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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

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The United States and Africa

Statement by Secretary Kissinger[1]

I am pleased to have this opportunity to report to you on my visit to Africa and on the state of our relations with this increasingly important continent.

A sound relationship between America and Africa is crucial to an international structure of relations that promotes peace, widening prosperity, and human dignity. When I began my African trip, war had already begun in the south of the continent, risking possible great-power conflict. Africa's hopes for steady economic development were being distorted by increasingly radical forces, and the course of peaceful social change threatened to degenerate into widespread bloodshed. For this reason President Ford directed me to go to Africa to present proposals aimed at bringing about moderate, negotiated solutions to the urgent political problems of southern Africa; the long-term economic development of the continent; and strengthening our ties with Africa in the service of interests we share—peace, independence, prosperity, respect for human dignity, and justice.

I believe that we have laid a sound foundation for progress in these areas. It is this progress which I want to discuss with you today.

Africa is of immense size, strategically located, with governments of substantial significance in numbers and growing influence in the councils of the world. The interdependence of America and our allies with Africa is increasingly obvious. Africa is a continent of vast resources. We depend on Africa for many key products: cobalt, chrome, oil, cocoa, manganese, platinum, diamonds, aluminum, and others. In many of these commodities, Africa supplies from 30 to 60 percent of our total imports.

In the last two decades, American investments in black Africa have more than quadrupled, to over $1½ billion. Trade has grown at an even faster rate; Africa's importance to us as a commercial partner—as a producer of energy and commodities and as a market for our own products—is substantial and bound to grow in the future.

The reliance of Europe and Japan on Africa for key raw materials is even greater than our own. For example, three-quarters of the manganese imported by the European Community, and over half that imported by Japan, comes from Africa. The continent provides a growing area of investment for our allies and is an important trading partner as well. Western Europe's and Japan's combined trade with Africa now exceeds $30 billion a year.

Thus, an independent and prospering Africa is of considerable consequence to the security, political, and economic interests of all the great industrial democracies.

For her part, Africa recognizes full well the crucial importance of our markets and

[1] Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 13 (text from press release 246). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

investments to her own prosperity. And politically, the emphasis which African leaders placed in conversations with me on the need and importance of American action and support is proof that our assets and our moral influence are recognized and valued on the continent.

We are, in addition, bound by a moral dimension—the cultural heritage of 23 million Americans and the moral sympathy of over 200 million Americans who understand the motivations of peoples who would establish their freedom and prosperity against great odds.

Thus, the formulation of a sound relationship between America and Africa is of considerable importance to our country. It is, as well, a complex and difficult task:

—Never before in history has so revolutionary a change occurred with such rapidity as Africa's transition from colonialism to independence. Many African states are but a decade or so old.

—Moreover, a continent of nearly 50 nations cannot easily, if at all, be encompassed by a single, coherent policy. Africa's drive for unity is a reality; yet Africa's great diversity makes clear-cut general formulations difficult to achieve and apply.

—If Africa is not to become a grave source of great-power conflict and of international tensions, Africa's problems must be for Africans to solve. They must not be permitted to become the subject of great-power rivalry and confrontation. Their ultimate resolution lies in the processes of Africa's own internal political and social evolution.

Significant developments in recent years make it clear that Africa occupies an important place in the course and the conduct of international affairs. The spread of national independence in Africa has done much to transform the numerical and the political makeup of world institutions and the nature of international affairs. Political and social pressures, especially in southern Africa, have raised the threat that the continent might once again become an arena for big-power competition, with profound implications for global stability. And major changes have taken place in the international economy, leading the developing nations of Africa to claim more control over their economic destiny and a greater share in global prosperity.

To take account of such changes on the international scene, and with the aim of strengthening the relationship between the United States and Africa, President Ford in 1974 ordered a review of our African policy. As part of this effort, I announced one year ago that I would visit Africa in the spring of 1976. Last September, I set forth the fundamental elements of our policy toward Africa to members of the Organization of African Unity assembled in New York for the United Nations.

I said then that America had three major concerns:

—That the African Continent be free of great-power rivalry or conflict;

—That all of the continent should have the right of self-determination; and

—That Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a strong participant in the global economic order—an economic partner with a growing stake in the international system.

Late last year the situation in Africa took on a new and serious dimension. For the first time since the colonial era in Africa was largely brought to an end in the early 1960's, external interventions had begun to control and direct an essentially African problem.

In the hope of halting a dangerously escalating situation in Angola, we undertook a wide range of diplomatic and other activity pointing toward a cessation of foreign intervention and a negotiated African solution.

But the impact of our domestic debate overwhelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. In January, on behalf of the Administration I put before the Senate our views on the consequences of our inaction on Angola. I shall not review those arguments again today.

Soviet-Cuban intervention had contributed

to an increasingly dangerous situation turning the political evolution away from African aspirations and toward great-power confrontation:

—The Soviets and Cubans had imposed their solution on Angola. Their forces were entrenched there, and fresh opportunities lay before them.

—With the end of the Portuguese era in Africa, pressure was building on Rhodesia, regarded by Africans as the last major vestige of colonialism. Events in Angola encouraged radicals to press for a military solution in Rhodesia.

—With radical influence on the rise, and with immense outside military strength apparently behind the radicals, even moderate and responsible African leaders—firm proponents of peaceful change—began to conclude there was no alternative but to embrace the cause of violence. By March of this year, guerrilla actions had begun to break out against Rhodesia.

—On a broader scale, our friends in Africa were increasingly dismayed by our irresolution in countering external pressures and embarrassed by what they interpreted as passivity or worse on the most central issue of African politics, the future of southern Africa. The possibility grew of an emerging pattern of accommodation to the reality of the Soviet presence and American inaction. We saw ahead the prospect of war—which indeed had already begun—fed by outside forces; we were concerned about a continent politically embittered and economically estranged from the West; and we saw ahead a process of radicalization which would place severe strains on our allies in Europe and Japan.

—There was no prospect of successfully shaping events in the absence of a positive political, moral, and economic program of our own for Africa.

It was for these reasons that President Ford and I determined that the African trip which had long been planned as part of an unfolding process of policy development now had a compelling focus and urgency. Indeed, it had become an imperative. We had these aims:

—To provide our African friends once again with a moderate and enlightened alternative to the grim prospects so rapidly taking shape before them—prospects which threatened African unity and independence and indicated growing violence and widened economic distress;

—To strengthen U.S.-African relations by applying our policy to the critical problems of the moment—the issues of self-determination and economic development;

—To stress the positive elements in our policy around which our friends could rally, to make it possible for responsible African leaders to identify with the United States and to work with us; and

—To give friendly and moderate African governments the perception that their aspirations for justice can be achieved without resort to massive violence or bloodshed and that their hopes for prosperity and opportunity can best be achieved through the open economy of the West rather than by submission to the determinist economic dogma of the Communist world.

In short, we sought to show that there was a moderate and peaceful road open to fulfill African aspirations and that America could be counted on to cooperate constructively in the attainment of these objectives.

My trip addressed the three major issues facing Africa:

—Whether the urgent problems of southern Africa will be solved by negotiation or by conflict;

—Whether Africa's economic development will take place on the basis of self-respect and open opportunity or through perpetual relief or the radical regimentation of societies; and

—Whether the course of African unity and self-determination will once again be distorted by massive extracontinental interference.

It is clear that these issues are interrelated. A just, negotiated, and peaceful

resolution of the problems of majority rule, minority rights, and economic progress can only take place in a continent which remains free from great-power intervention. But American calls for an end to outside intervention would receive scant if any attention from African leaders who did not also perceive that we shared their aspirations that justice, self-determination, and prosperity spread throughout the continent.

The Political Dimension: Southern Africa

The issue of overriding concern to Africans is the question of southern Africa—most urgently, the question of Rhodesia.

When my trip began, armed struggle had already been declared from the nations bordering Rhodesia. At the same time, it was clear that if the United States put forward a package of proposals on Rhodesia which moderate governments could support, they would be prepared to concentrate on an African solution, stressing a peaceful evolution to majority rule, around which the nations of Africa could rally. I believe we have achieved this; the possibilities of a negotiated solution have been greatly enhanced.

In Lusaka, on behalf of the President, I set forth a 10-point program aimed at helping achieve an outcome that would end bloodshed, permit a negotiated solution, block external encroachment, and make possible the eventual achievement of an independent and multiracial society under majority rule and with guarantees of minority rights.

The cumulative substantive thrust of these points and the fact that the speech was made on African soil signaled a new departure for American policy. We made, I believe, an immense and welcome impact in Africa on those—of all political persuasions—who truly care for peace, independence, and justice. These themes were also the basis of my subsequent private talks and public statements in Africa. The reactions were universally positive.

An important development is the agreement by a number of African leaders that outside powers should not in the future deal directly with liberation movements in southern Africa. We agreed to this and urge all other countries to do the same. This represents a significant step in the direction of African solutions to African problems—and toward direct negotiations between the African groups involved, whether black or white.

Unfortunately, the violence in southern Africa has already begun. But the United States has lent its weight to the only route that can stop the fighting and achieve objectives which I believe all Americans can support—the goals of independence, self-determination, majority rule, minority rights, and peaceful change. It is clear from my conversations with the African leaders that they recognize and welcome this strong endorsement of a policy which offers a peaceful and principled resolution of the major problems facing Africa.

There was always considerable suspicion in other African countries of the Cuban presence in Angola and considerable apprehension as to where they might direct their energies next. But instead of seeing such intervention as inevitable—or, worse, beyond their power to prevent—I believe many African leaders now see that there is an alternative and that they can coalesce around a peaceful approach. I believe that it is becoming more unlikely that other African countries will invite Cuban troops and the opportunities for other external intervention are being reduced.

In sum, I believe we have achieved a platform which moderate and responsible Africans can support and which serves interests we share—for peace, justice, progress, and for an Africa free from outside pressures.

—The possibility of a negotiated settlement now exists; our active concern has increased the possibility that the moderate African leaders can take the lead away from "the men with the guns" and that the burning questions of southern Africa can be solved without the great loss of life which

seemed inevitable only a short while ago.

—By offering a realistic alternative to violent change the possibilities have been enhanced for black and white to work out themselves the mode of their future coexistence and cooperation. The Republic of South Africa is offered the opportunity to turn away from its increasingly isolated position and positively engage in a moderate and hopeful process of peaceful change.

—African leaders recognize that our support and their best chance for continued independence depends on the absence of external military intervention. This is, above all, in the interest of Africa. Big-power intervention can only undermine unity, set African against African, and involve the risk of conflict. I can state categorically that the United States has no such designs on the continent and that therefore further Soviet or Cuban military intervention would raise the gravest questions.

