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The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and of officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

The Law of the Sea: A Test of International Cooperation

Address by Secretary Kissinger¹

I want to speak to you today about one of the most important international negotiations that has ever taken place: the global conference now underway here in New York on the law of the sea. Last summer in Montreal I set forth a comprehensive U.S. program to help bring matters at this year's conference to a rapid and successful conclusion. Today I will offer new proposals which address the remaining important issues before us, so that this great negotiation may lead to a final result this year.

For we live in an age when the accelerating forces of modern life—technological, economic, social, and political—are leading the peoples of the world into unprecedented and interrelated areas of human activity. New prospects are opening before us—fraught with potential for international contention but filled as well with the hope of unparalleled human advancement.

The principal problems which all nations face today are truly global in nature. They transcend geographic and political boundaries. Their complexity eludes the conventional solutions of the past, and their pace outstrips the measured processes of traditional diplomacy.

There is the imperative of peace—the familiar but vastly more urgent requirements of maintaining global stability, resolving conflicts, easing tensions—these issues dominate the agenda of relations

between East and West. And there are the new challenges of the world's economy and of cooperative solutions to such international problems as food, energy, population, trade, and the environment. These are the agenda of the modern period, particularly in the evolving relationship between the developed and the developing nations.

In an international order composed of sovereign states, the precondition of effective policy is security. But security, while essential, is not enough. The American people will never be satisfied with a world whose stability depends on a balance of terror constantly contested.

Therefore, side by side with seeking to maintain the security of free countries, the United States has striven to build a new world based on cooperation. We are convinced that our common progress requires nations to acknowledge their interdependence and act out of a sense of community. Therefore, at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly in September of last year we made a major effort to project our vision of a more positive future. We sought to mobilize collaboration on a global scale on many current issues of economic development. We were gratified by the response to our initiatives. We are prepared to accelerate our effort.

Virtually all major elements of this new age of interdependence are involved in one of the great issues of our time: the question of mankind's use of the oceans. In no area are the challenges more complex or the stakes higher. No other common effort holds so much positive hope for the future relation-

¹ Made before the Foreign Policy Association, the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, and the U.N. Association of the U.S.A. at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 8 (text from press release 62).

ship between rich nations and poor over the last quarter of this century and beyond.

Today I want to speak to you about the urgency of this issue. The law of the sea negotiations now are at a critical stage. There have been many successes, but they will prove stillborn unless all the remaining issues are settled soon. The United States believes that if the present session does not complete its work, another—and final—session should be assembled this summer. If the negotiations are not completed this year, the world will have lost its best chance to achieve a treaty in this generation.

I want to focus today upon the most important problems remaining before the conference to speed their solution. I shall set forth proposals which in our view can serve as the basis for a widely accepted treaty.

The Importance of the Oceans

Most issues in international affairs impinge on our consciousness in the form of crisis, but many of the most important problems which crucially affect our future come to us far less dramatically. The world is undergoing fundamental economic, technological, and social transformations which do not dominate the daily headlines. Some of them are even more profound in their consequences than most immediate political crises. In no area is this more true than the oceans, a realm which covers 70 percent of the earth's surface.

Freedom of the seas remains basic to the security and well-being of most nations. The seaborne commerce of the globe is expected to quadruple within a few decades. The reliance of the world's people upon the seas to carry food and energy is increasing. Modern technology has enabled industries to sweep the seas for fish and to probe the oceans' floors for vital minerals and resources. Mankind's growing dependence on the seas, and the burgeoning world population along their shores, are already burdening the ecology of the oceans—a development of potentially catastrophic significance, for the oceans are the very source of life

as we know it, the characteristic distinguishing our world from all other planets.

These developments have brought with them a vast array of competitive practices and claims, which—unless they are harmonized—threaten an era of unrestrained commercial rivalry, mounting political turmoil and eventually military conflict. We stand in danger of repeating with respect to the oceans the bitter rivalries that have produced endless conflict on land.

A cooperative international regime to govern the use of the oceans and the resources is therefore an urgent necessity. It is, as well, an unprecedented opportunity for the nations of the world to devise the first truly global solution to a global problem. And the opportunity is all the greater because we start with a clean slate.

Thus the multilateral effort to agree upon a comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea has implications beyond the technical problems of the use of the oceans. It touches upon basic issues underlying the long-term stability and prosperity of our globe. The current negotiation is a milestone in the struggle to submit man's endeavors to the constraints of international law.

Let us understand more precisely what is at stake:

—In a world of growing scarcity, the oceans hold untapped riches of minerals and energy. For example, it is estimated that 80 percent of the world's petroleum and a virtually inexhaustible supplies of minerals lie beneath the sea. Our economic growth and technological progress will be greatly affected by the uses made of these resources.

