



# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*

## The United States and Africa: Strengthened Ties for an Era of Challenge

*Address by Secretary Kissinger<sup>1</sup>*

More than a century ago Abraham Lincoln remarked that Americans were the "Almighty's almost chosen people." Whether he meant that the Almighty had given us careful consideration and decided to pass us by, or whether he was simply being modest on our behalf, I do not know. I prefer to believe, however, that he meant that America had been provided with everything—material and spiritual—needed to lead the world toward a better time and that the rest was up to us.

In the 111 years that have passed since an assassin's bullet ended Lincoln's life, Americans have done much to make this a better world. More than any other nation, America has stood in opposition to intolerance, poverty, and war. We have offered a haven to the homeless and food to the hungry; we have striven to bring hope to the downtrodden and freedom to the oppressed.

Being human, we have known prejudice, injustice, and cruelty; our institutions have sometimes been rigid and unresponsive. But being a nation of principle, our values have goaded our conscience; we have regularly produced sweeping movements for change which have given new impetus to our institutions and fresh dedication to our people. Americans have never been satisfied with what we were, so long as it was less than what we knew it should be.

The Urban League epitomizes those

qualities. This organization has worked tirelessly against prejudice and for equality with wisdom and uncompromising principle. The league has been a part of the conscience of our time. I have known this personally since the 1950's because of my friendship with Lester Granger, one of the founders of the Urban League. He was a fine man and a distinguished American who felt deeply that genuine progress for black and white alike could only come through cooperation. Because of that friendship and because of the distinguished work of this organization, it is a special honor for me to be here today.

My purpose is to speak to you about the foreign policy of the United States, and in particular about Africa. No part of the world more challenges American purposes and values than that vast and vital continent.

There is, first, a profound human and moral dimension to America's ties with Africa. Three months ago I stood in the dank cells of a slave prison on the Isle of Goree in Senegal, from which hundreds of thousands of Africans were forcibly transported to the New World. I was deeply moved by that grim and awesome scene. The institution of slavery still remains—and always shall remain—the worst blot on the history of our nation. It has affected the lives of every American who has ever lived. Its bitter residue continues to this day. Our challenge now is to show the world that the two races who began their association so tragically can surmount the legacy of the past and learn to live together

<sup>1</sup> Made before the annual conference of the National Urban League at Boston, Mass., on Aug. 2 (text from press release 360).

in freedom and harmony based on a recognition of their common humanity.

History has linked America to Africa in a special bond. The heritage and the struggle of 23 million black Americans have inspired throughout this country a profound awareness of, and support for, the aspirations of the African peoples who seek their freedom and their future against great odds. In this generation the assertion of black nationhood in Africa has coincided with the new affirmation of equality, dignity, and justice in the United States. Americans know that the values their country stands for—peace, equality, economic opportunity, and national independence—are today being tested in Africa as nowhere else in the world.

The moral imperative behind our African policy is reinforced by practical considerations. With the sweep of political independence and economic interdependence, Africa, in less than a decade, has assumed great importance in world affairs. It is a continent of immense size, strategically located, with nearly 50 nations of increasing weight in the world scene. Its vast natural resources are essential elements of the global economy. In the last 20 years direct American investment in black Africa has tripled. Trade has grown at an even faster rate.

Africa's importance to us as a producer of energy and commodities and as a market for our own products is substantial and bound to grow in the future. It is also important for the other industrialized democracies; Western Europe's and Japan's combined trade with Africa now exceeds \$30 billion a year.

An independent and thriving Africa is essential not only to America's national interest and moral purpose but to global stability and progress as well.

#### **America's Global Responsibility and Africa**

I do not want to pretend that the realization of the significance of Africa has come easily to American policy. It grew out of painful experience. But whatever past

omissions, the lesson has been learned. And we will now pursue our new African policy with conviction and dedication.

To be effective our foreign policy must be global; to be realistic, it must be complex; to be lasting, it must be rooted in the hearts as well as the minds of the peoples it is designed to serve.

That global policy is the product of necessity and of the American people's moral and practical interest in the peace of the world and the progress of our fellow man. Africa has an important place in that design. The fundamental principles of our policy and the basic issues of our time are being tested there. We cannot achieve our worldwide foreign policy goals if we do not strive mightily for them in Africa.

The United States is the world's strongest nation, militarily, economically, and in our commitment to democracy. When we fail—for whatever reason—to use our strength for peace and progress, there is a gap that no one else can fill. Without our vigilance, there can be no global security; without our support for friends, there can be no regional balances. Without our cooperation, there is no realistic hope for advancement of the new nations. Without our espousal of freedom, justice, and human dignity, their cause will fade.

And the reverse is equally true. Never before has our well-being been so affected by events abroad. America's peace and safety rest crucially on a global balance of power; our prosperity depends on a flourishing international economy; our future is bound up with the fate of freedom around the world.

But the world of the 1970's is more diverse, fluid, and complex than was the world of the quarter century following the Second World War. Our strength has become less predominant; our margin for error has narrowed; our choices are more difficult and ambiguous.

New centers of power have emerged—including stronger allies and more assertive energy- and raw-material-producing nations. There is now a substantial nuclear balance between the nuclear superpowers.

The once-monolithic Communist bloc has been fractured by bitter rivalries. The economic system links all nations' fortunes, but the developing nations rightly claim a greater role in it.

The colonial and cold war structures of international relations have come to an end, but a new accepted international system has yet to take their place. To shape a new pattern of global relations assuring peace, freedom, and progress is the foremost task of our time.

In pursuit of this objective we have consolidated our partnerships with our principal allies, the great industrial democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. We have resisted attempts to tip the global balance or to threaten the independence of smaller nations. We have sought to reach beyond security to a relationship more hopeful than a balance of terror constantly contested. And we have striven to engage the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in full and constructive participation in the international order.

Today, all these global challenges have a crucial African dimension. The nations of Africa face a uniquely difficult task. A continent of vast wealth and potential is fragmented by the arbitrary boundaries of the colonial era. Tribal differences divert energies and resources; racial hatred smothers the spirit and the talents of both its victims and its advocates. National identity—a concept often taken for granted in other parts of the world—must, in many African countries, be consciously created in an almost impossibly short span of years. An enterprise of nation-building is being pursued at a rate and in ways which have no parallel in human experience.

And in the last two years, the pace of change in Africa has accelerated in every dimension:

—The sudden collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire created fundamental changes in southern Africa. Efforts to negotiate the racial conflict in Rhodesia and Namibia stalled. The forces for moderation

in black Africa risked being discredited. Radical movements and guerrilla violence were on the rise.

—Worldwide recession and the sharp rise in oil prices had a drastic impact on the world's poor nations, many of them African. Developing countries began to form blocs to challenge the industrial countries, threatening new cartels and economic warfare.

—Factional divisions within liberation movements drew outside powers into confrontation in Angola. After Angola, there was a general fear that foreign intervention would spread to other conflicts in southern Africa. Responsible Africans feared that the peace, integrity, unity, and independence of the continent were gravely threatened.

The United States could not remain indifferent to these trends. We decided to exert our influence in the search for negotiated solutions in southern Africa before time ran out, to seek new ways to foster Africa's economic development and progress, and to buttress the principle of African solutions for African problems in the face of the growing danger of foreign intervention.

President Ford made the courageous decision, for these reasons, to send me on a mission to Africa. It was essential to provide responsible African leaders with a moderate alternative to the grim prospects of violence so rapidly taking shape before them; it was time to strengthen U.S.-African relations in ways with which Africans could identify and cooperate. The new impetus we gave to our policy in Africa was designed to demonstrate that there is a positive and peaceful road open to fulfill African aspirations and that America can be counted on for understanding, advice, and assistance.

Against this background, let me discuss in greater detail our response to the three principal challenges:

—Africa's quest for self-determination and human dignity in southern Africa and throughout the continent;



—Africa's striving for economic progress; and

—Africa's determination to preserve its unity and freedom from outside interference and great-power rivalry.

### Southern Africa

Late last year the situation in southern Africa took on a new and more critical dimension with implications not only for the peace, independence, and unity of Africa but for global peace and stability.

For the first time since the end of the colonial era in the early 1960's, external interventions had begun to overwhelm an essentially African problem. The political evolution of Angola was slipping out of African control toward determination by outsiders. The United States was prevented by congressional action from assisting its friends in their efforts to counter foreign intervention and negotiate a compromise African solution.

After Angola, there was concern that the precedent of external intervention would spread to *Rhodesia*, where a guerrilla war was already taking place. The white minority regime there—representing only 4 percent of the population—is not recognized by a single government in the world. The negotiations which it had conducted with black leaders had broken down, and guerrilla actions had intensified. Even moderate African leaders began to urge a military solution.

To reverse these trends, the United States set forth a comprehensive program in Lusaka, Zambia, in April. We put our weight behind a British proposal for majority rule in Rhodesia within two years. We stated our readiness to help a new majority-ruled Rhodesia in its peaceful transition to an independent Zimbabwe and after. We stressed the importance of racial peace and equality, including minority rights.

