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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the function of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed

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Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of September 11

Press release 429 dated September 11

Secretary Kissinger: Before I take questions I wanted to make a few points about the trip to Africa that I am undertaking starting on Monday.

First, the American diplomatic effort is being undertaken with the support and with the encouragement of all of the parties involved.

Second, there is no "American plan." The solutions have to be found in Africa and have to be found by negotiations among the parties.

Third, the United States has agreed to offer its good offices because no other country was available to perform this role and because the risks to world peace of an escalating violence in southern Africa were very severe.

Fourth, war had already started in southern Africa. The danger of its expansion, the danger of foreign intervention, the impact on the national security of the United States and on world peace dictated that we make an effort to find a peaceful solution. The worst that can happen if this effort fails is what was certain to happen if the effort is not made.

We are dealing with three problems: Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa—each having different aspects and each having different timetables.

On this trip we will deal primarily with the issues of Namibia and Rhodesia. It is not a negotiation that will lend itself to dramatic final conclusions, because there are, in the case of Rhodesia, four states, four liberation movements, the Rhodesian settlers, and South Africa involved; in the case of Namibia, several African states, again South Africa, the national movement recognized by the Organization of African Unity, namely, SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], and several internal groups assembled in a constitutional conference.

We are pursuing this policy, which will not support violence and which stands opposed to foreign intervention, in the interest of world peace, in the national interest of the United States, and above all for the interests of the peoples of Africa.

Now I will be glad to take questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think any arrangements you can help to make to resolve the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia can have any lasting relevance and stability in a region where the strongest nation, South Africa, is saying through Prime Minister Vorster that they intend to preserve their system of white rule?

Secretary Kissinger: The solutions to Rhodesia and Namibia, if they can be achieved, can have a lasting character.

The purpose is to enable a transition to independence in Namibia and to majority rule and protection of minority rights in Rhodesia under conditions that will enable all the communities to live together and in which the bloodshed is put to an end.

The conditions in South Africa are more complicated and require a much longer timespan for their evolution.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you go into some detail on the apparent American-British incentive plan to help bring about a transition to black rule in Rhodesia? There has been a lot of speculation about it. I know you have spoken to people on the Hill about it. Could you provide us with some details?

Secretary Kissinger: Obviously, any solution in Rhodesia will have to have political components and economic components. It should not be seen as an effort to buy out the white settlers. Rather, Rhodesia is a rich country that can have a substantial economic rate of progress after full independence is achieved.

What we have been discussing with the United Kingdom and with other interested parties is a scheme that can be used either for investment in Rhodesia to spur economic progress or as a safety net for those settlers who want to leave—or for both. Some of the funds can come from private sources that have economic interests there. Some can come from governments.

The leadership in this effort will have to be taken by the United Kingdom, which has the legal responsibilities for Rhodesia, with our support. We have talked to other countries, and the Government of France has already announced its support. So this plan is going to have a wide basis, but its exact features cannot be discussed until it has evolved further. But its basic philosophy is what I have outlined here.

Establishing Framework for Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask two questions based on your statement.

You say that this is not a negotiation which lends itself to final conclusions; therefore, what would you expect to achieve on this, and when might you get a final conclusion?

And then you also said that the worst that can happen if the effort fails is that what was certain to happen will happen, if the effort were not made. What is that?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the second question: We are facing a situation now in which a so-called "armed struggle" is already taking place in Rhodesia and is beginning in Namibia.

The history of these struggles is that they lead to escalating violence, drawing in more and more countries, and have the danger of foreign intervention and the probability of the radicalization of the whole continent of Africa, in which moderate governments will find it less and less possible to concentrate on the aspirations of their people and become more and more focused on events in southern Africa. For this reason, we want to provide a nonviolent alternative to this prospect.

Now this prospect is before us. This prospect has a short time limit, and therefore it cannot wait for our own electoral processes. This is what will almost certainly happen if efforts of negotiation fail.

Now I have forgotten your first question.

Q. The first question was that in your statement you said this is not a negotiation that will lend itself to dramatic conclusions—

Secretary Kissinger: That's right.

Q. What do you expect to achieve, and when might you expect a final conclusion?

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, we are dealing with about eight parties on the side of black Africa. In Rhodesia we are dealing with the white settlers and we are dealing with South Africa. And in Namibia also we are dealing with many different groups.

Therefore in both cases an objective is to establish a framework for negotiations in which then the details will have to be worked out by the various parties concerned. We cannot supply the details by which transitions to independence are achieved. What we can do is to bring the parties sufficiently close so that they think a negotiating effort—they believe in a negotiating effort—and perhaps establish some of the basic conditions for the negotiations.

Whether this can be achieved in both cases in one trip, I would question; but progress toward these objectives can be made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how important is it to end the guerrilla struggle that is already taking place on Rhodesia's borders, and beginning in Namibia? And will you seek any commitments from the frontline nations to diminish their support of the guerrilla struggle if you

ucceed in creating the conditions for majority rule in Rhodesia?

Secretary Kissinger: I think everybody agrees that if a peaceful solution can be found, then there is no purpose in a guerilla struggle. So the problem is: Can one find conditions in which all parties can agree to this?

But as I pointed out, the United States does not support violent solutions when peaceful alternatives are available.

Bernie [Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times].

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you feel that you yourself should engage in a shuttle diplomacy? Why cannot this be done through more orthodox diplomatic channels? While there has been widespread support on the Hill, one Congressman yesterday characterized this mission as "Lone Ranger" diplomacy, and I wonder if you would address yourself to why you feel you yourself must be involved.

Secretary Kissinger: That Congressman was not very original, it seems to me. He plagiarized a Southern Governor. [Laughter.]

We have had three missions in Africa. The British have had two. And a point has clearly been reached where, since the Presidents of so many black African states are involved as well as the leaders of Southern Africa, matters cannot be brought beyond this point by the exchanges of notes, by referring documents back for detailed instructions, and what is needed now is an impetus in which the negotiations can be conducted somewhat more flexibly.

This is true especially in South Africa as well, where some difficult decisions have to be taken.

So this is what led all of the parties concerned to believe that this was the best way to proceed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that you will be seeing some black African leaders within South Africa itself. Now, you mentioned earlier that you didn't expect to accomplish anything on the South African question on this particular trip. What would be the purpose of your meeting with black Africans within South Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: I expect to meet representatives of all communities in South Africa, and not only of the white community, primarily to inform myself on conditions there so that I can form a better judgment of what the right American policy might be.

U.S. National Interest

Q. Mr. Secretary, many Americans believe that there is no U.S. interest in southern Africa and that our national security is not concerned there. You, however, have a contrary view, and I wonder if you can elaborate on that a bit more.

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, at issue is not only the future of two states in southern Africa but the potential evolution of all of Africa, with its profound impact on Europe and on the Middle East.

It is the fixed American policy that solutions to complicated international issues should not be sought by violence. And conversely, if the principle of violent solutions is established, it will have an impact on other areas of the world.

Secondly, all European countries recognize the interests that they have in a moderate evolution of events in Africa; and this is why we have received public support from the United Kingdom, with which we have been cooperating most closely, from the President of France, and from the Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, together with diplomatic support from all our other allies.

Therefore the consequences of the radicalization of Africa would be serious in many other parts of the world. We are now at a moment when we can still, with relatively small effort, at least attempt to arrest this.

We have been urged, not only by the states of southern Africa but by all the moderate leaders in Africa, to engage in

this enterprise, because they understand what is at stake for the future of their countries.

And therefore we believe that the national interest of the United States is involved. Success is not guaranteed, but an effort must be made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the current situation to result possibly in any further currency devaluation, such as in the South African rand and the British pound?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think I should be asked economic questions, since there are so many people here who will tell you that I am an argument against universal suffrage on these issues.

I have not even thought about this. I don't expect that it will have any impact on devaluation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what role do you think the West German Federal Republic can play being helpful in this African settlement?

Secretary Kissinger: As Chancellor Schmidt said at a press conference in Hamburg, the Federal Republic has a historic relationship to some of the population in Namibia. I understand there are about 30,000 people of German origin that live in Namibia, and so the Federal Republic can be helpful, especially helpful, in any efforts that may be made there; but it has indicated that it will give its general support to efforts in southern Africa generally.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if this matter is so important to U.S. national security, why wasn't a great deal more done long ago when the positions were not so fixed and when it was more possible to make progress in the area?

Secretary Kissinger: Because the conditions for making progress did not exist previously. Until the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, the conditions did not exist.

Secondly, the United States did not feel that it had a primary responsibility in an area that had been traditionally governed by European countries and where many European countries had a longer historica interest; and therefore we wanted to giv every opportunity to Great Britain, whic was engaged in a diplomatic effort wit respect to Rhodesia—for this effort t succeed.

It was the combination of a number c factors which made it clear that thes methods would not work and that unde lined the urgency of the situation.

Solution Primarily African Matter

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any evidence th black Rhodesian unity is possible, and w you meet with any black Rhodesians on th trip?

Secretary Kissinger: The meeting in D [es Salaam], which was supposed to- which brought together the so-called fron line Presidents and the various liberati movements, was more successful in brin ing about unity among the frontli Presidents than among liberation mov ments. I would say that at this mome there is little evidence of unity among the movements.

With respect to whether I should me them or not, I will be guided by the reco mendations of the African Presidents.

I have taken the position that in ord to avoid foreign intervention on the moc of Angola, the United States would r deal directly with the liberation mo ments, provided no other country wou do this. If any of the Presidents think— if the Presidents think that it would desirable for me to meet with them, th I would be prepared to do it.

But I must stress that the solution these problems is primarily an Afric matter and for the parties concerned. T United States can act as an intermediar the United States can offer suggestio The United States cannot bring abo unity; the United States cannot by its bring about moderation; and the final o come depends on the wisdom and t capacity to work together of the Afric parties.