—In a world where the growth of population threatens to overwhelm the earth's capacity to produce food, the fish of the seas are an increasingly precious—and endangered—source of protein. The well-being and indeed the very survival of future generations may well depend upon whether mankind can halt the present wanton depletion of this vast storehouse of nutrition.

—In a world in which the health of the planet our children will inherit depends upon

decisions we make today, the environmental integrity of the oceans, which affects the quality of life everywhere, is vital.

—And in a world still buffeted by national conflicts, economic confrontation, and political strife, the free and fair use of the oceans crucial to future peace and progress.

The oceans are not merely the repository of wealth and promise; they are, as well, the last completely untamed frontier of our planet. As such, their potential—for achievement or for strife—is vast.

In the 19th century, the Industrial Revolution gave birth to improved communications, technological innovations, and new forms of business organization which immeasurably expanded man's capacity to exploit the frontiers and territories of the entire globe. In less than one generation, one-fifth of the land area of the planet and one-tenth of its inhabitants were gathered to the domain of imperial powers in an unstrained scramble for colonies. The costs in affronts to human dignity, in material waste and deprivation, and in military conflict and political turbulence—haunt us still. Like the non-Western lands of a century before, today it is the oceans which suddenly are accessible to new technology and alluring exploration. Their promise may be even greater than the untapped lands of the century past. So, too, is their potential for conflict. The decision will be ours.

The international community now stands at the threshold of what can easily turn into a new period of unheralded competitive activity. It is our contention that the nations of the world cannot afford to indulge in another round of unrestrained struggle for the wealth of our planet when the globe is already burdened by ideological strife and thermonuclear weapons.

The United States could survive such competition better than other nations; and should it be necessary, we are prepared to defend our interests. Indeed, we could gain a great deal unilaterally in the near term. But we would do so in an environment of constant and mounting conflict. All nations, in-

cluding our own, ultimately would lose under such unpredictable and dangerous conditions.

That is not the kind of world we want to see. Our preference is to help build a rational and cooperative structure of international conduct to usher in a time of peace and progress for all peoples. We see the oceans as a trust which this generation holds—not only for all mankind but for future generations as well.

The legacy of history makes this a difficult task. For centuries, the songs and legends of peoples everywhere have seen the oceans as the very symbol of escape from boundaries, convention, and restraint. The oceans have beckoned mankind to rewards of wealth and power, which awaited those brave and imaginative enough to master the forces of nature.

In the modern era the international law of the sea has been dominated by a simple but fundamental principle: freedom of the seas. Beyond a narrow belt of territorial waters off the shores of coastal states, it has long been established and universally accepted that the seas were free to all for fishing and navigation.

Today the simple rules of the past are challenged. Pressure on available food, fuel, and other resources has heightened awareness of the ocean's potential. The reach of technology and modern communications has tempted nations to seek to exercise control over ocean areas to a degree unimagined in the past. Thus coastal states have begun to assert jurisdictional claims far out to sea, claims which unavoidably conflict with the established law and with the practices of others and which have brought a pattern of almost constant international conflict. Off the shores of nearly every continent, forces of coastal states challenge foreign fishing vessels: the "cod war" between Iceland and Great Britain, tuna boat seizures off South America, Soviet trawling off New England—these are but some examples.

It is evident that there is no alternative to chaos but a new global regime defining an agreed set of rules and procedures. The problem of the oceans is inherently inter-

national. No unilateral or national solution is likely to prevail without continual conflict. The Law of the Sea Conference presents the nations of the world with their choice and their opportunity. Failure to agree is certain to bring further, more intense confrontation, as the nations of the world, now numbering some 150, go all out to extend unilateral claims.

Progress to Date at Law of the Sea Conference

These are the reasons why the international community has engaged itself in a concentrated effort to devise rules to govern the domain of the oceans. Substantive negotiations on a law of the sea treaty began in 1974 in Caracas; a second session was held in Geneva last year. Now, here in New York, work is underway aimed at concluding a treaty before this year is out.

It is no exaggeration to say that this is one of the most significant negotiations in diplomatic history. The United States approaches this negotiation with the conviction that we simply cannot afford to fail.

The issues before the Law of the Sea Conference cover virtually every area and aspect of man's uses of the seas, from the coastline to the farthest deep seabed. Like the oceans themselves, these various issues are inter-related parts of a single entity. Without agreement on all the issues, agreement on any will be empty; for nations will not accept a partial solution—all the less so as some of the concessions that have been made were based on the expectation of progress on the issues which are not yet solved.

Significant progress has been made on many key problems. Most prominent among them are:

First, the extent of the territorial seas, and the related issue of free transit through straits. The conference has already reached widespread agreement on extending the territorial sea—the area where a nation exercises full sovereignty—to 12 miles. Even more importantly, there is substantial agreement on guaranteed unimpeded transit

through and over straits used for international navigation. This is of crucial importance, for it means that the straits whose use is most vital to international commerce and global security, such as the Straits of Gibraltar and Malacca, will remain open to international sea and air transit. This is a principle to which the United States attaches the utmost importance.