The United States is working hard to carry forward this program. We are consulting closely with the leaders of black

Africa, Western Europe, and South Africa to promote equitable solutions. We are not seeking to impose an American blueprint; instead we are doing our best to encourage the African parties involved to negotiate a settlement in which black and white can coexist and cooperate for Africa's future on the basis of equality, dignity, and peace. The United States, together with others, stands ready to help the parties overcome the economic dislocations which inevitably will accompany the process of change in southern Africa.

In recent weeks we have heard charges that through its policy toward Rhodesia the United States is raising the likelihood of violence and of civil war.

The truth is just the opposite. There is bloodshed and civil war now and has been for years. The violence is certain to increase. The Rhodesian authorities—recognized by no one—face an impossible task. The issue is not whether change will take place, but how—whether by violence or by peaceful means, whether the future of southern Africa will be determined by guns or through accommodation. The answer will determine what legacy will be left to the peoples of southern Africa.

What we seek is the only alternative to intensified conflict: a negotiated settlement that assures the rights of all Rhodesians, black and white, preserves the economic strength of the country, and removes the opportunity for foreign intervention.

We are moving energetically to take advantage of the momentum thus far achieved. A process is in train. We are engaged in frequent consultations with the African states most directly concerned. We have been in close touch with Great Britain, which has a historic and legal responsibility for Rhodesia. Following my trip to Africa I had useful talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster, after which the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs returned to Africa for further consultations.

Obviously I cannot go into details about delicate and complicated negotiations

which are still in a formative stage. I can say that while the task is formidable, it is by no means impossible. If it is to succeed, however, all interested parties will have to do their share.

The white population of Rhodesia must recognize the inevitable and negotiate for a solution which respects its basic interests while there is yet time.

South Africa must demonstrate its dedication to Africa by assisting a negotiated outcome.

The black African states—especially those most directly concerned—must provide guidance, encourage unity among black leaders, and help ease the transition to a government based on majority rule and minority rights.

The black leaders of Rhodesia must submerge their differences and outline a future of cooperation and racial coexistence in an independent Zimbabwe.

Failure would be serious, but it will not occur because of lack of effort by the United States.

We have made progress. We will continue on our course with hope and dedication.

While Rhodesia is the most immediately dangerous of the problems of southern Africa, the future of *Namibia* is also of deep concern.

The former German colony of South West Africa was a mandated territory of South Africa from 1920 until the United Nations terminated the mandate in 1966. Five years ago the International Court of Justice held that South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia was illegal. The United States supported both of those decisions and voted for a U.N. resolution calling for South Africa to take specific steps toward Namibia's self-determination and independence by August 1976. That deadline is now upon us.

Progress in solving the Namibian problem has become imperative. A source of international discord for many years, Namibia, like Rhodesia, contains the seeds of greater conflict. With thousands of for-

eign troops north of the Namibian border and with intensifying warfare in Rhodesia, a far more volatile climate for violence exists in southern Africa. The risks of confrontation mount. Time is running out.

The United States strongly supports self-determination and independence for Namibia. We urge South Africa to permit the people and all the political groups of Namibia to express themselves freely, under U.N. supervision, and to participate in determining the future of their country. We support also a firm date for self-determination for Namibia. At the same time we urge the African groups concerned to approach negotiations in a spirit of conciliation. We are working actively in this direction.

We are convinced that a solution can be found protecting the interests of *all* who live and work in Namibia. Once concrete steps are underway, the United States will ease its restrictions on trade and investment in Namibia and provide economic and technical assistance to help that nation consolidate its independence.

The problem of *South Africa* itself is more complex. No one—including the responsible leaders of black Africa—challenges the right of white South Africans to live in their country. They are not colonialists; historically they are an African people; they have lived on African soil for 300 years. But South Africa's internal structure is explosive and incompatible with any concept of human dignity.

Racial discrimination is a blight which afflicts many nations of the world. But South Africa is unique in institutionalizing discrimination in an all-pervasive enforced separation of the races which mocks any definition of human equality. The recent clashes in black urban townships and black universities in South Africa are a vivid expression of the frustration of black South Africans with a system that denies them status, dignity, or political rights. The United States appeals to South Africa to heed these warning signals.

The United States, true to its own beliefs,

will use all its influence to encourage peaceful change, an end to institutionalized inequality, and equality of opportunity and basic human rights in South Africa.

The new momentum of our policy in southern Africa has been welcomed by African leaders of all political persuasions. It has found widespread support around the world. It has given heart to moderate leaders and friends of America. It is the best chance for peaceful solutions and for a secure and just future for Africa free of outside intervention.

There are grounds for hope. What is needed now is vision and courage among the groups and governments involved—and in America public support and understanding for the course which we are pursuing. In this spirit, the United States appeals to all nations and parties involved to take rapid, responsible, and cooperative steps and thereby spare countless thousands the agony and sacrifices that violence brings:

—We appeal to the current Rhodesian authorities to begin urgent talks for an independent Zimbabwe while the future of the white population can still be negotiated peacefully and guarantees are yet attainable. On this basis, let all Rhodesians, black and white, end the bloodshed and work together to create a new nation in which all races coexist and cooperate in peace.

—We appeal to the Republic of South Africa to recognize that the wind of change is again blowing through Africa. Let it end its increasing isolation and demonstrate its commitment to Africa by making a positive contribution to the humane evolution of the continent.

—We appeal to the black African nations of southern Africa to continue the statesmanlike effort which they have already begun. They have declared that peace and stability can only be built upon a settlement that takes account of the legitimate interests of all the groups and races involved. Let them help make these pronouncements a reality.

—And we appeal to the former colonial

powers to use their valued continuing ties to Africa to promote justice, peace, and economic progress for Africa, turning the legacy of the past into a proud and positive future.

Let all the nations and groups make a conscious and dedicated effort to overcome the hatred and distrust of generations. This cannot be easy. But to repeat the past is to perpetuate its anguish. Old injustices cannot be removed by accumulating new ones. At some point, the cycle of violence must be broken and the suffering ended. There will not soon come again an opportunity such as we now have.

### **Economic Development**

The nations of Africa do not want to expend all their energies on the problems of southern Africa. No peoples have more earned the right to economic progress. None have a better prospect to realize their aspiration to economic development. America stands ready to cooperate with Africa on the long-term positive tasks of economic development. The obstacles are vast—but so are the opportunities.

Africa is blessed with immense natural wealth. The ratio of population to resources is more favorable than in almost any other region of the developing world. And there is great potential for increasing agricultural productivity.

But development in Africa must also surmount great handicaps, some faced by developing nations everywhere, others unique to Africa:

—First, Africa is encumbered by a cruel legacy of history. The continent is fragmented by frontiers drawn in the colonial period into political units that do not always produce viable national economies. Tribal divisions often thwart the national cohesion and social organization needed for development. Spanning these states are regions of enormous extremes, from fertile and rich lands to poor and barren deserts.

—Second, Africa bears a crushing burden of poverty. Eighteen of the world's 28



least developed countries are located in Africa. Only 17 percent of the people are literate. Out of every hundred infants born, 15 die before their first birthday; life expectancy is 10 years less than the average in the developing world and almost 30 years less than in the United States.

—Third, Africa is the chronic victim of natural disaster. Few regions are so subject to natural catastrophe. For example, drought in the Sahel, on the southern edge of the Sahara Desert, has become chronic; it is altering the ecology of western Africa and has expanded the desert, which now encroaches steadily into once-fertile lands, producing famine and suffering.

—Fourth, Africa is dependent on the world economy to an extraordinary degree. Many African countries rely almost exclusively on the export of one or two primary products for critical foreign exchange earnings. The world recession and declining raw material prices, together with rising prices for food and fuel, have hit the African nations harder than any other region of the world.

America has a stake in the economic development of Africa. A world in which half prosper while the other half despair cannot be tranquil; a world which the majority of nations considers unjust is a world of instability, turmoil, and danger. We have sought to respond to the challenges of African development in four ways:

—First, to surmount the economic fragmentation that is the legacy of the colonial era, the United States has supported efforts for regional cooperation within Africa. For example, we have offered our help to promote a more efficient regional transportation network in southern Africa. We have stressed the importance of regional cooperation to deal with the pervasive problems of the Sahel. We believe that the African fund proposed by President Giscard d'Estaing of France can be used to encourage other regional initiatives.

—Second, to help Africa surmount its

pervasive poverty, American trade and investment are crucial, and they are rapidly expanding. But they are not enough, especially for the poorest countries. Our bilateral assistance programs are increasingly concentrated on the least developed countries and on such sectors as food, education, and population, where the needs of the poor are greatest. Our requests to the Congress for development assistance for Africa are planned to grow substantially over the coming years.

—Third, to reduce Africa's vulnerability to natural disasters, the United States is placing great emphasis on long-term development projects. The time has come for comprehensive international programs aimed at eliminating problems rather than relief efforts to ease their effects. Last May in Dakar we outlined a program for international cooperation to help the nations of the Sahel develop additional water resources, increase crop acreage by modern agricultural methods, and improve food storage facilities, all designed to make the Sahel less vulnerable to crises in the future.