The Economic Dimension

Beyond the immediate political crisis of southern Africa lies the long-term problem of the continent's economic future. Africa has emerged as a continent of 48 states whose boundaries, based on the former colonial frontiers, have brought not only political and social consequences but economic fragmentation, as naturally complementary regions are often divided among two or more states. Consequently there has been a lack of coherence in economic development programs.

In addition, many of the poorest nations of the world are in Africa. Their plight has required massive relief efforts from the United States and other major donor countries of the industrialized world.

It is for these reasons that during my African trip we put forth proposals aimed at providing moderate African states with positive programs through which they can work together toward common objectives. And we proposed measures aimed at ultimately ending Africa's heavy reliance on international relief efforts and setting them on the road toward greater self-reliance. The idea that the United States, along with other industrial nations, can hope to solve or even basically alleviate the economic problems of others simply by massive applications of emergency relief is no longer tenable. Today what is most needed is not relief but assistance programs designed to solve ultimately fundamental development problems by enhancing the possibilities for developing nations either individually or in regional cooperation to attain self-sustaining economic growth.

In this regard, at Dakar, and at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Nairobi, I presented the Administration's views on how best to overcome two major causes of persistent economic distress: the recurrent natural disasters which nullify development progress and the problems which many developing nations experience in adjusting to the dynamics of the global market economy—problems of trade, technology, and investment which often interrupt their progress toward sustained economic advance.

Until long-term goals are reached, foreign assistance will continue to be an important element of our efforts to strengthen the global economic system. Aid will continue to be a crucial response of the international community to natural disasters, other national economic emergencies, and the need to come to grips with basic economic problems which have prevented the achievement of self-sustaining growth.

In this regard, I strongly welcome and support the action of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week in taking the initiative to provide assistance for Zambia, Zaïre, and for other countries affected by the problems of change in southern Africa. This is a critically important initiative to meet immediate needs of the area, and we will be working closely with you during the legislative process.

The responsibility to assist cannot be a purely American effort, requiring large new outlays. We need a reorientation of programs

and a new sense of direction coupled with strategic new initiatives. These should overcome the fragmented national approaches of current programs and involve all key industrial and recipient nations.

We welcome the proposals of French President Giscard d'Estaing as a most valuable initiative. President Giscard has proposed an exceptional fund for the advancement of Africa which will incorporate two basic institutions: a council of donors and a council of recipients. Its primary objectives will be to improve transportation, agriculture, and mineral development in Africa and to control drought in the Sahel.

In addition, President Giscard has proposed a European-African Institute to facilitate the transfer of technology to enable African countries to process their own raw materials.

These are the kinds of major and coordinated efforts with participation by all concerned which are required if the root causes of development problems are to be addressed. We welcome President Giscard's proposals and will be discussing them further with him next week. It is especially important to recognize that these are not proposals for further handouts, but efforts to rationalize and coordinate existing programs with the aim of turning relief programs into self-sustaining development.

In recent years, the drought-stricken area of the Sahel has been a major recipient of relief assistance. The time now has come, as we pointed out in Dakar, to strike at the heart of the problem.

At Dakar we pointed out that the United States strongly supports the efforts of the international group of donor countries called the *Club des Amis du Sahel*. The Club is working on mobilizing foreign and local investment on a major scale over the next decade with the aim of reversing the current economic and ecological decline of the area. I know the Congress shares this view and had already requested the Administration to prepare a long-term comprehensive development proposal for the area. This report, sent to the Congress on April 30, outlines the basic strategy which we and all nations concerned believe will lay the foundations for future growth in the Sahel.

At the UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi I sought on behalf of President Ford to advance the positive trend in the North-South dialogue which has been evident since the United States set forth our comprehensive proposals at the U.N. seventh special session last September. Our aim, then and now, has been to address the issues most troubling the developing nations, commodities, trade, technology, investment, balance of payments, and the needs of the poorest countries, not only in their interest but in ours.

We hope that by the end of the conference a consensus will emerge on the broad outlines of our comprehensive and constructive approach. We would then look to smaller international groups to deal with the individual proposals we have made.

With the critical political issues of southern Africa—including Namibia and South Africa as well as Rhodesia—dominating the scene, the economic dimension of our policy could not in itself be decisive. But it is essential. With the platform established by the Lusaka speech our economic policy strongly reinforces our position. Over time, as the problems of southern Africa are resolved, the relative importance of development issues will increase. At Nairobi we have laid a firm foundation for constructive, mutually beneficial cooperation on those issues.

Mr. Chairman, I found in Africa a great concern with three cardinal objectives:

—That aspirations for self-determination be achieved;

—That Africa must take its place as a responsible and healthy participant in the global economic system; and

—That Africa should be free from external intervention.

And I found a warm welcome for the concrete proposals by which we applied this policy to the issues of most immediate concern to Africa.

I believe that our policy is moderate and reasonable. More than that, it is right.

—We have advanced the possibilities for

peaceful change by giving African nations an alternative to the path of bloodshed that had already started and was certain to escalate.

—We have fostered an economic process aimed at giving all nations a stake in a fair and mutually beneficial global economic system and aimed at the ultimate termination of handouts from rich to poor nations by enabling developing countries to move toward more basic economic self-reliance.

—We have laid the foundation for a strengthened relationship between the United States and Africa, a continent with vast potential for the future.

—We have taken important steps to resist Communist encroachment and preserve the balance of global stability—not by truculently throwing our weight around, but by identifying ourselves with principles which America has always stood for and which the world still looks to us to foster and defend.

Thus our African policy is an important element in our overall international effort to help build a structure of relations which fosters peace, widening prosperity, and fundamental human dignity.

We have regained the initiative. We have offered our African friends a welcome alternative for the future, both political and economic. We have told much of the world that America continues to have a positive vision and to stand ready to play an active and responsible role in the world.

But we should have no illusions. A two-week trip cannot solve all our problems. Africa will be watching us closely to see that we match our speeches with concrete action.

Over the long term the crucial factor in Africa—as in our dealing with all parts of the world—will be the restoring of our domestic fabric and projecting ourselves with coherence and steadiness in the world.

The African Continent today presents us with a major challenge. We are on the way to meeting that challenge successfully. Our actions will have to continue to be comprehensive and well integrated. We have a solid base from which to work. And we have the essential assets to carry out a successful policy. Much will depend on our performance—Congress and the executive together—over the next few months.

And if we carry out these policies together, America will vindicate what it has always stood for: conciliation rather than violence; human dignity rather than oppression; self-determination and not colonialism, new or old; progress and hope.

Comments Invited on Draft Text of U.S.-Canada Pipeline Agreement

The Department of State released on May 10 (with press release 238) the ad referendum text of an agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada concerning transit pipelines which was initialed by representatives of the two governments on January 28. Our purpose in releasing the text is to provide for full consultations with all interested parties before final Administration decision.

Neither the U.S. nor Canadian Governments have signed, nor has the U.S. Government given its final approval to the proposed treaty. Its release does not prejudge final approval of the draft agreement nor a decision by the Administration on a transportation system for Alaskan natural gas.

The Department also initiated consultations on May 10 with the Congress and interested persons on the basis of this draft text preparatory to a final decision by the Administration on the proposed agreement. The Department also published a notice in the Federal Register informing interested persons of the publication of the draft agreement and inviting their comments on or before June 9.

American Resolve and the Security of Israel

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

I want to take a few moments this evening to recall some of our basic objectives and opportunities in the world—the permanent interests and concerns for which this nation is responsible—and why our commitment to the security and survival of Israel is an essential element of our global policy.

We have been committed for 30 years to the maintenance of global peace. No other nation has the strength to do so without us. The United States for 30 years has been the engine of the world economy and the promoter of economic development. No other nation has the resources or technology or managerial skill to do so alone. Without our commitment there can be no security; without our dedication there can be no progress.

This role is not an act of altruism, but a matter of vital self-interest. Upheavals in key areas such as the Middle East menace our friends and allies, jeopardize our prosperity, and raise the risk of global confrontation. The Middle East war of 1973 brought a confrontation with the Soviet Union and contributed to the most severe recession in the postwar period.

But neither peace nor progress comes inevitably or automatically. These goals are mere abstractions if they are not pursued with strength, vision, and conviction. For a generation, America has been the leader in maintaining the balance of power, in offering help to friends to insure their survival, in mediating conflicts, in building and sustaining international cooperation for economic progress. We could not have done so without our strength; we would not have done so without our convictions.

Today we can be proud of where we stand.

After 35 years of continual tensions and intermittent conflict, America is now at peace; no American is at war anywhere in the world. Militarily, our power is vast and growing, superior in technology and in the most important categories of strategic strength. We have solid and secure allies. Our readiness and our resolve deter wars and buttress global stability.

Economically, the United States and the great industrialized democracies have shown once again the resiliency and basic vigor of free economies. We have successfully come through a period of recession and inflation induced in large part by drastic and unwarranted oil price increases. The solidarity of our major alliances has dramatically proved itself in a new sphere of common endeavor—economic recovery and energy policy—adding another dimension of unity above and beyond our collective defense.

Our Founding Fathers were men of faith and vision. They had faith in the future of a free people. And they had the vision to understand, as Edmund Burke said, that "You can never plan the future by the past."

We need these qualities as much today as 200 years ago: Faith, because, to our people, dedication to the cause of freedom transcends partisanship and ethnic or social division; vision, because while we must learn from the past, we are not, and must not become, its prisoner.

[1] Made at Baltimore, Md., on May 9 upon receiving the Chizuk Amuno Synagogue Distinguished Leadership Award (text from press release 237).

These qualities of faith and vision are characteristic also of another people—the people of Israel. They are qualities we need especially as we contemplate the future of the Middle East and seek to build there, together, a lasting peace.

There is no greater example of the power of faith than the creation of the State of Israel. For centuries it was a dream for the persecuted and oppressed; then it became a reality. And a reality it shall remain. The survivors never lost their faith, and they built a modern nation in the desert in our own lifetime. Now they dream of peace. And that, too, they will achieve.

The road ahead is almost certainly more difficult—but nonetheless inescapable—than the steps we have taken so far. But we are launched together on that road, and we shall continue together with confidence and dedication.

For our relations with Israel are central to and inseparable from the broad concept of our foreign policy. The United States has permanent and fundamental concerns in the world that reflect the values of our people. True to the origins of our own nation:

—We have always been inspired by moral aims, committed to use our power for the cause of freedom, justice, and international security.

