THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for NBC "Today" Show

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger at Washington on May 15 by Barbara Walters, which was broadcast on the NBC "Today" show on May 17.

Press release 248 dated May 16

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, how do you feel knowing that you are the target of criticism for a whole segment of the Republican Party? How do you feel knowing that you are considered a liability?

Secretary Kissinger: Foreign policy is an important aspect of the lives of Americans, and most Secretaries of State have been the subject of attack at one point or another. I do not look at my task as a political one. I have to do the best I can for peace and the economic progress of the United States, and I cannot worry about particular political attacks.

Miss Walters: Doesn't it ever get to you personally? It has been an awful lot.

Secretary Kissinger: My father, who collects news clips on me, indicates that he would prefer getting different ones than the ones he has been receiving. I would prefer more unanimity, but I can live with what is going on.

Miss Walters: If President Ford is re-elected, would you stay on as Secretary of State?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to tie the conduct of foreign policy to me personally. If a foreign policy is well designed, then it should be able to be carried out by many people.

So, on the whole, I would prefer not to stay.

On the other hand, I do not want to say today, when I do not know the circumstances that exist, the necessities that the President may feel he has, that I won't even listen to him; but on the whole I would prefer to leave.

Miss Walters: One of the most controversial matters concerning you has been the report in the Woodward and Bernstein book "The Final Days" that Richard Nixon, in those last days, asked you to get down on your knees and pray with him. Woodward and Bernstein say that this is true, that you told aides of the incident. Is it true or false?

Secretary Kissinger: I have taken the position that I would not comment on incidents in the Woodward and Bernstein book. The last week of President Nixon's incumbency was a very tragic, personal experience for a man who had gone through a great deal of travail and with whom I had worked closely.

I do not believe that the authors understood the complexity of human motivations in all the accounts they give of various incidents, but I do not want to go into the details of what was a very difficult and a much more complicated period.

Miss Walters: I have to pursue this, Mr. Secretary, because this is such a telling point. As far as the motivations, that is something one can have disagreement about, but as to whether an incident occurred, when there are only two people who would know it, one being the President and one being the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State refuses to say whether it is accurate or not, leaving aside the motivations, I think it is very hard for an audience to understand why.

Secretary Kissinger: Because I believe that

for me—if I start going into one event, I have to go into all events.

Miss Walters: Well, that is the major one.

Secretary Kissinger: If I go into all events, I will then have to write my perceptions of the history of that period. I simply believe that it is not appropriate for me, for somebody who had such close experience, now to go into essentially personal matters on television or anywhere else.

Miss Walters: Is the book essentially accurate?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the rendition of the sequence of events, insofar as I know it, it was essentially accurate. Many other aspects of the book I consider factually inaccurate.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, another point of controversy about you stems from the statement allegedly made by you to Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations.

In his book, he quotes you as saying that in 1970 you said, "The United States has passed its historic high point. It is on a down hill. My job is to negotiate the second-best position for the United States available before the Soviet Union and the United States both perceive these changes in balance have occurred." Did you ever say anything like this?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the statement is totally untrue. Admiral Zumwalt alleges that I made this statement on a train going to an Army-Navy football game. Now, if anybody has ever been on a train going to an Army-Navy football game, you cannot imagine that a group of admirals and advisers to the President sit together and discuss the relationship of Athens to Sparta and whether that is a particularly good audience to which to say the United States has passed its zenith. Nor when you go to an Army-Navy football game with the Chief of Naval Operations do you expect that he then writes a memorandum of conversation, God knows how many days or weeks later, of his recollection of what may or may not have been said. I did not say it. It is not my view.

Our policy has never been conducted on that assumption. Our policy assumes that the United States can achieve its purposes in this world and can work for peace without giving up its values or interests.

Miss Walters: You also supposedly said to Admiral Zumwalt, "The American people lack the will to do the things necessary to achieve strategic parity and to maintain superiority." Is that incorrect?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think Admiral Zumwalt is running for the Senate in Virginia against somebody who is not called Kissinger, but I am not sure he has yet fully understood this. I do not believe that the United States lacks the will to achieve strategic parity. I have supported, since I have come here, every budget recommended by the Defense Department. I believe we have strategic parity. I believe we can maintain it. We have suffered no setback anywhere in the world ever for lack of strength.

Miss Walters: There has been much talk about the fact that your trip to Africa might have hurt President Ford's chances in the primaries in several southern states. One member of the Ford election committee is quoted in Newsweek magazine as saying, "Sending Kissinger to Africa to be the black man's brother right before three southern primaries was insane." Couldn't you have taken this trip later, after the primaries?

Secretary Kissinger: I wasn't sent to Africa, first of all, to be anybody's brother. I was sent to Africa to prevent a conflagration in the southern part of Africa and to see whether the Communist influence from the Soviet Union and Cuba could be checked and a hopeful evolution could be started. Now, as for my trip—

Miss Walters: Couldn't you have done it after the Texas primary, for example?

Secretary Kissinger: It is my responsibility as Secretary of State to recommend to the

President the best timing. The timing was dictated by these factors: There was a meeting in Nairobi—an international meeting in Nairobi—which I wanted to address on behalf of the President and the Administration, about international developments; secondly, several of the key leaders of Africa whom I had to see on this problem were leaving for the month of May on various trips they had already planned. This is why I picked the period.

The President and I went over this in great detail. As in all other things, he personally approved every proposal that I made. I briefed the Cabinet two weeks before I went, in the presence of all of the political experts, and nobody said this was a bad, inopportune time to go. I don't believe it is my obligation as Secretary of State to introduce political considerations into the conduct of foreign policy.

The President decided that this was the right time to go, and I think he deserves a great deal of credit for focusing on the substance of foreign policy and not gearing it to the weekly primaries that are taking place.

Panama Canal Negotiations

Miss Walters: How do you feel about the controversy over the Panama Canal?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, it has to be understood that these negotiations on the Panama Canal are not something that was invented recently. The negotiations on the Panama Canal have been going on for 12 years, they have been conducted by three different Presidents, and they have been conducted by three different Presidents because each of them came to the conclusion that he had an obligation to see whether it was possible to assure the safe and neutral passage of ships of all nations, including, of course, of the United States, through the Panama Canal without alienating all of Latin America.

Up to this moment, not one line of an agreement has even been put down on paper. After such an agreement exists, which is—I don't know—certainly not imminent, after such an agreement exists, one-third and one member of the Senate can block it. We need a two-thirds vote in the Senate to ratify. Before we conclude it, we will discuss it in full detail with both Houses of the Congress.

There is no question of giving up the Panama Canal. The issue is whether our interests in the Panama Canal should be maintained under conditions of constant political tension with the entire Western Hemisphere or whether we can bring about a safer and better arrangement.

If necessary, we will defend the Panama Canal. When we defend the Panama Canal, we want to be able to tell the American people that we've made every effort to achieve a better arrangement. And we cannot agree to the proposition that a President should not even make that exploration and should not even engage in a negotiation to see what is possible. Which is all that is going on at this moment.

Miss Walters: If there should be a war over the Panama Canal, we would send troops?

Secretary Kissinger: If we have to defend the Panama Canal, we will defend it. And that will depend whether we can get the terms we consider essential for our security.

Preventing Further Intervention in Africa

Miss Walters: Cuba. You warned Cuba against further intervention in Africa.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Miss Walters: Well, suppose Cuba doesn't take your warning. Suppose it sends troops to Rhodesia. What will the United States do?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, our African policy is designed to avert this eventuality.

Miss Walters: But suppose.

Secretary Kissinger: If Cuba—I have said it repeatedly—if Cuba engages in further military adventures, it will raise the gravest question for the United States. I said it be-

fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee only last week. I have said it publicly—

Miss Walters: But what? Troops? Would we send troops? We have given these warnings, and a lot of people say "Fine, Mr. Secretary. You give these warnings, but you know, what specifically are you talking about?"

