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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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The Future of America's Foreign Policy

Address by Secretary Kissinger[1]

Two days ago this nation joyfully and confidently celebrated its 200th birthday. And in a little less than four months our people will go to the polls to elect a President and begin charting our course through our third century.

No two events more vividly symbolize our contemporary challenge, its hope and its promise. For 200 years we struggled to build a nation from a wilderness, a sanctuary for the oppressed, and a home for all those who love liberty and believe in man's right to govern himself. And during those 200 years, despite occasional setbacks and mistakes, we have succeeded in vindicating the dreams of the great men who came together in Philadelphia to proclaim a new nation. At home, we have created a society more free, just, and prosperous than any other on earth. And abroad, no nation has done more to defend peace, promote prosperity, feed the hungry, heal the sick, spread knowledge, welcome refugees from tyranny, and champion the rights of man.

The past gives perspective to our endeavors, pride in where we are, and hope for what we may become. But the future, as always, depends on choices which now are ours to make.

Much will be said in the months between now and November about the state of our nation. Some of it will make sense; some will not. Some of it will reflect reality; some of it will not—but rather the desire to create a temporary mood or to capitalize on it.

Let us recall that four years ago we were told by some that we had become a nation of potential war criminals, that our military establishment had passed the bounds of reason and was out of control, that our foreign policy aggressively invited conflict, and that we were neglecting the needs of our people. That was not true then. It is not true now.

Today we are told that we have let our military position slip to the point that we are second rate, that we are being pushed around, and that our government is resigned to seeking the best available terms. That also is not true, and the American people know it. They know we remain far and away the strongest nation in the world. They know that America's dedication to peace and progress is essential to the world's security and well-being. They learned painfully long ago that military conflict abroad threatens American lives; more recently they have seen how global economic conflict can threaten American jobs and well-being.

With our defense shield the core of the security of free countries, with our economy representing a third of the gross national product of the entire free world, our actions and the confidence of those nations who depend on us are crucial for the prospects of all free peoples. We must avoid a complacency that is unworthy of our challenges. But equally we must resist a rhetoric of impotence which disquiets friends and emboldens adversaries.

The people of Chicago hardly need a lec-

[1] Made at Chicago, Ill., on July 6 before a luncheon meeting sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Mid-America Committee (text from press release 339).

ture about the vigor and strength of their country. Chicago has been called "the pulse of America," "the city of the big shoulders." Chicago is a symbol of America's phenomenal productivity, energy, and economic power. No other city so embodies the sense of America's fiber. Here is where the skyscraper was born; here is where the atomic age began. This city is a promontory from which to view the world of tomorrow, a world in which America must live and which it therefore must help to shape. Chicago's excitement is a testimony to might and mass and beauty and to the raw pursuit of excellence.

It is clear that before us lies a period of potentially unparalleled creativity. This is an age of complex and dangerous forces. But the United States, and the great industrial democracies which share our values and our ideals, have the opportunity to give a new meaning to the vision of human dignity which for centuries has brightened the prospects of Western man.

Thirty years ago, with the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, the formation of our alliances and new international economic institutions, America burst forth on the world scene in a great outburst of creative statesmanship. Because it had conquered the depression, the generation which shaped our postwar policy had faith in the power of governmental programs to promote economic advance and social progress. Because it had won a war whose moral imperatives were clear cut, it acted on the assumption that we would always face straightforward moral choices. That generation was inspired by the hope that at some point its exertions could end, as our allies became self-sustaining and our adversaries mellowed.

Today, reality is more complex. We have learned that economic development cannot be achieved overnight or through governmental projects alone. The nuclear age imposes upon us the inevitability of coexistence. We now live in a world of greater diversity, a world of many centers of power and ideology. America, for the first time in our history, faces the reality of permanent involvement in international affairs.

The challenges of peace, prosperity, and justice are unending; there are no easy and no final answers. Good intentions alone do not constitute a foreign policy. We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations throughout history have had to conduct it—with persistence, subtlety, flexibility, nuance, and perseverance; with the knowledge that what can be achieved at any one point will always fall short of the ideal but that without ideals the search for the merely practical becomes stultifying. We can no longer afford to oscillate between isolation in preservation of our purity and interventionism in pursuit of objectives whose attainment would permit us to withdraw from the world. Foreign policy must be conducted not as a response to domestic passions, or to international crises, but as a long-term enterprise—engaging our best efforts for as far ahead as we can see—of building a better and safer world.

Our national objectives and ideals, if they are well conceived, cannot change every four years or with every new Administration. To pretend that they do, or even that they can, would make American policy itself a major factor of instability in the world.

Whether we call it "structure" or "architecture," whether the process which produces policy is solitary or done by committee, the nation will have to continue to engage itself in managing the transition from the postwar international order based primarily on defense against aggression to a new international system which adds to security the needs of economic cooperation and political consensus on a global scale.

And we must do so under radically altered psychological conditions at home. The generation that undertook the great initiatives of the postwar period was inspired by the recollection of a conflict whose morality was unquestioned and whose outcome was conclusive. The generation that will have to sustain contemporary foreign policy recalls only wars that appeared morally ambiguous and whose outcomes were profoundly frustrating. Ours is a period much less confident of the ability of governments to manage the great issues of the era.

And yet too much depends on us to per-

mit our commitment to falter. We have physical strength in abundance. We must marshal the vision to put it into the service of our ideals.

The time has come to build a new foreign policy consensus similar in scope but different in content from that which sustained our previous achievements. Democrats and Republicans, Congress and the executive, government and citizen, must once again conduct the foreign policy debate in the spirit of partnership—recognizing that we are not at war with each other, but engaged in a vital national enterprise affecting our future and the world at large. Our electoral process can do much to strengthen our role in the world—both by healing the wounds of the last decade and by forging the elements of a new nonpartisan consensus in foreign policy. This election, whatever its outcome, should be remembered as the time when the American people rediscovered their unity in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

Despite the domestic turmoil of recent years, much has already been achieved.

For the first time in a decade and a half, we are at peace. Our relations with the industrial democracies are the closest they have been in 20 years, and our collaboration is steadily expanding into new fields. Here in the Western Hemisphere, we are forging a new association based on equality and mutual respect. We have inaugurated a hopeful new policy in Africa. Important progress toward peace in the Middle East has been made, and the elements for major new advances exist. In Asia, our relations with Japan have never been better. We have opened a new relationship with the People's Republic of China that will expand in keeping with the Shanghai communique. And with respect to the Soviet Union we have combined vigilance with conciliation, a determination to resist expansion with a readiness to build relations on a more stable and lasting basis than a balance of terror.

But great tasks remain: to strengthen further the solidarity with our major allies, to explore new prospects for reducing tensions with our adversaries, and to shape the new dialogue between the industrial and developing nations into a constructive long-term relationship of common benefit.

Let me turn now to these issues.

The Collaboration of the Democracies

The collaboration of the industrial democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan has been the central core of America's foreign relations throughout the postwar period. It remains the principal focus of our foreign policy today. And it has been constantly strengthened in recent years.

The intensity, regularity, and scope of the permanent dialogue among the industrial democracies can scarcely be exaggerated. President Ford since he has been in office has conferred with the leaders of our NATO and Japanese allies at four summit meetings and over 60 individual meetings, abroad or in Washington. I have met with Foreign Ministers or heads of government of the industrial democracies over 200 times since I have been Secretary of State—including over 100 times with leaders of the major nations represented at the Puerto Rico summit. This solidarity is a record unmatched by any other group of independent nations. For many years there have been no major disputes between America and our allies; today there are no significant differences in approach or policy. The relations among the industrial democracies have not been as close in many decades—and are far closer than they were 10 years ago.

Of course, frequency of consultation is not enough. We must never cease to keep our alliances relevant to current conditions. Our alliances were formed a generation ago to stave off common dangers—the threat of Communist aggression and the fear of economic collapse. These goals have been substantially achieved.

Our economies are the most prosperous on earth; we comprise 65 percent of the world gross national product and 70 percent of its trade. Our technology, managerial skill, and productive dynamism have proven to be indispensable to all nations that seek to develop their economies and improve the lot of their citizens. The developing countries and

the Socialist countries—despite their habitual denunciation of the free market system—now recognize that they must turn to the industrial democracies for trade and assistance in improving their own economies.

We confront the agenda before us with confidence, aware that our cohesion which has brought us this far remains crucial to all that we do:

—We must maintain our common security in changed circumstances. For most of the postwar period we relied on strategic forces for both deterrence and defense. Today, the numbers and destructive power of nuclear weapons tend to produce a strategic stalemate. Challenges below the strategic nuclear level become more dangerous; forces for regional defense—land, sea, and air—therefore grow more important. Our alliance forces must reflect these new realities and be strengthened in crucial categories.

—We must continue to coordinate our economic strategies to encourage economic growth while controlling inflation. In a period of growing economic interdependence, we cannot afford to have national economic policies working at cross-purposes.

—We must develop joint approaches to relations with the developing nations. Almost all development in the world today gains its impetus from the industrial democracies. There is no reason for defensiveness. If we compete among ourselves for the favor of the developing nations, we dissipate our own resources and tempt the developing nations in unproductive and unrealistic directions. If the industrial nations cooperate among ourselves, we have the best chance to bring about cooperative relations between developed and developing. Only this can end tactics of confrontation and contribute to new global arrangements in which all nations participate and benefit.

—Finally, the industrial democracies must coordinate our policies with respect to East-West trade. The volume of that trade has been growing at a rapid rate—more in the other industrial democracies than in the United States. We must better understand the implications of interchange between market and centrally controlled economies; we must avoid its political exploitation; we must study the implications of the mounting debts of the nonmarket economies; we must shape the trade in a direction beneficial to the overall purposes of the industrial democracies.

This is the meaning of the President's meeting 10 days ago with the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan at the Puerto Rico economic summit. There, as at Rambouillet last November, the allied leaders discussed such basic issues as how to consolidate our economic recovery and head off a resurgence of inflation. They exchanged views on East-West economic relations and the status of the dialogue with the developing nations. The meeting reflected and promoted the growing cooperation of the industrial democracies. It symbolizes their political will to shape their future together.

All the tasks that I have enumerated here grow out of the strength of the industrial democracies. And all these tasks are inescapable. We have every reason to face the future with confidence. A world that yearns for peace and freedom, for economic advance, for fundamental human justice, today looks to our nations for understanding and for leadership. If the democracies remain strong and united, we can usher in an era of unprecedented peace and progress.

The Agenda of War and Peace

Throughout its existence, the Atlantic alliance has based its quest for peace on two complementary policies. First, we must maintain our defenses, resist military challenges, and prevent the Soviet Union from transforming its military strength into political expansion. Second, we must seek to resolve conflicts and disputes through negotiation, foster habits of restraint in international conduct, and expand the area of constructive relations.

However we label such an approach, its objectives are imposed by the unprecedented conditions of the nuclear age. No statesman

will lightly risk the lives of tens of millions. Every President, after entering office and seeing the facts, has come to President Eisenhower's insight that there is no alternative to peace.

We have no illusions about the Soviet ideological and geopolitical challenge, but neither should there be illusions about what is needed to deal with it.

The strength of the West—military, economic, and moral—must be used to shape international relationships in accordance with our vision of a better world and with a full sense of responsibility toward the awful cataclysm of nuclear war. We must avoid both a sentimentality that would substitute good will for strength and mock toughness that would substitute posturing for a clear perception of our interests. We will maintain the balance of power, but we will also recognize that peace, to be lasting, must rest upon more than a balance of terror constantly contested. Specifically:

—We will continue to seek a fair and reliable agreement on strategic arms limitation, because this is in our interest and the interest of world peace. The President will not hesitate to sign an agreement that protects our national interests and those of our allies. But he will never agree simply for the sake of agreement or run risks with our national security.

—We will continue, together with our allies, to seek negotiated solutions to East-West political problems in order to diminish the risks of confrontation.

—We will continue to develop cooperative ties on the basis of reciprocity to foster responsible international behavior and a mutual interest in better political relations.

It goes without saying that a reduction of tensions requires an equivalence of obligations and commitments:

—Agreements reached must be balanced and reliable; they must be complied with strictly both as to their letter and their spirit.

—There must be consistent patterns of behavior in different parts of the world. We will not permit the relaxation of tensions to be practiced selectively. We cannot accept insistence on restraint on strategic arms or in Central Europe while tensions are exacerbated in other parts of the world in the name of "national liberation" or "proletarian internationalism."

—There must be tolerable definitions of ideological rivalry. We do not fear ideological competition; indeed, we assume it. We have every reason for confidence in the power of the idea of freedom. But we cannot agree that ideology alone is involved when Soviet military power is exerted in remote areas or when ideology is invoked so that regional or local instabilities can be exploited.

—The relaxation of tensions must not become a subterfuge to play allies off against each other. Allied cohesion insures that relaxation of tensions is broadly based; division and competition among us would only dissipate our advantages and open up opportunities for adversaries.

In Europe, the relaxation of tensions must apply to the Eastern as well as Western half of the continent. There should be no room for misconceptions about American policy:

—We are determined to deal with Eastern Europe on the basis of the sovereignty and independence of each of its countries. We recognize no spheres of influence and no pretentions to hegemony.

