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The Challenges of Africa

Address by Secretary Kissinger[1]

I am proud to speak before this remarkable group that so well embodies the American tradition of humane concern combined with practical action. And I want to add my voice to the tribute you have paid two great Americans in presenting the A. Philip Randolph award to Roy Wilkins. These men have demonstrated vividly the qualities of courage and vision which have built this country and made it a champion of democratic and compassionate principles around the world.

I have come here today to talk about Africa—one of the compelling concerns of our time.

When we read of young African students killed in riots, of guerrilla raids, of refugee camps attacked in reprisal, the reality lies not in the cold statistics that the media report. In Africa, it is the death of men, women, and children; it means hopes extinguished and dreams shattered. The grand issues of strategy or the complexity of negotiations are no consolation to innocent, brutalized victims.

As long as these conflicts fester, Africans of all races will be caught up in a widening and escalating cycle of violence. Until these wars are ended, Africa faces a future of danger, anguish, and growing risks of foreign intervention.

This is why I will leave on Friday to continue discussions on the President's behalf with the Prime Minister of South Africa. This trip will be the next step in an intensive diplomatic effort ushered in by my visit to Africa in April. Under Secretary of State [for Economic Affairs William D.] Rogers and Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs William E.] Schaufele have just returned from a mission to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and Zaïre, where they met with the Presidents of those African nations most affected by events in southern Africa—the third such mission in three months. In close collaboration with Great Britain, a serious effort by this country is now underway. We shall use our power and influence to help resolve the burning conflicts of southern Africa which now sunder Africa's peace, unity, and hopes for progress.

Nearly a third of the world's some 150 sovereign nations are on the continent of Africa. Africa's independence—now barely 20 years old—has transformed the character and scope of international affairs. African nations play a major role in international institutions; their importance to the world economy is growing; the interdependence of Africa and the industrialized world is obvious. Thus, conflict in Africa has political, security, and economic implications that reach far beyond the continent itself.

The relationship between the United States and Africa is unique. We were never a colonial power, but America's character and destiny have been permanently shaped by our involvement in a tragic aspect of

[1] Made before the convention of Opportunities Industrialization Centers (OIC) at Philadelphia, Pa., on Aug. 31 (text from press release 403).

Africa's past. Twenty-three million black citizens testify to this heritage, and all the American people have been profoundly affected by it. In this generation, the affirmation of equality and black dignity in America has coincided with the assertions of black nationhood in Africa. Both represent a great human struggle for freedom; both compel our support if America's principles are to have meaning.

The United States is the only country which can speak to all sides in southern Africa's current conflicts. We seek no special place for ourselves and thus have an influence that can be important for a peaceful outcome. That position carries with it a great responsibility to promote fair and lasting solutions. Our values, our own self-interest in an Africa that lives in peace and racial harmony, and our abiding commitment to peace and world order permit us no other course.

America's contribution to peace and progress in Africa cannot depend on good will and good intentions alone. Nor can our policy be confined to one continent. Our ability to act effectively in Africa reflects in large measure our standing in the world —our strength, our vision, and our reputation for reliability and steadfastness.

It is with great satisfaction, therefore, that I can tell you that America's foreign relations are prospering and dynamic; that the American people are clearly prepared to do their part in helping shape a better and freer world:

—Today we are at peace for the first time in over a decade. No American is in combat anywhere in the world.

—We have the world's strongest and technologically most advanced military establishment.

—Our relations with our allies in North America, Western Europe, and Japan have never been better. Our close cooperation on a wide range of political and economic issues now reinforces our traditional concern with collective security.

—We have established durable new relations with China, the world's most populous nation. This relationship will hold great significance for global stability and progress as we continue to broaden it in the years to come.

—We are on the road to bringing peace to the Middle East after unprecedented progress in recent years.

—We have reduced the levels of tension with the Soviet Union, resolved some conflicts, and begun to push back the specter of nuclear war. We have slowed the strategic arms race; and there is hope that we may soon, for the first time in history, set a firm ceiling on the total number of strategic nuclear weapons of the two major nuclear powers.

—And we have begun a comprehensive and promising dialogue with the nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa on fundamental questions of economic equity and progress.

In short, America has come through a decade and more of travail with unmatched strength and resiliency and with a reinforced dedication to the cause of freedom. America with its vast strength remains the hope of the world; America with its optimism and energy remains the tide of the future.

And we ourselves have much at stake. Never before has the well-being of Americans been so affected by events abroad. Our own peace and safety depend on global security; our prosperity at home depends on a flourishing global economy.

Nowhere are contemporary events moving more rapidly than in Africa. Within recent months southern Africa has faced an imminent, seemingly inescapable prospect of widening violence, economic disarray, and a virulent new form of colonialism. The Soviet Union and its Cuban surrogate took upon themselves the right of massive military intervention. Time has been running out fast for negotiated solutions—the only alternative to mounting warfare which could embitter and burden the region for generations to come.

Change has come to Africa with astonishing swiftness. Thirty years ago, much of

Africa was the dominion of European powers; today we see a continent of 49 independent nations struggling against time, against the elements, and against the forces of instability, to consolidate their nationhood.

Africa seeks to achieve three fundamental goals: self-determination and racial justice in southern Africa, economic development and progress for all of Africa, and the preservation of the continent's unity and integrity against outside interference and great-power rivalry.

The pace of change has accelerated in the last two years in every dimension:

—The sudden collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire wrought fundamental changes in southern Africa. The remaining outposts of colonialism were placed in an untenable position. But civil war within the liberation movement in Angola, Soviet-Cuban intervention, and the continuing massive Cuban military presence in Angola raised the danger that foreign powers acting for their own ends would seek to impose solutions to all the problems of southern Africa.

—New efforts to find negotiated solutions for the racial conflicts in Rhodesia and Namibia failed. The forces for moderation in black Africa risked becoming irrelevant. The peoples of southern Africa were menaced by a mounting spiral of action and reprisal. A course of violence from which no nation was safe had been set in motion.

—Worldwide recession and the sharp rise in oil prices had a drastic impact on the poorest nations, many of them African. Development plans were crippled by the fall of export earnings and by the surge of prices for fuel, fertilizer, and other key imports. New cycles of drought and famine halted economic progress and intensified the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people.

Against this ominous backdrop, President Ford, last April, decided on a new American initiative in support of peace, racial justice, prosperity, and independence for Africa. Our offer of help and constructive influence was strongly encouraged by the leaders of Africa.

With wisdom and flexibility by the parties involved, and with the support of the American people, we have a chance to contribute to a turning point in the history of Africa. We can, if we will, participate in a new birth of independence and racial peace; we can, if we will, help shape a new international dedication to Africa's economic development; and we can, if we will, contribute to an Africa strong and free of the threat of outside intervention.

There is no guarantee that our current diplomatic effort will succeed. It would be naive to suggest that a peaceful solution to issues so surrounded by passions is inevitable. But whatever the immediate outcome, let it never be said that the United States did not exert itself with energy and determination in the cause of peace, freedom, and human dignity at a moment of need and opportunity.

Let me discuss with you what has been achieved, and what yet remains to be done.

Southern Africa

Most urgent has been the mounting racial conflict of southern Africa—in Rhodesia, in Namibia, and in the Republic of South Africa itself.

The white minority regime in Rhodesia, representing only some 4 percent of the population, is not recognized by a single government—not even by neighboring South Africa. Its unilateral declaration of independence from Britain in November 1965 is regarded as illegal by every member of the world community. Three U.S. Administrations have supported Britain throughout its long effort to restore its constitutional authority; Britain has been—and remains—committed to grant independence only under conditions of majority rule.

Early this year, negotiations between the illegal white minority regime and moderate black nationalist leaders broke down. Guer-

rilla action intensified; rapidly escalating violence threatened to engulf the region.

While Rhodesia is the most immediately dangerous problem, Namibia is also of urgent concern.

From 1920, South Africa administered the former German colony of South West Africa under a League of Nations mandate. In 1966, the U.N. General Assembly concluded that South Africa was violating important obligations. As a result, the United Nations, with U.S. support, terminated South Africa's mandate. The United Nations assumed direct responsibility for the territory. South Africa, however, stayed on. In 1971, the International Court of Justice concluded that South Africa's occupation was illegal, that it must immediately withdraw, and that no country should recognize, support, or assist South Africa in Namibia.

The United States has consistently supported the conclusions of the Court and the resolutions of the Security Council.

The latest resolution, which passed unanimously last January, calls on South Africa to comply with the Court's conclusions, to declare its acceptance of free elections under U.N. supervision and control, and to respect the rights of Namibians and the responsibility of the United Nations. The Security Council decided to review South Africa's compliance on or before today, August 31, 1976.

Namibia, like Rhodesia, contains the seeds of greater conflict. There, too, time is running out. With thousands of foreign troops north of the Namibian border and with intensifying warfare in Rhodesia, a volatile situation is emerging.

And in South Africa itself, the recent outbreaks of racial violence have underscored the inevitable instability of a system that institutionalizes human inequality in a way repugnant to the world's conscience.

