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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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SECRETARY KISSINGER ATTENDS NATO AND CENTO MEETINGS;  
VISITS FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, AND LUXEMBOURG

*Remarks and News Conferences by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Leaders,  
Statement Before the CENTO Council of Ministers,  
and Text of North Atlantic Council Communiqué 769*

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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## Secretary Kissinger Attends NATO and CENTO Meetings; Visits Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, and Luxembourg

*Secretary Kissinger visited Oslo May 20–22, where he headed the U.S. delegation to the regular ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council; Bonn May 23; Stockholm May 23–25; Luxembourg May 25; and London May 25–27, where he headed the U.S. observer delegation to the annual meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Following are remarks and news conferences by Secretary Kissinger and foreign leaders, toasts by Secretary Kissinger, and his statement before the CENTO meeting, together with the text of the North Atlantic Council communique.*

### NEWS CONFERENCE, OSLO, MAY 21

Press release 258 dated May 21

*Secretary Kissinger:* Ladies and gentlemen, I will make no opening statement. I will say two things. First, I want to comment about some press reports that I have seen that attempt to win the Pulitzer Prize for fiction, in particular that I expressed some doubts about President Ford's campaign rhetoric. I want to make absolutely clear that whatever foreign policy pronouncements are made in the United States are done in complete harmony within the Administration. When occasionally I am asked questions about some of the more extreme statements that may be made by some of the candidates, my reply applies to extreme statements by other candidates and never by our own Administration. I suppose one should take this for granted, but I simply want to make that point clear.

Second, with respect to the NATO meeting, I thought it was an extremely harmonious one in which the assessment of the Ministers with respect to East–West relations, with respect to Africa, and with respect to other issues that were discussed were as close to unanimous as I have seen them and in which the conviction existed that NATO is a going concern, that the military equilibrium must be maintained, and that the West has the capabilities and the determination to preserve its security and to maintain its values.

And now I'll be glad to answer your questions.

*Q. In view of some of the campaign statements that have been made in the United States have you found any serious concern among your NATO colleagues about the direction and constancy of American foreign policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't think basically that it's appropriate for me to comment on the American campaign while I am abroad. I believe that our allies understand that every four years we are seized by a fever that leads to very exalted statements.

But they will also remember the constancy of American policy throughout 30 years of the postwar period. I have the impression that our allies understand that the main lines of American foreign policy enjoy wide support among the American public and that this will remain true as it has been in the past.

*Q. Why didn't you propose this year a link between Spain and NATO? Is it because you*

*have invoked a military agreement, bilateral, between the United States and Spain?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. We have never asked for a specific decision on this subject, either last year or this year. Our view has been and remains that Spain should be brought into Western institutions as rapidly as possible. Our allies know these views, and we believe that as the political evolution in Spain develops, the conditions for closer relations between Spain and our allies and the alliance and the European Community will be developed.

*Q. Can you tell me, sir, if you are concerned with the prospect of the alliance being weakened by Communists coming into government in Italy after next month's elections?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that it should be understood in Europe what is not always made clear, that almost all of the statements that are attributed to me with respect to Communist participation in governments either come from classified documents which were not written for publication but which were leaked to the press, or in response to questions. But I have now learned not to respond to every question. I have stated our views on this subject. And I don't think there is anything I can add.

*Q. [Inaudible.] [Dealt with possible purchase by Canada of long-range patrol aircraft from Lockheed.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My understanding is that this particular deal broke down on financial considerations and that discussions are continuing between the Canadian and U.S. Government, and possibly between the Canadian Government and other companies, that would make new financing possible. So until these discussions are concluded, I don't want to draw any conclusion.

*Q. [Inaudible.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the U.S. Government interest is in the antisubmarine capability of the alliance. In this sense we

have favored this deal, but we believe that a useful arrangement can be worked out with the Canadian Government.

*Q. We understand that Africa has been discussed. What is NATO's problem in Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* NATO as an institution does not take a position on Africa. But it is customary in NATO that Ministers who have engaged in foreign policy initiatives report to their colleagues, since events in other parts of the world can affect the security or progress of NATO countries. It was in this spirit that the British Foreign Secretary reported on his trip to China.

I reported on my trip to Africa and on the American policy toward Africa. We did not ask NATO as an institution to take a position with respect to Africa. Nor will NATO as an institution get involved.

Several member states of NATO have historic relationships with certain African countries, and they may want to coordinate their efforts. I have already publicly expressed our support for the proposal of the French President. But this is not within a NATO framework. For this, new institutions or new mechanisms of coordination will have to be created. It is not a NATO matter.

*Q. While not wanting to comment any further about the political problems possibly raised by Communist participation in NATO member governments, can you say whether as a result of informal discussions you've had here in the last couple of days, there is now a prepared response to such an eventuality?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have taken the view, and I believe all of our colleagues share it, that NATO as an institution cannot deal with a question of domestic jurisdiction of other countries. Individual NATO members can draw their own conclusions after certain events have occurred with respect to their own policies. But no attempt has been made to develop a consensus, and it was not a topic of conversation. So I cannot advance the matter beyond where it was when I got here.



*Q. Mr. Secretary, you explained, I believe, that plans for the increase of the present Soviet force were the result of defense plans which were decided upon 5 or 10 years ago. Have you reason to believe that the plans made now are more favorable, less disquieting if you like, than those which preceded them?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The point that I was making is that the military forces that exist in any one year are the result of decisions that are made at least 5 and probably 10 years previously. And this is true on both sides. Therefore the Soviet forces that exist today reflect essentially decisions of the late 1960's and represent a long-term trend. There is no reason to believe that the current decisions are any different from the decisions of the late 1960's.

I called attention to the necessity in the West to plan a long-term military program that can prevent the balance of power being turned against us and the necessity of doing this on a long-term basis and not on a year-to-year basis, because it is almost impossible to assess on a year-to-year basis what the precise decisions are. So this was the basic thrust, not to imply that current decisions are different. In fact, our assessment is that Soviet strength is likely to grow—that therefore larger efforts by NATO are necessary, especially in the field of conventional and tactical forces.

*Q. I understand you have been meeting with the British Foreign Minister this morning, Mr. Crosland. Did you discuss the fishing dispute between Iceland and Britain?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The British Foreign Secretary brought me up to date on his discussions with the Icelandic Foreign Minister. And I also had a brief word with the Icelandic Foreign Minister. The United States is of course intensely interested in a satisfactory solution of the dispute between two close friends, and we are hopeful that progress will be made in the negotiations between Great Britain and Iceland while they are in Oslo.

*Q. Could you please explain why the American Government couldn't lease or lend Iceland patrol boats, one or two to the Icelandic Government?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First—above all—we have not taken an official position on this matter. We haven't been asked to take an official position on this matter. I've seen many press reports on the subject. But up to now we have not taken an official position.

*Q. Could you say something about the timetable for a second SALT agreement? Whose is that next move? [Inaudible.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* What is the question?

*Q. The question is could you say something about the timetable for a second SALT agreement. Whom does the next move have to come from, and when do you expect it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, the timetable does not depend entirely on us. There are a certain number of issues that remain to be resolved—what types of weapons are to be included in a SALT agreement and how they are to be counted if they are to be included, and what their limitations are if they are not to be included. The Soviet Union gave us their considerations some weeks ago. We are now studying them, and we will submit a reply in the next few weeks. I would not want to give a timetable. I would say that progress has been made. The remaining issues are relatively few in number, but they are important. But I would not want to give a timetable.

*Q. On the Italian problem once again, if you don't mind. You said before that each country, of course, has the right to take its own preparations for certain occasions which might occur, and you said also that you have not made any concrete NATO plans to this problem. Does that mean you have had problems convincing the European countries of certain standpoints?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not made any effort at the NATO meeting to achieve a common position or to convince any other

countries. Our own position is well known. There is no need to take any further decisions; and no effort was made. There was no failure to achieve any agreement because no effort was made.

*Q. There were some reports this morning in the press stating that, while you were speaking last night in the NATO meeting, you were interrupted by somebody because apparently you were digressing from the problems considered. Could you say if there is any truth in such statements?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Apart from the technical impossibility of interrupting a Harvard professor when he is in midflight [laughter], this is one of those stories that reflect the fertile imagination of some journalists. Nothing like this—or remotely like this—happened. I was not interrupted for that or any other reason, and I didn't raise that subject.

*Q. Have these two days of detailed discussions here on NATO in any way affected your own personal plans about your future?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My own personal plans are a matter of intense interest to many people in this political year. I have stated my views. I am not taking a poll among my colleagues about their views.

It is my responsibility to try to conduct American foreign policy. American foreign policy is geared to the permanent interests of the United States and our friends.

Our NATO interests have been pursued since the founding of NATO. They have nothing to do with our primary campaign. They are independent of any personalities. They've been carried out by every Secretary of State in the postwar period. My own plans have absolutely nothing to do with these meetings.

This meeting was conducted in a spirit of great cordiality, common purposes, and common understanding of the world situation. This common understanding is not due to individuals. It reflects the permanent interests of our countries and should not be seen in personal terms.

*Q. You have started a mini-diplomacy in the Hotel Scandinavia between the Turks and the Greeks. You saw the Greek Minister, then the Turkish Minister. You are going to see both of these Ministers again. Do you think that a solution will be found to this dispute between two NATO allies?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Turkey and Greece have managed to exist for several hundred years without any overwhelming success in solving all of their problems. And while no one has ever accused me of underestimating my abilities [laughter], I do not believe that I will necessarily interrupt this historical pattern in two breakfast meetings [laughter].

We have attempted to urge on both parties the importance of settling their differences. We believe it is in their interest. It is in the interest of Western defense, and it is in the interests of all the communities involved.

We are trying to facilitate some of the procedural and substantive issues, but the situation is extremely complicated and it is overlaid by domestic considerations in both countries. We will do our best. We hope that when the two Foreign Ministers meet tomorrow that some progress will be made. But I do not believe they will announce the final solution of all issues between Greeks and Turks tomorrow.

*Q. When do you think that the new Turkish-American agreement will be sent to the Congress?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Within the next few weeks. Very soon.

*Q. There are times when it seems that the foreign policy that you are conducting and the domestic debate in the United States, particularly as it comes from the White House, are not exactly the same. Do you feel that at any time you were being undercut by the White House?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Absolutely not. First of all, I do not believe that what is being said by the White House differs from the foreign policy that is being conducted, since the fundamental decisions on foreign policy



are taken by the President. And there is complete unanimity. There is no feeling of being undercut, quite the contrary. I simply don't agree with your basic proposition.

*Q. What were the differences on Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There were absolutely no differences on Africa between the White House and myself. Before I went to Africa I went over all the points that were going to be made, on several occasions, in great detail with the President. The President himself directed certain lines to be taken. I briefed, at the request of the President, both the Cabinet and the National Security Council, and I stated at a press conference before I went to Africa the main lines of what I was going to do there. This doesn't mean that there may not be this or that person who has nothing to do with foreign policy who may be mumbling something in the corridors of the White House. But I'm talking about the President, about all those officials who have anything to do with foreign policy.