Q. How critical is unity among the liberation groups to your current effort?

Secretary Kissinger: It is not for me to determine how a solution is to be achieved. If the African Presidents and the various liberation movements feel that they can negotiate by having individual teams, then it is not for me to decide that they should use another method.

So I would say that the organization of the negotiations on the black African side depends on the African Presidents and it is not going to be prescribed by the United States.

Admission of Viet-Nam to United Nations

Q. To change the subject to another area, does the United States intend to block the admission of Viet-Nam to the United Nations? And if so, does this have any domestic political implications here or reasons for doing so?

Secretary Kissinger: The President stated publicly this week that we considered the gesture of releasing the names of 12 missing in action as insufficient. And what we are considering is whether a government that is not fulfilling one of its basic obligations under an international agreement would be able to fulfill its obligations under the U.N. Charter, and this is—we will make our decision when the case actually comes before the Security Council.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does President Ford feel that there is any political gain in your embarking on this diplomatic shuttle?

And, secondly, you are talking about the complexity of this issue. Is it possible for you to complete the beginnings of success in this issue, assuming you make progress, prior to the election or in the period prior to inauguration? Aren't you against some sort of political deadline?

Secretary Kissinger: I think, first of all, with respect to political benefits it was accepted wisdom that the trip to Africa in April was not a spectacular success in many of the primary elections that were then taking place.

It was undertaken, and it was supported by the President at the time, because he concluded that we could not, in the national interests of the United States, delay any longer.

Whether progress is possible before the election, I cannot say. But that progress needs to be made during this year if the situation is not to get dangerously out of control on at least some of the issues, I believe all the students of the subject agree to.

The impact of this negotiation on the election is impossible to determine. It should have no impact whatsoever. I was on the Hill yesterday meeting with 47 Senators, and I found that there was an essentially nonpartisan support.

What we are doing in the pursuit of peace in Africa is not a party matter. It is a matter for all the American people, and it will not be handled as a party issue, and I believe it will not be handled as a partisan issue by either side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talk about a framework of negotiations, does that mean that you need a commitment from Rhodesia to transfer power to the black majority within two years, and can you get that on this trip? Can you get it without having someone to whom to transfer power?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to predict what is possible within any particular time frame. What we are trying to do on this trip is to move matters forward toward the point where negotiations can start and where some specific proposals may emerge.

I would not expect that this can be achieved with respect to Rhodesia on one trip.

With respect to Namibia, the issue is whether a framework of participants in possible negotiations can emerge. I am somewhat more hopeful on this. But even that issue involves so many parties, I would not want to predict until I had talked to them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up Don Oberdorfer's question, it has been alleged not only that U.S. policy before last April was indifferent to Africa, but that it actively aided the white minority regimes. Particularly as a token of this is the Byrd amendment. Last April you promised that the Administration would take steps to repeal that amendment. That was almost five months ago. No steps have been made.

Are you going to be able to explain this to the African heads of state?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the African heads of state understand that if a negotiation can be arranged over Rhodesia, the issue of sanctions will then be substantially irrelevant. The issue of sanctions arises only under conditions when there is no progress in the negotiations and no prospect for a transition in the governmental structure.

Therefore I have found that there is substantial understanding on the part of the black African Presidents for the steps we have been taking.

Developments in Lebanon

Q. Mr. Secretary, during the period that you will be in Africa, Lebanon faces an important date in the transition of power from President Franjiyah to President Sarkis—President-elect Sarkis. And at the same time, there are reports that Syria is making intensive efforts to produce some sort of negotiated solution that will allow Sarkis to take power in normal conditions.

What are your expectations for Lebanon in the next two weeks, and what is your view of the Syrian efforts? Is the United States in favor of them?

Secretary Kissinger: I had an opportunity yesterday to talk to two Foreign Service officers who just returned from the Christian part of Lebanon and who have had an opportunity to talk to President Sarkis. Also, I will be taking with me on this trip, an expert on the Middle East, so that I can be in close touch with developments in Lebanon.

We favor a negotiated solution on the basis of the formula that was worked out in Damascus earlier this year, and we have generally supported the political efforts based on that formula.

Whether the advent of a new President would lead to a rapid solution is not yet clear.

We support the independence and territorial integrity and unity of Lebanon. We will use our influence in this direction. We have invited President Sarkis to send a representative to the United States for further talks soon after his installation and we will use our influence in the direction of the unity and integrity of Lebanon.

Panmunjom Incident

Q. I have a two-part question. One, what is your evaluation of the aftermath of the Panmunjom incident? And, two, there have been conflicting reports about the role of the influence of the Soviet Union and China toward Kim Il-song's role in this case. Will you become a fair judge over this important issue [sic]?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that North Korea realized that the United States and its allies in the Korean Peninsula would not tolerate such brutal behavior. They, in effect, apologized for the incident. As a result of the discussions, the guardposts that they had on our side of the line in the Panmunjom area have been removed, and I believe that conditions have been created in which a repetition of such incidents is relatively less likely.

We have also shown our capacity to reinforce Korea very rapidly and our determination not to permit any transgression in Korea.

As for the role of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, we are not familiar with any diplomatic initiatives that they may have taken. We did not ask them to pass any messages. We noticed that their press was not particularly vocal

in support of North Korea, and we consider this positive, since it was a brutal act of murder.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you or the President or any senior member of the Administration be talking with former Defense Secretary Schlesinger when he returns from China?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I had an extensive talk with former Secretary Schlesinger before he went to China. I expect to have an extensive talk with him after he returns, and we have had reports of his—we've had some fragmentary reports of his conversations there, and he's behaved himself with a great sense of responsibility.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you're an old hand at being a troubleshooter in many parts of the world. I'm wondering now, as you're about to leave, how would you rate your own chances of succeeding?

Secretary Kissinger: I was afraid you meant as I'm about to leave office, and I thought 1981 wasn't that imminent. [Laughter.]

This is the most complex negotiation procedurally in which I've been engaged, and the chances of success are very difficult to evaluate, because it depends on so many intangibles and because there isn't any one interlocutor on each side.

Senator [Dick] Clark estimated my chances at success at 1 in 20. I rate my chances higher than that, but I don't want to give an exact percentage.

African Liberation Movements

Q. Mr. Secretary, twice this morning you've mentioned that your mission has the support of all the parties concerned in the area. By saying that, do you mean the black liberation movements? Do you have any word from them that they welcome the mission which you are about to undertake?

Secretary Kissinger: I have made clear that we have not dealt directly with the black liberation movements. So when I speak of the parties I speak of the states in the area; and the relationship of the liberation movements to this process is being worked out by the so-called frontline Presidents. We have not had any direct discussion with the liberation movements.

Q. If I can follow that up, you said, as I understood it, that you would not deal with them—

Secretary Kissinger: Excuse me. We've had a discussion with SWAPO with respect to Namibia, and I would apply my statement to them.

Q. Well, that perhaps is the point I was making. Some of these movements, as I understand it, have had relations or have had contacts with other governments in the past. Where you said you would not deal with them as long as other governments did not, I wondered how you took that into account.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, clearly, if outside powers become very active in southern Africa, then the danger of Africa becoming an arena for superpower conflict is very great, and I have said that the United States stands opposed to outside intervention in African affairs.

Up to now we have the impression that in the last months the Rhodesian liberation movements have dealt with the outside world substantially through the various frontline Presidents, which is the understanding that I have of the situation. Should that change, then the United States would also have to reexamine its position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, back to Rhodesia, again on the financial aspects—what was the reaction of the people on the Hill to the dimensions of the plan? And could you be clearer—is it a case of the United States being asked to spend several hundred million dollars in allocations, or is it a kind of possibility; is it an insurance plan?

Secretary Kissinger: We are talking primarily of an insurance plan. Nor are we saying that the American part of this in-

surance plan has to come entirely from governmental sources; there are other sources that may also be available.

So we have not worked out a figure; we have not yet worked out a governmental participation. But we are talking of something that is essentially an insurance plan rather than a direct commitment, and we're talking of a consortium in which the United Kingdom will be the convoking country with our support and which will have the support, we expect, of most industrial democracies.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate being able to present this package to [Rhodesian] Prime Minister Smith during this trip?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not yet decided whether I will meet with Prime Minister Smith on this trip. This depends on the evolution of the discussions and on our estimate of his basic attitude.

Death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, People's Republic of China

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, died at Peking on September 9. Following is a statement made by President Ford that day, together with the transcript of a news conference held that day by Secretary Kissinger.

PRESIDENT FORD

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 13

The People's Republic of China announced today the passing away of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Chairman Mao was a giant figure in modern Chinese history. He was a leader whose actions profoundly affected the development of his own country. His influence on history will extend far beyond the borders of China.

Americans will remember that it was under Chairman Mao that China moved together with the United States to end a generation of hostility and to launch a new and more positive era in relations between our two countries.

I am confident that the trend of improved relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, which Chairman Mao helped to create, will continue to contribute to world peace and stability.

On behalf of the U.S. Government and the American people, I offer condolences to the Government and to the people of the People's Republic of China.

Thank you very much.

SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 423 dated September 9

Secretary Kissinger: I will just read a statement, and then I will answer a few questions about Chairman Mao's death. I will probably have a press conference tomorrow where we can take other questions.

I extend my sympathy to the people and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the occasion of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's death.

Chairman Mao was a historic figure who changed the course of events in the world. He had a tremendous impact on the present and on the future of his country.

In the last years of his life, we worked closely with him on the improvement of relations between our two countries. His personal interest in that process was a vital factor in the Sino-American rapprochement which began in 1972.