—Fourth, the United States has taken the lead in efforts to reform the global economic system for the benefit of the developing nations. We called for, and made recommendations to, the World Food Conference of 1974, to expand agricultural production worldwide. In U.N. meetings ever since, we have set forth comprehensive proposals to accelerate development. As a result, several new institutions and mechanisms of cooperation have been created. We have proposed just means of improving the earnings potential of key raw materials. We have reduced trade barriers to the exports of many developing countries into the United States. We are paying special attention to problems of developing countries at the multilateral trade negotiations now underway in Geneva. We have made proposals for a system of world food security. We are examining ways to help developing countries hard hit by increasing energy costs to improve their energy programs. All these initiatives have special

relevance to Africa and bring particular benefits to it.

Economic development in Africa requires the cooperation of *all* the industrial democracies. No other group of countries—certainly not the Socialist countries—is able to provide similar levels of technology, managerial expertise, or resources. But the industrial democracies must coordinate their programs if they are not to dissipate resources and see their efforts overlap or conflict. This is why the United States has endorsed the imaginative proposal of President Giscard d'Estaing of France for a fund to organize and coordinate Western assistance efforts for Africa. And we are seeking within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development a more general coordination of development efforts among the industrial democracies.

Economic development is a long-term process. Manifestos, rhetorical assaults, or wholesale programs to redistribute wealth are not the answer. Development depends, above all, on the sustained and substantial effort of the developing countries themselves. And it requires cooperation between industrialized and developing nations. Neither can impose solutions on the other. An atmosphere of rancor, extortion, or unworkable resolutions undermines public support in the industrial nations, whose effective contribution is crucial to development. Confrontation leads to retrogression for both the industrial and the developing world. Progress will be sustained only if it benefits both sides.

The choice we all face is between cooperation and chaos. America has made its decision. We will work with all nations in a constructive spirit to make our interdependence a period of unparalleled progress for all of mankind.

#### African Independence

The surest way to thwart all hopes for political and economic progress in Africa will be to permit the continent to become

an arena in which outside powers contest for spheres of influence. Africa has only recently freed itself of great-power rivalry. The clock must never be turned back.

The United States does not seek any pro-American bloc in Africa. We will accept and support the nonalignment of all nations and groups. But we strongly oppose the efforts of any other nation that seeks to undermine African independence and unity by attempting to establish an exclusive, dominant position. African unity, integrity, and independence are, and will remain, fundamental tenets of our policy.

We have heard it said that there is no need to fear foreign intervention in Africa—that however successful non-African nations may prove to be temporarily, at some indefinite date in the future African nationalism will reassert itself and expel the intruder. But let us not forget that it took generations to throw off colonial powers. The modern forms of intervention are much more refined and more difficult to remove.

Those who are threatened or pressured from outside do not have the luxury of waiting for history; they must decide whether to resist or succumb. Advice which counsels adaptation and confidence in the verdict of the future and which pretends that freedom occurs automatically may sentence African nations to decades of outside interference and the entire continent to increasing great-power confrontation.

There is no better guarantee against foreign intervention than the determination of African nations to defend their own independence and unity. Let us, therefore, not minimize the importance of the security problems that some African nations face. I cannot accept the proposition that black African nations do not have the same right as other nations to defend themselves against recognized dangers—especially when their neighbors have been heavily armed by the Soviet Union. We are determined to avoid unnecessary arms races. But when friendly nations like Kenya or Zaïre make modest and serious requests for as-

sistance to protect themselves against neighbors possessing substantial Soviet arms, we owe them our serious consideration.

The ultimate solution is for Africa to strengthen the institutions of its unity and thereby its capacity to insulate African problems from outside involvement. We welcome the efforts of those black African leaders who have specifically warned against great-power involvement in the problems of southern Africa and who have asked the great powers to refrain from supplying individual factions. The United States supports this principle and will abide by it. The United States will do its utmost to help prevent a repetition of the factional and regional rivalries that made it possible for outsiders in Angola to replace a Portuguese army of occupation with a Cuban one.

We will vigorously support African unity, independence, and integrity.

#### **America's Commitment**

Distant events touch our lives and our hearts—whether it is a drought in the Sahel, a civil war in Lebanon, or an earthquake in China. In the modern age, our consciousness of each other is a moral as well as a practical reality. The future of races, nations, or continents is shared.

That is why America's acceptance of global responsibilities is not an act of generosity, but a wise pursuit of the national interest. If we do not do our best to maintain the peace, it is not just the rest of the world but we ourselves who will suffer. If

we fail to help those living in poverty and despair, the torrent of revolution and turmoil that will inevitably follow will affect us all. And if we flag in our effort to support the forces of liberty and human dignity we cannot long preserve our own freedom.

For two centuries the oppressed everywhere have known that the Declaration of Independence was addressed not just to Americans but to all the world. Men and women deprived of freedom in other lands knew that it was an appeal not just to the conscience of this country but to all mankind.

No group knows better than this one that justice must always be evenhanded, that no moral end is served if the contest is defined as which group shall dominate the others. As we defend majority rule, we must not neglect minority rights. As we promote economic development, we must never forget that economic progress is empty if it does not extend the area of human freedom.

Today, one of history's great human dramas is being played out in Africa. There, peoples cry out for liberty and economic advance. They will not be denied. The question is whether mankind has learned from its travail, whether the price of freedom must be paid in treasure and lasting hatred.

Let us pray it will not be so. Let us help the voice of reason to prevail in Africa. In so doing, we will have reflected America's own values in the world. And we will have taken a great step toward the goal of a true world community of brotherhood that remains our most noble vision.

## Humanitarian Problems in Lebanon Discussed by Department

*Statement by Philip C. Habib  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

Mr. Chairman [Senator Edward M. Kennedy]: I greatly welcome your invitation to discuss with the subcommittee the humanitarian problems arising from the continuing tragedy afflicting Lebanon. Over the many months of civil strife in that country, the human costs of this chronic situation have been of great concern to the U.S. Government. We have taken various steps, given the overwhelming physical problems, to alleviate human suffering in Lebanon.

Before I proceed to outline what we have been able to do to meet the needs in Lebanon, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment to set the stage regarding the difficulties of operating programs of any kind in that stricken land.

As you are aware, a chronic state of insecurity has prevailed in many parts of the country, and particularly in Beirut, for some time. In this atmosphere, instrumentalities of the Lebanese Government have ceased to function nationwide, and agencies of the United Nations have been, in many cases, withdrawn, along with a large number of diplomatic missions.

Aside from the increasing difficulties of day-to-day operation, accentuated by the collapse of some public services and the

scarcity of essential commodities such as gasoline, very little remains in the way of structure to receive, administer, and distribute humanitarian assistance from any source. It is even difficult to know what the needs are and to what extent efforts are being used effectively.

To complicate the situation further, transport and communications links—particularly the Beirut port and international airport—are severed for much of the time.

In summary, assistance efforts of any kind face difficult problems calling for flexibility and ingenuity so long as the fighting continues.

As you know, earlier this year when it appeared that a cease-fire would take hold in Lebanon, the United Nations issued an appeal for \$50 million to undertake a large-scale relief program for approximately 250,000 people who have been displaced or made destitute by the civil war. The \$20 million budget amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act for fiscal year 1977 submitted by the President on June 18, 1976, was designed to enable the United States to respond positively to this appeal: 75 percent, or \$15 million, of the total requested was earmarked for the U.N. program; the remaining \$5 million was intended for medical supplies and other support to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the American University Hospital (AUH), and other relief activities.

Since the original U.N. appeal, the se-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on July 29. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



curity situation in Lebanon has deteriorated, and the United Nations has indicated that it will not be able to undertake its relief program until after the fighting is reduced substantially. At that time, we will review our earlier request to determine if it is still responsive to total relief needs in Lebanon and advise the appropriate committees of Congress accordingly. The experience with the U.N. program, however, illustrates my previous point about the considerable practical obstacles to relief activities in Lebanon.

Under the circumstances which I have sketched above, we have found only two neutral institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the American University Hospital, which have been able to function on a continuing basis during the period of the Lebanese crisis. U.S. support for these institutions, in the form of financial assistance as well as medical and commodity support, has been significant in permitting them to continue to provide vital humanitarian assistance to the victims of Lebanon's civil strife.

The ICRC, which is the only functioning international agency in Lebanon, has been quite active there, providing direct medical and relief assistance. At present it has 36 delegates and medical personnel in Lebanon, not counting local staff. I am certain, for example, that you are familiar with its current efforts to arrange the evacuation of the seriously wounded from the refugee camp at Tal Zaatar in east Beirut. In addition, the ICRC has operated an airlift from Larnaca, Cyprus, to Beirut to transport medical, food, and other relief supplies for various hospitals in Lebanon, including its own field hospital. Larger Red Cross shipments have also been sent by sea from Cyprus.

The U.S. Government has contributed a total of \$2 million in response to ICRC appeals for its program in Lebanon. This amounts to approximately 40 percent of the ICRC's program expenditures in that country since October 1975, and we antici-

pate making further contributions as these appear needed and appropriate.