—We have maintained a strong defense and supported our friends, knowing that we could not leave the future of freedom to the mercy of others.

—We have wielded our strength as a creative force for peace, promoting solutions to conflicts and new endeavors of cooperation, confident that mankind is not doomed to anarchy and destruction; that its power can be used for conciliation and progress.

—And we have exerted our leadership as well in the economic realm, conscious that the well-being of nations and peoples is a fundamental component of international order and of a better future.

These principles will guide our policy as we seek peace in the Middle East.

Morality and Foreign Policy

The genius of America has always been its moral significance. Since its birth America has held a promise and a dream to which others have clung and many have sought to emulate. As Gladstone said, ". . . the American Constitution is the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man."

Americans have always believed that what we did mattered not just for ourselves but for all mankind. We have been the bulwark of democracy, a refuge for those fleeing persecution, and the most humanitarian nation in history.

Since the end of World War II global peace and prosperity have depended to an extraordinary degree upon America. Throughout this period America's might has always been used to defend, never to oppress. So it will be in the future.

The relationship between America and Israel rests fundamentally on this moral basis. If the world is to be peaceful and equitable, the conduct of nations must have an ethical foundation. Those who have suffered from its absence, who have been victimized by arbitrary power—and no people has been more than the Jewish people—know in their bones how without ethical principles the ruthless will rule and the weak will suffer. Peace with justice must have a special meaning for a people—like the Jewish people—who have, through history, sought it so fervently but experienced it so rarely.

For all these reasons, Americans look upon Israel as a loyal friend committed, as are we, to the principles of freedom and democracy. We value the part we played in creating the State of Israel and in sustaining its survival. The United States can never ignore its moral responsibility for the fate of nations which rely upon us as the ultimate defender of their survival and freedom. We are thoroughly convinced that Israel's survival is inseparable from the future of human dignity, and we shall never forget that Israel's security has a special claim on the conscience of mankind.

Nor will we forget that the true strength

of friendship lies in our honesty and candor with each other. Our relationship with Israel is too important for us to delude ourselves with less than our honest opinions. We do not prove our friendship by ignoring the realities we both face. We undermine our common future if, for temporary expediency, we tell each other fairy tales. We prove our good intentions by working together with dedication, facing hardship and reality for the common good, and above all by never forgetting how important our partnership is for all that we each seek in the world.

America's aim is a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and so is Israel's. During the U.N.'s consideration of the Palestine question over 25 years ago, an American diplomat expressed the hope that the day will come when the Jews and Arabs in the Middle East will live together in the true spirit of Christian brotherhood. We may be amused by the phrase, but it reflects a basic aspiration. Israel is entitled to live with its neighbors in the same sense of safety and normalcy that is taken for granted almost everywhere else in the world.

The United States and Israel can debate over tactics, but never over the basic reality that our relationship with each other is special for reasons that transcend tactics. What ties us together is not legal documents, but a moral connection which cannot be severed.

A Strong Defense

The second strand of American policy is a realistic appreciation of the importance of American strength. Aspirations for a better world are empty without the strength to implement them. No one should understand better than the Jewish people that weakness is not a virtue and that righteousness alone is no protection in a world of insecurity and injustice.

There can be no security without equilibrium and no safety without the restraint which a balance of power imposes. Only when the rights of nations are respected by necessity, when accommodation supplants force, can mankind's energies be devoted to the realization of its higher aspirations.

For 30 years the United States has occupied a central place in the global balance of stability. Our strength or our weakness, our effectiveness or ineffectiveness, affect decisively the calculations of nearly every nation in the world and determine our ability to shape events to our purposes. We cannot surrender one strategic part of the world to those who oppose us and remain secure and unchallenged in another. So those who want America strong in one part of the world have a special obligation to keep it strong in all strategically important areas. Nations, wherever they are located, that rely on us cannot fail to be affected whenever America abdicates responsibility—whether in Asia or in Africa.

The American people have never been comfortable with weakness. We have never relished abdication. And when it is imposed on us by domestic divisions it has its inevitable reaction. It is reassuring to see the American people once again emphatically united on the necessity of a strong defense. This year's defense budget will allow us to continue to improve our military forces—to insure that no other nation can threaten us, our interests, or our friends.

As President Kennedy wrote, we did not ask to be "the watchmen on the walls of world freedom." [2] But circumstances have made us so. History taught us that our own tranquillity depends on global stability. From Waterloo to Sarajevo, America benefited from the stability of a world balance of power which maintained global security and prevented international war. That responsibility now rests, in large measure, with us. It is a responsibility we cannot skirt.

The United States will keep its friends and allies strong enough to defend themselves with our support—to insure that peace is seen clearly by their adversaries to be the only feasible course.

We will not fail to provide for Israel's

[2] For President Kennedy's address prepared for delivery at Dallas, Tex., on Nov. 22, 1963, see "Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1963," p. 890.

security. American aid to Israel was $437 million in fiscal year 1973; since then it has increased to 2.3 billions of dollars for the current fiscal year—a fivefold increase in three years. Israel now receives about a third of our total foreign assistance. Israel has received $6 billion in aid since its founding; we have proposed $4.1 billion for the next two years. Those who opportunistically question our dedication to the security of Israel should examine these statistics.

Maintaining a Stable Peace

Strength alone is not enough. It is useful only in the service of a concept of the national interest and when wielded with creativity, wisdom, and compassion to shape the course of events. Thus our true strength is not military power, but the dedication of a free people which knows its responsibility, which has a vision of what it seeks and the courage to seek it.

The United States has never been defeated for lack of military power. All our recent setbacks, from Indochina to Angola, have been self-inflicted; they have occurred because of divisions among ourselves that paralyzed our action.

Together there is little we cannot do. Divided, there is little we can attempt.

The most urgent challenge before America is a national consensus on our purposes and objectives. As a nation, we must maintain the balance of power and have the vision to fulfill positive aspirations. There is no ultimate safety in a balance of terror constantly contested. We must vigilantly protect our own security and that of our allies and friends, but we must also seek to build habits of communication and relationships of cooperation.

With respect to our adversaries, we are determined to resist moves to gain unilateral benefits by military pressure, direct or indirect. The United States will not accept any further Angolas. At the same time, we owe it to ourselves and to the world to seek to push back the shadow of nuclear holocaust, to slow the strategic arms race, to resolve political problems through negotiation, and to expand our relations on the basis of strict reciprocity.

This process is meant to serve, not to sacrifice, our interests and values. The state of relations between the United States and the Communist powers is vastly better today for us and for global peace than it was 10 years ago, when crises were frequent, when communication was rudimentary, and when the world did not have the luxury of criticizing efforts to reduce tensions.

Our policy in the Middle East, similarly, is designed to serve our most positive goals. The extraordinary steps that have been taken in the last few years between Arab states and Israel have brought us progress undreamed of a few short years ago. The process of negotiation between the parties is continuing; the United States remains in a pivotal position to promote a balanced negotiation, to support friends, and dampen conflicts. The Middle East today is at a moment of unprecedented opportunity:

—Israel has shown in negotiation the boldness for which it is renowned in battle, and that in turn has made possible concrete political steps toward a durable peace settlement.

—Some of the Arab countries are now at last speaking openly and wisely of making peace and bringing an end to generations of conflict.

—The United States has shown its determination and ability to promote a just and enduring solution between the parties, to prevent this region from again becoming the focal point of global crisis.

—If we continue to conduct our relationship with the major outside powers with reason and firmness, we can move toward a global environment of restraint that will enhance even further the possibilities of constructive negotiation and progress.

The negotiations ahead in the Middle East will present difficult obstacles and difficult decisions. We understand the complexity of Israel's position. Any negotiation will require Israel to exchange territory in return

for political, and therefore much less concrete, concessions. Even Israel's ultimate goals—a peace treaty and recognition from its neighbors—are inherently intangible. But they would be the greatest step toward security since the creation of the State. We do not underestimate the dilemmas and risks that Israel faces in a negotiation; but they are dwarfed by a continuation of the status quo. And we recognize our obligation, as the principal support for Israel's security, to be understanding of Israel's specific circumstances in the process of negotiations.

All of us who are friends of Israel and who are at the same time dedicated to further progress toward peace understand Israel's uncertainties—and at the same time we share her hope. There will be no imposed solutions; there should be negotiations between the parties that will eventually have to live in peace.

It is a delicate but careful process, because no American and no friend of Israel can be ignorant of what is at stake. Much work and many dangers—most immediately the situation in Lebanon—remain, but the peace process has come further than all but a very few dared hope.

As the process continues, the United States will not weaken Israel by failing to perceive its needs, or by failing to understand its worries, or by abandoning our fundamental commitment to its survival and security. In this process there is hope; in stagnation there are mounting dangers. Together we can achieve what a few years ago seemed a vain dream: a Middle East whose nations live at peace and with a consciousness of security.

A Prosperous World Economic Order

A fourth element of American foreign policy is our commitment to sustain the world economic order. A dominant issue of international relations for the next generation will be the economic division of our planet between North and South—industrial and developing—which has become as pressing an issue as the division between East and West. I have just returned from Nairobi, from addressing a meeting of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, where I put forward new ideas for multilateral cooperation.

Peace would be fragile indeed in a world of economic stagnation or frustration, in an era of economic warfare or unremitting hostility between the industrial world and the developing world. In the last few years the world community has been reminded dramatically by the oil embargo and the ensuing recession of the extent to which economic relations are an essential foundation of the international order. Bold new policies are needed to make the international economic system more secure and more dynamic. Therefore, just as we seek to move beyond a balance of power in East–West relations, so must we transcend tests of strength in North–South relations in favor of more creative and constructive relationships in tune with the sweep of human aspirations.

We do so in our own self-interest. As the world's strongest power, the United States could survive an era of economic warfare. But the American people would not be true to ourselves were we to turn our backs on the legitimate hopes of tens of millions for a better life. Our own self-interest requires us to use our preeminent economic strength to strengthen and build upon the interdependence of all nations in the global economy.

No other country has our opportunity to build long-term relations of partnership in helping nations to develop their resources and economies. All over the globe American economic strength is admired and sought; it should be seen by us not as a "giveaway" but as an unmatchable advantage which can be creatively used to strengthen our diplomacy for peace and the prospects of a stable and just world order.

Israel, too, has made a great contribution to the cause of constructive relations between the advanced and the developing countries. The imagination and creativity which the pioneering settlers of Israel used to make the desert bloom have been generously of-

fered to many developing countries. We support those initiatives, and we will do what we can to assist them.