There has been complete unanimity, and there is no independent foreign policy being conducted. Every initiative that is being taken is discussed in full detail and ordered by the President.

*Q. The agreements you have signed with Spain and with Turkey and Greece on the one hand, and the Italian situation on the other hand, give the impression that the United States is more interested in following defense policy for the West in a bilateral way than in the framework of NATO. What's your impression?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We believe very strongly that the cohesion of the Western alliance is the absolutely fundamental element of our foreign policy. With respect to the defense agreements with Spain, Greece, and Turkey, in each of these cases there have been special conditions which required a bilateral solution.

All of this has been fully discussed with our allies and I believe has their general agreement, as was reflected with respect to

Greece and Turkey in the communique today. I'll take two more questions.

*Q. This will again be on Italian communism, but not to ask your short-term judgment on the Italian elections. From the point of view of a Harvard professor, how would you judge in global terms the possible emerging of a model of communism in Western Europe different from those we know, the Soviet and the East European allies model, and the Chinese model?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I'm afraid that I can be an issue in only one election at a time [laughter], and I have to give preference to my own country [laughter].

*Q. Yes, but I was speaking to the Harvard professor. You are at your own university now. You are not at an Italian university now.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are many people who are trying to speed my becoming a Harvard professor here [laughter], and when that condition has been reached I will give you an answer which will then take 50 minutes [laughter].

*Q. Is it true what some newspapers reported that you have decided that after the elections you will give up your position even if President Ford wins the election?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Very precisely, my view on that matter is somewhat more complicated than you have just expressed. But I believe that having stated it I should not repeat it and I should now conduct foreign policy to the best of my ability. I wish we would all remember that there are many critical areas in the world and that we cannot be obsessed all the time with the personal decisions of individuals. I have stated my view. I will not say any more on my plans for the rest of this year.

*Q. [Inaudible] you are the Secretary of State throughout the next Administration through 1980?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think my reply speaks for itself. It was designed to put an

end to this discussion. I think the reply is self-explanatory, and I will say no more about my personal plans than I have already said, but it is not to mean that I don't appreciate your interest.

*Q. May I ask you more precisely about Spain? Are you for a quick entrance of Spain into NATO?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I hope that you will all notice that I am being drawn into Italian domestic politics and Spanish domestic politics and I'm already heavily involved in other domestic politics. I think the evolution of Spain toward institutions more comparable to those of other European countries will have a positive impact on their membership in NATO and in the European Community, and I expressed this view when I visited Spain at the end of January as well.

*The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.*

#### **TEXT OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE, OSLO, MAY 21**

Press release 259 dated May 21

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Oslo on 20th and 21st May, 1976. Ministers reaffirmed their adherence to the central purposes of the Alliance and their determination to maintain and, where necessary, enhance the cooperation and solidarity of the Allies, as well as their deterrent and defensive strength. Only if the security of the peoples of the Alliance is guaranteed in this way can East-West relations continue to improve.

2. After reviewing recent trends in East-West relations, Ministers agreed that, while there were certain encouraging aspects, others gave cause for concern. They remained convinced that Allied Governments, intent on building a more constructive and stable relationship with the East, must continue to strive for a relaxation of tensions and to try to devise further practical measures of cooperation in areas of common interest, while preserving the cohesion and strength of the Alliance. They stated that such a policy, entailing a dialogue attuned to current realities, has the full support of the member countries.

However, the pursuit of a genuine and durable détente is possible only if all states concerned exercise restraint both in their relations with each other and in their actions in other parts of the world. The necessary confidence could not be established be-

tween East and West if crises and tensions were to be avoided in Europe only to appear elsewhere. In this regard, Ministers underlined that all signatories of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Final Act have recognized the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole.

Accordingly, Ministers felt that they must once again voice their concern at the sustained growth in the Warsaw Pact countries' military power, on land, at sea and in the air beyond levels apparently justified for defensive purposes. Should this trend continue, it could lead to an arms race of dangerous dimensions. Ministers again stressed the determination of their governments to take the measures necessary to maintain and improve the efficiency of their forces, as an essential safeguard for the security of member countries, whether against military aggression or political pressure.

3. Ministers examined the progress made in implementing the provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE. They emphasized the importance they attach to full implementation of all parts of the Helsinki Final Act by all signatories, so that its benefits may be felt not only in relations between states, but also in the lives of individuals. Ministers recognized that some steps have been taken affecting human contacts and working conditions for journalists. However, in view of the importance of what still remains to be done, they expressed the hope that progress in this field would gather momentum during the coming months and that progress would also be recorded in cooperation in economic relations and in other spheres, as well as in the observance of the principles guiding relations between participating states.

In the field of confidence-building measures, they noted that a number of military maneuvers in Europe had been notified and observers had been invited to some of them. They stated their intention to continue fully to comply with the relevant provisions of the Final Act and expressed the expectation that all signatories would do the same.

Ministers expressed the view that the meeting to be held in Belgrade in 1977 would provide an opportunity not only to exchange views on the implementation of the Final Act of the CSCE, but also to consider the further progress that could be made toward the objectives agreed in Helsinki.

4. Ministers heard a report from the United States Secretary of State on the continuing United States efforts toward the further limitation of strategic offensive arms and toward embodiment of the Vladivostok understanding in a SALT Agreement. The Ministers discussed how the negotiations affect common security interests. They expressed the hope that further efforts would lead to the resolution of outstanding issues and to the conclusion of a satisfactory SALT Agreement. The Ministers also underlined the value of continuing consultations within the Alliance with respect to SALT.



5. The Ministers of those countries which participate in the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) reviewed the state of these negotiations. They again stressed that MBFR must result in eliminating the ground force manpower disparity in Central Europe and in mitigating the disparity in main battle tanks if the agreed aim of contributing to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe is to be achieved. They reiterated, therefore, the importance which they attach to the Western proposal to establish, in the area of reductions, approximate parity in ground forces in the form of a common collective ceiling for ground force manpower on each side and to reduce the disparity in tanks. As proposed by the participating Allies, agreement to the goal of a common collective ceiling and reductions of American and Soviet ground forces in the first phase would be an important and practical first step leading to a common collective ceiling in the second phase.

The Ministers expressed their continuing resolve to press for achievement of the objectives of the Western participants. They recalled their important specific additional offer of December 1975 which was made conditional upon agreement to the objectives as set out in the Western proposals. They expressed the hope that these would be given the most serious consideration.

These Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that their proposals provide a reasonable foundation for a just and equitable agreement which would in its turn constitute an indispensable contribution to a further relaxation of tensions. These Ministers are convinced that the realization of the aims pursued by the West in the negotiations would lead to a more stable military situation which would ensure undiminished security for all countries concerned and would thus be to the advantage of both sides.

The Ministers noted with satisfaction that solidarity is fully maintained and that their public opinion supports the Western position as logical and fair. They reaffirmed the principle that NATO forces should not be reduced except in the context of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Agreements.

6. The Ministers reviewed the developments relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole which have occurred since their last meeting in December 1975.

They took note of the agreements concluded on 19th December 1975, by the two German States, agreements which will bring, in the interest of the German people, further improvements to the traffic to and from Berlin.

As regards Berlin, the Ministers discussed the further experience gained in the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd September, 1971, and especially of those provisions of the Agreement which concern the Western sectors of Berlin. They noted, in particular, that the provisions of this Agreement which concern the traffic to and from

Berlin were being implemented in a satisfactory way.

Noting that Berlin's participation in international activities is an important element of the viability of the city, the Ministers viewed with concern attempts of certain countries to impose limitations on the right of the Federal Republic of Germany, as confirmed in the Quadripartite Agreement, to represent the interests of the Western sectors of Berlin abroad. They expressed the hope that, in the interest of the Berliners and of progress in cooperation in Europe, all provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement and, especially, the provisions which relate to the representation abroad of the interests of the Western sectors of Berlin by the Federal Republic of Germany, will be fully implemented and strictly observed.

7. Ministers took note of the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions. They emphasized the importance they attach to maintaining the Balance of Forces throughout the Mediterranean area. They requested the Council to continue its consultations on this subject and to report to them at their next meeting.

Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress made regarding new defense cooperation agreements that will open the way to enhancing Allied defenses in the South-Eastern region.

They expressed concern at the serious situation arising from the continuing instability in the Middle East and reaffirmed that rapid progress must be made toward a just and lasting settlement of the conflict.

8. The Fisheries Dispute between Iceland and the United Kingdom was again raised and discussed.

9. As part of their continuing efforts to improve the military capability of the Alliance and to make more effective use of available resources, Ministers addressed the general subject of standardization and discussed an interim report on equipment interoperability. This report, which had been prepared by an Ad Hoc Committee set up after the December Ministerial Meeting, concentrated on certain priority areas. The need for full implementation of existing standardization agreements was stressed. The Ministers noted that there were encouraging prospects for improving operational flexibility of Allied forces. They asked for a full report in December, 1976.

10. The Ministers reaffirmed the commitment of their countries to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, justice and social progress which inspire the Alliance and on which their political institutions and way of life are founded. They expressed the confidence that, on the basis of the security provided by the Alliance, their governments would overcome the problems confronting them now and in the future.

11. The next Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council will be held in Brussels on 9th and 10th December, 1976.

*Secretary Kissinger:* Before you ask any questions, could I take this opportunity to thank the Norwegian Government for the very excellent arrangements that were made for the NATO conference and for the warm reception that we received both in our attendance at the NATO meeting and on this official part of the visit to the Government of Norway. I have of course known your Foreign Minister for a long time, and we have worked together in many international meetings. And I found our discussions today extremely helpful. Now I'll be glad to—

*Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund:* I forgot to welcome you all to this press conference. That's my privilege, but I just thought that you would mostly just shoot the questions at Dr. Kissinger. That was my modesty. But I think we have about 30 minutes to go—25. Would you tell me who you are when you ask questions?

*Q. Could you, Mr. Secretary, please explain to us why you and your government cannot accept the Norwegian position on the question of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea and around the Spitzbergen Islands?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The question of the continental shelf raises many issues about the relationship of the Spitzbergen Treaty and about the consequences. Up to now, we have reserved our position. We had very good and extensive talks this morning with your government, and we are going to stay in close touch. Our intention is, our conviction is, that we will work out a position that will be mutually acceptable. We have just begun addressing the problem in detail, and the Norwegian side put its considerations to us with great eloquence, and we will study them with care. So I don't think you should draw any conclusions from our present position.

*Q. Is the U.S. Government afraid that*

*Norway is not strong enough to oppose increasing Soviet pressure on this area?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, actually, we have had previous exchanges on the problem at a lower level. This is the first time that we have had an opportunity to exchange ideas at the Foreign Ministers level. And I quite frankly have only begun to study this problem myself in detail in recent weeks. So it is not a question of being afraid.