—For this reason, we will continue to develop our bilateral ties in economic and other fields with the nations of Eastern Europe and encourage similar efforts on the part of our Western European allies.

—We will continually seek improvements in the basic conditions of human life in Eastern Europe, in terms of emigration, unification of families, freer flow of information, and increased travel and economic interchange.

Improving relations between East and West is a long-term process. We pursue it on the basis of *our* purposes and *our* ideals. We will never slacken the quest for peace.

We can only benefit from the challenge of peaceful competition. Nowhere have the in-

dustrial democracies suffered setbacks because of lack of strength. Without exception, the problems have been internal; they are therefore within our power to remedy.

We must not so bemuse ourselves with rhetoric that we forget that in every category of relevant power, the democracies have the means to preserve and foster their objectives. We need only to stay together and stay the course.

In the military field, we have the strength to defend our interests. In the economic area, our performance has been overwhelmingly superior. In the ideological competition, it is not our nations, but the East, that has shown fear of the power of freedom. The winds of change are blowing from the West. If we act with wisdom and unity, the free nations have it in our power to leave our children a safer and more hopeful world than the one we found.

The Emerging Structure of a Global Community

Within the past decade and particularly over the past several years, a new dimension of international affairs has moved to center stage: the relations between the Northern and the Southern Hemispheres.

For the first time in history the international system has become truly global. Decolonization and the expansion of the world economy have given birth to scores of new centers of power and initiative. The globe's security and prosperity have become more and more indivisible.

Yet in a world of over 150 sovereign nations, many of which have only recently achieved independence, progress toward understanding of our common destiny has been halting and uneasy. Too many nations still seek to extort what is meaningful only if freely offered. Attempts at economic warfare, and sterile disputes between the industrial and developing nations, have been all too characteristic of international conferences. Such tactics overlook some basic realities:

—Development is an arduous and long-term process not susceptible to quick or easy solutions. It requires great efforts to bring about social change, above all by the developing countries themselves.

—If there is to be any hope of development, the new nations need the sustained help of the industrial democracies. The Communist countries have been to all practical purposes irrelevant to this process and clearly unwilling to assist it.

—A serious development effort requires cooperation. Confrontation and artificial voting majorities destroy the psychological basis for a sustained relationship. Parliamentary victories in international forums prove empty if they are not followed by the willing implementation of the minority.

The United States has a vital stake in the health of the world economic system. We need only recall the oil embargo of 1973 to know that interdependence is more than a slogan. That event helped to produce the worst inflation as well as the most severe recession of the postwar period. The price and supply of energy and raw materials, the conditions of trade and investment, the protection of the environment, the use of the oceans and space—these are all issues on which American jobs and livelihood and progress depend. And we know as well that no structure of international relations can be durable if the world remains divided between the rich and the poor, the privileged and the oppressed, the hopeful and the despairing.

We have offered our cooperation in our own interest and in the hope that it will help build a better world. But we insist that others meet us in the same spirit. We will not submit to blackmail or to pressure. We will resist hostile resolutions and unworkable proposals. Artificial majorities and claims to a monopoly on morality in world forums will only undermine public support here and in the other industrial democracies —the only nations capable of contributing effectively to development.

The task is to build a consensus based on mutual respect and self-interest. Only in this way can we encourage realistic methods of international collaboration and lay the foun-

dation for a cooperative international economy.

To this end the United States has in the last few years assumed a role of leadership. We have offered comprehensive initiatives in such areas as energy, food, trade, finance, commodities, technology transfer, and the special problems of the poorest countries. We have done so in many international forums: at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly last September, at the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation in December, at the Jamaica conference on world monetary issues in January, at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi this spring. Progress has been achieved on many of our proposals; many new institutions and vehicles of cooperation are already underway.

Thus, just as we seek to move beyond a balance of power in East-West relations, so we are seeking long-term cooperation in North-South relations with a view to building a genuine world community.

In this enterprise there is no more important place to start than in our own hemisphere. If we are to build a stable, prosperous, and just world structure, we will need the firm foundations of close bonds with our friends in Latin America.

Our traditional special relationship in the hemisphere antedates our cooperation with other regions of the developing world. We share unique experiences in the Americas—the exploration and development of new continents, the forging of nations free from colonial domination, the development of unique human and moral ideals. We have shaped democratic institutions and spurred economic growth, conscious that we benefited greatly from our relationship with each other. We have long held a common interest in shielding our hemisphere from the intrusion of others. We have led the world in building international organizations to serve our cooperative endeavors for both collective security and economic progress.

The challenge we face today is that history—and indeed the very growth and success we have achieved—have complicated our relationship. What used to be a simple perception of hemispheric uniqueness, and a self-contained exclusive relationship, has become enmeshed in the wider concerns we all now have in the rest of the world.

The United States recognizes its global responsibility to maintain the world balance of power, to help resolve the age-old political conflicts that undermine peace, and to help shape a new international order encompassing the interests and aspirations of the more than 150 nations that now comprise our planet.

At the same time, in the sixties and seventies Latin American nations have become steadily more prosperous and self-confident. They are now major factors in their own right on the world scene. Their economies are among the most advanced of the developing world—indeed, they can be said to constitute a "middle class" among the nations of the world, encouraging progress but with an increasing stake in stability. They are increasingly important in the global economy and the world's political forums. And they have a growing sense of solidarity with developing nations in Africa and Asia. Such global involvement is inevitable; at the same time, it inevitably creates new and conflicting pressures on traditional friendships.

The United States has sought to build a new framework in our hemispheric relations which takes into account new realities without sacrificing the precious advantage of our tradition of collaboration.

Most important, given the long period of neglect, real or perceived, our sister republics in the Western Hemisphere now know that we care. We have inaugurated a new dialogue based on equality and mutual respect and on a recognition of sovereign independence.

This dialogue does not reflect demands by one side and defense of old patterns by the other. On the basis of the new Latin American strength and self-confidence, we now deal with one another with a mutuality of regard and understanding quite impossible a few years or even a decade ago.

There is a growing recognition that we

have shared concerns as well as different perspectives; that the nations of this hemisphere, where men sought a haven from oppression, have an opportunity to begin a new era of cooperation between industrially advanced and developing countries.

In the past few years, the United States has offered initiatives to deal coherently with the catalogue of hemispheric issues—political, economic, and moral. A milestone in this process came at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Santiago last month, where we presented a comprehensive series of proposals:

—To advance hemispheric cooperation for development, including trade opportunities and access to contemporary technology;

—To strengthen joint efforts to deal with the issue of human rights in the hemisphere; and

—To modernize our inter-American system of political consultation.

The United States is demonstrating leadership on all these issues. As a result, Latin American nations expressed their belief at Santiago that a new chapter in hemispheric relations is opening up. There was a climate of candor, of friendship without complexes, and of common endeavor. Our initiatives no longer raise fears of paternalism or domination but are welcomed again by our sister republics as reflecting mutual interests and our proper role.

We believe that we have inaugurated a new era of inter-American cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit. And we believe, too, that this can serve as a bridge between developed and developing nations everywhere and as an example for the world community.

America and the World

The world has entered a new era. We live in a time marked by change and uncertainty; our age cries out for new patterns of order and new efforts to better the human condition. The challenges of peace and progress and justice require sustained and devoted effort from the responsible nations of the world and a permanent role of leadership by the United States.

The United States has faced challenge before. No other people could have celebrated its birthday so joyfully or with such optimism about its future. America has always stood for something beyond its own physical strength. The heritage we have celebrated this week is a vision of mankind's most glorious ideals—the equality of all peoples and individuals; the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Only in our free countries, where these principles are secure, do they sometimes seem platitudes; to a world in which the majority of mankind lives without them, they are the burning issues of our time.

America's success has come from its blend of pragmatism and idealism. Our pragmatic tradition has helped us confront reality, neither blinded by dogma nor daunted by challenge. Our idealism has given us not only principles to defend but the conviction and courage to defend them. In today's world of complexity, we need more than ever a moral compass to steer by, a sense of conviction that enables us to persevere through the stages of the attainable toward the ideal which will always be beyond.

The world no longer offers us the simplicity of detachment or temporary applications of overwhelming power. In a world of interdependence, of unending challenge, and of diversity, we must recognize our permanent involvement. Nor do we have reason for apology or hesitation. We remain the most powerful nation on earth. And there is much to accomplish together with the other industrial democracies as long as we offer the leadership for which all free nations long. And other nations will join us in collaborative endeavors if they see us—the world's most powerful nation—offering leadership.

So it is time to put an end to our domestic divisions, for they are the principal obstacle to the full realization of our opportunities. We have consumed too much of our substance in domestic strife; we run the risk that in pursuit of such self-absorption we will lower our sights. All great achievements were dreams before they were realities. The truly creative actions do not grow out of fine calculations of expediency and technical analysis. They require a vision which draws men to far horizons.

Almost 70 years ago Winston Churchill, with that blend of optimism and humanity that so set him apart from lesser men, described our contemporary challenge:

> What is the use of living, if it be not to strive for noble causes and to make this muddled world a better place for those who will live in it after we are gone? How else can we put ourselves in harmonious relation with the great verities and consolations of the infinite and the eternal? And I avow my faith that we are marching towards better days.

So let us avow our faith that we are marching toward better days. And through that act, America, with its vast strength, its optimism and idealism, can make a decisive contribution to a world of peace, progress, and justice.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Chicago

Press release 339B dated July 6

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please comment on what bearing the outcome of last week's meeting of European Communist Parties has on the future course of our foreign policy and particularly the bearing it has on maintaining the unity with the industrial democracies which you have so stressed?

Secretary Kissinger: I have expressed my view on the Communist Parties of Western Europe on a number of occasions, and I found that I became a political issue, even in foreign countries. [Laughter.] I feel that I can be a political issue in only one country at a time, and I have to give preference to the United States. [Laughter.]

But there are two problems in connection with the Communist Parties of Western Europe: one is their relationship to Moscow; and secondly, that they are Communists, regardless of what their relationship to Moscow may or may not be. None of these parties has disavowed the Leninist principles of political organization which have inspired their leaders for all of their adult life. For all of them, participation in government would raise serious problems for NATO, for the European Community, and for other multilateral institutions.

Nor can one take statements at face value. They would have to be tested over a period of time. In 1947 the leader of the Czech Communist Party, Mr. Gottwald, made the following statement:

> The Czechoslovak Communist Party seeks to attain socialism, but we are of the opinion that to reach socialism there exists not only the method of the dictatorship of the proletariat. I believe not only that we are capable of attaining socialism by routes different from that of the Soviet example, but that we have already set off in that direction. The Communist coalition with other parties is not opportunism. With regard to parliamentary institutions, they will have no more vigilant guardians than the Communists, when they are written into the new Constitution.

A year later Mr. Gottwald overthrew the parliamentary institutions.

So I would have to say that we have to look at the actions and not at the rhetoric before we make any judgment about the final significance of that conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your estimation would relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, or détente, if you please—is there a consensus in which U.S. foreign policy can operate and, if so, what is it?

Secretary Kissinger: Since there is press here, I want to make it clear that the word "détente" was used by the questioner. [Laughter.]

I think that the relations with the Soviet Union are a permanent feature of the international scene. I think that the avoidance of nuclear war must be a permanent objective of American foreign policy. And I believe that to seek to avoid war by maintaining our principles and our interests enables us to define the consensus and to obtain public support.

How to do this in every concrete circumstance, of course, requires discussion and examination. But in itself, we should not pretend to ourselves that we have a choice in which, suddenly, the problem of the Soviet Union will disappear—the problem will be with us. It is the responsibility of the government and of the public, together, to manage it in such a way that we preserve our values and the interests of our country and of our allies without nuclear war. And we can do it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what will be the U.S. position on the [Israeli] raid to rescue hostages [at Entebbe]? And also, Mr. Secretary, what is your personal view on this event?

Secretary Kissinger: The President has expressed the great gratification of the American people at the rescue of the hostages. It is very difficult to establish a general rule in a situation like this. Clearly the attack on an airport is an unprecedented attack. But equally clear is that the hijacking of airliners—the holding of a hundred innocent people for ransom in a situation where the host government, at a minimum, proved impotent to enforce any accepted international law—indicates that we face here a new international problem.

The United States over a period of years has proposed to the United Nations an international convention where no country would permit hijacked airliners to land or where, automatically, hijacked airplanes that do land are subject then to arrest and will receive no support whatever from the government concerned. For many years we have failed in this effort.

We believe that it is essential that some international arrangement be made to deal with terrorism, because it cannot be tolerated that innocent people become the playthings of international thugs.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there going to be some effort made to maintain the present value of the dollar internationally?

Secretary Kissinger: I have a treaty of nonaggression with Secretary [of the Treasury William E.] Simon, because he holds the view that my knowledge of economics is an argument against universal suffrage. [Laughter.] And the agreement is that if I will not speak about economic matters, he will take over foreign policy only slowly. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, my question relates to southern Africa. Can we expect our government to take a greater and more realistic attitude to the problems in southern Africa as they affect the black Africans themselves and the interests of the devout democratic nations as well?