Israel faces serious economic difficulties in the years ahead, partly because—let us face it squarely—Moses had some shortcomings as a petroleum geologist. In place of natural resources, Israel's economy must be driven by creativity, hard work, and determination —assets which fortunately are in abundance in that little country. To prosper, Israel must have access to world markets, and countries and companies that wish to trade with her must be free to do so.

The United States will continue to help Israel's economy overcome world recession, higher petroleum prices, and the costs of a strong national defense. The United States is committed to ending restrictions on Israel's rights to trade and on the rights of others to trade with Israel. Steps toward peace in the political and military field must include steps to end the economic warfare.

America and Israel

As America makes progress toward all its broad objectives of global peace and well-being, the world is made safer for all countries that rely on us. But if legislative battles and domestic divisions weaken America's leadership, it will not be America alone which pays the price. Our friends and allies will grievously suffer.

Americans and Israelis must work together creatively and boldly in the challenging period ahead. Diplomacy at its best is a process of creation, not of passive reactions to events. For Americans and Israelis above all, who have always shaped actions out of purposes, there is no excuse for political wrangling that in perilous times makes coherent and purposive action impossible.

America has a special responsibility. Never has there been any question about our physical power. As our economy rebounds from recession, there is every reason for confidence about our long-term—and indeed permanent—superiority in the economic and technological strength that is the basis of our military power as well as of our economic welfare. The challenge to us at this point in our history is whether we can restore the consensus and national confidence that can make this power effective for our goals.

I am optimistic. We are not weak; we are only hesitant. It lies within us to remedy our difficulties.

The former Foreign Minister of France, Maurice Couve de Murville, said on the floor of the French Assembly three days ago:

> The instability in the world is above all a result of the American crisis caused by the defeat in Viet-Nam and the Watergate affair, rather than by the increase in Soviet power . . .

Americans know that when all is said and done, there cannot be peace for one nation; there must be peace for all nations, or all are in jeopardy.

The world looks to us. This is one fact that I have found, whatever continent I have visited—Africa, Latin America, Asia, or Europe. Although we no longer enjoy the preponderant power we once had, we are still the strongest single country and a nation recognized throughout the world for its honesty, its decency and unselfishness. If we persevere, if we use our great moral and physical influence to maintain the balance of power, promote world prosperity, mediate conflicts, and put our considerable weight on the scales of justice—if, in short, we do as we have always done—we will usher in an unparalleled period of progress and peace.

President Roosevelt once said that his generation of Americans had a rendezvous with destiny. Let it be said of our generation of Americans that they have had a rendezvous with peace and with progress.

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Hearst Newspapers

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by John P. Wallach of the Hearst Newspapers at Washington on May 11.

Press release 244 dated May 12

Mr. Wallach: What are the most positive achievements of the African trip?

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in Africa was drifting. War in southern Africa had already started. The radical elements were gaining the upper hand. The Soviet Union was appearing from the outside as a champion; the moderate regimes were coming under increasing pressure; and therefore all the moderate governments in Africa were in danger and all the Western interests were in jeopardy.

I think with this trip the Administration started a process which can lead to negotiation of the so-called armed struggle in southern Africa and permit black and white populations there to work out a way to live together.

We gave friends in Africa a standard to rally around, and the undecided, something to consider. And therefore I think it protected the Western interests in a moderate, constructive evolution of African affairs. And I think it will be so perceived as time goes on.

Mr. Wallach: Was there a danger that if you did not take the trip at the time you took it, the Soviet influence would have gained—

Secretary Kissinger: The timing of the trip was dictated by the availability of the heads of government, the UNCTAD Conference [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] in Nairobi, and the forthcoming heads-of-government meeting of African leaders in Mauritius. It was not just invented. Of course, you cannot say that a one-week delay or a two-week delay wasn't possible. But with every delay, the trends that I described would have gotten worse, and the situation would have become more unmanageable. And everybody agreed that it was imperative to take some steps.

Mr. Wallach: Do you feel that the results of the Texas primary would have been different if you had postponed the trip?

Secretary Kissinger: It is my job to conduct foreign policy. It is my job to time these trips in terms that are most useful from a foreign policy point of view. If somebody wants to raise a political consideration, I would of course take it seriously. And of course the President has the final decision. The fact of the matter is that even though I briefed the Cabinet about two weeks before going and even though all the political advisers—those responsible for political affairs—were present, nobody raised a political objection to the trip.

Since I have returned, I have talked to a number of people who are politically astute, and they all tell me that the trip either did not affect it or affected it in such an infinitesimal way that it isn't measurable. But I have no personal judgment.

Mr. Wallach: There are reports Congress is unlikely to enact a ban on the Rhodesia program unless the Administration wages an all-out effort. Do you have such a commitment from the President that at some point in this year the Administration will be willing to do that?

Secretary Kissinger: My understanding is that the President will give full support to the policy proposals.

Mr. Wallach: What do you believe is now required to give credibility to the pledges that you made in Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we will see that all the programs will begin to be implemented. President Giscard [Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of France] has announced a program in which he calls on the industrialized countries to form a group to work together with a group in Africa, which is certainly related to the objectives of this trip, something that we will endorse and which he will recognize as compatible with the proposals I have made.

We will take steps on the Sahel issue, and we will be in touch with other countries, including South Africa, on the problem of southern Africa.

Mr. Wallach: What kind of time frame do you have in mind on the Rhodesian program—issue?

Secretary Kissinger: I can't say. It depends on the legislative situation.

Mr. Wallach: But you feel confident that the Administration will—

Secretary Kissinger: I feel confident that the Administration will carry out its own policies.

Mr. Wallach: Supporters of the Byrd amendment contend the United States doesn't have the right to put such pressure on Rhodesia, because in many other black African nations, so-called majority rule has led to dictatorships or one-party rule, not political freedom for the black people of those countries.

Secretary Kissinger: The problem is that the change in southern Africa is either going to come through negotiation or through war. We did not start the armed struggle that is now going on. We do not approve of the forms of government of several of the African states as we now know them. But there is a difference how these states govern themselves, or whether an outside minority that has no international status and has never been recognized by anybody, including the United States, executes it.

Mr. Wallach: Do you feel that without the actions you have taken there was a risk of Soviet or Cuban involvement in Rhodesia?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, there was.

Mr. Wallach: Do you think that if South Africa remains out of the struggle you have anything resembling assurances from some of the countries you visited that Soviet or Cuban troops will not be asked to intervene?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to call it assurances, but I have every confidence that there will be no outside forces. And if that should change, everything else will change.

Mr. Wallach: What assurance is there? You mentioned several times on the trip the desire to have a constitution in Rhodesia that would protect white minorities. Do you feel that there is a possibility of that?

Secretary Kissinger: All these questions are leading us in the wrong direction, because these questions are giving the impression that it is the United States which is imposing a solution there. What we want is an African solution free of outside pressures. The question that we are trying to influence is whether the future will be shaped by men with guns or by civilians. We have no stake in the government of any one country there. We have a stake, however, in not having the whole continent become radical and move in a direction that is incompatible with Western interests. That is the issue.

Mr. Wallach: What do you believe would be the consequences in the Canal Zone and Latin America if the American Government took the position that the United States bought the canal, paid for it, and intends to keep it?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not sure exactly

what the advocates of that position have in mind. Presumably they must have in mind that they will stop the negotiations.

Now, there are a number of things to keep in mind. These negotiations were not started by this Administration. These negotiations had been started in 1964. They have been going on for 12 years, under three Administrations of two different parties, making it clear that three successive Presidents of as different personalities as Johnson, Nixon, and Ford have come to the conclusion that it is in the national interest to negotiate a better arrangement for the Panama Canal. They have come to the conclusion not because a local ruler has made certain demands, but they have come to this conclusion because of their conviction that our relations with all the countries in Latin America would be impaired if we did not make at least a good-faith effort to negotiate an arrangement and because of their conviction that if we make a new arrangement, it might insure a safer operation and a better security for the Panama Canal.

Once the negotiations are concluded, a one-third-plus-one vote of the Senate can block them. A one-third majority of the American Senate can block any new treaty. We will defend the national interests of the United States in Panama. We are confident that if we go to the American public, as we would have to with a new agreement, they will see it as in the national interest.

So the issue right now isn't the substance of an agreement; the issue is that the opponents won't even give us an opportunity to negotiate to preserve our Western Hemisphere policy and to see whether we can get a better arrangement in Panama than the one that now exists. That is the issue.

Mr. Wallach: Is there a danger that if the charges from Reagan and others continue—that this could affect the negotiations, or has it already affected the negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: The charges have certainly not helped the negotiations. But I don't mind the charges. I think the charges we can live with. The policy would be a disaster.

Mr. Wallach: Would you campaign to see that that policy would not go into effect?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is very difficult for a Secretary of State to engage in a political campaign. But it is also very difficult for a Secretary of State to see the basic foreign interest of the United States jeopardized and not try to defend it.

This campaign has exploited foreign policy issues in a partisan way in an unusual manner.

Mr. Wallach: Just picking that up, there seem to have been some victims already of the political campaign, including the SALT negotiation with the Soviet Union. What areas do you see possible for yourself to make progress in the remaining months?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, we have an extraordinary situation. We are at peace. Our relations with all major countries are good and improving. Our relations with our allies have never been better. We are putting together a structure of relationships with the developing nations which is recognized throughout the world as pointing in the most positive direction in that area that has existed in the postwar period. And at this precise moment, foreign policy is becoming a domestic issue, with charges that no one can define, with allegations that the United States has become—is slipping behind—that no foreigner would agree with, that the Institute of Strategic Studies in London is contradicting.

So, it is my responsibility to keep in mind that the foreign policy of the United States must reflect the permanent interests of the United States. And I am trying to keep it together during the turbulence of an electoral period, at a time when an intense debate is going on.

Mr. Wallach: Can you assess American gains diplomatically versus Soviet gains or defeats in the last several years?

Secretary Kissinger: If you look over the world situation, the Soviets have suffered serious setbacks in the Middle East. The Western alliance has become much stronger. The Soviet Union has achieved no gains anywhere except those that our domestic divisions handed to them. The only Soviet gain you can point to is in Angola, which our own congressional action handed to them.

Therefore, if you look at progress toward peace in the Middle East, if you look at the opening of our relations with China, you see a series of problems for the Soviet Union and a series of advances for the United States, and you see no setbacks that the Soviet Union has inflicted on us. The United States has had no setbacks caused by insufficient strength anywhere.