We of course consider Norway a close ally. We would resist any pressures that are put on Norway from any quarter. But we would also like to see what is the best position for both of our countries. And I am confident that when our deliberations are concluded that we will have an agreed position that we can both support. But at this point, we have just started in the U.S. Government our own higher level explorations of this.

There will be further talks in August between American and Norwegian officials. But you should not have the impression that there is a controversy. The discussions were conducted in a spirit of friendship and with the attitude that a positive conclusion will be reached, and it will be reached.

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* May I add here that the aim of the Norwegian Government is to keep the calm and the low tension in these areas, and we are very glad to see that that is also the line of those countries which we have consulted on this matter, and then today also with the United States.

*Q. In view of the fact of the mounting pressure of the international trawler fleet in the Barents Sea—and for the sake of conservation of fish stocks, has the United States any objections to Norway establishing a 200-mile fishery zone around Spitzbergen?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We would like to reserve our position until we have had a chance to study all aspects of the problem. But I want to repeat again, we are not approaching these discussions in an attitude of controversy with Norway. We are trying to find a position that maintains a low level of tension and preserves essential Norwegian

<sup>1</sup> Held on May 22 (text from press release 260).



rights, and of course Norwegian sovereignty is in any case uncontested, so I don't want to get into details that are really ramifications of the basic point.

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* I must also add here that the question of a 200-mile economic zone around Spitzbergen was not a subject for discussion during our meeting today. It didn't come up today.

*Q. I wonder perhaps, for the benefit of those who are not familiar with the problem, if you, Mr. Frydenlund would be kind enough to tell us very briefly about the question.*

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* On what question?

*Q. Spitzbergen.*

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* You want a lecture. [Laughter.]

Well, the question is that Norway has sovereignty over Spitzbergen on the basis of a treaty that has 40 signatures—there's 40 partners to the treaty. And where this treaty *inter alia* states that there shall be equal economic treatment of these 40 partners. And no country doubts Norwegian sovereignty over Spitzbergen.

What is at issue now is the question of the continental shelf around Spitzbergen, where the Norwegian thesis is that the Spitzbergen Treaty, or the regime for Spitzbergen, does not apply to this continental shelf. This Norwegian thesis is not accepted by all the partners to the treaty. Some have reserved their position.

*Q. [Inaudible.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The question is, there seem to be differences of view between the United States and the Norwegian Government on the situation in southern Africa. I, frankly, was not in the room when my friend the Foreign Minister commented on the situation in southern Africa. I do not have the impression—we did not discuss it at this morning's session. So he would really have to comment for himself.

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* Well, what we thought was a very encouraging sign in

U.S. policy toward Africa was the speech that the Secretary of State gave in Lusaka and which was favorably received by the African states.

Of course, we have different views or, let's say, can have different views. Our attitude, for instance, toward the liberation movements, with the words used here, we have had maybe closer contacts with the liberation movements than the United States has. But as a whole we appreciate the signals that were given by the Secretary of State in his Lusaka speech.

By the way, we also had an interesting talk this morning about the basic relations between the United States and Norway, the United States being of such a great importance to Norway, not least as a basis for developing also good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union.

We have to stick together on vital questions, but you have also to agree to disagree on certain questions in other parts of the world. Isn't that true, Mr. Professor? [Laughter.]

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are close friends and allies, but each country is free to pursue its own views in various parts of the world.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you please comment on the offer by the President of France to dispatch peacekeeping troops to Lebanon?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have only seen press reports. I have not seen the text of what he actually said. France has mentioned to us some general possibilities, but at no point has a specific proposal been made. Our reaction would have to depend on what the situation is in which such a proposal arises—whether the Government of Lebanon has requested it, whether it would bring with it the introduction of other outside forces, which we would oppose, and what the views are of other interested parties in the Middle East.

So we cannot take a definitive position on this matter until it comes up in a more formal way than it has and until we know the views of other interested parties in the Middle East in greater detail—Arab and



others—and then we will take a formal position. We listened with sympathy to the concern of separating the various warring groups. And we will look at it when it arises.

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* Well, it is impossible to make justice to all here because there are so many hands at the same time, so I apologize, but I think Per Egil Hegge was next.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if I could quote some words you wrote about eight years ago about détente. You said it might be appropriate to ask why in the past every period had proved stillborn. Could we have your status report today when the baby is exactly four years old?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe the relations between the West and the Soviet Union must always be based on several elements. One, we have to make certain that no military imbalance develops against the West, because such an imbalance can be used to bring about political pressure. Secondly, we must resist pressures and efforts at expansion. But thirdly, we must always keep in mind that in the nuclear age the achievement of peace must remain a central task of the leaders of all countries, and peace must rest on something more secure than a balance of terror that is constantly being contested.

Now, all the elements of our policy must be pursued simultaneously. I believe that in recent years some progress has been made. We have also had some disappointments. We have expressed in strong views our disappointment about the course of action in Angola, and we intend to pursue both policies: that of a firmness in the face of pressure, of making certain that the military balance will always be maintained, but also being ready to seek accommodations on the basis of reciprocity and with a sense of responsibility for the safety of future generations.

*Q. The American military position in the northern flank of Europe has changed considerably during the last 10 years. In 1965,*

*there were no problems for the U.S. Navy to reach the Norwegian coast in case of a war. Today, the picture has really changed. Operation analysis shows that it is far from certain that the U.S. Navy will win the sea battle in the northern Atlantic. In a scenario where you have a conventional war in Europe, even if the United States will win, there has to be very heavy losses. So, will you try to meet this problem and also really convince Norway that you come to this part of the world on a big scale?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, since Sweden is a neutral country we do not have access to the systems analyses made by the Swedish Broadcasting Company [inaudible] we suffer from the illusion, and base our policy on it, that we are likely to be superior at sea, and certainly in a general war with the Soviet Union there will be losses.

We believe, however, that we are in a position now and that we will maintain the forces in the future to enable us to remain dominant at sea and that we will be able to assist our allies in Europe, including Norway, by the use of the sealanes. And we are planning our naval program on that assumption.

*Q. I would like to ask a question regarding the law of the sea. It is most likely that the development of the law of the sea will confer on coastal states certain extended rights. You have territories under partly international regime or with a mixed status. Is it, in the opinion of the United States, reasonable that all parties who benefit under a mixed status or an international regime should also benefit from the extension, whatever that might be, under the new law of the sea?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not absolutely sure that I understand all the ramifications of that question.

*Q. May I just add to what I said. I asked the question with special reference to the Svalbard area, but it will have ramifications in other territories as well.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, in the Svalbard

area, of course, you have the additional problem of an existing treaty and what its relevance may be to jurisdictions. But I repeat that in the Svalbard area the United States is operating with the attitude that we will find a solution that maintains a low level of tension, is acceptable to the Norwegian Government, and will be worked out in a friendly and consultative spirit between the Norwegian and American Governments. And there is no problem. It is simply that our own study of this issue has not yet advanced quite as far as the Norwegian one.

With respect to the law of the seas, we have taken the position—on the economic zone and various other zones of jurisdiction in which all nations can share in the benefits, even those that do not have the technical means of exploiting them, that is, specifically in the continental margin and in the deep sea mining—we have made specific proposals of how national efforts and international efforts can be reconciled so that the resources of the seabed become a common heritage of mankind. But I do not suppose you want me to go into the details of all of these proposals.

*Q. Which precise criteria do you have for assessing whether détente policy has been a success or a failure, and which conclusions are you drawing from such an assessment?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Only because there are so many Americans here who have a tendency to write provocative articles, I want the record to show that the word you used was introduced by you and not by me. [Laughter.] So, with respect to détente policy—to quote you [laughter]—I think there are a number of matters that have to be understood.

One, détente has been sometimes caricatured by some of its advocates who claim too much, but it has been caricatured even worse by its critics who make claims for it that it cannot fulfill. No one has ever said that there is a policy of détente between, for example, Norway and the United States. Détente is a policy you pursue toward opponents or potential adversaries. It is not a policy you have for friends. Therefore it is a

means of regulating what is essentially an adversary relationship.

No one should believe that détente can bring about an end of all tensions or an end of all conflicts. We remain ideological adversaries. We have differently viewed political interests. It is a means of, at first, bringing some restraint into this relationship to prevent it from exploding into nuclear confrontation or war—hopefully, over a period of time to move toward an increasingly normal set of relations. It is a long process.

On the whole, we believe that progress has been made in the regulation of nuclear armaments and in the restraint that has been shown in several parts of the world, including Central Europe and, for example, the Middle East. There have been setbacks such as the behavior in Africa. So one would have to make a mixed assessment, but we believe that the policy is correct. We believe it is the only possible one, given the dangers of nuclear war, especially if it is allied to a strong military defense and close allied cooperation.

*Q. What sort of policy modifications in Norway do you want to accept the Norwegian position with regard to the continental shelf around Spitzbergen? Do you want economic concessions with regard to the economic exploitation of that area?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not made any specific proposal to the Norwegian Government, and it is not for the United States a primarily, or even largely, economic problem. So what we did this morning is to go into detail, certainly for the first time at my level, into all the considerations involving the Norwegian position, and we discussed some of our preliminary studies, about which we have not yet reached any final conclusions.

We have made no requests of the Norwegian Government, and this will not turn into an economic haggle between Norway and the United States. We are concerned with the stability of the northern flank and the security of Norway, and our approach will be entirely governed by those consid-



erations and not by economic considerations.

*Q. You just said again that the United States and the Soviet Union would remain ideological adversaries. You reportedly told the NATO Council that ideological aggression was not compatible with peaceful coexistence. What did you mean by that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* One of the advantages of the restricted sessions in NATO, in which ministers can exchange ideas in an atmosphere of complete confidence, is that so many different versions of the stories then emerge that it is almost as good as keeping secrets. [Laughter.]

What I meant was this: It is not possible on the one hand to maintain the position that so-called wars of liberation or upheavals in various parts of the world can be encouraged in the name of ideology while insisting on coexistence on the basis of state-to-state relations. The relaxation of tensions must be indivisible. And it is not possible to pursue aggressive policies in one part of the world and insist that coexistence applies only to specific issues and to limited areas.

Therefore we believe that the restraint of the superpowers as well as of all other countries on a global basis is essential if real coexistence is to be achieved. That was the meaning of my remarks.

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* I think there is time for only one more question, and I leave it to you to pick one of your favorites. [Laughter.]

*Secretary Kissinger:* That would exclude all the Americans. [Laughter.]

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* You take one American journalist.