We have also provided medical supplies valued at \$1.65 million to the American University Hospital since November 1975. This facility has been a major center for treating casualties during the crisis and, given its superior facilities, has also functioned as a referral institution. Substantial portions of the medical supplies provided to AUH by the U.S. Government were redistributed to hospitals on both sides of the confrontation line bisecting Beirut. AUH has recently submitted a new list of urgently needed medical supplies which we estimate will cost about \$1 million, which will bring the amount of our direct assistance to the institution to over \$2.65 million.

In addition to direct commodity support to AUH, a grant of \$1.5 million is in process under the American schools and hospital program [of the Agency for International Development (AID)]. That will, among other effects, assist the hospital in meeting a serious cash-flow problem brought about by the high casualty patient load accepted on a "pay-if-you-can" basis and by other fiscal problems deriving from the civil war.

We have appreciated your initiative, Mr. Chairman, in offering an amendment to the 1977 foreign assistance appropriation to provide an additional \$5 million to the State Department in support of the ICRC's program in Lebanon.

We anticipate at this time that at least that level of additional funding will be needed there for humanitarian relief. We understand that your amendment would appropriate these funds to the State Department refugee and migration account. While we recognize that your purpose in this approach is to assure that funds be made available to the ICRC as rapidly as possible, we would suggest that the funds be appropriated for this purpose to the AID foreign disaster account. The \$2 million we have already committed to ICRC has been drawn from the foreign disaster



account, and we believe it would be simpler to continue our funding for this purpose under this heading. In addition, we would hope that the additional funds provided by your amendment could be used for other humanitarian purposes in Lebanon, such as the American University Hospital, rather than exclusively for the ICRC.

A joint State-AID task force has been established to monitor the relief needs on a daily basis so that prompt action can be taken to meet emergency and humanitarian relief needs as they become known.

Since November 1975 we have thus contributed \$4.65 million to help alleviate the human tragedy of Lebanon, and we presently have another \$1.5 million in process.

Another important aspect of the Lebanese tragedy involves stateless refugees—Assyrian, Armenian, and Coptic Christians—who were awaiting international resettlement in Lebanon when the situation there deteriorated. As Under Secretary Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, then Under Secretary for Political Affairs] informed the committee in testimony last April, some 2,700 refugees were transported to safe haven in Athens. This operation was successfully completed as the result of an extraordinary effort on the part of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, ICEM [Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration], the voluntary agencies, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and Embassy officials in Beirut and Athens. Out of the 2,730 flown to Athens, 2,341 have arrived in the United States, primarily in the Chicago area, where they are being carefully resettled by the Assyrian-Armenian community in concert with the voluntary agencies.

In conclusion, I would like to address briefly the question of visa issuance, both immigrant and nonimmigrant, to Lebanese citizens. As you may be aware, the consular section of our Embassy in Beirut was closed on July 19 in accordance with the decision to reduce substantially the size of our official presence in that war-torn city. Consular personnel departed Lebanon

July 27. The visa files from Beirut have been packed for relocation at Athens, and further processing will become possible once this has been accomplished.

Without going into great detail, I can say that throughout the civil strife in Lebanon, the Department has attempted, within the constraints of applicable law, to be sympathetic to the plight of the Lebanese and aware of the special problems they face. We have taken care of that consular officers in third countries where Lebanese citizens might apply for nonimmigrant visas are cognizant of these special circumstances and in a position to view applications sympathetically and realistically. We have also sought to be as responsive as possible in immigrant visa cases.

As the internal situation in Lebanon worsened, the volume of immigrant visa applications increased and the need for rapid processing became more acute. Among the administrative measures instituted to expedite issuance are the following:

—The Department worked out procedures with the INS to transmit approved petitions for immigrant visa applications by telegram.

—The INS agreed to the Department's proposal to approve petitions from relatives in the United States conditional upon the presentation of documentation establishing relationships to the consular officer abroad by the visa applicant at the time of the interview.

—All visa-issuing posts were alerted to the fact that conditions in Lebanon make impossible the presentation of some documentation ordinarily required and were reminded of the necessity for the exercise of discretionary powers to waive documents under exceptional conditions of hardship.

—A special channel for the telegraphic request of visa numbers for Lebanese was established.

And in addition to these measures of assistance to visa applicants, we have

worked closely with the INS to ease the problems of Lebanese who are in the United States temporarily. I am pleased to report that the INS expressed complete understanding and agreed to consider applications for extensions of stay on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the necessity to grant permission to accept employment when there is an indication of the need to do so.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that this statement will provide you and the members of your committee with the broad outlines of our efforts to deal with the significant humanitarian aspects of the Lebanese tragedy. It is much to be regretted that the violence in Lebanon continues to increase human suffering and to complicate efforts to provide relief. Pending the restoration of some degree of calm to the Lebanese scene, the U.S. Government and others interested in providing assistance can hope to offer only the most urgent forms of assistance.

## **Senate Asked To Approve Treaties With U.S.S.R. on Nuclear Explosions**

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, and the Protocol thereto, referred to as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTB Treaty), and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social-

ist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, and the Protocol thereto (PNE Treaty). The TTB Treaty was signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974 and the PNE Treaty was signed in Washington and Moscow on May 28, 1976. For the information of the Senate, I transmit also the detailed report of the Department of State on these Treaties.

These Treaties together establish procedures for the conduct of all underground nuclear explosions by the United States and the Soviet Union. All nuclear explosions other than underground nuclear explosions are prohibited by the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (the Limited Test Ban Treaty) of 1963. The TTB Treaty and PNE Treaty are the first agreements since the Limited Test Ban Treaty to impose direct restraints on nuclear explosions by the Parties and, as such, contribute to limiting nuclear arms competition.

These two Treaties represent approximately two years of intensive effort. Negotiation of the TTB Treaty began in the Spring of 1974 and was completed in July of that year. However, the question of the relationship of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to limitations on nuclear weapon testing was not then resolved. As a result, Article III of the TTB Treaty provided that the Parties would negotiate and conclude an agreement governing underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Work on the PNE Treaty began in the Fall of 1974 and after six lengthy negotiating sessions was completed in April of 1976.

The TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty are closely interrelated and complement one another. The TTB Treaty places a limitation of 150 kilotons on all underground nuclear weapon tests carried out by the Parties. The PNE Treaty similarly provides for a limitation of 150 kilotons on all individual underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

During the negotiation of the PNE Treaty, the Parties investigated whether

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on July 29 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. N, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the treaties and protocols and the report of the Department of State. For texts of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Protocol, see BULLETIN of July 29, 1974, p. 217; for texts of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty and Protocol, see BULLETIN of June 28, 1976, p. 801.

individual explosions with yields above 150 kilotons could be accommodated consistent with the agreed aim of not providing weapon-related benefits otherwise precluded by the TTB Treaty. The Parties did not develop a basis for such an accommodation, largely because it has not been possible to distinguish between nuclear explosive device technology as applied for weapon-related purposes and as applied for peaceful purposes. The Parties therefore agreed that the yield limitations on individual explosions in the two Treaties would be the same.

The TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty contain numerous provisions to ensure adequate verification, including some concepts, more far-reaching than those found in previous arms control agreements, which are not only important in themselves but which will have significant precedential value as well. For example, the Limited Test Ban Treaty is verified only by national technical means. The TTB and PNE Treaties add requirements for exchange of specific information in advance to assist verification by national technical means, and the PNE Treaty establishes procedures for on-site observation under certain conditions on the territory of the Party conducting the explosion.

The TTB Treaty provides for an exchange of data on the geography and geology of nuclear weapon test sites as well as the yields of some actual weapons tests conducted at each site. The PNE Treaty requires that the Party conducting any underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes provide the other Party in advance with data on the geography and geology of the place where the explosion is to be carried out, its purpose, and specific information on each explosion itself. These requirements are related to the yield of the explosion and become more detailed as

the magnitude of the explosions increase.

In addition to the limitation on individual nuclear explosions of 150 kilotons, the PNE Treaty provides for an aggregate yield limitation of 1.5 megatons on group underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. A group explosion consists of substantially simultaneous individual explosions located within a specific geometrical relationship to one another. The Treaty provides for mandatory on-site observer rights for group explosions with an aggregate yield in excess of 150 kilotons in order to determine that the yield of each individual explosion in the group does not exceed 150 kilotons and that the explosions serve the stated peaceful purposes. The Treaty also provides for on-site observers for explosions with an aggregate yield between 100 and 150 kilotons if both Parties agree, on the basis of information provided, that such observers would be appropriate for the confirmation of the yield of the explosion.

The TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty, taken together as integrated and complementary components of this important limitation on nuclear explosions, provide that very large yield nuclear explosions will no longer be carried out by the Parties. This is one more useful step in our continuing efforts to develop comprehensive and balanced limitations on nuclear weapons. We will continue our efforts to reach an adequately verifiable agreement banning all nuclear weapon testing, but in so doing we must ensure that controls on peaceful nuclear explosions are consistent with such a ban. These Treaties are in the national interest, and I respectfully recommend that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 29, 1976.*

## Department Urges Support of Coffee and Tin Agreements and Protocols Extending Wheat Agreement

*Statement by Joseph A. Greenwald*

*Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I welcome this opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss the three treaties before you: the International Coffee Agreement of 1976; the Fifth International Tin Agreement; and the third extension of the Wheat Trade and Food Aid Conventions, constituting the International Wheat Agreement of 1971. Before describing the three treaties and explaining our reasons for supporting them, I would like to set them in the perspective of our overall commodity policy.