Second, the degree of control that a coastal state can exercise in the adjacent offshore area beyond its territorial waters. This is the so-called economic zone, in which lie some of the world's most important fishing grounds as well as major deposits of oil, gas, and minerals. Growing international practice has made it clear that in the absence of an international treaty, coastal nations would eventually attempt to establish the extent of their own zone and determine for themselves what activities—national and international—could be carried out there. These would be areas through which most of the world's shipping moves and which are as well the richest ground for economic exploitation. The complexities and confrontations which would result from such an approach are obvious.

Therefore we are gratified that the conference is ready to settle upon a 200-mile economic zone. This will permit coastal states control over some activities while maintaining vital and traditional international freedoms. The coastal states will control fisheries, mineral, and other resource activities. At the same time, freedom of navigation and other freedoms of the international community must be retained; in this sense the economic zone remains part of the high seas. In addition, the treaty must protect certain international interests, such as insuring adequate food supply, conserving high migratory species, and accommodating the concerns of states—including the landlocked—that otherwise would derive little benefit from the economic zone.

Third, the rights of coastal states and the international community over continental margin resources where the margin extends beyond 200 miles. The continental margin is the natural prolongation of the continent

and mass under the oceans. The question is: Who shall have the right to extract seabed resources in this region, and who shall share in the benefits of such exploitation? We seek a solution which will meet the international community's interest in the area beyond 200 miles and still take into account the desire of coastal states with broad margins to exploit their margin resources beyond the proposed economic zone.

The conference has before it a reasonable proposal for agreement on this question. In general, the coastal states would have jurisdiction over continental margin resources beyond 200 miles to a limit with a precise definition.

Under the system now being negotiated the treaty would also provide for the coastal states to share with the international community a specified percentage of the value of mineral resources exploited in that area for the benefit of the developing countries, including the landlocked countries. The coastal state would pay a royalty based upon the value of production at the wellhead in accordance with a formula fixed in the treaty; the money would then be distributed by an international authority under a formula still being negotiated.

Fourth, the protection of the marine environment. Effective international measures to protect the oceans from pollution are vital to the health—indeed, to the very survival of our planet. The law of the sea treaty will deal with all aspects of marine pollution. In the critical issue of pollution caused by cargo vessels, we anticipate that the conference will provide for effective enforcement of environmental protection regulations. We must now put forth our best efforts to reach satisfactory agreement on the enforcement of regulations covering all the outstanding issues concerning the protection of the marine environment.

Progress on these key issues has been heartening. But we must reach agreement on the remaining issues, or else the encouraging progress made to date will be lost and international anarchy will threaten.

The Remaining Issues

There are three major remaining unresolved issues:

First, ways must be found to encourage *marine scientific research* for the benefit of all mankind while at the same time protecting the legitimate interests of coastal states in their 200-mile economic zone, the area in which some 80 percent of such research now takes place.

Second, the treaty must include provisions for compulsory and impartial *settlement of disputes* in order that differences of interpretation and incompatible practices can be settled peacefully.

And *third*, we must create an international regime for the exploitation of resources of the *deep seabeds*, those heretofore inaccessible reaches of the seas beyond the economic zone and continental margin.

United States Proposals

The United States today proposes the following package as a contribution to helping the conference reach a swift and comprehensive solution on the major remaining problems.

Marine Scientific Research

The health, the safety, and the progress of the world's people may vitally depend upon the extent of marine scientific research; it must be fostered and not impeded. To further marine scientific research the United States is prepared to agree to a reasonable balance between coastal state and international interests in marine scientific research in the economic zone. We will agree to coastal state control of scientific research which is directly related to the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the economic zone. But we shall also insist that other marine scientific research not be hampered.

We recognize that this distinction is bound to raise difficult questions in practice. This is why we believe that its determination cannot be left either to the coastal state or to

the state seeking to do scientific research; it must ultimately be decided by an impartial body.

For our part, the United States is prepared to guarantee that coastal states will receive advance notice of scientific research in the economic zone, will have the right to participate in that research, and will receive data and results of such research as well as assistance in interpreting the significance of those results.

This proposal would help resolve the differences between those who desire complete coastal state control over all marine scientific research and those who seek to maintain complete freedom for such research in the proposed economic zone.

Dispute Settlement

No nation could accept unilateral interpretation of a treaty of such vast scope by individual states or by an international seabed organization or any other interested party.

To promote the fair settlement of disputes involving the interpretation of the treaty, the United States proposes the establishment of an impartial dispute-settlement mechanism whose findings would be binding on all signatory states.

Such a mechanism would insure that all states have recourse to a legal process which would be nonpolitical, rapid, and impartial to all. It would especially protect the rights of all states in the economic zone by resolving differences in interpretation of the treaty which might lead to serious conflict between parties. It must be responsible for assuring the proper balance between the rights of coastal states and the rights of other states which also use, and indeed often are dependent upon, the economic zones of coastal states. And its decisions must be obligatory.