Secretary Kissinger: What we would do and where we would do it, I don't think we should discuss now, and I don't believe that the danger is imminent. I believe that we can avert the problem. But if the Cubans engage in military adventures in Africa, it can only be as surrogates of the Soviet Union, and if that happens, we are facing a serious international crisis, which we would then discuss fully with the Congress, explain fully to the American public, but toward which this Administration will certainly not be indifferent.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, earlier in this interview we talked about the vague possibility, but still the possibility, that there might be a war, a battle over Panama. And you said if there were that we would fight, that we would send troops—

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Miss Walters: Now if you say it about one part of the world, I would think you would be willing to say it about another. If Cuba should intervene and send troops into Rhodesia, would there be the possibility of our sending troops?

Secretary Kissinger: I would think that it is a problem that can be dealt with without sending troops to Africa, but I also believe that it is the primary objective of our foreign policy to prevent this from happening, and I am confident that we can prevent it, or at least I hope very much that we can prevent it from happening.

Miss Walters: The way you answer that question makes me want to ask, are you then talking about taking some direct action in Cuba?

Secretary Kissinger: Barbara, I think it would be extremely unwise for me to say what we will do in circumstances that have not yet arisen, on which we have not made any final decisions, and I must warn, I can only warn, any country, any outside power that thinks of military adventures in Africa that it would not be taken lightly in the United States.

Miss Walters: Realistically, Mr. Secretary, how can we support the black majority while protecting the white minority? If fighting breaks out, the probability is that we would not commit troops. So, what leverage do we have?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem in Africa before my trip was that war in southern Africa had already started, that we had seen in other parts of Africa that if these operations continued to gain momentum, the danger of Soviet and Cuban intervention would multiply and that therefore we would see more and more external intervention and the radicalization of a continent upon which we depend for 30 to 60 percent of our imports of critical materials, and Europe and Japan from 60 to 90 percent of some of their critical materials like manganese, cobalt, and similar items.

The United States is attempting to deflect this into a peaceful path and to give the nations in the area a moderate alternative and to give the black and white communities an opportunity to work out their destinies through negotiation with each other.

The leverage we have is, if we can promise them, or if we can indicate progress and hope rather than conflict, that perhaps all of the parties will conclude that negotiation is preferable to bloodshed.

Possibilities for Middle East Negotiations

Miss Walters: And we turn our attention to the Middle East. Prime Minister Rabin said this week that he thought that it might be possible to have negotiations with Syria during this year to end the state of war. He

said they would need the help of a third nation; that is probably the United States. Now, is that the next step—negotiation with Syria?

Secretary Kissinger: We are prepared to be helpful in whatever forum the parties can agree to. Until recently, Syria has taken the position that it would not negotiate separately, but only together with other Arab countries. When Prime Minister Rabin was here in the United States last February, we agreed on certain procedures that could be followed and certain proposals that could be made. We began exploring these ideas with various Arab governments, when the situation in Lebanon erupted to a point that it absorbed all of the energies of all of the parties and therefore the process of exploration has been interrupted since the end of March, not because it has been—not because there have been any conclusive answers yet. I believe that as the situation in Lebanon settles down, it will be possible to begin this process of exploration again.

In this, Israel indicated it was prepared to proceed on all fronts simultaneously in return for a certain progress toward ending the state of war. We have, as I said, had no conclusive answers. If that approach does not work, then we will have to talk to the parties again, about either the possibility of separate negotiations or some other framework for all of the negotiations.

Miss Walters: Well, there seems to be such a stalemate, this past fall. Now, with this possibility of conversation with Syria, it seems that something has happened. Has something? Or is this just wishful thinking?

Secretary Kissinger: In the Middle East, things usually oscillate between excessive optimism and excessive pessimism. And they always go through periods of stalemate in which all parties feel each other out and come to an understanding of the limits of their possibilities. I believe that progress toward peace in the Middle East is possible. I believe that the chief elements for it exist and that it is only a question of time before the momentum starts again.

Miss Walters: The first time you and I did an interview together—it was eight years ago—and I asked you if you thought the crisis in the Middle East would be over in 10 years, and you said, "Yes." That gives us two more years to go.

Secretary Kissinger: Three more years.

Miss Walters: I don't add. That is one of my problems. Three more years to go.

Secretary Kissinger: I think in three more years we can have made very substantial progress toward peace, or achieved peace.

Miss Walters: Do you think we may have peace in three years?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it's possible.

Discussions With North Viet-Nam

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, turning to Viet-Nam. Are you surprised that there was no bloodbath there as was predicted?

Secretary Kissinger: I am gratified that in Viet-Nam itself there has not been a bloodbath, although in Cambodia there has been horrendous suffering and hundreds of thousands killed and by any definition there has been a terrible bloodbath in Cambodia. We don't know yet what is going to happen in Viet-Nam. It is only a year since Saigon fell, and the process of assimilation has only started. But we would be very pleased if the loss of life and suffering in Viet-Nam would have finally stopped.

Miss Walters: When do you think the United States will recognize the Government of Viet-Nam? What would it take for us to do that?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the issue between us and Viet-Nam is the accounting for missing in action and full accounting for the remains of Americans who were shot down over Viet-Nam or otherwise killed in Viet-Nam. This is the absolute precondition without which we cannot consider the nor-

malization of relations. All our talks with the North Vietnamese up to this point have concentrated, I would say, almost exclusively on the subject of the Americans missing in action, and only as we make progress on that can we begin other diplomatic conversations.

Miss Walters: Are you making progress?

Secretary Kissinger: So far we have not made any progress, no.

Miss Walters: Why?

Secretary Kissinger: Because the North Vietnamese believe they can blackmail us by using the remains of Americans to extort economic and other aid, and we will not be blackmailed by the American suffering, and we will not attach any conditions to the missing in action.

Miss Walters: China. Have you had any contact, have you had any word through the Chinese envoys in this country that the policy and the relationships with the United States are the same since the new government in China has taken place?

Secretary Kissinger: All indications are that the relations between us and China have not been affected by the domestic changes in the People's Republic, and every conversation that American officials or other Americans have had in China has confirmed this.

Miss Walters: Do you have any plans, or would you like to go back to China now and meet the new leader?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it's been an annual event. But I think I should wait until our own domestic turmoil has calmed down a bit.

Miss Walters: Can you imagine yourself going before, let's say, November or January?

Secretary Kissinger: I can imagine myself going before January, but not so easily before November.

Miss Walters: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

President Giscard d'Estaing of France Visits the United States

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of the French Republic, made a state visit to the United States May 17–22. While in Washington May 17–18, he met with President Ford and other government officials and addressed a joint meeting of the Congress. Following are remarks by President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing made at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn at the White House on May 17.[1]

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 24

PRESIDENT FORD

Mr. President, Madame Giscard d'Estaing, ladies and gentlemen: On behalf of the American people, Mrs. Ford and I are very delighted to welcome you to the White House.

Mr. President, you have come to the United States at a very historic time—the celebration of the 200th anniversary of our independence. Your visit is a very special and a very fitting gesture by France, which two centuries ago sent her sons as well as her treasure to help an infant republic win its independence.

In the last two decades of the 18th century, the world was transformed by the American and the French Revolutions. Who could have predicted that these two new republics, who came together in their infancy to establish freedom and independence, 200 years later would remain steadfast friends and allies, still depending and still defending these same ideals.

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[1] For exchanges of toasts between President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing at a White House dinner on May 17 and at a French Embassy dinner on May 18 and their remarks at the opening performance of the sound and light program at Mount Vernon on May 19, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 24, 1976, pp. 905, 908, and 913; for President Giscard d'Estaing's address before a joint meeting of the Congress, see Congressional Record of May 18, 1976, p. H 4484.

As in 1776 and 1789, our nations continue to champion liberty and democracy. We cooperate in peace as we have in war to preserve our revolutionary heritage of freedom. We welcome you today with the warm recollection, Mr. President, of France's aid to a struggling young republic.

Within the past 30 years, the number of independent nations has nearly doubled. As each new nation has declared its independence and set its political course, the world has become much more complex, more interdependent, and demands from us ever greater in wisdom in the conduct of our foreign relations.