Therefore, in Lusaka, Zambia, in April, on behalf of President Ford I put forward an American initiative which addressed the full sweep of the crisis in southern Africa:

—We promised that we would actively support [U.K. Prime Minister James] Callaghan's proposal for majority rule in Rhodesia in two years or less. We urged the African parties involved to pursue a negotiated settlement in which black and white could coexist and cooperate. We stated our readiness to assist a new Rhodesia—Zimbabwe—to overcome economic dislocations so that it could effectively take its place in the community of nations.

—We urged South Africa to set a date for Namibian independence and to broaden the political process. In our view, *all* the political groups of Namibia should be permitted to express themselves freely, under U.N. supervision, and to participate in shaping the constitutional and political future of their country.

—And I restated on African soil America's rejection of the principle and practice of apartheid. I called on South Africa to demonstrate its commitment to peace and harmony on the continent by facilitating early solutions in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Unmistakable progress has been made since this American initiative:

—The character of our relationship with black Africa has been transformed. Our dialogue with the nations of black Africa has become close and intensive. Mutual confidence and respect between America and black Africa have grown substantially. We are now seen as active agents in the process toward independence, self-determination, justice, and human dignity in Africa, not as passive observers.

—Since my talks with Prime Minister Vorster in June, South Africa has publicly proclaimed its support for majority rule in Rhodesia—an important step forward.

—In Namibia, the constitutional conference organized by South Africa has recently proposed a date of December 31, 1978, for Namibia's independence, conceding the vital principles of independence and majority rule. The means and processes by which the country moves to independence must still be worked out between

ne interested parties, but the fact that Namibia will shortly be independent is in itself a major breakthrough.

These significant developments show that progress is possible. But the obstacles to a negotiated settlement remain formidable.

In Rhodesia, it is now vital to bring together the leaders of black Africa, the various liberation movements, South Africa, and of the Rhodesian regime on a common program. Namibia will not be removed from the world's agenda of crises until a means and a forum are found for working out Namibia's political future on the basis of participation by *all* authentic groups.

The situation in South Africa continues to be highly volatile; it not only poses a threat of intensified suffering within that country but also threatens South Africa's ability to assist constructively in solutions for Rhodesia and Namibia.

The task of diplomacy is to find the common ground among the differing objectives of the multitude of nations and groups involved. Our consultations have convinced us that there *is* common ground. But all parties must overcome the legacy of generations of mistrust; all must keep in mind that the desire to achieve everything at once may frustrate the significant progress which may now be attainable.

We shall be carrying this message:

—The white populations of Rhodesia and Namibia must recognize that majority rule is inevitable. The only issue is what form it will take and how it will come about. Will it be through protracted and bloody conflict that will leave a heritage of bitterness and destruction for generations? Or will it come rapidly through the peaceful means which offer hope for a just and cooperative future in which majority rule is coupled with a guarantee of minority rights?

—South Africa has taken positive steps with respect to Rhodesia and Namibia. We hope that it will continue to recognize that now is the time to make a constructive contribution to Africa by committing itself to rapid progress toward independence in Rhodesia and Namibia.

—Black African leaders in the states neighboring Rhodesia and Namibia have perhaps the most difficult challenge. They feel in their hearts the suffering of their brothers; they have themselves experienced the oppression of colonial rule; and they have seen past efforts at settlements fade away. All their instincts are for rapid solutions without the tedious give-and-take of negotiations. And yet violence will only escalate bloodshed and lengthen, rather than shorten, the road to their goal. The wisdom and moderating influence of black African leaders are essential if progress is to be achieved. Their own suffering must have taught that new injustice does not right old injustice. They now have the opportunity to break the vicious cycle of centuries of suffering by seizing this opportunity not for conflict but for reconciliation of the races.

—Black nationalist groups competing for power must bridge their differences if there is to be early progress to majority rule. We will urge them not to jeopardize everything by personal competition for power. Those rivalries are certain to delay —and may even defeat—the realization of what they have fought so long to attain.

A complex process of negotiation is underway on the urgent issues of Rhodesia and Namibia. These issues are related, but we recognize that the requirements for solutions in each case are substantially different. If circumstances so indicate, each issue can be dealt with at the pace appropriate to it. Depending on the desires of the many interested parties, we are prepared to deal with each issue on its individual merits.

Most importantly, all parties must keep in mind that lost opportunities can be irretrievable; there are now conditions for settling *both* issues that did not exist previously and may never do so again. It would be ironic, to say the least, if after

years of struggle, hope, and disappointment, those who have the most to gain should let the opportunity slip away because of internal disagreements.

Public support for this effort will be a major factor in the success and durability of any settlement that may eventually emerge. Our goals—to end the suffering and violence of southern Africa and to bring about majority rule and minority rights—reflect what is best in American values. They are a firm foundation for our common commitment; they are not confined to one party or one branch of the government. They represent an American effort.

South Africa's racial problems are more complex. In Lusaka in April, I pointed out that South African assistance in bringing about rapid negotiated solutions in Rhodesia and Namibia would be viewed positively by the community of nations as well as by the rest of Africa. And I must point out here that since then South Africa's role —with respect to these two problems—has been constructive.

As for conditions within South Africa itself, the world, and most black African leaders, recognize South Africa as an African country. Its white settlers have lived on African soil for centuries. No one, including the responsible leaders of black Africa, challenges their right to remain there. Unlike Rhodesia and Namibia, South Africa cannot be regarded as an illegitimate government, as an outside colonial intrusion.

But South Africa's internal structure is incompatible with any concept of human dignity. We are deeply saddened by the recent and continuing clashes in black urban townships, universities, and schools throughout South Africa. They are dramatic evidence of the frustration of black South Africans toward a system which denies them status, equality, and political rights. No system that leads to periodic upheavals and violence can possibly be just or acceptable—nor can it last.

The United States must be true to its own beliefs. We urge South Africa to take account of the conscience of humanity. We will continue to use all our influence to bring about peaceful change, equality of opportunity, and basic human rights in South Africa. Our policy is based upon the premise that within a reasonable period of time we will see a clear evolution toward just internal arrangements. In our talks with the South African Prime Minister and in our diplomatic efforts, we will impress upon South Africa the need to make this premise a reality.

Economic Progress

It is economic progress which ultimately will determine whether Africa can fulfill the aspirations of its peoples.

You here at this convention know that the economic dimension is fundamental. You know full well, as a black Mississippi politician said recently, that "It's no good being able to join the country club if you haven't got the money to buy a drink."

And you are taking action.

Africa's development needs are massive and your OIC programs strike at their heart: vocational training to teach the skills that Africa needs to realize its potential regardless of changing political circumstances. A mechanic's training or a carpenter's trade can be practiced in the most turbulent times; political upheavals cannot diminish the individual's sense of worth which your training instills. We give you concrete support through the Agency for International Development and will continue to do so. But it is your initiative and energy which has turned that support into something vital and alive.

Beyond its need for skilled manpower, Africa's economic aspirations confront a wide range of other challenges.

Africa is blessed with immense natural wealth. The ratio of population to resources is as favorable as that of any region of the developing world. Agricultural productivity can be vastly improved.

But no continent suffers so cruelly when crops fail for lack of rain. No continent's

atural economic regions are so fragmented by borders drawn up—often arbitrarily—in the colonial era. And no continent bears such a crushing burden of poverty and illiteracy.

Africa is doubly challenged—by recurrent economic catastrophes and by the need for long-term growth. The United States is dealing with the various dimensions of the task:

—To provide relief from natural disasters, drought, and famine, we have, in the past five years, more than quadrupled emergency aid to African nations.

—American trade and investment are crucial for Africa's development. While they are rapidly expanding, they are not enough, especially for the poorest countries. Therefore we plan to increase development assistance for Africa substantially over the coming years—especially for the least developed countries.

—Because Africa's needs frequently transcend the limits of national boundaries, we are now directing much of our assistance to support regional cooperation—in transportation, agricultural development and health programs, and in collecting information by satellite on crops, weather, water resources, land use, and mineral extraction.

What Africa requires above all else is a strategy for development. For example, the Sahel, the chronically drought-ridden region on the southern edge of the Sahara Desert, has been a major recipient of international relief assistance. The monumental suffering in that area has prompted the generous contributions of many individual Americans, as well as large-scale government relief efforts.

But the disasters which afflict the Sahel come in recurrent cycles. They are altering the ecology across central and western Africa; the desert is steadily encroaching upon once-fertile lands.

The time has come to go beyond periodic measures of relief and to take comprehensive steps. To this end the United States, together with an international group of donor countries, is seeking to reverse the economic and ecological decline of the Sahel and lay the foundations for future growth. We have proposed developing major river basins to improve water supply; increasing crop acreage by modern agricultural methods; improving food storage facilities; and enhancing the transportation network of the area.

The long-term effort in the Sahel, and others needed elsewhere in Africa, will require intensified cooperation among the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. This is why the United States has endorsed the imaginative proposal of President Giscard d'Estaing of France for a fund to organize and coordinate Western assistance efforts for Africa. And we are seeking within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development a more general coordination of development efforts among the industrial democracies.