World trade in agricultural products, metals, minerals, and foodstuffs amounts to a substantial portion of total international trade. This trade is important to us both as producers and consumers. The role of commodity trade in our economy is growing significantly. We import, for example, 85 percent of our bauxite requirements, 80 percent of our tin, 70 percent of our nickel, and virtually all of our cocoa and coffee. For commodities such as wheat, our exports account for nearly 50 percent of total world exports; for feed grains, 60 percent; and for soybeans, 68 percent. In 1975, our grain exports alone amounted to \$11.6 billion.

Other developed countries are more dependent than the United States on raw material imports. Taking the nine major industrial minerals as an illustration, in 1950 Europe imported 65 percent of its consumption requirements. In 1980 it will import an estimated 80 percent. For Japan, the comparable shift is from 17 percent in 1950 to 95 percent by 1980.

As we have seen in recent years, commodity prices can be extremely volatile and can have a substantial impact on the economies of both developing and developed countries. The sharp rise in commodity prices in 1972 and 1973 was a major factor in the double-digit inflation of that period. The subsequent sharp fall in commodity prices in late 1974 and 1975 greatly exacerbated the balance-of-payments situation of those commodity-exporting countries which had to pay substantially higher prices for their oil imports.

The fundamental objective of our international economic policy is to seek an open world economy that permits market forces to operate with the minimum restriction on the flow of goods, services, capital, and technology across international borders. We are also engaged in a concerted effort by the economically advanced countries to improve the development prospects of the developing countries.

Our approach to commodity policy is supportive of our general international eco-

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<sup>1</sup>Submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 27. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



conomic policy. We thus seek to rely to the greatest extent possible on free markets to facilitate the flow of goods between producers and consumers and to deal with serious problems in ways that will expand rather than restrict trade. The basic objectives of our commodity policy are:

1. To insure adequate investment in resource development to meet market demand in the decades ahead;

2. To improve the functioning of individual commodity markets through case-by-case consideration of specific problems and the adoption of appropriate arrangements;

3. To improve market access for the processed goods of developing countries;

4. To assure security of supply for consumers; and

5. To promote stable growth for the commodity export earnings of the developing countries.

Developing countries rely on commodities for approximately two-thirds of their export earnings. Because of the importance of commodity trade to the developing countries, our commodity policies have become a major issue in the so-called North-South dialogue. Many Third World nations are skeptical that the present world system is responsive to their concerns. These nations have called for greater control of their economic affairs and have challenged the existing economic order.

It is our view that this challenge should not and need not lead to confrontation. Thus, in September of last year at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary Kissinger sought to reverse the trend toward North-South confrontation and to shift the substance of international discussions from ideological debate to practical measures to deal with concrete problems. In February of this year we began an important new dialogue with developing countries and oil-exporting countries in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation to consider problems of energy, development, raw materials, and related financial issues. In May

we participated actively in UNCTAD IV [fourth ministerial meeting of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] and, among other things, agreed to join in further discussions on 18 specific commodities over the next year or two.

#### **Case-by-Case Approach to Commodity Problems**

The three treaties before you today illustrate our case-by-case approach. The economic provisions of the coffee agreement bear no resemblance to the measures proposed in the tin agreement. Each was the result of careful technical analysis of the problems of the trade in the specific commodity. The extension of the wheat agreement contains no new economic mechanisms, but provides for the continuation of the framework for international cooperation on wheat trade matters.

I think it is fair to observe, Mr. Chairman, that many other countries tend to approach commodity problems differently than do we. Since the malfunctioning of a commodity market is almost always reflected in the price of that commodity, proposals for international action are frequently to do something about the price: to raise it, to lower it, or to stabilize it. Our approach is to deal with each problem more fundamentally: to inquire about the cause of the malfunction and to examine alternative means of dealing with it.

In some cases, the commodity problem can be dealt with by an international agreement to stabilize the price of that commodity, either through a buffer stock or some other kind of commodity arrangement. Most often, however, the more effective approach will be to treat the root causes of the problem, rather than the price manifestation, by means of policies which more directly promote investment, expand markets, encourage diversification into alternative production, or develop new uses.

It is for this reason, Mr. Chairman, that we lay so much stress on the case-by-case approach. The problems of each commod-



ity must be carefully analyzed and measures adopted which would be suitable for that particular commodity. We are therefore not committed to negotiate price stabilization agreements for each commodity or to bring before the Senate every so-called price stabilization agreement internationally negotiated. We have, for example, concluded after careful review that the International Cocoa Agreement, as presently negotiated, is not a workable agreement; and we have not signed it. We do believe, however, after equally careful analysis, that the three agreements before you today are appropriate mechanisms for dealing with the commodities they cover and should be supported by the United States.

I would like now, Mr. Chairman, to turn to the specific agreements.

#### **International Coffee Agreement**

After petroleum, coffee is the most important export of the developing world. In 1975, coffee exports from more than 40 producing countries amounted to over \$4 billion. In 1976, that value will exceed \$7 billion. Because of its economic importance to the exporting countries, coffee plays a significant role in our overall relations with them.

We rely almost entirely on foreign production for our coffee. U.S. imports in 1975 amounted to \$1.6 billion. Although our per capita coffee consumption is declining, we still consume about 35 percent of total world imports.

The United States has participated in International Coffee Agreements since 1962. The 1962 agreement was the result of a joint U.S. and Brazilian initiative. At that time, the situation of coffee producers was desperate. Record high prices in 1954, a situation similar to today, had led to massive planting of new coffee trees, followed by overproduction, surplus stocks, and disastrous prices. The purpose of the 1962 agreement was to stabilize coffee prices and the export earnings of the large

number of producing countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Through a system of export quotas, the 1962 agreement and its successor in 1968 were relatively successful in stabilizing prices during the 1960's at levels equitable to producers and fair to consumers.

By 1972, however, both producers and consumers recognized that the world coffee outlook had changed. Consumption was exceeding production, accumulated stocks were declining, and the prices received by producers had improved considerably. Accordingly, the economic provisions of the agreement were suspended, but the International Coffee Organization was preserved as a forum for consultation and negotiation. In 1973, the 1968 agreement was extended for a period of two years with all the economic provisions deleted. In 1975, the 1968 agreement was extended for a further year. Each of these agreements was of course submitted to your committee and received the advice and consent of the Senate.

When Mr. Katz [Julius L. Katz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs] appeared before you last September to discuss the extension of the 1968 agreement, he indicated that we already had made substantial progress in the negotiation of a new agreement with economic provisions and that we hoped to conclude the agreement in time to permit entry into force October 1, 1976. The negotiations were concluded successfully in December 1975, and after an intensive review, the President submitted the treaty to you on April 5, 1976. Before discussing the details of the new agreement, I would like first to review the background against which the negotiations took place.

#### **Coffee Price Trends**

Negotiations began in early 1975. The overproduction phase of the coffee cycle had clearly ended. The prospect was for reasonable balance between supply and demand, barring some new disturbance.

Prices had fallen from their 1974 highs to a level under 50 cents per pound and appeared to be trending downward in anticipation of a good Brazilian crop. Producers had become concerned and began to pursue seriously efforts to conclude an agreement.

On July 17, 1975, a severe frost struck the coffee-growing regions of Brazil, and the outlook for the next several years now appears to be one of relatively tight balance between supply and demand. USDA's [U.S. Department of Agriculture] most recent estimate is that Brazil's 1976 production will amount to about 9.5 million bags, compared to a previously anticipated 28 million bags. At best, it will take three years to fully restore Brazil's pre-frost production of 26-28 million bags annually.

Since the frost, the prices paid for green coffee have jumped very sharply. Green coffees which were selling for under 50 cents a pound pre-frost have recently sold as high as \$1.50 a pound. As these higher raw material costs work their way through the processing and merchandising chain, retail prices are rising sharply. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the one-pound can of roasted coffee that cost an average \$1.27 in May 1975 cost \$1.71 in May 1976 and more recently has sold at the \$2.00 level.

The tight supply outlook has created a situation in which both buyers and sellers of coffee are placing a much higher value on the product. In the short run, rapidly escalating prices appear to have increased rather than decreased demand.

World coffee exports through March 1976 ran 13 percent ahead of the same period last year. U.S. imports of coffee through April of this year are running 13.3 percent higher than last, and roastings increased 13 percent through June. It appears that the steady series of price increases has induced consumers and perhaps retailers to build up inventories in their pantries and warehouses in anticipation of further price increases.

We are now seeing some reversal of this

trend. With the threat of a new frost in Brazil this season largely behind us, there is an apparent drawing-down of inventories taking place and prices have responded. During the first weeks of July, the indicator price of "other milds," a type of coffee produced in Central America, has fallen over 25 cents per pound.

### **Salient Features of Coffee Agreement**

When we resumed negotiations in November 1975, we had the following goals in mind:

- Maximum incentive for producers to export all available coffee during the next several years.