Establishment of a professional, impartial, and compulsory dispute-settlement mechanism is necessary to insure that the oceans will be governed by the rule of law rather than the rule of force. Unless this point is accepted, many nations could not agree to

the treaty, since only through such a mechanism can they be assured that their interests will be fairly protected. And agreement on this matter will make accommodation on other issues easier.

The Deep Seabeds

The third, and the most complex and vital issue remaining before the conference is the problem of the deep seabeds.

For decades we have known that the deep seabeds contain great potential resources of nickel, manganese, cobalt, and copper—resources whose accessibility could contribute significantly to global economic growth in the future. It is only recently that the technology has been developed which can enable us to reach those deposits and extract them.

The conference has not yet approached agreement on the issue of the deep seabed because it has confronted serious philosophical disagreements. Some have argued that commercial exploitation unrestrained by international treaty would be in the best interests of the United States. In fact the country is many years ahead of any other in the technology of deep sea mining, and we are in all respects prepared to protect our interests. If the deep seabeds are not subject to international agreement, the United States can and will proceed to explore and mine on its own.

But while such a course might bring us short-term advantage, it poses long-term dangers. Eventually any one country's technical skills are bound to be duplicated by others. A race would then begin to carve out deep sea domains for exploitation. This cannot but escalate into economic warfare, endanger the freedom of navigation, and ultimately lead to tests of strength and military confrontations.

America would not be true to itself, or to its moral heritage, if it accepted a world in which might makes right—where power alone decides the clash of interests. And from a practical standpoint, no one recognizes more clearly than American industry that investment, access, and profit can best be protected

in an established and predictable environment.

On the other hand, there are those who would place all the deep seabeds' resources under an international authority. Such a proposal would not provide adequate incentives and guarantees for those nations whose technological achievement and entrepreneurial boldness are required if the deep seabeds are to benefit all mankind. It would give control to those who do not have the resources to undertake deep seabed mining.

Let me briefly review the specific issues before us and then set forth the proposals which we believe can form the basis for a new consensus on the deep seabeds.

First, the decisionmaking machinery for managing the deep seabeds. There has been considerable debate over the form and the powers of the decisionmaking machinery established under the treaty. The United States is prepared to accept international machinery; but such machinery must be balanced and equitable and insure that the relative economic interests of the countries with important activities in the deep seabeds are protected, even though those countries may be a numerical minority.

Second, access to the deep seabeds. The conference has been struggling with the issue of which nations, which firms, and which international authorities will have direct access to, and share in the benefits from, the developing of deep seabed resources.

The United States understands the concern that the riches of the seas not be the exclusive preserve of only the most powerful and technologically advanced nations. We recognize that the world community should share in the benefits of deep seabed exploitation.

What the United States *cannot* accept is that the right of access to seabed minerals be given exclusively to an international authority or be so severely restricted as effectively to deny access to the firms of any individual nation including our own. We are gratified to note an increasing awareness of

the need to avoid such extreme positions and to move now to a genuine accommodation that would permit reasonable assurances to all states and their nationals that their access to these resources will not be denied.

Third, the effect of seabed mining on land-based producers. Land-based producers of seabed minerals are concerned that seabed production may adversely affect their national economies. This is an especially serious problem since many of these producers are poor, developing countries. We take these concerns seriously. But at the same time it must be recognized that commercial seabed production of these metals is at least five years away. For many years thereafter, seabed production will amount to only a fraction of total global production. Moreover, global metal markets are expanding and should easily be able to accommodate additional production from the seabeds without adversely affecting revenues of land-based producer countries.

The United States is prepared to make a major effort to resolve these issues equitably and to bring the Law of the Sea Conference to a swift and successful conclusion. In this spirit, the United States offers the following proposals:

First, to insure an equitable decisionmaking system, the United States continues to believe that the treaty should authorize the formation of an *International Seabed Resource Authority* to supervise exploration and development of the deep seabeds. The Authority would be comprised of four principal organs: An Assembly of all member states, to give general policy guidance; a Council, to serve as the executive, policy-level, and main decisionmaking forum, setting operational and environmental rules for mining and supervising the contracts for deep seabed mining; a Tribunal, to resolve disputes through legal processes; and a Secretariat, to carry out the day-to-day administrative activities of the Authority.

The United States proposes:

—That the power of the Authority be

carefully detailed by the treaty in order to preserve all those rights regarding the uses of the seas which fall outside the competence of the Authority, and to avoid any jurisdictional overlap with other international organizations.

—That the composition and structure of the Council reflect the producer and consumer interests of those states most concerned with seabed mining. All nations whose vital national economic concerns are affected by decisions of the Authority must have a voice and influence in the Council commensurate with their interests.