In such a world, the French-American relationship—entering its third century—stands out as an enduring symbol of common dedication to freedom, to the rights of man, and to the increased well-being of our peoples in a more peaceful and prosperous international environment.

Mr. President, the longstanding and close relationship between the United States and France has never been more important. In dealing with formidable economic, security, and political challenges facing all democracies today, close cooperation is more crucial than ever. We can successfully meet these challenges, Mr. President.

Speaking for the American people, I salute the role of France in strengthening international economic cooperation and French contributions to international efforts to deal with the problems of energy, inflation, food, and financial pressures.

We have many, many important issues to talk about, Mr. President, and I look forward to these talks in full confidence that they will contribute significantly to political and economic stability in the world.

Mr. President, Americans are most appreciative of the generous and thoughtful ways France has chosen to honor our Bicentennial. I know that your visits, Mr. President, to American towns and cities and your participation in Bicentennial ceremonies at hallowed landmarks of our Revolution will further strengthen the traditional and enduring friendship between the United States of America and France.

Mr. President, Madame Giscard d'Estaing, America bids you a most cordial welcome.

PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING

Mr. President, I feel especially fortunate to be the President of France to whom it falls to come and celebrate with you the Bicentennial of your independence:

First, in calling to mind the imagination, initiative, and courage of those great men whose successors we are and who on both sides of the Atlantic launched the idea of liberty, first here in 1776 and then echoed by France in 1789.

Secondly, because in the course of these two centuries our two countries have remained friends. This example is perhaps unique in history. We are fully aware of the role you played in defending our liberty. The French people have not forgotten; they thank you for it.

The real secret of our understanding springs from the principle which inspired it. Both countries have shown without a break, and sometimes in dramatic circumstances, an identical passion for independence and liberty.

Today, two centuries later, this principle remains at the center of the world's problems—the independence of peoples and the freedom of men. This is the reason why I have come to tell you, Mr. President, that the France of 1976 is as much committed to the struggle in the defense of liberty as she was, along your side, two centuries ago.

My sincere wish is that this Bicentennial meeting should be for our two countries, for the United States and for France, a festival of liberty—that principle of democratic liberty that will, if we have the determination, will continue to shape the destiny of the world.

Long live the United States and the great people of America.

Preparing for a Human Community

Address by John Richardson, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs [1]

We are met here today in observance of two anniversaries: the 30th birthday of the program in international educational exchange begun in 1946 through the foresight, imagination, and energy of Senator J. William Fulbright and the 200th anniversary of the United States. We are met to commemorate an initiative which has been, in the words of the late and distinguished British historian Arnold Toynbee—a man who thought, above all, of the global community —"one of the really generous and imaginative things that have been done in the world since World War II."

And we are met here, too, because most of us surely realize that our common goal of mutual understanding is both in jeopardy and more crucial than ever before to our common purpose.

I refer to our gathering as one of commemoration rather than of celebration; for it seems appropriate that our mood should be one of introspection, our task one of exploring shared experience, our goal one of defining new measures by which to discern the emerging global community, rather than a gathering of noise, fireworks, paper hats, and self-congratulations about supposed accomplishments. For while much has been accomplished toward mutual understanding, and thus there is much to celebrate, so much remains to be done that it is sober stock-taking rather than euphoria which should characterize our approach.

The same is true for this nation, let me add. Those who come to us from abroad may have been led to believe that our national Bicentennial is primarily a moment for enhancing our self-image, for the celebration of American power—even for the production of commercial objects from tin trays to imprinted balloons to American flags emblazoned on the back of cereal boxes. Some of this is real, of course, for we believe that we do have much to celebrate—and we have our own peculiar style of celebration.

But above and more lasting than the rhetoric and imagery of the occasion is a more important reality: this is a moment when many Americans are asking themselves what their nation's goals should be what its goals have been in the past, how far we have come in achieving those goals and how far yet we must go before we can genuinely celebrate the achievement.

There are many types of nations, and national goals may be expressed in many ways For the United States, our goals have been explicit, and they have long been on the record; for they are stated clearly in early American "scripture"—in the Declaration of Independence and the preamble to the Constitution of the United States.

You are met here, in part, to help us judge how far we have come in pursuit of those goals; to show us how we may still progress toward those goals, so they can continue to be, as in the past, a beacon for mankind; and to consider how education (and especially

[1] Made at Washington on May 18 before an international convocation sponsored by the Board of Foreign Scholarships in observance of the 30th anniversary of the Fulbright program.

international education) may contribute to the realization of humankind's unalienable rights.

I should like to suggest three themes I believe worthy of your attention. The first theme is about our national Bicentennial; the second is about the current realities of international education; the third is directed to the future.

Two Hundred Years of Shared History

Many of you are inclined to think of the United States as a young nation. Many Americans excuse our mistakes on the grounds of our alleged youth. Observers from abroad also continue to refer to the youthful American culture. It is not infrequently suggested that the American nation, while technologically advanced, is still in its social and intellectual infancy. Yet metaphors that compare nations to the growth stages of a human being are always misleading, for the growth of a nation is not a biological process, and in this instance to think of the United States as a young nation is particularly misleading.

In truth, the United States is, politically speaking, one of the oldest countries in the world. How many nations have survived for two centuries under the same constitution, the same form of governance, with which they began? While the far older *cultures* of Europe or Asia have been passing through their republics, empires, and dynasties, the United States has continued to function under the Constitution upon which it settled in 1788. Only Britain's constitutional system may be said to be older.

We are a young nation culturally, but we are by modern standards a very old nation indeed, politically. It is this remarkable continuity, the flexibility that made this continuity possible, and the stubborn pursuit of the goals originally stated that we celebrate as a nation this year. It is therefore in the context of maturity rather than the context of an alleged youthfulness that our deliberations should take place. If youth, it is an ageless youth we celebrate in this Bicentennial.

In this context, the United States has been engaged in educational exchange for 200 years. Only those nations that were the product of massive transplantations of people, of new settlements and moving frontiers, can be said to have exchanged so much education with others, for the very shaping of our history, as of the history of other settlement societies (such as Australia or Argentina or Canada or Brazil), has been a massive demonstration of the efficacy of educational exchange.

No other nation has received so large an influx of immigrants in relation to the original population as has the United States, and every act of immigration was an educational interchange. Each time a new settler sought to adjust to the new environment of that which was labeled the New World, both settler and the settlers here before him experienced educational exchange.

The American Revolution itself, drawing upon the ideas of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, of Rousseau and Montesquieu, was testimony to the transfer of ideas from one continent to another. In time, ideas would flow back to Europe, Asia, and Africa from the New World. As the American Constitution helped shape the Constitution of Belgium in 1830, as Alexis de Tocqueville took back from his American tour concepts that helped shape his vision of a new France, as the young G. K. van Hogendorp drafted the first constitution for the Netherlands after a visit to America, so too has the modern United States provided stimulation for ferment, change, and perhaps even new perspectives on goals to others of the world's peoples.

For the United States has not simply been a laboratory in which the impact of high technology upon society can be observed, as true as this also may be; can anyone question that, for good or ill, positively or negatively, much of the world's educational interchange has arisen from a dialogue with the United States?

Perhaps I may be forgiven for thinking that this interchange, plus the influence of

the United States, has been more for good than for ill, more positive than negative. Let me put the question counterfactually: Had there been no United States for these 200 years, had there been no America with which the rest of the world might engage in interchange, had there been no search for a mutuality of interests, can anyone really think that the world would be a freer place, a better place, for that absence? I think not.

And it is in this sense, then, that we celebrate 200 years of shared history.

But what of today and the problems that confront, the challenges that greet, and the triumphs that warm, this gathering?

Significance of Fulbright Program

There can be no question that the program so closely associated with the name of J. William Fulbright (and since 1961 with that of Wayne Hays) has been successful in a number of ways.