We have since that time created a durable relationship based on mutual understanding and a perception of common interests; and we, for our part, will continue to cement our ties with the People's Republic of China in accordance with the Shanghai communique.

This is the formal statement, and I will be glad to take a few questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you think the opening between Washington and Peking was the result of Mao's philosophy and work?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that during his lifetime all the major decisions in China were either made by him or followed guidelines laid down by him. In the case of the opening of relations between the People's Republic and the United States, it is clear that that relationship bore his personal stamp; and on many occasions in my conversations with Prime Minister Chou En-lai, he would interrupt the meeting to say that he would have to consult with Chairman Mao in order to get further instructions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you know about Chinese leaders now, can you say with any confidence that China will continue to follow a policy of "open door" toward the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: When any historic figure disappears, it is extremely difficult to predict everything that his successors will do. The basis of the relationship between China and the United States is mutual interest. I believe that these mutual interests are to some extent independent of personalities and that therefore the main lines of the policies are likely to be continued.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you at all personally regretful that the United States was not able to make more progress on the Taiwan issue while Chairman Mao was alive?

Secretary Kissinger: The specific issues that are involved in the process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China cannot be tied to the lifetime of personalities. I had the occasion five times for extended conversations with Chairman Mao, and I believe he was a man of very great vision; but the relationship between our two countries cannot be given a timetable that is geared to individuals.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any expectation of visiting China between now and January 20, and has the death of Mao in any way affected those expectations?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no expectation of visiting the People's Republic before the election. What travels I may undertake after the election could be affected by the outcome. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think of the prospects that China might move now to remove the strain in relations with the Soviet Union, since Mao was considered to be personally hostile to the Russians?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the basic line of the Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union has been determined by the fundamental interests of China and not by the personal preferences of an individual. It is therefore likely that the main lines of Chinese foreign policy will be continued, though there could be modifications of tactics.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you've met with Mao, as you said, several times. Could you give us some flavor of those conversations—what kind of things you talked about, how he looked upon history, or something more than just the fact that you met with him?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Mao was an enormously forceful personality—a man who tended to be the center of the room simply by the enormous willpower that he reflected. He preferred to conduct his conversations in the form of a dialogue in which he made brief, epigrammatic, rather pithy comments and invited the other party's reaction to his comments.

I found that nothing he said, even though it seemed totally unplanned, was ever without purpose; and therefore these conversations tended to be rather complex and extremely illuminating.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the President were to telephone Peking and say, "I want to talk to the leader," who'd talk to him?

Secretary Kissinger: I think he would talk to the Prime Minister.

Q. Do you think he's the man who's in control there now?

Secretary Kissinger: He is the man who is in charge of the government, and he would certainly be the interlocutor for the President.

Q. Mr. Secretary, recently there have been reports of internal strife in China. Do you think Mao's death will intensify this?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there have been reports of various factions, but these reports occur repeatedly. The United States deals with the government in Peking, and the internal affairs of China are matters for the Chinese and not for us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that normalization of relations will be easier or more difficult for yourself or your successor after Mao's death?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe, from our side, as I pointed out in my statement, normalization will continue; and I'm sure that from the Chinese side the basic lines of the policy, as we have known them, will continue to be pursued.

Q. Well, that doesn't really answer the question, though. Some people on the Chinese political scene seem to be a bit more antagonistic or hostile toward the United States. Now, if Mao's death gives them more power in the future, will this make it more difficult to settle Taiwan with them?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, obviously, if people who are more hostile to the United States should take power in China, this might complicate our relationship. We have seen, as of now, no evidence of it; but, of course, it is very early to tell.

I do not believe that Chinese policy is basically influenced by the personal likes and dislikes of Chinese leaders, but by their assessment of what is in the long-term interest of China.

We have to remember that when a towering figure disappears from the scene not even his successors can know exactly what the shape of events will be, and it is premature to speculate as to what the future evolution should be.

President Calls for Full Accounting of Americans Missing in Viet-Nam

The Vietnamese Embassy at Paris on September 6 published and furnished to the U.S. Embassy a list of 12 U.S. airmen whom they described as having died in air crashes in Viet-Nam. Following is a statement by President Ford made in the press briefing room at the White House on September 7.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 13

At my direction, the American Embassy in Paris today contacted North Vietnamese representatives and informed them that we expect that the United States will be provided with a full accounting without further delay of all Americans missing in action in Viet-Nam.

Speaking on behalf of all Americans, I welcome the fact that the Vietnamese have finally begun to keep their promise to provide information on our men missing in action in Southeast Asia.

While the report on these 12 men was grim, it at least resolved their status and removed the crushing burden of anxiety and uncertainty from their relatives and their loved ones.

But none of us can be satisfied with this limited action by the Vietnamese. What they have done is to release information of only a dozen men. They still have information on hundreds more.

For wives, parents, and friends of the men still missing, the anxiety and the uncertainty continues. It is callous and cruel to exploit human suffering in the hope of diplomatic advantage.

The Vietnamese have an obligation to provide a full accounting of all Americans missing in action. I call upon them to do so without further delay. Normalization of relations cannot take place until Viet-Nam accounts for all our men missing in action.

U.S. Responsibilities in World Population Issues

Address by Marshall Green
Coordinator of Population Affairs [1]

The population problem is too often defined in narrow Malthusian terms of too many people pressing on inadequate food supplies. This is but one dimension of the problem, and not the most serious one at present, although it may be some years hence. Today the most serious manifestations of overpopulation are an alarming increase in unemployment as well as widespread environmental degradation.

An excellent booklet recently circulated by the Worldwatch Institute, and funded in part by the United Nations, specifies 22 different ways in which current excessive worldwide population growth poses dangers to mankind. These dimensions include impending world food shortages, pollution and disruption of the earth's ecosystem, depletion of mineral and water resources, energy shortages, erosion, deforestation, expanding deserts, unemployment, overcrowded cities, crime and juvenile delinquency, deteriorating living conditions, social unrest, authoritarianism, and political conflict. Meanwhile, nuclear weapons are proliferating in a crowded, restive world.

No country is spared the impact of population growth, even countries like the United States where population growth rates are not large. For we all live on a shrinking planet, small enough that events half a world away have a large, growing impact upon us all.

Moreover, high population growth rates and resulting unemployment in the less developed world generate enormous pressures for migration. As Gen. [Leonard F.] Chapman, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, told this club last year, legal immigrants to the United States now number over 400,000 per year, but illegal immigrants in recent years have annually totaled over twice that figure. What impact does this have on our economy? Even more seriously, what is the impact on our society of such large-scale violations of our laws?

And we have our own internal population growth problems. Every year the equivalent of a city the size of Philadelphia is added to our population. Even relatively small increases in population slowly but relentlessly aggravate a lot of problems like air, water, and noise pollution; impose greater demands on resources; and contribute to the tensions of overcrowded cities, to higher and higher social costs, and to congested highways and recreational areas. Coping with all these issues will inevitably involve more and more permits, licenses, red tape, and bureaucracy—in short, increasing limitations on our vaunted free way of life. The Rockefeller Commission on Population Growth stated in its report to the President in March 1972 that Americans 50 years from now will look back with envy on what, from their vantage point, appears to be the relatively unfettered life of the 1970's.

I suspect that you are all fairly familiar

[1] Made before the Commonwealth Club of California at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 10 (text from press release 433 dated Sept. 13; opening paragraphs omitted).

with these warnings, for the dangers involved in population growth are increasingly sensed. This is particularly true of young Americans. A recent survey conducted by the Overseas Development Council and the U.S. Coalition for Development showed that two-thirds of Americans 18–25 years old identified overpopulation as the second most serious world problem. The most serious was regarded as pollution, which is closely related to population growth. In fact, I coined the word "popullution" to cover them both.

Yet there is still a tendency on the part of too many people to see population growth as somebody else's problem, not their own, or as one to be left for future generations to solve. Leaders and bureaucrats are all too prone to give greater attention to the procedural and short-term than to the substantive and long-term.

Obstacles and Achievements

The fundamental question is whether mankind can cope effectively with population growth. Perhaps not. That, in essence, summarizes the school of thought which sees mankind as having irretrievably lost the race to control population growth. Others espouse a totally contrary view. Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute, for example, sees an abundant life for all a century from now, and he goes on to portray a happy world of 15 billion souls thriving on food substitutes derived from converting wood and agricultural waste into glucose.

My own view of the future, and the one I believe is generally shared in our government, is that mankind can still save itself even though the hour is late. I take this view despite the many obstacles to effective population programs around the world. We are still plagued with obstacles such as:

—Traditionalism (large families are just a way of life).

—Male machismo (you find these characters all around the world, not just in Latin America).

—Ignorance, illiteracy, suspicion, and the desire of some countries or tribal areas to outnumber their neighbors.

—Desire for many sons and even daughters to provide for their parents in their old age. This in many ways is the most understandable reason for large families in the absence of social security systems which poor countries cannot afford or perhaps even operate.

A principal obstacle to combating population growth is lack of administrative competence and the prevalence of bureaucratic delays, inertia, and general inefficiency.

Moreover, few doctors and nurses are willing to serve in rural areas, understandably preferring the social and professional amenities of the cities. Many of them migrate abroad to strange places like Los Angeles where the pay is higher. I was told in India that most of the graduating class at Baroda Medical School last year piled into buses to go to our consulate in Calcutta to apply for U.S. visas.

But there is a much more hopeful side to the population problem.

Today the great bulk of the world's population lives in countries where family planning is not only accepted but where governments actually favor and promote family planning. This percentage is steadily increasing, although most of sub-Saharan Africa and much of Latin America are still hesitant to go the route of government-sponsored family planning programs. However, even in those countries, most governments have come to recognize that spacing of children is important for the health of mother and child alike and that high population growth rates dim prospects for economic growth and better conditions of life.