Secretary Kissinger: We have, in recent months, attempted to adjust our African policy to the new realities in southern Africa. These realities are: that a war is already taking place in Rhodesia, which all black African countries are supporting; second, that 15,000 Cuban troops were permitted to land in Angola and that we were prohibited by the Congress from opposing them; third, that a way must be found to permit African problems to be settled within an African context, because otherwise there will be major international confrontations; [and] fourth, that the best hope for the white minorities in countries like Rhodesia and Namibia is a negotiated solution with moderate black leaders, before the radical

elements take over perhaps supported by foreign forces.

The United States has attempted to put an end to the war that has already been going on in southern Africa, to return matters to the negotiating table, to permit the white minorities and the black majorities to work out a method of coexistence, to encourage the moderate African states that are prepared to settle matters without foreign intervention and on the basis of the rights of all the peoples in these countries.

We are doing this because without it, the warfare is certain to escalate—and the danger of foreign intervention is likely to increase. And a racial conflict of extreme violence is likely to break out all over southern Africa, in which then the coexistence between the races becomes impossible.

So our intent is to mediate and to enable the communities to live together and to put an end to the cycle of violence that started before we made our speeches.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you mentioned during your talk, there has been some recent criticism of American defense policy for allegedly falling behind the Soviet Union in military strength.

Regardless of the accuracy of this criticism, others have contended that the more important factor is that the Soviet Union is perceived by leaders in many parts of the world as gaining rapidly in military strength and that the military balance is tending in its favor.

Does this problem of perception seriously weaken the political influence of the United States in the world?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course there is a third factor: it's that the perception of many foreign leaders is formed by what is said in the United States in the years divisible by four. [Laughter.]

There is no question that the Soviet military strength is growing, as Soviet industrial strength and its technological basis are growing. And therefore the free-world countries must make continued efforts to maintain the military balance.

As somebody who has had responsibility for diplomacy for many years—no one is more convinced than I am that you cannot have an effective diplomacy without an adequate military strength.

At the same time, we must not talk ourselves into a position of impotence.

In most significant categories of strength we are still ahead of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has always had a very large land army. And if we look ahead over the next 10 years, as I pointed out in my prepared remarks, we must make greater efforts, together with our allies, in building forces that are suitable for regional defense, because the strategic balance is tending toward a stalemate.

But overall, if we look at the total parity of strength, the free-world countries cannot be defeated by a lack of strength. Their problem is to muster the will to mobilize that strength.

I think at this moment the United States' strength is adequate to its responsibilities, and we have every intention of maintaining it in this position as far as we can.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I offer this question most respectfully and ask why should the United States continue to remain a member and provide a major portion of the financial support for an organization whose charter and principles have become a mockery and the antithesis of what we as a nation stand for? And of course I am referring to the United Nations.

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has expressed repeatedly its objection to many of the tendencies that we now see in the United Nations.

In my remarks today, I pointed out that these artificial majorities, one-way morality, and the dependence on parliamentary maneuvering cannot be accepted as the normal pattern of international relations. We have repeatedly pointed out in U.N. votes that we will not accept this.

On the other hand, there is a necessity for some meetingplace where views can be exchanged and for some mechanism in which crises can be handled rapidly and in which

discussion can take place without the need for formal arrangements.

So we still believe that the United Nations has a useful role to perform, but we shall also insist that the United Nations behave in a more equitable manner than has been the case in recent years. And we will not let ourselves be pressured by the artificial majorities that can be generated by demagoguery.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you foresee a permanent peace settlement in the Middle East—especially in Beirut, Lebanon, in the near future?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are two separate but related problems: one is the problem of Lebanon, and the second is the overall problem of the Middle East, although I recognize that the two are related.

The tragedy of Lebanon arises from the fact that two communities that have coexisted for several generations—and used to be cited as an example of how different religions can live together in the Middle East—have gradually fallen into conflict with one another, partly because of demographic changes, partly because of the influence of outside countries.

The Constitution of Lebanon of the 1930's depended, or was based, on certain assumptions about a population ratio which a generation since then has altered. So some political adjustment was inevitable in Lebanon.

It then became caught up in the politics of the area, where various of the factions were supported by various of the Arab countries and by some other outside countries, with the result that Lebanon became a microcosm of the larger countries.

The United States has constantly warned against military actions in Lebanon. The United States believes in the sovereignty and independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and in a political solution which permits both the Christian and the Moslem communities to coexist side by side.

The missing ingredient has been how an outside force could be introduced, or how an inside force could be generated, that would bring about the authority of the central government.

We favor a roundtable discussion among all of the parties. And a new special representative of the President, who went there last week, is encouraging all the parties in that direction.

Of course the primary solution has to be found among the concerned Arab states and cannot be imposed by the United States. But I am hopeful that a solution will be found.

With respect to the Middle East in general, I believe that significant progress has been made toward a settlement in the Middle East. I believe that conditions are being created in which further progress can be made, and I would stress that a permanent peace in the Middle East is one of the primary objectives of American foreign policy—and one of the goals which must be approached on a nonpartisan basis in the interest of all concerned.

President Ford Expresses Satisfaction at Rescue of Hijacking Victims

Following is the text of a letter sent on July 4 by President Ford to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel.

White House press release (Philadelphia, Pa.) dated July 4

JULY 4, 1976.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: The American people join me in expressing our great satisfaction that the passengers of the Air France flight seized earlier this week have been saved and a senseless act of terrorism thwarted.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

President Ford's News Conference of July 9

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford at the White House on July 9.[1]

. . . . .

Q. Mr. President, Governor Reagan made the statement when apprised of the Israeli rescue raid in Uganda, "This is what Americans used to do." And one of the hostages, who is an American citizen, said America didn't "give a damn about us, Israel freed us." I wonder, what is your reaction?

President Ford: I can assure you that this Administration has taken a firm action wherever we have been confronted with any illegal international action. The best illustration of course is what we did in 1975 in the *Mayaguez* incident. I think that was a clear warning to any nation that violates international law that this Administration will act swiftly and firmly and, I think, successfully.

Q. If I could follow that up, the State Department said—when asked, "What is the United States doing?"—said that they had contacted numerous governments, as well as the International Red Cross. What else did we do to compare with the Israeli action?

President Ford: We took whatever action we felt was appropriate at that time to indicate our strong feeling against international terrorism, and we asked for the full cooperation of all governments to make certain that the hostages were freed.

And as you know, we indicated to Prime Minister Rabin that we were gratified that the Israelis had taken the very specific action to free the hostages, and at the same time we reiterated our firm opposition to international terrorism.

Q. Did we know in advance of that Israeli raid?

President Ford: We did not.

. . . . .

Q. Mr. President, when you met with the Saudi official [Prince Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Sa'ud, Second Deputy Prime Minister] this morning, did he indicate to you that oil prices will be going up again at the end of the year, or didn't you discuss this at all?

President Ford: There was no discussion of the prospect of any oil price increase. I expressed my appreciation for the action by OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] in not increasing oil prices in their recent meeting. I pointed out I thought that was in the best interests of the free world and that it would be beneficial not only to the oil consumers but the oil producers in the long run.

. . . . .

Q. Mr. President, what would you like for the International Olympic Committee to do to resolve the dispute between Canada and Taiwan?

President Ford: I think it's tragic that international politics and foreign policy get involved in international sport competition. I strongly feel that the Olympics are a healthy thing for the world as a whole. Competition between athletes from all countries ought to be stimulated rather than curtailed. And so I hope and trust that the diplomatic problems or the international foreign policy problems can be resolved so that this healthy competition can go on.

Q. Have you done anything about it? Have you contacted the Canadian Government?

[1] For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 12, 1976, p. 1144.

President Ford: I am being kept abreast of it, but this is a decision that gets involved in Canadian Government decisions on the one hand and the International Olympic Committee on the other. I have expressed myself very clearly that we hope they will continue as broadly based as possible.

Q. Mr. President, do you believe that the Israeli violation of Uganda national sovereignty was justified?

President Ford: The Department of State and our representatives to the United Nations will set forth our position very clearly in the debate that I think begins today, on one or more resolutions before the Security Council. I am told that our position is a firm one, on good legal grounds, and I will wait and let that be expressed by them during the debate.

. . . . .

Q. Mr. President, could we talk about the Alaska pipeline another time? You are from the Middle West, and when the pipeline act was passed in Congress—

President Ford: I voted for it.

Q. Okay. There was quite a debate, though, about building a trans-Canada pipeline that would deliver oil to the Middle West where it is needed. There is still talk about that and, in fact, there is some legislation. Would you support legislation to build a pipeline from Valdez across Canada to the Middle West?

President Ford: I don't believe that is an active possibility. I think you are referring to the possibility of a gas pipeline—

Q. They were going to double-truck it, apparently.

President Ford: —from northern Canada or northern Alaska to the Middle West as one of several alternatives. There are other alternatives that would involve bringing the gas down to the Gulf of Alaska.

That matter is before the Federal Power Commission at the present time. It is also before—in one way or another—before the comparable agency in the Canadian Government.

There is legislation that is being sponsored which I think is good legislation, that would expedite the determination as to which route is the preferable one. It would be legislation much like that which was approved for the delivery of Alaskan oil.

If that gas is badly needed in the United States—and I am not saying on the west coast or the Middle West—but I think a decision has to be expedited. And so I would favor such legislation which would expedite the determination by the proper authorities as to which route was the better of the two or which is the best, if there are more than two.

Q. Mr. President, since this is an election year, I wonder if you think there is not much chance of any startling developments in the area of foreign affairs, such as a SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement or MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions], or in any other area? Do you think it is very difficult to conduct negotiations at a time when, frankly, the occupancy of the White House is going to be uncertain for next year? Are we sort of at a standstill for the rest of the year in foreign affairs?

President Ford: I have said specifically, as far as SALT is concerned, if we can get a good agreement I will make that agreement regardless of any political consequences. We are in the process of thoroughly analyzing our last proposal, the Soviet Union's reaction or last proposal. And if we can move forward on a good SALT agreement, I certainly will push for it, because I think it is in the national interest and in the best interest of mankind as a whole. So politics won't enter into any decision as far as SALT is concerned. I know of no other major areas that would have any political consideration as far as foreign policy.

Q. How about the SALT agreement?

President Ford: I intend to push for it. I am not passing judgment as to whether it will come or won't come, but we are working on it, and I intend to push it. Whether we can achieve an agreement or not is uncertain. But it is in the best interest of the United States and mankind as a whole if we can get the right agreement. And I will do it regardless of the political atmosphere that may prevail here because of our election.

. . . . .

Execution of Daniel Gearhart in Angola

Following are statements by Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford, issued on July 9 and 10 and a statement by Secretary Kissinger issued on July 10.

STATEMENTS BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

Statement of July 9

White House press release dated July 9

The President was shocked to learn that Angolan President Neto has refused to commute the death sentence of Daniel Gearhart for alleged mercenary activity in Angola. The death sentence is unjustified by the facts presented at Mr. Gearhart's trial and unwarranted by international law. We will continue to use every available means in urging President Neto to reconsider his decision and to commute Mr. Gearhart's sentence as an act of justice and humanity.

The President hopes that President Neto would reconsider in a humanitarian spirit the death sentences of the others which were reconfirmed today.

Statement of July 10

White House press release (Newport, R.I.) dated July 10

The President strongly condemns the unjustified and unwarranted execution of Daniel Gearhart by the Government of Angola. This execution, carried out in defiance of worldwide pleas for a humane commutation of Mr. Gearhart's sentence, will make even more difficult any steps toward the normalization of relations between Angola and the United States.

The President has expressed his sincerest condolences to Mr. Gearhart's family.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, JULY 10

I have learned with a deep sense of shock that the Angolan authorities have executed Daniel Gearhart despite the numerous pleas for clemency in his case that it had received from the United States, other governments, international organizations, and individuals.

As I said in my press conference this morning, there is absolutely no basis in national or international law for the action now taken by the Angolan authorities. The "law" under which Mr. Gearhart was executed was nothing more than an internal ordinance of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] issued in 1966, when the MPLA was only one of many guerrilla groups operating in Angola. Furthermore, no evidence whatsoever was produced during the trial of Mr. Gearhart in Luanda that he had even fired a shot during the few days he was in Angola before his capture.

The decision by President Neto to ignore both the law and the facts can only be regarded by the United States as a deliberately hostile act toward this country and its people. As such, it cannot help but affect adversely the development of relations between the United States and Angola.

Mrs. Gearhart and her family have my deepest condolences on the tragic death of her husband.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of July 10

Press release 345 dated July 10

Q. Mr. Secretary, good morning.

Immediately after the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport, President Ford sent a message to Prime Minister Rabin expressing U.S. gratification over the rescue of the hostages. Since then, the State Department seems to have had second thoughts about the legality of such operations. Can you explain this apparent contradiction in U.S. policy?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no contradiction in U.S. policy. The President expressed gratification about the rescue of the hostages. The United States is going to state in detail its position with respect to the legality and the international implications of this operation when Ambassador Scranton speaks at the United Nations—I believe it is in all likelihood going to be on Monday.