Mr. Wallach: Hasn't the U.S.-Soviet cooperation been affected by the political dialogue in this country—SALT, for example?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, on SALT, these are intangible things, and it is hard to know. But I believe that the problem of making of peace in the nuclear age is one that is absolutely unavoidable—that we have to have a dual policy of preventing Soviet expansion but also putting our relationship on a better basis. Any Administration will have to follow this. And even if Mr. Reagan became President, he would soon be confronted with the imperative that you cannot rest the peace of the world on the constant threat of a war that by every estimate will kill hundreds of millions. That is a permanent necessity for the United States. And mock-tough posturing will not get us around it.

Mr. Wallach: Do you still think there is any possibility of a SALT agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: I think there is a probability of a SALT agreement before October 1977, when the interim agreement runs out, because I think it is in the overwhelming interest of both sides and in the interest of the world peace.

Mr. Wallach: But you wouldn't say the political process has hurt the chances of agreement this year?

Secretary Kissinger: The political process hasn't helped it, but it hasn't hurt it—it hasn't hurt it irrevocably.

Mr. Wallach: Let's turn to the Middle East for a moment. Do you regard the latest Soviet proposal for a two-stage Geneva Conference, including the possibility of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] working in the preparation of that conference, as containing any new elements?

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't found any new elements yet. Of course, as you know, we proposed a two-stage approach, and if the first stage could be conducted without the PLO without any prejudice to what happens later, then I think we would be very close to the Soviet position. But the first stage could include those countries that were invited to the first Geneva Conference and then let those countries that were, after all, the originators of the conference, decide where we go from here. Then I think we would be prepared to meet.

Mr. Wallach: Would the PLO be able to participate as a member of one of those delegations?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that has never been raised yet. Our position is that the PLO must recognize Israel.

Mr. Wallach: Do you see a chance for a Geneva Conference this year?

Secretary Kissinger: It doesn't look too promising now.

Mr. Wallach: Have you discussed since your return from Africa your own future with the President, and have you received any assurances from him about being able to remain?

Secretary Kissinger: This question implies that I am consumed with the desire to remain. I made clear to the President in December that I was serving only at his request, to hold foreign policy together dur-

ing the electoral period. I ask no assurances from the President. I do not say I am indispensable. We have to consider the problem of a change in May of an election year and the process of transition at such a stage. But that is a decision for the President. I have not asked for any assurances. I am trying to serve my country, and if I am the slightest embarrassment for the President, there will be no difficulty about my leaving.

Mr. Wallach: But has he told you that he wants you to stay, or has it not come up?

Secretary Kissinger: He has repeatedly told me that he wants me to stay, but I don't need to ask for a vote of confidence. If he has something to tell me, he will undoubtedly tell me. But we have an excellent relationship that has not been impaired. It isn't the sort of relationship in which you ask for a vote of confidence.

Mr. Wallach: Have you at all considered resigning?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is my duty to do my job in these conditions until somebody who knows the political situation tells me that it is becoming problematical. It is not my duty to bend with every election result.

Mr. Wallach: And no one yet has said to you that you are a political liability in the Administration?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I read it in the newspapers, but no one says it to me.

Mr. Wallach: Let me turn, if I can, to Europe. Do you believe that your warnings about possible Communist participation in the Italian Government have had any beneficial effect?

Secretary Kissinger: The elections in Italy have to be decided by Italians. I cannot tell Italians what to do. I can tell foreigners the impact on the United States of their actions. The choice is then up to them. We have a relationship with European countries that is very close and which involves hundreds of thousands of Americans stationed in Europe. And I must point out what the dangers to that relationship are. But I do not attempt to assess how the Italian voters react to it.

Mr. Wallach: What are the major challenges you see in the remaining six or eight months of this Administration?

Secretary Kissinger: The major challenges remain the challenges that we have had all along—to build a structure of peace; to strengthen our relationships with our allies; and to build a structure of peace with our adversaries and to strengthen our relationships with our allies and to build a new set of relations with the new nations. Within that, then, we have to avoid an outbreak of war in the Middle East. We have to do what can be done to make progress on these other issues. Those goals are permanent and are not affected by the election year.

Mr. Wallach: You don't see any specific objectives in the Middle East or in relationship with the Soviet Union, in the Third World, that you would like to accomplish before you leave office?

Secretary Kissinger: How do you know when I leave office? [Laughter.] Our foreign policy is not geared to the satisfaction of my own ego.

Mr. Wallach: On the Panama Canal—is an efficiently functioning canal still an important U.S. interest?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Wallach: And what assurance is there that it would be continued if Panama gains control?

Secretary Kissinger: The definition of Panama gaining control is—this is itself a misstatement. The treaty will provide for the safe, neutral, unimpeded transit of ships through the canal. This will be a right we will have—we will be able to assert.

Secondly, what we are negotiating involves American participation in both the operation and the defense of the canal for extended periods of time, not unrelated to the expected usefulness of the canal.

And therefore we believe will have adequate assurances, and I must repeat, we will have to convince two-thirds of the Senate that what we have done is in the national interest.

Mr. Wallach: If the danger of nuclear war is to be averted, do you believe Congress must be prepared to take greater risks for peace than it has shown a willingness to do in recent times?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the actions that the Congress has taken in Turkey, in Angola, and in some aspects of the intelligence investigations, have not served the national interests.

Mr. Wallach: How would you describe your relationship today with Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: I think my relationship with the Congress today is better than with the candidates.

Mr. Wallach: A final question: Is America in danger of abdicating its leadership of the free world?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States, in the last years, has exercised unprecedented leadership in the free world. No matter what the field is, whether it is defense, whether it is energy, whether it is relations with the developing countries, whether it is East-West relations, the entire agenda is an American agenda. There is almost no initiative that is not originated in the United States. We are the leaders of the free countries, and therefore we have a special responsibility; and therefore we must not downgrade ourselves, because it affects not only us, it affects scores of nations around the world.

United States and Canada Extend Fisheries Agreement

Joint U.S.-Canada Statement [1]

The Governments of the United States and Canada extended their agreement on Reciprocal Fishing Privileges for one year by an exchange of notes in Ottawa dated April 14, 1976 and April 22, 1976. At the same time they agreed to continue consultations on a new agreement which would be compatible with extended fisheries jurisdiction in both countries.

This agreement, which was initially concluded in 1970 and renegotiated in 1973, is being extended to April 24, 1977. It provides for nationals and vessels of each country to conduct commercial fishing for designated species on a reciprocal basis within certain defined areas in the waters over which each country currently exercises fisheries jurisdiction.

[1] Issued at Washington and Ottawa on Apr. 22 (text from press release 191).

American Diplomacy at the United Nations: The Real Stakes

Address by Samuel W. Lewis
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs [1]

This evening I want to share with you some deep concerns about where we as a nation are going in the United Nations.

We have come a long way since the U.N. Charter was adopted 31 years ago. The world as a whole has changed, and the United Nations has changed. It is not the same organization that Americans helped to create out of the global upheaval of world war. Almost 100 new nations have joined since 1945. These countries are dissatisfied with the cards they were dealt at independence and have different political systems, cultural traditions, and economic needs. Some of them are bringing to U.N. debates a harshness and stridency that grates on Western ears.

In earlier years the United Nations was chiefly an arena of Soviet-American conflict. It was a barometer of East-West tension. It was also a place where we and our allies—the principal founders of the United Nations—were almost always able to advance our most important concerns. Today, however, the United Nations has become a place of conflict and competition along new lines. The North-South debate over development, trade, the sharing of the world's resources, is at times harsh and acrimonious. And distortions of reality, such as last year's infamous declaration on Zionism in the General Assembly, have seemed to overshadow much of the good work done in the United Nations.

My message to you this evening is that while all is not well with the United Nations, much of value is being accomplished there. Most of the resolutions passed—in the committees, technical bodies and agencies, and even in the General Assembly—are decided by consensus. Most of the issues are judged on their merits. And much of the work of the United Nations is of direct benefit to Americans as well as to others. But this view of the United Nations, as an organization working for the mutual benefit of all members, is often overshadowed by the few highly publicized political differences that typically arise in the General Assembly each fall.

I do not wish to minimize these differences. We are working hard on many fronts to protect our interests and those of our friends and to advance the cause of peace in the Middle East and elsewhere. But these political differences, so long as the underlying causes remain unresolved, will persist—at the United Nations as in the world itself.

My overriding concern is that a distorted view of the United Nations—as a place where we are simply taking it on the chin—has more currency in the United States than at any previous time. The polls show that public regard for the United Nations has recently reached a new low. This view is reflected in the decreasing support in Congress for paying our dues and contributing to voluntary U.N. programs. And more Americans

[1] Made at Milwaukee, Wis., on May 12 before the Governor's Conference on the United Nations (text from press release 243).

are writing to us, calling for the United States to leave the United Nations if it does not "mend its ways."

Against this background, we should take a hardheaded, pragmatic view when we assess our role in the United Nations. We must ask ourselves how our participation benefits the United States and its citizens. We must ask how the United Nations of 1976 squares with our ideals. But we should also acknowledge that this organization—the only one of its kind—must inevitably reflect the divisiveness, the imperfections, of the world it represents. After all, it is not some abstraction called the United Nations which is responsible for good or bad decisions, but individual governments which decide how their representatives should act in U.N. bodies.

Moreover, I believe we must view our policy toward the United Nations as simply one aspect of a broader effort on many diplomatic fronts to shape the kind of world we seek: a world at peace, a world of growing prosperity, and a world of individual liberty.

If we accept this more limited view of the United Nations, we can then ask ourselves:

—Not whether the United Nations can solve *all* the world's problems, but whether it can achieve *some* of our purposes.

—Not whether we can win every dispute in the United Nations, but whether we can work within the organization to build a world order in which all countries, rich and poor, new and old, feel a genuine stake.

This evening I would like to explore with you some answers to these questions. They are complex questions. They are not simply answered.

I would like therefore to tell you why I believe American support for the United Nations is important—what the real stakes are for us as Americans in the effective functioning of the world organization. I want to discuss with you the challenges we face in conducting multilateral diplomacy in today's complex world. And finally, I want to describe the opportunities I think we have to work constructively with other governments within the United Nations to shape the future.

Frankly, a great many Americans take the United Nations and its benefits for granted. Much of its work is largely unknown.

The United Nations is not just a General Assembly adopting highly political and sometimes offensive resolutions. It is instead a vast array of institutions embracing a vast spectrum of activities. It includes specialized agencies helping to regulate international shipping, aviation, communications, and finance. Some of its organs deal with highly political issues. Others wrestle with the complexities of international economic policy. And some extend food, technical assistance, and humanitarian aid to the poor countries of the world.

