.

Peace requires a balance of strategic power. This the United States will maintain. But the United States is convinced that the goal of strategic balance is achievable more safely by agreement than through an arms race. The negotiations on the limitation of armaments are therefore at the heart of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Unprecedented agreements limiting and controlling nuclear weapons have been reached. A historic effort is being made to place a ceiling on the strategic arsenals of both sides in accordance with the Vladivostok accord. And once this is achieved we are ready to seek immediately to lower the levels of strategic arms.

The United States welcomes the recent progress that has been made in further curtailing nuclear weapons testing and in establishing a regime for peaceful nuclear explosions for the first time. The two treaties now signed and awaiting ratification should be the basis for further progress in this field.

Together with several of our European allies, we are continuing efforts to achieve a balanced reduction in the military forces facing each other in Central Europe. In some respects this is the most complex negotiation on arms limitation yet undertaken. It is our hope that through patient effort reciprocal reductions will soon be achieved that enhance the security of all countries involved.

The United States remains committed to the work of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. We welcome the progress there on banning environmental modification for destructive purposes. We will seriously examine all ideas, of whatever origin, to reduce the burdens of armaments. We will advance our own initiatives not for purposes of propaganda or unilateral advantage but to promote peace and security for all.

But coexistence and negotiations on the control of arms do not take place in a vacuum. We have been disturbed by the continuing accumulation of armaments and by recent instances of military intervention to tip the scales in local conflicts on distant continents. We have noted crude attempts to distort the purposes of diplomacy and to impede hopeful progress toward peaceful solutions to complex issues. These efforts only foster tensions; they cannot be reconciled with the policy of improving relations.

And they will inevitably be resisted. For coexistence to be something better than an uneasy armistice, both sides must recognize that ideology and power politics today confront the realities of the nuclear age and that a striving for unilateral advantage will not be accepted.

In recent years the new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China has held great significance for global security.

We came together out of necessity and a mutual belief that the world should remain free of military blackmail and the will to hegemony. We have set out a new path: in wide-ranging consultations, bilateral ex-

changes, the opening of offices in our respective capitals, and an accelerating movement toward normalization. And we have derived reciprocal benefits: a clear understanding of the aspirations of our peoples, better prospects for international equilibrium, reduced tensions in Asia, and increased opportunities for parallel actions on global issues.

These elements form the basis for a growing and lasting relationship founded on objective common interests. The United States is committed to strengthen the bonds between us and to proceed toward the normalization of our relations in strict conformity with the principles of the Shanghai communique. As this process moves forward, each side must display restraint and respect for the interests and convictions of the other. We will keep Chinese interests in mind on all international issues and will do our utmost to take account of them. But if the relationship is to prosper, there must be similar sensitivity to our views and concerns. On this basis, the progressive development of our relations with the world's most populous nation will be a key element of the foreign policy of the United States.

The world today is witness to continuing regional crises. Any one of them could blossom into larger conflict. Each one commands our most diligent efforts of conciliation and cooperation. The United States has played, and is prepared to continue to play, an active role in the search for peace in many areas: southern Africa, the Middle East, Korea, and Cyprus.

Southern Africa

Racial injustice and the grudging retreat of colonial power have conspired to make southern Africa an acid test of the world's hope for peace and justice under the charter. A host of voices have been heard in this chamber warning that if we failed quickly to find solutions to the crises of Namibia and Rhodesia, that part of the globe could become a vicious battleground with consequences for every part of the world.

I have just been to Africa, at President Ford's request, to see what we could do to help the peoples of that continent achieve their aspirations for freedom and justice.

An opportunity to pull back from the brink now exists. I believe that Africa has before it the prize for which it has struggled for so long: the opportunity for Africans to shape a future of peace, justice, racial harmony, and progress.

The United Nations since its inception has been concerned with the issue of Namibia. For 30 years that territory has been a test of this institution's ability to make its decisions effective.

In recent months the United States has vigorously sought to help the parties concerned speed up the process toward Namibian independence. The United States favors the following elements: the independence of Namibia with a fixed, short time limit, the calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under U.N. aegis, and the participation in that conference of all authentic national forces including, specifically, SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization].

Progress has been made in achieving all of these goals. We will exert our efforts to remove the remaining obstacles and bring into being a conference which can then fashion, with good will and wisdom, a design for the new state of Namibia and its relationship with its neighbors. We pledge our continued solicitude for the independence of Namibia so that it may, in the end be a proud achievement of this organization and a symbol of international cooperation.

Less than a week ago the Rhodesian authorities announced that they are prepared to meet with the nationalist leaders of Zimbabwe to form an interim government to bring about majority rule within two years. This is in itself a historic break from the past. The African Presidents, in calling for immediate negotiations, have shown that they are prepared to seize this opportunity for a settlement. And the Government of the United Kingdom, in expressing

its willingness to assemble a conference, has shown its high sense of responsibility and concern for the rapid and just independence of Rhodesia.

Inevitably after a decade of strife, suspicions run deep. Many obstacles remain. Magnanimity is never easy, and less so after a generation of bitterness and racial conflict. But let us not lose sight of what has been achieved: a commitment to majority rule within two years, a commitment to form immediately a transitional government with an African majority in the Cabinet and an African prime minister, a readiness to follow this with a constitutional conference to define the legal framework of an independent Zimbabwe.

The United States, together with other countries, has made major efforts, and we will continue to do what we can to support the hopeful process that is now possible. But it is those in Africa who must shape the future. The people of Rhodesia, and the neighboring states, now face a supreme challenge. Their ability to work together, their capacity to unify, will be tested in the months ahead as never before.

There may be some countries who see a chance for advantage in fueling the flames of war and racial hatred. But they are not motivated by concern for the peoples of Africa or for peace. And if they succeed they could doom opportunities that might never return.

In South Africa itself, the pace of change accelerates. The system of apartheid, by whatever name, is a denial of our common humanity and a challenge to the conscience of mankind. Change is inevitable. The leaders of South Africa have shown wisdom in facilitating a peaceful solution in Rhodesia. The world community takes note of it and urges the same wisdom—while there is still time—to bring racial justice to South Africa.

As for the United States, we have become convinced that our values and our interests are best served by an Africa seeking its own destiny free of outside intervention. Therefore we will back no faction, whether in Rhodesia or elsewhere. We will not seek to impose solutions anywhere. The leadership and the future of an independent Zimbabwe, as for the rest of Africa, are for Africans to decide. The United States will abide by their decision. We call on all other non-African states to do likewise.

The United States wants no special position or sphere of influence. We respect African unity. The rivalry and interference of non-African powers would make a mockery of Africa's hard-won struggle for independence from foreign domination. It will inevitably be resisted. And it is a direct challenge to the most fundamental principles upon which the United Nations is founded.

Every nation that has signed the charter is pledged to allow the nations of Africa, whose peoples have suffered so much, to fulfill at long last their dreams of independence, peace, unity, and human dignity in their own way and by their own decisions.

Middle East

The United Nations, since its birth, has been involved in the chronic conflict in the Middle East. Each successive war has brought greater perils: an increased danger of great-power confrontation and more severe global economic dislocations.

At the request of the parties, the United States has been actively engaged in the search for peace in the Middle East. Since the 1973 war, statesmanship on all sides has produced unprecedented steps toward a resolution of this bitter conflict. There have been three agreements that lessen the danger of war, and mutual commitments have been made to pursue the negotiating process with urgency until a final peace is achieved. As a result we are closer to the goal of peace than at any time in a generation.

The role of the United Nations has been crucial. The Geneva Conference met in 1973 under its aegis, and the implementation of subsequent agreements has been negotiated in its working groups. Security

Council resolutions form the only agreed framework for negotiations. The U.N. Emergency Force, Disengagement Observer Force, and Truce Supervision Organization are even now helping maintain peace on the truce lines. I want to compliment the Secretary General and his colleagues in New York, Geneva, and on the ground in the Middle East for their vigorous support of the peace process at critical moments.

The United States remains committed to help the parties reach a settlement. The step-by-step negotiations of the past three years have now brought us to a point where comprehensive solutions seem possible. The decision before us now is how the next phase of negotiations should be launched.

The United States is prepared to participate in an early resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference. We think a preparatory conference might be useful for a discussion of the structure of future negotiations, but we are open to other suggestions. Whatever steps are taken must be carefully prepared so that once the process begins the nations concerned will advance steadily toward agreement.

The groundwork that has been laid represents a historic opportunity. The United States will do all it can to assure that by the time this Assembly meets next year it will be possible to report significant further progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Since the General Assembly last met, overwhelming tragedy has befallen the people of Lebanon. The United States strongly supports the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of that troubled country. We oppose partition. We hope that Lebanese affairs will soon be returned to the hands of the people of Lebanon. All members of the United Nations, and all the conflicting parties in Lebanon, have an obligation to support the efforts of the new President of Lebanon to restore peace and to turn energies to rebuilding the nation. And the agencies of the U.N. system can play an important role in the reconstruction effort.

Korea

The confrontation between North and South Korea remains a threat to international peace and stability. The vital interests of world powers intersect in Korea; conflict there inevitably threatens wider war.

We and many other U.N. members welcome the fact that a contentious and sterile debate on Korea will be avoided this fall. Let this opportunity be used, then, to address the central problem of how the Korean people can determine their future and achieve their ultimate goal of peaceful reunification without a renewal of armed conflict.

Our own views on the problem of Korea are well known. We have called for a resumption of a serious dialogue between North and South Korea. We have urged wider negotiations to promote security and reduce tensions. We are prepared to have the U.N. Command dissolved so long as the armistice agreement—which is the only existing legal arrangement committing the parties to keep the peace—is either preserved or replaced by more durable arrangements. We are willing to improve relations with North Korea provided that its allies are ready to take similar steps toward the Republic of Korea. We are ready to talk with North Korea about the peninsula's future, but we will not do so without the participation of the Republic of Korea.

Last fall the United States proposed a conference including all the parties most directly concerned—North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China—to discuss ways of adapting the armistice agreement to new conditions and replacing it with more permanent arrangements. On July 22 I stated our readiness to meet immediately with these parties to consider the appropriate venue for such a conference. I reaffirm that readiness here today.

If such a conference proves impracticable right now, the United States would

support a phased approach. Preliminary talks between North and South Korea, including discussions on the venue and scope of the conference, could start immediately. In this phase the United States and the People's Republic of China could participate as observers or in an advisory role. If such discussions yielded concrete results, the United States and China could join the talks formally. This, in turn, could set the stage for a wider conference in which other countries could associate themselves with arrangements that guarantee a durable peace on the peninsula.

We hope that North Korea and other concerned parties will respond affirmatively to this proposed procedure or offer a constructive alternative suggestion.

Cyprus

The world community is deeply concerned over the continuing stalemate on the Cyprus problem. Domestic pressures, nationalistic objectives, and international rivalries have combined to block the parties from taking even the most elementary steps toward a solution. On those few occasions when representatives of the two Cypriot communities have come together, they have fallen into inconclusive procedural disputes. The passage of time has served only to complicate domestic difficulties and to diminish the possibilities for constructive conciliation. The danger of conflict between Greece and Turkey has spread to other issues, as we have recently seen in the Aegean.

All concerned need to focus on committing themselves to achieve the overriding objectives: assuring the well-being of the suffering Cypriot people and peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

A settlement must come from the Cypriot communities themselves. It is they who must decide how their island's economy, society, and government shall be reconstructed. It is they who must decide the ultimate relationship of the two communities and the territorial extent of each area.

The United States is ready to assist in restoring momentum to the negotiating process. We believe that agreeing to a set of principles might help the parties to resume negotiations. We would suggest some concepts along the following lines:

—A settlement should preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

—The present dividing lines on Cyprus must be adjusted to reduce the area currently controlled by the Turkish side;

—The territorial arrangement should take into account the economic requirements and humanitarian concerns of the two Cypriot communities, including the plight of those who remain refugees;

—A constitutional arrangement should provide conditions under which the two Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs; and

—Security arrangements should be agreed that permit the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under international agreement.

I have discussed this approach with the Secretary General and with several Western European leaders. In the days ahead the United States will consult along these lines with all interested parties. In the meantime we urge the Secretary General to continue his dedicated efforts.

Economic Development and Progress

The economic division of our planet between the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, between the industrial and developing nations, is a dominant issue of our time. Our mutual dependence for our prosperity is a reality, not a slogan. It should summon our best efforts to make common progress. We must commit ourselves to bring mankind's dreams of a better life to closer reality in our lifetime.

There are many reasons why cooperation has not made greater strides:

—The industrial democracies have sometimes been more willing to pay lipservice

to the challenge of development than to match rhetoric with real resources.

—The oil-producing nations command great wealth, and some have been generous in their contribution to international development. But the overall performance in putting that wealth to positive uses has been inadequate to the challenge.

—The countries with nonmarket economies are quite prepared to undertake verbal assaults, but their performance is in inverse ratio to their rhetoric. Their real contribution to development assistance has been minimal. Last year, for example, the nonmarket economies provided only about 4 percent of the public aid flowing to the developing nations.