*Secretary Kissinger:* And then you pick one Norwegian.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on Spitzbergen, you have spoken of a solution that will maintain a low level of tension. I take it you mean vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, I picked up the remarks of my colleague and friend the Norwegian Foreign Minister. I do not want to create the impression that all a

country has to do is to create tension to make us give up what we consider to be essential rights. But we are proceeding in the examination of this problem with the attitude that it is possible to reconcile various points of view, and while it would be more dramatic to say there are differences, we really had a most amicable, constructive, and useful discussion out of which we are positive that solutions will emerge, or approaches will emerge, that the Norwegian and American Governments will jointly support and that we hope will find also the approval of other interested parties.

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* I will add to that that we envisage increased activities in these areas, and our aim is to see that these increased activities can take place without increasing tension. And that is the reason why we now have taken up contacts with several of the partners to the Spitzbergen Treaty to see if we can try to find solutions to questions before they become conflicts.

*Secretary Kissinger:* Our basic approach is to support the Government of Norway, and in this process—in these objectives, and in the general attitudes—to work out a common position which is compatible with the principles which the Foreign Minister has just outlined.

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* Well, with the last question, and I have to be careful now, this Norwegian with whom I shall be friend or enemy. [Laughter.]

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, given the fact that according to OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] statistics Norway will in the course of five or six years be at the top within the OECD group of countries as regards their GNP, would you expect Norway to increase its contributions to allied defense accordingly?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, I have to tell you in all candor that I look with terror to the period when my friend the Foreign Minister will have joined OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] [laughter] and represents OPEC in negotia-



tions with the United States [laughter].

As far as the Norwegian defense is concerned, I think it should be governed by the requirements of Norwegian defense and not by the gross national product of Norway. We do not have an abstract figure in our mind of what the Norwegian defense contribution should be. I believe that as we jointly study within NATO the requirements of the defense of the northern flank, certain conclusions will be reached, and those should be met, but we have not made any proposals—certainly I have not today—of any specific sum that is related to the GNP of Norway.

*Foreign Minister Frydenlund:* If I had known that that would have been the question, Mr. Bolin would not have got the floor, because he is asking for pressure and trouble. [Laughter.] But I will use this opportunity to thank you all for coming here and thank also the Secretary of State for his willingness to answer these questions of a more local nature. We are very pleased that you have come here to have these talks with us, with the government, and also with the press.

Thank you, and have a good weekend.

**REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER  
AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, BONN, MAY 23<sup>2</sup>**

*Federal German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt:* Ladies and gentlemen, the American Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, and the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, have had several hours of discussions throughout the day and have discussed a number of questions in detail. During the past one and a half hours, the three of us have had discussions in order to make a résumé.

We have found ourselves in full agreement in the assessment of the state of the North Atlantic alliance, especially following the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Oslo, in the conviction that this alliance will fully

meet its task today and tomorrow as before.

We exchanged opinions on the economic upswing in our countries. We are very satisfied that what we launched last fall in Rambouillet, jointly with other governments, has had such extremely positive effects in America, in Germany, but also in France and other countries.

As a third item, we have of course spent part of our time [discussing] questions presently pending in Nairobi and later again in Paris, on economic questions, questions of financial policy, on raw materials policy, and their relationship between industrial nations on the one hand and developing countries on the other. And we have also arrived at a very satisfactory agreement of our views in this sector.

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would like to express my appreciation to the Chancellor and to the Foreign Minister for the extraordinarily cordial reception we have received here and for the friendship with which we have discussed all subjects of mutual concern.

We agreed that NATO is in a strong position. The policy of relaxation of tension based on the strength of the allied countries, European integration, and Atlantic solidarity is fundamental to our policy.

The close cooperation of the industrial democracies which was symbolically and substantially expressed at Rambouillet last fall contributed importantly to the economic recovery that has since taken place and which we must now jointly sustain. And in the dialogue between the developed and developing countries now taking place in Nairobi and soon to be continued in Paris, again, the close cooperation of our countries and of other industrial countries can play a crucial role in helping construct a safer and better international system.

On all of these subjects we had most satisfactory exchanges, and we leave Bonn with a feeling of appreciation and a feeling that our bilateral relations, as well as allied relations, are in very excellent and firm condition.

Thank you.

<sup>2</sup> Made following a meeting (text from press release 263).

*Chancellor Schmidt:* Will you be willing to answer a few questions of your countrymen or journalists?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Certainly.

*Chancellor Schmidt:* Are there questions to Mr. Kissinger?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Or to you?

*Q. Are you able now to foresee a successful conclusion to the UNCTAD Conference [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development]?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we had very good discussions between the American and German groups. As I understand it, the German Government is making some decisions tomorrow afternoon. We achieved substantial agreement on at least the positions that we think can be taken. I think there can and should be a successful conclusion of the Nairobi conference.

*Q. Mr. Chancellor, what difference would you see between very good agreement and fully satisfactory agreement [unintelligible] UNCTAD?*

*Chancellor Schmidt:* I endorse "very good agreement."

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss the Italian political situation?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have already discussed the Italian situation publicly between us, so there was no need to repeat it.

*Chancellor Schmidt:* But we did anticipate your question, sir. Any other questions? Many thanks.

Thank you.

## NEWS CONFERENCE, STOCKHOLM, MAY 24

Press release 267 dated May 24

*Secretary Kissinger:* Ladies and gentlemen, before I take your questions, let me express my appreciation and that of my colleagues for the very cordial reception we have received here from the Swedish Government. I have had between last evening and today about six hours with your Prime

Minister and Foreign Minister, and I found the talks extremely useful.

We did not come here in order to agree on any particular set of policies, but Sweden, by virtue of its neutral position, has developed views on many social problems to which we listen with great interest, and we expressed our own views.

If that is not totally disastrous for your government, I would like to point out that on many issues we agreed, on some we maintained different perspectives, but above all I wanted to express my gratitude for the very warm reception we have received here and my appreciation for the scope of the talks and their very constructive nature.

Now I will be glad to take questions. May I suggest that I will take questions from the Swedish press first, and then I will take some from the American contingent that's traveling with me—unless you antagonize me too much, then I will move to the Americans right way.

*Q. On which issues do you still differ with the Swedish Government?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We did not sit down and try to draw the balance sheet on where we agreed and where we disagreed. I think it can be said that the Swedish Government looks at many problems in the world primarily from the point of view of the domestic evolution of those societies. And from the Swedish point of view that makes a great deal of sense. We, on the other hand, having certain responsibilities for the global balance of power in which Sweden does not share, have to look at problems also from the point of view of the world equilibrium and from the foreign policy point of view.

So that occasionally produces a difference in perspectives. But we did not sit there and try to draw up a communique on where we agreed and disagreed. I was impressed by the scope of the analyses of your leaders and profited by it, and in some cases presented our own view.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, General Electric is planning to sell two nuclear plants to South*



*Africa. Now, I know there is an agreement between the States and South Africa on co-operation in this field of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Now, not only Jimmy Carter is against it, but what is your point of view, especially since South Africa has not signed this Nonproliferation Treaty? Are you going to ask [them] to sign this treaty before delivery?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This issue has come up so far in the form of a general discussion where there were three consortia involved: the French, the Germans, and a combination of Dutch, Swiss, and American. We are strongly opposed to proliferation. We will absolutely insist on safeguards that will guarantee that no reactors that the United States sells can be used for nuclear weapons technology. And we are at this moment carefully examining the relationship of any of our reactor sales to the possible signing by South Africa of the Nonproliferation Treaty. So this is an issue that is now under very careful study in Washington. There has not been any absolutely vital decision on this; there has been a preliminary one.

*Q. If you look upon the European scene where do you see the most likely war risks, and how would you like to minimize these war risks?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I know what you are trying to get me into; but there is an obsession on this trip on the part of the European journalists in various countries to get me to say something about the domestic evolution of countries that may have imminent elections. As I already said in Oslo, I can get involved in the domestic politics of only one country at a time, and I am fully involved in our own—as an issue, not as a politician.

If I look at the European scene I think that in the field of security great progress is being made in NATO in strengthening defense. Great progress is being made in developing a coordinated approach on East-West relations. I believe what is needed now on the part of all the industrial democracies, those that are in alliance systems, and

maybe those that are not, is to try to develop some conception of what it is they want to achieve in the fields of development and in the field of the East-West trade and economics that permits a more coherent policy.

On the whole, I think that the military problems of the West are solvable and that we know what needs to be done. The political problems of cooperation in the traditional fields—great progress is being made. What we must now concentrate on is to develop some vision of the future, of the kind of world we want to build, and see how we can do it cooperatively because the individual efforts of any country, not even the largest, even of a country like the United States, by itself, cannot do it.

*Q. In which country in Europe do you see the most trouble?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The biggest problems that exist today are immediate problems like the Greek-Turkish dispute. The second problem is that industrial societies—in fact both East and West, speaking now about Western Europe—is how to establish a relationship in which the citizens of industrialized democracies feel part of the political process. This is an issue in many European countries, and this is the hardest problem of the so-called participation of various parties in the political process.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you and your government aware of the fact that the Panamanian people will never accept as legal and binding any canal treaty that is signed by the present dictatorship in Panama, which has been set up and sustained with the highest per capita U.S. aid in the world, or any similar type of dictatorship? But there are plenty of Panamanians and other Latin Americans who would be ready to blow up the Panama Canal if such a treaty is imposed on them. And in view of that, Mr. Secretary, we believe the United States should accept a peaceful, democratic, and civilized solution to the problem; i.e., a free plebiscite in Panama, in which the Panamanian voters can choose the best treaty the United States can offer*



*Panama and the free Panama Canal people. Thank you.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think this question proves that man cannot escape his destiny. First of all, may I ask you whom you represent? Which newspaper?

*Q. I represent the Latin Americans here and the Latin American press.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I frankly do not know by what method the Panamanian people will react to any agreement that may or may not be made. At this point, the United States is exploring with the Government of Panama what can be done to improve the situation in Panama in such a way that the relationship between the United States and the Western Hemisphere will be fostered rather than damaged.

Not one line of an agreement has as yet been drafted and much of the discussion is quite premature, but the basic problem we face is that we are in favor, we have to insist on the safe and unimpeded passage of ships through the Panama Canal, and we are now discussing how this can be achieved while maintaining our traditional relationship and friendship with the Western Hemisphere. Only after that is completed can the question of ratification be considered.

*Q. In your airport statement last night you said Sweden and the United States are united by the devotion to the democratic principles. Now in what way has your government shown its devotion to democratic principles in Chile in the last few years?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You know it is very easy to be self-righteous when you are far away and when you operate on the basis of slogans. The presentations that have been made of the situation in Chile have been vastly oversimplified, and this is obviously not the occasion to go into a detailed exposition. We believed that we were giving the democratic process an opportunity to express itself in the elections of 1976. The coup that occurred was not fostered or encouraged or known by us. But I think, before one

makes judgments on faraway countries, one has an obligation to study it in greater detail than through tendentious publications.