Most of these functions are interconnected. For example, while the Security Council makes political decisions to establish and control peacekeeping forces, such as those in the Middle East, it is the General Assembly where all the members jointly agree to share responsibility for these peacekeeping expenses.

When we threaten diminished American support for the United Nations, we need to weigh the consequences for the *entire* U.N. system, not merely for this or that piece.

Unfortunately, many of the measures now being suggested for reducing our support would be extremely broad in their impact. There are proposals now under consideration in Congress that would seriously cripple our participation and might even end it. Recent bills would unilaterally reduce our financial support of the United Nations from the 25 percent we now pay to 15 percent or even to less than 1 percent of the total U.N. budget. And one pending bill would totally suspend U.S. participation in the General Assembly.

Few people realize that under the present assessment rates the United States is treated specially—and favorably. If the "capacity to pay" formula used for calculating the dues

of others—for example, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union—were applied strictly to the United States, we would pay more than our present 25 percent.

It requires no vivid imagination to see that if we drastically reduced our support for the U.N. system, its very existence would be placed at risk. It would undoubtedly stumble on for a time, as did the League of Nations after its major members began to turn their back on it. But it is hard to imagine an effective United Nations if our nation chose, for whatever reasons, to violate our solemn treaty obligations to pay our assessed share of the budget or if to avoid that humiliation we withdrew from membership. Others might pay for some of our share of the budget for a time. But the United Nations would be left to cope with global problems of security and economic cooperation without the participation of its richest, strongest, and often most creative member. If the United Nations is now unable to cope adequately with the unprecedented demands of global interdependence, how much more ineffectual would it become without us?

A World Without a United Nations

If withdrawal of American support led to the U.N.'s eventual collapse, what would be lost? What would be the impact on world peace and security?

First, there would be greater likelihood that regional disputes would erupt into full-scale wars. Governments feeling themselves victims of injustice would have only two options: to seek redress bilaterally or to go to war. If the weaker country could not persuade the stronger to make fair concessions, pressures toward the military course would inevitably increase. One might think that the weaker country would swallow its frustration, knowing that a military adventure was unlikely to succeed. But all of us know that when grievances are intense, logic often does not prevail.

In a world without the United Nations there would be no Security Council available at a moment's notice where an aggrieved party could take its cause, seeking the support of other governments and world opinion to counter its adversary's demands. Within recent months—in Cyprus, the Spanish Sahara, Djibouti, Iceland, Timor, and southern Africa—the Security Council has helped to defuse growing crises.

Second, governments would lack their most important vehicle to help them freeze a crisis temporarily while preserving their long-range negotiating options. It would be much harder to organize diplomatic mediation or to set up peacekeeping forces—in short, to provide time and opportunity for negotiated solutions. Without a United Nations, diplomats would be faced in every crisis with a multitude of difficult and time-consuming secondary issues. Where should antagonists get together? Who should serve as the secretariat? What procedures should be utilized? Who would pay for the time and expenses of observers, mediators, or for any necessary peacekeeping forces? Who would be trusted to solicit and organize the necessary forces from other countries? The list is almost endless.

But at the present time, there is a United Nations, a Security Council, a Secretariat, and established procedures which permit all of those involved in a crisis to get down to business efficiently and without delay.

Third, there would be significantly greater danger of world war in which the United States would be involved. Whether we like it or not, many regional conflicts today carry the seeds of great-power conflict. And the choice is not always up to us. Great-power involvement can be created when one of the *other* powers chooses to intervene.

This risk of escalation was vividly demonstrated during the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. The United Nations played an indispensable role in helping us to arrange the cease-fire and to separate hostile armies. If the conflict had continued, not only would the destruction and suffering in the area have been much greater, but world peace itself would have been gravely jeopardized. No one can be certain that another world war, involving

the United States, would not ultimately have ensued.

This last example underscores how impossible it is to make any strict cost-benefit analysis of U.N. performance. One simply cannot assign a dollars-and-cents value to helping prevent conflicts that could lead to nuclear war. The U.N.'s value in helping to terminate the fourth Arab-Israeli war was beyond calculation. As Secretary of State Kissinger has said, "If this organization had no other accomplishment than its effective peacekeeping role in this troubled area, it would have well justified itself." [2]

Let me turn now to ask what the world would look like without the work of the United Nations in the fields of economic and social cooperation. What would we have to give up or do without? Would it make any difference? I think it would. We and our major allies would lack any worldwide forum to identify and discuss major global problems—forums like the seventh special session of the General Assembly on world economic problems, the Bucharest Conference on Population, the Stockholm Conference on the Environment, the Vancouver Habitat Conference on global housing and urban problems, and the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development now meeting in Nairobi. The United Nations provides a common meeting ground.

Without such universal forums, it would be far harder for governments to identify problems common to both rich and poor nations and to frame agreed goals for this age of increasing interdependence. Without the United Nations, the road would lead toward political upheaval and implacable hostility toward us by the globe's poorer majority.

But let me turn to more concrete effects of a world without the United Nations and its network of organizations.

First, American air travelers abroad—businessmen and tourists, all of us here today—would lack confidence that minimum flight-safety standards were being followed. Equipment standards, minimum altitudes, aircraft intervals, even runway lighting—those things that make the difference between getting there safely and not getting there at all—cannot be left to the choice of individual governments. That is the job of the International Civil Aviation Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations.

Second, Americans would sleep less securely if there were no international safeguards on the peaceful nuclear activities of other countries. And for good reason. Plutonium, an essential ingredient for making nuclear bombs, is being produced in large quantities all over the world as a byproduct from the operation of nuclear energy reactors. The U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency now carries out international inspections to insure that these dangerous materials are not transferred from peaceful uses to the fabrication of weapons.

Third, our citizens would be exposed to even greater dangers from drug trafficking. Without international cooperation in curbing dangerous drugs, we might well be risking more ruined American lives and more violence and death associated with heroin addiction. This is why we have a U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control.

Fourth, our families would be exposed to greater hazard of contagious diseases, which recognize no borders. The millions of us who travel abroad, and even those of us who stay at home, are better protected against outbreaks of epidemics—smallpox, cholera, plague, malaria—through a worldwide information and early-warning system. This is one job of the World Health Organization, another vital part of the U.N. system.

Fifth, as consumers, we would worry more about the food products we import and consume in our homes and restaurants. Without international food standards regarding chemicals and other additives and the use of pesticides, we would be exposed to much greater danger of food contamination. Plant and animal diseases could more easily cross our borders and plague our farmers. The U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization is working effectively on all these problems.

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[2] For Secretary Kissinger's address before the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 22, 1975, see BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1975, p. 545.

Sixth, Americans would have less time to prepare for bad weather—for example, destructive hurricanes on our southern and eastern coasts—without adequate international cooperation and early warning. Transoceanic air travel would be more hazardous and less reliable. The World Weather Watch of the World Meteorological Organization, another part of the United Nations, helps us to minimize the hazards of the elements.

Seventh, the poor nations of the world would no longer receive much of the vital technical assistance they need to help themselves. Many countries want to break the paternalistic relationship between donor and recipient. To do so they need education and training—to create a "critical mass" of talent and expertise—so that they can manage their own economic development efforts. The U.N. Development Program helps to do just this.

This list could be longer—much longer than time permits this evening. The U.N. Fund for Population Activities, the U.N. Environment Program, UNICEF [U.N. Children's Fund], the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the U.N. Disaster Relief Office, and many other bodies—all are working toward a more peaceful, cooperative world. It is under the U.N. flag that these efforts go on. Without the United Nations, many of them would wither and die.

I conclude, therefore, and I hope you will agree, that a world without the United Nations would be a far less congenial place for Americans—a more threatening, competitive, polluted, unsafe, unhealthy world—a poorer place to nurture the human spirit.

Let me ask how many of you know how much these benefits cost us. The answer is about $2.00 for each living American each year. That covers our annual bill—around $450 million—for *all* aspects of the U.N. system. When we purchase one fully equipped modern aircraft carrier, the bill could be up to $3 billion. That is more than six times our annual support for the United Nations. Six times more.

Challenges and Opportunities

Ladies and gentlemen, some of you may wonder if I have exaggerated in painting a picture of a world without the United Nations. Perhaps I have. Perhaps some of the consequences could be lessened or even avoided. But that is essentially beside the point.

The central point is this: The United Nations continues to serve direct U.S. national interests in a thousand concrete ways. It serves those interests imperfectly at times, but surely our challenge is to make it work as well as possible, not to weaken or destroy it. It would be tragic to take unilateral steps which could jeopardize the U.N.'s survival.

Our task then, as concerned citizens, is to maintain American support for the United Nations—to continue our participation in a way that advances our interests, that brings the greatest benefit to all of us. But we cannot ignore the obstacles. Some of these result from recent events within the United Nations, while others are inherent in our national character. Let me review these briefly.

First, we Americans have been prone to extremes of idealism or disillusionment in our view of the United Nations. When the United Nations was founded, many hoped that it would insure universal and lasting peace. Thirty years later, we know that this was an unreal dream. The nuclear holocaust has *not* erupted, and the United Nations has played some part in preventing it. But many Americans remain unaware of its solid achievements and see only the gap between the world as it is and the high ideals of the U.N. Charter. When problems have no final solution, many yearn to withdraw to more finite terrain.

A second major difficulty is our discouragement over the inherent problems in dealing with nearly 150 nations with very different historical backgrounds, cultures, and national objectives. Bilateral diplomacy between two governments can be difficult enough. Multilateral diplomacy can be even more complicated, more frustrating. With

our tremendous energy and genius for solving problems, Americans are used to getting things done quickly and successfully. But in today's world, and in the United Nations in particular, there is rarely any "quick fix." The problems require long discussion, hard bargaining, compromise, and patience. For example, the U.N. conference to negotiate a comprehensive treaty governing the world's oceans has already been going on for three years. Yet no diplomatic effort casts a longer shadow over the future economic welfare and security of many nations, including our own.

Third, many Americans are distressed that, despite our great power and despite our basic good will, we encounter hostile rhetoric at the United Nations. We are often outvoted by the very governments whose independence we championed and whom we have assisted generously.

These are real obstacles. They cannot be ignored, just as we ought not to ignore the shortcomings of the United Nations itself. But I believe we can overcome many of them —over time. We possess many assets. We should base our actions on the fundamental premise that the United Nations can succeed—but only if the United States continues to play a strong role of leadership in its work.