—The developing nations are understandably frustrated and impatient with poverty, illiteracy, and disease. But too often they have made demands for change that are as confrontational as they are unrealistic. They sometimes speak of new economic orders as if growth were a quick fix requiring only that the world's wealth be properly redistributed through tests of strength instead of a process of self-help over generations. Ultimately such tactics lose more than they gain, for they undermine the popular support in the industrial democracies which is imperative to provide the resources and market access—available nowhere else—to sustain development.

The objectives of the developing nations are clear: a rapid rise in the incomes of their people, a greater role in the international decisions which affect them, and fair access to the world's economic opportunities.

The objectives of the industrial nations are equally plain: an efficient and open system of world trade and investment; expanding opportunities and production for both North and South; the reliable and equitable development of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw materials; a world economy in which prosperity is as close to universal as our imagination and our energies allow.

These goals are complementary; indeed they must be, for neither side can achieve its aims at the expense of the other. They can be realized only through cooperation.

We took a major step forward together a year ago, at the seventh special session of this Assembly. And we have since followed through on many fronts:

—We have taken steps to protect the economic security of developing nations against cyclical financial disaster. The newly expanded compensatory finance facility of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has disbursed over $2 billion to developing nations this year alone.

—An IMF trust fund financed by gold sales has been established for the benefit of the low-income countries.

—Replenishments for the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank will provide additional resources for development.

—Worldwide food aid has expanded. We have committed ourselves to expand the world supply of food. With a U.S. contribution of $200 million, we have brought the International Fund for Agricultural Development close to operation.

—The major industrial nations have moved to expand trade opportunities for the developing world. We have joined in a solemn pledge to complete by next year the liberalization of world trade through the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations. For its part, the United States has established a system of generalized preferences which has significantly stimulated exports from developing nations to the United States.

The United States continued this process by putting forward a number of new proposals at the fourth ministerial United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in May 1976. We proposed a comprehensive plan to improve the capacity of the developing countries to select, adapt, improve, and manage technology for development. We committed ourselves to improvements in the quality of aid, proposing that a greater proportion of aid to poor coun-

ries be on a grant basis and untied to purhases from donor nations. We agreed to serious effort to improve markets of 18 asic commodities.

These measures undertaken since we met ere just a year ago assist—not with rhetric and promises, but in practical and conrete ways—the peoples of the world who re struggling to throw off the chains of overty.

Much remains to be done.

First, the application of science and techology is at the very heart of the developent process. The United States, conscious f its pioneering role in technology, has put orward three basic principles, which we ill support with funds and talent:

—To train individuals who can identify, elect, and manage the future technology f the developing world;

—To build both national and internaonal institutions to create indigenous echnology, as well as adapt foreign deigns and inventions; and

—To spur the private sector to make its aximum contribution to the development nd transfer of technological progress.

To achieve these goals, we are today exending an invitation to the World Confernce on Science and Technology for Develpment, now scheduled for 1979, to meet this country. In preparation for that eeting, we have asked members of the dustrial, academic, and professional scintific communities throughout the United tates to meet in Washington in November. hey will review the important initiatives is country can take to expand the technogical base for development, and they will rive to develop new approaches.

Second, the ministerial meeting of the onference on International Economic Coperation in Paris should be given new petus. We are making several new proosals:

—We will seek to help nations facing sere debt burdens. For acute cases we will ropose guidelines for debt renegotiation. or countries facing longer term problems, we will propose systematic examination of remedial measures, including increased aid.

—We will advance new ideas for expanded cooperation in energy including a regular process of information exchange among energy producers and users, and an expanded transfer of energy-related technology to energy-poor developing nations.

Third, the industrial democracies have been far too willing to wait for the demands of the developing countries rather than to advance their own proposals. Now, however, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, at the suggestion of the United States, have agreed to examine long-range development planning and to develop a more coherent and comprehensive approach to global growth and economic justice.

Fourth, natural disaster each year takes thousands of lives and costs billions of dollars. It strikes most those who can afford it the least, the poorest peoples of the world. Its toll is magnified by a large array of global issues: overpopulation, food scarcity, damage to the ecology, and economic underdevelopment. The United Nations has a unique capacity to address these global concerns and thus improve man's odds against nature. We urge this body to take the lead in strengthening international cooperation to prevent and alleviate natural calamity.

Our dream is that all the children of the world can live with hope and widening opportunity. No nation can accomplish this alone; no group of nations can achieve it through confrontation. But together there is a chance for major progress—and in our generation.

Interdependence and Community

It is an irony of our time that an age of ideological and nationalistic rivalry has spawned as well a host of challenges that no nation can possibly solve by itself:

—The proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities adds a new dimension of dan-

ger to political conflicts, regionally and globally.

—As technology opens up the oceans, conflicting national claims and interests threaten chaos.

—Man's inventiveness has developed the horrible new tool of terror that claims innocent victims on every continent.

—Human and civil rights are widely abused and have now become an accepted concern of the world community.

Let me set forth the U.S. position on these topics.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

The growing danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons raises stark questions about man's ability to insure his very existence.

We have lived through three perilous decades in which the catastrophe of nuclear war has been avoided despite a strategic rivalry between a relatively few nations.

But now a wholly new situation impends. Many nations have the potential to build nuclear weapons. If this potential were to materialize, threats to use nuclear weapons, fed by mutually reinforcing misconceptions, could become a recurrent feature of local conflicts in every quarter of the globe. And there will be growing dangers of accidents, blackmail, theft, and nuclear terrorism. Unless current trends are altered rapidly, the likelihood of nuclear devastation could grow steadily in the years to come.

We must look first to the roots of the problem:

—Since the 1973 energy crisis and drastic rise in oil prices, both developed and developing nations have seen in nuclear energy a means both of lowering the cost of electricity and of reducing reliance upon imported petroleum.

—In an age of growing nationalism some see the acquisition and expansion of nuclear power as symbols of enhanced national prestige. And it is also clear that some nations, in attaining this peaceful technology, may wish to provide for themselves a future option to acquire nuclear weapons.

A nation that acquires the potential for a nuclear weapons capability must accept the consequences of its action. It is bound to trigger offsetting actions by its neighbors and stimulate broader proliferation, thereby accelerating a process that ultimately will undermine its own security. And it is disingenuous to label as "peaceful" nuclear devices which palpably are capable of massive military destruction. The spread of nuclear reactor and fuel cycle capabilities, especially in the absence of evident economic need and combined with ambiguous political and military motives, threatens to proliferate nuclear weapons with all their dangers.

Time is of the essence. In no area of international concern does the future of this planet depend more directly upon what this generation elects to do—or fails to do. We must move on three broad fronts:

—First, international safeguards must be strengthened and strictly enforced. The supply and use of nuclear materials associated with civilian nuclear energy programs must be carefully safeguarded so that they will not be diverted. Nuclear suppliers must impose the utmost restraint upon themselves and not permit the temptations of commercial advantage to override the risks of proliferation. The physical security of nuclear materials—whether in use, storage or transfer—must be increased. The International Atomic Energy Agency must receive the full support of all nations in making its safeguards effective, reliable, and universally applicable. Any violator of the IAEA safeguards must face immediate and drastic penalties.

—Second, adherence to safeguards, while of prime importance, is no guarantee against future proliferation. We must continue our efforts to forge international restraints against the acquisition or transfer of reprocessing facilities which produce

separated plutonium and of enrichment facilities which produce highly enriched uranium—both of which are usable for the construction of nuclear weapons.

—Third, we must recognize that one of the principal incentives for seeking sensitive reprocessing and enrichment technology is the fear that essential nonsensitive materials, notably reactor-grade uranium fuel, will not be made available on a reliable basis. Nations that show their sense of international responsibility by accepting effective restraints have a right to expect reliable and economical supply of peaceful nuclear reactors and associated nonsensitive fuel. The United States, as a principal supplier of these items, is prepared to be responsive in this regard.

In the near future President Ford will announce a comprehensive American program for international action on nonproliferation that reconciles global aspirations for assured nuclear supply with global requirements for nuclear control.

We continue to approach the proliferation problem in full recognition of the responsibility that we and other nuclear powers have—both in limiting our weapons arsenals and in insuring that the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy can be made available to all states within a shared framework of effective international safeguards. In this way the atom can be seen once again as a boon and not a menace to mankind.

Law of the Sea Negotiations

Another issue of vast global consequence is the law of the sea. The negotiations which have just recessed in New York represent one of the most important, complex, and ambitious diplomatic undertakings in history.

Consider what is at stake:

—Mankind is attempting to devise an international regime for nearly three quarters of the earth's surface.

—Some 150 nations are participating, reflecting all the globe's diverse national perspectives, ideologies, and practical concerns.

—A broad sweep of vital issues is involved: economic development, military security, freedom of navigation, crucial and dwindling living resources, the ocean's fragile ecology, marine scientific research, and vast potential mineral wealth.

—The world community is aspiring to shape major new international legal principles: the extension of the long-established territorial sea, the creation of a completely new concept of an economic zone extending 200 miles, and the designation of the deep seabeds as the "common heritage of mankind."

We have traveled an extraordinary distance in these negotiations in recent years—thanks in no small part to the skill and dedication of the distinguished President of this Assembly. Agreement exists on key concepts: a 12-mile territorial sea, free passage over and through straits, a 200-mile economic zone, and important pollution controls. In many fields we have replaced ideological debates with serious efforts to find concrete solutions. And there is growing consensus that the outstanding problems must be solved at the next session.

But there is hardly room for complacency. Important issues remain which, if not settled, could cause us to forfeit all our hard-won progress. The conference has yet to agree on the balance between coastal state and international rights in the economic zone, on the freedom of marine scientific research, on arrangements for dispute settlement, and most crucially, on the regime for exploitation of the deep seabeds.

The United States has made major proposals to resolve the deep seabed issue. We have agreed that the seabeds are the common heritage of all mankind. We have proposed a dual system for the exploitation of seabed minerals by which half of the mining sites would be reserved for the International Authority and half could be developed by individual nations and their

nationals on the basis of their technical capacity. We have offered to find financing and to transfer the technology needed to make international mining a practical reality. And in light of the many uncertainties that lie ahead, we have proposed that there be a review—for example, in 25 years—to determine whether the provisions on seabed mining are working equitably.

In response some nations have escalated both their demands and the stridency with which they advocate them.

I must say candidly that there are limits beyond which no American Administration can, or will, go. If attempts are made to compel concessions which exceed those limits, unilateralism will become inevitable. Countries which have no technological capacity for mining the seabeds in the foreseeable future should not seek to impose a doctrine of total internationalization on nations which alone have this capacity and which have voluntarily offered to share it. The United States has an interest in the progressive development of international law, stable order, and global cooperation. We are prepared to make sacrifices for this —but they cannot go beyond equitable bounds.

Let us therefore put aside delaying tactics and pressures and take the path of cooperation. If we have the vision to conclude a treaty considered fair and just by mankind, our labors will have profound meaning not only for the regime of the oceans but for all efforts to build a peaceful, cooperative, and prosperous international community. The United States will spend the interval between sessions of the conference reviewing its positions and will approach other nations well in advance of the next session at the political level to establish the best possible conditions for its success.

International Terrorism

A generation that dreams of world peace and economic progress is plagued by a new, brutal, cowardly, and indiscriminate form of violence: international terrorism. Small groups have rejected the norms of civilized behavior and wantonly taken the lives of defenseless men, women, and children—innocent victims with no power to affect the course of events. In the year since I last addressed this body, there have been 11 hijackings, 19 kidnapings, 42 armed attacks, and 112 bombings perpetrated by international terrorists. Over 70 people have lost their lives, and over 200 have been injured.

It is time this organization said to the world that the vicious murder and abuse of innocents cannot be absolved or excused by the invocation of lofty motives. Criminal acts against humanity, whatever the professed objective, cannot be excused by any civilized nation.

The threat of terrorism should be dealt with through the cooperative efforts of all countries. More stringent steps must be taken now to deny skyjackers and terrorists a safe haven.

Additional measures are required to protect passengers in both transit and terminal areas, as well as in flight.

The United States will work within the International Civil Aviation Organization to expand its present technical assistance to include the security of air carriers and terminal facilities. We urge the universal implementation of aviation security standards adopted by the ICAO. We are prepared to assist the efforts of other governments to implement those standards.

The United States will support new initiatives which will insure the safety of the innocent. The proposal of the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany against the taking of hostages deserves the most serious and sympathetic consideration of this Assembly.

The United States will do everything within its power to work cooperatively in the United Nations and in other international bodies to put an end to the scourge of terrorism. But we have an obligation to protect the lives of our citizens as they travel at home or abroad, and we intend to meet that obligation. Therefore, if multi-

lateral efforts are blocked by those determined to pursue their ends without regard for suffering or death, then the United States will act through its own legislative processes and in conjunction with others willing to join us.

Terrorism is an international problem. It is inconceivable that an organization of the world's nations would fail to take effective action against it.