—That the proposed permanent seabed Tribunal adjudicate questions of interpretation of the treaty and of the powers of the International Authority raised by parties to the treaty or by private companies engaged in seabed mining. Without a Tribunal, unresolved contention is a certainty. Such a body will be necessary if any seabed proposal is to win wide acceptance.

Second, to insure that all nations, developed and developing, have adequate access to seabed mining sites:

—The United States proposes that the treaty should guarantee nondiscriminatory access for states and their nationals to deep seabed resources under specified and reasonable conditions. The requirement of guaranteed access will not be met if the treaty contains arbitrary or restrictive limitations on the number of mine sites which any nation might exploit. And such restrictions are unnecessary because deep seabed mining cannot be monopolized; there are many more productive seabed mining sites than conceivably can be mined for centuries to come.

—The United States accepts that an "Enterprise" should be established as part of the International Seabed Resource Authority and given the right to exploit the deep seabeds under the same conditions as apply to all mining.

—The United States could accept as part of an overall settlement a system in which prime mining sites are reserved for exclusive exploitation by the Enterprise or by the developing countries directly—if this ap-

proach meets with broad support. Under this system, each individual contractor would propose two mine sites for exploitation. The Authority would then select one of these sites, which would be mined by the Authority directly or made available to developing countries at its discretion. The other site would be mined by the contractor on his own.

—The United States proposes that the International Authority should supervise a system of revenue sharing from mining activities for the use of the international community, primarily for the needs of the poorest countries. These revenues will not only advance the growth of developing countries they will provide tangible evidence that a fair share in global economic activity can be achieved by a policy of cooperation. Revenue sharing could be based either on royalties or on a system of profit sharing from contract mining. Such a system would give reality to the designation of the deep seabeds as the common heritage of all mankind.

—Finally, the United States is prepared to make a major effort to enhance the skills and access of developing countries to advanced deep seabed mining technology in order to assist their capabilities in this field. For example, incentives should be established for private companies to participate in agreements to share technology and train personnel from developing countries.

Third, in response to the legitimate concerns of land-based producers of minerals found in the deep seabeds, we offer the following steps as an additional major contribution to the negotiations:

—The United States is prepared to accept a temporary limitation, for a period fixed in the treaty, on production of the seabed minerals tied to the projected growth in the world nickel market, currently estimated to be about 6 percent a year. This would in effect limit production of other minerals contained in deep seabed nodules, including copper. After this period, the seabed production should be governed by overall market conditions.

—The United States proposes that the

international Seabed Resource Authority have the right to participate in any international agreements on seabed-produced commodities in accordance with the amount of production for which it is directly responsible. The United States is prepared to examine with flexibility the details of arrangements concerning the relationships between the Authority and any eventual commodity agreements.

—The United States proposes that some of the revenues of the Authority be used for adjustment assistance and that the World Bank, regional development banks, and other international institutions assist countries to improve their competitiveness or diversify into other kinds of production if they are seriously injured by production from the deep seabeds. An urgent task of the International Authority, when it is established, will be to devise an adjustment assistance program in collaboration with other international institutions for countries which suffer economic dislocations as a result of deep seabed mining.

These proposals on the issue of deep seabed resources are offered in the spirit of cooperation and compromise that characterized our economic proposals at the seventh special session and that guides our policies toward the developing nations. The United States is examining a range of commodity problems and ways in which they might be fairly resolved. We intend to play an active role at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development next month in Nairobi and come forward with specific proposals. We look toward a constructive dialogue in the Raw Materials Commission of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris. And we are actively committed to producer-consumer forums to discuss individual commodities—such as the recent forum on copper.

The United States believes that the world community has before it a grave responsibility. Our country cannot delay in its efforts to develop an assured supply of critical resources through our deep seabed mining projects. We strongly prefer an international

agreement to provide a stable legal environment before such development begins, one that insures that all resources are managed for the good of the global community and that all can participate. But if agreement is not reached this year, it will be increasingly difficult to resist pressure to proceed unilaterally. An agreement on the deep seabed can turn the world's interdependence from a slogan into a reality. A sense of community which nations have striven to achieve on land for centuries could be realized in a regime for the oceans.

The Possibility and the Promise

The nations of the world now have before them a rare, if not unique, opportunity. If we can look beyond the pressures and the politics of today to envision the requirements of a better tomorrow, then we can understand the true meaning of the task before us.

Let us pause to realize what this treaty can mean—to this generation and to the possible realization of humanity's dream of a progressive ascent toward justice and a good life for all peoples.

If the conference is successful, mankind's rights and responsibilities with regard to the oceans will be clear to all.

This will mean freedom of navigation, preserving the rights of all on the seas.

It will mean a greater flourishing of trade and commerce, bringing the benefits of a freer flow of goods to consumers and producers alike.