I stated our view on Tuesday in Chicago, in which I pointed out that it is of course an unprecedented act for a nation to rescue hostages at the airport of another. It is also totally unprecedented to deal with the issue of terrorism that we now find in the world.

We have been telling nations for years that terrorism must be ended; and when innocent people are being held under conditions in which the government that controls them either is unable or unwilling to cooperate against the terrorists, you have a situation for which there is no precedent in international law and in which various considerations must be balanced. That has been our position consistently, and there are no second thoughts.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have linked the—that is, the resolution of the Lebanese conflict with the general Middle East settlement. There are reports now that U.S. officials are depressed, or despair of ever finding a Lebanese settlement. Does that mean a Middle East settlement is out of the picture?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the depressed U.S. officials aren't talking to me, probably because they would feel more depressed if they did.

I have pointed out that one of the elements in a Middle East settlement is a degree of unity among the Arab nations. The conflict in Lebanon, in which there is disagreement among several of the key Arab countries, has deflected attention and concern away from the overall Middle East settlement.

We strongly support a conference in which all the parties in Lebanon get together and attempt to settle their affairs.

We are not depressed about the prospects. We believe that there are prospects for a solution—given some good will and given, above all, the increasing realization that none of the parties can impose a solution by force.

So we believe that there are possibilities of a Lebanese settlement, and we are convinced that there are prospects for a Middle East settlement, and we will be encouraging both of these.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been talking about the need for a new consensus in American foreign policy. In line with that, do you think it would be a good idea if, after the conventions, President Ford, whether he is nominated or not, conferred with Jimmy Carter, presuming he will be nominated, and Mr. Reagan, if he is nominated, or just himself and Mr. Carter, to discuss how American foreign policy could proceed in the interim months?

In other words, it has been said that because of the elections, it is difficult to get progress on any substantive fields in foreign policy. But if it was possible to work out some—at least implicit—agreements, would that be possible?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have been calling attention to the importance of a national foreign policy ever since my confirmation hearings. This is not a new theme for me.

I have always believed that the foreign policy of the United States must reflect permanent interests and permanent values—those values and interests cannot change at regular intervals. Of course there can be tactical disagreements, but at some point the lines of American foreign policy ought to be set for a considerable period of time.

This has been my conviction, which I have expressed in every speech for over three years.

With respect to the particular solution that you put forward, I think this is a decision that has to be made after the nominations of both parties have been made, and it involves many considerations.

I do not believe that the foreign policy is being slowed down.

I also believe that the main lines of some of the themes that I have heard from the candidates are compatible enough to permit progress to be made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you—

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the style of the conduct of foreign policy, do you think it would be a good idea, then, after the election, to end your "Lone Ranger" style of diplomacy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, I am very flattered to be constantly put on horses by various people. It gives me great prestige with my children, who have never seen me on one. [Laughter.]

So, I think we will continue foreign policy the way it has been conducted.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects for preserving the life of Daniel Gearhart, in your estimation, and how far is the United States willing to go to accomplish this?

American Under Death Sentence in Angola

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has made enormous efforts. We have appealed to over 10 countries. There has been a direct appeal to President Neto. There has been an appeal through international organizations like the International Red Cross.

If one considers that Mr. Gearhart is being tried under a law—under a regulation that was promulgated in 1966, when the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] was one of many resistance movements to the Portuguese, one can only feel that the legal basis for this action is problematical.

We hope that the decision that was announced yesterday is not final, and we are appealing it on humanitarian grounds.

We cannot permit our basic foreign policy to be dictated by our concern for the lives of Americans—of individual Americans—that may be held prisoner, because this would encourage people to take Americans prisoners all over the world. But we believe, on humanitarian grounds, there is a strong case for clemency, and we hope that President Neto, on reconsideration, will consider it in this light and will also consider the impact on American opinion if he goes through with his intention.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been quoted as saying that you could live with the foreign policy outlined by Governor Carter. Do you, in fact, support the basic outline of the foreign policy as he has laid it down, or do you find objection to certain points? And if so, which?

Secretary Kissinger: I think this issue is stated a little bit upside down.

We have been talking about foreign policy a lot longer than Governor Carter, and if

there is agreement by him with several of the things that have been put forward by this Administration, we of course welcome support wherever we can find it.

There have been some indications, some hints in the speeches that have not been fully elaborated, with which we would disagree, but I would prefer to wait until they are elaborated more before commenting on them.

But the main outlines that I have found in the speeches have been fairly consistent with the outlines of the foreign policy that we have put forward previously.

Resolution on Terrorism

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was apparently some thought in the State Department last week that the United States should seize the initiative in the U.N. Security Council debate that is going on and perhaps introduce a resolution condemning terrorism and asking for cooperation from other countries.

In view of the legal debate over the Israeli actions, has that initiative now been dropped?

Secretary Kissinger: You know, I am not aware of a legal debate over the Israeli action that has been going on here.

Our position with respect to the Israeli action has been consistent from the first day. We have maintained it since then, and there have been no second thoughts about this.

We are at this moment discussing with other countries a resolution which we hope to introduce, together with other countries, dealing with the subject of terrorism, and we have not yet achieved a final consensus with all of the other countries. But when we do, we will put it forward.

If we cannot achieve a consensus, we will put it forward on our own.

We believe that the issue of terrorism is one that the international community must address. It is intolerable that innocent people are being used as hostages for the political aims of particular groups. It is a violation of the Geneva Convention [1] and of all basic principles of humanity, and the United States will strongly oppose it and will participate in nothing that encourages it.

Communist Conference in East Berlin

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you—is your concern about the participation of Communists in the Italian Government in any way relieved by the recent elections and/or by the recent events at the Communist Party meeting in East Berlin, which turned to a ratification of national communism, and would you appraise that East Berlin meeting?

Secretary Kissinger: The outcome of the Italian election has tended to polarize Italian political life between the Christian Democrats and the Communists. The Christian Democrats did better than had been expected by some. The Communists did quite well.

It is important to remember that the non-Communist vote was more than two-thirds of the total vote. So one cannot, in any sense, speak of a mandate for the Communists. The Communists had 34 percent of the vote; 66 percent was non-Communist.

Even if you exclude the right-wing nondemocratic parties, you would still have to say that the democratic parties had over 56 percent of the vote in the Italian Parliament. So the technical possibility for constituting a government without the participation of the Communists exists.

Our concern about Communist participation has been stated, and we have not changed our view with respect to that in any sense.

With respect to the conference in East Berlin, there are a number of things to keep in mind.

First, the issue concerned the internal organization of the Communist movement. It

[1] The Secretary meant to refer to the Hague Convention of 1970 which deals with the unlawful seizure of aircraft. [Footnote in transcript.]

did not concern the policies of the individual Communist Parties.

Second, our concern is not only whether the parties are controlled from Moscow, but also that they are Communist and that their philosophy and their basic approach is likely to have long-term consequences for the Western alliance which we consider unhealthy for the Western alliance.

Third, this is not the first time in history that there have been statements about "different roads toward Communism." And I would urge all of you to read statements that were made between 1945 and 1948 by the leaders of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, by Mr. Gottwald, by Mr. Gomulka, by Mr. Dimitrov—we have a compilation of those which we can make available next week—in which, in effect, at that time they set their different roads toward communism: We have chosen in Eastern Europe the democratic road; the revolutionary means or the dictatorship of the proletariat is not the inevitable result.

Now, I am not saying necessarily that the views that are expressed now are insincere. All I am saying is that it is dangerous to judge the long-term orientation of these parties by what is said when their interests, their electoral interests are so identical with what they are now saying. And I do point out that this is not the first time that this has happened.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow that up with a question. In 1968 your predecessor Mr. Dean Rusk described a doctrine that has been put forth in the Soviet Union as the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty. Do you think that doctrine still exists, following the East Berlin conference?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think one can judge from the East Berlin conference whether or not the doctrine still exists. And if one judges by the historical record, one has to say that historically any attempt by Communist Parties in Eastern Europe to establish independent positions has been dealt with, if necessary, by military force.

I would not make a final judgment on the basis of the East Berlin conference whether the Brezhnev doctrine still exists. We, of course, hope it does not. And if it does not, that would mark a significant change. But I think it is totally premature to draw the conclusions that I have seen in some of the speculations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when the President was asked yesterday about the comment of one of the American hostages in Uganda that, quote, "America didn't give a damn about us, but Israel freed us," Mr. Ford replied by asking us to remember his Administration's swift and decisive action with regard to the Mayaguez, and within hours, on another issue, the President expressed shock about what he termed the unjustified death sentence of Daniel Gearhart.

My question is, since Ambassador Scranton has apparently sanctioned black nationalist intrusion into Rhodesia, why can't this Administration consider some sort of Mayaguez or Israeli action to save Gearhart from being what the President terms "unjustifiably executed"?

Secretary Kissinger: Each of these circumstances has to be looked at in the conditions that prevail and in relation to what is physically possible.

We are not elaborating a doctrine by which a nation, whenever it has any grievance against another nation, can enforce it by the use of military power.

With respect to Ambassador Scranton, our position is that we are attempting to settle the conflict in southern Africa by peaceful means. All of our efforts have been designed to bring an end to the violence that had already started before we enunciated our policy. We have urged all of the parties in southern Africa to resort to negotiations.

The efforts we are now undertaking in our conversations with the South African Prime Minister, in the mission that Ambassador Schaufele [William E. Schaufele, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs] is now undertaking in black Africa, are designed not to

encourage violence. Quite the opposite. They are designed to bring an end to violence and to permit the communities in southern Africa to coexist under conditions of justice and equality.

Radiation at U.S. Embassy at Moscow

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that the Department has broken its silence with respect to the radiation problem at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, could you please clarify some of the aspects of this which have caused a lot of concern among Foreign Service personnel and the public?

First, why did the United States wait for 15 years before making a concerted effort to stop the radiation at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow? Second, is the U.S. timidity and long silence related to American electronic eavesdropping from the roof of that Embassy, and if so, why doesn't it stop, since the Russians already obviously know about it?

Secretary Kissinger: I would not accept your characterization of "American timidity" with respect to this signal. There were many complicated issues involved, and the intensity of the signal did not reach proportions that required concentrated action until the second half of last year.

At that point the United States—at all times, the intensity of the signal was well below American safety standards.

It is now an infinitesimal proportion of American safety standards and well below levels that exist in many American buildings from existing American electronic equipment.

Therefore, there is no present danger. The level has been significantly reduced. It has been reduced to one ten-thousandth of the American safety standard, and it was never more than a fraction of the American safety standard.

But, be that as it may, there are many factors involved in the American response. And even if some things are known, there is not always the possibility to do something about them, even when they are known.

Q. May I follow that up by asking if there are no grounds for concern, or very little, as the Department said in its statement and as you suggest, why are we criticizing the Russians for continuing this, "without regard for the working life of Americans in Moscow"?

Secretary Kissinger: Because we do not believe that a signal of whatever intensity aimed at an American installation is an appropriate procedure. But we have reduced the intensity of the signal, partly through unilateral action and partly through negotiation, to an infinitesimal part of the American safety standard, and a very small fraction of the Soviet safety standard.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why have the Soviets declined, or what have they [inaudible] given you as a reason for not stopping the signal?

Secretary Kissinger: As I have pointed out, there are many complicated issues involved with respect to the signal and also with respect to our own counteractions which have been very carefully considered.

Timidity or concern about our overall relations with the Soviet Union has not been a factor in these, but we have had to balance various advantages and disadvantages for the United States, and we have of course had to pay primary attention to the health of our employees.

There has been a response in a very substantial reduction in the intensity of the signal.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you know about the fate of Dora Bloch, the woman in the Kenya—in the Uganda hospital?

Secretary Kissinger: We have really no information beyond what has been printed in the newspapers. The last we know is that she was taken from the hospital in which she was held by two Ugandan plainclothesmen, and we have had no account of her whereabouts since then.

The statement that was made on the Ugandan radio is obviously untrue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the House Select Committee on Intelligence has charged that you

and Deputy Under Secretary for Management Eagleburger violated Federal law by interfering with the civil right of a State Department officer by the name of Thomas Boyatt to transmit information to that committee. What was your response to those charges?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not familiar with these charges. Are you talking about the report that was not published?

Q. That is correct. It was published; it just wasn't published by the Congress. It was published before [*sic*] *the House Select Committee on Intelligence.*

Secretary Kissinger: I am not familiar with the charge that we interfered with the right of—what is the name of this—?

Q. Boyatt.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, Thomas Boyatt. Well, we went through this at great length. The Department took the position that recommendations by junior officials to their seniors should not be submitted to congressional committees, because it would lead to a situation in which every official would be afraid to make his recommendations for fear that either then or later he would be haled before a congressional committee to account for his recommendations.

We offered to make available any policy-making official, any official whose appointment had been confirmed by the Congress, and let him testify with respect to this particular—to any policy matter, and with respect to any recommendation that had been made to him.

In addition, we offered to the committee, and indeed the committee accepted, that we would make a compilation of all the recommendations that had been made on the subject, including Mr. Boyatt's recommendation, without identifying them by name, so that the committee would have before it all the recommendations that we had before us, without, however, the names of the people who had made the recommendations.