Over 120,000 scholars have experienced—intensively and extensively—an educational and social environment other than their own. Literally thousands of Americans have broken out of the parochialism engendered by the vast size of their nation and its distance from most other societies. Many, perhaps most, of you present this morning effectively began your scholarly careers on the basis of Fulbright scholarships, whether in the form of travel grants to the United States or full maintenance stipends to any of the many countries that have shared in this international adventure in education. Many have shown a quick adaptability to other environments and an attraction to people who represent different ways of life, sometimes dramatically underlined by marrying a national of the host country. Many of you acquired a knowledge of a foreign language or languages which has proved invaluable to you in your work; and that has helped break down the isolation so much a part of each of our national environments, but perhaps especially of the American.

Friendships have been forged, working partnerships in productive research have been formed, even entire curricula of universities have been changed as a result of the energy and creativity of participants in this program. The number of university and college presidents, provosts, deans, and departmental chairman among Fulbright alumni is very great.

But the significance of the Fulbright program does not rest in size alone—even though it probably is the largest planned program of educational exchange in the history of the world. The results, in fact, are surely more in the realm of quality than quantity, precisely because one can never hope to measure accurately the impact of any interchange of ideas—of any process of encounter even among such exceptionally well-motivated and capable people as yourselves. But we can be confident that most who participated in the Fulbright program have become even better motivated, even more knowledgeable and insightful people for doing so.

You, of course, are largely a self-selected audience, and your presence indicates that you, more than most, perhaps feel that participation has made a significant qualitative difference in your life. But there are many who could not be here who share this sense of accomplishment and the accompanying sense of responsibility for themselves, and through themselves, for their disciplines, their institutions, and even their countries. As H. G. Wells once wrote, our civilization is in "a race between education and catastrophe"; and all of us here have helped, so far, to at least keep the outcome in doubt. The quality of the world's educational experience—of the global learning process on which survival depends—has been improved because of you and your fellow participants from all countries.

So too has the quality of diplomacy, formal and informal. How many diplomats and other international and transnational negotiators, reporters, mediators, of all our nations, first realized their interest in another culture through a Fulbright scholarship? How many came to recognize the value of another language? How many have come to

challenge received opinions on world affairs as a result of this experience, individual and collective? Above all, surely we are more aware of the way in which idealism and pragmatism may be combined in the educational enterprise and how central to world peace, to a genuine community of concern and identity, education in the broadest sense of the term has become.

But I am being highly general, and (you may feel) engaging in cliche. No doubt this is so, for cliches become cliches precisely because they are widely recognized as true. One must have the courage, on occasion, to restate the obvious. But I should like also to share a few less obvious observations with you—observations that arise from my experience with the program and the purposes for which you are gathered. In offering these I am aware that I am moving from the present into the future.

Conveying a Global Perception

First, the Fulbright program has helped to teach many Americans a form of "global coping" which is essential to survival today. The phrase is Stephen K. Bailey's, of the American Council on Education, and I believe it an apt one.

Just as a liberal education, pursued to its conclusions, should provide young men and women with a sense of confidence, with an understanding that they can solve problems as they confront them—that they can keep options open in their lives to move from business to education to foreign affairs, for example, so that they need not feel themselves locked into a single career—so too does a liberal education conducted internationally encourage a sense of ease with the world. To cope globally is an imperative of the educated man or woman, for it means the ability to discuss reality through the dust thrown up by clashing ideologies, ethnocentrisms, fears, and hostilities. More than any other program, the one we commemorate today has met this imperative.

Let me use "imperative" in another mode. Through programs of international education, we all come to understand what one scholar has called "the cultural imperatives" of differing cultures. Rather than assuming that all societies rank various cultural qualities similarly, we learn that one values theater above ballet, another soccer above poetry, another achievement above spiritual development, another tradition above change. We know that the rank order of each society's cultural imperatives will differ, of course; for one may learn this in the classroom, even in front of a television set. But he who knows this only as an abstraction, in the manner of the bookish, cannot truly understand the depth of emotion or the complexity of reason that stands behind these differing patterns of belief and conviction and the differing patterns of reasoning, as well, that underlie our varying perceptions of the world.

Ultimately, after all, mutual understanding does rest upon perceptions, not upon hard, clear realities. What people believe to be true is far more important in understanding human affairs than "the true facts" as demonstrated by any number of careful monographs. And one can understand the variety of these perceptions, their power to move people to extraordinary heights and depths, only through direct person-to-person experience.

Emphasizing the Comparative Dimension

Educational exchange programs help preserve each of us from isolation, help to make each of us aware of the perceptions of others, help open doors and develop new options for our societies. Higher education in the United States is older than the nation; there were nine degree-granting colleges at the time of the American Revolution (there were not nine universities in England until the end of the last century). Higher education is also more outreaching than the nation as a whole. This year there were nearly 180,000 foreign students enrolled in universities and colleges in the United States. These foreign students are an invaluable national resource, not alone to their own homelands but to the United

States as well; for their presence on our campuses works against our isolation, our parochialism, and our tendency to be preoccupied with our own domestic problems. The presence of 20,000 Iranian students in the United States surely brings to us more information about Iran than any other mode or source of information. The presence of American Rhodes, Marshall, and Fulbright scholars in the United Kingdom, taken collectively, is an incalculable force for constructive American relationships in that island nation.

Unhappily, we must face the fact that the United States is becoming increasingly isolated linguistically. Against this development work such programs as the Fulbright. Many Americans now find that the world has come to them, in that it has learned their language. The American can travel in Europe, Asia, or Africa with little fear of not finding someone who can understand him, whether he speaks in the rhythms of Iowa, the Deep South, or New England.

This has led shortsighted Americans to argue that we no longer have a national need for language training, that science, commerce, and industry can progress without parsing sentences in a foreign tongue. The number of college undergraduates studying languages other than English is decreasing by 15 percent annually; only one student in 20 is enrolled in a course which provides insights into non-North American cultures; only 5 percent of students in teacher education programs are receiving any foreign-area training; the number of American students who study abroad has been cut in half in the last three years.

In the face of such appalling shrinkage, programs in international education are in no sense frills—they are essential to cultural and, indeed, political survival. For how else does one come to understand that another language also encapsulates another form of thought, that perceptions of the world—of right and wrong, good and bad, strong and weak—*do* legitimately differ, that national goals are *not* interchangeable?

A particular, and specific, benefit that has flowed from international educational programs has been our growing awareness that the United States is not unique.

For many years the trend of our scholarship, especially in history and literature, was to argue for American uniqueness, for "exceptionalism," by which the American story was one set apart from the world. Such views were helpful as the nation was striving to separate itself from older cultures of which it was once a part.

To be sure, many aspects of the American experience *are* unique—the remarkable mobility of the American, the presence of great natural abundance, the century and a half of security from foreign invasion that embraced the period 1815 to 1942—but emphasis on this uniqueness led us to think of ourselves as a people *apart* and (some no doubt also thought) *above* others. It also led scholars in other nations to conclude that the American experience held little that was relevant for them.

In recent years, as a result of experiences abroad, especially by our practitioners in the humanities and the social sciences, and of the presence here of scholars from these disciplines but of other nationalities, we have increasingly become aware of the comparative dimensions in the human story, of the ways in which the American experience might be compared to others. As our history has become more and more relevant to the curricula of other nations, so has the experience of other nations become more meaningful to us.

In the future, the Fulbright program might well emphasize even more the comparative dimension in the human agenda. To fail to participate in the world is to behave irresponsibly; for an American to deprive him or herself of the ability to see the national experience in its world context is self-inflicted myopia; to not prepare oneself with the knowledge by which one may participate in society intelligently in a democracy based upon the consent of the governed—a consent that cannot be assigned to anyone else but that must be exercised individually, at the polls, in the classroom, in the communi-

ty, and in the face of the media—is a form of intellectual treason.

An Emerging Planetary Consciousness

Of course, as some of you will say, I am speaking of an elite group, of those in any society who have the curiosity, the tenacity, and the ability to take an interest in matters outside their daily routine. It does not bother me to see this as an elite group, for I feel that there is a process underway centering in various elites which is tending to produce a new transnational consensus at many levels.