Human Rights

The final measure of all we do together, of course, is man himself. Our common efforts to define, preserve, and enhance respect for the rights of man thus represent an ultimate test of international cooperation.

We Americans, in the year of our Bicentennial, are conscious—and proud—of our own traditions. Our founders wrote 200 years ago of the equality and inalienable rights of all men. Since then the ideals of liberty and democracy have become the universal and indestructible goals of mankind.

But the plain truth—of tragic proportions—is that human rights are in jeopardy over most of the globe. Arbitrary arrest, denial of fundamental procedural rights, slave labor, stifling of freedom of religion, racial injustice, political repression, the use of torture, and restraints on communications and expression—these abuses are too prevalent.

The performance of the U.N. system in protecting human rights has fallen far short of what was envisaged when this organization was founded. The principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are clear enough. But their invocation and application, in general debates of this body and in the forums of the Human Rights Commission, have been marred by hypocrisy, double standards, and discrimination. Flagrant and consistent deprivation of human rights is no less heinous in one country or one social system than in another. Nor is it more acceptable when practiced upon members of the same race than when inflicted by one race upon another.

The international community has a unique role to play. The application of the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be entrusted to fair and capable international bodies. But at the same time let us insure that these bodies do not become platforms from which nations which are the worst transgressors pass hypocritical judgment on the alleged shortcomings.

Let us together pursue practical approaches:

—To build on the foundations already laid at previous Assemblies and at the Human Rights Commission to lessen the abominable practice of officially sanctioned torture;

—To promote acceptance of procedures for protecting the rights of people subject to detention, such as access to courts, counsel, and families and prompt release or fair and public trial;

—To improve the working procedures of international bodies concerned with human rights so that they may function fairly and effectively; and

—To strengthen the capability of the United Nations to meet the tragic problems of the ever-growing number of refugees whose human rights have been stripped away by conflict in almost every continent.

The United States pledges its firm support to these efforts.

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished delegates: The challenge to statesmanship in this generation is to advance from the management of crises to the building of a more stable and just international order—an order resting not on power but on restraint of power, not on the strength of arms but on the strength of the human spirit.

Global forces of change now shape our future. Order will come in one of two ways: through its imposition by the strong and the ruthless or by the wise and farsighted use of international institutions through which we enlarge the sphere of common

interests and enhance the sense of community.

It is easy and tempting to press relentlessly for national advantage. It is infinitely more difficult to act in recognition of the rights of others. Throughout history, the greatness of men and nations has been measured by their actions in times of acute peril. Today there is no single crisis to conquer. There is instead a persisting challenge of staggering complexity—the need to create a universal community based on cooperation, peace, and justice.

If we falter, future generations will pay for our failure. If we succeed, it will have been worthy of the hopes of mankind. I am confident that we can succeed.

And it is here, in the assembly of nations, that we should begin.

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 31st U.N. General Assembly

The Senate on September 22 confirmed the nominations of the following-named persons to be Representatives and Alternate Representatives of the United States to the 31st session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

Representatives

William W. Scranton
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
George McGovern, U.S. Senator from the State of South Dakota
Howard H. Baker, Jr., U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee
Rev. Robert P. Hupp

Alternate Representatives

Albert W. Sherer, Jr.
Jacob M. Myerson
Nancy V. Rawls
Stephen Hess
Ersa Hines Poston

United Nations Day, 1976

A PROCLAMATION[1]

On October 24 we will observe the 31st anniversary of the United Nations Charter, adopted in 1945 by governments determined to prevent a repetition of world war, to encourage the development of human rights and justice, and to remove the underlying causes of conflict by promoting economic and social progress for all nations.

The United States has played a leading role in encouraging the Organization to fulfill the promise of the Charter. We, and the rest of mankind, have benefited greatly from the vital contributions made by the Organization, particularly the Security Council, to the maintenance of world peace—the most striking reminder being the current peacekeeping role of the United Nations in the Middle East.

The United Nations has also been a forum for other areas of international concern: conferences to work out laws to govern the use of the oceans, to promote arms control, and to focus world attention on such problems as human rights, health, education and hunger; new programs to promote trade and economic developments; and other activities designed to solve many of the new problems associated with independence in today's world.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Sunday, October 24, 1976, as United Nations Day. I urge the citizens of this Nation to observe that day with community programs that will promote the United Nations and its affiliated agencies.

I have appointed Edgar Speer to be United States National Chairman for United Nations Day and through him, I call upon State and local officials to encourage citizens' groups and all agencies of communication to engage in appropriate observances of United Nations Day in cooperation with the United Nations Association of the United States of America and other interested organizations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this seventh day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and first.

GERALD R. FORD.

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[1] No. 4454; 41 *Fed. Reg.* 38147.

Secretary Kissinger Discusses Southern African Issues With African and British Officials

Secretary Kissinger visited Tanzania September 14–15 and 21, Zambia September 15–17 and 20–21, South Africa September 17–20, Zaire September 21–22, Kenya September 22–23, and the United Kingdom September 23–24. He met with the Presidents of Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, and Kenya; at Pretoria he met with South African Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster and with a Rhodesian delegation headed by Ian D. Smith; he met with British Prime Minister James Callaghan and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Anthony Crosland at London. Following are statements and news conferences by Secretary Kissinger and a news conference held by the Secretary and Foreign Secretary Crosland.[1]

ARRIVAL, DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA, SEPTEMBER 14

Press release 435 dated September 14

I have come here at the direction of President Ford to talk with President Nyerere about the prospects for peace in southern Africa.

This initiative started at the request of African leaders during my visit in April. Every step that has brought us here has been carefully discussed with leaders in Africa, and especially with the frontline Presidents. Every step we will take in the future will be closely coordinated with the frontline Presidents.

The United States wants nothing for itself except its interest in peace and in economic and social progress. The conflict that we are trying to end is a conflict which will affect most of all the peoples of Africa. The progress we are trying to bring will benefit, above all, the peoples of Africa.

We will do what we are asked to do; we will do nothing that is not requested; we will take no initiatives that are not invited; and whatever progress will occur depends on the attitude of the parties and the good will of the participants. We are prepared to make the effort that is encouraged.

And in this spirit I look forward very much to my talks with the distinguished leader of this country, President Nyerere, with whom we have had close communications over the recent months and who has encouraged us in our enterprise.

NEWS CONFERENCE, DAR ES SALAAM, SEPTEMBER 15

Press release 437 dated September 15

Secretary Kissinger: I understand this is a day of press conferences. We will go right to the questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we've just come from a press conference with President Nyerere which was, to say the least, not encouraging for your mission. On both the Namibian and the Rhodesian questions, he said he received nothing of encouragement. In fact, on the Namibian question he said he is now less hopeful than before. Does this reflect your views on the future?

Secretary Kissinger: I have said from the

[1] Other press releases relating to the Secretary's trip are Nos. 432 of Sept. 13, 439 of Sept. 15, 443 of Sept. 16, 448 of Sept. 19, 450 of Sept. 20, 451 of Sept. 21, 453 and 459 of Sept. 22, and 463 and 465–469 of Sept. 23.

beginning that whatever can be achieved depends on the attitude of the parties. All the United States can do is to enable the parties to deal with each other; to bring whatever ideas they have; occasionally to offer a suggestion, based on the knowledge of having talked to the parties, of what might be possible. But ultimately it is up to the parties to decide.

Nothing has changed from what was known a week ago, and therefore I cannot make judgments based on fluctuating moods.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't the fact alone that nothing has changed since last week an unhopeful sign?

Secretary Kissinger: No, nothing could change since last week, since the positions of the parties—the purpose of my visit here was to get clear about the view of Tanzania. I will then take the views of the frontline Presidents to Pretoria, and then I will return to Lusaka and here. At that point we will be able to judge whether any progress has been made. But it is not possible to judge that on the first day.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the other purposes of your visit here was to find out what decisions were taken at the five-nation African summit. Can you give us some idea as to what the consensus was at that summit?

Secretary Kissinger: I have a rather clearer idea now of what the views were. I do not believe that it is up to me to discuss the decisions of the five-nation African summit. I think this is a question that should be addressed to President Nyerere.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what if the worst comes to the worst? Should the peaceful negotiations you are undertaking right now fail and the armed struggle is intensified, which side will the United States support?

Secretary Kissinger: We can give no blank check in advance. We are here to find peaceful solutions. We have at this moment not given up expectations of peaceful solutions, and that is a question that can be addressed when we know the circumstances which made peaceful solutions impossible.

Q. Will you clarify the four points put by the Tanzanian Government on fear of the American intervention in the present situation in southern Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has made clear on many occasions that it has no intention of intervening in southern Africa. The United States pursues a policy that African development should be in the hands of Africans. We also oppose the intervention of any other outside powers. The United States has no intention by itself to initiate intervention in Africa.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere made clear that he thought only the South Africans and SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization] should be represented at a constitutional conference on Namibia. Is it the American view that the tribal and ethnic groups that were represented at the Windhoek conference should also participate?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States is putting forward no program of its own. The United States communicates the positions of the parties, each to the other, with the explanation that each party gives for its position. At the end of that process the parties will have to decide whether they can reconcile their differences. And in any negotiation each side has a tendency to state its optimum conditions at the outset, and if a solution is reached, it will depend on whether there is a willingness to compromise by one or both sides. That determination will have to be made later.

Q. Mr. Secretary, both in the statement by the Tanzanian Government yesterday and in the press conference of President Nyerere, there was a strong implication and a fear expressed in a way that your approach, the American approach, toward the problems of southern Africa is unduly obsessed with the fear of the spread of communism here. Since this does seem to be a rather important fear

here, I wonder if you would address yourself to it?

Secretary Kissinger: They are two separate problems. We do not say that the liberation movements are Communist, and we do not fear the liberation movements, either in their own right or because they are Communist. On the other hand, we are concerned when there are interventions from outside the continent here. But, in themselves, our concern here is to help bring a peaceful solution, to enable the peoples of this area to make progress.

We can only repeat that the lives that will be saved will be African lives. The progress that will be made will be African progress. It is not something from which the United States benefits, and it is not a part of an anti-Communist crusade against any particular movement, because it is precisely these movements that will ultimately benefit from a peaceful solution.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you heard here today, are you more or less hopeful about the possibilities of finding a peaceful solution?

Secretary Kissinger: My views are approximately those with which I came. That is to say, I have heard the views now explained in greater detail by the President of Tanzania. I am certain that since this is the beginning of the process they were not understated. These views have been expressed; they will be faithfully conveyed in Pretoria. The views of the other side will be equally faithfully repeated here.

I found no surprises and nothing to change my basic view, which is that the chances are somewhat less than 50–50; that the worst that can happen if this mission does not succeed is what is certain to happen without this mission; that no one else was available—no other country was available—to undertake it; that the effort has to be made, and if it should fail and conflict should prove unavoidable, at least we will know it is not because the United States failed to make a major effort.

Q. Would you be able to confirm what President Nyerere said, and that was that Cuban intervention in Angola took place only after South African intervention?

Secretary Kissinger: First, I hope you all realize I have not seen a transcript of President Nyerere's press conference.

Our understanding is that Cubans were in Angola before South Africans, and I seem to recall a speech by Fidel Castro in which he pointed out that the reason they reinforced the Cubans is because some of them had been killed by South Africans, from which one would assume they were there before the South Africans. But I would have to check this to make sure.

Q. Mr. Secretary, another thing President Nyerere indicated was that—in fact, he said something to the effect—that he didn't understand how even intelligent people could be so preoccupied with the subject of Cuba. I think we might infer from that that there has been rather a difference of opinion between yourself and the President on the subject. Has it come up?

Secretary Kissinger: The subject of Cuba was not discussed between President Nyerere and myself.

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday the Tanzanian Government asked that the United States declare its support for the freedom fighters in the event that negotiations fail. Have you given President Nyerere such assurances, or are you prepared to make such a declaration of support?

Secretary Kissinger: As I have indicated, we do not operate on the assumption that negotiations will fail, and until the negotiations have failed, we cannot make any such commitment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere put it slightly differently today. He said that because of an ambiguity it would be a good thing if the United States would say it will not help those who are fighting majority rule —in other words, the Smith regime—if the

guerrilla war should become worse. Can you—

Secretary Kissinger: We stated our position in the Lusaka speech, and this remains American policy.[2] I am conducting my conversations with President Nyerere privately and not by commenting on his press conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you at this point clarify at all what you regard as the specific obstacles you are facing in trying to be helpful in both the Rhodesian and the Namibian situations?

Secretary Kissinger: It is clear that a conflict that has gone on for so many years and has such a long history has created profound distrust and so many efforts have failed that the parties are becoming more and more committed to the process of struggle rather than to the process of negotiation. I think this is the basic underlying obstacle—the reluctance of anybody to admit that negotiations are possible before they know that negotiations will succeed. And of course they will never find out whether negotiations will succeed until they first admit that they are possible. This is the underlying difficulty.

Then there are many specific issues: the composition of conferences, the basic agenda that conferences might address, what issues should be dealt with as preconditions, and which issues can be left to the conference. All of these are before the various parties, and all of these will be explored over the next few days.