One of the most important achievements was the World Population Plan of Action adopted by consensus by 136 nations at the Bucharest Conference in 1974. They agreed that nations should have population programs and that every married

couple had the right to plan its family and to have the information and means to do so. Family planning had at long last gained worldwide respectability.

There is now mounting evidence that population programs launched some years ago are having a real impact on reducing birth rates in developing countries like China, Korea, Thailand, Colombia, the Philippines, Tunisia, and Costa Rica.

It is true that industrialization, modernization, and increased literacy are helping to reduce birth rates, but it would be wrong to deny the important role which family planning has played in that regard.

U.S. Support for Family Planning Programs

The United States has taken the lead in promoting worldwide family planning. We started 10 years ago to help countries launch their programs, and ever since, we have contributed roughly one-quarter of all foreign and domestic funds devoted to that purpose, including those of receiving countries. The total worldwide sum, while growing, is not large. It involves from all sources, including contributions from all governments, organizations, and private groups, only about half a billion dollars a year, which is about half the cost of a Trident submarine.

Our support has largely taken the form of providing family planning supplies either directly through bilateral agreements or indirectly through U.N. organizations like the UNFPA [U.N. Fund for Population Activities] or nongovernmental international groups like IPPF [International Planned Parenthood Foundation] or private U.S. groups like the Population Council, Pathfinder Fund, Family Planning International Assistance, and the Ford Foundation. We have also financed a large share of worldwide biomedical and social sciences research involved in population issues.

The United States has a special obligation in this regard. We have long been the major aid donor nation, and our assistance has enabled countries to reduce their mortality rates. This is as it should be, but we have thereby helped to promote the so-called population explosion. To be specific, we have been giving 16 times as much foreign aid to mortality reduction programs (such as food aid, nutrition, and health) as we have to fertility reduction programs; namely, family planning.

Clearly it is our responsibility to help insure that all of our aid has maximum developmental impact, that it stimulates receiving countries to increase their own food production, and that it assists the poorest people in these countries to increase their incomes. To serve these objectives, should not a larger percentage of our aid be in the form of support for other countries' population programs?

This is not to deny our awareness that whatever promotes economic development, improves education, and hastens modernization generally will also create a more favorable setting for helping countries to cope with excessive population growth rates. But it does raise the further question of how effective any outside economic assistance can be if the receiving country is inattentive to its own population problems.

Needless to say, the main task is not ours, but the countries threatened by excessive population growth. We can only help them in carrying out programs of their own devising. Some of these countries want no outside assistance; others are prepared to accept nonbilateral assistance; and still others have no restrictions on the sources of support. Our responses must be conditioned by these preferences.

Elements of Successful Population Programs

However, I am strongly persuaded that the most successful population programs involve four interrelated elements and that if any country is really serious about coping with its population problems it would do well to give due weight to all four of these elements. They are:

1. Leadership commitment; that is, lead-

ers of countries with serious population problems speaking out clearly and firmly in support of population programs and seeing that effective national programs are carried out at the village or community level.

2. Innovative approaches designed to root family planning in the villages, such as wives' clubs of Korea and Indonesia or the community-based distribution systems that are beginning to appear in Asia and Latin America.

3. Training paramedics to provide general health services, including family planning, in the communities where these people are known and trusted. This offers extensive personalized family planning advice and services to people even in remote rural areas at costs which the poorer nations can afford. Currently we are supporting this approach in some 17 countries and hope to see it expanded widely. I should point out that innovative approaches combined with paramedic systems can produce rather dramatic results. For example, new acceptor rates in West Java have more than doubled in recent months with the introduction last January of the so-called STMK program. Involved are 1,200 teams of two persons each, one a health worker, the other a motivator, calling on each household to counsel on health and family planning. Personalized approaches are far more effective than billboards, radio programs, and the like.

4. Improved status of women. This is not just a question of liberating women from traditional endless childbearing. It is a political and economic necessity—politically, because human rights must be the ultimate purpose of government; economically, because women continue to be the most underrated economic resource of nations.

It will be readily seen that these basic elements of a successful population program demand intensive efforts by governments and extensive involvement of their people. In the economic jargon of our times, the problem requires a people-intensive solution. It would be a mistake to infer that our supply-oriented assistance can solve other countries' population problems. It will definitely help, but the basic issue is, after all, not the supply of family planning services so much as creating the demand for those services. And that job is for governments and communities in developing countries to carry out as best they know how, drawing on the success stories of other countries tailored to their own requirements.

Particularly in the case of developing countries so far uncommitted to population programs, our help must take into account the various sensitivities and attitudes involved. We must, for example, avoid the language of "birth control" or "population control" in favor of "family planning" and "responsibility in parenthood," with emphasis on promoting basic human rights and the well-being of mother and child, as well as the economic benefits to a community and nation. Introduction and extension of primary health services provides the most widely acceptable way of moving toward family planning in most developing countries.

In all of our assistance, we would do well to maintain a low profile. It is probable that we will have to work more and more through international organizations and private voluntary groups since these non-U.S. Government entities are rather widely preferred in countries now entering the family planning field.

I suppose we can look back with some satisfaction to the indispensable role the United States has played in world family planning. We have been fortunate in having had the services of a number of dedicated, hard-working Americans both in and out of the government. On the other hand, the job could have been done even better had there been more involvement of our leaders and diplomats, especially our Ambassadors. The issue has, quite frankly, been left too exclusively in the hands of AID [Agency for International Development] officials without the involvement of our total diplomacy. The subject of population has rarely come up in meetings be-

tween our leaders and other leaders, or between our Ambassadors and the heads of governments to which they are accredited. Yet these are the American officials who have ready access to the leaders of other countries—often in an informal setting—and who are therefore in the best position to discuss population and related issues with men and women who decide policies and programs. It is not a matter of our lecturing them or they us, but of learning from each other.

If population is the key issue it is in some countries, why not talk about it? I am hopeful that this situation is now being corrected. Certainly, our Ambassadors over the past year have been given clear directions on this subject, and the results are beginning to show.

It is customary for after-luncheon speakers, especially diplomats, to end up with pleasant, optimistic conclusions that digest well along with the host's coffee and cigars, but I must desist. Population problems can only be aggravated by any attempts to gloss them over. The world has been far too slow in coming to grips with the population explosion. It has dillydallied until the problem has now reached the point where a horrendous spectacle of human misery threatens to unfold.

It was during our lifetime—yours and mine—that the worldwide population explosion occurred, and it is therefore our special responsibility, while time remains, to mitigate its effects as far as humanly possible. Otherwise, we leave a grim legacy to our children and their children. Our responsibility must be for the world forever.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Consultations on Chemical Weapons Prohibition

Following is the text of a communique agreed upon by U.S. and Soviet delegations at Geneva on August 30.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release 76-17 dated August 30

Pursuant to an agreement between the USA and the USSR taken on the basis of the Summit communique of July 3, 1974, consultations were conducted in Geneva between August 16 and August 27, for the purpose of further consideration of issues related to a possible joint initiative in the CCD with respect to the conclusion of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare as a first step toward complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons. The representatives of the U.S. and USSR to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr. and Ambassador V. I. Likhatchev, headed their respective delegations, which included technical experts. Questions, particularly those of a technical nature, linked to the definition of the scope of prohibition and with measures for verification of a possible agreement on chemical weapons, were considered. The discussions of these and several other problems were useful.

The delegations will submit the results of their deliberations to their governments. The consultations will be continued, after due consideration of the issues raised in the course of the discussions, at a time to be determined.

Department Urges Congressional Approval of Agreement With Turkey on Defense Cooperation

Statement by Philip C. Habib
Under Secretary for Political Affairs [1]

I am here today to describe the importance the Administration attaches to restoring a relationship of trust and confidence beween the United States and Turkey, a relationship which has been beneficial to the United States and to Western security interests for almost three decades. Specifically I ask that the committee recommend approval of the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement concluded in Washington on March 26, 1976, and transmitted to the Congress by the President on June 16, 1976.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that this agreement, and a comparable agreement now being negotiated with Greece, are essential elements if we are to refurbish and strengthen our ties with these two close friends and allies. Both agreements replace and supplement earlier mutual defense arrangements with these countries that have proven to be in our national interests. Both are designed to promote our continuing objectives in the vital southeastern flank of NATO and the general area of the eastern Mediterranean. Both have been structured in a way that we believe reflects the needs and sensitivities of these two allies as well as our own basic national interests.

The Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey provides the basis for a reopening of strategic U.S. facilities in Turkey and the continued operation of other U.S. and NATO installations. The new agreement flows directly from our mutual responsibilities and obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. It is consistent with, but not identical to, the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey. Founded on reciprocal respect for the sovereignty of the parties, the new agreement authorizes U.S. participation in defense measures pursuant to article III of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is understood that when the agreement enters into force, activities will resume which were suspended by the Government of Turkey in July 1975, when the Turkish Government requested negotiation of a new defense cooperation agreement.

The agreement provides a mutually acceptable framework for this important security cooperation. The installations authorized by the agreement will be Turkish Armed Forces installations under Turkish command, but the agreement clearly provides for U.S. command and control authority over all U.S. Armed Forces personnel, other members of the U.S. national element at each installation, and U.S. equipment and support facilities.

[1] Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Sept. 15. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The installations shall be operated jointly. In order to facilitate this objective the United States is committed to a program of technical training of Turkish personnel.

Other provisions of the agreement deal with traditional operational and administrative matters, including operation and maintenance of the installations; ceilings on levels of U.S. personnel and equipment; import, export, and in-country supply procedures; status of forces and property questions.