It will mean that the oceans, recognized as "the source of all" since Homer's day, can continue to enrich and support our planet's environment.

It will mean that there will be a comprehensive regime for all of the world's oceans embracing not only territorial waters but a new economic zone, the continental margin, and the deep seabeds.

It will mean the realization of the promise of scientific research in the oceans—the further probing of the mysteries of our planet to better the lives and preserve the health of all.

It will mean that the seas' resources of

nutrition and raw materials can be tapped for the use of the entire human community.

It will mean that an arena of conflict, and one which is becoming increasingly dangerous, will become an area for cooperative progress.

It will mean that the entire international community—the developing as well as developed, landlocked as well as coastal—will share in the uses, the nourishment, the material resources, and the revenues which this great treaty could provide. For the poorer countries in particular, it will mean revenues from the continental margin and the deep seabeds, and the opportunity to participate in deep sea mining through an international organization.

And above all, it will mean the nations of the world have proved that the challenges of the future *can* be solved cooperatively; that for the first time mankind has been able to surmount traditional enmities and ambitions in the service of a better vision.

These, then, are the stakes; these are the possibilities we hold in our grasp. Will we have the maturity and the judgment to go forward? Will we fulfill the obligation which future historians—without question—will assign to us? I believe we shall. The United States is determined that we shall. The possibility and the promise have never been more clear. Through reason, through responsibility, and by working together, we shall succeed.

With hindsight it is easy to identify the moments in history when humanity broke from old ways and moved in new directions.

But for those living through such times, it is usually difficult to see the true significance even of epoch-making events.

That is why the nations who are engaged in the Law of the Sea Conference have come to a unique moment in history. Only rarely does mankind comprehend the significance of change in the world as we so clearly do today. We share a common perception of

—The need to contain potential conflict

—The importance of cooperative solution to shared problems; and

—The necessity to achieve the full and fair use of the possibilities of our planet both material and moral.

If a second session is necessary this year to complete the work of the conference, let us make that session the final one. To underline the importance the President attaches to these negotiations, he has asked me to lead the U.S. delegation to that session. It is our hope that other nations will attach similarly high importance to it and be prepared to discuss the remaining issues before us at a decisive political level. This should be a time for determined action, a time to avoid rhetoric and to commit ourselves to decisions and a final agreement.

The United States calls upon all nations deliberating this great treaty to summon the sense of responsibility and urgency which history and this task demand of us. For our part, the United States pledges to work tirelessly to seize this rare chance for decisive progress on one of the great challenges of our time.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at New York City

Press release 162B dated April 8

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment on the charge made by Ronald Reagan that the Administration policy of détente is a one-way street?

Secretary Kissinger: I first of all want to make clear that I am using the word only in response to a question, so let me explain what the policy that used to be called "détente" involves. [Laughter.]

The United States faces several problems: one, how to contain growing Soviet power and, secondly, how to build a world whose security and progress is not constantly dependent on a balance of terror.

The United States must take both of these problems seriously. We have a problem of security. The growth of Soviet power is not caused by the policies of any Administration; it is the inevitable byproduct of the development of Soviet technology and Soviet industry. And, therefore, from that point of view, every four years we can run a Presidential campaign on the issue that Soviet power has grown in the interval.

Our responsibility is to prevent the Soviet Union from using this power so as to expand its political domination for its political interest. This we are attempting to do, and I believe we have succeeded in doing. But, secondly, when one looks at history one cannot afford, in the thermonuclear age, to rely on an international environment in which the great powers settle their disputes by endless confrontations.

Our generation is traumatized by the experience of Munich, where a disparity of strength produced a war. But we would do well to remember that a war that caused equally great dislocations started in 1914, in the First World War, when there was a

rough equality of strength and where nations had faced each other down for 50 years, until a crisis much like any other exploded into war that killed millions of people and destroyed the structure of the international order as it existed for a century.

We cannot conduct our affairs on that basis, and any Administration has a responsibility to look for a better arrangement. This is what we have attempted to do. I do not believe that this policy has represented a one-way street. A lasting peace is in everybody's interest. It is not a favor we do to anybody else. And we are prepared to discuss or to debate any specific agreement that has been made to see whether it was in the mutual interest.

I would argue that the agreements that have been made have been equitable and that the strategy we are pursuing is required by the necessities of the thermonuclear age, in which peace must be achieved by something better than posturing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, because of the great importance of NATO, I feel, to our government, we should support the U.S.-Turkish agreement that has just been made. Can you show us why this would also be in the best interest of Greece—which I believe it would be, because they are not members of NATO—and would be helped by the strong support of the Turks, who have been great friends of ours?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, my confidence in myself has been remarked upon; but I would not assume that I could easily persuade the Greeks that an agreement between the United States and Turkey is likely to be in their interest. I think it is not necessarily because they are right but the passions on this issue run, as you know, very deep. I re-

call meeting with a group of Greek-American leaders, and I was what I thought extremely persuasive and asked one of them to sum up what we had discussed. He said, "Kill the Turks." [Laughter.]