*Q. As you might know, Viet-Nam has been quite an issue in this country, and I wonder if the time is right today to say the U.S. involvement in Indochina was a big mistake from the beginning to the end?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You know 50,000 Americans were killed in Viet-Nam, and it is a very painful experience for many Americans, and successive Administrations, wisely or not, thought that they were serving a good cause. They may have made mistakes; one would have to say in retrospect great mistakes were made. But we would also have to say that the American people supported it in the belief that the freedom of other peoples depended on it. And I do not think that in a foreign country, now, I should be asked to judge whether everything that was done was a mistake; it was an extremely painful experience in which many people tried to do what they thought was best for the United States and what they thought was best for other free peoples, and it was perhaps more painful for those directly involved than for those who had the advantage of the perspective.

*Q. One of the issues brought up during the demonstrations yesterday is that the United States is responsible for not having paid the compensation to Viet-Nam according to the Paris agreement which you negotiated. What is the reason why the United States did not fulfill that promise? You have been accused for not fulfilling it.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You know we indicated last year on a number of occasions that we were prepared to improve our relationships with Viet-Nam. We are not interested retroactively to refight the war in Viet-Nam diplomatically after the anguish everyone went through during the war. But it is asking a little bit much of the American people to be asked to apply one paragraph of a treaty every other provision of which has been totally violated by the North Vietnam-

ese. All the less so is that one obligation, as that one clause only stated a very general willingness and not a formal obligation.

Now, if the North Vietnamese want to improve relations with us, if they want to discuss with us the missing in action, turning over the remains of Americans who were killed in Viet-Nam, we will listen to whatever concerns they have. But we cannot accept an obligation, and we do not believe that it is sensible or moral to turn this into an issue for demonstration. We are not going to continue refighting the Viet-Nam war. But we recognize no obligation from the treaty, each of whose provisions has been systematically violated by the other side.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, the Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Palme, is very interested in shaping a sort of third force in foreign politics, a Social Democratic bloc of countries. What is your opinion of this?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Mr. Palme this morning first of all explained the basis of Swedish neutrality, which is a separate problem, and I have made it very clear to him that the United States does not have any objection to the basis of Swedish foreign policy. We might disagree with this or that application on the specific circumstances; but with a principle that Sweden will pursue its independent foreign policy as it has historically we agree, and I think it can play a very useful role and has played a useful role in many parts of the world.

With respect to Mr. Palme's participation in bringing together or cooperating with other Social Democratic parties, we believe that on the whole the cooperation of the Social Democratic parties in Europe has been a constructive element, that it has fostered social progress; and on a number of issues in which we have foreign policy interests ourselves we feel that they have played a very constructive role. We have, again, no objection to the principle of it; we have welcomed many specific applications of it. It does not mean that we may not disagree now and then to other applications of it. But the principle of it we think is useful.

*Q. Which are the most important differences between yours and Mr. Palme's opinion on the question in Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* In Africa, I think that Mr. Palme really should speak for himself. I did not have the sense that there were any major differences in our assessment of the African situation. Sweden has a more prolonged experience in certain parts of Africa where we have none. And we did not agree in your evaluation of the Angola situation, as you know; but if one looks at the present situation, I think our views, are complementary rather than in disagreement. I do not want to undermine Mr. Palme's position here by saying this. That was my impression, but since we did not sit down and try to draw up a balance sheet, I do not want to speak for the Swedish Government.

*Q. As you know, some Scandinavian countries are members of NATO and some are not. Do you think the future of NATO will continue at the same strength and the same position the next coming 5 to 10 years?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, I would expect NATO to continue, and I would expect in fact its military capacities to improve; but we are making no efforts to change the orientation of European countries that have chosen not to be members of NATO.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there are still a large number of American war resisters in Sweden. Are you willing to or will you make a statement on the disposition on amnesty or some sort of role you will play at home?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think the position on amnesty has been stated by President Ford. It is not within the province of the Department of State. And the position that we have is the position that President Ford has announced on that subject.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent is Sweden's neutrality made possible by the existence of NATO and the American nuclear forces in Europe?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that the neutrality of a number of countries becomes



effective because there is a balance of power being maintained in Europe by NATO backed by the United States, and I think that would be generally recognized by anybody studying the problem of defense that Sweden, with its relatively small population, cannot defend itself in the absence of a balance of power that exists in Europe.

*Q. Recent contacts between naval and government officials in Argentina and Brazil have shown the existence of developed plans for a South Atlantic treaty organization in the style of NATO. Your recent visit to Latin America and southern Africa has been mentioned as having the purpose to coordinate these attempts with your aim to counter the growing Soviet influence in the area. Would this surging organization fulfill your aim for security?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Some of the imagination becomes too exuberant here. First of all, I did not visit Argentina. Secondly, I have never heard of a plan for a South Atlantic treaty organization, and I doubt that such a plan exists. We are certainly not going to participate in it if it does exist. Thirdly, my visit to southern Africa included all of the countries—including countries that are aggressively nonaligned and several of their leaders have in fact visited Sweden since; and I think it is very easy to confirm the fact that no plans for any military organization or any other treaty organization were discussed with leaders in Africa on my trip through Africa.

So my visits to Latin America and to Africa were in the context of relations between developed and developing countries and had nothing to do with creating any military relationships.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, You have had an opportunity to talk to many of the Foreign Ministers of Europe in the last few days on the Continent. Who is Europe's favorite candidate in the American Presidential election?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My own favorite candidate—who is their favorite or mine?

*Q. Let's try Europe first.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Who is Europe's favorite candidate? Well, I do not really think it's appropriate for me to comment on the American domestic situation even indirectly while I am abroad. Besides I may have encouraged them in a certain direction.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, my name is Thorsson, from Swedish television. I would like to have your opinion on the following problem: How do you see the future for NATO if there should be Communist representatives in governments in several NATO countries?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have avoided answering this question in many capitals, and I do not want to discriminate in favor of Sweden. I have stated my views publicly on a number of occasions before I left the United States, and those views have not changed.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, did you discuss the special steel import quotas questions with the Swedish leaders?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Actually that issue has not yet come up, but of course I am seeing your Foreign Minister again this evening.

*Q. Will the quotas be imposed on them? What importance do you attach to that quotas question?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* According to the decision that has been made, in the absence of some other arrangements or agreements there is a high probability that quotas will be imposed. But the time limits for making our final decision have not yet been reached.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, let me tell you how disappointed half the Swedish population is by your not bringing your beautiful wife. Why didn't you?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My wife is engaged in finishing the reports of the Rockefeller Commission on Critical Choices, which has to go to the press on June third. That's her official reason; it may be that because my Labrador retriever is not permitted on the airplane, she may have preferred him to me.

*Q. Could you assure the Swedish audience*



*that the U.S. Government is not going to overthrow Communist liberal democratic government in Italy by clumsy means?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I know I am performing a very important sociological function here, which is to demonstrate to the Swedish public the depth human depravity can reach. The United States will respect the decisions of the Italian electorate. We have the right to draw our own foreign policy consequences from our own conclusions. But as far as interfering in the international politics of Italy, we will of course accept the decisions of the Italian electorate.

**TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER,  
STOCKHOLM, MAY 24<sup>3</sup>**

Distinguished guests: First of all, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, I would like to thank you for the very warm hospitality which we have received and for the excellent and useful discussions that we have had.

The complaints we have to make are relatively minor. One of your guests tonight said to me he wanted to make sure that Mr. [Helmut] Sonnenfeldt was at this dinner, too, because he had heard so much about him. [Laughter.] You had better get a good look at him because he won't be with me much longer. [Laughter.] Another minor complaint I have, Mr. Foreign Minister, is if you could occasionally produce a Swede of about my size; it enhances my natural humility always to have to look up to people.

Seriously, the talks we have had have been very illuminating and very hopeful. Our relations have improved constantly over the past year, and I believe that this visit marks the return to the friendly atmosphere that is an ordinary characteristic of Swedish-American relations.

Your Prime Minister explained to me

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<sup>3</sup> Given at a dinner hosted by Foreign Minister Sven Andersson on May 24 (text from press release 268, which includes Foreign Minister Andersson's toast).

today with great eloquence the basis of Swedish neutrality. And we respect it. It enables you to have a global view on problems, and it is backed by a military strength which makes it evident that you do not rely on good will alone. On the other hand, I think we can also agree that the neutrality of some is made possible by the commitment of others. And therefore the basis for mutual understanding exists as long as both sides understand the conditions in which the other one has to conduct its policies.

As far as the United States is concerned, I appreciated your kind words about the policy which we now call "peace through strength." [Laughter.] I had to make clear that I follow instructions strictly. [Laughter.]

Our policy is based on three major elements. One is that we can never forget that the security of the world depends on a global balance of power for which the United States, as the strongest democratic country, has a special responsibility. We cannot afford experiments with respect to world security; we cannot run irrevocable risks with respect to world security. And it is inevitable that sometimes our perception may seem perhaps too anxious to others who do not have, of necessity, this global responsibility. So we feel that we must stand by our allies. And we feel also that we must maintain an adequate military strength to prevent aggressive countries from upsetting the world balance of power even in areas with which we are not allied.

On the other hand, we will never forget that the peace of the world cannot depend alone on a balance of terror. And while we are concerned with security, we also have a responsibility to make certain that nuclear war does not break out, and beyond that, that countries do not regulate relationships with each other through constant tests of strength. We have therefore welcomed Swedish initiatives in the disarmament field. We agree with the emphasis on basing international relations increasingly on the rule of law.

We believe that we must pursue both

strands of this policy, the strand of security and the concern with building a safer world, simultaneously. And we cannot give up one for the other, because you cannot have security without a prospect of peace and you cannot have peace without security.

To these two pillars there has been added in recent decades a new element: the need to integrate into the world community scores of nations that have grown into independence very recently, that are trying to find political identity and economic relationships with the rest of the world. And here all industrial nations, whether they are part of alliance systems or not, have a special obligation to see to it that these scores of nations are given an opportunity to participate in a world which they feel is at least partly their own.

Now these are the three great tasks before America and the world. And we often hear doubts about what is possible and where we are going. But if we look at each of these issues, we know that the industrialized democracies have the capacity to take care of their security, we know that they have the imagination to work for peace, and we have learned that the great competition in the developing world that was talked about 15 years ago—between the Communist and the democratic models—this competition is not going on. Because only the industrial democracies have the resources and the skill and the technical know-how to bring about development. So if the industrialized democracies work together in those areas where their interests coincide, they have before them the opportunity of building a more prosperous, a safer, and a more secure world than we have known in the entire postwar period.

Sweden has always had a global vision, as a result of its desire to stand on an independent policy. It has had distinguished leaders that have played a role in it. I have here some quotations from Dag Hammarskjöld which I think express the necessities of our time as well as any statements. He said:

"The dilemma of our age with its infinite

possibilities of self-destruction, is how to grow out of the world of armaments into a world of international security, based on law."

"We know that the question of peace and the question of human rights are closely related. Without recognition of human rights, we shall never have peace, and it is only within the framework of peace that human rights can be fully developed."