I see many hopeful signs that indeed we are moving, however tortuously, toward human community.

To begin with, I think we can discern a relatively new transnational consensus (among the socially aware): That governments ought to promote the general welfare of those they govern, not merely enlarge their own and the nation's power.

There are other emerging points of general agreement: That starvation anywhere is unacceptable; that torture by governments anywhere is unacceptable; that the use of nuclear and biological weapons is unacceptable; and that political, cultural, and ideological diversity (within some limits) ought to be tolerated.

And although they are far from agreed on specifics, there is an increasingly generalized consensus among thinking people that it is necessary to face up to ecological trade-offs: That there are limits to growth, or at least to unregulated growth, especially of population and pollution.

It is also only in recent history that certain categories of knowledge have come to be unquestionable by the nonexpert: physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics. Are not these additional potent elements both of a universal language and of a universally accepted reality?

Also, there is another new community of belief, shared by nearly all who are concerned with such matters: That certain principles of behavior are generally valid and broadly applicable, such as various generalizations in the fields of psychology, anthropology, geography, and comparative religion.

And we have recently discovered—the human family has discovered—that a rapidly growing variety of technologies are workable almost anywhere; think, for example, of such fields as medicine, communications engineering, data processing, organizational management. We even widely share the insight that the more serious problems of technological transfer are fundamentally cultural and educational.

In addition to such features of the planetary landscape that most of us see pretty much the same way, there is a new shared awareness that represents an additional new force pressing in the direction of human community: I call it the emerging planetary consciousness. It has developed in the last 10 to 15 years, as a result of human ventures into space (we can all visualize that universal image of the planet earth photographed from the moon); as a result of the rapid transmission of visual images by print and electronic journalism; as a result of multinational print periodicals; from the realization that the earth's resources are finite; from the multinational distribution of books; from planetary sharing of the products of the creative arts and of cultural artifacts; and from the emergence of a jetsetting superculture of businessmen, scientists, academics, journalists, international civil servants, and performing artists whose ties to any one country are increasingly subordinated to other loyalties—these are some of the elements of the new planetary awareness, much more readily shared in my children's generation than in mine. It is summed up in the *new* cliche that the peoples of the world and their institutions as well as their economies and even their ways of thinking and believing are, whether we like it or not, interdependent.

Many transnational organizations contribute to this process of global enlightenment, this emerging planetary consciousness, but even more directly to the ever-thickening fabric of human relations—economic, social, and cultural—which increasingly blurs

the line between domestic and foreign affairs in all of our countries. There are a myriad of such organizations whose activities extend across national boundaries.

Indeed, whether functioning bilaterally, regionally, or globally, there are few organizations of any kind, either governmental or nongovernmental, even in such a large country as the United States, which do not have some international involvement and impact.

The huge multinational corporations are only one example, with their unrivaled ability to transfer technology as well as to pose problems of sovereignty and their enormous power to interchange, motivate, and educate people; to generate new capital and resources —as well as to disrupt traditional cultural patterns and to overwhelm traditional economies.

Other, less noticed actors on the world scene have long since escaped the confines of national boundaries. Every profession, from medicine to farming and from banking to city planning, has its international dimension, through which its members broaden their horizons and sharpen their sensitivity to cultural and ideological differences and commonalities. So do trade union organizations, museums, educational groups, sports, and other recreational activities—all are now as multinational as Coca Cola, depending, in other words, on resources beyond those of any one country for essential elements of their strength, competence, or capacity for service.

And in nearly every case, these international activities contribute to the global learning process whereby powerful individuals in every country are coming to see each other as human beings instead of foreign devils, as competitors instead of enemies, as collaborators instead of aggressors, as people who are understandably different rather than dangerously malevolent.

New Forms of International Interaction

What, then, of the future? Will a transnational consensus become effective? Will we learn to master the media which would separate us as well as join us by placing labels upon us? Will we learn to listen more carefully to one another? I believe so, for mine is the report of an optimist.

We are told that the United States is in a time of troubles. Perhaps it is, but ours is now a world civilization that sails on a single ship on the global ocean. Charges once hurled at Americans—that ours is a violent society, materialistic, corrupt—no longer wound so deeply, for we realize that violence is a worldwide condition. We realize now that many people we once thought unalterably anti-American have, in some senses, been optimists for us, disappointed that we did not become what they had hoped for us to be. Some still think us the "last, best hope of earth"; others see in us potential for world destruction. It is to these contrasting futures that we now direct our attention, as we meet to discuss the meaning of international education as a link for human understanding and a basis for human cooperation.

In his letter of invitation to you, Senator Fulbright wrote that from your review of educational exchanges must come "greater support and leadership from both the public and private sector" for an awareness of our mutual interdependence. The Board of Foreign Scholarships, your host over these days of introspection and debate, will seek (as the Senator's letter states) "new directions and a strengthening of purpose which will help to create a greater understanding of exchange and its importance both here and abroad." As President Ford said, in his message to the regional conferences of Fulbright-Hays alumni, also sponsored by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, those of you gathered here "are living examples of the program's value on an international scale."

While I know that you share my concern for international education, I do not feel that I am preaching to the converted. We in government, in the Board of Foreign Scholarships, and in the many support institutions, are here to listen, to learn how growing interdependence, which is unquestionable, may best be used to enhance mutual understanding, to strengthen mutual respect, to

enlarge mutual confidence so as to solidify the basis for cooperation requisite to survival.

As I wrote last year, when commenting on the theme of mutual understanding:

> It would be egregious error to assume that governments alone are capable of the initiative, imagination, and dynamism necessary for major forward progress in this field. The principal government role in America should be facilitative, supportive, reinforcing, stimulating, because the major energies in this country affecting international cultural communication and, therefore, "mutual understanding" are nongovernmental.

Those major forces are the press, the business community, the many kinds of voluntary organizations, the 2,600 universities and colleges in our land, the thousands of individual scholars who, like yourselves, care that we not delude ourselves into thinking that intellectual isolationism is possible, not to speak of permissible.

I am optimistic that we will not slip into intellectual isolationism, and my confidence is based in part on our shared dynamism. You from other lands will not permit us to do so. Perhaps the truly unique element in the Fulbright program is its binational nature, in which we have been partners for these 30 years with so many nations in a common cause.

As I near my conclusion, it seems appropriate to remember the final words of that Declaration which I mentioned as I began: in support of our purposes, we must "mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor." That sacred honor is best observed in deepening and strengthening the educational bonds which knit us together. They are a heritage of these 30 years, as they are a symbol of these 200, that we must preserve and extend.

I speak to you this morning from within a bureaucracy. You in turn will deliberate these three days as scholars and administrators, as teachers and students in the broadest sense of the word. Much of the time and effort of statesmen and diplomats is devoted to resolving immediate political, economic, and military disputes. This may have been inescapable amid the atmosphere of storm and stress characteristic of international relations since 1946. But none of us can afford to be so preoccupied that he fails to recognize this historic moment—*this* moment, today, when our world is radically changing into an interacting whole, wherein the capacity to manage the political, economic, and security issues before us is increasingly dependent upon, and limited by, our grasp of the human dimension, our ability to relate as human beings.

We must give that human dimension much more attention. Only through adopting attitudes and pursuing approaches which encourage a new sense of human community can we assure that the global changes underway will work to the benefit of all mankind. To build toward a reconstituted global community will require not so much new forms of world government as new forms of interaction among nations, not the weakening of traditional national loyalties in which we all take just pride but the strengthening of our global commitment and citizenship.

We must think anew about educational exchange programs, so that they may be fresh, significant, exciting, and ultimately true to our mutual needs. We must commit our intellectual, creative, and communicative energies to this task. Once you were pioneers; you must be pioneers again.

We have seen the earth from the moon. Now we must make internal that vision, seeing ourselves "as riders on the earth together," so that the erosion of the ancient barriers between nations can begin in earnest. "Where do we go?" you ask yourselves. We must not let indifference, despair, or the momentary distractions of other causes lead us to drop the work of 30 years. To a practical people, all the past is future.