Q. I'd like to follow that up. Have you made at this stage any advance in these procedural questions?

Secretary Kissinger: An advance has been made over the time that these discussions started. But it would be rash to say that a solution is in sight.

Q. Would the process of negotiation in Rhodesia toward majority rule be hastened if the present government were to be removed or otherwise removed itself?

Secretary Kissinger: We are dealing with the issues and not with the personalities and structures. We are telling each side what we believe the requirements of a successful negotiation are.

Which authorities carry this out is for the people concerned to determine.

Q. Early this year the United States participated in the Security Council triple veto which saved South Africa from U.N. military and economic sanctions. With U.S. national investments and political interests in South Africa, do you really think the United States can be an impartial peacemaker in southern Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: On my visit to Africa in April, every African leader that I saw urged me to get in touch with Prime Minister Vorster since it was their belief that he held the key to a solution in southern Africa.

We would not be engaged in this process if we did not believe that our influence can bring about peace and in the direction that has been requested by black African leaders. Whether it will succeed or not is for the future to determine and depends on the attitude of all of the parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere spoke of the possibility of a proclamation between yourself and Ian Smith being drawn up. Can you tell us if this was in fact discussed? And secondly, was the question of compensation for white settlers in Rhodesia discussed today?

Secretary Kissinger: There is absolutely no possibility of a joint proclamation between Ian Smith and the U.S. Government. The question of compensation—the issue isn't compensation. The question of a financial-guarantees plan was discussed and met with the approval of President Nyerere.

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[2] For Secretary Kissinger's address at Lusaka, Zambia, on Apr. 27, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1976, p. 672.

Q. The President said that this did crop up. Do we take it from that that you rejected the question of a joint proclamation?

Secretary Kissinger: The issue of a joint proclamation has never come up, was never discussed between President Nyerere and myself, has never been requested by the Rhodesians or anybody else. Indeed, we have not been in touch with the Rhodesians, so it could not have come up. At any rate, that is not a possibility.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the apparent issues of difference, though, is that President Nyerere said that it was his belief that the great majority of whites in Rhodesia would leave. Is that an African consensus, and how does it square with your own views on the future of Rhodesia?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know whether he said "should" or "would." And our position has been that the communities should be enabled to live together, that there should be no discrimination of one side against the other, but that the final relationship between the communities is one that has to be settled by a constitutional conference or some other device, which is at this point premature.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your problem about measuring any degree of progress at this particular time. But after all, you've had a weekend of talks with Prime Minister Vorster; you've had today with President Nyerere. Do you find, even in a tentative way, the possibility of coinciding views that in fact makes you a touch more optimistic than you're prepared to concede today?

Secretary Kissinger: There are several coinciding views and several sharply different views. The question which we face in the next week is whether the different views can be bridged. This I cannot judge until we have had further conversations. If there were not some possibility of bridging these views we would not have undertaken the journey.

Q. On the question of guarantees to the white community in Rhodesia—in addition to the perhaps billion dollars that is being talked about to safeguard the white minority in Rhodesia, there seems to be another element, an element concerning the relationship or some guarantees being given by a black majority government to the white community in Rhodesia. Now, would these guarantees include things like the right to live, work, and vote in Rhodesia like any other citizen, or is there something else involved?

Secretary Kissinger: It has always been my understanding from the African Presidents that they want a society that is not based on any racial discrimination from either side. I have never been given any other indication.

What specific guarantees will be worked out in this connection will depend on a conference, if there is a peaceful settlement, that will eventually have to take place between Rhodesian nationalists and the Rhodesian white settlers under British aegis. I am in no position to go into the precise details. The United States is not prescribing the details of the settlement. The United States indicates its general attitude on the kind of solution it favors, but it cannot compel the parties to accept that preference.

Q. Certain circles have said that the sudden interest the United States has shown in the southern Africa problem is because of the fear of communism. Would you subscribe to that?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not know who these circles are. On my previous visit all of the leaders I met were very critical of the United States for not showing sufficient interest in Africa and urged us to show interest in Africa. Now we are showing interest in Africa. Why can you not ascribe it to the persuasiveness of your leaders? [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, wouldn't it be logical for anybody, for an African in particular, to take

the U.S. initiative suspiciously, particularly when you consider that it is the Americans who are propping up the Smith regime economically?

Secretary Kissinger: What we are seeking to achieve is what African leaders have been asking for. Every move we have made has been made in close consultation with the leaders of Africa. If the leaders of Africa are suspicious and if the leaders of Africa believe that the American initiative cannot be helpful, then we will of course stop this initiative. We will have to be judged by the results. And we have tried in good faith to prevent a conflict the major impact of which will be on Africa. It is now up to Africans to decide whether they will wish to continue to cooperate with this or not. So far everything that has been done has been with the encouragement and with the approval of African leaders.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are American troops in [inaudible]?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has no objection to the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] as a political force. The FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] in Mozambique, whose political views are nearly indistinguishable from MPLA, was recognized by the United States as soon as it took office, and we have established a reasonable relationship with Mozambique.

Our objection to Angola was the massive infusion of Soviet military help to begin with, followed by the sending of an expeditionary force, which was not—or could not have happened on the part of so small a country as Cuba without Soviet support. Therefore it seemed to us a massive outside intervention into the affairs of Africa.

This is the view of the United States on that subject, and it is a quite different matter whether an expeditionary force appears in a civil war or as part of a normal alliance relationship.

Q. Mr. Secretary, last week the summit conference was attended by President Agostinho Neto [of Angola]. In view of the fact that your government does not recognize his government, do you expect you might have to meet with him at some point, and how would you surmount this problem?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that I will meet President Neto on this trip.

Q. Last month the State Department stated that the South African promise to grant Namibia independence did not go far enough. What would you find acceptable in terms of independence?

Secretary Kissinger: We have stated that simply giving a date for independence did not go far enough. Our view is that there has to be a procedure by which all authentic groups can participate in the negotiations, and a conference which is acceptable to those parties most concerned.

Q. On the question of South Africa, I understand that you did discuss this with President Nyerere today, but it was widely reported that during your talks with Prime Minister Vorster in Zurich you were seeking to find out whether or not Vorster was willing to detach or separate the future of South Africa from the futures of Namibia and Zimbabwe. You have yourself stated on several occasions that you see the necessity for the end of the apartheid system in South Africa. But the logical extension of ending apartheid in South Africa is black majority rule, and therefore it would seem that any detachment or separation of the issues of southern Africa would only be a matter of time.

If it is correct to assume that eventually we would be looking for black majority rule in South Africa, then what kind of time period are we talking about? Are we talking about one year, ten years, or maybe a hundred years?

Secretary Kissinger: I would not want to speculate about the amount of time. You are quite right that time is what is implied by the phrase of separating the problem.

But time is of the essence if a peaceful

solution to so complex a problem as that of South Africa is to be found. We have no precise timetable. Some timetables were given publicly by African leaders. We have no timetable of our own.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT, NEWS CONFERENCE, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA, SEPTEMBER 17

Press release 447 dated September 17

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, on behalf of my whole delegation, I would like to thank you and President Kaunda for the warm reception we have received here. This was not a stop for negotiation. It was a stop to clarify the principles that will be taken to Pretoria and that we hope will form the basis for progress toward justice and peace in southern Africa.

We were encouraged by the spirit of the talks and by the moral support which we have received here, but it is of course clear that the serious negotiation lies ahead of us and that the decisions on whether the objective of peace—in human dignity—can be achieved are not going to be made in Lusaka.

So, Mr. Foreign Minister, I leave with the determination to make a major effort. I have been strengthened in this by my conversations with your President and his associates, and I want to thank you once again for the extraordinary reception we have had here.

Now I will be glad to take a few questions.

Q. Will your stop in Pretoria be a negotiating stop?

Secretary Kissinger: My stop in Pretoria, I hope, will move matters forward so that when I return to Lusaka we will have something more precise to work with than is the case today.

Q. Are you going to see Smith?

Secretary Kissinger: I stated last Saturday before I left Washington that I would meet Smith only under the condition that this was the final element in reaching a satisfactory conclusion. I do not have this knowledge today, and therefore there is no basis for my meeting him at this time.

Q. Could you spell that out for us, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated my view and the American position. There is no point in repeating it every day, since I have not heard anything yet about the discussions between Prime Minister Vorster and Mr. Smith. I will not see Mr. Smith to negotiate; I will see him if it helps to move matters to a conclusion and only if some clear result is in prospect. Since that is not the case today, there is nothing that I can add to what has already been said.

Q. Mr. Secretary of State, if your negotiations fail and other friends of Africa come to help with the only other alternative of armed struggle, will you still be talking about outside intervention?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States is opposed to outside intervention in Africa. All the African Presidents with whom I have spoken mentioned their determination to deal with these questions as an African problem. There is no point in my speculating now about what may happen, since I have not come here to fail.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what are your chances now that you have had two views from Tanzania and Zambia that the armed struggle should be intensified? What are your chances in the event of total rejection of your initiatives?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to speculate about what the United States will do in the case of the failure of a mission whose failure we do not anticipate. We stated our policy here in Lusaka as supporting the objectives of majority rule, minority rights, freedom, and human dignity in southern Africa. These objectives we will support regardless of the success of one diplomatic mission.

Q. With regard to your talks with John Vorster, how nearer is Namibia to independence?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that we have made some progress, or I would not have come here. I thought that the progress that had been made warranted this effort because I agree with President Kaunda's statement of yesterday—that if we do not make this effort and if peaceful efforts fail, the consequences for the southern part of Africa will be too ghastly to contemplate.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you worried about Communist influence in Namibia and Rhodesia?

Secretary Kissinger: I have to separate two problems. One is the internal direction of African movements. We believe that African nationalism will take care of its own evolution and of its own direction.

The second problem is outside military intervention from outside Africa, either from the Soviet Union or from other countries supported by the Soviet Union. That we oppose.

The direction of the liberation movements is a matter for Africans to settle, and we will not intervene in this.

Q. Has Britain got any special role to play in your initiatives?

Secretary Kissinger: Britain has the legal and historic responsibility for Rhodesia. Every initiative that we have taken has been taken in the closest coordination with Great Britain. And if my efforts either on this trip or later should succeed, Great Britain will have to provide the legal framework by which a further evolution takes place. This has been agreed to by all of the parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would share with us your feelings as you are about to embark on the South African trip?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that a combination of factors has produced a situation where the United States, alone in the world, is in a position to make a contribution to avoiding a conflagration. We have this responsibility, which we did not seek.

It is in the interest first of the peoples of southern Africa, but eventually of all of the peoples of the world, that the world not be divided between races, that there not be a race war, and that outside powers not manipulate the aspirations of the people. If I can help on behalf of the United States, I believe that this reflects the values of human dignity and freedom and justice for which the United States has always stood.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you be a little more specific about what you hope to accomplish in South Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated the objectives repeatedly. We will try to move Rhodesia and Namibia toward independence, majority rule, minority rights, and a constitutional framework in which, as President Kaunda said yesterday, all the races and all the people can live side by side in human dignity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you explain America's late arrival on the scene?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has gone through a very difficult decade in which it was occupied with many problems in other parts of the world.

Secondly, until the process of decolonization had reached a certain point, it was not possible for the United States to make its influence felt the way it is attempting to do now.

Q. Mr. Secretary of State, the frontline countries have discussed this type of negotiations before, but it failed. Now they have adopted that the only solution is to intensify armed struggle. Now America has arrived on the scene late. Are you genuinely shuttling

diplomacy, or are you simply displaying some kind of intellectual superiority?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not see how I can demonstrate intellectual superiority by failing. I am here. When I was in Africa in April, all of the African countries, including this, urged the United States to make an effort. I know all previous efforts have failed, and I told President Kaunda this morning that if we fail we will join a distinguished company. But I also said I have not come here to fail.

A just peace and a just solution must be one that the people of the area accept and believe in. It cannot be one that outsiders impose on them. And it has nothing to do with demonstrating any particular quality.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there are four frontline states; that is, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and Mozambique. But the Secretary of State has only visited Tanzania and Zambia. Is there any special reason why he has not gone to Mozambique or Botswana?

Secretary Kissinger: Associates of mine have already visited Mozambique, and other associates of mine will visit Botswana on Saturday. And in any event, we recognize that the decisions will be taken by the four frontline Presidents. We count on their unity, and we will work with them cooperatively.

Q. But precisely, has John Vorster indicated to you at any time that he is prepared to give independence to Namibia?

Secretary Kissinger: I hope that when I return here the principle of independence for Namibia will be beyond question.

Foreign Minister Mwale: Mr. Secretary of State, Madame Kissinger, once again on behalf of the party, the Government, and indeed the people of Zambia, we wish you all the success in your difficult task and wish you a safe trip to Pretoria and back to Zambia.

Thank you very much.