"Future generations may come to say of us that we never achieved what we set out to do. May they never be entitled to say that we failed because we lacked faith or permitted narrow self-interest to distort our efforts."

I think it is safe to say that whatever differences in perspectives may have existed on this or that point today, on these fundamental principles the Swedish and American participants in today's meetings were in complete agreement. In this spirit I would like to propose a toast: To the Foreign Minister and to the cause of friendship between the Swedish and American peoples.

#### DEPARTURE, STOCKHOLM, MAY 25

Press release 269 dated May 25

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would like to thank everybody: the Swedish Government, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, as well as those members of the public who prepared for a very friendly reception. I am very pleased with the talks. I think they have strengthened Swedish-American relations enormously.

*Q. There is a new development this morning, the message from Fidel Castro to Palme with the word that Cuba is pulling back from Angola. How would you comment on that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we are studying it at this moment, and we have always strongly urged the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and when they are withdrawn it will permit normalization of relations between us and Angola.

*Q. And what will that mean concerning U.S.-Soviet relations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, it will contribute to an easing of the situation.

*Q. Are you happy with that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think we had a good visit here, thank you.

**TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER,  
LUXEMBOURG, MAY 25 <sup>4</sup>**

We have for the first time in history the problem of how to build a global international system. Never before have there existed so many nations that were part of the relevant international world. Never before has it [diplomacy] had to be conducted globally. Never before have the nations that had to construct the international system been in their majority really new nations, without a tradition of participation in diplomacy. Never before has humanity had the capacity to destroy itself, and never before has the moral connection between peoples been of such consequence.

I appreciated that of all the things that you could have said, you pointed out that our foreign policy at this moment attempts to recognize that one cannot construct peace by power alone. This is true. On the other hand, it is also true that without power one cannot be secure. Therefore, we meet at NATO and other institutions to make sure that the fundamentals of our security are preserved.

We must never delude ourselves that good intentions, high principles, or sentiments alone can secure the freedom of peoples. A major defense effort is essential. What it should be, how it is balanced, this is another subject. But at the same time at least we in the United States have had to learn painfully what perhaps other nations have always

known: that the world cannot be secure if might makes right and if power alone is the criterion of international conduct.

If we think of the fact of the last conference that Gaston and I attended together, at UNCTAD in Nairobi, it brought home one of the curious phenomena in this world: that the elements of power are really quite disparate; some countries are militarily strong but economically not relevant; others are politically influential but perhaps militarily not so strong.

One of the interesting aspects of the Communist world is that it is militarily extremely strong, but I know no part of the world where it is influential where it has not either stationed troops or exported arms. Its ideology and its economy have not been decisive factors.

Now, I say all of this because it is crucial in building a new international order that the countries of the West and the countries that share traditions of democracy work together in the most intimate manner. It is essential for Europe, but it is also essential for the United States.

It is true that there are many problems we can solve alone. We are militarily extremely strong. We are economically extremely powerful. But for the United States to be the center of decision in the democratic world is not healthy—above all for the United States—and it would create strains and tensions in America that over the long run would prevent us from achieving our objective.

Now, therefore, I would like to say emphatically, and I will take an early public opportunity to repeat it, that we consider European unity not a necessary evil but a political and moral necessity. But for European unity to be meaningful, it must be built by Europeans. It cannot be built by Americans. It cannot be done, as was proposed in the late fifties and early sixties, to share America's burden. It will share America's burden, but its motivation must be to develop its own political conception.

It is true that we have gone through

<sup>4</sup> Given at a luncheon hosted by Prime Minister Gaston Thorn (text from press release 273, which includes Prime Minister Thorn's toast).



periods, and you were one of those who did his best to ease them, where some countries attempted to build European unity in opposition to the United States. That must lead to disaster. First, because our interests are really basically compatible, so it would be an artificial creation to begin with. Secondly, because the process would lead to tensions that would emphasize national divisions in Europe. But we believe that it is imperative that Europe unify itself. We will encourage it. We will cooperate with it, and indeed, we think the most meaningful cooperation between Europe and the United States will occur only after Europe has achieved political unity.

Precisely because in the world today it is of such great importance that countries feel they have a sense of participation, the role of Gaston, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of a small and not, in physical terms, powerful country, has been so crucial. I think he has always emphasized a very important point: that the role of a country like Luxembourg depends on its reliability, on its unselfishness. There is no national gain that Luxembourg can achieve in any of the international forums in which we participate, and therefore all of us listen with respect and concern to the approach to Europe, to the Atlantic partnership, and in Nairobi, to international economic problems, of my friend Gaston.

While professors write that all decisions of statesmen are made on the basis of objective criteria, this is because professors never make any decisions. All of the foreign policy decisions that are difficult are ambiguous. A great deal depends on the interpretation of events and on the confidence one has in one another.

The personal friendship that we have and the confidence that you inspire in all of your colleagues is one of the lubricants of the relationship in which we are all engaged. I cannot think of many international relationships in which Gaston is not engaged. He has been a close friend and a valued colleague. I would like to propose a toast to a man with many titles and to the close friend-

ship between our two peoples and between Europe and the United States.

#### **NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRIME MINISTER THORN, LUXEMBOURG <sup>5</sup>**

*Secretary Kissinger:* Mr. Prime Minister, I want to express our appreciation for the friendship with which we have been received here. The Prime Minister and I have developed over the years of our association a high professional regard for each other. The Prime Minister is one of those men whose dedication to European unity has advanced that great cause enormously and who has worked with dedication for an Atlantic partnership based on a united Europe in close association with the United States. On many other issues we have exchanged ideas, and since Luxembourg has no overwhelming national aspirations, it sees its future in a progressive and peaceful world order. We had very good talks together and a very friendly meeting.

*Q. In regard to your recent talks with European leaders, are you preparing a European aid package for Angola and southern Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not discussed any concrete program for any part of Africa. I have emphasized to my European colleagues the importance of coordinating aid efforts around the world and especially in Africa. But we have not had any specific discussions about any particular areas, and of course the United States as of this moment has no diplomatic relations with Angola.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, I wonder if you could bring us up to date on the letter from Fidel Castro that Prime Minister Palme read to you—tell us what the contents were, sir, if you can, and what significance you read into the move?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When I was in Sweden, Prime Minister Palme read to me

<sup>5</sup> Held on May 25 (text from press release 271).

from a communication he had received from Castro, according to which the Cuban Government had decided to begin withdrawing troops from Angola at the rate of 200 a week with the implication that all of the combat troops would be withdrawn. We were not given a precise base figure from which this withdrawal would be calculated or a definition of troops. Therefore we are now making our own checks, and we are looking for further confirmation.

We consider this communication, however, a positive development. We have insisted that Cuban troops had to be removed from Africa and that developments in other parts of the world should not be affected by surrogate forces. We would consider a total withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola a positive development, and we are now looking into it to determine our response.

*Q. Do you believe that this has come about as a result of U.S. insistence, or for other, unrelated reasons?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We believe that the policy we have pursued of making clear the incompatibility of this situation with a peaceful international environment, together with its support by African nations, has contributed to this.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, what about the Cuban presence in Somalia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are opposed to Cuban military forces in any part of the world. Countries have from time to time sent technical advisers, but we would oppose the presence of Cuban military forces, as of any other military forces from outside of Africa, in any part of Africa. We, of course, have no intention of sending any of our forces to Africa. We believe African developments should be settled by Africans and not by outside countries.

*Q. Did the Soviet Union have any influence in this Cuban decision?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As of this point we do not know precisely what the decision is, beyond what I have told you. Nor do we

know which country has influenced the Cuban decision, so it would be premature for us to speculate.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if they pull out their troops at the rate of 200 a week, in a year they would remove 10,400. That is some 5,000 less than you and the State Department estimated was their current strength. Is that enough of a withdrawal?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We do not consider that a partial withdrawal, even a substantial partial withdrawal, is sufficient. We believe that all Cuban combat forces and military personnel should be withdrawn from Angola, and of course we would hope that the rate that has been given to us could be speeded up.

*Q. After the talks you had recently in Oslo with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey with no results, as generally believed, do you think there would be any development in the near future that could lead to fruitful discussions? Recently, President Makarios suggested direct talks with the Turkish Government. Could you comment on this? Do you think that the European Community could help toward a solution of the Cyprus problem?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is not my impression that the talks with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers were without results. Nor would I characterize my talks with each of them separately as being without results. I believe a certain amount of progress has been made, and had in fact been preferred by both Foreign Ministers. The question now is whether it will go rapidly enough to lead to the solution which is in the interest of both of those countries, as well as in the interest of the Western defense.

The United States would hope that the negotiations are pursued urgently. We are prepared to lend our good efforts, and we believe that the United States and the European Community together could lend their good offices to speed the negotiations.

As for any particular proposal made by

any one of the parties to the other, I think I would prefer not to comment.

*Q. What about the Middle East? Did you forget it in your discussion with the NATO Council? President Ford and yourself repeated many times that you would never tolerate stagnation, yet stagnation is very much there—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, I don't believe that there is complete stagnation. Of course, events in Lebanon have everybody's attention, but we believe the elements for progress exist. We did discuss the Middle East with many of our colleagues in Oslo and making progress toward peace in the Middle East is very much on our minds.

*Q. What about your policy of step by step? Is it still working?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have always made clear that the step-by-step approach would merge at some point with an overall approach, an approach involving all of the parties. As for whether it would lead to a solution in one step or in several steps, that we would want to examine when the process starts in earnest.

*Q. Is there anything new in the events in Lebanon?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The events in Lebanon are a tragedy that had its own independent causes. We hope for the most rapid end of the conflict in Lebanon and of the suffering that is going on in Lebanon. We are prepared to do our utmost for peace negotiations as soon as the parties are prepared to hold discussions. I can only say that the United States hopes for a solution in Lebanon that respects its territorial integrity and sovereignty and respects the right of existence of all the communities in Lebanon.

*Q. What is your opinion about the French move in Lebanon?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have stated my view on this previously. If all the interested Middle East parties agree, if the French move does not bring with it the introduction

of other outside forces, and if all the parties in Lebanon agree, then the United States would be prepared to consider it.

*Q. Have you had any indication that Syria will extend the U.N. Force in the Golan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I understand it, the U.N. Secretary General is going to be visiting Damascus in the very near future. We are hopeful the U.N. Force on the Golan will be extended, because it is overwhelmingly in the interest of the parties, in the interest of Middle East peace, above all, in the interest of progress toward peace in the Middle East.

*Q. How would the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola affect U.S.-Cuban relations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is a precondition to the improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations, but it would have to be completed before we can make any decision on that.

*Q. Is it true that if the Communists entered into a European government the United States would reconsider its policy toward that country?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have stated our view on this problem at excruciating length in the United States and to anguished European reaction—not in Luxembourg—I do not think I should repeat them in Europe.