- Encouragement for Brazilian and other producers to restore production as soon as possible.

- Provision in the longer term for building of stocks as a hedge against future supply disruption.

- No restrictions on the export of coffee until necessary to defend much lower prices.

The negotiations were prolonged and difficult, but it was clear that the coffee producers feared that without an agreement they might repeat the boom-and-bust cycles of the past. In the end, we emerged with an agreement which I believe meets our goals and is a significant improvement over earlier agreements. I will briefly outline its salient features.

There are no fixed price objectives and there is no indexation in the agreement.

Export quota levels and price ranges will be established annually by the International Coffee Council in the light of the prevailing level and trend of coffee prices.

The agreement will enter into force October 1, 1976, with quotas in suspense. Under a formula for introducing quotas, they can only be triggered automatically when green coffee prices fall to between 63 and 77 cents per pound. They probably will not come into operation before late 1979.

While quotas are in suspense, there is no obligation on our part to exclude coffee from any source.

When quotas are in effect they will be suspended automatically whenever prices rise 15 percent above the range established by the Council; or if the Council has not established a price range, they will be suspended when prices rise 15 percent above the average of the preceding year.

All Council decisions regarding quotas and prices require a two-thirds majority of producers and consumers voting separately. The United States has 40 percent of consumer votes. Brazil has 34 percent of producer votes.

When export quotas are in effect they will be distributed among producers in a flexible manner. Annual quotas will be divided into fixed and variable portions.

The fixed portion will account for 70 percent of total annual quotas and will be based on a country's export performance either during the last four years of the old agreement (1968/69 to 1971/72) or the first two years of the new agreement, whichever is better for the producing country. This means that a producing country which improves its performance during the next two years will be rewarded with a permanent quota increase for the life of the agreement.

The variable portion of the annual quota is 30 percent and will be distributed to producing countries in the proportion of their stocks to total world stocks. Stocks will be verified annually by the International Coffee Organization. This encourages all countries to hold stocks during periods of surplus and enables countries with expanding production to increase their quotas.

A new provision obliges producers to either ship their full quota or declare a shortfall and permit its reallocation. Countries which declare shortfalls in the first six months of a coffee year will receive a bonus of 30 percent of the amount declared the following year.

Another innovation is the establishment of a producer-financed fund for the promotion of coffee consumption in consuming countries. This fund will raise \$26 million in the next two years for eventual use on a matching basis by the trade and industries in the consuming countries. In effect, the producers are setting aside funds now for use later on to combat the long-term trend of declining consumption in the United States and other countries.

The agreement is for a period of six years; however, after three years each member must formally notify the United Nations of its intention to continue membership or it automatically ceases to participate at the end of the third year.

#### **Consumer and Foreign Policy Interests**

Mr. Chairman, throughout the negotiations our foremost concern was to improve the protection provided for the American consumer. An international agreement cannot repeal the law of supply and demand, nor can it convert a situation of tight supply into one of surplus. The fact is that tight supplies and high prices for coffee are likely to prevail for several years.

However, international cooperation can make a valuable contribution to ameliorate the worst effects of the short-term outlook. It can assure that no artificial restrictions are placed on the flow of coffee to the market. It can offer an additional incentive to ship during the period of tightest supply and reward those producers who perform best. It can provide a stimulus to the producing countries to restore production to levels adequate to meet our consumption needs at reasonable prices. And in the longer term, it can assure regular supplies and adequate stocks by preventing prices from falling to levels which would force producers to move out of coffee production. This, Mr. Chairman, is what we sought in the new International Coffee Agreement, and I believe we achieved it.

The coffee-producing countries have behaved responsibly since the Brazilian frost

last year. They have increased their exports of available coffee to world markets. Most have adopted internal measures which will facilitate an increase in coffee production. Brazil is well along with a \$1 billion program to rehabilitate its damaged production. Many countries, including Brazil, have increased coffee prices to their domestic consumers by amounts comparable to the increases experienced in this country.

The 43 producing countries which participated in the negotiation of the new coffee agreement have expressed their strong desire to continue and improve their cooperation with the consuming countries.

Mr. Chairman, I think that both our foreign policy interests and our interests as consumers are well served by this new agreement. I strongly urge its prompt and favorable consideration by this committee and the Senate.

#### **Fifth International Tin Agreement**

Like coffee, tin is also an important provider of employment and a source of foreign exchange earnings for a number of developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Tin is also similar to coffee in that production is concentrated in developing countries while consumption is concentrated principally in the industrialized nations of the world.

In 1974, world exports of tin totaled about 190,000 metric tons, valued at approximately \$1.5 billion. Tin is thus a significant commodity in world trade, particularly in trade between developing and developed countries.

The United States is the world's leading consumer of tin. Normally we consume over 25 percent of annual world production. In 1974 we consumed some 66,000 long tons of tin, and in 1975 about 44,000 tons. The production of tinplate for food and beverage canning represents the chief end use for tin, followed by its use in solder and other alloys, and chemicals. Approximately 75-80 percent of our tin consump-

tion is of primary or new tin, with secondary or recycled tin accounting for the remainder.

U.S. domestic production of tin is negligible, and we must rely on imports for most of our tin needs. In 1974 we imported approximately 45,000 tons of tin, valued at \$326 million; and in 1975 we imported just under 50,000 tons, valued at \$356 million.

Malaysia, the world's leading tin producer, traditionally has been the principal supplier of tin to the U.S. market. Other significant suppliers are Thailand, Bolivia, Indonesia, and in recent years, the People's Republic of China.

In addition to imports, sales of surplus tin from the General Services Administration strategic stockpile have supplemented our tin needs in recent years. The GSA stockpile contains some 204,000 long tons of tin, of which approximately 164,000 tons are surplus to current stockpile objectives.

Since 1956 world tin trade has been influenced by four successive five-year International Tin Agreements, and a new Fifth International Tin Agreement came into force provisionally on July 1, 1976. The United States did not join any of the first four agreements, but we have signed the fifth agreement, which is now before you for your advice and consent to ratification.

We are currently participating provisionally in the work of the International Tin Council, which administers the tin agreement, on the basis of a nonbinding notification of our intention to ratify the agreement, subject to our constitutional requirements, which we deposited with the United Nations on June 29. We followed this procedure in order to participate in the first session of the Tin Council under the fifth agreement, which took place in London July 1-7. Our delegation to this important organizational meeting included representatives of various government agencies, as well as advisers from a number of American industries concerned with tin.

Membership in the recently ended fourth agreement included seven tin-exporting



countries, accounting for an estimated two-thirds of world tin production, and 22 consumer countries. While not all members of the fourth agreement have yet deposited their ratifications or notifications of intention to ratify, we believe that all seven producer members and virtually all of the consumer members will do so. The seven producer members of the new agreement are Malaysia, Bolivia, Indonesia, Thailand, Australia, Nigeria, and Zaire. The People's Republic of China is the only significant tin producer and exporter not a member of the tin agreement. If we include the United States, all of the world's major tin consumers are now members of the agreement.

Basically, the Fifth International Tin Agreement, like its predecessors, seeks to stabilize tin prices within floor and ceiling prices agreed on jointly by its producer and consumer members. This is done mainly through a buffer stock which buys tin to defend a floor price and sells tin to defend a ceiling. In addition, under certain conditions the agreement permits the imposition of export controls on tin exports by producer members when necessary to supplement buffer stock operations in defending the floor price.

Buffer stock financing contributions in the form of tin and/or cash are compulsory for producer and voluntary for consumer members of the agreement. Thus far, five consumer members—Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—have announced they will make buffer stock contributions under the fifth agreement. The United States has announced it does not intend to make a contribution.

Decisions on price ranges, export controls, and other matters relating to the agreement are made by the International Tin Council, which is headquartered in London. Producers and consumers share voting power equally in the Council, with each group holding 1,000 votes. Within each group, the 1,000 votes are divided among members on the basis of their proportionate share of tin production or con-

sumption. All decisions of the Council require at least a majority of votes cast by both groups, voting separately.

As the world's leading tin consumer, the United States holds the largest number of consumer votes. On the basis of membership to date in the fifth agreement, the July 1976 Council meeting allotted the United States 299 of the 1,000 consumer votes. However, as additional countries deposit their ratifications or notifications of intention to ratify, the number of votes held by the United States is expected to decline to approximately 260.

As a member of the Fifth International Tin Agreement, the United States would have two basic obligations:

—To pay a proportionate share of the International Tin Council's administrative expenses. Each member's share of expenses is keyed basically to its voting strength in the Council, and the U.S. share for the first year of membership would be an estimated \$115,000.

—To consult with the International Tin Council on tin disposals from our GSA stockpile. Since we have always consulted with the Council in the past, the obligation to consult on stockpile disposals will have little practical effect. However, the United States has retained and will retain the right of final decision concerning its stockpile disposals. We made this point clear in announcing our intention to sign the fifth agreement.

#### **Benefits of Membership in Tin Agreement**

Following negotiation of the fifth agreement in May-June 1975, in which the United States participated, the executive branch undertook an intensive interagency review of the new agreement. This study concluded that U.S. membership in the fifth agreement would have no adverse economic effects on the United States. We do, however, see a number of benefits stemming from membership:

—Through its membership in the Inter-



national Tin Council the United States will be able to influence the Council's policies affecting the long-term supply of tin. This will afford some protection to American industry and consumers, who must rely on imports from the producer members of the tin agreement for the major part of their tin needs.