STATEMENT, PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SEPTEMBER 19 [3]

I reported to Mr. Smith the propositions developed jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom in close consultation with the Presidents of black Africa. Mr. Smith and his colleagues considered these propositions, and they have now returned to Salisbury. I am satisfied that Mr. Smith and his three close collaborators will report favorably to their other colleagues. After consultation with their colleagues, they will have to present these propositions to their party caucus.

While the Rhodesian institutional processes are taking place, I will seek certain clarifications from the Presidents of black Africa, particularly President Kaunda and President Nyerere. We expect that this process of clarification and consultation will be concluded toward the end of this week.

NEWS CONFERENCE, KINSHASA, ZAIRE, SEPTEMBER 22

Press release 455 dated September 22

Q. What did you discuss with our President?

Secretary Kissinger: We had a very friendly and cordial talk in which we reviewed primarily the situation in southern Africa. After this press conference we will have another meeting over lunch in which we will discuss primarily U.S.-Zairian bilateral relationships.

I reported to the President about the diplomatic steps that have been taken to attempt to ease the situation in southern Africa and to bring progress toward inde-

[3] Made following a meeting with Prime Minister Vorster and the Rhodesian delegation at the Prime Minister's residence (text from press release 449, which also includes questions and answers).

pendence and majority rule. Of course I had kept the President informed throughout by letters and cables, and we had a very good exchange of views on the situation in southern Africa and throughout Africa.

Q. We will have a chance to ask President Mobutu later, but do you now feel you have the support of the Zairian Government in your plan to set up negotiations in southern Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course the President will have to answer for himself, but I had the impression of being given great encouragement.

Q. One has the impression that your government attempts to avoid direct contact with African nationalists. What is your government doing for the African nationalists?

Secretary Kissinger: This is not correct. Our position is that the problems of Africa should be dealt with by Africans and therefore we have asked all superpowers to avoid contact with the African nationalist movements and to permit the African Presidents to deal directly with the nationalist movements. On this basis and on this basis alone do we believe that the evolution of Africa can be in African hands.

We will meet with African nationalist movements if the African Presidents ask us, but we do not want superpowers or anybody else to begin supporting one group against another, because this will export the rivalries of the superpowers into the continent and it will prevent these nationalist movements from pursuing nationalist objectives. So we have given the leadership of these various conflicts in Africa to the African Presidents, and we are working through the African Presidents.

Q. But still, Mr. Secretary, you do not hesitate to have direct contact with the holders of power of white rule in southern Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: When I was in South Africa I talked to a group of black leaders, many of whom were in strong opposition—in fact, all of whom were in strong opposition—to the governmental leaders; and members of my party talked to other black leaders. So in South Africa I made it a point to talk to the leaders of the black and colored communities.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you confirm that Ian Smith has accepted the principle of the accession of the majority to rule?

Secretary Kissinger: For me to perform the function that I am trying to exercise it is important that I do not speak for the parties and permit the parties to speak for themselves. I have indicated that I believe considerable progress has been made. I think it is clear that majority rule is the objective. So I will wait until Mr. Smith has spoken for himself—which I understand will take place on Friday [September 24]—but I have indicated that, in my judgment, considerable progress has been made.

Q. The last time we were here, sir, there was great concern about the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, which is a neighboring state. Could you tell us now what the situation is with respect to the Cubans in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no clear indications. We received reports of some having been withdrawn, maybe on the order of 2,000 to 3,000; but on the other hand, we also have reports of many civilians coming in to replace them.

The withdrawal of the Cuban troops, if there has been any, has not been strategically significant, because over 10,000 still remain; and we remain concerned about an African country whose government can sustain itself only by the presence of an expeditionary force from across the ocean.

Q. Since your talks with President Nyerere, have you communicated any further views of the black African Presidents to the Smith regime in order to provide any further clari-

fication which would produce a positive decision by the Rhodesian white minority?

Secretary Kissinger: As part of my efforts here, I attempt to make sure that all of the parties know what the other parties are thinking. I have conveyed through the South Africans my understanding of the thinking of President Kaunda as well as of President Nyerere to the Rhodesian authorities so that they can take it into their consideration as they make their decisions this week.

Q. You've talked about Rhodesia. Now I should like to know what you have resolved about Namibia.

Secretary Kissinger: The discussions about Namibia are still in progress. Everybody agrees that progress has been made.

The United States is in favor of the participation of all the authentic groups, including SWAPO, in any discussions concerning Namibia. We are also in favor of a U.N. role in this. And I believe that progress has been made toward achieving these objectives, as well as South Africa's role in the discussions. The precise relationship of the various groups to each other in these negotiations still remains to be worked out, but we are hopeful that in the weeks ahead we can make further progress toward the objective of setting up a conference about the independence of Namibia.

Before we end the press conference I want to say that in my discussions with President Mobutu he suggested that it would be important that the OAU [Organization of African Unity] be formally informed about the results of our efforts in southern Africa. I accepted his suggestions, and I will send an emissary to see the President of the OAU to inform him of the efforts that have taken place during the last week.

Q. Who is the President of the OAU?

Secretary Kissinger: That's the Prime Minister of Mauritius.

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND [1]

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I wanted to thank Mr. Crosland for agreeing to come over here. After it had been set up as a press conference for me, he agreed to join me.

I wanted to make only one point before we go to questions: that I have seen many references that the Rhodesian authorities are now considering a Kissinger proposal. I think it is well to understand what is being considered in Salisbury, or what has been considered in Salisbury all week.

First of all, the basis of the proposals is the plan put forward by Prime Minister Callaghan on March 22. This has been elaborated in detailed consultations between the British and American Governments. There have been five missions to Africa, three American and two British, in which these ideas were discussed in great detail with the African Presidents and refined in the light of their comment.

So what is being considered in Salisbury is not the plan of an individual, but what we hope reflects a consensus between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the essential requirements of the leaders of Africa. It is on this basis that we hope to make our contribution to the solution of the future of southern Africa.

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I would like to underline that. The British Government for the last two or three weeks has deliberately remained in a not very visible position on the grounds that you couldn't have people trying to negotiate vicariously over a distance of 5,000 miles or whatever it is.

But what Dr. Kissinger says is right. This has been very much of a joint plan. I think my first event as Foreign Secretary was to meet Dr. Kissinger on an airfield in Lincolnshire and since then we have met six times at least, with the Prime Minister

[1] Held at London on Sept. 24 (text from press release 472).

very often, to discuss this. Respective officials—British officials—have been to Washington many times; State Department officials have been to London many times; and as Dr. Kissinger says, the missions to southern Africa have been, to some extent, shared between the two countries.

So he's quite right to say—though I should add that this in no way diminishes the very high proportion of the total credit that he, Dr. Kissinger, deserves—he's quite right to say that the plan within the broad framework of which he's been operating in recent weeks, and indeed in recent months, has been to a very large extent a collective one.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I could follow that up with a question to both of you gentlemen. Now that the shuttle is finished—I presume you are not going back—does the lead in the diplomatic process now pass to the British?

Secretary Kissinger: If the Rhodesian authorities decide favorably, the next step will have to be a discussion of legal and governmental coordination in Rhodesia. Britain has a historic and legal role in this respect, and it would therefore seem to us natural that Britain would be in a position to be very helpful to the parties, if the parties requested it.

But the United States will be prepared to back up whatever efforts Britain will make and to continue its interests in a peaceful solution of this problem.

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I think that's absolutely right. Britain has a constitutional and a legal responsibility which, of course, the United States does not have, and therefore it will fall to Britain in any event to carry through the required legislation to validate and legalize what, hopefully, will emerge in Rhodesia.

But quite apart from that, if diplomatic help is wanted to bring the two sides together, in the early stages in particular, Britain, I think, would have to take the lead in providing such diplomatic assistance as we could which would help toward an agreed settlement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, assuming that there is a peaceful transfer of power in Rhodesia, what steps have you taken, or what guarantees have you sought, that you won't end up with another Angola, where the Russians come in and back one faction very heavily and there's a civil war and a radical regime takes over?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, the major responsibility to prevent this will be with the Presidents of Africa, and we would assume that they could not want Africa turned into an arena for great-power competition. It is our understanding that once an interim government has been formed, guerrilla war would cease.

Q. Two points, sir. Has a document of any kind been passed to the Smith government? Is there anything that has been signed, initialed, or exchanged in the form of papers? And secondly, you started to say what happens if the operation goes well in the handover to the British. What happens if it gets sticky?

Secretary Kissinger: We'll get the blame. [Laughter.]

Foreign Secretary Crosland: That's right. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to your first question, no document has been initialed or signed. Several points have been put forward as our best distillation of the consensus that I have earlier described, and it is those points which the Rhodesian authorities have been discussing all week.

We do not know precisely what Mr. Smith is going to say tonight, although he knows precisely what we think the basis of a settlement would be.

Q. Could you just follow up on that? Are those points oral, or are they in writing so there can be less ambiguity about what's been said?

Secretary Kissinger: We gave him the points in writing.

Q. Could you describe the arguments that you put to Mr. Smith when you talked to him

in South Africa and which seem to have persuaded him to accept a deal?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe I should go into it at this [inaudible].

Q. Secretary Crosland, could you please tell us, in view of the possible threat of outside intervention in Rhodesia or to one of the liberation groups, what is your feeling about how quickly the constitutional conference should be convened and an interim government should come into existence?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, generally as quickly as possible. It's impossible to lay down or foresee a precise timetable for this. But the last thing we want—assuming that Mr. Smith's response tonight is "yes," unequivocally "yes," the last thing we want then is a long delay in which everything would get muddled and other people would start poking their noses in and the rest of it.

I can't set a time, but I would much rather that it was a matter of weeks at the most—anyway, as soon as possible.

Q. Before the constitutional conference or before an interim government?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, first of all, before talks take place between the whites and the blacks on the formation of an interim government and, secondly, before the formation of an interim government. And, as soon as an interim government is formed, then we will take in London the necessary legal and parliamentary action to legalize it.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, have you any doubts at all as to whether Mr. Smith will accept the peace plan?

Secretary Kissinger: I am hopeful that he will. I have no doubt at the moment, but we just cannot be sure until he has spoken.

Q. Do you think that the Rhodesia peace plan has removed the danger of a race war in southern Africa if it proceeds according to plan?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it has given us the possibility to avoid that danger, and it has already sharply reduced it.

Q. Can you give any idea of the cost to Great Britain and the United States of the peace plan if it's carried out?

Secretary Kissinger: We are going to be studying this next week jointly in Washington. We have not arrived at a figure yet.

Q. Do you think that at some point that, as part of this process, Rhodesia will have to renounce UDI [unilateral declaration of independence]?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, if this process goes well there are two constitutional acts that are involved.

The first one is to legalize the interim government that will come, we hope, into being in a short space of time; and the second is at the end of two years, when majority rule has been achieved within the conditions laid down by the Prime Minister on March 22. We shall then need final legislation which will confer total independence on what will then be a majority black government in Rhodesia.

Q. Sir, did you mean to say "at the end of two years" as firmly as that?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, I can't say. Nobody has laid down the actual day; but Dr. Kissinger, as I understand it, and the British Government have been consistently talking within the phrase used by the Prime Minister on March 22, of 18 months to two years.

Q. Is that Dr. Kissinger's view, too, about the terms in which he has been conducting the talks?

Secretary Kissinger: That is and has been my view.

Q. You spoke of the talks within Rhodesia between black and white about the formation of an interim government before any U.K. legislation. Is there a possibility that those talks could break down in view of the divisions on the African side, or do you have

assurances from the African side that an interim government can be formed?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have taken consistently the position that the African side is responsible for its representation and for its program. The African Presidents seem to be confident that they can produce a delegation; and we would expect that, after all the anguish that both sides have gone through, they would conduct the discussions with a sense of responsibility. And on that basis we believe a solution could be found.

Q. Mr. Secretary, given the history of military dictatorships and so forth in Africa, what kind of future do you see for Rhodesia in the event that black majority rule is established?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we should—we have not even taken the first steps on that road yet, and it is premature to speculate until we see how these discussions are going.

Q. Mr. Crosland, this two years more or less—when does the clock start running—today, at the point of Mr. Smith's announcement, or at the beginning of a constitutional conference or when?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I can't give you a cut-and-dried answer on a particular day. Let's wait and see what Mr. Smith is going to say tonight. Let us wait and see what reaction there is to that from the black African states, and then we shall be able to lay down the kind of timetable and program which we want to see fulfilled.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since you have been so concerned about the danger of the racial war in southern Africa, I wonder if you could explain once more how the establishment of black, and quite possibly militant, regimes on the borders of South Africa, will reduce the pressure leading to such confrontations in that country.

Secretary Kissinger: We now have a war going on in Rhodesia, and we have the danger of war in Namibia. What we are attempting to do is to demonstrate the possibility of peaceful solutions and of the utility of negotiations. Any step that is taken is not going to be a final step in that process. We believe that if this process that, hopefully, will start today will be carried out to its conclusion, it will contribute to moderation in Africa and to creating additional incentives for negotiated solutions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions. Is it your understanding that during the interim government Mr. Smith will remain as Prime Minister? Secondly, who do you now understand will chair the constitutional talks?