U.S. Economic and Business Relations with the Middle East and North Africa

Address by Sidney Sober
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs [1]

I welcome the opportunity to discuss with you today current developments affecting business and economic relations generally with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. We in the State Department see a vital link between our economic role in the area and preeminent foreign policy concerns.

I recently attended a conference in Tunis of our Foreign Service commercial officers, where we had the opportunity to discuss in some detail both the opportunities and the problems of American business in the area. My impression is that we are doing rather well in all the major markets of the area. This is so in the face of stiff competition from other suppliers, port congestion, talk of cutbacks in development spending, difficulties arising from changing policies on agents' fees, and problems faced by U.S. firms resulting from the Arab boycott of Israel.

In an earlier era it was dogma that "trade follows the flag." Maybe the reverse is true. In any event, these days our flag is flying high throughout most of the Middle East. Surely there is still room for improvement, but our relations overall are perhaps better and closer than ever before—and business is good.

In the Middle East, our overriding national objective continues to be a just and durable peace. We have committed ourselves to an unprecedented effort to that end. We are also deeply concerned with strengthening our relations with countries throughout the area and with seeing the development of conditions conducive to the flow of commerce and to the security of adequate supplies of oil at manageable prices. These are all questions which have enormous implications for the Middle East but also for our own security and our economy.

As much as anywhere in the world, U.S. commercial and other economic activities in the Middle East are essential elements of our foreign policy. The development of economic ties helps build a broad base of mutual interests and shared perceptions as to our joint stake in peace, sound development in the region, and a healthy world economy.

We in government have looked for new ways in the economic field to strengthen our ties with traditional friends and open constructive new phases in our relations with various countries in the area. One aspect is the creation of joint commissions with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia. Four Middle East aid programs play a key role in support of our peace-seeking efforts. I am glad to say that there is broad support for the over $3 billion we have proposed in aid to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria this year—about half of our entire global aid request to Congress.

We are keenly aware, however, that the key role in our efforts to forge broader and

[1] Made at Washington on May 14 before the Economic Seminar on American Business in the Middle East and North Africa, sponsored by the Middle East Institute.

closer economic ties will be played by the private sector. The U.S.-Egypt Business Council, for instance, is already playing a principal role in moving toward closer cooperation in investment and industrial development in that country. On a broader scale, increasing numbers of American firms are involved in seeking new opportunities or expanding old ties throughout the Middle East.

In broad terms, the figures are encouraging: U.S. exports to the Middle East and North African markets in 1975 totaled over $10 billion, constituting nearly 10 percent of our global sales—or about twice what it was only two years earlier, as a share of our worldwide sales. Iran remained our single largest market in the area, taking $3.2 billion of our merchandise in 1975. Israel was our second largest market, with $1.6 billion, and Saudi Arabia third, with $1.5 billion. Statistics for the first three months of this year show continued export growth areawide, with Saudi Arabia moving ahead of Israel and sales to some of the smaller markets growing at an increasing rate.

We enjoy a number of commercial advantages in the Middle East. English is widely accepted as the second language, and we Americans—surprising as it may be to some—enjoy a comfortable cultural rapport with Middle Easterners. More directly, we can build on the high acceptability of U.S. goods, a strong desire for U.S. technology, and a political disposition to trade with us.

There are also certain problems. Competitors among other industrialized countries are exceptionally active. Some of them benefit from traditional ties going back many years, geographic closeness, and the ability to offer commercial inducements stemming from facilities provided by their governments. Today, however, I have been asked to address two particular issues of increasing prominence which currently command a good deal of attention by both business and government.

The first of these is the Arab boycott of Israel. It is an issue in which it is extremely difficult to separate politics and economics. The Arab states which apply the boycott see it as a sovereign act of economic warfare, thoroughly justified by international law. The boycott is thus an integral element of the unresolved dispute between the Arab states and Israel. And it thus impinges on our key objective in the Middle East: the achievement of a just and durable peace.

While we are aware of the Arab viewpoint, our own national policy is one of opposition to the boycott of Israel—as it is to boycotts by other countries of any countries friendly to us. This policy is set forth in law. It is now well known within the American business community as well as to those countries which apply the boycott of Israel. As Secretary Kissinger said earlier this week: [2]

> The United States is committed to ending restrictions on Israel's rights to trade and on the rights of others to trade with Israel. Steps toward peace in the political and military fields must include steps to end the economic warfare.

Consistent with our policy, the U.S. Government has taken steps to oppose the boycott which go far beyond the actions of any other country. Over the past year alone, the Commerce Department's reporting requirements have been tightened, the official dissemination of trade opportunities involving documents known to contain boycott clauses has been terminated, the Justice Department has taken action in the antitrust field, and the Federal Reserve Board has provided guidance to member banks. The President's statement of last November 20 underlined our total opposition to discrimination against Americans—on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex—that might arise from foreign boycott practices.

Given this clear stand on the boycott, it has been our view that further legislation on this subject was not called for and could, indeed, be counterproductive to our objective of easing the restrictions of the boycott, pending its total elimination. As a matter of fact, in recent months we have seen some welcome changes in boycott enforcement as a result of successful efforts by a number of

[2] For Secretary Kissinger's address at Baltimore, Md., on May 9, see BULLETIN of June 7, 1976, p. 720.

U.S. firms to resist the use of boycott language in various stages of their business transactions with Arab countries. We believe that some of the new legislation proposed in the Congress would actually result in strengthening enforcement of the boycott of Israel rather than weakening it.

While we are on the boycott, I would like to touch on two misconceptions which seem to be widely held.

First, Israel continues to be one of our most important markets in the Middle East and North Africa. As I noted earlier, our exports to Israel in 1975, at $1.6 billion, were greater than those to our largest single Arab customer and compared positively with our total exports of $5.3 billion to all Arab countries. Our share of the Israeli market increased from 18 percent to 22 percent last year, at a time when Israel had signed a preferential trade agreement with the European Community and despite the increased attention given to the Arab boycott.

It would appear that, despite some misapprehensions on this score, American business by and large understands and operates successfully on the thesis that the Arab boycott regulations do not restrict normal U.S. trade with Israel. We would not wish misconceptions of the boycott by American firms to lead them to overlook the significant and profitable market for American products in Israel or to refrain from purchases which make up part of a healthy trade relationship.

Another common misconception about the boycott has identified it with direct acts of religious or ethnic discrimination—which we as Americans, both in government and in private life, totally reject as repugnant to our ethic and policy. As a matter of fact, Arab representatives have gone out of their way to assert that religion or creed bears no relationship to their boycott of Israel. We welcome the reaffirmation of this position.

In those isolated cases where the application of the boycott has involved instances of apparent discrimination, we have made official representations to the countries concerned. These cases appear to have been rather rare exceptions to the general rule, and usually we have obtained assurances that they did not represent the policy of the government in question. I have already referred to the President's statement of last November 20, which was quite categorical, regarding our policy on this subject.

Thus, we will continue to deal with the boycott in ways which reflect well-established U.S. policy and which also take into account both our continuing close friendship for Israel and the very important stake we have in strengthening our relations with the Arab states. In practice, you will appreciate, this is not a task in which we can be expected to please all of the people all of the time. We shall continue to try to do our best.

The second issue which I have been asked to talk about pertains to agents' fees and related payments, licit and illicit. It is a field where domestic and foreign practices and attitudes are changing, but not always at the same rate.

And I want to say at the outset that we see fees to agents, in the vast majority of cases, as legitimate payments for proper and useful services rendered in the normal course of business. The problem relates to those relatively few cases where fees are paid to agents in violation of local law or regulation, or where such payments are intended to elicit illegitimate actions.

I might say that this seems to be a problem without any particular regional boundaries. It is certainly not peculiar to the Middle East.