[At this point a Luxembourg journalist warmly thanked the Secretary for his comments and went on to add his personal thanks for all the Secretary has done for the United States, Europe, and in particular Luxembourg. The Secretary said he was moved by these comments. The questions and answers then shifted to German.]

*Q. The situation in the European Community is not the best. Did you bring a solution for Minister Thorn?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* A solution for European unity is not for us to decide. We stand fully behind the political unity of Europe. We support President Thorn in his attempts



in this direction, and we support European unity in general.

*Q. Would you have a simple message in German for the Luxembourg population?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am very pleased to have the opportunity to be in Luxembourg. Your Prime Minister is an old friend whose views on European union and on the relationship of the United States and Europe are of the greatest importance. This has been a visit to friends and a very good day.

*Q. Are there any problems between Luxembourg and the United States of America?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I regret that I must say there are no difficulties and that we have no problems between Luxembourg and the United States of America.

*Q. Are you pleased by the most recent developments in Angola?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am pleased with the developments in Angola, but we must watch to see how far it will go; but it is a step in the right direction.

*Q. A direction which you strove for from the beginning?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, which we strove for from the beginning.

*Q. Do you believe that the European Community and the United States of America can do something together to speed things up?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would first like to see the text of Castro's letter. We do not yet have the text in hand [which we must] before I can really decide.

*Q. Would that—the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola—have a positive effect on U.S.-Cuban relations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When the Cuban troops are completely withdrawn, that can have a positive effect.

*Q. [Addressed to Prime Minister Thorn.] Were there any bilateral problems in your talks with Secretary Kissinger?*

*Prime Minister Thorn:* We had no time to create bilateral problems; I mean to conjure them up from nothing. Our discussions were concerned primarily with international world problems, about European Community and U.S. relations. As I can judge them, being the Acting President of the Community, European Community-U.S. relations are excellent and much better than they were a few years ago. We hope to be able to show evidence of this in Nairobi.

*Q. What points of agreement are there between the European Community and United States on Middle Eastern policy?*

*Prime Minister Thorn:* There are still several developments we are awaiting, and I think that in order to help these along we should perhaps avoid publicity at the moment.

#### INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER FOR CBS, LONDON, MAY 25

Press release 275 dated May 25

*Mr. Bernard Kalb:* Mr. Secretary, can you tell us the circumstances of the note that we have read about that Sweden provided to you on Cuba?

*Secretary Kissinger:* When I met with Prime Minister Palme, he read me a communication he had received from Castro, in which Castro indicated that Cuba was going to withdraw at the rate of 200 a week. It was not clear from this communication whether the withdrawal had already started or was imminent, and it was not clear to what point—down to what point they would withdraw. But the implication was that all of the forces would be withdrawn. If this is true—we are checking it out at this moment—and if we can obtain confirmation of it, it would be a positive development and a result in part of our insistence and pressure we have been bringing on this point together with friendly African countries.

*Mr. Kalb:* Mr. Secretary, does the U.S. position remain total withdrawal of all Cuban

*troops, or will you settle for something less than that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, our position is total withdrawal of all Cuban troops. If it is a question of advisers in technical fields, that is a different matter. But all organized Cuban troops should be withdrawn.

*Mr. Kalb:* *Mr. Secretary, did the Soviet Union play any role in bringing about this development?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not been able to assess as yet exactly what the development means, and therefore we want to caution against going too far with it. We do not know what role the Soviet Union played, though we had some indications earlier from them that they were thinking in the same direction. But we cannot be sure who influenced it.

*Mr. Kalb:* *Mr. Secretary, why do you think Cuba has taken this action?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think Cuba has had to recognize that its relationship with the United States was deteriorating to a serious point, that we were determined to prevent any further military adventures. And also that other African states agreed with our policy that African development should be left to African nations and should not be determined by outside forces. I think all of these factors came together.

*Mr. Kalb:* *Do you think, sir, that it is the new American policy toward Africa that helped prod Cuba in this direction?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think the new African policy contributed importantly and certainly gained us a great deal of support in Africa. I think it was a factor.

#### **STATEMENT BEFORE CENTO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, LONDON, MAY 26**

Press release 272 dated May 25

Mr. Secretary General [Umit H. Bayülken, of Turkey], Ministers, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen: It

is a pleasure for me to meet again with my colleagues, the Ministers of the nations joined in this organization and dedicated to common action for peace.

History shows that changing conditions are a test of the solidarity of alliances. This association has met this test. It has proven its durability; the range of issues on our common agenda has expanded, not diminished, over the decades. Our experience demonstrates that traditional friendships can become more significant and more valued amid change and challenge. President Ford has asked me to convey to you the continuing commitment of the United States to work with you for our common security and well-being and for the security and well-being of mankind.

My country, Mr. Secretary General, celebrates this year the Bicentennial of its independence. And we are engaged as well in the great democratic enterprise of our Presidential election.

Our electoral process affords full play to competition and debate. It gives no rewards for reticence; it therefore seems to emphasize divisions. But our Bicentennial reminds us of the deeper reality. It is, in its essence, a celebration of the remarkable continuity of the American nation. The fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy have been constant for the past 30 years, through all Administrations, and they will remain constant.

The American people have learned the lessons of history. They are committed to a permanent, active, and responsible American role in the world. They are dedicated to standing by our friends and allies; they are determined to resist aggression; they deeply believe in the moral necessity of building a more stable peace; they are prepared to cooperate in the dialogue between industrial and developing countries for promoting human progress. These basic objectives are permanent interests of the United States. They will not be diminished; they will not change; they will be reaffirmed.

The main lines of U.S. policy are clear.

First is our commitment to solidarity with

our allies and friends. America's partners in the world comprise many nations of different stages of development, cultures, and political structures. But we have in common a determination to collaborate to insure against external domination and to cooperate in many positive ways for the greater well-being of our peoples. The American people regard these friendships and alliances as our most valuable assets in our foreign relations.

Three NATO members are represented here. The United States is gratified at the close collaboration that exists today among all the major industrial nations of the Atlantic community and Japan, which is so crucial to the maintenance of the balance of power and the world's hopes for economic advance. I have just come from a ministerial meeting of the Atlantic alliance in Oslo, where our solidarity on all the basic issues facing us was strongly reaffirmed. Our sense of common purpose has never been stronger. Our peoples have shown a continuing appreciation of the need to enhance our common defense. Our efforts to reduce tensions are reflected in coordinated policies. And our collective economic recovery is well underway, reminding us all of how global interdependence can be an engine of common prosperity if we manage our affairs with wisdom and dedication.

This organization, CENTO, embodies similar principles. The countries assembled here are interested in the stability and economic progress of a pivotal region of the world. The strategic importance of this area has never been greater. The United States reaffirms its continuing interest in the security and progress of this region.

Peace rests fundamentally on an equilibrium of strength. The United States will stand by its friends. It accepts no spheres of influence. It will not yield to pressure. It will continue to be a reliable partner to those who defend their freedom against foreign intervention or intimidation.

The second enduring principle of U.S. foreign policy is a commitment to use our strength to promote a secure peace and the reduction of tensions.

We shall never forget that in a world of intercontinental missiles and thermonuclear weapons, building a firmer foundation for peace must be the inescapable imperative of all our action. In this age the very survival of mankind depends upon nurturing among nations fragile habits of restraint, negotiation, peaceful resolution of differences, and striving to transform present conflicts in time into a structure of cooperation. We owe our children a future based on something more secure than a balance of terror constantly contested. The nuclear powers, above all, have a responsibility for self-restraint; they owe it not only to their own people but to mankind. This is why the United States, while striving for an easing of tensions, cannot accept selective relaxation of tensions. Peace is indivisible; claims to coexistence in one part of the world cannot be coupled with disruptive conduct in another.

History is replete with the tragedies of the breakdown of world order. In the nuclear age, the scale of potential catastrophe staggers the imagination. But the potentiality of statesmanship, of creative diplomacy and peacemaking, is equally great. If we act confidently—with a courage worthy of the ideals we defend and represent—we have it within our means to shape the world's peace, and our own.

So we will not succumb to a sentimentality that seeks to found peace on good intentions alone. Nor will we confuse policy with a posturing which leaves man's tremendous capacities for destruction in the service of no positive conception. We will pursue a steady course, guided by our ideals and our interests striving for a more peaceful and secure world, always mindful of the security and concerns of our allies and others who rely on us.

In the CENTO region, a hopeful evolution has taken place in the last year toward more peaceful relations. We applaud these efforts.

Pakistan has moved imaginatively and effectively to improve relations with her neighbors. We welcome this. The United States has a continuing interest in the security and territorial integrity of Pakistan.



We will continue to strengthen our cooperation with Pakistan bilaterally as well as within the CENTO framework. At the same time, we support all efforts to reduce tensions, restore normalcy, and advance the prospects for secure and peaceful economic development in the region.

We are impressed as well by Iran's initiatives to expand ties of friendship and cooperation with her neighbors. Iran plays a key role in regional stability and has acted with statesmanship. It has made major efforts to provide for its security and at the same time to promote rapid economic development, on which its security and the well-being of its people must rest in the long run. Iran has also been generous in sharing its resources with others, especially on a regional basis. The United States values its traditional friendship with Iran.

Thirdly, the United States and Turkey signed in March a defense cooperation agreement underlining the importance we attach to this longstanding friendship and to overcoming the difficulties of the recent past. For the solidarity of NATO, we will continue to urge our two allies Turkey and Greece to resolve the differences between them. We hope to see early progress on the constitutional and territorial issues on Cyprus in ways that meet the economic and security requirements of the two communities and respect their dignity. We hope to see the disputes over the Aegean peacefully resolved. These steps are essential to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Europe as well.

The Middle East, an area of special concern to CENTO, has also seen hopeful developments. We should not let the present ferment and turmoil in the area or the temporary interruption of the negotiating process obscure either what has been accomplished or the opportunities for further progress. Step-by-step diplomacy brought significant results, including the Sinai agreement last September. The time is approaching when new impetus must be given to movement toward an overall peace.

The United States remains dedicated to

helping achieve a just and lasting peace in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 338. We look to all parties to show dedication and willingness to take risks for peace. We are actively exploring the most fruitful possibilities for renewing the negotiating process.

Unfortunately the tragedy of Lebanon has preoccupied the attention of many of the parties in the Middle East. We hope the election of a new Lebanese President will begin the necessary process of reconciliation within Lebanon and among those in the area who wish Lebanon well. The continuing toll of death and destruction in Lebanon must end, for the sake of Lebanon and her suffering people and also for the sake of peace and stability in the entire region. The United States supports the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of Lebanon and continues to urge outside powers to practice the utmost restraint in an already difficult situation.

The third permanent principle of U.S. policy is a commitment to build international economic cooperation to promote prosperity, development, economic justice, and social progress for all nations. The world's economic concerns have come to the forefront of international diplomacy. In their scale and complexity, these issues mock the efforts of any single nation or group of nations to solve them in isolation. In the last quarter of the 20th century the world community has the technical capacity to work a massive transformation of the quality of life in every region of the globe. Hunger, disease, illiteracy, degradation—decisive steps can be taken in mankind's age-old struggle against these scourges. They wait only on our collective political will and determined decision.