The installations and support facilities which Turkey has made available to the United States over the past 30 years have played an important strategic role. They have provided our easternmost operating base in the NATO area for combat aircraft, as well as major airlift, POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] storage, refueling, supply, training, and communications operations. U.S. intelligence collection in Turkey has allowed the monitoring of Soviet missile testing, has been a primary source of vital early-warning information on Soviet missile and satellite launchings, and has been an important data link on explosions of Chinese and Soviet nuclear devices.

Much of this lost information cannot be duplicated by other systems and sites now available to us. The adverse effect of this intelligence loss increases rather than diminishes with the passage of time, and we do not foresee resolution of the problem by the substitution of other-country sites or more sophisticated technology in the near future. In sum, we need the Turkish facilities.

The agreement provides also for continued U.S. assistance in helping Turkey meet its important NATO defense obligations. The agreement commits the United States to furnish Turkey a total of $1 billion in grants, FMS [foreign military sales] credits, and loan guarantees over a four-year period. However, only one-fifth of this total will be grant aid. The balance, or $800 million, will take the form of Federal Financing Bank loan guarantees, which require an appropriation of only 10 percent of the principal amount of the guaranteed loans.

This level of assistance is modest, given the size of the Turkish military forces and their importance to us as key elements in the North Atlantic Treaty alliance. It is also consistent with past levels of U.S. military assistance to Turkey. It is responsive to U.S. needs in ways and at levels which we think are acceptable to the Congress and the American people.

Security of Mediterranean Region

Mr. Chairman, I need hardly remind this committee of the crucial role of the southeastern flank of Europe in insuring the overall integrity of our common defense. Our position throughout southern Europe and the Near East is dependent on the maintenance of a system of security relationships which we have built up in the eastern Mediterranean and which have served this country well over many years. Turkey's role in this structure is of obvious importance, particularly in light of the increasingly strong Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean area. Turkey shares common borders with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, and it controls the Turkish Straits. Turkey's Armed Force of 500,000 men is the largest of all our NATO partners and requires the Warsaw Pact to devote substantial ground and air forces to this area. Turkey borders on areas of the Middle East and Iran of increasing sensitivity to U.S. interests.

Turkey thus adds major strength to the Western alliance system and is a link to other important U.S. defense relationships in the area. In turn the NATO alliance and the American partnership provide Turkey a bulwark against pressures from its Soviet neighbor, the temptations of neutralism, and a too-close association with radical forces in the Arab world. Our alliance with Turkey and our close bilateral relationship

have thus served our mutual interests, and I believe it is clear to members of the committee from their own contacts with the Turkish leadership that this mutuality of interests should and can continue.

In our view, anything that undercuts these relationships will have the effect of undermining our security and vital interests throughout the Mediterranean region. Our facilities in Turkey have served our interests in many times of crisis, both in the context of NATO and in other areas of the eastern Mediterranean. They have given us mobility, in terms of both access and transit, that is not elsewhere available. Any weakening of this association could thus jeopardize, in times of real crisis, our ability to come to the assistance of our other friends and allies in the Mediterranean. For inevitably a loss of access to facilities in Turkey, both those now suspended and others which continue to function, would not be felt in Turkey alone but would impact on the utility of all our other defense arrangements in the area and on our capacity to be responsive to our commitments.

Mr. Chairman, it is for this, among many reasons, that we are concerned over Turkey's capacity to assist in the common defense. Since the imposition of the arms embargo, and even with the partial relaxation of restrictions subsequently enacted, Turkey's Armed Forces have suffered continued deterioration in their capability to fulfill important NATO responsibilities. Turkey is an active and dedicated participant in the NATO military structure. Its commitment to NATO remains public and strong. But NATO authorities are agreed that, under present U.S. restrictions, Turkey's military capability to conduct sustained combat operations in support of NATO has been impaired. Although several NATO members have acted to help meet this impairment, it is clear that Turkey's ability to maintain its vital contribution to NATO will continue to depend on the flow of equipment from the United States, its major and historic supplier.

We regret that Turkey felt it necessary to suspend the operation of U.S. intelligence facilities in Turkey until new defense cooperation arrangements between us are worked out and approved. These intelligence facilities remain of great importance to the common defense, and we understand the committee will hear separately from other government agencies on this matter. I think we are all agreed, however, that what we are ultimately concerned with here is not only these individual facilities in themselves but also a restoration, through the agreement which we have concluded with Turkey, of an overall political relationship of fundamental significance.

In the postwar period Turkey has made tremendous strides forward in modernizing its economy and in moving toward an open and pluralistic society. Turkey fought with us in Korea. In 1952, with our encouragement, it joined NATO. Turkey's leadership is committed to continuation of the closest possible ties with Western Europe and the United States. These are policy directions we wish to encourage and support. The reestablishment of a close and effective security relationship will give us the means to do this.

Negotiation of Agreement With Greece

Mr. Chairman, in emphasizing the importance of this agreement with Turkey to the overall interests of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean, let me also emphasize our strong view that Greece remains equally important. We are in no sense making a choice for Turkey. We will make no choices among allies. Our security interests, and we believe those of Turkey and Greece as well, require that both countries remain committed to the NATO alliance and to the defense structure that has been served so well by Greek and Turkish participation in the past.

For that reason we seek also to update

and modernize our defense arrangements with Greece. Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister [Dimitrios S.] Bitsios of Greece agreed on a set of principles last April which is now being negotiated into an agreement between the two countries. Unlike Turkey, the Government of Greece has preferred to include all detailed arrangements for our facilities in Greece in appendices to the agreement itself. This has required highly technical and time-consuming discussions to assure that all points are covered to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. Several rounds of negotiations have been held, and a team headed by Ambassador [Jack B.] Kubisch is actively at work in Athens at this time.

The Cyprus Question

Mr. Chairman, at this juncture I would like to say a few words about Cyprus and its relationship to the other subjects I have just been discussing. We are keenly and indeed painfully aware of the adverse implications of the continued impasse on Cyprus and of deepening Greek-Turkish distrust over conditions in the Aegean. American interests have suffered and will continue to suffer so long as this impasse and these conditions continue. So do the basic interests of Greece and Turkey, and those of the alliance as a whole.

For two years the U.S. Government has been in the forefront of efforts to restore peace and stability to Cyprus. We have seized every opportunity to advance the cause of a fair and equitable settlement to this difficult problem. We have worked directly with the parties themselves; we have worked closely with U.N. Secretary General [Kurt] Waldheim; we have worked with our Western allies, who share our firm desire that a satisfactory solution be found.

Secretary Kissinger has given special emphasis to the Cyprus problem in the numerous and frequent encounters he has had with his Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot counterparts; with U.N. Secretary General Waldheim; and in consultations with our major Western allies. In several instances, the stalled negotiating process was set into motion following such an initiative by the Secretary. Unfortunately the history of the talks has been one of brief inconclusive rounds followed by long recesses—during which the position of each side seems to become more rigid and less susceptible to outside efforts at conciliation. The President's five Cyprus reports to Congress record the active efforts of the United States and other parties to convert the Cyprus situation from a series of lost opportunities into a sustained negotiating process which offers promise of a final resolution of this complex problem.

This experience has brought home one immutable fact of the Cyprus situation. The will to achieve results in Cyprus can have no effect unless it is shared by the parties themselves. We and our allies can advance the cause no further than the two Cypriot communities themselves are willing to do. Mutual suspicion and distrust still greatly hinder the parties' ability even to test one another by entering into serious discussions of the outstanding issues. Efforts at a dialogue are bogged down in procedural disagreements.

We do not intend to let our efforts flag. But it is patently evident that a long difficult path lies ahead. Our ability to act as an effective catalyst in this process depends in great measure on the depth and strength of our relationships with the parties involved. Anything that will ameliorate that relationship—anything that will strengthen mutual confidence—will add to our ability to help the parties on a path to an equitable settlement. Conversely, anything which vitiates our ability to so act will reduce the prospects for a reasonable conclusion of the Cyprus question.

An eventual solution will require compromise and new perspectives in the light of practical considerations and recognition that the situation which existed prior to 1974 is forever gone. The two sides must

come to the realization that both must demonstrate statesmanship and flexibility if the Cypriot people are to live again in a stable and secure environment.

The Aegean Dispute

Let me comment similarly but briefly on the situation in the Aegean, where tension has recently received even more headlines than that in Cyprus. The Aegean problem involves deep and complex and emotional differences between Greece and Turkey, differences which we, together with our allies, have tried to help resolve.

On August 25 the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution, cosponsored by the United States, Britain, France, and Italy. The resolution appealed to the parties to exercise utmost restraint in the present situation, to resume direct negotiations over their differences and to seek mutually acceptable solutions, and to take into account the contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the International Court of Justice, are qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences.

The fact that the Security Council was able to adopt a resolution on this controversial matter by consensus represents a very constructive step by the international community. We believe it should help to move Greece and Turkey toward a peaceful solution of this complex dispute. As for the United States, we will continue, as we have in the past, to do everything in our power to urge the parties to settle this matter peacefully.

But I must emphasize again, Mr. Chairman, what is perhaps a truism but which is also basic, and that is that we can play a helpful role, on this or the Cyprus issue, only to the degree that we have a relationship of mutual confidence with both Greece and Turkey. It is that need that our Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey —as well as that with Greece—is designed to serve.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I would like again to emphasize the importance the Administration attaches to having a strong and stable Turkey firmly committed to NATO and the West. Only with a Turkish ally of this kind can our overall Mediterranean policies be firmly anchored. And only with the passage by Congress of a U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement can Turkish-American relations be restored. We ask the support of the Congress, therefore, in dealing with the whole complex of foreign policy issues which I have outlined this morning and which have been so detrimental to our interests for the past two years. All of us want to preserve our friendship and security ties with both Greece and Turkey. All of us want a just and durable Cyprus settlement and a peaceful resolution of the dispute over the Aegean. We believe this process can best begin by congressional approval of the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement and the similar agreement with Greece. I ask your assistance in bringing this about.