Africa is heavily dependent upon the world economy. No African nation can plan its future effectively if its income is buffeted by external economic forces over which it has little or no influence. The export earnings of many African economies rely upon global market conditions for a single commodity. And higher energy prices or inflation abroad can—as they have—raise to prohibitive levels the price of imports that Africa desperately needs.

One year ago, at the special session of the U.N. General Assembly, the United States presented a comprehensive series of proposals aimed at responding in a cooperative spirit to the needs of the developing countries. We have followed up these initiatives with major efforts at the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation, at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi, and in many other international institutions. Many of our proposals have been implemented and have had a direct impact on Africa.

Substantial progress has been made in the past year in shaping the long-term eco-

nomic relationship between the nations of the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. The initiatives which now form the agenda for discussion are, by and large, proposals made by the United States. But much work remains to be done. The United States is prepared to move forward in areas of great importance to the nations of Africa. For example:

—We are prepared to address the crushing balance-of-payments problems and debt burdens which many poor African nations suffer as a result of high oil prices, global inflation, and the recession-related downturn in export earnings.

—We are prepared to join with producers and consumers of key commodities to explore measures to improve and stabilize markets. We are ready to participate in producer-consumer forums in ways that will benefit Africa.

—We will seek satisfactory international arrangements to foster the investment necessary for Africa's growth—arrangements which both respect national sovereignty and assure predictability and fair treatment for foreign investors.

—We have proposed in the multilateral trade negotiations to reduce tariffs for tropical products which are of special interest to Africa.

—We are seeking authorization from Congress to make an initial contribution of $15 million to the African Development Bank's Development Fund in order to foster industrialization.

—And we will make major efforts to stimulate the flow of modern technology to Africa so as to promote growth and diversify economies now excessively dependent on a single commodity.

The United States is committed to work constructively with the nations of Africa and with other developing countries to promote economic progress and fuller participation in the global economic system. But we must be frank to say that rhetorical assaults and one-sided declarations undermine the conditions for such cooperation. They weaken public support for development in the industrial democracies, whose effective and sustained role is crucial. No other group of countries—least of all the Socialist countries—is able to provide the technology, the managerial expertise, or the resources.

Many of the resolutions of the just concluded nonaligned conference in Colombo were clearly anything but nonaligned in content or phraseology. We reject such one-sided proclamations and warn that to be effective nonalignment must be true to its name. It cannot—indeed, it will not—be taken seriously if it becomes nothing more than a rigid grouping aimed at producing automatic majorities and rhetorical attacks against the industrial democracies.

The choice that all nations face is between cooperation and chaos. America has made its decision for cooperation. We invite others to join us in the same spirit.

African Independence: Precondition for Progress

Africa's development will be impossible if the independence and integrity of the continent are not maintained. Africa must not again become an arena in which outside powers contest for spheres of influence.

This is why the United States agreed with the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia that non-African nations should not deal directly with the liberation movements of southern Africa—to avoid the divisions and the competition which led to the tragedies of the Angolan civil war. We oppose those who would subject the African people to outside domination. Western colonialism in Africa is dying; it must not now be replaced by a new form of external intervention more insidious because less familiar which, in the end, may take generations to root out.

The United States seeks no African bloc of its own, no paramount influence in Africa. We will oppose all those who do. The United States calls on all nations to affirm the principle that Africa's destiny is for Africa to determine. The United States

will not import great-power conflict into Africa. We will expect others to do the same.

There is no better guarantee against foreign intervention than the determination of African nations to defend their own independence and unity. Let us, therefore, not minimize the importance of the security problems that some African nations face. Economic development is certainly a crucial priority; but by itself it cannot prevent outside pressure or threats to African sovereignty.

So let us not accept the facile proposition that black African nations do not have the same need as other nations to defend themselves against recognized dangers—especially when they perceive serious and imminent threats from nearby nations which have been heavily armed by the Soviet Union. We are determined to avoid unnecessary arms races. But when friendly and moderate nations like Kenya or Zaïre make modest and responsible requests for assistance to protect themselves against belligerent neighbors possessing substantial quantities of modern Soviet weapons, we owe them our serious consideration.

Africa and the World

One fact is clear: a time of change has come again to Africa. Let us all take the opportunity before us to avoid a future of bitterness, escalating war, and foreign intervention. Let us all help a peaceful and prospering and just Africa take its rightful place in the world.

What Africa needs now is not a return to the exploitative or interventionist practices of decades past. Nor does it need exuberant promises and vapid expressions of good will. It requires concrete commitments to progress—political and economic. It requires our readiness to cooperate as sovereign equals on the basis of mutual responsibility and mutual benefit.

In this spirit, the United States will do its part. Let there be no mistake: Africa will take its destiny firmly into its own hands, whether we like it or not; it will make its contribution to the world community in its own way, whether we cooperate or not. But the cause of freedom, not only for ourselves but for all mankind, will be vitally affected by the part America plays. We can turn our backs on one of the most massive awakenings of a people in history and, in the process, desert our principles and help doom a continent to a future of despair.

Or we can, as every generation of Americans before us, make history ours.

I believe Americans will choose the course of hope and heart. And by so doing we will once again have demonstrated the vitality of our values and given the world a "new birth of freedom."

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Philadelphia August 31

Press release 404 dated August 31

Q. Thank you, Reverend Sullivan.[1]

Mr. Secretary, in connection with your upcoming talks, what specific recommendations will you make on behalf of the United States to make peace in South Africa and also Rhodesia?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think it would be appropriate for me to go into the details of discussions that are about to take place this weekend. But I have laid out our views with respect to both Rhodesia and Namibia.

With respect to Rhodesia, we believe that there should be a rapid transition to majority rule, protection for minority rights, and a negotiation in which the black African states, the various movements in Rhodesia, and the existing authorities of Rhodesia participate to find a solution within that framework.

With respect to Namibia, we believe that there should be a firm date for independence, a negotiation in which all the groups —all the relevant groups—participate and establish a constitutional framework on the basis of majority rule.

Q. Are you suggesting, perhaps—in your speech earlier, with economic help to Africa —a new "Marshall plan" for Africa? Is that what you have in mind?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the methods that were appropriate at the time of the Marshall plan do not lend themselves exactly to the conditions in the 1970's. But we believe that Africa needs regional development because many of the nations are very fragmented. And we believe also that other industrial nations should cooperate with us in order to get the maximum impact.

We have to remember that Africa is actually—it is a huge continent, but not too thickly populated. So that it is possible in Africa, with its substantial resources, to make considerable progress if coordinated efforts are developed.

Q. On South Africa, you said, "Our policy is based upon the premise that within a reasonable period of time we will see a clear evolution toward just internal arrangements."

Can you tell me first what you consider a reasonable period of time and what you consider a clear evolution toward changes? And, failing these, what action would the United States take in regard to South Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: I am meeting with the Prime Minister of South Africa this weekend, and I don't think it would be appropriate for me to go into details on these points now.

Q. You said earlier in the speech that you believe the white populations of Rhodesia and Namibia should accept the concept of majority rule, and you did not mention South Africa. Was that an intentional omission?

Secretary Kissinger: I have also stated we do not accept the principles and practice of apartheid. We have made a distinction in all our public statements, not on the principle of majority rule but on the principle that South Africa does not, in our view, represent a colonial entity. It represents a legitimate government which

[1] Opening remarks by Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, founder, Opportunities Industrialization Centers, are included in press release 404.

carries out practices with which we disagree. And this is a different phenomenon from Rhodesia and Namibia, requiring a different sort of influence.

Q. Does the United States support the concept of majority rule in South Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States supports the principle of majority rule everywhere.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the United States plan to recognize Angola, and if not, why not? And also, can we expect economic aid to be forthcoming for Mozambique, as promised in the Lusaka speech?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to Angola, the United States has stated repeatedly that our objection to Angola is not the grouping that took power there. We recognized Mozambique immediately, even though its leadership also had a radical orientation.

Our concern with Angola is the influence—it is the existence there of a large Cuban military force that permeates all aspects of that society.

In a speech in Monrovia, Liberia, last April, I indicated that if we were given some assurances about the removal of those forces, the road to recognition would be open.

A few weeks later, we were given some assurances through the Prime Minister of Sweden to the effect that Cuban forces would be removed over a period of time.

We have been watching this now since we received those assurances, and we have no clear-cut indication that Cuban forces are being removed. Some are leaving and new ones are coming in.

So the obstacle to our relations with Angola is the presence of a Cuban expeditionary force.

With respect to Mozambique, the Administration has made its proposal to the Congress, and it is now in the hands of the Congress.

Q. You've been holding meetings with the black movement for quite a number of weeks—

Secretary Kissinger: With whom? I didn't hear—

Mr. Funseth [Robert L. Funseth, Special Assistant for Press Relations]: The black movement.

Secretary Kissinger: The black movement, yes.