We made such a compilation. We submitted it with the approval of the committee that voted, I think, nine to five in favor of this. Therefore the committee had before it all the recommendations that had been made to us.

But, for the protection of the integrity of the Foreign Service, we do not believe that middle-level officials should be compelled to be accountable for their recommendations. The responsibility for the recommendations, and for the actions that are taken, is, in the first instance, that of the Secretary of State and, secondly, those other senior officials who have a congressional appointment.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Q. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have been a cornerstone of your and the President's policy. A number of months have passed now with no apparent sign of progress. Could you give us some indication of where we are on this matter?

Secretary Kissinger: The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have settled a large percentage of the outstanding problems. There are two major issues that remain—whether "Backfires" should be counted in the total and how cruise missiles should be either counted or limited.

On these two issues, there has not been a final resolution. We have put forward an approach. The Soviet Union has put forward a different approach, and it has, up to now, not been possible to settle, to reconcile, those two approaches.

On the other hand, in Geneva, the teams have continued to negotiate on the very considerable area on which agreement has already been reached, working out the technical implementation of the agreements in principle that have been achieved, so that whenever those two issues of the cruise missile and the Backfire are finally resolved, it ought to be possible to make—when they are conceptually resolved—it ought to be possible to make fairly rapid progress toward a solution.

Q. Is there active negotiation on those two outstanding issues at this point?

Secretary Kissinger: On those two issues, we are studying the Soviet position. They are studying our position. And these two issues are still open, and there is no immediate negotiation going on until we have restudied our position on those two limited—on those two issues.

Q. Mr. Secretary, despite your pronouncement in Lusaka, thus far since you came back from Africa the Administration has really made no major push toward getting the Byrd amendment repealed. It has paid lipservice to it, but really no major Administration effort. Is such a major push in the offing this session?

Secretary Kissinger: We will put before the Congress the repeal of the Byrd amendment, but even without the repeal of the Byrd amendment, we are making major efforts to bring about a diplomatic solution to the issues of Rhodesia and Namibia and to make progress on the whole range of issues in southern Africa. And if these diplomatic efforts succeed, of course, then it may be that over time the issue of the Byrd amendment could become moot. But we are proceeding to make major diplomatic efforts, and we will also approach the Congress on the Byrd amendment.

Paramount Factor in Radiation Issue

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: The gentleman in the rear.

Q. Sir, returning to the question of the microwave signals in Moscow, are you saying that there is some effort being made to achieve a mutual level of eavesdropping back and forth?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not saying there is an effort being made to achieve a mutual level of eavesdropping. I am saying that in making our decisions as to what diplomatic approaches to use and what retaliation might be appropriate, we have to consider many factors, but the paramount factor is the health of our employees, which I believe has been adequately safeguarded.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask again, what reason do the Soviets give for not stopping the signals entirely? Do they say that there is no safety factor involved, so it is not the Embassy's business, or is it because of certain American activity—electronic activity—at the site of the Embassy?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it would be appropriate for me to give the content of the diplomatic exchanges. But in activities of this kind, it is not always easy to obtain an admission that it has taken place to begin with, and sometimes one can observe de facto actions without having a theoretical discussion as to whether they are in fact taking place.

Q. Does the fact that the State Department went public recently mean that they have really given up, or there does not seem to be any great chance of getting a stoppage?

Secretary Kissinger: They have pointed out there is no—the best medical judgment that we have been able to obtain—and measured also against any safety standards that any nation has ever devised for this problem—what is now going on is an infinitesimal amount and a smaller amount than takes place in many industrial areas simply by walking in the streets. So we are not dealing now with a health problem of any kind.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you might not now be dealing with a health problem, but I think it is a fact that the American standard that you quote is a thousand times less stringent than the Soviet standard, and the Soviets do take into account a great many medical issues that the United States does not, and there was a time last year when the level of activity on the Russian part was higher than their own standard would have permitted.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct, and at that point we took very strong action.

Q. Is it not possible then, or are you acknowledging here that it simply isn't possible to demand that the Russians stop this?

Secretary Kissinger: We have demanded that the Russians stop it—

Q. And they haven't—

Secretary Kissinger: —it has not been completely stopped.

Proposed Purchase of Aircraft by Kenya

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the tension in east Africa, is the United States sending any naval units to the area of Kenya—Uganda? And what is your opinion of Kenya's proposed purchase of 20 F–5E's from the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it would be quite a trick to send naval units to Uganda. [Laughter.] So I can safely say that none of that is being contemplated.

There have been periodic port calls at Mombasa, and there will be a port call by an American frigate in the near future. But this is not a new development. This is something that has taken place in the past.

With respect to the sale of airplanes to Kenya, one has to keep in mind that Kenya is surrounded by neighbors that are heavily armed by Communist nations, that have made territorial claims on Kenya; that Kenya has been a country that has pursued a very moderate policy—has pursued a policy in which the various races and communities have been able to live side by side, and it is the direction in which we would hope African countries in other parts of Africa will also evolve.

So we are sympathetic to some of its military requirements.

Q. Mr. Secretary, before the California primary you canceled a couple of speeches because I think the Department said they might be viewed as too political. Why do you think it is now proper to go around the country making speeches that will also certainly be interpreted as political?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, at that time it was on the Friday before the primary in a campaign which was very intense, and it seemed to me that to speak, even though it was before a nonpartisan forum two days before the election—or three days before the election—might be viewed as a partisan effort. What I'm doing now is a continuation of what I've been doing for nearly two years—that is, to speak about once a month in some part of the country about the main outlines of American foreign policy before nonpartisan forums.

In the leadership meetings that take place off the record, we always invite individuals of all political parties and of different views. And my effort is to bring before the American public the nature of our foreign policy.

And it is not a new effort. It is not especially related to the election.

Effect of Execution on U.S.-Angola Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I clarify an earlier answer on the Gearhart matter? You said that it would not be proper for us to permit our foreign policy to become hostage to the fate of any one particular individual or prisoner, because this would encourage other countries to do so. Does this mean that you are not—you have not and you will not, in any way, link the question of future economic aid to Angola to the fate of Mr. Gearhart or any other prisoner?

Secretary Kissinger: We will not promise economic aid to Angola in order to obtain the release of Mr. Gearhart. Obviously, the execution of Mr. Gearhart will worsen the relationship between Angola and the United States and slow down any possibilities of normalization that may have existed. But we are putting our appeal to President Neto on humanitarian grounds, and we are not negotiating a ransom.

Q. Well, we haven't told Mr. Neto what you're saying here today—that his execution would obviously slow down this process of

admission to the United Nations, for example?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not talking about any particular political conditions that we have put before Mr. Neto. Mr. Neto must understand—and he certainly has been given to understand—that the general attitude of Americans toward Angola will be seriously affected by his actions in the case of Mr. Gearhart.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States noticed yet any net reduction in the presence of Cuban troops in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: What makes a judgment very difficult to come by is that there is obviously an outflow of some Cuban troops, but there's also an inflow of other Cubans. And to make a net judgment as to how many have returned and how many remain has not been easy.

We've also had unconfirmed reports that some of the Cuban troops that are leaving Angola are going to other African countries. We have not been able to confirm it yet. But it is clear that whatever reduction has taken place is not significant enough to affect the basic situation that the government is being significantly supported by a foreign expeditionary force of, by African standards, very substantial dimensions—which is, in turn, supported by the Soviet Union—and it is a precedent which we find extremely difficult to live with.

Prince Abdallah of Saudi Arabia Visits Washington

Following is a toast by Secretary Kissinger given at a luncheon in honor of Prince Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Sa'ud, Second Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, on July 8.

Press release 344 dated July 9

Your Royal Highness: It is always a great privilege for me to welcome friends from Saudi Arabia to the United States.

His Royal Highness pointed out to me that I have visited Saudi Arabia 13 times in the last three years; I pointed out to him that on my first visit I detected a certain suspiciousness on the part of my host, but I'm glad to say that we have developed a relationship now of mutual confidence and of personal friendship.

Of course, I always feel a little apologetic when I welcome people from Saudi Arabia here, because I recognize that as far as hospitality is concerned, the United States is an underdeveloped country. [Laughter.]

Your Royal Highness is visiting the United States at a very important period in the relationship between the Arab countries and the United States and in the history of the Middle East. We are all conscious of the tragedy that is taking place in Lebanon, and we are also aware of the necessity of making progress toward peace in the Middle East. The two events are closely related because, in all candor, peace in the Middle East cannot progress without unity among the Arab nations. Contrary to what our critics are saying, the United States favors unity among the Arab nations.

We think that the Kingdom, and His Majesty in particular, has taken wise initiatives in bringing together the Prime Ministers of Syria and Egypt and in using the good offices of Saudi Arabia to arrange negotiations among all of the parties in Lebanon.

Whatever assistance the United States can give these efforts, we will be eager to do. We believe that the time has come in Lebanon for all of the parties to recognize that a continuation of the conflict only leads to a needless loss of life and only encourages outside forces—that are neither interested in the independence of Lebanon nor in progress toward peace in the Middle East—to exploit the situation. I believe, and I have the impression that our friends in Saudi Arabia also believe, that it is time to have a roundtable conference in which all of the parties discuss arrangements in which the various communities can live together, the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon are safeguarded, and outside influences are gradually withdrawn.

As far as the Middle East as a whole is concerned, the United States has stated re-

peatedly that we believe important steps have been taken toward peace in the Middle East. But very major steps remain to be taken; and those steps, in our view, and I believe in the view of all of the parties now, have to be taken on all fronts, so that progress toward peace can be uniform for all of the principal parties concerned. This is the attitude with which the United States is approaching the problem, and again, I want to emphasize that the cooperation between the Arab states has to be an important component of this effort.

As far as our bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia are concerned, Saudi Arabia has been our oldest friend in the Arab world. We have had an uninterrupted relationship of trust and confidence, and in the world as it is today, it is important that countries know that friends of the United States know of our interest in their sovereignty, in their prosperity, and in their independence; and that it is known that the United States stands behind its friends.

A few years ago, a group at the National War College sent a plaque—in brass, since only the Saudis can afford gold—with a piece of a plank on which the first meeting took place between President Roosevelt and the King of Saudi Arabia. A few weeks ago, the wheel of that ship was presented by Ambassador [William J.] Porter to the Government of Saudi Arabia. It symbolizes the fact that, while it may have taken 170 years of our history for our leaders to meet the leaders of Saudi Arabia, in the last 30 years these contacts have been frequent and important in the negotiations that I have had the privilege of conducting in the Middle East.

The advice of His Majesty King Faisal, of His Majesty King Khalid, and of the Crown Prince, Prince Fahd, has been of enormous importance. And anyone who knows how Saudi diplomacy operates—discreetly and unostentatiously—also knows that our Saudi friends always do more than they say, and I would like to stress that this close relationship we are dedicated to maintaining and to strengthening.

It is a great privilege, Your Royal Highness, to welcome you to the Department of State and to the United States, and I would like all of our guests to drink a toast: To His Royal Highness and to the growing friendship between our two peoples.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 2d Session

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Report of the committee of conference to accompany S. 2662. H. Rept. 94–1013. April 6, 1976. 78 pp.

Middle East Assistance. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting his objections to the Senate action adding to the budget for foreign military sales credits and security supporting assistance for the transition quarter for Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. H. Doc. 94–444. April 8, 1976. 2 pp.

U.S. Participation in the OECD Financial Support Fund. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, together with minority views, to accompany S. 1907. S. Rept. 94–746. April 9, 1976. 11 pp.

Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act. Report of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to accompany S. 713; S. Rept. 94–754; April 14, 1976; 54 pp. Joint report of the Senate Committees on Commerce, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations, together with additional views; S. Rept 94–935; June 8, 1976; 28 pp.

Establishing a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 2679; S. Rept. 94–756; April 23, 1976; 6 pp. Report of the House Committee on International Relations; H. Rept. 94–1149; May 14, 1976; 8 pp.

To Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany H.R. 12226. S. Rept. 94–757. April 23, 1976. 24 pp.

Relations With the Soviet Union. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Res. 406. S. Rept. 94–758. April 23, 1976. 4 pp.

The United States and the Middle East

Address by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs [1]

It is particularly appropriate, just four days before the Bicentennial of our Declaration of Independence, to be meeting with members of an organization whose history goes well back into the first century of America's independence. For 133 of America's 200 years, B'nai B'rith has been a guardian of the principles of freedom, justice, tolerance, and individual dignity which are the essence of this nation.

I do not feel a stranger among you. For as long as I can remember, and long before I knew what the words "B'nai B'rith" meant, that name has been synonymous to me with the highest ideals of service and brotherhood.

In more recent years, I have had a fruitful dialogue with your representatives in Washington on the subject I want to speak about tonight: U.S. policy in the Middle East. This dialogue has helped me understand the special feeling of American Jews for Israel. It has also, I believe, helped your representatives understand the complex considerations which those of us who deal daily with the problems of the Middle East must weigh in conducting our relations with this area of such vital importance to our national interests.