To play that role, we must first acknowledge that the United Nations is not itself responsible for the world's problems. Rather, it is a mirror in which all those problems reflect. The world remains a competitive and often threatening arena for conflicting national ambitions. But it is also an arena filled with common fears, common hopes, common dreams. The United Nations can help us transform those dreams into concrete programs, programs which can turn dreams into reality.

The crowded agenda of the United Nations offers great opportunities for creative diplomacy:

—Our role in the United Nations offers a chance to share the responsibility and the burden of seeking negotiated solutions to conflict. Through the Security Council we can encourage the practice of restraint and conciliation in situations that threaten the peace. In recent years the Council has been conducting its business with heightened seriousness and efficiency.

—The growing problems of an interdependent world require American involvement. Because of the range of our interests and the weight of our influence, there can be neither global security nor economic cooperation without us. Our practical experience, technological expertise, and managerial talent are essential for a more prosperous world. For us, the stakes are not abstract—they involve jobs, inflation, prosperity, and even the ability to pursue the way of life we cherish.

—The United Nations offers Americans an ideal vehicle for expressing our humanitarian tradition in practical ways. Through the U.N. Development Program, the World Food Program, the Human Rights Commission, UNICEF, and many other organizations, we can assist our fellow men, women, and children around the globe. Our prosperity and abundance place a special obligation on us, and our support for U.N. programs can summon our finest qualities.

—Our participation in the United Nations offers us an opportunity to work forthrightly for higher standards of international behavior. Nations will often disagree with us, of course. Every country has its special and distinctive interests and the right to pursue them. But we will expect others to engage us in a spirit of mutual respect and to deal with issues on their merits. We will not passively accept unworkable, biased resolutions, nor arbitrary procedures, nor unwarranted attacks on our good name. Confrontation and cooperation cannot coexist in the United Nations or anywhere else. Our firmness and candor in the United Nations should strengthen our role in the organization. Others will know that we care more about the work of the United Nations when we engage in vigorous give-and-take. I believe all

our citizens strongly support this approach.

Finally, it is only fair to ask: What are our prospects? What are the prospects for the United Nations itself? No one can be certain. But recent events suggest that determined and creative leadership by the United States can produce encouraging results.

Last September we played a leading role in the seventh special session of the General Assembly on world economic cooperation. Our government presented a comprehensive set of proposals for improving economic relationships between the developing countries and the industrial world. Our proposals became the basis for the program adopted by the Assembly. The important point is that this was a test case—was it going to be possible to fashion an approach to global economic issues which would be more attractive to the developing nations than sterile political confrontation? We proposed a nonideological approach to the challenge of economic interdependence, a concrete program of benefit to poor countries and rich countries alike. We found an overwhelming majority of governments ready to try this path with us. And Secretary Kissinger has just tabled in Nairobi a program of further practical steps along this cooperative road. So long as we find other nations want to travel it with us, we will persevere.

Last year's special session was a major success for the United States and for the United Nations. Its outcome demonstrates that the United Nations *can* serve to advance America's fundamental interests.

Ladies and gentlemen, your government made that success possible through leadership and determined effort. I believe we can accomplish much more. But we will have to be bold, farsighted, and persistent.

Americans have always responded best to challenges. We regard them as heights to scale, not chasms which cannot be bridged.

In short, the choice is up to us. We know what is right. We know what the stakes are. We have the strength and the skill to continue to lead. Let us do so.

Message on Drug Abuse Control Sent to the Congress

Following are excerpts relating to international aspects of drug abuse control from a message from President Ford to the Congress dated April 27.[1]

To the Congress of the United States:

I address this message to the Congress on a matter which strikes at the very heart of our national well-being—drug abuse.

The cost of drug abuse to this Nation is staggering. More than 5,000 Americans die each year from the improper use of drugs. Law enforcement officials estimate that as much as one half of all "street crime"—robberies, muggings, burglaries—are committed by drug addicts to support their expensive and debilitating habits. In simple dollar terms, drug abuse costs us up to $17 billion a year.

. . . . . .

When this problem exploded into the national consciousness in the late 1960's, the response of the Federal Government was swift and vigorous. Federal spending on a comprehensive program to control drug abuse grew from less than $100 million in 1969 to over three-quarters of a billion in 1974; specialized agencies like the Drug Enforcement Administration and the National Institute on Drug Abuse were created; and international diplomatic efforts to mobilize the assistance of foreign governments in a world-wide attack on drug trafficking were intensified.

With the help of State and local governments, community groups and our international allies in the battle against narcotics, we were able to make impressive progress in combatting the drug menace. So much so that by mid-1973 many were convinced that we had "turned the corner" on the drug abuse problem.

Unfortunately, while we had won an im-

[1] For the complete text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 3, 1976, p. 704.

portant victory, we had not won the war on drugs. By 1975, it was clear that drug use was increasing, that the gains of prior years were being lost, that in human terms, narcotics had become a national tragedy. Today, drug abuse constitutes a clear and present threat to the health and future of our Nation.

The time has come to launch a new and more aggressive campaign to reverse the trend of increasing drug abuse in America. And this time we must be prepared to stick with the task for as long as necessary.

. . . . .

I call on Congress also to ratify an existing treaty for the international control of synthetic drugs.

Over the past fifty years the major nations of the world have worked out treaty arrangements for the international control of drugs with a natural base, such as opiates and cocaine. But no similar arrangements exist for the control of synthetic drugs—such as barbiturates, amphetamines and tranquilizers; and the abuse of these synthetic drugs is a growing problem which is now almost as serious as the abuse of heroin in the United States.

Five years ago the United States played a major role in the preparation of the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, a treaty to deal with international traffic in synthetic drugs. But the Senate has not yet ratified this treaty, and Congress has not yet passed the enabling legislation.

The delay in U.S. ratification of the Convention has been an embarrassment to us. Moreover, it has made it extremely difficult for us to urge other countries to tighten controls on natural-based narcotic substances, when we appear unwilling to extend international controls to amphetamines, barbiturates and other psychotropic drugs which are produced here in the United States.

So far, I have emphasized the need for additional legislation and Congressional action.

But there are Executive actions which I can take and I am today doing so.

. . . . .

No matter how hard we fight the problem of drug abuse at home, we cannot make really significant progress without the continued cooperation of foreign governments. This is because most dangerous narcotics are produced in foreign countries. Thus, our capability to deal with supplies of drugs available in the United States depends largely on the interest and capability of foreign governments in controlling the production and shipment of illicit drugs.

Many countries still see drug abuse as primarily an American problem and are unaware of the extent to which the problem is truly global in scope. Poorer nations find it difficult to justify the allocation of scarce resources to deal with drug abuse in the face of many other pressing needs. Also, some opium producing countries lack effective control over, or access to, growing areas within their boundaries and, thus, their efforts in drug control programs are made more difficult.

Still, we have been reasonably successful in enlisting the cooperation of foreign governments. We must now intensify diplomatic efforts at all levels in order to encourage the greatest possible commitment from other governments to this international problem. We must continue to provide technical and equipment assistance through cooperative enforcement efforts with U.S. agents stationed overseas, all aimed at strengthening drug control organizations within foreign countries. And we must continue to participate in building institutions and a system of international treaties which can provide a legal framework for an international response to this international problem.

I have spoken personally to Presidents Echeverria of Mexico and Lopez-Michelsen of Colombia and with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey in an effort to strengthen cooperation among all nations involved in the fight against illicit drug traffic. I intend to continue to urge foreign leaders to increase their efforts in this area. Attorney General Levi has recently discussed drug

control problems with the Attorney General of Mexico and Secretary of State Kissinger has discussed narcotic control efforts with senior officials in Latin America on his recent trip there. I have asked both of them, as well as our Ambassador to the United Nations, William Scranton, to continue to expand these important discussions.

The reactions of the governments which we have approached have been positive—there is a genuine and healthy air of mutual concern and cooperation between our countries and I am confident that our joint efforts will bring about a real reduction in drug trafficking into the United States.

One recent example of the new awareness and commitment of foreign governments to this struggle deserves special mention. President Echeverria has written to inform me of his intention to set up a cabinet level commission to coordinate all law enforcement and drug treatment programs within Mexico and to suggest that his commission might periodically exchange information and ideas with a counterpart here. This proposal, which was the result of discussions between President Echeverria and concerned members of the United States Congress, stands as a clear signal that the Mexican government recognizes the need to build a coordinated response to the problem of drug abuse. I believe the periodic exchange of views on this matter between our two nations would be helpful. Accordingly, I am assigning responsibility for liaison with the Mexican Commission to the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotic Control and I am directing the Secretary of State, as Chairman of the CCINC to immediately form an executive committee to meet with its Mexican counterpart to discuss ways in which our government can collaborate more effectively. We shall of course consult with concerned members of Congress as these efforts are carried on.

. . . . .

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *April 27, 1976.*

President Vetoes Security Assistance Authorization Bill for Fiscal 1976

Message to the Senate [1]

To the Senate of the United States:

I am returning, without my approval, S. 2662 [International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976], a bill that would seriously obstruct the exercise of the President's constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs. In addition to raising fundamental constitutional problems, this bill includes a number of unwise restrictions that would seriously inhibit my ability to implement a coherent and consistent foreign policy:

—By imposing an arbitrary arms sale ceiling, it limits our ability to respond to the legitimate defense needs of our friends and obstructs U.S. industry from competing fairly with foreign suppliers.

—By requiring compliance by recipient countries with visa practices or human rights standards set by our Congress as a condition for continued U.S. assistance, the bill ignores the many other complex factors which should govern our relationships with those countries; and it impairs our ability to deal by more appropriate means with objectionable practices of other nations.

—By removing my restrictions on trade with North and South Vietnam, S. 2662 undercuts any incentive the North Vietnamese may have to provide an accounting for our MIA's.

—By mandating a termination of grant military assistance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal year 1977 unless specifically authorized by Congress, the bill vitiates two important tools which enable us to respond to the needs of many countries and maintain vital controls over military sales programs.

The bill also contains several provisions

[1] Transmitted on May 7 (text from White House press release).

which violate the constitutional separation of executive and legislative powers. By a concurrent resolution passed by a majority of both Houses, programs authorized by the Congress can be later reviewed, further restricted, or even terminated. Such frustration of the ability of the Executive to make operational decisions violates the President's constitutional authority to conduct our relations with other nations.

While I encourage increased Congressional involvement in the formulation of foreign policy, the pattern of unprecedented restrictions contained in this bill requires that I reject such Congressional encroachment on the Executive Branch's constitutional authority to implement that policy.