Q. Yes. I was wondering how valuable the input has been to you, and has it heightened your sensitivity to the problem in South Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: It is true that I have been meeting with leaders of the black movement. And I think, as Reverend Sullivan pointed out, this had not previously been the practice of my predecessors, and therefore both sides have had something to learn. Many of the leaders of the black movement have not in the past dealt at the policy level, and I had no experience at dealing with black leaders, as I demonstrated in my remarks to the Urban League in Boston a few weeks ago.

But it has been extremely valuable to me in giving me a sense of the mood of that part of our population which has perhaps the deepest concern for these problems. And these meetings are taking place regularly now and will continue to be part of our policy considerations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your speech today seemed to indicate a concern for perhaps a weakening of support among some black African leaders and also a concern for the fragmentation of black nationalist leaders in Africa. This being the case, and along with some of the statements made recently by [Zambian] President Kaunda, is the situation worse today or better today, as you embark on your new efforts?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the situation has been improving, but as progress is being made, obviously the difficulties also become more apparent. Because as long as

you are talking about an objective in the abstract, hard decisions do not have to be made. As an objective grows nearer, the decisions become more complicated.

So the reports of Under Secretary [for Economic Affairs William D.] Rogers and Assistant Secretary [for African Affairs William E.] Schaufele were, on the whole, positive. But the issue of Rhodesia is extremely complicated, involving, as it does, the many parties of black Africa, of the various liberation movements of Rhodesia and South Africa. The issue of Namibia is separable from the issue of Rhodesia, and, as I pointed out in my speech, need not be dealt with in the same time frame. But it also has its complications.

So, on the whole, I would say progress is being made, and as progress is being made, obviously the more difficult issues remain for the last.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Dr. Sullivan suggested that the United States should withdraw its diplomatic presence if the elimination of apartheid does not occur in South Africa within a reasonable time. What is your reaction to that and also to his proposal that the U.S. Government use its influence to see that American businesses operating in South Africa end racial apartheid within their own organizations? What kind of influence can you exert on those businesses?

Secretary Kissinger: We strongly support the proposal that American businesses not practice apartheid, and practice the same policies that they do at home.

With respect to future measures about South Africa, our hope is still to promote a peaceful evolution. And we shall discuss the subject, and I think it would be inappropriate for me to set deadlines or to threaten prior to a meeting in which we will discuss issues which we hope will lead to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia and will have a beneficial impact within South Africa.

Q. How likely is a peaceful settlement in the entire South Africa—southern African region?

Secretary Kissinger: It is an extremely complicated issue. On the other hand, we also feel that time is running out on it and that we have a moral and political obligation to do what we can to bring about a peaceful settlement, all the more so as violence will delay achievement of these goals and may have serious consequences for everybody.

We will do the best we can, but obviously we cannot predict the outcome.

Q. Mr. Secretary, today is the deadline, I think, that has been set by the Security Council for some positive action concerning Namibia's independence. Some of us are waiting to hear what is going to be done or said by South Africa. Can you anticipate what is going to be done?

Secretary Kissinger: Because of some of the diplomatic efforts now underway, there has been a general consensus to delay the debate in the Security Council until later in the month of September, and the discussions will take place at that time, and what will be done will depend on the events that have occurred in the interval.

Q. There is a rumor, Mr. Secretary, that you have a crystal ball somewhere. Can you look into that crystal ball and try to give us a hint as to what might happen?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that a solution to the problem of Namibia is possible, since the principle of independence has now been accepted. But there are still many thorny issues on the road to a settlement, and I would reserve making a final prediction until the consultations which I am starting this Friday—or this Saturday.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in February you promised the Black Caucus to hire more blacks in the State Department. Has that been fulfilled yet, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain the situation of hiring in the State Department.

I think it is fair to say that traditionally the State Department has considered it-

self—or has been an organization which has been largely white, and it has been extremely difficult to break that mold.

In 1973, when I became Secretary of State, there were eight Ambassadors, most of them political—eight black Ambassadors, one principal officer in a Mission, and one Deputy Chief of Mission.

Now we have still eight Ambassadors, but most of them are career. We have one black Assistant Secretary—the first in the Department's history—two Deputy Assistant Secretaries, four Deputy Chiefs of Mission, and four principal officers.

Now, the numbers aren't very large because the whole Foreign Service is a relatively small organization of less than 5,000 members.

Secondly, the number of officers—of black officers—has risen from 250 to something like 361.

Now, it is a slow process because we have to do two things. We have to get more black college students to apply for the Foreign Service. And in order to change the numerical balance in the direction of hiring more blacks, we have started a system of what is called lateral entry, where people can enter the middle grades of the Foreign Service without going through the whole process of promotion. This system was only started in 1975, and we take 20 black officers a year under that system. We now have 300 applicants under that program.

We have also created an Office of Equal Opportunity which has the—has no other responsibility than to improve the recruitment of minority personnel and which can also act as a grievance board for minority personnel.

We have made a special recruiting effort and have allocated funds by going to 203 universities and 19 black colleges in order to get more black applicants into the Foreign Service. Since the law prohibits us from keeping records on the basis of color, I cannot give you the breakdown of how many additional black officers are in fact applying.

And, finally, we have had now underway for a year two outside studies, one having to do with the problem of lateral entry and one having to do with the problem of recruitment under the equal opportunity system.

So, while we started very far behind in the State Department, we are making a major effort to bring in more black personnel by the various methods that I have described and by the promotions that I have indicated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us some idea of what the factors are that will determine whether or not you will personally visit South Africa and whether the extent of their cooperation in the Rhodesian effort will be a factor in determining whether you go?

Secretary Kissinger: Whether I personally visit southern Africa, you must mean.

Q. No, South Africa.

Secretary Kissinger: The first question is whether I will—there is no point in going to South Africa unless I go to black Africa first. So, a great deal will depend on my conclusions after some exchanges which we are now engaged in with black African leaders and my discussions with Prime Minister Vorster.

Then I will have to decide—I do not believe that it is possible to settle the Rhodesian issue within a few weeks. That will take a more extended period of time.

But if I am convinced that progress is possible on the Rhodesian issue, that would affect the decision.

The same is true of the Namibian issue, which is somewhat less complicated and perhaps lends itself better to a solution.

But the judgment will be made on the basis of whether significant enough progress is achievable, even if no final solution is possible.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why is it that the United States has suddenly expressed such great interest in black Africa after sort of ignoring it for decades? You are now planning your second major trip there. There has been

fighting in Sudan and previously we ignored it. What has changed to bring about this new U.S. interest? Is it the American political race at the moment, or is it something else?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that it was obvious that my previous trip was not one of the—was not a political "ten-strike."

We came to the conclusion that the conditions in Africa would lead to—if the United States did not play a more active role—would lead inexorably to great-power involvement, to a major risk of war, or to the radicalization of the entire continent.

And we concluded that it was in the interest of world peace, in the interest of security, and in the interest of the United States and in the interest of Africa that the United States make a major effort. Because otherwise we saw only a deteriorating situation.

Having made that decision, we felt that we should make a major effort, because if it is worth doing, it is worth doing with energy and conviction.

Dr. Sullivan: And there is another reason, because some of us in this country aren't going to let them sit and do nothing any more. It will never happen as long as fellows like me are around now. There is a change. And whatever happens, it will never be like it was before.

That is why we say there has got to be freedom in Namibia; there has got to be majority rule for Rhodesia; and apartheid has got to come to an end sometime in South Africa. It is a whole different ball game now. That's another reason why.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you amplify on this point, which you touched on in your speech from a different perspective.

In view of the recent spiral of violence in South Africa itself, does this make it awkward for you to visit, to contemplate visiting South Africa, or do you believe, with some reason, that this makes it more necessary for you to go?

Secretary Kissinger: Visiting South Africa is not the purpose of the trip to Africa.

If I should go to South Africa, it would be with the full support of the leaders of black Africa, in order to bring about objectives which we have jointly worked out with the leaders of black Africa. Whether that is possible will depend on talks first with the South African Prime Minister, and afterward, if I decide to go to Africa, with the leaders of black Africa.

So, this is not a mission that the United States undertakes as a protocol visit. It is a mission which we would take in the closest cooperation and with the full support of black Africa, or it would not be undertaken.

Secretary Interviewed by Philadelphia World Affairs Council Panel

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger at a dinner meeting sponsored by the Philadelphia World Affairs Council on August 31. Members of the panel were Creed C. Black, editor, Philadelphia Inquirer; John G. McCullough, editor of the editorial page, Philadelphia Bulletin; Jessica Savitch, anchorwoman and reporter, KYW–TV; C. Sumner Stone, associate editor and columnist, Philadelphia Daily News; and William W. Bodine, Jr., president, Philadelphia World Affairs Council, moderator.[1]

Press release 405 dated August 31

Secretary Kissinger: First, the foreign policy of a great nation is not the invention of its President or of its Secretary of State. The foreign policy of a nation is determined very importantly by the objective circumstances in which it finds itself, by the values of its people, and only to some extent by the ability of its leaders to discern these trends and to shape them for their own ends.

One therefore should not believe that foreign policy can be changed dramatically at regular intervals. Indeed, a well-considered foreign policy at some point in the nation's history must achieve some level of stability and must in its main lines be fixed.