Department Testifies on Human Rights in Iran

Statement by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs [1]

The observance of basic human rights in all countries of the world and the willingness and ability of governments to carry out the aims of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the conventions on human rights are important foreign policy objectives of the United States. They are important because they are inherently right. They are important if we are to be true to our traditions and values, to our international obligations, and to the intent of the Congress. Even viewed in terms of realpolitik, we know that the observance or violation of human rights affects the long-term stability of countries and thus affects the realization of U.S. national interests and objectives.

As others of my colleagues have said before me, we must of course, in approaching the issue of human rights in every country, weigh our policies in the light of the totality of our interests in our relations with that country. We must also approach this issue in recognition of the fact that there are wide varieties of social and legal systems throughout the world, extraordinarily diverse cultures, and widely varying historical experiences and political and economic systems.

Our interests in our bilateral relations with Iran, and the ways in which Iranian policies are congruent with and supportive of ours in the Middle East, in South Asia, and globally—all this is a matter of public record which I need not reiterate today.

It is important, however, to put the question of political and civil rights in Iran, which is basically what is before us today, in the perspective of Iran's historical experience and in the context of human rights in Iran in their broadest sense. I ask the subcommittee's indulgence, Mr. Chairman [Representative Donald M. Fraser], in what may at first seem a diversion but what I sincerely believe is directly relevant to an honest examination of the issues. I apologize that some of what I will say covers ground already gone over by Mr. Butler [William J. Butler, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Commission of Jurists] in his thoughtful testimony, but I am sure you will agree that it is important to have in the record executive branch views on some of the points he covered.

Iran, like Turkey and other ancient countries of the Near East, suffered in the 19th century what it regards as indignities at the hands of the West. Accordingly, they are today extraordinarily nationalistic and keenly sensitive to their sovereign rights and their distinctive cultural and political heritage.

Present-day Iran has a legacy of an ancient and complex culture and social system. It is an extraordinarily diverse land, with at least three or four major ethnic and

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[1] Made before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on Sept. 8. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20420.

linguistic groups and wide variations within the population in outlook, aspirations, expectations, and educational levels. It is not an exaggeration to state that for the last 40 to 50 years, Iranian leadership has been involved in the difficult and demanding task of creating and building a modern national state on the foundation of a traditional and, in many ways, feudal civilization.

The task of modernizing a traditional land and people with what were until recently very limited financial resources and a narrow skilled-manpower base is as great in Iran as it has been elsewhere. There have been severe social shocks to the system and disruption in the traditional way of life. The Government of Iran in the last few decades has made great progress in this process but has a long way yet to travel.

There are practices and procedures in Iran's judicial, penal, political, and informational systems which vary considerably from our own. Iran's legal system, for example, has for about 75 years been based on the Napoleonic Code, but it operates in a country whose very long history includes cultural, religious, and political systems which are in no way linked to Western traditions. Mixed with the Napoleonic Code are Islamic traditions and local customs. Among the latter, one of the most relevant to our discussion is the country's history of strong central leadership—a monarchical tradition that dates back 2,500 years.

However, we share with modern-day Iran many aspirations and hopes for our respective peoples, and this has been one of the bases for the particularly close and mutually beneficial relationship which has been firmly established over the last three decades.

The Shah of Iran for nearly two decades has been instituting what was first called the White Revolution and, later, the Shah-People Revolution. Whether it be called a revolution or a forced evolution, one thing is clear: Iran is undergoing a massive process of change in every sphere of human enterprise.

What I will sketch out here are some of the efforts which are being made rapidly to transform this traditional society into a modern one. Iranian leaders face major problems and would be the first to admit that their country has far to go to cope with all of them. The programs they have instituted can be considered very impressive efforts to raise the conditions of life for the Iranian people.

Economic and Social Reforms

Land reform was among the most visibly successful elements of the social and economic reform instituted in the 1960's. In the first phase of land reform in 1962, nearly 600,000 farm families received titles to the land they were tilling for the large, in many cases absentee, landholders. In the second phase five years later, over 2 million farmers benefited from land distribution. One can roughly estimate that a third or more of the population was beneficially affected by these major initiatives.

Another major area of beneficial change resulted from the new Literacy Corps, which was first dispatched to the countryside in 1963. Since that time, approximately 100,000 young Iranians, over 10,000 of whom are women, have worked in the villages, teaching the children and adults to read and write and to acquire a number of other skills.

Perhaps one of the most significant features politically and socially of this effort has been bringing together the newly educated class in the corps with remote villagers. A result of this has been the spreading of new or modern ideas and concepts and presenting visible evidence that the leaders of government were concerned about the development of the nation's human resources. This has not always been the case in Iran's long history. Also, an unexpected dividend of this experience is that thousands of the corpsmen and women have elected to become teachers.

The success of the Literacy Corps, which has been popular in the villages, led in 1964 to the creation of the Health Corps

to bring medical care to rural areas where there were no doctors. In the 12 years that have followed, over 9,000 Health Corpsmen—about one-third doctors and the remainder trained medical assistants—have given regularly scheduled outpatient treatment from rural clinics and by the use of mobile vans. A Women's Health Corps has recently been formed, which will emphasize family planning.

The Health Corps program is universally popular in Iran, for it provides a service which everyone wants. It has been one more effort to meet the felt needs of the people.

The Extension and Development Corps is the last of these unique institutions—so reminiscent of our own Peace Corps—that I will mention today. This organization was envisioned as successor to the agricultural extension program which had been heavily emphasized during the period of American Point 4 aid to Iran. It was announced simultaneously with the Health Corps in September 1964 (although the first teams did not go to the field until May 1965) and was expected to function in tandem with that program and with the Literacy Corps. Service requirements are the same: 4 months of training and 14 months of service in a village. University-trained agronomists and veterinarians serve as second lieutenants, and high school graduates are extension agents with the rank of sergeant.

The Extension and Development Corps was to bring to the rural areas of Iran, in the Shah's words, "development, prosperity, advanced agricultural methods and a new method of social thinking." Roughly 5,000 corpsmen are serving, and the total number who have taken part in the program is over 24,000.

One of the most serious problems traditionally faced by farmers in Iran (and in many other developing countries) was access to a reasonably equitable juridical process to settle disputes. Traditionally, the landlord or his agent imposed a decision, or the headman of the village negotiated the dispute. The only appeal from the landlord's decision was to the courts in a town or city, but the time and money involved effectively removed this form of potential redress from most of the peasantry.

To remedy this situation, the House of Equity decree was issued in December 1963. It provided for the election by secret ballot of three chief judges and two alternates from a list of villagers to serve as a village court. An interesting interconnection of these various reforms is that the Literacy Corpsman generally serves as the secretary to the court. These village courts are empowered to try all financial disputes involving less than 5,000 rials (about $70) and to adjudicate cases such as inheritance, trespass, adultery, breach of promise, water sharing, and land boundaries—in other words, elemental disputes that often ravage villages and lead to violence. A somewhat similar concept has now been introduced in over 200 towns in Iran.

The most controversial reform when it was first brought up in 1962 involved voting rights, for it involved giving women the vote as well and generally improving their status in society. Whereas land reform benefited all the farmers working land where they lived, the advent of women's suffrage was unpalatable to all but the most liberal Iranians in all walks of life.

As in all social reforms, progress in women's rights has been gradual; laws have been passed giving women the right to hold property and to sue for divorce for cause, but social attitudes have changed more gradually than the laws. But the changes in the status of Iranian women, particularly in the cities, are impressive.

Programs To Benefit City Dwellers and Workers

Mr. Chairman, I have selected the above reforms out of the 17 which are included in the Shah-People Revolution because they relate directly to a number of fundamental economic and social rights: justice and equity for the farmers and villagers through land reform and village courts; increased literacy, without which no coun-

try can prosper; new efforts to provide health care; assistance in other forms of rural development; and improvement in the status of women. In sum, they amount to a significant improvement in the human rights of millions of Iranians.

Except for the voting reform, these reforms and most of the others of the 1960's largely benefited the rural areas where the vast bulk of the population still lives.

However, in Iran in recent years, as in all rapidly developing countries, the movement to the city from the countryside is altering the demographic balance. The Government of Iran is now facing the very problems—and the benefits—we all face with urbanization. Tehran, for example, is now a city of over 4 million people, whereas two decades ago the population would have numbered only several hundred thousand. Our own experience shows that there are no panaceas for the problems confronting the new urban proletariat. However, having made major changes in the rural areas, the government is now attempting to meet the needs of the city dweller and worker.

An early reform was a profit-sharing scheme which called for employers to pay bonuses to their workers based either on gross income, net profit, or production levels. A rough estimate is that 270,000 workers are benefiting from the program. The most recent addition to the reform program took place last year when the Iranian Government set in motion a stock divestiture program under which up to 49 percent of stock in a particular industry will be offered to workers and farmers. It is too early to say what the results of this bold plan will be, but it is reflective of the government's intent to provide ownership-participation and new benefits to the industrial worker.

In addition to these reforms—which I again note are a part of the Shah-People Revolution—the government has introduced a wide variety of measures aimed at implementing the social and economic rights of its people.

The prices of many staples—flour, salt, and sugar, for example—are heavily subsidized by the government to keep them within reach of even the less well-off citizen. The government spends approximately $1 billion per year on this program.

Education is now free through the high school level, and a very large scholarship program provides for free college education. There are approximately 20,000 Iranians studying in this country, many of them with Iranian governmental financial assistance.

A new social security system, patterned on our own social security law, has been introduced.

There is a wide variety of other social and economic improvements which are being implemented or which will be commenced in the near future.