Secretary Kissinger: You must understand that before Mr. Smith has spoken it would not be appropriate for me to go into the details of all the ideas that he may put forward for all of the negotiations that would ensue.

The United States has generally taken the position that it is for each side to put forward its representatives and that the United States would not prescribe to either side who should represent it in any talks that might result. And so let us wait until after Mr. Smith has spoken and then see what delegations are actually being produced by the two sides.

Q. On the constitutional talks?

Secretary Kissinger: On the constitutional talks—we haven't actually thought through the chairmanship.

We believe that Britain has an important contribution to make. How it will exercise this will obviously depend on the parties and on the decisions of the British Government.

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Could I just add one word to that? We can't see the nature of the constitutional talks at the moment. We don't know whether this will take the form of a standard, regular type of conference or whether the talks will be very much more informal.

So any discussions of who will take the chair is premature, but I repeat what I said earlier—that as far as diplomatic help and activity is concerned, the British Government will give all the assistance that it possibly can to whatever talks occur and to make sure they come to a successful conclusion.

Q. Does that mean, Foreign Secretary, that you are opposed in principle to Britain taking the chair at such constitutional talks?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: No. I'm not opposed in principle; I'm not in favor in principle. I can't see the scenario and so I've got to keep all the options open until I can see the scenario more clearly.

Q. Mr. Crosland, are you expecting Mr. Smith to come to London for the constitutional conference as part or as head of that delegation, and would you be happy for that to take place?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I think it highly unlikely that the constitutional conference would take place in London to begin with. I think it would almost certainly take place in Africa.

Q. And would the British Government be happy for Mr. Smith to be part or head of that Rhodesian delegation?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, we wouldn't be responsible. I've said we'd give what help we can to the constitutional conference but the people to answer that question would be the black negotiating team, not the British Government.

Q. But you're still prepared for Mr. Smith to be the head of the interim government until the transfer of power takes place?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I'm not either prepared nor unprepared. This is a matter which has got to be the subject of agreement between the white Rhodesians whoever they're led by in a week's time, on the one hand, and the black Rhodesians, or the black Presidents behind them, on the other hand; and it's not for the British Government at this moment of time to say what we think should come out of that negotiating process.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could we hear from both you and from Mr. Crosland, if you could, on your views as to what has produced what you hope will be a successful conclusion? What have been the factors which at this time, after 11 years, seemingly have brought the situation to this climax?

Secretary Kissinger: Personal charm. [Laughter.] I think—

Foreign Secretary Crosland: As soon as he said "personal charm," someone said "Mr. Crosland." [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: It was a combination of factors. A continuation of the war, the assessment by the Rhodesian authorities of the likely trends, the participation of the South African Government in the negotiations, and the commitment of the U.S. Government to a peaceful solution and its willingness to engage itself, together with the efforts that Great Britain has been making consistently, produced new factors in the situation.

Q. Mr. Crosland, could you tell us which will come first, the constitutional conference or the interim government?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: No, I can't tell you.

Q. Mr. Crosland, do I take it from your earlier reply of the two constitutional acts that are required, that it will be unnecessary for Mr. Smith to actually renounce UDI in a formal way?

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Let me make this absolutely clear—that we have—that Dr. Kissinger has been pushing, as a joint approach to both sides, a certain number of possibilities that form part of a plan which we hope will be broadly adopted and will lead to the two sides negotiating together. But if Mr. Smith says what we hope and if the African sides react favor-

ably to that, then at that point it becomes for negotiations in Africa to answer the various questions that have been raised during the last two or three minutes.

It is not for the U.K. Government nor—if it comes to that—for the U.S. Government to say in advance they want this, they don't want that, the other. This is for the whites and blacks in Africa to agree amongst themselves.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere of Tanzania is quoted as saying that you put a lot of pressure on Rhodesia through South Africa. What kind of pressure did you put, and what kind of ultimatum did you deliver?

Secretary Kissinger: We delivered no ultimatum, and we reviewed the likely evolution of events and the alternatives that were available and we believe that this contributed to the decision. There were no addition—there were no threats or pressure.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I bring you back to the question of money, please? There have been reports that in order to get this plan, a safety net in the amount of $1.5–$2 billion is being considered, with an American contribution that could run to $400–$500 million. Could you now sort out the money figures for us, please?

Secretary Kissinger: No, none of the figures have any official status. Secondly, the idea of a safety net is a somewhat crude description of a complicated scheme that has been discussed among officials, that would be alternatively available for the investment or for an insurance scheme for those who might eventually wish to emigrate.

There will be discussions next week in Washington between American, British, and South African officials to try to refine this and come up with specific figures. At this point no specific figures have been agreed to.

Q. You said just now that you assumed that there would be a cease-fire in the guerrilla war as soon as the basic settlement had been accepted by Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith has used the device of saying that there has not been a cease-fire to wriggle out from previous obligations. Are you now confident—

Secretary Kissinger: No, I said when an interim government is formed. But I believe that this, too, should await Mr. Smith's speech and the negotiations that we hope will follow this speech.

Q. Has Mr. Smith asked that the guerrilla cease-fire should be a condition of his implementing your suggestions?

Secretary Kissinger: Again, I believe that Mr. Smith will have to speak for himself but I—my impression is that he will put forward whatever—if he—what he says without preconditions.

Q. Is there any room for Mr. Smith today to say, "yes, but," or does he have to say "yes" or "no" specifically to the total package? Is there any room for him to hedge on this?

Secretary Kissinger: I really am in no position to speak for Mr. Smith. Our impression is, as he has said himself, that his statement will be clear and unambiguous and will leave no room for evasion; this I gather from his own public statements.

Q. But does he have to accept the total or reject the total or can he accept most of it and say, "but I don't want this piece"?

Secretary Kissinger: We'll know in a few hours. We think the process would be helped most if the total package were put forward.

Q. If there is any prospect of them not accepting the total package, would you consider returning, or would you say that that's the end of negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the matter has gone so far that it must be con-

cluded. But why speculate about what may happen tonight?

Q. I just wondered what you think might happen if he didn't accept.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't operate on that assumption. I operate on the assumption that—that the total package will be put forward.

Q. Which do you think should come first, the constitutional conference or the formation of a government?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it extremely important that the solutions for southern Africa be seen to be African solutions and that the United States and the United Kingdom, whose primary interest has been to produce peace in southern Africa, not appear to be dictating the precise outcome. Therefore I believe that we should wait for, first, Mr. Smith's speech and then the African reaction.

As my colleague has already stated, the United Kingdom is willing to be helpful; the United States is prepared to be supportive; but let us first get some other reactions on the table.

Q. Have you spoken with Mr. Smith since leaving Africa or any representative of his government?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I have not.

Q. Do you expect any trouble from the Soviet Union, Dr. Kissinger, because they have been kicking you rather hard over what you have been trying to do? Do you think that they can stir up diplomatic trouble in the United Nations or elsewhere in Africa to try and sabotage the whole plan?

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that it should be in the interest of all countries to promote peace in southern Africa; and we would hope that the Soviet Union would not, for the sake of ideology or great-power rivalry, try to introduce an element of contention which must above all hurt the peoples of southern Africa and destroy an opportunity for peace.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, it seems from both you gentlemen, then, the United States and the United Kingdom do not want to take much responsibility for the actual solutions. Can you say how it would be possible for the blacks and whites in Rhodesia to work out an interim government by themselves?

Secretary Kissinger: No, we did not say they should do it by themselves. I think we both said that we would be active, supportive, cooperative, in any way that we are asked and in any way that can be useful.

Thank you, gentlemen.

ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AFB, SEPTEMBER 24

Press release 473 dated September 24

The mission to Africa which I undertook on behalf of the President was aimed at the achievement of the most fundamental values in which all Americans believe: peace, justice, and human dignity. We have made encouraging progress.

We believe there is now a good opportunity for settling the issue of Rhodesia and making progress toward negotiations on Namibia. Much remains to be done that depends on the good will of all the parties concerned. The United States remains prepared to give its good offices and to cooperate with Great Britain, which, with respect to Rhodesia, has a historic and constitutional role to play.

I would like to thank all of the governments whose cooperation was so essential and whose representatives did me the courtesy of coming out here and all of my associates whose indefatigable work made this possible.

I now will report to the President immediately, and early next week I will report to the Congress.

President Ford Pledges U.S. Support for Efforts for Solution in Africa

Statement by President Ford[1]

I am very pleased to hear of the announcement today by Ian Smith of Rhodesia. On behalf of the Rhodesian authorities, he has accepted proposals that can head off an escalating conflict and should produce negotiations which can bring southern Africa closer to peace.

The United States is proud to have made a contribution—but we have not done so alone. The principles of the settlement set forth are based on the plan outlined by Prime Minister Callaghan on March 22. I wish to pay tribute to the Prime Minister and to the United Kingdom, with whom we have closely cooperated. Farsighted and indispensable contributions were also made by the various African Presidents. I would like as well to acknowledge the constructive role played by Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.

The road is now open for an African solution to an African problem—free of outside intervention, violence, and bitterness. This has been the objective of the United States, and the purpose of the skillful and energetic diplomacy that we have pursued. We call on other nations to support, not impede, the African search for a peaceful settlement.

The United States is prepared to continue to help. We will not prescribe for the peoples of Africa what only they can bring about. But we will be available to lend our full support to the efforts of the British, the Rhodesians of both races, and the African states concerned.

It is my earnest hope that the several parties will now move swiftly to establish the conditions for independence in which all of its peoples can live together in harmony. Today we have seen an act of realism that is the first step toward that goal. With good will on all sides, that vision can become a reality.

A threat to world peace has been eased. We can take satisfaction in the role we have played. I extend my best wishes to the peoples of Rhodesia and of all Africa. I call on all nations to help them shape a future of peace, prosperity, and human dignity.

[1] Made in the press briefing room at the White House on Sept. 24 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 27).

Secretary Discusses Southern Africa in Interview for NBC "Today" Show

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by Tom Brokaw and Richard Valeriani recorded on September 27 and broadcast on the NBC–TV "Today" show on September 28.

Press release 476 dated September 28

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. Secretary, you worked out the details of a two-year transition to black majority rule in Rhodesia. Mr. [*Ian D.*] *Smith stated the conditions in a speech to Rhodesians last Friday. Now the black Presidents who have been participating in these negotiations are very critical of at least an element of those conditions. What has happened?*

Secretary Kissinger: The basic proposals that were put forward were for majority rule in two years, a transitional government to be established immediately, a constitutional conference to work out the constitution at the end of the two years; and those points have been accepted.

Secondly, it isn't correct to say that Smith made these proposals. The proposals that Smith put forward were the result of discussions between the United States, Great Britain, and the African Presidents prior to my meeting with Smith.

I think one has to understand that each

of these leaders has his own constituency. For African leaders to say they accept proposals of Smith is almost impossible.

They have indicated that there are certain things they want to negotiate. They have indicated that they made no preconditions. We have received messages today from three of the leaders who attended the meeting, stressing that they think matters are on track and that they are looking forward to early negotiations.

So, I think we should cut through the rhetoric and look at the reality. And there is going to be a lot of rhetoric in the next few weeks.

Mr. Brokaw: But are you saying that these African leaders have been critical for their own domestic political purposes?

Secretary Kissinger: I am saying that obviously there will have to be negotiations for the transition.

Mr. Brokaw: How many of these conditions does Mr. Smith think are negotiable?

Secretary Kissinger: The composition of the government, the allocation of ministers —none of this has been settled yet. This requires negotiation. Prior to this, it is quite possible for both sides to make public statements that may seem irreconcilable.

But we should always remember that the biggest steps have been taken and that the differences that remain are relatively small compared to the steps that have already been taken.

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Secretary, have the African Presidents rejected anything that they told you they would approve, or are they upping the ante now?

Secretary Kissinger: The African Presidents have not indicated a rejection of anything specific. The African Presidents have made a general statement that they will not accept the dictation of Smith with respect to all the details of the transitional government.

On the other hand, what Smith has put forward was not his idea, but in itself reflected a compromise between many points of view. So, we will have to wait until a conference meets to find out what the real differences are.

The British are sending a minister to Africa within the next day, with the explicit purpose of getting the conference which all sides have now asked for to meet to work out the details.

Mr. Valeriani: There is no chance that you are going to go back, is there?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no chance that I will go back.

Mr. Brokaw: Will the conference have to take place in Rhodesia, as Mr. Smith seemed to indicate on Friday when he said it would be worked out in Rhodesia?

Secretary Kissinger: The locale of the conference in Rhodesia was not part of those five points. And I think that the basic point is that it should meet at a mutually agreeable place.

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Secretary, if I can look back, it is very difficult to believe that this came about without your putting a great deal of pressure on Rhodesia or a great deal of pressure on South Africa to put pressure on Rhodesia in turn. How much pressure did you have to apply on South Africa? What did you have to promise South Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: We promised nothing to South Africa. Leaders make a decision on the basis of their assessment of what is likely to happen. South African leaders understood, as the Rhodesian leaders came to understand, that the alternative to a negotiation and to a peaceful settlement is an escalating war whose outcome would be extremely problematical for them and which has the great risk of expansion without changing the outcome.