But if you ask me to explain it to a non-Greek audience, I would say that Turkey at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, standing between the Soviet Union and the Middle East, maintaining one of the largest armies in NATO, is an essential element of the security of the West, including the security of Greece. The failure by the Congress to approve this agreement would lead to an irreparable blow to security of the eastern Mediterranean under conditions in which the tensions in the Middle East have to be one of our principal security and foreign policy concerns.

So we hope very much that the Congress will see matters in the same light—all the more so as we are prepared to make a parallel arrangement with Greece and are in the process of negotiating with Greece right now. The United States does not feel that it should choose between two countries whose friendship it has valued, whose contribution to the common defense is essential. And we will pursue a policy of friendship with both Greece and Turkey, and we will make a major effort to contribute to a solution of the conflicts between them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, another question relating to NATO. Why could not NATO endure if Communists entered the governments of France or Italy, provided the Communist parties of those two countries become truly national Communist parties?

Secretary Kissinger: You are putting me into a position where tomorrow I'll be accused again in certain European countries of intervening in their domestic affairs. [Laughter.]

The basic problem with Communist parties in European governments, as far as the United States is concerned, is not that they are dependent on Moscow but that they are Communist and they would therefore bring with them a set of priorities and a set of

electoral commitments and a tradition that makes it extremely unlikely that it would be possible to pursue the kind of cooperative policies that have existed in the past.

The United States has had friendly relations with many Communist countries, and it is quite possible for the United States to have friendly relations with other countries that go Communist. But it is hard to believe that the present NATO structure, the present integration of military planning, of political consultation, could continue if there were a significant contribution of Communist parties in many European countries. It would be a change in our relationship.

What its historical significance is to remain to be seen.

Now, the United States cannot affect the decisions of the voters of these countries but the United States at least should not delude itself that the coming to power of Communist parties in West European countries would not produce a massive change in the postwar situation as we have known

Q. Mr. Secretary, a question on Angola and Cuba: What measures do you believe the United States can take to deter Cuba from further military intervention in black Africa?

Secretary Kissinger: I can already see the outraged editorials coming out of this meeting. [Laughter.]

The United States is concerned that Soviet sponsored interventions by surrogate countries in trouble spots is going to lead to a situation in which the political conditions in major parts of the world are going to be determined by the willingness of the Soviet Union and its surrogates to intervene.

This is of consequence not only in Africa but also in the Middle East. It applies not only to Cuba but to other countries that could have adventurist tendencies. In time it will spread to the Western Hemisphere. This is why we have attempted to make clear that the United States could not accept the fact that the Soviet Union, operating with surrogates in distant parts of the world, intervenes with military force.

What we will do in concrete circumstances will have to leave for those circumstances to determine. But people would make a mistake if they thought we were not serious.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a question regarding China: Could you comment on the effect of the current succession problems in the People's Republic of China on U.S.-China relations?

Secretary Kissinger: I must say that I have some sympathy for what Teng Hsiao-ching has been going through. I am in the "wall poster" stage myself. [Laughter.]

The succession problem in China is primarily a matter of Chinese internal policies, and we have been told repeatedly in public statements and otherwise that it does not affect the basic direction of Chinese foreign policy. The basic direction of Chinese foreign policy depends on the Chinese perception of the degree to which the United States can play an effective international role. I don't doubt that right now in China, at similar meetings, the question is asked: "What do you think is going on in all these upheavals in the United States, and how will this affect its foreign policy?" [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, another question on Africa: Could you please indicate the present U.S. Government position regarding the struggle for independence among the majority people in southern Africa, especially as it relates to the role of the U.S. Government?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has stated very strongly its support for majority rule in southern Africa, and we do not wish that any regime in southern Africa continue our opposition to Cuban and Soviet military intervention as an endorsement of its practices and its policies. The United States will support majority rule.

I am planning to go to Africa in a few weeks; and on this occasion I will make clear and I will attempt to organize, together with the interested black African states, a set of policies and procedures which we hope will lead to majority rule. But we will not be pres-

sured into it by Soviet threats or Cuban intervention.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the Administration have any plans to move our relationship with China off dead center?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't believe that our relationship with China is on dead center. Our relationship with China depends on the national interests as they are perceived by both sides. It has been pursued with care and seriousness by both sides. We intend to pursue the course of normalization, and we intend to achieve the objectives set forth in the Shanghai communique.¹

The pace at which this proceeds must be determined by international conditions as well as by the domestic possibilities of each side. But I think on the essential international concerns our policies with respect to China are on course, and we expect that this process will continue.