As Deputy Secretary of State Robinson noted in his testimony last month before the Senate Banking Committee, illicit or improper payments involving U.S. firms abroad have serious ethical, economic, political, and foreign policy ramifications. Our government has made it clear that we are determined to take appropriate and effective action to control such payments. As you probably know, new regulations governing the Foreign Military Sales Program require that buyers be fully informed of any agents' fees included in the price of goods sold. Further tightening of rules governing practices and disclosure has been proposed in the Congress. President Ford has underscored the seriousness of the matter by establishing a Cabinet

Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad, under the leadership of Commerce Secretary Richardson.

From the perspective of the State Department, it is apparent that much is being done in this country—by government and by business—to address the problem of illicit payments. It is part of our strength that we tend, in this country, to live in glass houses. It is our conviction, however, that more should be done by the international community because:

1. Unilateral action will not solve an international problem;
2. Action by our government that is not matched by others can place U.S. traders and investors at an unfair competitive disadvantage abroad; and
3. While disclosure can be an effective deterrent to illicit payments, unilateral disclosure in this country of alleged wrongdoing by foreign officials in their own countries can do serious damage to our foreign relations.

We believe strains arising from disclosure of payments to agents could be eased and the other problems met by a multilateral treaty that would be implemented by national law in all countries concerned. What we propose is uniform disclosure legislation, not extraterritorial criminal sanctions against illicit payments. We believe it would be inappropriate for us to seek to police the relationship of our nationals with foreign officials in the latters' own countries. We strongly believe that each country has the responsibility to determine the standard of conduct to be applied in its territory and to take the steps necessary for fair enforcement of those standards.

In summary, we support both domestic and international action to resolve the problem of illicit payments. We are convinced that business can prosper best when there is felt to be no need for such payments and when clear standards of conduct exist for the guidance of all concerned.

I would not want, in touching on problems which do exist, to end on a negative note. The predominant fact of our business prospects in the Middle East is that tremendous market opportunities do exist for American goods and services and that these will continue to grow.

With the quadrupling of earnings since 1973, the Middle East oil producers are making unprecedented expenditures to diversify and industrialize their economies and also to raise the living standards of their people. The implications for U.S. sales—especially of capital goods—are vast. Some of the other countries in the region, in addition, are benefiting from financial assistance offered by the oil producers and likewise offer increasingly attractive markets for U.S. goods and services.

It may be instructive to note some figures regarding the two largest of these burgeoning markets. Iran has scheduled development expenditures totaling $70 billion for its current five-year plan ending March 1978. Under the U.S.-Iran Joint Commission, a target for two-way trade of over $26 billion has been set for the period 1975 to 1980, exclusive of oil and military items. This implies U.S. exports well in excess of $20 billion. Our trade with Iran so far is evolving on target.

We have not set any formal trade target with Saudi Arabia. But the Saudis are planning on over $80 billion of government imports under their new five-year plan. If their estimates hold and we maintain our present market share of about 25 percent—in fact, we hope to do better—we would register sales of $20 billion over this period.

Large numbers of American firms which have traditionally traded with Middle Eastern countries have raised their sales sharply in the past couple of years. Many others are embarking on new voyages of discovery as they become aware of opportunities to do business in the area.

In the broadest sense, the opportunities for trade—imaginatively and energetically pursued by American business—can spell a success story that will serve the interests of the United States in many ways. Not the least of these is the impetus that it can give to the development of our friendly relations with all the countries of the region and to the continuing search for peace.

The March–May Session of the Law of the Sea Conference

Following is a statement by Ambassador at Large T. Vincent Learson, Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea and U.S. Representative to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, made before the Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 20.[1]

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to appear here today to discuss with you the results of the recently completed session of the Law of the Sea Conference.[2] Your interest in the law of the sea is of course well known, and I want to express our appreciation for your efforts over the years. I would like, if you agree, to submit for the record the report of the U.S. delegation and to make a few informal comments.

As you know, the conference will convene again in New York in August in an attempt to conclude the substantive negotiations and all outstanding issues, with the goal of producing a treaty ready for signature in the first half of next year. I believe that goal is attainable. The U.S. delegation will certainly make every effort to achieve it.

On April 8 Secretary Kissinger made a major statement on the law of the sea negotiations before an American audience, which was circulated to all delegations, and then met with the conference officers and the heads of delegations.[3] The Secretary's statement and appearance were widely welcomed as an indication of the high-level U.S. interest in an early and successful conclusion to the negotiations, and his new proposals regarding the deep seabeds were welcomed as evidence of a real effort to accommodate the interests of developing countries.

I would like to briefly review the work at the recent conference session.

It is widely recognized that the deep seabed portion of the Geneva single negotiating text did not represent a satisfactory basis for negotiations in the view of the United States and many other developed states. Thus my remarks will concentrate on the Committee I negotiations.

Committee I

In light of the developments at the New York session, we believe that most countries genuinely seek a deep seabed regime to which all nations can agree. They also recognize that the time for reaching political compromise on vital issues has arrived. Hence the negotiations on deep seabeds in Committee I are now characterized by a more constructive spirit of moderation than heretofore.

The new single negotiating text produced by the chairman of Committee I at the close of the New York session reflects this new spirit. We have not yet had the time to analyze thoroughly the highly detailed and complex articles and annexes. However, I can summarize the major changes:

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[1] The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] The third substantive session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held at New York Mar. 15–May 7.

[3] For Secretary Kissinger's address at New York on Apr. 8, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1976, p. 533.

—First, the text sets forth a system for exploitation of deep seabed resources that provides for mining by states and their nationals pursuant to contracts with the [International Seabed Resource] Authority. Annex I, the Basic Conditions of Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation, now elaborates in some detail the procedures to be used in concluding such contracts and circumscribes the Authority's discretion in granting contracts.

—Second, as part of the system of access, there would be mining sites reserved for exploitation by the Enterprise [the organ through which the Authority shall direct and carry out exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed] or by developing countries. The exploitation system insures that mining activities conducted directly by the Authority, through the Enterprise, will be undertaken on the same conditions as other mining operations.

—Third, the text does not grant the Authority power to impose direct controls over seabed production levels and prices. An alternative approach in the new text is used to protect developing-country land-based producers against possible economic harm from ocean mining. The chief element of this approach is a provision that during a 20-year period beginning in 1980 or at the commencement of seabed production, whichever comes earlier, seabed nickel production may not exceed the projected cumulative growth segment in the world nickel market, which the text provides would in no case be less than 6 percent annually. This limitation is complemented by Authority powers to participate to the extent of its production in any international commodity arrangements established for these minerals and to provide for economic adjustment assistance to developing-country producers that are seriously harmed by ocean mining production.

—Fourth, the text now clarifies that the Authority's powers and functions concern the administration of deep seabed resources and do not extend to other nonresource activities in the deep seabed.

—Fifth, the text attempts to balance and separate the powers and functions of the Assembly and Council of the Authority so as to delineate the differing roles each organ will play.

—Sixth, the text contains a large number of generally agreed articles involving the structure and operational procedures of the new international organization.

Based on our experience at the recent session and on initial review of the new text, it is clear that there are a number of very important issues on which that text remains unsatisfactory to us; these will be considered at the next session:

—First, there was no attempt at the New York session to reach agreement on the vital question of the composition and voting system for the Council.

—Second, several industrialized countries continue to vigorously advocate some form of limitation on any one country's share of overall ocean mining production. The United States is strongly opposed to any state quota or similar provisions which would arbitrarily restrict our access.

—Third, there is no clear consensus on the financing of the Enterprise.

—Fourth, a number of countries, for domestic constitutional reasons, oppose the provisional application of part I of the convention before the treaty enters into force on a permanent basis. Many others appear to support the concept but wish to see provisional application applied to the convention as a whole and not part I alone.

I would like to emphasize that the new single negotiating text, like the Geneva version, is the personal work product of the chairman. It represents his view of the possible direction in which a consensus may be found. Our assessment is that it does reflect to a large extent the trends emerging in the committee's informal debates in New York.