On the other hand, there occasionally are periods of great change. And in the last eight years, the United States has undergone very important changes in the international environment in which we find ourselves.

It is not only that we had to end a war, which we found when coming into office, in a rather painful and difficult way and that America had to adjust to this traumatic experience. It is also that the many elements in the international environment, as we have known it throughout our modern history, had radically altered.

First, this is the period in which the growth of nuclear weapons on both sides has created the unprecedented fact that there are two nations in the world that can destroy each other and destroy humanity. And therefore many of the traditional patterns of international relations, many of the risks that in the past could be run, are no longer applicable. Whoever is President will sooner or later be driven to the realization that was first expressed by President Eisenhower—that there is no alternative to peace.

How to create a stable peace and how to control the nuclear arsenals of both sides becomes an overriding task of our diplomacy.

Throughout history, it was inconceivable that a nation could possess too much power. Almost any additional increment of power you acquired could be put to political use. We live in a period in which an upper limit of destructiveness is reached beyond which, civilization having already been destroyed, the additional accumulation of at least strategic power is no longer relevant.

What conclusions one draws from this in the field of negotiations or in the field of day-to-day diplomacy, we can perhaps discuss with the panel. I simply want to point out the new facts of international relations.

The second new fact is that for the first time in history, foreign policy has become truly global. Never before have the continents been in daily contact with each other.

[1] Introductory remarks by Mr. Bodine and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's remarks, which are included in press release 405, are not printed here.

Never before have there been power centers in every part of the globe. And never before has it been necessary to construct an international community out of so many diverse elements.

And this is compounded by the rapidity of communications, so that not only is policy global, reaction has to be nearly instantaneous.

Now, when one speaks of peace, one has to speak of a world which the majority of the nations considers just or at least just enough so that they do not feel that they can achieve their ends only by overthrowing it.

The great upheavals of our period have been caused because there have been countries which assaulted the international order as it then existed. And the great challenge of our time is to build a peace in which the majority of nations will have a sense of participating.

This is why I have greatly welcomed the efforts made here in this city that have taken the form of a declaration of interdependence, because interdependence is the cardinal fact of our period and is one of the novel features of our period.

And as Americans, we are living for the first time since our early days under conditions in which we do not have overwhelming power. Our influence for good or ill is decisive for security and for progress. But we can no longer overwhelm our problems with resources. We no longer have the margin of safety that permitted us to wait until threats became overwhelming before we reacted or that enabled us to solve the economic problems of a continent as we did at the time of the Marshall plan with unilateral American decisions.

So much more depends on our understanding and on our sophistication and on our public support than ever before in our history.

And this means that we have to face one of the fundamental problems of statesmanship, which is that when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is at a minimum. When your knowledge is greatest, the scope for action has very often disappeared.

In 1936, it would have been very simple to deal with the threat represented by Hitler. But the world would still be debating today whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination.

By 1941, everybody knew that he was a maniac bent on world domination, but it was a knowledge acquired at the price of tens of millions of lives, and therefore we have to face the fact that our most important actions have to be based on assessments that cannot be proved true when they are made. And foreign policy therefore requires a greater degree of public understanding and a greater degree of support than has ever been the case in our history.

Now, I think it would be better to respond to specifics of our foreign policy in the form of answers to questions. But it is important to keep in mind the permanent goals of American foreign policy—for peace, for progress, for justice, for international order, for relating these scores of new nations that have come into being to a new system, for strengthening our ties with our traditional friends, and for bringing about a safer and more progressive world than the one we found.

And with this, I will be glad to answer questions.

Mr. Black: Mr. Secretary, as the first media representative speaking, I suppose I should join in the welcome. You certainly have made our lives more interesting over the last eight years. And I would ask you to extend our special regards to that highly placed source that usually travels with you. If he isn't with you tonight, we will tell him how helpful he has been. [*Laughter.*]

It is true, as you say, that in the last years there have been some dramatic changes in our policy. And you have, despite what you say about the formation of foreign policy, been the architect of many of these changes.

In Kansas City, a couple of weeks ago, the

Republican Party adopted an amendment to the foreign policy plank which was generally regarded as a repudiation of many of these policies.

One of our Washington colleagues just this very morning, who I think is very well informed—that is, Marquis Childs—wrote a column in which he quoted one of your associates as saying that, just as you left for Kansas City, you described this as the most wearing experience of your life. I wonder if you could tell us if that is an accurate description of your reaction to the action of your own party in Kansas City?

Secretary Kissinger: You know, one of the attributes of high office is that none of one's associates is ever willing to admit that he doesn't know what he is talking about. [Laughter.]

The so-called morality plank in the Republican platform has to be seen in terms of the internal maneuvering of the Republican Party of the convention and not as an expression of well-considered substantive sentiment.

There was an intention to force a fight between the Ford camp and the Reagan camp, after the Ford camp had won the rule 16(c).

President Ford and his associates decided, in my view wisely, not to fight on a plank which in itself was really quite unexceptionable.

The phrases in that plank can be subscribed to by anybody, including myself, by about 90 percent. To be sure, we are not children, and we know that a few words were put in there in order to result in some needling.

But if you say, should we make unilateral concessions, nobody can say we were making unilateral concessions. And the basic principles that were stated there are principles that I don't object to—in fact, that I subscribe to. And the maneuvering with respect to that platform had much more to do with lining up delegates for the final nominating vote than with the substance of foreign policy. And I stayed out of it. And I consider that the decisions of that week were not decisions in which I should get myself involved.

Southern Africa

Mr. Stone: Mr. Secretary, in your public utterances, you have consistently drawn a moral distinction between Rhodesia and Namibia on the one hand and South Africa on the other. For example, in a speech at noon today before the OIC [Opportunities Industrialization Centers], you said, "The white populations of Rhodesia and Namibia must recognize that majority rule is inevitable." And one of my colleagues from the Inquirer suggested you deliberately omitted South Africa.

Later in the speech, you said, "Unlike Rhodesia and Namibia, South Africa cannot be regarded as an illegitimate government."

Do you think that black Africa's leaders and South Africa's disenfranchised blacks agree with your assessment of South Africa as a legitimate government?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that most of black Africa's leaders—and I would say all of the ones that I know—would agree that there's a big difference between South Africa and Namibia and Rhodesia.

They consider Namibia and Rhodesia a colonial structure. They consider South Africa an African government that has an unjust domestic structure that must be changed.

But they are not talking about expelling the white population from South Africa. And therefore I would think that the problem of South Africa is a different problem from the problem of Namibia and Rhodesia, even though in my speech this afternoon I also condemned the practices of the South African Government with respect to its domestic legislation.

Mr. Stone: Would you [inaudible] say that majority rule is inevitable in South Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: I would believe that the practice of apartheid must end.

Mr. Stone: I didn't ask that question.

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that majority rule must also come to South Africa. But I would say the way of achieving it is a different way than the way in Namibia and Rhodesia.

Ms. Savitch: Mr. Secretary, getting back to Mr. Black's question on what happened in Kansas City. During the Nixon years, it seems as though you acted as a personal emissary of the President, while in the Ford Administration it seems as though foreign policy is implemented on a much wider level.

What are your own future plans past January 26, or whenever Inauguration Day is?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in the Nixon Administration, except for the last year, I was Assistant to the President. And through all of the Ford Administration, I have been Secretary of State. And those are two different functions.

As Assistant to the President, you act primarily as an extension to the President. As the Secretary of State, you have to conduct the foreign policy of the United States through a well-established apparatus.

As far as my own personal plans are concerned, I am constantly asked that question. I believe it is important to keep in mind that we have to conduct foreign policy, even during this election, in a rather dangerous and complicated period. And I don't want to add any more uncertainty to it.

I have said repeatedly that after President Ford is reelected is the time to discuss this and that it would be presumptuous for me to say now what I will do.

Ms. Savitch: Has it hurt us diplomatically, or has it hurt you as a diplomatic negotiator, and has anyone perceived you as possibly being a lameduck negotiator?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, it is not always easy to get a word in edgewise with me, so I am not absolutely sure how people have reacted to me. [Laughter.]

An election year in the United States is often unsettling to foreign nations because they hear very many extreme statements that are being made by various candidates.

The impression is always created that everything that has been done is a disaster and that everything that will come after will be a radical change.

And while foreign nations are becoming more sophisticated about the exuberance of our rhetoric, it nevertheless tends to create a period of some uncertainty.

I must say that on the major issues with which I have dealt, I have not found that the election year has significantly affected our foreign policy, but it does tend to produce a certain slowdown in the conduct of some of the issues.

Korea and Stability of Northeast Asia

Mr. McCullough: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the need for public support of foreign policy, and I take that to mean a foreign policy with which the people feel comfortable. I would like to talk for a moment about Korea and the fact that—

Secretary Kissinger: About what—

Mr. McCullough: About Korea. Even during the midst of the crisis on the truce line, the Government of South Korea has imprisoned 18 quite respected dissenters. Some of the people were formerly in the government there. Some were clergy, others teachers. And it seems to some of us that the Government of South Korea is not above using the tragic death of the two American officers to bring the United States into even closer support of the regime there.