I will not go into further detail at this time, but you may be interested to know that of Iran's anticipated expenditure of $92.5 billion (excludes foreign loan repayments, foreign investments by Iran, and miscellaneous items and welfare support; the latter item consists largely of the government's food commodity support program) in the current five-year plan, approximately 55 percent is dedicated to what can be fairly viewed as directly contributing to the social and economic betterment of the people. Per capita income is about $1,600, compared to only $700 a few years ago. The rich are getting richer, but even a short visit to Iran reveals much better than dry statistics that a substantial middle class is developing and more people have more disposable income.

Mr. Chairman, I have briefly touched upon some key elements of the programs and actions of the Government of Iran for two reasons:

1. The first is to draw more attention to the significant degree of social change which is bubbling in this traditional society and the major strides taken toward fulfillment of goals addressed in the international documents on human rights.

2. The second point I wish to make is that Iran is clearly in a period of major social change. The people who have bettered their lives, or have a reasonable expectation of doing so, are many. But other forces have also been deeply affected by the change—the vested interests whose power in society and body politic has been reduced or eliminated. In many societies, the position of traditional power elites is very frequently undermined by the process of change. In fact, modernization in the best sense of that word is possible only if the grip of older elites is loosened or a unique consensus of old and new is achieved. In Iran the large landholders and the leaders of large tribal groups have seen the bases of their strength severely eroded by land reform and the other reforms which I previously mentioned. The religiously conservative elements in the society, powerful in varying degrees in all Moslem countries, have at times vigorously opposed the whole process of modernization, which they consider to be sectarian and anti-Islamic.

The voting rights proposal referred to earlier, for example, brought about large-scale rioting in the streets of Tehran in 1963. These riots, which were put down with force by the government, had been organized by a leading cleric who exploited the strong antifeminist sentiment in the society.

Extremist Opposition Movements

There is another important source of opposition to the Iranian changes of recent years. To this day, Mr. Chairman, the Government of Iran is confronted by the opposition—using at times brutal and harsh methods—of extremists from the Left and the Right.

I will not go into a long presentation on the development of the Communist or radical leftist movements in Iran, but let me recall that large parts of northern and western Iran were occupied by Soviet forces between 1941 and 1946. This was the second occupation in this century by Russian forces of significant parts of Iran. In the war years the Soviet Union actively encouraged and abetted separatist movements in these areas and substantially helped in the development of an Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh Party, which owed its principal allegiance at that time to the Soviet Union.

In the latter stage of Prime Minister Mossadegh's government in 1953, the Tudeh Party was virtually in control of and had organized a broad conspiracy throughout the country. When the Shah reasserted his control, the Tudeh Party and the advocacy of communism were outlawed. The advocacy of communism is still a crime, and the accused are tried in the military courts.

Thus the Government of Iran has faced during the past 30 years strong opposition from an extreme leftist movement, tied in various ways to the outside, and opposition from the indigenous, extremely traditional forces who resent change and modernity.

As I noted above, the opposition to the Government of Iran has frequently taken a violent and brutal turn. By this I mean terrorist actions, which we saw senselessly reflected only a week ago in the murders of three American civilians.

Terrorism as a form of political action is not a new phenomenon in Iranian history. It has long historical and cultural roots. Since the 1960's a number of separate terrorist groups whose principal platform has been the violent overthrow of the regime have come and gone, but this phenomenon continues. The victims of the terrorists have included an Iranian Prime Minister, numerous police and government officials, and six Americans. Plots to kidnap the Empress of Iran and the Crown Prince were uncovered, and several efforts to murder the Shah were made. You will also recall that in 1949 the Shah was wounded by a terrorist attack. Relatively little is known about the numbers of terrorists involved—they are not particularly

large, we are told—but through stealth and individual murder, they are able to make their presence felt.

Neither do we know a great deal about the various political programs of these groups, for their principal motivation appears to be the destruction of the current society and its leaders; these groups have not promoted constructive alternatives. It appears that, in effect, the terrorists come from two ideological currents—one extreme leftist if not neo-anarchist, and the other strongly influenced by extreme religious conservatism.

At times there have appeared to be two separate movements, both of which can be hazily linked to earlier terrorist organizations. But it also appears that the two groups have often worked together in individual political murders and may in fact be wings of the same movement brought together in a loose federation—having in common their hatred of the regime. We do know that elements representing at least one of these groups were involved in the murder of the two American colonels last year in Tehran.

It is also very clear that in addition to the indigenous support that the terrorists receive, they have established links with a variety of terrorist movements abroad and have received substantial financial assistance and very large quantities of arms. In recent successful attacks on terrorist safehouses in Tehran, large caches of foreign arms—machineguns, hand grenades, pistols, et cetera—have been found, as well as sums of money.

All of us have been horrified by the Lod massacre, the murders at the Olympic games, the numerous hijackings of civilian airliners, and the numerous individual assassinations, including the murder of American Ambassadors and other officials, which have taken place throughout the world. The media, except on rare occasions, have not paid as much attention, quite understandably, to the fact that the Iranian leadership is faced today, and has been faced for many years, with a terrorist movement which need not take second place to any group in its brutality. This problem—this cancer—must be kept in mind when we view events in Iran.

Investigation and Trial Procedures

In view of these disruptions and their threat to the security of the state and to its leaders, the Government of Iran through its legislative processes has determined that persons charged with actions against the security of the state or of actions against official persons and property will be tried by the military court system.

The International Commission of Jurists and others have criticized this procedure and have made a number of charges concerning the treatment given to people who fall within the military court system. The procedures of that court system do not, in fact, meet the criteria set forth in relevant international conventions or those we have established for our court systems, although the courts do operate according to Iranian law.

Investigating authorities in Iran have the power to detain suspects during investigations of alleged crimes without formal charges being immediately placed. Detention for persons involved in crimes having to do with state security can either last only a few hours for the initial questioning—which is probably the case for the vast majority of cases—or up to one to four months for the rare fuller investigations of detainees on whom prima facie evidence of a crime has been gathered or who have a previous record.

When formal charges are made, the accused has a right to select counsel from a list and, to the best of my knowledge, this right is generally observed in practice. If the accused prisoner does not make a choice of counsel from the list, the court appoints counsel.

We understand that visits from family and friends are not permitted during the investigatory stage but that during the

trial and later, if the individual is sentenced, such visits are generally permitted.

We have also seen reports from individuals who claim that torture has been used in the investigatory period. While we have no direct verifiable evidence of this, it is difficult to discount the many persistent reports, particularly in the context of terrorist violence, that there have been cases of harsh methods being used by the Iranian police and security services. I do not condone such treatment in the Iranian system or any other system. I simply must reiterate again the context of the charges. Most of the charges of torture are at least two to three years old. The only recent charges, largely made by Iranians abroad, all concerned terrorists who were allegedly killed or maimed under torture.

As Mr. Butler noted, it is very difficult to obtain information on this situation. However, in a number of specific cases that our Embassy in Tehran has been able to examine, we have found that many of those alleged to have been tortured had been killed or wounded in armed exchanges with the security forces or suffered wounds during the clandestine preparation of explosives.

I should at the same time point out that while the Iranian penal code imposes severe penalties on those who order or practice torture, we have no information on cases where these penalties have been imposed.

Political Crimes and Sentences

Mr. Chairman, a fair amount has been written about the number of "political prisoners," and in your invitation to me you requested that I comment on this matter. There is no precise definition of the term "political prisoner" in the Iranian context, but there may well be a number—perhaps 100 to 150—who would fall within the definition in your letter; that is, "persons who have been detained, arrested or punished for their beliefs or opinions but who have neither used nor advocated violence."

As I said earlier, membership in a Communist movement or the advocacy of communism is illegal under Iranian law. I simply do not know how many persons are jailed for what we would consider normal political dissent. I am reasonably certain that the large majority of prisoners who have gone through the military court system were convicted for involvement in planning or carrying out violent acts against the security of the state or overtly engaged in acts of terrorism or were associated in some way with the terrorists. The number of such people in prison today is probably in the range of 2,800 to 3,500.

Iran has for some years had an amnesty program, and this month 307 prisoners convicted by military tribunals were released to commemorate the golden jubilee of the Pahlavi dynasty, as were nearly 1,800 persons convicted in civil courts for various offenses. Earlier this year 247 persons convicted in military courts were pardoned and released. This is the largest single group in recent times, as far as I am aware, but each year substantial numbers of prisoners who were not directly involved in terrorist murders have been amnestied. Last year over 200 were released.

We estimate that over 90 percent of the ex-members of the Tudeh Party who were arrested have been released and integrated into the society. In fact, in one recent Cabinet, two members were ex-Tudeh Party members.

You also wished me to comment upon the number of persons convicted of "political crimes" and the sentences which they have received. We have no information on the numbers convicted, but sentences have ranged from a few years to life imprisonment and to the death sentence. In his report Mr. Butler wrote that of the 424 prisoners whose names were listed, ". . . 75 have been executed, 55 have been given life sentences, 33 have been sentenced to between 10 and 15 years imprisonment and others have been given lesser sentences." Mr. Butler's statistics are probably within a reasonable order of magnitude, but let

me add that recently an American journalist from a major U.S. newspaper visited an Iranian prison and was introduced to and interviewed a number of prisoners who opponents of the Government of Iran have long claimed had died in prison from torture.

The Iranian criminal code specifically calls for the death penalty for persons involved in actions against internal security which result in the death of others or in the destruction of major government property. Conspiracy to commit such crimes can result in sentences of up to three years. Violence against an individual which does not result in his death has been punishable by from three to five years of hard labor, but a recent law has required a minimum sentence of five years for crimes involving a threat to state security.