Committee II

The Second Committee deals with the issues of greatest importance to the greatest

number of states. The clear overall impression of the debate in New York was that part II of the Geneva single negotiating text was broadly acceptable. There was continued broad support for a 12-mile territorial sea, a transit-passage regime in straits used for international navigation, and a 200-mile economic zone. Few changes were made to the text. I will comment, then, on the major outstanding issues.

The major contentious issues in Committee II faced by the recent session were:

1. The juridical status of the economic zone as high seas. Many states, including the United States, maintain that the zone should be a part of the high seas, while others maintain that it is neither high seas nor territorial sea, but a *sui generis* zone.

2. The access to the sea of landlocked states and access of landlocked states and geographically disadvantaged states to the living resources in the economic zones of neighboring states of a region.

Other important issues on which there were significant differences were:

1. Delimitation of economic zone and continental shelf boundaries;

2. The question of coastal state authority over construction, design, equipment, and manning standards for foreign vessels in the territorial sea; and

3. Management of highly migratory species, such as tuna.

It will also be necessary to do further work with regard to the continental margin where it extends beyond 200 miles.

Moreover, there were difficulties with provisions of a political nature whose scope transcends the law of the sea, including the resource rights for territories under foreign occupation or colonial domination.

Committee III

Objectives in the pollution part of the law of the sea negotiations have been to establish effective environmental protection obligations with regard to all sources of marine pollution.

In the area of vessel-source pollution, three major aspects were addressed: coastal state regulations in the economic zone; enforcement generally against vessel-source pollution; and coastal state rights in the territorial sea.

With respect to economic zone regulations, most countries agree that there should only be generally applicable international regulations in the economic zone, although there would be special areas, defined by criteria in the treaty, in which more strict international discharge regulations would apply.

On enforcement of international discharge regulations, an accommodation has been generally supported along the following lines:

1. Strict flag-state obligations;

2. Port-of-arrival enforcement rights;

3. A coastal state right to take enforcement action in the economic zone against flagrant or gross violations of international discharge regulations causing major damage or threat of damage to coastal state interests;

4. A flag-state right to preempt prosecutions for violations, subject to important qualifications and limitations; and

5. A series of safeguards.

With regard to the territorial sea, a major split remains. The other major maritime powers argue that the coastal state should not be authorized to establish construction, design, equipment, or manning regulations more strict than international regulations. Many coastal states and the United States support complete coastal state authority subject only to the right of innocent passage.

The main focus of the marine scientific research discussions dealt with research in the economic zone and on the continental shelf. The U.S. approach was that coastal state interests in the economic zone should be protected through a series of agreed obligations upon the researcher. Many developing countries sought consent for all scientific research in the economic zone. In an attempt to reach a reasonable accommodation, Secretary Kissinger stated a willingness to accept a reasonable approach dis-

tinguishing between types of scientific research, with resource-oriented research subject to coastal state consent and nonresource research subject to certain international obligations. This type of approach was discussed.

The revised single negotiating text, however, reflects a different approach from those discussed in the negotiations. It requires consent for all scientific research in the economic zone but provides that consent shall not be withheld unless certain conditions are met. The new text also provides that disputes regarding research will be referred to binding dispute-settlement procedures. This text goes too far in the direction of coastal state control over scientific research in the economic zone.

Settlement of Disputes

Effective provisions for the binding settlement of disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the law of the sea convention are an essential part of a negotiated package. Without a provision for compulsory settlement of disputes, the substantive provisions of the convention would be subject to unilateral interpretation and the delicate balance of rights and duties achieved in a convention would be quickly upset. Secretary Kissinger emphasized the importance of this in his April 8 speech.

The revised single negotiating text on dispute settlement differs from the Geneva single negotiating text in two significant respects. There is a more flexible procedure on the choice of forum, and the article on the applicability of dispute settlement in the economic zone has been rewritten.

The question of application of dispute settlement in the economic zone is the most difficult and complex issue. If the economic zone is not to become the functional equivalent of a territorial sea, the dispute-settlement system must provide adequate protection for the rights of both coastal and other states.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to underestimate the problems that still face the conference and which must be resolved if we are to achieve a timely and satisfactory treaty. We are, however, much closer to such an agreement than we were at the start of the recent New York session.

It will take hard work and political will, but the substantive negotiations can and should be completed at the August–September session. If we are successful, I would then expect the drafting committee of the conference to do the technical work after that.

In any case, the goal of the conference is to have a treaty ready for signature in the first half of next year. I feel at this point that we have a better than even chance of achieving this scenario and obtaining an acceptable treaty.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended, with annex. Done at London September 26, 1974. Entered into force October 1, 1975.
Ratification deposited: Mexico. April 22, 1976.

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975.[1]
Signature: Liberia, May 7, 1976.

Energy

Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperative information exchange relating to the development of solar heating and cooling systems in buildings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 1–4, 1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975.
Signature: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique of France. May 17, 1976.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086.
Acceptance deposited: Angola. May 15, 1976.

[1] Not in force.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Sri Lanka, May 17, 1976.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971. Enters into force August 16, 1976.[2]
Accession deposited: Iraq, May 17, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Togo, May 18, 1976.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited: New Zealand, May 13, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.
Acceptance deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with declarations), May 24, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Sweden, May 25, 1976.
Declaration of provisional application deposited: Spain, May 27, 1976.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Sweden, May 25, 1976.

Women—Political Rights

Inter-American convention on the granting of political rights to women. Signed at Bogotá May 2, 1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949; for the United States May 24, 1976.
Ratification deposited: United States, May 24, 1976.

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agreement relating to the sale of six C–47 aircraft to Colombia for civilian cargo and passenger service. Signed at Bogotá April 21, 1976. Entered into force April 21, 1976.

Loan agreement to assist in financing a program designed to strengthen the rural cooperative movement in Colombia, with annex. Signed at Bogotá April 28, 1976. Entered into force April 28, 1976.

Costa Rica

Loan agreement relating to United States assistance in a nutrition program in Costa Rica, with annex. Signed at San José April 26, 1976. Entered into force April 26, 1976.

Guatemala

Loan agreement to assist Guatemala in carrying out a program for small farmer development, with annex. Signed at Guatemala April 8, 1976. Entered into force April 8, 1976.

Jordan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 14, 1975 (TIAS 8197). Effected by exchange of notes at Amman April 27, 1976. Entered into force April 27, 1976.

Nicaragua

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from Nicaragua of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua April 26 and May 13, 1976. Entered into force May 13, 1976.

Portugal

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of March 18, 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon April 30, 1976. Entered into force April 30, 1976.

Sri Lanka

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 9, 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo April 30, 1976. Entered into force April 30, 1976.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol to the treaty of May 26, 1972 (TIAS 7503), on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974.
Ratifications exchanged: May 24, 1976.
Entered into force: May 24, 1976.

Treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, with protocol and agreed statement. Signed at Washington and Moscow May 28, 1976. Enters into force on the day of exchange of instruments of ratification.

United Kingdom

Understanding relating to passenger charter air services, with related letters. Effected by exchange of notes at London April 28, 1976. Entered into force April 28, 1976.

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[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.

Name Index

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: May 24–30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*265	5/24	U.S.-Japan conference on cultural educational interchange to open May 27.
*266	5/24	Kissinger: remarks to press, Stockholm.
†267	5/24	Kissinger: news conference, Stockholm.
†268	5/24	Kissinger, Andersson: toasts, Stockholm.
†269	5/25	Kissinger: departure, Stockholm.
*270	5/25	Kissinger: arrival, Luxembourg.
†271	5/25	Kissinger: news conference, Luxembourg.
†272	5/25	Kissinger: CENTO Council of Ministers, London, May 26.
†273	5/25	Kissinger, Thorn: toasts, Luxembourg.
*274	5/25	U.S.-Canadian Pacific salmon negotiations.
†275	5/25	Kissinger: interview with CBS, London.
*276	5/27	Program for the state visit of King Juan Carlos of Spain.
*277	5/27	Rosemary L. Ginn sworn in as Ambassador to Luxembourg (biographic data).

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.