—Our foreign relations will benefit from our support for this longstanding international agreement. Moreover, our membership in the agreement will provide further support for the concept of producer-consumer cooperation on raw materials.

—Since the First International Tin Agreement in 1956, both producer and consumer members have strongly desired that the United States, the world's largest single consumer of tin, join them in their work. Our accommodation of this desire will have a positive effect on our relations with these countries.

—Our membership would constitute a clear affirmation of our willingness to join with producers and consumers in seeking solutions to outstanding raw material problems on a case-by-case basis. It would be a demonstration of our desire to be forthcoming toward the developing world while at the same time safeguarding our national interests.

I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that U.S. membership in the tin agreement is opposed by a number of companies in the steel industry and in the tin trade. Such opposition was largely responsible for our remaining out of the first four tin agreements. As I understand it, industry opposition is based largely on the following grounds:

—The tin agreements have not been successful in protecting consumers from steadily rising tin prices.

—U.S. membership in the tin agreement will set a precedent and be a forerunner to membership in commodity agreements for other minerals and metals.

—U.S. membership could damage our relations with producer members of the

agreement in the event we take positions opposed to theirs in the International Tin Council.

In reply, I would first agree that tin prices have risen since the first tin agreement in 1956. However, a rising price trend does not of itself indicate instability. The costs of producing tin have also risen during the past 20 years, with labor, equipment, power, and transportation all costing more. Few, if any, raw materials have escaped these increased costs of production and consequent higher prices.

Although tin prices have risen, for most of the 20 years since the first tin agreement they remained generally stable relative to the prices of other raw materials. Perhaps the most dramatic departure from general price stability occurred during 1973-74, when tin prices rose to record levels. However, this price surge, which subsequently collapsed, occurred during the most intensive worldwide commodity boom since the Korean war. The 1973-74 boom saw the prices of wheat, soybeans, copper, and other commodities, not to mention the price of oil, reaching record levels. With very few exceptions, none of these commodities were covered by commodity agreements.

Opponents of the tin agreements have also charged that in practice the tin agreements have favored producer interests over those of consumers. While there may be some valid objections to the way the agreements have operated in the past, inasmuch as the United States chose not to join any of the first four Tin Agreements it is difficult for us to criticize their operations. As a member, the United States could have had a significant voice in their implementation. Instead, we chose voluntarily to forgo such a role.

To cite an example, tin export controls are one issue which the United States as a member could have affected. Basically, we oppose the use of export controls in defending the floor price, except under extraordinary circumstances. We believe that unless they are used sparingly and

lifted as soon as they are no longer required, export controls and production cut-backs add a "stop-go" element which could affect tin supplies and contribute to price instability. As a member of the tin agreement the United States will review very carefully any proposals for export controls and will oppose their imposition unless it believes them to be absolutely necessary.

As for the concern expressed that U.S. membership in the tin agreement will be a forerunner to participation in commodity agreements for other minerals and metals, our policy has been and will continue to be that of examining any proposals for commodity agreements on a case-by-case basis. Participation in the tin agreement in no way implies our possible participation in agreements for other minerals or metals. I might add here that other consumer members of the tin agreement have joined us in opposing proposals for commodity agreements where we have felt such agreements to be unfeasible or unnecessary.

Finally, concern has been expressed that our relations with tin-producing countries might be damaged as the result of our taking differing positions in the Tin Council. If we were to accept this argument, we would probably have to withdraw from most international organizations to which we belong and to refrain from participating in world affairs. This, as a nation, we are not prepared to do. The United States belongs to a range of international organizations in which it takes positions based on its national interests. These positions do not always agree with those of other countries with which we share common overall interests and enjoy friendly relations.

As in other international organizations, our positions in the Tin Council will be based on our national interests. From time to time we will find it necessary to disagree with the positions taken by producer members. However, we do not see this as affecting our basically friendly relations with them.

I might add here that both before and after reaching a decision to seek member-

ship in the Fifth International Tin Agreement, the executive branch consulted with American industry and organizations and took their views into consideration. We will continue to do so. Our delegation to the first session of the Tin Council under the new agreement included industry advisers representing American can manufacturers, solder producers, the single U.S. tin smelter, and the tin trade. We believe that broad industry representation is extremely useful in providing technical advice to our delegation, and we intend to continue this practice.

#### **Extension of International Wheat Agreement**

The Administration has also requested the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the Protocols for the Third Extension of the Wheat Trade and Food Aid Conventions, constituting the International Wheat Agreement of 1971. Secretary [of Agriculture Earl L.] Butz signed the protocols for the United States on April 5, and the United States applied them provisionally June 17. A conference of governments in London on June 29 determined that conditions had been met for entry into force of the extending protocols.

The protocols extend the International Wheat Agreement until June 30, 1978. This two-year extension of the International Wheat Agreement, following two one-year extensions, was sought by the United States and supported by other major exporters and importers of wheat.

Extension of the Wheat Trade Convention maintains the framework for international cooperation on wheat trade matters. The extension of the Food Aid Convention continues the commitment of the adhering parties to provide minimum annual quantities of food aid. The contributions of the United States under the convention are made up of commodities sold concessionally or donated under Public Law 480 or U.S. assistance programs. All members of the Food Aid Convention have now deposited ratifications or provisional ap-

plications of the third extending protocol.

The importance of the International Wheat Council, established by the International Wheat Agreement, goes beyond information exchange. The Council has served as the principal forum for discussion of one of the key initiatives of the World Food Conference, the establishment of an international system of nationally held grain reserves. Disappearance within this decade of large grain stocks has made the maintenance of adequate world grain supplies more vulnerable to fluctuations in production. The U.S. proposal for a food security reserve in the context of a new International Wheat Agreement is designed to provide greater assurance to all nations that adequate supplies will be available despite unpredictable shortfalls in global production.

After the United States presented its reserves proposal in the International Wheat Council in London in September 1975, a number of countries indicated that these discussions should also include broader grain trade questions. The European Community (EC), in particular, insisted that negotiations on reserves should be a part of the overall multilateral trade negotiations underway in Geneva under the auspices of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and not a separate negotiation in the Wheat Council. I am pleased to report that this procedural obstacle was overcome at the beginning of the year and that discussions on reserves have continued in the International Wheat Council with EC participation.

This does not mean that the issue of the relationship between food security and trade relations has disappeared from the discussion. On the contrary, the relationship remains a central element in the debate that continues in both London and Geneva. The major obstacle to more rapid progress on the reserves initiative has been the stand taken by many countries, including many developing countries, that the negotiations should give greater emphasis to the establishment of price objectives and particularly price floors on world grain

markets rather than to the provision of adequate supplies of grain during periods of severe world shortage. The United States regards this focus on the maintenance of market prices as an unfortunate diversion from the strategy for improved world food security set forth at the World Food Conference.

Talks in the International Wheat Council will continue in the months to come. The United States favors the early establishment of a reserves system within a new International Wheat Agreement and believes that the trade implications of a negotiation on reserves should be taken into account in the multilateral trade negotiations. The World Food Council at its ministerial meeting in Rome last month registered concern over the slow progress on establishing a reserves system. We share that concern and hope that the Food Council's endorsement will strengthen our efforts for an early and successful conclusion of the International Wheat Council's work.

Let me close by commenting briefly on consumer interests and the International Wheat Agreement. The American consumer wants assured supplies of wheat at reasonably stable prices. Because we have open markets for agricultural products, the price the American consumer must pay depends importantly on overall world supply. Wheat prices must be high enough to provide adequate incentives for farmers to produce the increasing amounts of wheat the world needs. But if they are too high, there is danger of excess supply, which will either reduce production or require large government subsidies to farmers to continue growing wheat. We seek a new International Wheat Agreement in which prices are determined by market forces. At the same time, in order to insure that year-to-year fluctuations in production do not result in very wide price movements, it is important to reestablish world food reserves along the lines we have proposed.

Ratification of these protocols is important to allow continuing U.S. participation in the activities of the International Wheat Council, to demonstrate our support for

food assistance to needy nations, and to continue our role in the deliberations for a successor agreement to the present International Wheat Agreement which we hope will enhance assurance of continuing availability of adequate wheat supplies.

In closing this statement, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reiterate the relationship of these three agreements to our overall commodity policy.

Our policy is based on case-by-case consideration of individual commodity problems. We have considered each of the three agreements before you today on their own merits. They are being presented to your committee together only for the sake of time and convenience. They are not substantively linked except for the fact that they represent three of the five commodity agreements extant today (we have rejected the cocoa agreement, and sugar will not be renegotiated until next year).

Support of the three agreements will reinforce the credibility of our case-by-case approach, and I commend them for the favorable consideration of your committee.

## **Senate Asked To Approve Protocol to North Pacific Fur Seal Convention**

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Protocol amending the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, signed at Washington on February 9, 1957, which Protocol was signed at Washington on May 7, 1976, on behalf of the Governments of Canada, Japan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America.