Those were the basic facts that everybody faced. And when those facts became

clear, certain conclusions followed. We did not have to bring any additional pressure other than an analysis of the facts.

Mr. Valeriani: What is to prevent the Russians from coming in now and backing a faction as they did in Angola, stirring up a civil war and having another Angola, which you are specifically trying to avoid?

Secretary Kissinger: This has to be largely the responsibility of the African Presidents. It is up to the Africans to decide whether they want their continent to become the arena for great-power rivalry—because inevitably, outside intervention, as a regular pattern, cannot be ignored—or whether they want African solutions to African problems.

As far as the United States is concerned, we seek no sphere of influence in Africa. Up to now, the African Presidents have prevented any of the outside powers from backing any one of the factions. We support this; and if this continues, there can be a moderate, responsible, and peaceful outcome to Rhodesia.

Mr. Brokaw: What do you see as the U.S. continuing role in Rhodesia during this interim period over the two years—economically, in terms of assistance, and so on?

Secretary Kissinger: The immediate problem is to bring the various parties to the conference table within the framework of the principles that have been laid out.

Britain has to take the lead in this because Britain has the constitutional and historical responsibility.

We will back it up diplomatically. We have been in close contact with all of the African Presidents in recent days, and nothing we have heard would indicate that this conference will not take place.

After the conference has met, after the transitional government is established, then it will be our policy to encourage this transitional government, and we will be prepared to talk with anyone about economic and other relationships.

Mr. Brokaw: But no commitments have now been made prior to the establishment of that?

Secretary Kissinger: There are no secret commitments. There are plans for economic cooperation, which are in the process of being worked out and which will be submitted to the Congress before they are implemented.

Mr. Valeriani: You apparently have made a lot of guarantees to Rhodesian whites, or provisions for Rhodesian whites.

Secretary Kissinger: That is not correct.

Mr. Valeriani: Well, there is an international fund of some sort, isn't there?

Secretary Kissinger: There is the idea of a fund that can be used for investment as well as for guarantees. The purpose is not to drive the whites out, but to enable the whites to stay there.

Mr. Valeriani: Why should the American taxpayer provide that kind of guarantee for Rhodesian whites?

Secretary Kissinger: Because the consequences of a race war in southern Africa with foreign intervention and of the radicalization of all of Africa, which would be the alternative, would cost the American taxpayer infinitely more than what we are thinking about now might cost.

Mr. Brokaw: What is the next step in South Africa, in that country? What kind of pressure does this put now on Prime Minister Vorster?

Secretary Kissinger: I think South Africa has to face the necessity of change and the domestic pressures that its system has imposed, and Prime Minister Vorster will have to consider what the evolution of his own country should be.

Mr. Brokaw: In the not too distant future?

Secretary Kissinger: In the not too distant future.

Mr. Brokaw: After Rhodesia has a change to majority rule?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to go into details of what the South African Government should do. But most thoughtful South Africans I met realize that some changes were necessary.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. Secretary, very briefly, is this the last of your major shuttle-diplomacy efforts in far-distant points? Can you foresee any other place you will have to go?

Secretary Kissinger: Not before the election.

Mr. Brokaw: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

International Economic Support for Rhodesia Settlement Discussed

Following is a press statement issued on October 7 at Washington.

Meetings were held for two days, October 6–7, between senior officials of the United States and Great Britain, and periodically in consultation with the South African Ambassador to the United States. The officials discussed ways and means of providing international economic support for a Rhodesian settlement.

The purpose of this international effort should be to assist a new government to promote:

—Widespread economic and social development of Zimbabwe;

—Rapid expansion of economic opportunities and skills of the black majority; and

—Economic security for all segments of the population so that they might contribute their skills and enthusiasm to Zimbabwe development.

The officials discussed the resources that might be required and the kinds of programs for development and economic security that might be supported by an international fund. They examined ways of administering and operating the fund for prompt and effective assistance to the Zimbabwe economy. They discussed how the fund could work with the interim government and the future independent government of Zimbabwe. They considered how development assistance to Zimbabwe might be related to development needs in the southern Africa region after the lifting of economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

The officials discussed how they might communicate the views expressed and progress achieved at these meetings to other potential participants in the international fund. Toward this end, the officials will consult with their respective governments over the next few days and resume their discussions next week in London.

The Search for Peace in Southern Africa

Statement by William D. Rogers
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs [1]

This is a critical moment in our relations with Africa. The Secretary of State has just returned from two weeks in Africa. The purpose of his trip was to explore whether the United States could play a constructive role in the search for peaceful solutions to the crises of Namibia and Rhodesia.

We began the effort convinced that the prospects were less than favorable. You, Mr. Chairman [Senator Dick Clark], estimated them to be 1 in 20. It now appears, however, that in fact we have made some progress on Namibia and that there may be at hand a major breakthrough toward majority rule in Rhodesia within two years.

I would like to say a few words about this effort, since it is not unrelated to the central issue before this committee—South Africa—nor was South Africa entirely irrelevant to the effort. First, however, I would like to express our appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, for your interest and understanding and for the interest and understanding of other members of this committee and of the Senate. As you know, we have made particular efforts to keep the Senate advised of the Department's initiatives. A few hours before he left, the Secretary met with almost half the Senate for a full briefing.

We have tried, both before and since the trip, to keep you and others, Mr. Chairman, advised. And we will continue to do so, for we entertain no illusions that the search for peace in southern Africa is the monopoly of any single branch of our government nor, may I add, of any single party of our political system.

I would like, first, to discuss with you the reasons for undertaking this effort and, second, where we stand.

Why have we made the effort?

I should stress first why we did not make the effort. We did not make the effort to establish a sphere of influence for the United States. We did not make the effort to place our own nominees in power in Rhodesia or Namibia. We did not make the effort to perpetuate injustice.

We made the effort because the alternative to a peaceful solution is violence: race wars in Namibia and Rhodesia, wars which will pit blacks against whites, pride against vengeance, and which would be an open invitation to foreign intervention and the radicalization of all of Africa.

Sustained racial warfare in southern Africa would polarize international relations everywhere and poison the atmosphere for international cooperation. In addition it could inflame old passions in our

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Sept. 30. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

own country. We have enjoyed three decades of progress in race relations in the United States. A full-blown race war on the television screens of this country could set us back a considerable way.

It was for these several reasons—and because all other efforts had finally failed—that the Secretary undertook his trip to southern Africa earlier this month.

Its purpose was to get the parties themselves to undertake to find African solutions to African problems, not on the battlefield but at the bargaining table. We could impose no final result, and we knew this from the outset. We could only help to begin the process, a process by which those directly affected could agree to consult together, to determine for themselves the shape and structure of a free, independent, and unitary Namibia and Rhodesia.

On Namibia, we have made progress. We consulted at considerable length with South Africa. The decisive moment has not yet come to hand, but our meetings give us reason to believe that there is room for compromise and hope on this issue, as the Secretary will suggest in his statement to the General Assembly of the United Nations today.

Complex Problem of Rhodesia

On Rhodesia, events unfolded rather more rapidly than many had thought possible. Rhodesia, as you know, is an extraordinarily complex problem. The parties involved include the four frontline Presidents, the highly diverse national liberation movements, the British Government, the South African Government, and the authorities in Salisbury.

We and the British undertook some five missions to Africa to consult with African leaders prior to the meeting in early September in Zurich with Prime Minister Vorster [of South Africa]. After that meeting we had a most careful review of the situation with both President Nyerere [of Tanzania] and President Kaunda [of Zambia]. Following that review, the Secretary traveled to Pretoria to meet with Prime Minister Vorster and then with Mr. Smith [Ian D. Smith, of Rhodesia]. We then communicated the views of Mr. Smith to the frontline Presidents through Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda. The proposals which we discussed were derived from working papers which the United Kingdom and the United States put together.

On Friday of last week, Mr. Smith announced that, for the first time since 1965 when Salisbury announced its independence from Britain, he would accept majority rule and that majority rule would occur, furthermore, within two years. In addition, he agreed that Britain should enact the enabling legislation necessary to legitimate the process to majority rule and that a government of transition should be immediately organized with major black participation.

The Presidents of the frontline states have responded by stating that they also agree that an early meeting should be called to organize the new government and have accepted the basic proposals put forward for majority rule within two years.

The United Kingdom announced yesterday that, in view of the acceptance of this framework, it is convening a conference of the parties to begin now the establishment of the government of transition.

In our view, the path is now open to the parties for the peaceful resolution of the crisis of Rhodesia. We have no illusions about the process which has begun, however. There will be problems, difficulties, and hitches enough in the months ahead. Rhodesia knows hatred, fear, and frustration. The sense of conciliation and the spirit of compassion and understanding which are so essential to compromise and negotiation are hard to maintain in such an atmosphere. Already the African Presidents have said publicly that, though the Rhodesian nationalists will take no preconditions to the bargaining table, they

cannot accept all that Smith has, at our suggestion, put forward as to the structure of the two-year transitional government.

All we can be certain is that the opening is at hand. It rests with the parties now to determine whether they can seize the opportunity before them. We and the United Kingdom, which has the ultimate legal and constitutional responsibilities in Rhodesia, are pledged to do all in our power to bring them together.

Easing Economic Shock of Transition

Mr. Smith also mentioned in his statement on September 24 a summary of ideas which the United Kingdom and the United States had put together relating to the extent to which the international community can cooperate to ease the economic shocks of the transition to majority rule.

The objective of this effort would be to maintain confidence in the future of Rhodesia. This proposal would be intended to give an incentive to those who have a positive contribution to make to stay in Rhodesia and work for the future of the country. Its overall aim would be to expand industrial and mineral production in Rhodesia, to enhance agricultural potential, and to provide the funds for necessary training and skills.

Its broader purposes would be: to equip black Rhodesians to take advantage of the opportunities which will be opened to them in a majority-ruled Rhodesia, to expand investment in the country, and to allow the economy to adjust to the removal of sanctions.

It is not a plan to buy out the holdings of the white Rhodesians. No one would be paid to leave. It is not like the program the British Government employed in Kenya. As I have said, its overall objective is to maintain a sense of confidence in the economic future of the country, not to encourage emigration and capital flight.

At this point we are not able to say what the dimensions of an American contribution to such a plan might be. As you know, we will be holding tripartite meetings here in Washington shortly with representatives of both the British and South African Governments to elaborate the concept and work out the shape of the financial commitment which might be necessary. As soon as these studies are completed, we will share their results with the Congress and with the several other nations which we expect will join us.

This has been the purpose and effect of the Secretary's recent efforts in Africa. Its emphasis, in terms of practical, immediate results, has been on Namibia and Rhodesia. But we have not lost sight of South Africa itself.

U.S. Interests in South Africa

I know you have expressed concern, Mr. Chairman, as have others, that with our concentration on these two territories we would ignore, or compromise, our interests in the problem of South Africa itself. But we do not think that an effort in Rhodesia and Namibia will dilute our capacity to influence favorably developments in South Africa. To the contrary. If we can somehow avoid war in those two neighboring areas and shift from violence to negotiation as the way to resolve racial conflict, we may have a profoundly positive effect on the circumstances within South Africa itself and its own prospects for peaceful evolution.

I am grateful, therefore, to have this opportunity to review with you our interests in South Africa, our policy toward that country, and the implications of recent developments in South Africa.

South Africa plays an important role in the world economy, and it is located at the crossroads of major trade routes used by ourselves and our allies. It is an important and populous African country, a source of valuable raw materials.

Our investment and trade in South Africa each constitute slightly more than 1 percent of our total worldwide private

foreign investment and total worldwide trade. Nonetheless, South Africa is an active trading partner. In 1975 the United States exported about 1.3 billion dollars' worth of goods to South Africa, which accounted for about 30 percent of our total exports to all of Africa and 1.4 percent of our total exports to all countries. Last year we imported $840 million in products from South Africa, which was equivalent to about 10 percent of our total imports from Africa and slightly less than 1 percent of our total imports from worldwide sources.

South Africa is also an important but not vital source of a variety of essential minerals such as antimony, manganese, vanadium, chromite, and platinum. The book value of American private investment in South Africa at the end of 1974 totaled $1.46 billion, which was about 40 percent of our total investments in Africa but only slightly more than 1 percent of our total worldwide private foreign investments.

Our strategic interests in South Africa are modest. While South Africa is strategically located on the lines of communication between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, we have determined that U.S. use of South African port facilities is not now vital to our defense needs. While we continue to maintain, on a standby basis, the contract-operated tracking station, near Johannesburg, of the U.S. Air Force South Atlantic Missile Test Range, it has been used only infrequently in recent years.

South Africa's agricultural lands are varied and productive; it has been endowed with an unusually broad range of mineral resources. Its people, too, are a significant resource, with a strong sense of pride and an eagerness for advancement. Drawing on its natural and human resources, South Africa has been able in the past century to create a solid base for industrial development. Especially in the postwar years, South Africa has undergone a period of rapid economic growth.