The United States has pledged itself to major efforts for reform and assistance if we are met in a spirit of mutual respect. Last September at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly, we worked for multilateral consensus on a comprehensive program of action on trade, investment, technology, and the special plight of the poorest nations. We have carried these efforts

further in the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation last December, and three weeks ago at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi. Many of our proposals have already been implemented. We shall continue in all these fields of endeavor.

This organization includes both consumers and producers of energy, both industrial nations and developing nations severely affected by the recent crisis in energy. This continues to be an important issue on the international agenda. It affects all of us. The United States is convinced that the interdependence of the global economy compels, from all of us, an unprecedented commitment to multilateral cooperation. The world is beginning to understand that amid all the diversity and multiplicity of states, we are dependent on a single global economic system which makes us prosper or suffer together. The rhetoric of conflict, the doctrines of struggle, have nothing to offer save a contest without issue. Reality makes our economic problems common problems, and our moral convictions compel us to engage ourselves in their practical solution.

The last decade has shown conclusively that only the industrial democracies have the resources or the managerial skill to promote sustained development. They must cooperate with each other and with the developing countries to shape a better future. Extraordinary cooperative steps have been taken in a few short months in a series of international forums. The United States will make every effort to maintain this momentum and accelerate it.

Mr. Secretary General, the nations participating in the Central Treaty Organization have an important responsibility in all of these areas: maintaining our solidarity, promoting peace and reduction of tension, and fostering international economic cooperation.

I want to pay special tribute to the energy and imagination you have brought to CENTO as our Secretary General. Our alliance is unique in the diversity of its members and in the enduring partnership we have enjoyed through many changing conditions. CENTO

has been a forum for intimate discussions, an instrument of common action, and a symbol of independent nations' determination to remain free.

At last year's meeting in Ankara, I stated the continuing commitment of the United States: "We will remain fully engaged because of our own self-interest, because of the responsibility our wealth and power confer upon us, and because only by standing by our friends can we be true to the values of freedom that have brought progress and hope to our people." These are the values my country celebrates in its Bicentennial year, and they will be the principles of our policy in the decades to come.

## **Security Council Debates Situation in Occupied Arab Territories**

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative William W. Scranton on May 26, together with the text of a Security Council majority statement read out that day by Louis de Guiringaud, Representative of France and President of the Council for the month of May.*

### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON**

USUN press release 59 dated May 26

First may I say that the statement which I am about to make clearly indicates I believe that the United States of America is not unrelentingly supporting "Zionist aggression," nor is it making its position because of internal matters within the United States but, rather, because it believes thoroughly that in any matter that comes before this Council it is important that we have a balanced answer, particularly as this Council is instructed through the charter of our great organization first and foremost to be thinking of peace.

Mr. President, my delegation has dissociated itself from the statement you have read out which represents the view of the



majority of the Council's members. As you know from views that my government has expressed on past occasions in this chamber and elsewhere, there is much in the statement of the majority view with which we could agree.

We agree, for example, that the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967. We believe in the importance of following its prescriptions. In fact, we made our position on this question clear during the March deliberations in this Council. From the unanimous agreement, therefore, of this Council that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the occupied territories, it follows that all of its provisions apply. We also agree that Israel should scrupulously comply with all the provisions of that convention. Our position about the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is similarly well known.

We are concerned, however, that the statement of the majority view lacks balance, and it is the element of balance which should be the hallmark of the deliberations of a body charged, as this one is, with maintaining the peace.

While the summary statement does contain references to certain provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention describing the obligations of an occupying power, there is no corresponding reference in the statement to those provisions of the convention which explicitly recognize that the occupying power has the duty to maintain law and order and the right to protect its forces. We object, furthermore, to the fact that the statement is unrelieved by any recognition of the many areas in which Israeli administration of the occupied territories has been responsible and just, as in its administration of the holy places in Jerusalem and in its substantial efforts to permit the population to choose their own elected representatives to local government.

In particular, we believe the statement's

sweeping injunction to Israel to rescind measures is out of place in this context and at this time.

Having said this, however, and having disassociated ourselves from the view of the majority, we would be remiss if we did not call the attention of the Government of Israel to the fact that there are aspects of its policies in the occupied territories, in particular that involving the establishment of settlements, that are increasingly a matter of concern and distress to its friends throughout the world and are not helpful to the process of peace. Israel has ample reason, with the experience of recent years, to feel that this Council too seldom approaches the Middle East problem with objectivity. It would be mistaken, however, to dismiss as products of blind partisanship all the points contained in the statement read out in this chamber today.

#### **SECURITY COUNCIL MAJORITY STATEMENT**

Following the request submitted by Egypt on 3 May 1976, the Security Council held seven meetings between 4 and 26 May to consider the situation in the occupied Arab territories. After consulting all the members, the President of the Security Council concludes that the majority of the members agreed on the following:

Grave anxiety was expressed over the present situation in the occupied Arab territories; concern was also expressed about the well-being of the population of these territories.

The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The occupying Power was therefore called upon to comply strictly with the provisions of that Convention and to refrain from and rescind any measure that would violate them. In this regard, the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories that alter their demographic composition or geographical nature and particularly the establishment of settlements were accordingly deplored. Such measures, which cannot prejudice the outcome of the search for the establishment of peace, constitute an obstacle to peace.

The Security Council should continue to follow the situation closely.



## U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-Syria Sector Extended

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative William W. Scranton on May 28.*

USUN press release 60 dated May 28

Having had the opportunity to comment on other aspects of the situation in the Middle East both in the March Security Council debate and the debate which closed just a couple of days ago, I shall confine my remarks to the proposition that is immediately before us.

This is the first time that I have participated in Security Council deliberations renewing a peacekeeping force in the Middle East. Let me say that I do so today with the greatest pleasure, and for two reasons:

First of all, the United States believes that the continuation of the peacekeeping forces in the Middle East is an essential element in maintaining a stable environment which allows efforts toward an overall peace settlement to proceed. Consequently, we commend the Syrian Government for its statesmanlike decision to allow UNDOF [U.N. Disengagement Observer Force] to be renewed for a further six-month period and, equally, the welcome concurrence of the Government of Israel in the renewal of the force. While the presence of UNDOF on the Golan Heights is not an end in itself, positive steps between the parties involved would be much less likely if the force were to be withdrawn. I would like to interpret the continuation of UNDOF forces for another six months as a sign that the parties intend to pursue the road to peace.<sup>1</sup>

And second, this meeting provides an opportunity to comment on the conduct and the

effectiveness of the force itself. UNDOF is a continuing credit to the United Nations, to the officers and the men who serve with UNDOF, and to those in the U.N. Secretariat who are responsible for UNDOF's operation. The cease-fire between Israel and Syria has been well maintained. There have been no serious incidents and no loss of life in the period that is covered by this report.<sup>2</sup> On behalf of my government I would like to commend all those who are associated with UNDOF for the contribution they make and are making to the pursuit of peace.

Finally, Mr. President, last but by no means least, I would like to express to our Secretary General the deep appreciation of my government for his efforts over the past few days—indeed, over the past months and years—to improve the possibilities for peace in the Middle East.

### TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Environmental Cooperation

Agreement regarding monitoring of the stratosphere. Done at Paris May 5, 1976. Entered into force May 5, 1976.

*Signatures:* France, United Kingdom, United States, May 5, 1976.

#### Labor

Instrument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Done at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 20, 1948.

*Admission to membership:* Papua New Guinea, May 1, 1976.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. S/12083, "Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period 25 November 1975 to 24 May 1976."

<sup>1</sup> In a resolution (S/RES/390 (1976)) adopted on May 28 by a vote of 13 to 0 (the People's Republic of China and Libya did not participate in the voting), the Security Council decided "To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months."

## Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* New Zealand, April 27, 1976.

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.

*Accession deposited:* Tunisia, May 4, 1976.

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.<sup>2</sup>

*Accessions deposited:* New Zealand, April 27, 1976; Tunisia, May 4, 1976.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* New Zealand, April 27, 1976.

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Tunisia, May 4, 1976.

## Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London November 2, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Tunisia, May 4, 1976.

## Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratifications deposited:* Mauritius, June 2, 1976; Morocco, June 3, 1976; South Africa, May 28, 1976.

## BILATERAL

### Costa Rica

Loan agreement to assist Costa Rica in a national nutrition program, with annex. Signed at San José April 26, 1976. Entered into force April 26, 1976.

### Egypt

Grant agreement relating to technology transfer and manpower development. Signed at Cairo April 22, 1976. Entered into force April 22, 1976.

Agreement concerning claims of nationals of the United States, with agreed minute and related notes. Signed at Cairo May 1, 1976. Enters into force upon exchange of notes stating each government's final approval.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 28, 1975 (TIAS 8201). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo May 4, 1976. Entered into force May 4, 1976.

### Haiti

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of March 22, 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince May 14 and 17, 1976. Entered into force May 17, 1976.

### India

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at New Delhi May 3, 1976. Entered into force May 3, 1976.

### Morocco

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Rabat May 17, 1976. Entered into force May 17, 1976.

### Pakistan

Loan agreement relating to the provision of technical services and equipment required to enable Pakistan to qualify for and manage foreign investment capital, with annex. Signed at Islamabad April 8, 1976. Entered into force April 8, 1976.

### Romania

Agreement on maritime transport, with related letters. Signed at Washington June 4, 1976. Entered into force June 4, 1976.

### Syria

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 20, 1976. Effected by exchange of letters at Damascus May 11 and 16, 1976. Entered into force May 16, 1976.

### Venezuela

Statement of understanding relating to educational cooperation. Signed at Caracas May 7, 1976. Entered into force May 7, 1976.

### Yugoslavia

Agreement relating to interim arrangements for scheduled air services and amending the non-scheduled air service agreement of September 27, 1973 (TIAS 7819). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 14, 1976. Entered into force May 14, 1976.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†278	6/1	U.S. statement at final plenary session of UNCTAD IV, Nairobi, May 31.
†279	6/1	Kissinger, Simon: joint statement on UNCTAD IV.
*280	6/3	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on radio communications, June 29.
†281	6/4	U.S.-Ireland understanding on air service operation.
*282	6/4	National Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, June 23-24.
*283	6/4	Food experts of 17 nations to discuss ways of improving food systems.
†284	6/4	Kissinger: news conference following meeting, U.N. Headquarters, New York.
†285	6/6	Kissinger: arrival, Santo Domingo.
*286	6/6	Kissinger: remarks, President Balaguer's office, Santo Domingo.
†287	6/6	Kissinger: toast, Santo Domingo.
†288	6/6	Kissinger: press conference, Santo Domingo.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.