The provisions of the Protocol were ini-

tially formulated by the North Pacific Fur Seal Conference held at Washington from December 1 through December 12, 1975.

I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report by the Department of State with respect to the Protocol.

This Protocol is significant because it permits the continuation in force, with minor modifications, of the only international agreement affording protection to the fur seals of the North Pacific. I recommend that the Senate give favorable consideration to this Protocol at an early date because all the States party to the Interim Convention must ratify the Protocol prior to October 14, 1976 to prevent the lapse of the Interim Convention.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 19, 1976.*

## **Senate Asked To Approve Convention on Authentication of Documents**

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents adopted at the Ninth Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law on October 26, 1960. The Convention, which was opened for signature on October 5, 1961, is presently in force in twenty countries.

This is the third convention in the field of international civil procedure produced by the Hague Conference on Private International Law to be sent to the Senate. It complements the Conventions on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on July 19 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. M, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the protocol and the report of the Department of State.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on July 19 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. L, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the convention and the report of the Department of State.



Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters and on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters which are already in force for the United States to assist litigants and their lawyers in civil proceedings abroad.

The provisions of the Convention contain short and simple rules which will reduce costs and delays for litigants in international cases. The provisions would eliminate unnecessary authentications of documents without affecting the integrity of such documents. They would also free judges and other officials, who presently certify signatures, from the time-consuming and unnecessary administrative process presently required.

The Convention has been thoroughly studied by the bench and bar of the United States. Its ratification is supported by the Judicial Conference of the United States, by the American Bar Association, and by other bar associations at the state and local level.

I recommend that the Senate of the United States promptly give its advice and consent to the ratification of this Convention.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, July 19, 1976.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 2d Session

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the International Atomic Energy Agency. An analytical report prepared for the Senate Committee on Government Operations by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. March 1976. 139 pp., 11 appendixes.

Temporary Reduction of Duty on Levulose. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 11259. H. Rept. 94-1064. April 29, 1976. 4 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Mattress Blanks of Rubber Latex. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 11605. H. Rept. 94-1066. April 29, 1976. 4 pp.

State Department Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1977. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H.R. 13179. H. Rept. 94-1083. May 4, 1976. 15 pp.

U.S. Policy Toward Africa. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Res. 436. S. Rept. 94-780. May 5, 1976. 13 pp.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution on Incursion Into Zambia

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative William W. Scranton on July 30, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.*

#### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON

USUN press release 85 dated July 30

The U.S. delegation has followed this debate with particular interest and concern. As members of this Council know, my government is involved in a most significant and important effort to assist the nations and the peoples of southern Africa to find a solution to the complicated political and human problems of their region. We were therefore deeply alarmed at the announcement by the Government of Zambia of an incursion into their territory on July 11. We were deeply distressed to hear of the loss of 24 lives and the wounding of 45 other individuals. We were also concerned that the sensitive and delicate process of consultations concerning southern Africa would be materially harmed by this incursion.

Let me state first, and forcefully, that my government condemns this incursion into Zambia. We oppose unequivocally the violation of Zambia's territorial sovereignty and integrity. We deeply deplore



the loss of life and the destruction of property.

Further, it is important to record that South Africa has no legal right, in our opinion, to continue to administer the Territory of Namibia. It has no legal right to station troops on Namibian soil. Thus it has no basis to complain of incursions into Namibia. If the South African Government was responsible for this raid and utilized the territory of Namibia as the base of its operation, then South Africa is clearly in violation of international law.

In spite of our very strong views on South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, my government has a comment on the evidence brought forth during this debate to determine the responsibility for the July 11 raid.

The distinguished Foreign Minister of Zambia has made a very impressive and well-documented presentation of the outrages to which his country has been subjected. No one has denied that the attack on Sialolo took place. The Representative of South Africa in reply has simply said that his government has no knowledge whatsoever of this event.

Under such circumstances, we believe that this was a case in which investigation could have produced a more careful and authoritative statement on the part of this body; and we regret that there was no inclination on the part of the members of this body to authorize such an investigation, which we think might have resulted in strong Security Council action.

As a result, several paragraphs of this resolution contain language which, in our view, is too categorical in light of the evidence that has so far been made available here.

Secondly, and very important to us, the resolution has another major shortcoming. There are currently efforts of a serious nature being made to make progress toward solutions in southern Africa which this Council has long advocated. We believe that it would be appropriate for a resolution which addressed any issue beyond the

immediate incident concerned to have welcomed these efforts and to have encouraged every possible assistance to them.

For these reasons, Mr. President, my delegation has abstained on this resolution.

#### TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Taking note of the letter of the representative of the Republic of Zambia contained in document S/12147,*

*Having considered the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zambia,*

*Gravely concerned at the numerous hostile and unprovoked acts by South Africa violating the sovereignty, air space and territorial integrity of the Republic of Zambia, resulting in death and injury of innocent people as well as in the destruction of property and culminating on 11 July 1976 in an armed attack which resulted in the regrettable loss of 24 innocent lives and the injury of 45 other persons,*

*Gravely concerned at South Africa's use of the international Territory of Namibia as a base for attacking neighbouring African countries,*

*Reaffirming the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Namibia to liberate their country from the illegal occupation of the racist régime of South Africa,*

*Convinced that the continuance in time of the deteriorating situation in southern Africa could constitute a threat to international peace and security,*

*Conscious of the need to take effective steps for the prevention and removal of threats to international peace and security,*

*Recalling also its resolution 300 (1971) which, inter alia, called upon South Africa to respect fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Zambia,*

*Beaving in mind that all Member States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,*

1. *Strongly condemns the armed attack of South Africa against the Republic of Zambia, which constitutes a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia;*

2. *Demands that South Africa scrupulously respect the independence, sovereignty, air space and territorial integrity of the Republic of Zambia;*

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/RES/393 (1976); adopted by the Council on July 30 by a vote of 14-0, with 1 abstention (U.S.).

3. *Demands* that South Africa desist forthwith from the use of the international Territory of Namibia as a base for launching armed attacks against the Republic of Zambia and other African countries;

4. *Commends* the Republic of Zambia and other "frontline" States for their steadfast support of the people of Namibia in their legitimate struggle for the liberation of their country from illegal occupation by the racist régime of South Africa;

5. *Declares* that the liberation of Namibia and Zimbabwe and the elimination of *apartheid* in South Africa are necessary for the attainment of justice and lasting peace in the region;

6. *Further declares* that, in the event of South Africa committing further acts of violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zambia, the Security Council will meet again to consider the adoption of effective measures, in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the United Nations Charter.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Amendment to the agreement of September 25, 1956, on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Iceland to provide for additional services. Adopted by the ICAO Council at Montreal June 14, 1976. Entered into force June 14, 1976.

Amendment of article V of the agreement of September 25, 1956, on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands to increase the financial limit for services. Adopted by the ICAO Council at Montreal June 14, 1976. Entered into force June 14, 1976.

##### Pollution

Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of marine pollution by substances other than oil. Done at London November 2, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Sweden, June 28, 1976.

*Accession deposited:* Tunisia, May 4, 1976.

##### Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4, 1967; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

*Accession deposited:* Iran, July 28, 1976.

#### Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* July 24, 1976.

#### Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the United States April 21, 1976.

*Notification of approval:* New Zealand, April 27, 1976.<sup>2</sup>

#### Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization. Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970. Entered into force January 2, 1975; for the United States December 16, 1975.

*Proclaimed by the President:* July 31, 1976.

## BILATERAL

#### Canada

Agreement relating to the purchase by Canada of 18 Lockheed P-3 long-range patrol aircraft, with related note. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 6 and 7, 1976. Entered into force July 7, 1976.

#### Colombia

Loan agreement for research and technical assistance to identify and overcome constraints to small farmer development, with annex. Signed at Bogotá June 14, 1976. Entered into force June 14, 1976.

#### Guatemala

Project agreement relating to assistance for Guatemala's earthquake relief efforts, with annexes. Signed at Guatemala June 17, 1976. Entered into force June 17, 1976.

#### Poland

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with annexes, agreed minutes, and related letter. Signed at Warsaw August 2, 1976. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by exchange of notes.

#### Spain

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter, with annex. Signed at Washington July 14, 1976. Entered into force July 14, 1976.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Applicable to Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelau Islands.

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**Checklist of Department of State  
Press Releases: August 2-8**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
360	8/2	Kissinger: National Urban League, Boston.
†361	8/2	U.S. and Poland sign new fisheries agreement.
†362	8/4	Robinson: National Press Club, Canberra.
*363	8/4	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Sept. 17.
†364	8/4	Kissinger: letter to President of Law of the Sea Conference.
†365	8/5	ANZUS Council communique, Canberra, Aug. 4.
†366	8/6	Kissinger, Ansary: toasts, Tehran.
†367	8/7	Kissinger, Ansary: remarks to press.
*368	8/7	U.S.-Iran Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation, Tehran, Aug. 6-7: agreed minutes.
*369	8/8	Kissinger: arrival, Lahore.
†370	8/8	Kissinger, Bhutto: toasts, Lahore.
†371	8/8	Joint U.S.-Afghanistan statement.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.