And my questions—two of them—do you feel comfortable about the level of civil liberties in the Republic of South Korea? And if not, is there anything we in the United States can do about it?

Secretary Kissinger: There are several aspects to this problem. One is, do we feel comfortable about the level of civil liberties in South Korea? The answer is, no; South Korea does not have standards of human rights comparable to our own. And

only this Monday we presented a formal note to the Korean Government expressing our view on this matter.

Secondly, we are not in Korea because of the practices of the Korean Government, but because of the importance that Korea has for the stability of Northeast Asia. And we believe that if the Communists, if they were to take over South Korea—as several Presidents believed before this Administration—this would have an enormously unsettling effect on the stability of Northeast Asia, particularly of Japan.

Therefore we have to balance our security necessities against some of the feelings with respect to certain governmental practices. And we are trying to do our best to improve those practices.

But at the same time, we have an important commitment, not only legally but strategically, to the security of Northeast Asia that impels certain actions on our part.

Mr. Black: Mr. Secretary, I would like to get back to this question of the continuity of our foreign policy and the public understanding of it, because one of the problems, it seems to me, is that many differences are too often too subtle and too sophisticated to be understood by the public.

We are now in this election campaign, and Mr. Carter is being briefed by a number of people trooping down to Plains, Georgia, who have been critics of your foreign policy—George Ball, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and others.

Surely there must be some differences between the policies of the two parties. I wonder if you could explain to us what differences you see, as you understand Mr. Carter's foreign policy.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I basically believe that the political defense of our foreign policy is not the primary responsibility of the Secretary of State; and therefore I don't volunteer comments like this. But to answer your question, first of all I would have to say that the formal statements of Governor Carter have not been characterized by excessive precision. [Laughter.]

Mr. Black: Perhaps they will be now.

Secretary Kissinger: So, it isn't easy, as I said, to get a hold on them.

Now, in answers to questions, he has indicated some directions with which we would strongly disagree. He has indicated, for example, that he would save $7 billion from the defense budget by bringing home troops from abroad. Now, you can't save those $7 billion by bringing home troops from abroad unless you also disband them, because they cost as much in the United States as they do abroad. So that would have to mean an objective reduction in our strength.

We have a disagreement as to his assessment about the American reaction to Communist parties coming to power in West European governments, though I seem to have detected a certain evolution in his position. We disagree with respect to military assistance for such African countries as Kenya and Zaïre. And we disagree with respect to his view about some aspects of the role of covert intelligence.

I am sure that as the campaign develops, other disagreements will emerge. But these, from the record that now exists, are some of the important disagreements.

We have also conducted—he seems to imply that the Middle East should be settled by a prior agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which afterward is presented to the parties. Our view is that the negotiations in the Middle East should be conducted by the parties, with some assistance from the United States, though if there is a final settlement the Soviet Union can participate in guaranteeing it.

These are some of the differences that I see now.

Mr. Stone: Mr. Secretary, your Department estimated that in the last three years you made approximately 30 heartland speeches around the country.

This month was sort of a record. In your Administration, like Jimmy Carter, you were "born again," and you addressed two black groups for the first time, in one month—the Urban League on August 2 and today the OIC.

Traditionally, the black community has been very weak in its impact and influence on foreign policy; it's had very little involvement. This audience is a good example—there are only three or four blacks here tonight. What do you expect to gain by talking to black groups who have so little influence at the higher councils of policy, of which you have been a part in denying them in your three years as Secretary of State?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I didn't solicit these invitations.

Mr. Stone: The OIC said you did.

Secretary Kissinger: That is absolutely incorrect. Dr. [Leon] Sullivan came to my office—first of all, he wrote me a letter and then he invited me to speak there. And I have not solicited either invitation. But I thought it was important to explain to these audiences what our policy with respect to Africa was.

Now, I have, in fact, had the practice to meet with the Black Caucus from the early days of my incumbency in Washington. And I believe I am the first Secretary of State who has done so.

My basic responsibility is to create understanding for our foreign policy and to get as much advice from leaders of various groups as I can.

The purpose of these visits is not political, because all of the experts have a pretty good estimate as to what the likely voting lineup is going to be in the various communities.

But I believe that it is important, as long as we are engaged on a major new initiative in Africa, that we get the views of the black leaders and that we convey our thinking to black audiences.

As I said, I was meeting with the Black Caucus even at the time when we thought the opportunities for American initiatives in Africa did not yet exist over the last two years.

The Problem of Terrorism

Ms. Savitch: It has come to my attention that the Rand Corporation recently completed a study for the State Department on terrorism and that between 1965 and the present there have been almost 1,000 terrorist acts recorded.

Now, we in the media are constantly being criticized in that if we cover these terroristic events, we are somehow promoting them; if we do not, we are censoring, and it is a news blackout.

Is the State Department in much the same position, untenable position? In other words, if you ignore terrorist acts, you are knuckling under; if you use force, you can escalate to larger armed confrontation.

What is your policy going to be with regard to terrorism?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem of terrorism is novel in international diplomacy. And there aren't really any good rules, and there may not be any rules unless we can get an international convention that bans terrorism and in which all the nations agree that nobody will give any assistance to terrorists, no matter what they think of their political views.

We believe that the use of innocent people for political purposes which they cannot affect and in decisions in which they have no part is unconscionable.

Now, the problem of terrorism reaches the Department of State when American citizens are kidnaped or most frequently when American officials are kidnaped and when we have been asked to negotiate with the terrorists.

We have adopted the painful and difficult policy of refusing all negotiations with terrorists. The reason we do this is because no matter how successful any one negotiation may be, there are so many Americans spread all over the world that once it is

known that the United States is prepared to negotiate, then all Americans will be continually in jeopardy.

As long as terrorists know that American Ambassadors have no authority, or no hope of any authority, for negotiating about terrorist acts, there is at least a lowered incentive.

Now, in any one case, it produces the most anguishing decision for us.

I must say that this policy of not negotiating has worked in a number of cases. For example, there were a number of Americans that had been kidnaped in Eritrea. There were several attempts to contact us and to negotiate with us. We refused all substantive negotiations. And after several months, these kidnaped Americans were released.

It doesn't always work, but often nothing works in these cases.

We believe that it is the best policy, the one that will save the most lives and that will protect the most Americans abroad. However, we believe that the ultimate solution must be an international convention in which all nations pledge themselves to give no assistance of any kind to terrorists and in which those nations which refuse to join are ostracized from international air service and other measures. And we are going to push this strongly at the General Assembly at the United Nations.

Dealing With Boycott Practices

Mr. McCullough: Mr. Secretary, many of the individuals in your audience tonight are people in business, and some have spoken out in support of a proposal apparently gaining support in Congress that would block the cooperation by U.S. business in the Arab League boycott against Israel.

Senator Ribicoff sponsored it and said this is the only realistic way of dealing with what he thinks is an illegal and immoral type of economic warfare.

Treasury Secretary Simon, who I think is the last member of the Cabinet to speak out on this, said that such a law would make matters worse and would harden Arab attitudes.

I wonder if you would talk about that tonight and give us your view on it.

Secretary Kissinger: Not willingly. [Laughter.] Can I talk about it on November 3? [Laughter.]

Now that you have asked me—and I wish that the chairman had stopped before this—I agree with Secretary Simon.

I am against a boycott. I think it is wrong for American firms to participate in it. I also believe that we have important interests in some of the countries concerned. Saudi Arabia can have a major impact on the oil prices, which in turn can have a major impact on developing of the American economy.

Many of these countries are needed for progress toward peace in the Middle East. We believe that the way to deal with the boycott is through the Executive orders and through the actions of the Attorney General that the Administration has already done. And we are afraid that some of the legislation that is now being considered is going to produce confrontations and disadvantages from which everybody will suffer.

And therefore I support Secretary Simon's opposition to this amendment.

Mr. Bodine: Thank you, panelists, very much indeed.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, we would like to give an opportunity to those on the ballroom floor who wish to question the Secretary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, keeping in mind that in 1956 we had the Hungary crisis and in 1968 the Czechoslovakia business took place, predominately during the National Democratic Convention week, my question to you is this: Is there any evidence that either the Soviet Union or the Republic of China has a preference as to which candidate wins this year? And if so, do you expect either to manipulate a crisis to help effect that end?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, neither of the two countries has as yet communicated its

preference. [Laughter.] And I am not absolutely sure that I would know how it would come.

But I think it is exaggerated to believe that in 1956 and in 1968 the Soviet Union organized these actions in order to affect our political campaign. It happened that there were uprisings in both Czechoslovakia and Hungary that the Soviet Union considered incompatible with the stability of its own domestic structure.

But to answer your question, it is probably true that most foreign governments always prefer the Administration in office because they know it, they have worked with it, and they know what to expect. And that would be generally the case.

I don't know whether that is the case with respect to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

I think that any country would make a major mistake to create a crisis in order to affect our national election, because I am confident that there would be united support for the policy of the Administration on a nonpartisan basis in resisting foreign pressures.