In addition to the executions referred to by Mr. Butler, a number of others found guilty in the courts have been executed this year in conformance with the law. Among these were the chief planner and some of the persons actively involved in the murder of the two American colonels last year.

The Iranian Government also deals firmly with other acts of terrorism. A couple of years ago, Iraqi terrorists who hijacked a plane to Iran were tried and executed under Iranian law.

Mr. Chairman, I would like briefly to address two other questions which you put to me and to submit as an enclosure to this statement, in order to save time, answers to a few other matters in which you have shown interest. I would be glad to answer questions on those matters as well.

We believe that the Iranian Government has no doubt as to U.S. views on the observance of human rights. The Iranian Government is also aware of the legislation in which you have played a prominent role, Mr. Chairman.

However, we have not made official representations to Iran on the condition of human rights in that country for two reasons. First, we believe that the administration of Iranian judicial and penal systems is above all a matter of internal Iranian responsibility and that one sovereign country should not interfere lightly in another's domestic affairs. This is admittedly a matter of fine judgment on which there can be honest differences. In reaching our judgment, we have also taken into account the remarkable progress which has been made in Iran in many areas of human rights as well as the unique and extraordinarily difficult problems of terrorism and other manifestations of social disruption. If Iran's internal practices in matters relating to human rights were a growing affront to international standards, we would of course reconsider our judgment. The trend appears to us, however, to be in the opposite direction.

In applying section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act to Iran, we are about to begin the formulation of fiscal year 1978 security assistance programs. Available evidence regarding Iran's observance of internationally recognized human rights will be taken into account in this process, and a report to Congress on human rights in Iran will accompany our fiscal year 1978 legislative request.

The human rights situation in Iran was considered by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1975. The Commission members determined that there was not sufficient evidence presented to the Commission on which to base further action. The Commission adopted the following consensus decision: "The Commission decides that in the case of Iran, no action is called for under [Economic and Social] Council resolution 1503."

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States no longer has economic or military assistance programs with Iran, although Iran has purchased through the foreign military sales system a substantial amount of military equipment to strengthen its security and to permit it to play a responsible security role in the area.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I credit

Iranian leadership for its considerable skill and hard work in developing the land and training the people so that all Iranians will in time have a better life. Because this goal is violently opposed by both the extreme Left and the extreme Right without regard for the rights of their victims, there have been times that practices and procedures to deal with that opposition which we could not approve for ourselves have taken place. But when I place these in the broad context which I have tried to develop for you today, I believe that the advances which have been made in improving the human rights of the broad majority of Iran's population under considerable adversity far outweigh such abuses as have occurred in an attempt to control the violent challenges to the government.

U.S.-Republic of Korea Convention on Taxation Transmitted to Senate

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification, the Convention signed at Seoul on June 4, 1976, between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Encouragement of International Trade and Investment, together with a related exchange of notes.

There is no convention on this subject presently in force between the United States and Korea.

The Convention follows generally the form and content of most conventions of this type recently concluded by the United States. Its primary purpose is to identify clearly the tax interests of the two countries to avoid double taxation and to help prevent the illegal evasion of taxation.

For the information of the Senate, I also transmit, a covering report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention.

This Convention would promote closer economic cooperation and more active trade between the United States and Korea.

I urge the Senate to act favorably at an early date on this Convention and its related exchange of notes and to give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 3, 1976.*

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 2d Session

Disaster Assistance in Angola. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations. November 5, 1975–March 10, 1976. 207 pp.

Human Rights in Indonesia and the Philippines. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. December 18, 1975–May 3, 1976. 119 pp.

Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. Part I. March 17–25, 1976. 110 pp.

Proposed Sale of C–130's to Egypt. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 31–April 2, 1976. 121 pp.

To Require Certain Actions by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the House Committee on International Relations. May 25–June 8, 1976. 180 pp.

Anti-Semitism and Reprisals Against Jewish Emigration in the Soviet Union. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. May 27, 1976. 26 pp.

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[1] Transmitted on Sept. 3 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 6); also printed as S. Ex. P, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the convention and the exchange of notes and the report of the Department of State.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952; for the United States August 18, 1972. TIAS 7465.
Adherences deposited: Mexico, May 26, 1976; Papua New Guinea, June 1, 1976.

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975.[1]
Signatures: Bolivia, Portugal, July 15, 1976; India, July 16, 1976; Indonesia, Kenya, July 22, 1976; Peru, July 23, 1976; Ireland, Jamaica, July 26, 1976.
Ratifications deposited: Sweden, July 7, 1976; Trinidad and Tobago, July 2, 1976.
Acceptance deposited: Peru, August 31, 1976.

Conservation

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done at Oslo November 15, 1973. Entered into force May 26, 1976.[2]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: September 15, 1976.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea, August 30, 1976.

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: September 15, 1976.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. Entered into force December 6, 1975.[2]
Ratifications deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 23, 1976; Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, September 1, 1976.
Senate advice and consent to ratification: September 15, 1976.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea, August 30, 1976.

Inter-American Development Bank

Agreement establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington April 8, 1959. Entered into force December 30, 1959. TIAS 4397.
Signatures: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, July 9, 1976.
Acceptances deposited: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany,[3] Israel, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom,[3] Yugoslavia, July 9, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Denmark, July 9, 1976.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Israel, August 25, 1976.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.
Ratification deposited: Indonesia, September 3, 1976.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Ratification deposited: Indonesia, September 3, 1976.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Notification of succession: Bahamas, August 31, 1976.

Seals

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 3948). Done at Washington March 17, 1976.[1]
Senate advice and consent to ratification: September 15, 1976.

Seals—Antarctic

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972.[1]

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[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.
[3] With statements.

Senate advice and consent to ratification: September 15, 1976.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.
Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, September 8, 1976.

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.[1]
Signature: Singapore, August 31, 1976.

Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Romania, September 3, 1976.
Senate advice and consent to ratification: September 15, 1976.

Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force January 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.
De facto application: Angola, November 11, 1975; Cape Verde, July 5, 1975; Guinea-Bissau, September 10, 1974; Mozambique, June 25, 1975; Sao Tome and Principe, July 12, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Nigeria, September 15, 1976.
Accession deposited: Syria, September 15, 1976.

BILATERAL

Republic of China

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Washington September 15, 1976. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by exchange of notes.

Ecuador

Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Quito August 17 and September 3, 1976. Entered into force September 3, 1976.

Indonesia

Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta August 3 and 24, 1976. Entered into force August 24, 1976.

Kenya

Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Nairobi August 10 and 24, 1976. Entered into force August 24, 1976.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of February 18, 1976 (TIAS 8261). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul August 9, 1976. Entered into force August 9, 1976.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of September 12, 1975, to indemnify and safeguard the U.S. Government, its personnel and contractors for liability arising out of aircraft operations training in support of the cooperative program to curb illegal narcotics traffic. Effected by exchange of letters at México August 13, 1976. Entered into force August 13, 1976.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 7, 1975 (TIAS 8189). Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad August 10, 1976. Entered into force August 10, 1976.

Poland

Agreement amending and extending the air transport agreement of July 19, 1972 (TIAS 7535). Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw August 26, 1976. Enters into force November 1, 1976.

Swaziland

Arrangement for radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Mbabane July 7 and August 20, 1976. Entered into force September 19, 1976.

United Kingdom

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signature, and exchange of notes. Signed at London June 8, 1972.[1]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: September 10, 1976.

[1] Not in force.

[1] Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

The United States Passport, Past, Present, Future. History of the U.S. passport including issuance authority; regular passports; no-fee passports; fees; documents in lieu of passports; passport application processing equipment; and Passport Office policies. Includes list of exhibits, tables, glossary, and index. Pub. 8851. Department and Foreign Service Series 153. 242 pp. $5.10. (Cat. No. S1.69:8851). (Stock No. 044-000-01608-7).

Double Taxation—Taxes on Income. Convention, with related letters, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 8225. 36 pp. 50¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8225).

Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Convention with Other Governments. TIAS 8226. 60 pp. 75¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8226).

Energy—Long Term Cooperation Program. Agreement with other governments. TIAS 8229. 84 pp. 95¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8229).

Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 8230. 30 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8230).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with Ireland extending the agreement of June 28 and 29, 1973. TIAS 8239. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8239).

Early Warning System—Privileges and Immunities. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8241. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8241).

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Iran. TIAS 8242. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8242).

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: September 13–19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*430	9/13	International initiatives relating to the ozone layer.
*431	9/13	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on container transport, Oct. 13.
†432	9/13	Kissinger: departure, Andrews Air Force Base.
433	9/13	Green: Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Sept. 10.
*434	9/14	Advisory Panel on Folk Music and Jazz, Oct. 14.
†435	9/14	Kissinger: arrival, Dar es Salaam.
†436	9/15	U.S. and Republic of China sign new fisheries agreement.
†437	9/15	Kissinger: news conference, Dar es Salaam.
†438	9/16	Robinson: Conference Board, New York, N.Y.
†439	9/16	Kissinger, Mwale: arrival, Lusaka.
*440	9/17	Study Group 7 of the U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee, Oct. 5.
*441	9/17	SCC, Oct. 19.
*442	9/17	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Program, Oct. 27–28.
†443	9/16	Kaunda, Kissinger: remarks, Lusaka.
*444	9/17	Program for the state visit of President William R. Tolbert of Liberia.
*445	9/17	U.S.-Italian scientific meeting on Sept. 16 on release of toxic substances at Seveso in July.
†446	9/17	Kissinger: statement on Law of the Sea Conference.
†447	9/17	Kissinger: departure statement and news conference, Lusaka.
†448	9/19	Kissinger: remarks following meeting with Rhodesian delegation at U.S. Embassy residence, Pretoria.
†449	9/19	Kissinger: remarks following meeting with Rhodesian delegation at South African Prime Minister's residence.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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