This gathering this evening is an extension of that dialogue. I welcome it, and I am glad to be here. This kind of interchange is indispensable to the formulation of foreign policy in a democracy. Foreign policies must be based on an informed public opinion, and they must have public support, if they are to be sustained. I hope my words this evening will find a response among you that will contribute to the national consensus we must strive for in the search for peace in the Middle East.

All of us here tonight would agree that the security and survival of Israel must be a nonnegotiable premise of American Middle East policy. No significant body of opinion in this country would disagree with that premise.

Our national commitment to Israel's security and survival is not at issue. The issue, precisely stated, is to define and pursue a national policy that puts us in the strongest possible position to continue to meet that commitment. A responsible Middle East policy for America must assure that we retain the capacity to influence the course of events in the Middle East commensurate with our bilateral and global responsibilities as a major power.

The United States, with the good will which it uniquely has among all the parties in the Middle East, is in a position to help shape events, to help prevent wars, and to help the parties to find their way along the hard road to a negotiated peace. To continue to play this role, we must pursue policies which take into account the broad range of American concerns and interests in the Middle East.

It is therefore important, as a starting

[1] Made before the 108th Annual Convention Installation Banquet of B'nai B'rith, District 6, at Omaha, Nebr., on June 30.

point, to identify what those concerns and interests are:

—I have already mentioned our strong commitment to the security and survival of Israel. It is a commitment rooted deeply in history. It has been reaffirmed by every Administration in this country since the modern State of Israel came into existence almost 30 years ago. As recently as last May 13, President Ford told the annual meeting of the American Jewish Committee in Washington:

> A strong Israel is essential to a stable peace in the Middle East. Our commitment to Israel will meet the test of American steadfastness and resolve. My Administration will not be found wanting. The United States will continue to help Israel provide for her security.

A concrete manifestation of President Ford's policy toward Israel can be seen in the fact that for the fiscal years 1976 and 1977 he has requested over $4 billion in economic and military assistance, compared to a total of only $6 billion in U.S. assistance since the founding of the State of Israel.

—We also have good and mutually beneficial relations with most of the nations of the Arab world. This is important to them. They seek American technology and managerial know-how for their development programs. Moderate Arab leaders also look to military assistance from the United States as a buttress to their moderation and as a means of protecting themselves against more radical forces in the area. These good relations are also important to us. They are important economically, for example, in jobs created in this country by the growing volume of exports to, and investment in, Arab countries. They are important in helping meet our energy requirements for the years ahead. They are also important politically, in a world where the interdependence of developed and developing nations is a condition for the well-being of all.

Our relations with the Arab world, wisely nurtured, can enhance our ability to strengthen the forces of moderation in the Middle East and advance the cause of peace. A return to the estrangement that so long marred our relations with many Arab nations would, in today's interdependent world, have negative effects on our interests extending far beyond the Middle East.

—A third interest of the United States is the preservation and strengthening of our alliances. Each crisis in the Middle East places severe strains on the fabric of those alliances.

—Finally, we have an interest, dictated by our global responsibilities in this nuclear age, to prevent conflict in the Middle East from again becoming a flashpoint of superpower confrontation.

Fundamental Issues in Peace Process

We cannot pursue our interests in the Middle East selectively. Yet so long as the Arab-Israeli conflict persists, there are potential contradictions among them.

Simple logic therefore requires us—indeed, impels us—to persevere in the search for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In no other way can we guard against an evolution of events that could bring our multiple interests and concerns into conflict, benefiting only those, both within and outside the region, who seek to inflame or polarize or exploit the conflict. An Arab-Israeli peace settlement which had the strong backing of the United States and of the world community generally would constitute in the long run the best guarantee of Israel's security and survival.

The question we must therefore ask ourselves is whether or not conditions exist which make a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict attainable. What are the fundamental issues which must be dealt with if there is to be tangible progress toward peace? Briefly stated, the issues are these:

—Israel seeks from the Arabs recognition of its legitimacy and right to exist, with all this implies: an end to belligerency, an end to threats of force, and commitments to live together in peace and security.

—The Arab states seek the restoration of

occupied territories and, in their words, justice for the Palestinian people.

The suspicions between Arabs and Israelis are so deep, the absence of meaningful communication between them so absolute, that each tends to put the worst interpretation on the stated objectives of the other. When Israel says it seeks security, the Arabs take this to mean that Israel seeks to retain major parts, if not all, of the territories occupied in the 1967 war. When the Arabs speak of the national rights of the Palestinians, Israelis hear a call for the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state.

Undoubtedly some on both sides do harbor such extreme feelings. But there are also those who do not. Public opinion is not monolithic in either Israel or the Arab world; it is in flux, and there is a great yearning on both sides for an end to the killing and conflict. The present generation of Arab and Israeli leaders has an opportunity to lead their peoples to a genuine peace between them—an opportunity that has not existed before and that may not come again soon if the present opportunity is missed.

Achievements and Beginnings

Support for a peaceful settlement can only be consolidated, the true intentions of both sides can only be tested, in the give-and-take of a process of negotiations between the parties that holds out hope for peace. The precise form of negotiations—whether face-to-face, indirect through a third party, or some combination of the two—is less important than the dynamics of the process itself.

To generate such a process has been the central purpose of American diplomacy for years, and in particular throughout the active and creative period since the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. Through all the drama of shuttle diplomacy, Geneva Conference, and debates in the United Nations, our efforts have been directed toward this objective—to engage Arabs and Israelis in a process of negotiations that they themselves will come to recognize as in their own best interests.

Because there is so far yet to go, it is easy to forget how much has already been achieved. Between 1949 and 1974, there were no Arab-Israeli negotiations on the fundamental issues and no agreements to which they were direct parties. In two short years, 1974 and 1975, there were four negotiations and three agreements—two between Egypt and Israel, one between Syria and Israel.

Measured against the absolutes of final peace, the territorial and political distance covered by these agreements is modest. In psychological terms, it represents a quantum leap forward. For the first time in a quarter of a century, the rigid mindsets and sterile rhetoric that for so many years made progress toward peace impossible have given way to the beginnings of a new pragmatism and of a new vision of what the Middle East could be.

Like all changes that touch the deepest emotions, fears, and hopes of nations, that demand a break with past patterns of thought and behavior and a step into the unknowable future, these fragile beginnings have created new tensions and awakened old traumas. The internal debate in Israel, the dissensions within the Arab world, the travail of Lebanon, have in the first instance their own internal causes. But it is equally clear that these developments, which prolong and increase the ferment in the Middle East, are infinitely more intense and less amenable to solution precisely because they are caught in the crosscurrents of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Risks of Prolonged Stalemate

The resumption of negotiations looking toward a solution of that conflict must remain a high priority on the agenda of unfinished business in the foreign relations of the United States. We cannot change the imperatives of history. If our government does not retain the initiative in dealing with these issues, we will be forced to respond to the initiatives of others, and to events themselves. The same is true of our friends in the Middle East, who are much more directly concerned.

They recognize, as we do, that time is needed to prepare for the difficult decisions which lie ahead. We are not today at the moment of decision between war and peace.

But neither can that moment be postponed indefinitely. Sometime in the months and years ahead the Middle East will come to the crossroad where all concerned—both within and outside the region—must make the hard decision whether they will this time take the road toward peace or the road toward yet another Arab-Israeli war. That decision will confront all concerned with difficult and agonizing choices, as they come to grips with the basic issues between them —the issue of how to live together for the first time in peace after so many decades of belligerency and war, the issue of territorial withdrawals and final borders, and the issue of the future of the Palestinian people.

All these questions are the proper subject for negotiations. It would be tragic if the world community despaired of the hope that Arabs and Israelis could find the answers to their own destiny and concluded that peace should be imposed on the nations of that troubled region. This is not our way. We prefer to work instead for a peace through negotiations among the parties themselves—with whatever assistance we and others can provide, in whatever forums prove the most practical and acceptable.

But in the absence of a negotiating process, and of the compromises that will be necessary to make such a process possible, pressures will grow to seek an alternative way. If there is anything the history of this conflict should have taught, it is that the Middle East will not stand still. It has experienced four wars in 25 years. The intervals between wars have grown shorter and have been marked by sporadic tension and violence, including acts of terrorism which feed on the unresolved hatred and frustration of the basic conflict. The cost of each successive war, in blood and money, has increased appallingly; and each war has had increasingly dangerous global economic and political repercussions. It is unthinkable that there should be a fifth Arab-Israeli war—and yet that is the grim alternative to negotiation, compromise, and further progress toward peace.

The risks of moving toward peace are great for the leaders on both sides; witness, for example, the storm of criticism unleashed against Egypt for President Sadat's statesmanlike decision, in concluding the most recent Sinai agreement, to commit Egypt to seek a final settlement through peaceful and not military means. For Israel, the risks it perceives are agonizing. Israelis feel they are being asked to exchange something tangible—territory occupied in 1967—for something intangible—commitments by their neighbors to recognize Israel's right to exist and to live in peace. Seen through Arab eyes, however, these commitments are also tangible, representing as they do an abandonment of the claim to recover all of former Palestine—a claim which was the unanimous Arab position for many years.

Whatever the risks of moving toward peace, the risks in not doing so are infinitely greater. I do not need to dwell on the costs and risks, should there be another war. But consider the costs even in the absence of war, not least of all the risk that prolonged stalemate will set in motion forces which will undermine moderate leaders in the region, seek to isolate the United States and Israel in the world, and erode our ability to influence the course of events.

The Balance Sheet for Further Progress

If there were no alternative to this scenario of despair, the prospects for the Middle East and for the world would be grim indeed. I believe, however, that an alternative does exist. Let us look at the balance sheet.

On the one hand, the factors which make progress difficult are clear:

—The Lebanese crisis, which is in a sense an Arab crisis, makes more difficult the achievement of agreement by the Arab governments on how to move toward a settlement with Israel.

—Second, the leadership of the Palestinian movement has not accepted the frame-

work for peace hammered out in U.N. debates and embodied in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 following the 1967 and 1973 wars. That framework calls for withdrawal from occupied territory and clear recognition of Israel's right to exist in the context of a peace settlement. While the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people must be taken into account in a final settlement, it is not reasonable to ask Israel to negotiate with them so long as they do not agree that part of a final settlement must be an agreement to live in peace with a sovereign, Jewish State of Israel.

—A third factor is the continuing debate in Israel about peace goals; for example, how to deal with the Palestinian issue and what should be given up in return for peace. Meanwhile, policies such as the continued establishment of settlements in occupied territories raise questions in Arab minds about Israel's ultimate intentions.

—Similarly, voices of extremism in the Arab world and anti-Israel actions in international forums—usually supported for opportunistic reasons by many governments not directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict—raise questions in Israeli minds about ultimate Arab intentions.

Let us look now at the plus side of the ledger:

—An internationally sanctioned framework for a negotiated peace exists in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Israel, the principal Arab governments concerned, and the overwhelming majority of the world community—including the United States and the Soviet Union—are formally committed to and have accepted that framework. This framework was explicitly reaffirmed in the agreements between Israel, Egypt, and Syria.

—Second, while active negotiations are not presently going on, we have been exploring with the Arab governments concerned, and are prepared to continue to do so, an Israeli proposal for negotiations based on the concept of a termination of the state of war and further territorial withdrawals on one or more fronts. In our view, this would offer a practical way—though not necessarily the only way—of continuing the negotiating process.

—Third, for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and despite continued outbursts of shrill rhetoric from some quarters, there is today in much of the Arab world a moderate leadership which has accepted the principle of making peace with Israel and no longer espouses the goal of Arab sovereignty over all of what was Palestine.

—Fourth, the Soviet Union no longer has the same position of major influence it once enjoyed in certain Arab countries. Arab leaders perceive increasingly that while Soviet support may help them make war, only the United States—of the major powers—can produce progress toward peace, and the Soviet Union is well aware of the risks to it of continuing conflict, including setbacks to U.S.-Soviet relations.

—Fifth, there has been a constructive evolution in public understanding in this country of the complexities of the Middle East conflict, of its shades of gray as well as its blacks and whites, and of the importance of continued progress toward peace. This strengthens the ability of your government to speak with authority in its peacemaking efforts.

—Finally, the United States today enjoys the kind of relationship with both sides to the conflict which permits us to play a unique and positive role to the benefit of all who seek a reasonable, just, and lasting peace settlement.

If all the parties concerned act with the vision that distinguishes true statesmanship, I believe these factors on the plus side of the ledger can prevail. This will require difficult decisions by Arab and Israeli leaders; it will require putting aside dreams of absolute objectives for the sake of achieving realistic compromises; it will require each side to understand the fears and legitimate national aspirations of the other; it will require a determined and prolonged test of intentions in the crucible of negotiations; and it will require that the United States persist in its efforts to keep the peace process alive, to

avoid stagnation, to help the parties find solutions which are in their best interests—and ours. The United States will work *with* Israel throughout this process. I want to read you a brief quotation:

> I note with satisfaction that during the past two years, relations between the United States and Israel have become closer.
>
> Our governments have arrived at a common approach regarding the desirable political direction on the road to peace and in the development of the processes of peace . . . . There has been no erosion in the position and attitude vis-a-vis Israel of the Administration, the Congress or the American public.
>
> Relations between the United States and Israel remain firm.