Law of the Sea Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the Law of the Sea Conference now going on in New York, what can the United States do to redirect some of the efforts of the nonaligned countries that are restricting progress in Committee I negotiations with respect to the deep seabed resources?

Secretary Kissinger: I am going, in fact, from here to New York in order to see whether we can bring about more rapid progress on the law of the sea negotiations.

The law of the sea negotiations now are organized in three major committees. The first committee deals with the deep seabeds. The second committee deals with the so-called economic zone; that is, the exploitation of the 200-mile zone off the coast. And the third deals with scientific research.

With respect to Committees II and III, while there are still unsolved issues, I am reasonably optimistic that, by the end of the conference in two and a half weeks, substantial agreement will have been reached.

With respect to the Committee I on the deep seabeds, progress has been less rapid.

The deep seabeds have a great deal of mineral wealth. The United States, at this moment, is probably the only country with the technology to mine this wealth, although over a period—but even the United States cannot really begin operating before 1983 and 1984, in that time frame. By the end of the 1980's, many other countries will be in a position to do so.

So the problem is to create a regime for the deep seabeds in which business can operate in a legal framework and in which we avoid on the oceans the sort of colonial rivalry, or the sort of rivalry that led to colonial disputes in the 19th century.

Some of the disagreements in Committee I have to do with the intrinsic difficulty of the subject. And we will make some proposals tomorrow and the next day that we hope will break some of the deadlocks.

Other difficulties are caused, as you correctly pointed out in your question, by the attitudes of some of the radical nonaligned countries that are trying to put all of the deep seabeds under international control, which would mean that our exploration would be the subject of majorities in which we have no decisive influence, even though we are the only country that has the capacity to engage in this mining.

That proposition we cannot and will not accept.

We are prepared to divide the exploration of the oceans between an area that is generally available for private enterprise and an area that is generally available for international enterprise.

The problem now will be how to find the means to regulate this. And I am going up there for the next two days in the hope of making some progress by making some new proposals on some of the more reasonable

demands that have been made. But the extreme demands, we cannot possibly meet.

And therefore if no agreement is reached we will have to proceed unilaterally, reluctant as we are to do that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some observers have remarked that you personalized the position of the Secretary of State. Would you care to comment on the extent to which you feel your personality has influenced the course of international events during your tenure?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you know, many of my associates will tell you that humility is one of my most outstanding traits. [Laughter.] I don't think I am the best judge of the degree to which my personality influences foreign policy. I think my father could give you a much more objective opinion on the subject. [Laughter.]

But I was in office during a period when a number of dramatic initiatives took place, with some of which I was associated.

The secret trip to China, the secret negotiations with the Vietnamese, the beginning of negotiations with other countries, the breakthroughs in the Middle East—all of them lent themselves to a series of dramatic events.

And then during the period of Watergate, more attention focused on the Secretary of State than would normally be the case, regardless of the qualities of the Secretary of State.

I believe that in general, foreign policy —the reason these dramatic events took place was because of the revolutionary changes in the international environment that I described in the beginning. But it would be a mistake to believe that this sort of event can happen regularly or can be the normal style of foreign policy.

It was a combination of circumstances, both international and domestic.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States is now the greatest supplier of arms in the world. The last figure I read was some 136 nations.

What concerns me is the amount and the sophistication of arms being sold to countries in the Middle East, especially to Iran.

With billions of arms going to Iran, some 26,000 technicians there, I understand, are we not creating a "hostage" in that country? What would happen, for instance, if Iran went to war with any nation? Would we not then be very much involved? Would you be good enough to comment on this?

U.S. Arms Sales Abroad

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me do it in two parts. First, the general problem of the arms sales—and there the growing resources of many countries to buy arms, coupled with the competition between various countries, does create a problem. And we are setting up machinery which we hope to announce within the next few weeks to have a more systematic review of various arms requests than has ever been possible.

At the same time, the case of Iran is not the best case for your argument, if I may say so. Iran is a country whose independence has been considered important to the United States since the days that President Truman warned the Soviet Union about its occupation of Azerbaijan.

Iran is one of the larger oil producers in the Middle East. It has pursued a foreign policy very parallel to our own. It has not joined any embargo. It has never used its weapons for any purposes of which we did not approve. It has never threatened to use its weapons for any purposes of which we did not approve. It has never transferred its weapons to any other country, much less to any country of which we didn't approve.

It is threatened by the Soviet Union to the north. It has as its neighbor Iraq, which is one of the most radical Arab states and which, in relation to per capita, is armed much more extensively by the Soviet Union than we are arming Iran.

So, I would believe that Iran's willingness to defend itself, and to defend itself by paying cash for its arms, is a positive development.

Now, as for the Americans in Iran: I

have read this figure of 24,000 Americans that are in Iran. But it is important to break down the figure. Of these 24,000 Americans, 1,000 are in the military advisory group; 3,000 are with defense-related activities—that is, they are advisers for equipment which we have sold to Iran and in which they are training Iranians, and they will leave within a period of one or two years—7,000, no, 5,000, are connected with the oil industry; 2,000 are connected with other private enterprise; and the rest are dependents.

So even if you took out all the Americans connected with military activities, you still would have some 15,000 Americans in Iran. And if we therefore advanced the proposition that we cannot have Americans in any country abroad because it would be too risky, then we will finally wind up with having no Americans in any country but also no influence in any country and with a severe undermining of our economy.

In general, I recognize the concern about arms sales. But one has to keep in mind also that some countries—for example, there are countries in Latin America—which for diplomatic reasons I do not wish to mention—that were denied arms by the United States many years ago with the argument that they should put their resources into economic development. They then put their resources into Soviet arms. And now the Soviet Union has a military establishment in those countries, or at least has trainers in those countries in a greater degree than they otherwise would have had.

So nobody is pursuing a policy of selling arms for their own sake, but especially in the case of Iran—a country, I repeat, that did not join the embargo; that is selling oil to Israel; that has declared that it will not join any other embargo; and that has been a great friend and supporter of the United States on almost all objectives of foreign policy.

I think it is, on the whole, in the American interest to enable it to defend itself. All the more so as it is done entirely with its own resources.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Taiwan—are we progressing toward a solution?

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't hear you.

Q. Taiwan. In light of the Shanghai memorandum, are we progressing toward a solution?

Secretary Kissinger: The Shanghai communique states as an objective the normalization of relations. The United States stated that we believe—we also stated that the Chinese on both sides of the China straits assert that there is only one China, and we do not contest that proposition.

We differed with the People's Republic of China on the method in which the one China should be achieved. And we stated in the Shanghai communique that the United States believed that the methods should be peaceful.

We are prepared to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. We have not, however, up to now, been able to agree on the modalities by which this should be achieved, and therefore this is a matter that is still open.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 2d Session

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1977. Report of the House Committee on Appropriations, together with additional and supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 14260. H. Rept. 94–1228. June 8, 1976. 76 pp.

Authorization of Funds for Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation With Spain, Fiscal Year 1977. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 3557. S. Rept. 94–941. June 11, 1976. 4 pp.

Supplementary Extradition Treaty With Spain. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. B, 94–2. S. Ex. Rept. 94–26. June 15, 1976. 3 pp.

Extradition Treaty With the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. A, 94–2. S. Ex. Rept. 94–27. June 15, 1976. 6 pp.

U.S. Calls for Greece-Turkey Talks on Aegean Sea Dispute

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on August 25, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT

USUN press release 95 dated August 25

My delegation has followed the course of this discussion in the Security Council with great interest and special concern. For the United States has the closest of ties with both Greece and Turkey. They are our friends and allies. We share with them common purposes based upon common interests.

Accordingly, differences between them are of special concern to us. A problem such as this—which led both governments to send their distinguished Foreign Ministers to address the Council—requires not only our most careful attention but has led my government to exert its best efforts to encourage progress toward a resolution of the issues.

We do not underestimate the depth of feeling on both sides or the complexity of the legal issues involved. The historical roots of some aspects of the problem go back to classical times. The legal issues related to the continental shelf are among the most sensitive in the entire field of the law of the sea. I do not believe, however, that this is the place to analyze such complex issues of international law.

This Council, instead, should do all it can to encourage the two parties to engage in contacts and discussions that will insure that the problem between them does not now or at any time in the future lead to a threat to the peace of the area. To achieve this objective, this Council must exercise its responsibilities under the charter in a way that will contribute to the settlement of the dispute.

In working with other delegations to develop the resolution before you, my delegation held the strong view that nothing was to be gained by settling on language which would simply provide temporary satisfaction to one or the other of the parties, because inevitably the result would be that the underlying problem would remain unaffected. What was needed was a resolution which both parties could accept and under which they both could work to strengthen the peace.

My government believes this objective has been achieved.

During recent weeks and days, my government has been in close touch with both the Greek and Turkish Governments to encourage on both sides restraint and a renewed effort to achieve a basis for discussion. We are gratified that the leaders of both countries have sought to approach their differences with statesmanship and moderation.