I review these elements of South Africa's potential for two reasons: to point up the future that could be South Africa's and to place the material American interests there in perspective.

South Africa's Policies of Apartheid

As to South Africa's system of institutionalized racial discrimination, the views of the United States have been clear and consistent. They were publicly reaffirmed by Secretary Kissinger in his address in Lusaka in April and in other public statements since that time, and he will restate them today to the U.N. General Assembly. They have been privately reaffirmed in his discussions with Prime Minister Vorster.

The United States views those policies not only as unjust but also as unwise. As the Secretary stated in Philadelphia on August 31: "No system that leads to periodic upheavals and violence can possibly be just or acceptable—nor can it last." The violence which has persisted in South Africa since last June has eliminated with tragic finality any thought or pretense that the system of institutionalized discrimination will ever be accepted by the black people of that country.

This was impressed upon all of us in moving terms by the South African black leaders we met in Pretoria two weeks ago. In two momentous meetings, the Secretary heard the full spectrum of views on South Africa. He learned much. And, I add, by listening to them, he symbolized the American commitment to interracial cooperation.

U.S. representatives have frequently described those elements of our policy toward South Africa which are designed to communicate our strong views on apartheid to the South African Government and people. Without pretending to have the solutions to South Africa's complex problems, we intend to use our influence to bring about peaceful change, equality of opportunity, and basic human rights for all South Africans.

We recognize, however, that there may

be additional ways to further social development and meaningful change within South Africa. We agree with witnesses, Mr. Chairman, who have testified in recent days about the positive effect that American firms in South Africa, committed to enlightened business practices, could have on developments there.

We believe it is important, for example, for American business to continue to reflect the principles of the United States in their operations in South Africa, and we believe that this can be done despite the existence of institutionalized racial discrimination.

You are aware, Mr. Chairman, of our policy to encourage American businessmen to take positive steps to enhance the well-being of their black employees. We believe that American businesses can do, and will find it in their interest to do, more in this regard. In examining this question further, we will take into account the proposals expressed by the witnesses who have discussed this subject with your subcommittee.

Other measures designed to exert a positive influence on the pace of progress in South Africa have included our extensive exchange program under which South Africans, representing a broad cross section of South Africa's population, have visited the United States. In addition the American Embassy and our three consulates general in South Africa have vigorously worked to project, through their activities and the behavior of their staffs, the values for which we stand. I believe you may be able to testify, Mr. Chairman, to the commitment of our official representatives to these objectives.

The conviction that communication and exposure to positive influences are important if change is to be brought about in South Africa is also an important element behind our determination to continue to oppose the isolation of South Africa from the rest of the international community. We believe that excluding South Africa, and other nations as well, from international organizations can have serious detrimental effects both on South Africa and on the organizations themselves.

Mr. Chairman, these aspects of our policy toward South Africa have not changed.

What has changed is that we are now actively engaged in a positive effort to effectuate change in southern Africa by finding solutions to the most immediate and acute problems there. Events both inside and outside South Africa have added a measure of urgency to the need for change in South Africa. The key role that South Africa must play if the peaceful evolution of Namibia and Rhodesia to independence and majority rule is to take place has long been recognized, and American officials have long been urged by African leaders to "use their influence" with South Africa to this end. The Secretary discussed this point with African leaders during his first visit to the continent in April. Since then, we have been in close touch with the South African Government, as well as with leaders of black Africa, in recent negotiations on Namibia and Rhodesia. All these parties played a positive and constructive role in this effort, including Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.

But I wish to make it clear that South Africa's participation in these efforts was not secured by any trades or concessions involving other aspects of our policy which I described earlier. None were asked, and none were offered. There was no quid pro quo. Secretary Kissinger stated in June that the United States would not sacrifice its principles elsewhere in the search for peaceful solutions for Namibia and Rhodesia.

Recent events have shown the tragic proportions of the South African problem. It is, as I said earlier, a highly complex one. It is not a conventional case of decolonization. Blacks and whites have been in that land for hundreds of years. Neither is alien; all of its peoples are, in a root sense, African.

The search for a solution will demand

the most extraordinary effort of will, compassion, understanding, and conciliation by all South Africans. It is the issue of justice and decency which transcends Africa and reaches out to touch the moral sense of all mankind. The United States cannot be indifferent to it. And as the Secretary of State has made clear in his Lusaka statement and since, we shall not be.

Report on 1975 U.S. Participation in the U.N. Transmitted to Congress

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to send to the Congress the 30th annual report on United States participation in the United Nations and its many subsidiary bodies.

This report shows how the United States worked to advance its interests through the main activities of the United Nations system during Calendar Year 1975. It describes the outcome of important meetings such as the seventh special session of the General Assembly on world economic cooperation and the landmark International Women's Year conference; it covers the work of the Security Council in the Middle East and other areas; and it reports on such contentious political issues as the resolution of the 30th General Assembly equating Zionism with Racism with which we vigorously disagreed. These events, and many other UN activities, reflect an active year for the United States in the United Nations during which we persisted in our long-term effort to promote peace, economic progress and social justice within a worldwide framework.

In the area of security and crisis management, the United Nations was effective in carrying out its primary purpose: contributing to the maintenance of international peace. United Nations peacekeeping forces in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights areas of the Middle East continued to separate previous combatants while the search for a more durable peace continued. Similarly, in Cyprus, United Nations peacekeeping forces helped to patrol the lines where confrontation existed and contributed to humanitarian needs. The Security Council, in addition to making the arrangements for the continuation of the mandates for these forces, also helped reduce tensions over the Western Sahara and East Timor.

A major area of activity of direct importance for American interests was the seventh special session of the General Assembly on development and international economic cooperation. Convened September 1 just prior to the 30th regular session, this meeting established a new agenda for international cooperation on the planning of our emerging global economic system. Prior to this meeting there had been division, confrontation and acrimony within the United Nations and elsewhere, over how to improve the world economic system and how to accelerate the process of development. Determined to make the most of this opportunity and to search for common ground, the United States outlined a broad program of practical initiatives which would be of benefit to both developing and developed countries. The participants in this historic meeting responded positively to the U.S. approach, adopting a consensus resolution which embraced most of our proposals. This session demonstrated that the UN can help to advance America's fundamental interests when we exercise leadership in the organization.

An international conference of great importance to the United States was the World Conference of the International Women's Year in Mexico City. This meeting, which grew out of a 1974 U.S. initia-

[1] Transmitted on Oct. 1 (text from White House press release); the report, entitled "U.S. Participation in the UN—Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1975," is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Department of State publication 8880; 410 pp.).

tive, marked the first time that the problems of women had been the subject of such a major international conference. With some exceptions the conference recorded a number of major achievements. The United States made significant contributions to the World Plan of Action which was adopted at the conference, thus setting in motion a program that will gradually help the world to realize the full rights and potential of half of its people.

At my direction in November 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger sent a letter to the Director General of the International Labor Organization announcing our intention to withdraw from that organization in 1977 unless reforms are made before then. We cited four special areas of concern: erosion of tripartite representation; selective concern for human rights; disregard of due process; and increasing politicization of a technical agency. We took this step only after the most careful deliberation and, as we have stated, we will make every effort to promote conditions that could permit us to continue to participate in the organization.

The 30th session of the General Assembly was marked both by cooperation and contention. Many economic and social issues were debated, resulting in resolutions adopted by consensus. But political differences arose among the members over such issues as Korea, the Middle East, human rights and decolonization. Among other actions, a resolution equating Zionism with Racism was adopted over strong United States opposition. We view this resolution as a fundamental distortion of the truth and, as a result of its adoption, announced that we would not participate in the activities of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

These are but a few of the important events in the United Nations during the past year. Much of the work of the United Nations is unknown because it is not regularly reported through the news media. The economic, social and technical coordination work of the United Nations, which account for more than 90 percent of its total resources, include such important activities as:

—Maintaining international aviation safety standards;

—Helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;

—Working to combat illicit drug production and trafficking;

—Improving health conditions and standards worldwide and combating disease and plague;

—Setting improved international standards for the environment;

—Improving international food standards and preventing plant and animal disease from crossing borders;

—Providing economic development and technical assistance to the poorer nations of the world; and

—Providing food assistance and disaster relief.

As the world's strongest economic power with the greatest global reach, the United States derives many tangible benefits from these United Nations activities, many of which resulted from American initiative and leadership.

Despite difficulties inherent in working within an organization of so many sovereign states having differing interests and backgrounds, I believe that we are making progress in achieving our purposes in the United Nations. The United States is working actively to defend its interests, to oppose irresponsible actions and to promote cooperation among UN members in fulfillment of the great purposes of the Charter which we helped to frame.

As the world grows increasingly complex and interdependent, I conclude that United States leadership and participation in the United Nations serves our interests and hopes for realizing mankind's aspirations for a world of peace, economic progress and social justice.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 1, 1976.*

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Amendment of part IV of annex I of the 1956 agreements on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands and in Iceland by deletion of requirements for provision of LORAN services. Adopted by the ICAO Council at Montreal June 14, 1976; effective December 29, 1977.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975.
Notifications of provisional application deposited: Guatemala, August 16, 1976; Congo, September 10, 1976; Kenya, September 17, 1976; Mexico, September 23, 1976; Finland, France, Tanzania, September 24, 1976; Belgium, Luxembourg, September 28, 1976; Italy, Japan, September 29, 1976; Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Liberia, Nigeria, Spain, Cameroon, Yugoslavia, Zaire, September 30, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, September 17, 1976; Jamaica, United States, September 24, 1976; Federal Republic of Germany, September 29, 1976; Australia, September 30, 1976.
Accession deposited: Madagascar, September 29, 1976.
Provisional entry into force: October 1, 1976.

Conservation

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done at Oslo November 15, 1973. Entered into force May 26, 1976.[1]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: September 30, 1976.

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Madagascar, September 27, 1976; Laos, September 28, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.[2]
Acceptance deposited: Tanzania, September 28, 1976.

Seals

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 3948). Done at Washington May 7, 1976.[2]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: September 29, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Canada, October 6, 1976; United States, October 4, 1976.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, October 6, 1976.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1976.
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: September 30, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, October 7, 1976.[3]

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, October 7, 1976.[3]

BILATERAL

Canada

Arrangement relating to information in the nuclear field, with patent addendum and annexes. Signed at Ottawa and Washington August 6 and September 8, 1976. Entered into force September 8, 1976.

German Democratic Republic

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with annexes, agreed minutes, and related letter. Signed at Washington October 5, 1976. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by exchange of notes.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement concerning mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter, with agreed minutes. Signed at Washington September 24, 1976. Entered into force September 24, 1976.

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[1] Not in force for the United States.
[2] Not in force.
[3] Applicable to Berlin (West).

Greece

Agreement relating to payment to the United States of net proceeds from the sale of defense articles and eligibility for United States military assistance and training under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens August 31, 1976. Entered into force August 31, 1976.

Guinea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of April 21, 1976, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Conakry September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

Israel

Cash grant agreement to provide necessary foreign exchange to support the economic requirements of Israel. Signed at Washington September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

Loan agreement to promote the economic and political stability of Israel, with attachments. Signed at Washington September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

Program assistance grant agreement to promote the economic and political stability of Israel, with attachments. Signed at Washington September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

Italy

Procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter. Signed at Washington March 29, 1976.
Entered into force: April 12, 1976.

Peru

Agreement relating to compensation for the expropriated assets of the Marcona Mining Company. Signed at Lima September 22, 1976. Enters into force upon signature and acceptance of the promissory note and ore sales contract referred to in the agreement.

Philippines

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Manila October 1, 1976. Enters into force 30 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Syria

Agreement amending the agreement of April 20, 1976, for sales of agricultural commodities. Effected by exchange of letters at Damascus September 28 and 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement of October 18, 1972, relating to establishment of the Temporary Purchasing Commission for the procurement of equipment for the Kama River Truck Complex. Effected by exchange of letters at Moscow and Washington June 7 and September 13, 1976. Entered into force September 13, 1976.

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: October 4–10

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*493	10/4	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs: cancellation of Oct. 8 meeting.
*494	10/5	Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Federal Republic of Germany (biographic data).
*495	10/6	Advisory Committee on Transnational Enterprises, Oct. 28.
†496	10/6	U.S. and German Democratic Republic sign fisheries agreement.
*497	10/6	Experts from world's major science museums to study U.S. centers, Oct. 10–Nov. 14.
†498	10/7	Kissinger: toasts at luncheon for Latin American delegations to U.N., New York.
*499	10/7	U.S.-Canada discussions on border television, Oct. 6: joint communique.
*500	10/7	Edward E. Masters sworn in as Ambassador to Bangladesh (biographic data).
†501	10/8	Kissinger: toast at luncheon for African delegations to U.N., New York.
*502	10/8	Patricia M. Byrne sworn in as Ambassador to Mali (biographic data).
*503	10/8	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on carriage of dangerous goods, Nov. 9.
*504	10/8	Kissinger, Waldheim: news conference following meeting.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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