This was a statement by Prime Minister Rabin in the Knesset on June 15, two weeks ago.

Yet the challenge remains, with all its dangers and opportunities. The issues are clear, and they will neither change nor disappear. The imperatives for the nations of the Middle East, and for the interests of the United States, will be the same tomorrow as they are today. Our responsibilities to Israel, to ourselves, and to world peace and stability therefore leave us no realistic alternative but to continue on course, sustained by the hope that someday our children will look back on this period of history as the time when the Middle East—after a quarter century of strife—chose the road to peace.

Fifth International Tin Agreement Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Ford[1]

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Fifth International Tin Agreement, which was signed by the United States on March 11, 1976. The Fifth International Tin Agreement replaces the Fourth International Tin Agreement, which expires on June 30, 1976. The Fifth International Tin Agreement is scheduled to come into force July 1, 1976, for a period of five years.

Tin is a critical commodity for the United States. We have no mineable reserves and must import 80% of our requirements of tin, meeting the remainder by recycling tin-bearing scrap. In addition, our strategic stockpile contains an approximately four year supply of tin at current rates of consumption. We are the world's largest single consumer of tin, other large consumers being Japan, the European Community, Australia, and Canada. Primary tin is produced chiefly by six developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Malaysia is the world's largest producer, accounting for about 40% of world supplies. Tin is an important source of foreign exchange for all these countries and vital to the success of their development plans.

Like its predecessors, the Fifth International Tin Agreement has as its main purpose stabilizing tin prices within agreed limits. Previous agreements have had some success in achieving this objective, especially with regard to the floor price. These agreements have proved a notable example of cooperation between producers and consumers in seeking solutions to common problems. The chief features of the Fifth International Tin Agreement are the following:

—An International Tin Council which meets on a regular basis to consider important issues and make decisions. Votes are divided equally between producer and consumer members as groups. Within the two groups votes are apportioned among members on the basis of their share of world production or consumption. Thus, the larger producers and consumers carry more weight in the Council's proceedings, but neither producers nor consumers as a group can dominate the Council. Normally, decisions require a simple majority vote of both producers and consumers, but certain important decisions require a two-thirds majority vote of both. As a member of the Council, the United

[1] Transmitted on June 23 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. J, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the agreement and the report of the Department of State.

States would hold the largest number of consumer votes.

—A buffer stock consisting of at least 20,000 metric tons of tin or its equivalent in money. Sales are made from the buffer stock as the tin price approaches the agreed ceiling in an effort to defend the ceiling, while purchases are made as the price approaches the agreed floor in order to defend the floor. Producer members are required to make contributions to the buffer stock proportional to their share of world production. Consumer members may make such contributions on a voluntary basis and four—The United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands—have elected to do so. Both during the course of the negotiations of the Fifth International Tin Agreement and since that time, we have made clear that, should the United States elect to join, we would not make a contribution to the buffer stock.

—Provision for the imposition of export controls on producers. Export controls are usually imposed only after the buffer stock of tin metal has risen to over 5,000 metric tons as a result of efforts to slow falling prices.

—A requirement that member governments consult with the International Tin Council before making disposals from national stocks. For some years we have consulted with the International Tin Council as a matter of routine before making disposals from our strategic stockpile. This requirement, therefore, would not constitute any change for us. We have made clear, however, that we retain our right to make disposals from the stockpile as we see fit.

The United States did not join any of the first four International Tin Agreements. However, we participated in the negotiation of all but the Second International Tin Agreement, where we were an Observer. Following the completion of the negotiations for the Fifth International Tin Agreement in June, 1975, it received careful interagency examination and evaluation. As a result of that study, I have concluded that joining the Fifth International Tin Agreement would:

—Have minimal impact on the American economy and carry with it no adverse economic effects.

—Afford some protection to American industry and consumers by enabling the United States to influence the decisions of an organization that seeks to balance the international supply of tin with demand.

—Provide support for the concept of producer-consumer cooperation, and accommodate the strong desire of both producer and consumer members that the United States, the world's largest single consumer of tin, join them in their work.

—Constitute a clear demonstration of our willingness to join with others in seeking solutions to outstanding commodity problems on a case-by-case basis, and of our desire to be forthcoming towards the developing world while safeguarding our national interests.

In view of these conclusions, I am convinced that joining the Fifth International Tin Agreement would serve our interests and have foreign policy benefits. I am transmitting a report submitted to me by the Secretary of State that explains the Fifth International Tin Agreement and our assessment of it in greater detail.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Fifth International Tin Agreement, and grant its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *June 23, 1976.*

U.S. Gives Views in Security Council Debate on Israeli Rescue of Hijacking Victims at Entebbe Airport

Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative William W. Scranton on July 12 and by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on July 14, together with the texts of two draft resolutions.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON, JULY 12

USUN press release 81 dated July 12

This Council has been convened to discuss the military operation of Israel to rescue the hostages that were held by air hijackers at Entebbe Airport in Uganda. The Government of Uganda has condemned Israel for what is termed "aggression against Uganda." Israel has been accused of violating the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Uganda, of wantonly destroying sections of Entebbe Airport, and of killing a number of Ugandan soldiers. These are very grave charges, and it is clearly the duty of this Council to consider them in light of the facts and international law.

As members of this Council know, I have spoken several times earlier this year in this Council defending the principle of territorial sovereignty in Africa. I reaffirm that today. In addition to that principle, there are other basic principles and issues at stake in the question that is before us. We must be deeply concerned with the problem of air piracy and the callous and pernicious use of innocent people as hostages to promote political ends. This Council cannot forget that the Israeli operation in Uganda would never have come about had the hijacking of the Air France flight from Athens not taken place.

Let us review the circumstances surrounding the Israeli action at Entebbe Airport. On July 4, in order to rescue the remaining 100 hostages that had been hijacked in the Air France airbus and taken to Uganda, Israel sent a small military force to Entebbe Airport. This force succeeded in rescuing the hostages and returning to Israel. Three of the hostages, one Israeli soldier, seven of the terrorists, and a number of Ugandan soldiers were apparently killed, and several Ugandan aircraft were destroyed. The Israeli force was on the ground for an hour and a half and departed for Israel as soon as it was possible to do so in safety.

Israel's action in rescuing the hostages necessarily involved a temporary breach of the territorial integrity of Uganda. Normally such a breach would be impermissible under the Charter of the United Nations. However, there is a well-established right to use limited force for the protection of one's own nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death in a situation where the state in whose territory they are located either is unwilling or unable to protect them. The right, flowing from the right of self-defense, is limited to such use of force as is necessary and appropriate to protect threatened nationals from injury.

The requirements of this right to protect nationals were clearly met in the Entebbe case. Israel had good reason to believe that

at the time it acted Israeli nationals were in imminent danger of execution by the hijackers. Moreover, the actions necessary to release the Israeli nationals or to prevent substantial loss of Israeli lives had not been taken by the Government of Uganda, nor was there a reasonable expectation such actions would be taken. In fact, there is substantial evidence that the Government of Uganda cooperated with and aided the hijackers.

A number of the released hostages have publicly related how the Ugandan authorities allowed several additional terrorists to reinforce the original group after the plane landed, permitted them to receive additional arms and additional explosives, participated in guarding the hostages, and according to some accounts, even took over sole custody of some or all of the passengers to allow the hijackers to rest. The ease and success of the Israeli effort to free the hostages further suggests that the Ugandan authorities could have overpowered the hijackers and released the hostages if they had really had the desire to do so.

The apparent support given to the hijackers by the Ugandan authorities causes us to question whether Uganda lived up to its international legal obligations under the Hague Convention [for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft]. The rights of a state carry with them important responsibilities which were not met by Uganda in this case. The Israeli military action was limited to the sole objective of extricating the passengers and crew and terminated when that objective was accomplished. The force employed was limited to what was necessary for that rescue of the passengers and crew.

That Israel might have secured the release of its nationals by complying with the terrorists' demands does not alter these conclusions. No state is required to yield control over persons in lawful custody in its territory under criminal charges. Moreover, it would be a self-defeating and dangerous policy to release prisoners, convicted in some cases of earlier acts of terrorism, in order to accede to the demands of the terrorists.

It should be emphasized that this assessment of the legality of Israeli actions depends heavily on the unusual circumstances of this specific case. In particular, the evidence is strong that, given the attitude of the Ugandan authorities, cooperation with or reliance on them in rescuing the passengers and crew was impracticable. It is to be hoped that these unique circumstances will not arise in the future. We, of course, strongly defend the concept of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, the United States deplores the loss of life and property at Entebbe and extends its sympathy to those families who were bereaved by events originating in acts of terrorism that they neither supported nor condoned.

But the U.S. delegation believes very strongly that this Council should address itself to the causes of incidents such as that which occurred last week in Uganda. We believe that this Council should once again take positive action to put an end to such senseless violence. We believe the United Nations should do everything within its power to insure against a recurrence of this brutal, callous, and senseless international crime of hijacking—the crime which gave rise to the Israeli action.

At the very least, it seems to us, this Council should immediately record its collective view that international terrorism—and specifically hijacking—must be stopped. There is ample precedent for taking such action. The United Nations has spoken out strongly against hijacking and interference with international civil aviation a number of times.

On September 9, 1970, the Security Council adopted by consensus Resolution 286 appealing "for the immediate release of all passengers and crew without exception, held as a result of hijackings . . ." It called on states "to take all possible legal steps to prevent further hijackings or any other interference with international civil air travel."

Later in the autumn of 1970 the General Assembly adopted its detailed Resolution 2645 (XXV) condemning "without exception whatsoever, all acts of aerial hijacking . . ." The resolution, which the Assembly adopted by an overwhelming vote of 105 in

favor and none against, with eight abstentions, further declared that "the exploitation of unlawful seizure of aircraft for the purpose of taking hostages is to be condemned," and it called for every effort to make a success out of the then forthcoming Hague Conference negotiations for an antihijacking treaty.

Again acting by consensus, the Security Council on June 20, 1972, stated its grave concern "at the threat to the lives of passengers and crew arising from the hijacking of aircraft . . . ." The Council called upon states "to deter and prevent such acts and to take effective measures to deal with those who commit such acts."

In addition, there already exists an international legal obligation for all states to prevent terrorist acts. The U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, contained in General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), declares:

> Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed toward the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.

Concerning air hijacking in particular, 12 members of this Council have ratified the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on December 16, 1970. Over half the members of the international community have accepted this convention, including Uganda and Israel. The purpose of the Hague Convention is to promote the safety of international civil aviation. It seeks to discourage hijacking by creating the realistic prospect of severe treatment by states against persons hijacking aircraft.

To achieve this objective the convention requires every contracting state to make hijacking an offense punishable by severe penalties. Each contracting state is also bound to take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offense of hijacking and any other act of violence against passengers or crew of a hijacked aircraft which comes within its territory.

According to the convention, a contracting state shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander. It must also facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable and shall without delay return the aircraft and its cargo to persons lawfully entitled to its possession. Finally, it must take the hijackers into custody and either prosecute or extradite them.

These are high standards—nobody denies that—but they are reasonable standards. My government does not believe that the Government of Uganda has lived up to its legal obligations under the Hague Convention, to which it is a party.

The United States believes that the United Nations should go much further in addressing itself to the evils of international terrorism. In 1972, we proposed a draft convention to the General Assembly, which provided, inter alia, that a signatory state either prosecute persons in its jurisdiction who commit any acts of international terrorism or extradite them to the state in which the crime was committed. Unfortunately, nothing has yet come of our initiative, because of disagreement over the definition of terrorism.

With regard to air hijacking in particular, the United States has repeatedly pressed in the International Civil Aviation Organization for the adoption of an independent convention enabling states parties to act in concert against a state, even if not a party, that harbors hijackers or saboteurs or that fails to return an aircraft, passengers, or crew. We will continue to urge the adoption of such a convention, because we believe that it could provide for worldwide enforcement of the fundamental legal principles that are reflected in the Hague Convention.

Mr. President, this Council can and should reaffirm its own stand in opposition to air hijacking which was expressed in the Council's consensus decision on hijacking adopted on June 20, 1972. Let us condemn the taking of innocent people as hostages. Let us deplore the threat to innocent human life at the hands of terrorists. Let us also reaffirm our dedication to the preservation of the na-

tional sovereignty and territorial integrity of every member state. Most important, let us take a firm stand against terrorist hijacking —one of the most dangerous threats to peace and security in the world today.

Mr. President, these are the measured and considered views of my government concerning this episode, views with which I totally concur. But I ask you and my colleagues here to bear with me a few minutes longer, for I wish to make some personal comments about this episode in the context of the image of the United Nations itself and particularly the Security Council.

My tenure here, as you all well know, has been of very short duration—approximately four months. In that period of time the Security Council has been in session almost continuously. With rare exceptions the issues before it have been exclusively those of the Middle East, outstandingly, and southern Africa.