Prime Minister Caramanlis stated on August 9 that Greece is avoiding any resort to force and is instead hoping that the dispute will be resolved by peaceful procedures. At the same time Turkish leaders have expressed their desire to resolve the dispute through negotiation, and they have affirmed that their research activities are not intended to prejudice the legal rights of either Greece or Turkey in the Aegean.

In the course of our current debate the distinguished Foreign Minister of Greece has stated that there are many opportunities offered by Greece to Turkey for the peaceful settlement of the dispute and that these were not confined only to the proposal that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice. The distinguished Foreign Minister of Turkey has reaffirmed that Turkey stands ready to resolve all outstanding differences with Greece by peaceful means and that it does not exclude recourse to the International Court of Justice.

Therefore, both sides have reaffirmed to this Council their willingness to resolve

their dispute regarding the continental shelf of the Aegean.

We now believe that a fundamental basis exists for the kind of discussion and adjudication which must be undertaken if a settlement is to be achieved.

In such a situation, Mr. President, I believe that there are two cardinal elements to any advice which this Council might give to Greece and Turkey.

First, it is essential that this Council urge Greece and Turkey to continue to exercise utmost restraint and avoid falling into a pattern of action and reaction, the result of which would be an increasing rigidity of position, the raising of the stakes each party considers to be involved in the conflict, and a consequent heightening of tensions between the two countries.

Second, both governments should be encouraged to pursue the array of procedures which are available to them for the peaceful settlement of this dispute.

From what we have heard here from the distinguished spokesmen of Greece and Turkey, I think it is clear that both countries recognize that it is only through the resumption of direct and meaningful discussions between them that such a settlement can be achieved, or indeed must be achieved.

For our part, the United States strongly favors and urges the earliest return by the parties to such discussions. I believe it is also clear that both parties recognize the potentially valuable role of the International Court of Justice to consider matters which remain unresolved after negotiation.

The important thing is that the parties find a basis through direct contacts between them for whatever combination of direct talks and supporting adjudication may be necessary to achieve the peaceful settlement that my government is confident both governments seek.

Finally, I have no doubt that all of us are also agreed that the conditions for progress toward solutions to problems between Greece and Turkey can only further improve if both sides avoid any military measures which could in any way be interpreted as threatening and thus detracting from an atmosphere of peace which is now so essential.

My delegation has sought to bear these criteria in mind in our participation in the efforts that led to the elaboration of the text we have joined in tabling. We believe that text is fair and reasonable. It is intended to assist in creating a context in which the parties can solve their differences. We urge the parties to accept the Council's advice.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION[1]

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Greece dated 10 August 1976 (S/12167),

Having heard and noted the various points made in the statements by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey,

Expressing its concern over the present tensions between Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean Sea,

Bearing in mind the principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as the various provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter concerning procedures and methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes,

Noting the importance of the resumption and continuance of direct negotiations between Greece and Turkey to resolve their differences,

Conscious of the need for the parties both to respect each other's international rights and obligations and to avoid any incident which might lead to the aggravation of the situation and which, consequently, might compromise their efforts towards a peaceful solution,

1. *Appeals* to the Governments of Greece and Turkey to exercise the utmost restraint in the present situation;

2. *Urges* the Governments of Greece and Turkey to do everything in their power to reduce the present tensions in the area so that the negotiating process may be facilitated;

3. *Calls on* the Governments of Greece and Turkey to resume direct negotiations over their differences and appeals to them to do everything within their power to ensure that these result in mutually acceptable solutions;

4. *Invites* the Governments of Greece and Turkey

[1] U.N. doc. S/RES/395 (1976); adopted by consensus on Aug. 25.

n this respect to continue to take into account the ontribution that appropriate judicial means, in articular the International Court of Justice, are ualified to make to the settlement of any remaining egal differences which they may identify in conexion with their present dispute.

U.S.-Mexico Science and Technology Commission Holds Second Meeting

Joint Statement

Press release 356 dated July 27

The United States-Mexico Mixed Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation met July 19 and 20, 1976, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico at Tlatelolco, to review and orient the expanding program of scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries. The Commission was established by the Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the United States and Mexico, effected by an exchange of notes signed in the spirit of good will and friendship on June 15, 1972, during the visit of President Echeverría to Washington, D.C. This was the second meeting of the Commission; the first was held in Washington, D.C., in June 1974.

Cochairmen of the Commission meeting were Ambassador Frederick Irving, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and Ambassador Jose Gallástequi, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico. Dr. John Granger, Acting Assistant Director for Scientific, Technological and International Affairs, National Science Foundation, and Lic. Gerardo Bueno Zirion, Director General of the National Council for Science and Technology of Mexico, served as cochairmen of their respective delegations.

In their opening remarks, the cochairmen of the meeting noted the unique historical and personal ties between the two countries, and the desire of both governments to strengthen these ties through closer cooperation in science and technology. It was recognized that the promise of science and technology for furthering economic and social progress can best be fulfilled if national priorities receive primary attention in the programs of scientific and technical cooperation. Ambassador Gallástequi, in his opening remarks, made special mention of the fact that this year's Mixed Commission meeting coincided with the U.S. Bicentennial celebration. Ambassador Irving expressed his sincere appreciation for these comments.

In the course of the meeting, the Commission reviewed and accepted three progress reports, the first jointly prepared by the executive agencies in both countries—the National Science Foundation of the United States and the National Council of Science and Technology of Mexico—on cooperation in science and technology. The Commission noted with satisfaction and commended both agencies for the progress made since the first meeting. The Commission also accepted a joint report on the Program of Exchange of Young Technicians between the two countries. A third report which redefines the scope of the Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation and appropriate mechanisms for broadening and expanding cooperation between the two countries was also approved.

The Commission identified six areas of national priority for special attention for increased cooperation. These are: Energy, Tropical Agriculture, Ecology and Wildlife Preservation, Remote Sensing, Scientific and Technical Information, and Standards.

Presentations were made to the Commission by representatives of the principal related agencies of both countries and subsequent discussions were held on the opportunities offered within these fields to work ahead together toward mutually agreed and beneficial scientific and technical objectives, especially to develop new joint research projects. The Commission encouraged a continuing dialogue between these representatives to achieve broader understanding between the technical agencies of both countries and increase cooperative research activities.

The Mixed Commission decided to hold its next regular meeting in Washington,

D.C., in accordance with the terms of the Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the two countries, at a mutually agreeable time in 1978. The Commission expressed its appreciation for the strong technical participation in the meeting by officials and scientists of both countries and looks to the good will and determination of both delegations to advance cooperation under the agreement to a higher level of activity and service during the next two years.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, August 27, 1976.[1]

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.
Ratification deposited: Indonesia, August 27, 1976.[1]

Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975.[2]
Ratifications deposited: Burundi, August 25, 1976; United Kingdom, August 19, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Cape Verde, August 24, 1976.

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.[2]
Acceptance deposited: New Zealand, August 17, 1976.

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.[2]
Acceptance deposited: Cape Verde, August 24, 1976.

Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971. Entered into force October 7, 1975. TIAS 8140.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Japan, August 18, 1976.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited: German Democratic Republic, August 24, 1976.[3]

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974; for the United States April 21, 1976.
Notification of approval: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, June 22, 1976.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974; for the United States April 21, 1976.
Notification of approval: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, June 22, 1976.

Women—Political Rights

Inter-American convention on the granting of political rights to women. Done at Bogotá May 2, 1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949; for the United States May 24, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: August 30, 1976.

BILATERAL

Mexico

Agreement relating to the provision of additional equipment, material and technical support by the United States to curb illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico August 9, 1976. Entered into force August 9, 1976.

Portugal

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of March 18, 1976 (TIAS 8264). Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon August 13, 1976. Entered into force August 13, 1976.

United Kingdom

Protocol amending the convention of December 31, 1975, as amended April 13, 1976, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London August 26, 1976. Enters into force 30 days following the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

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[1] With a reservation.
[2] Not in force.
[3] With a declaration.

Name Index

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: Aug. 29–Sept. 5

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†400	8/30	Kissinger: letter to Chairman, Board for International Broadcasting, Aug. 28.
*401	8/30	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Oct. 8.
†402	8/30	Kissinger, Simon, Richardson: letter to corporate executives transmitting OECD investment declaration, Aug. 19.
403	8/31	Kissinger: Opportunities Industrialization Centers, Philadelphia.
404	8/31	Kissinger: news conference, Philadelphia.
405	8/31	Kissinger: panel discussion, World Affairs Council, Philadelphia.
*406	9/1	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 29–30.
†407	9/1	Kissinger: remarks at reception for heads of Law of the Sea Conference delegations, New York.
*408	9/1	Television specialists from 15 nations to participate in project in U.S. beginning Sept. 12.
†409	9/1	Kissinger: remarks following meeting with President of Law of the Sea Conference, New York.
†410	9/2	Kissinger, Waldheim: remarks following meeting, New York.
†411	9/3	Kissinger: departure, Andrews AFB.
*412	9/4	Kissinger: remarks to press, London.
*415	9/5	Statement on Sept. 4 Kissinger-Vorster meeting, Zurich.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.