Constitutional Objections

With regard to the Constitutional issues posed by S. 2662, this bill contains an array of objectionable requirements whereby virtually all significant arms transfer decisions would be subjected on a case-by-case basis to a period of delay for Congressional review and possible disapproval by concurrent resolution of the Congress. These provisions are incompatible with the express provision in the Constitution that a resolution having the force and effect of law must be presented to the President and, if disapproved, repassed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives. They extend to the Congress the power to prohibit specific transactions authorized by law without changing the law—and without following the constitutional process such a change would require. Moreover, they would involve the Congress directly in the performance of Executive functions in disregard of the fundamental principle of separation of powers. Congress can, by duly adopted legislation, authorize or prohibit such actions as the execution of contracts or the issuance of export licenses, but Congress cannot itself participate in the Executive functions of deciding whether to enter into a lawful contract or issue a lawful license, either directly or through the disapproval procedures contemplated in this bill.

The erosion of the basic distinction between legislative and Executive functions which would result from the enactment of S. 2662, displays itself in an increasing volume of similar legislation which this Congress has passed or is considering. Such legislation would pose a serious threat to our system of government, and would forge impermissible shackles on the President's ability to carry out the laws and conduct the foreign relations of the United States. The President cannot function effectively in domestic matters, and speak for the nation authoritatively in foreign affairs, if his decisions under authority previously conferred can be reversed by a bare majority of the Congress. Also, the attempt of Congress to become a virtual co-administrator in operational decisions would seriously distract it from its proper legislative role. Inefficiency, delay, and uncertainty in the management of our nation's foreign affairs would eventually follow.

Apart from these basic constitutional deficiencies which appear in six sections of the bill, S. 2662 is faulty legislation, containing numerous unwise restrictions.

Annual Ceiling on Arms Sales

A further objectionable feature of S. 2662 is an annual ceiling of $9.0 billion on the total of government sales and commercial export of military equipment and services. In our search to negotiate mutual restraints in the proliferation of conventional weapons, this self-imposed ceiling would be an impediment to our efforts to obtain the cooperation of other arms-supplying nations. Such an arbitrary ceiling would also require individual transactions to be evaluated, not on their own merits, but on the basis of their relationship to the volume of other, unrelated transactions. This provision would establish an arbitrary, overall limitation as a substitute for case-by-case analyses and decisions based on foreign policy priorities and the

legitimate security needs of our allies and friends.

Discrimination and Human Rights

This bill also contains well-intended but misguided provisions to require the termination of military cooperation with countries which engage in practices that discriminate against United States citizens or practices constituting a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations. This Administration is fully committed to a policy of not only actively opposing but also seeking the elimination of discrimination by foreign governments against United States citizens on the basis of their race, religion, national origin or sex, just as the Administration is fully supportive of internationally recognized human rights as a standard for all nations to respect. The use of the proposed sanctions against sovereign nations is, however, an awkward and ineffective device for the promotion of those policies. These provisions of the bill represent further attempts to ignore important and complex policy considerations by requiring simple legalistic tests to measure the conduct of sovereign foreign governments. If Congress finds such conduct deficient, specific actions by the United States to terminate or limit our cooperation with the government concerned would be mandated. By making any single factor the effective determinant of relationships which must take into account other considerations, such provisions would add a new element of uncertainty to our security assistance programs and would cast doubt upon the reliability of the United States in its dealings with other countries. Moreover, such restrictions would most likely be counterproductive as a means for eliminating discriminatory practices and promoting human rights. The likely result would be a selective disassociation of the United States from governments unpopular with the Congress, thereby diminishing our ability to advance the cause of human rights through diplomatic means.

Trade with Vietnam

The bill would suspend for 180 days the President's authority to control certain trade with North and South Vietnam, thereby removing a vital bargaining instrument for the settlement of a number of differences between the United States and these countries. I have the deepest sympathy for the intent of this provision, which is to obtain an accounting for Americans missing in action in Vietnam. However, the enactment of this legislation would not provide any real assurances that the Vietnamese would now fulfill their long-standing obligation to provide such an accounting. Indeed, the establishment of a direct linkage between trade and accounting for those missing in action might well only perpetuate Vietnamese demands for greater and greater concessions.

This Administration is prepared to be responsive to Vietnamese action on the question of Americans missing in action. Nevertheless, the delicate process of negotiations with the Vietnamese cannot be replaced by a legislative mandate that would open up trade for a specified number of days and then terminate that trade as a way to achieve our diplomatic objectives. This mandate represents an unacceptable attempt by Congress to manage the diplomatic relations of the United States.

Termination of Grant Military Assistance and Advisory Groups

The legislation would terminate grant military assistance and military assistance advisory groups after fiscal year 1977 except where specifically authorized by Congress, thus creating a presumption against such programs and missions. Such a step would have a severe impact on our relations with other nations whose security and well-being are important to our own national interests. In the case of grant assistance, it would limit our flexibility to assist countries whose national security is important to us but which are not themselves able to bear the full cost of their own defense. In the case of advisory groups, termination of missions by legislative fiat would impair close and long-standing military relationships with important allies. Moreover, such termination is incon-

sistent with increasing Congressional demands for the kind of information about and control over arms sales which these groups now provide. Such provisions would insert Congress deeply into the details of specific country programs, a role which Congress has neither the information nor the organizational structure to play.

I particularly regret that, notwithstanding the spirit of genuine cooperation between the Legislative and Executive Branches that has characterized the deliberations on this legislation, we have been unable to overcome the major policy differences that exist.

In disapproving this bill, I act as any President would, and must, to retain the ability to function as the foreign policy leader and spokesman of the Nation. In world affairs today, America can have only one foreign policy. Moreover, that foreign policy must be certain, clear and consistent. Foreign governments must know that they can treat with the President on foreign policy matters, and that when he speaks within his authority, they can rely upon his words.

Accordingly, I must veto the bill.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 7, 1976.*

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S., U.K., and France Sign Agreement on Stratospheric Monitoring

Department Announcement [1]

The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France agreed on May 5 at Paris to undertake a five-year cooperative effort designed to achieve a better understanding of the impact of man's activities on the earth's stratosphere. The agreement responds to mounting concern in many countries over the potential depletion of the ozone layer and other possible modifications of the upper atmosphere caused by such man-related substances as aviation emissions, fluorocarbons, and other chemicals.

The activities to be implemented under the agreement will be designed to accelerate and support the extensive international effort already underway in this field under the auspices of various U.N. agencies, regional and international scientific organizations, and other governments. The agreement specifically calls for collaboration with the World Meteorological Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, and the International Civil Aviation Organization to, respectively, expand global ozone-monitoring capabilities, increase research on the biological and climatic impacts of stratospheric modification, and evaluate the need for international stratospheric-pollution standards for civil aviation. The agreement will also build upon a variety of cooperative stratospheric-related programs and activities already being carried out by technical agencies of the three countries.

Under terms of the agreement, the three governments will seek ways to improve the collection and accelerate the processing, exchange, and analysis of stratospheric ozone data; expand the exchange of information on stratospheric research and analysis programs underway or planned in the three countries; and pursue opportunities for new collaborative research. Provision is made for a joint analysis of the state of knowledge about trends in stratospheric ozone levels, with recommendations for possible improvements in existing ozone-monitoring networks.

Participating U.S. organizations include the Federal Aviation Administration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department of Defense, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The involvement of the United Kingdom will be coordinated through the Department of the

[1] Issued on May 5 (text from press release 222, which includes the text of the agreement).

Environment, and the focal points in France will be the Committee on Coordinated Action in Regard to the Stratosphere of the General Delegation on Scientific and Technological Research (DGRST) and the Committee on Consequences of Stratospheric Flight (COVOS).

Negotiations on the agreement were initiated as the result of a request by Secretary of Transportation William Coleman in his February 4 decision on the Concorde SST (which authorized limited service to New York and Washington for a 16-month trial period) that the three countries seek ways to strengthen existing capabilities for monitoring the ozone layer. Although the effect on the ozone layer of the 16-month Concorde demonstration in the United States will not be detectable, the agreeing parties recognized the need to accelerate what must be a long-term effort to determine accurately the impact of potential stratospheric modifiers, including aviation emissions and chemical substances.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, May 17, 1976.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975.
Accessions deposited: Finland, May 10, 1976; Pakistan, April 20, 1976.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.
Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, May 12, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Jamaica, May 11, 1976.

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Iceland, Italy, Pakistan, Tunisia, May 13, 1976.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited: Mexico, April 26, 1976.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.[1]
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, May 11, 1976.

Telecommunications

Convention for the protection of submarine cables, with additional article. Signed at Paris March 14, 1884. Entered into force May 1, 1888. 24 Stat. 989.
Accession deposited: Algeria, February 6, 1976.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement relating to research on cropping systems and high priority food crops other than rice, with annexes. Signed at Dacca March 29, 1976. Entered into force March 29, 1976.

Agreement amending the agreement of March 29, 1976, relating to research on cropping systems and high priority food crops other than rice. Signed at Dacca April 15 and 19, 1976. Entered into force April 19, 1976.

Egypt

Agreement relating to cooperation in the areas of technology, research, and development. Signed at Washington June 6, 1975.
Entered into force definitively: April 14, 1976.

Zaire

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Kinshasa March 25, 1976. Entered into force March 25, 1976.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of March 25, 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Kinshasa April 28, 1976. Entered into force April 28, 1976.

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[1] Not in force.

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Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: May 17–23

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*249	5/17	U.S. delegation to U.N. Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat), Vancouver, B.C., Canada, May 31–June 11.
*250	5/18	Closing of American Consulate in St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada, June 30.
*251	5/18	Thomas R. Byrne sworn in as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (biographic data).
*252	5/19	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on ship design and equipment, June 16.
*253	5/19	SCC, SOLAS, working group on carriage of dangerous goods, June 15.
*254	5/19	SCC, SOLAS, working group on fire protection, June 17.
*255	5/20	Kissinger, Bitsios: remarks following meeting, Oslo.
*256	5/20	Kissinger, Mrs. Kissinger: interview for ABC's "Good Morning America" show.
*257	5/21	Kissinger, Caglayangil: remarks, Oslo.
†258	5/21	Kissinger: news conference, Oslo.
†259	5/21	NATO ministerial meeting communique.
†260	5/22	Kissinger: news conference, Oslo.
*261	5/23	Kissinger: arrival, Bonn.
*262	5/23	Kissinger, Genscher: remarks, Bonn.
†263	5/23	Kissinger, Schmidt: remarks, Bonn.
*264	5/23	Kissinger: arrival, Stockholm.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.