To my Arab friends here and elsewhere: the U.S. delegation has made it clear on several occasions that problems in the Middle East are by no means totally one-sided. Each of us, I am sure, has individual pictures and vivid images that dwell in our minds whenever matters—as they have over the last four months many times—concerning the Middle East confront us.

In my own personal experience, there is outstandingly a visit to a refugee camp southwest of Amman, where decent people were living under very trying conditions only with the help of UNRWA [U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East], having been expelled from their homes in some cases not once but twice, in 1948 and 1967. And another picture which will never leave my mind ever—the condition of Karameh after the raid on that village.

On the other hand there is an equally vivid picture of Jews with access now to pray at the Wailing Wall. Or, even more vivid—and you must all remember these—those horrors of Buchenwald, Dachau, and Auschwitz.

To my African friends here and elsewhere: on the issue of the liberation of southern Africa, my government has put itself squarely on the side of those who seek majority rule with the determination that it be achieved by peaceful means. I am very happy that policy has been adopted while I am here.

But to my Arab and African friends I say here and now, loud and strong, there may have been mixed pictures concerning some of the questions that have confronted the Security Council in the immediate past, but to my mind there is no doubt on this one, not one iota.

Why do I say that so strongly and so deeply? Yes, there was a temporary breach of the territorial sovereignty of Uganda, and let us hope that that never happens again. But there is another value, another judgment which surpasses that one in importance.

Like most of you I have never been the head of a nation nor had the responsibilities thereof, but I have been accountable for the safety and protection of 12 million people in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. During that period of time, even though hardly under the same circumstances, I know, there were several occasions in which incidents concerning the safety, the protection, and the lives of Pennsylvanians came to my office. Action thereon had to be decided by me, the ultimate executive authority in the Commonwealth. That was my first and foremost responsibility. It is the first and foremost responsibility of all governments.

In this episode, that responsibility lay with the Government of Israel to protect her citizens, hostages threatened with their very lives, in mortal danger in a faraway place. Those innocent people were subjected to the terrorist hijacking of the airplane on which they were rightfully flying and further subjected to a six-day terrorizing experience in a foreign country—seeing other persons freed while the Jews were forced to remain—subjected at gunpoint to seven hijacker terrorists who know no law—aware that the only possibility of freedom came from a government whose head had previously rejoiced at the slaying of Israeli athletes at Munich, called for the extinction of Israel, and praised that madman Hitler, who had on his evil conscience, if he had a conscience at all, the murder of 6 million Jews.

Under such circumstances, it seems to me, the Government of Israel invoked one of the most remarkable rescue missions in history, a combination of guts and brains that has seldom if ever been surpassed. It electrified millions everywhere, and I confess I was one of them.

Justified, truly justified, because innocent, decent people have a right to live and be rescued from terrorists who recognize no law and are ready to kill if their demands are not met.

Who has a conscience about this? We should. Every single one of us.

I assume that every one of us wants to do all in our power to avoid such episodes in the future. This is one episode in a series of cases of hijackings by terrorists—about which we can do a great deal. I believe that if we really want to, the Security Council and the United Nations can wipe such episodes off the face of this earth.

As my government has stated in this message I have just finished delivering, we can do this; I pointed out how. We must do this, and then and only then will our consciences be clear for the future. They will never be clear for the past.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT, JULY 14

USUN press release 83 dated July 14

I would like to make several observations on the conduct and substance of the debate which we are now concluding. The United States very much regrets that this Council did not take positive action against the criminal act of hijacking committed last week against the Air France aircraft and its passengers.

We believe that the resolution which we cosponsored with the United Kingdom was a balanced attempt at recording this Council's determined opposition to hijacking, as well as its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and its concern for the loss of human life in this tragic incident. We take considerable satisfaction that, with a majority of the membership participating in the vote, not a single delegation could bring itself to vote against such a balanced resolution.

Mr. President, we deeply regret the deaths of those on all sides of this controversy, those who had no responsibility for the act of terrorism which gave rise to the subsequent events. We extend our sincere condolences once again to all the families concerned, and particularly to the family of Mrs. Dora Bloch.

Furthermore, we are most sensitive to the major points stressed by our colleagues from Africa during this debate—that sovereignty and territorial integrity of states must be sustained and protected. This is a natural and fundamental standard to which my government fully adheres. As my country reviews its history in the year 1976, we particularly recall our own keen concern with this principle from the very outset of our life as a nation. We do not, however, view the exceptional nature of the incident at Entebbe as unjustified under international law. At the same time, we do not see it as a precedent which would justify any future unauthorized entry into another state's territory that is not similarly justified by exceptional circumstances.

This debate has provided, in our view, a valuable opportunity to air the entire question of hijacking and the issues surrounding the Israeli operation at Entebbe. The debate has heightened public and governmental awareness of the real threat which air hijacking poses to the world today. The Security Council has provided a unique forum for a full discussion of what actually happened at Entebbe and the antecedent cause of that incident.

One lesson has emerged clearly for all of us in this debate. We have had impressed upon us the terrible toll in human life and property caused by hijacking and the use of innocent people as hostages.

My delegation has been encouraged by several statements made during this debate by members of the United Nations who have stated their intention to press for action against hijacking by this organization. In

particular, we applaud the statement by the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who announced that his government will urge action by the 31st General Assembly for international measures to prevent the taking of hostages. My government will strongly support the efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany, and we shall work closely with them and with others to encourage all members of the United Nations to support a convention to this end. We are pleased to note in that connection that the Representative of the U.S.S.R., speaking to the Security Council on July 13, said, and I quote, "We are ready, along with other states, to take new additional measures against acts of international terrorism."

The sooner all the member nations of this body formally recognize that hijacking is a worldwide problem, the sooner we take positive steps to do away with this plague of international lawlessness, the safer life will be for ourselves and for our children.

TEXTS OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

U.S.-U.K. Draft Resolution [1]

The Security Council,

Noting the letter dated 5 July 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations (S/12124) and the letter dated 4 July 1976 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations (S/12123),

Recalling its decision on hijacking adopted by consensus on 20 June 1972, the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, and the Standards and Practices Governing Airport Security and Aircraft Safety recommended by the International Civil Aviation Organization,

Reminding all States signatory to the Hague and Montreal Conventions of their obligations flowing from their accession to these agreements,

1. *Condemns* hijacking and all other acts which threaten the lives of passengers and crews and the safety of international civil aviation and calls upon all States to take every necessary measure to prevent and punish all such terrorist acts;

2. *Deplores* the tragic loss of human life which has resulted from the hijacking of the French aircraft;

3. *Reaffirms* the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

4. *Enjoins* the international community to give the highest priority to the consideration of further means of assuring the safety and reliability of international civil aviation.

Benin-Libya-Tanzania Draft Resolution [2]

The Security Council,

Having considered the contents of the telegram from the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Prime Minister of Mauritius, His Excellency, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam (S/12126), and the letter from the President of Uganda, His Excellency, Field Marshall Alhaji Dr. Idi Amin Dada (S/12124),

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of Uganda,

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of Mauritius, Chairman of the twenty-seventh ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers,

Having also heard the statement of the representative of Israel,

Bearing in mind that all States Members of the United Nations must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations Charter,

Gravely concerned at the premeditated military raid committed by Israel against Uganda in violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity,

Grieved at the tragic loss of human life caused by the Israeli invasion of Ugandan territory,

Gravely concerned also at the damage and destruction done by the Israeli invading forces in Uganda,

1. *Condemns* Israel's flagrant violation of Uganda's sovereignty and territorial integrity;

2. *Demands* that the Government of Israel meet the just claims of the Government of Uganda for full compensation for the damage and destruction inflicted on Uganda;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of this resolution.

[1] U.N. doc. S/12138; the Council voted on the draft resolution on July 14; the vote was 6 in favor (U.S., U.K., France, Italy, Japan, Sweden), with 2 abstentions (Panama, Romania); Benin, the People's Republic of China, Guyana, Libya, Pakistan, Tanzania, and the U.S.S.R. did not participate in the vote. Nine affirmative votes are required for adoption.

[2] U.N. doc. S/12139; the draft resolution was withdrawn by its sponsors on July 14.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Amendments to the agreement of April 8, 1959, as amended, establishing the Inter-American Development Bank with respect to the creation of the inter-regional capital stock of the Bank and to related matters. Approved at Washington June 1, 1976. Entered into force June 1, 1976.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.

Notifications from World Intellectual Property Organization that accessions deposited: Ghana, Libya,[1] June 28, 1976; Mauritania, June 21, 1976; Mauritius, June 24, 1976.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

Accessions deposited: Libya, June 28, 1976; Mauritania, June 17, 1976; Mauritius, June 21, 1976.

Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Signed at Washington February 2, 1971. Entered into force October 16, 1973.[2]

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, May 25, 1976.

War

Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war;

Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick of armies in the field.

Done at Geneva July 27, 1929. Entered into force June 19, 1931; for the United States August 4, 1932. TIAS 2021, 2074, respectively.

Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea, April 7, 1976.

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, respectively.

Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea, May 26, 1976.

Accession deposited: Sao Tome and Principe, May 21, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976 with respect to certain parts; with respect to remaining parts July 1, 1975; entered into force provisionally for the United States June 19, 1976.

Accession deposited: Dominican Republic, July 13, 1976.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Loan agreement relating to the improvement of rural education in Bolivia, with annex. Signed at La Paz December 29, 1975. Entered into force December 29, 1975.

Loan agreement to assist small farmer organizations in Bolivia to strengthen their viability as self-sustaining units, with annex. Signed at La Paz March 24, 1976. Entered into force March 24, 1976.

Canada

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of June 29, 1973 (TIAS 7702), relating to the use of facilities at Goose Bay airport by the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 28 and 29, 1976. Entered into force July 1, 1976.

Colombia

Loan agreement concerning construction of feeder roads as a means of promoting increased agricultural productivity in Colombia, with annex. Signed at Bogotá March 12, 1976. Entered into force March 22, 1976.

Guarantee agreement relating to the loan agreement of March 12, 1976, concerning construction of feeder roads as a means of promoting increased agricultural productivity in Colombia. Signed at Bogotá April 22, 1976. Entered into force April 22, 1976.

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[1] With reservation and declaration.

[2] Not in force for the United States.

Costa Rica

Agreement relating to the operation and maintenance of a rawinsonde observation station at San José, with memorandum of arrangement dated June 28, 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at San José April 29 and June 8, 1976. Entered into force June 8, 1976.

Agreement relating to the provision of additional assistance by the United States to support cooperative efforts to curb illegal narcotics production and traffic. Effected by exchange of notes at San José June 21 and 24, 1976. Entered into force June 24, 1976.

Dominican Republic

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports from the Dominican Republic for calendar year 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo April 29 and June 30, 1976. Entered into force June 30, 1976.

Haiti

Loan agreement to assist Haiti in reconstructing agricultural feeder roads, with annex. Signed at Port-au-Prince June 29, 1976. Entered into force June 29, 1976.

Mali

Project agreement relating to improvement of crop production in Mali, with annexes. Signed at Bamako June 29, 1976. Entered into force June 29, 1976.

Mexico

Procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the General Tire and Rubber Company and the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company matters. Signed at Washington June 23, 1976. Entered into force June 23, 1976.

Morocco

Loan agreement relating to construction of the Doukkala-Zemamra sprinkler irrigation system, with annex. Signed at Rabat June 14, 1976. Entered into force June 14, 1976.

Seychelles

Agreement relating to the establishment, operation and maintenance of a tracking and telemetry facility on the island of Mahe. Signed at Victoria June 29, 1976. Entered into force June 29, 1976.

Switzerland

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters with related notes. Signed at Bern May 25, 1973.[3] *Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* July 10, 1976.

Turkey

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the McDonnell Douglas Corporation matters. Signed at Washington July 8, 1976. Enters into force in the manner provided by the domestic laws of the United States and Turkey, respectively.

[3] Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—$23.10; plastic binder—$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 35¢ each.

Bangladesh	Cat. No.	S1.123:B22
	Pub. 8693	8 pp.
French Antilles and Guiana	Cat. No.	S1.123:F88/976
	Pub. 8856	4 pp.
Gabon	Cat. No.	S1.123:G11
	Pub. 7968	4 pp.
Greece	Cat. No.	S1.123:G81
	Pub. 8198	7 pp.
Guinea-Bissau	Cat. No.	S1.123:G94/2/976
	Pub. 8209	4 pp.
Nauru	Cat. No.	S1.123:N22
	Pub. 8595	4 pp.

Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Cooperation. Agreement with India. TIAS 8176. 15 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8176).

Space Research—Rocket Launches and Similar Experiments at Cape Parry, Northwest Territories. Understanding with Canada. TIAS 8177. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8177).

Peace Corps. Agreement with Mali. TIAS 8178. 11 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8178).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 8180. 8 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8180).

Name Index

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: July 12–18

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*343A	7/12	Correction to itinerary of official visit of Federal German Chancellor Schmidt.
*346	7/12	Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., sworn in as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (biographic data).
*347	7/12	Office for International Labor Organization Affairs established in Bureau of International Organization Affairs.
*348	7/13	U.S. and Canada discuss Poplar River thermal generation project.

* Not printed.