I am delighted that Mr. Gates [Thomas S. Gates, Jr.] has agreed to head the Liaison Office in order to give a further impetus to this relationship.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the recent session of the Human Rights Commission and since then in a speech of Leonard Garment, the United States seemed to be taking a new position in confronting the hypocrisy which has dominated all Human Rights Commission sessions in recent years. Is this a sign that we are giving new importance to human rights? And are we going to again become the leader respecting human rights in the world?

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Garment in the Human Rights Commission reflected the basic policies of the U.S. Government. We have made clear that we do attach considerable importance to the human rights question. In our appointment of Ambassador Moynihan and in our general conduct in such institutions as the Human Rights Commission, we have tried to symbolize it.

¹For text of the communique, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435.

Mr. Garment reflects the basic policies of this government—as most of our Ambassadors do. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you please develop the idea, the rationale, of the "more organic relationship of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe," recently reported as an objective of our foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me tell you two things.

A few weeks ago I spent about 10 days preparing a carefully considered statement on Soviet policy which I delivered at a meeting like this in San Francisco. Since the paper was unclassified, it was not generally reported. [Laughter.]

The document to which you refer is a summary of extemporaneous remarks which were supposed to stimulate discussion, by one of my associates in whom I have complete confidence; and it had been filtered through several layers before it had reached its present formulation.

What Mr. [Helmut] Sonnenfeldt attempted to say was to restate the basic policy of the United States. What he said was that the present relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is unnatural; that it was our policy to encourage greater autonomy in Eastern Europe—that it was our policy, which he then expressed in the word "organic," to contrast it with the unnatural relationship.

He might have used a happier adjective—or maybe the note taker might have chosen

a happier adjective, but he was not promoting a new policy. He was stating that the present relationship of dominance is not one that we can condone or accept and that it is our policy to encourage Eastern Europe in the direction of greater autonomy.

And I consider the use that has been made of this summary—the amount of attention that it has received—a deliberate distortion in order to create a political issue which in no way reflects the views of the Administration, which are the views that have been consistently followed in the postwar period.

Q. The last question, Mr. Secretary: How do you assess the outlook for the Paris talks on economic and resources questions with the oil-producing and Third World countries?

Secretary Kissinger: So far, it is too early to tell. We have pursued, since the seventh special session [of the U.N. General Assembly] a deliberate policy of making concrete, detailed, and we hope forward-looking proposals. We have tried to move the dialogue from ideological confrontations and slogans to the specific issues that the nations of the world face. So far, this attitude has dominated the discussion in Paris.

We will make further proposals at the UNCTAD Conference [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] in Nairobi; and believe that if all countries continue to work in the spirit that has so far been exhibited we can make significant progress during the year.

Israel and the United States

Address by Secretary Kissinger¹

The greatness of America has not been so much its physical strength as its moral significance. Since its birth this nation has stood for something larger than itself. Americans have always had a sense of mission; we have been inspired by the knowledge that we were champions of liberty and progress for all mankind. We have been not only a refuge for those fleeing persecution but the defense of democracy and a bulwark for others in time of need, a feeder of the hungry, and a solace to the suffering. And history continues to present us these challenges and more. Today we bear a central responsibility for maintaining peace and shaping a global structure which can help realize mankind's dream of an end to conflict and hatred.

These are the qualities and responsibilities and hopes which tie America to Israel. No people knows more vividly than the Jewish people that morality must be more than a theory—it must be a quality of human conduct. No people yearns more for tranquillity than those who historically have been the first victims of its loss. And no people perceives more acutely that peace depends ultimately not on political arrangements, but on the conscience of mankind.

History is often cruel, but the wisest are those who know that fate can be shaped by human faith and human courage. The true realists are those who recognize that all great achievements were a dream before they became a reality. These are qualities that

have enabled the Jewish people to survive their tragedies. These are the qualities that brought about the State of Israel. These are qualities that guarantee the future of the people of Israel. And these are qualities which peoples and nations everywhere must possess if they are to be free.

The Moral Basis of Foreign Policy

History challenges us amid the world's ambiguities to shape events by our own purposes and ideals. If democratic societies like America and Israel are to prosper, we must summon the unity and resolve to be masters of our futures on the basis of our values.

The decisions that must be made are always difficult, for foreign policy deals with the interaction of sovereign entities. No country, no matter how strong, can impose its will on the world. Today, in a world of thermonuclear weapons, diffusion of power, and growing interdependence, foreign policy is more than ever an enterprise of incomplete and imperfect solutions. Tension is unavoidable between moral values, which are invariably cast in absolute terms, and efforts to achieve them, which of necessity involve compromise.

This accounts for much of the foreign policy debate in democratic societies, which to some extent is a rebellion against the contemporary world. In all democratic societies the temptation is great to deny the circumstances of the contemporary world and to blame them on individuals, to confuse optimism with the shallow projection of the desirable.

But we cannot escape the conditions around

¹ Made before the American Jewish Congress at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 4 (text from press release 159).

us. Morality without pragmatic action is empty, just as pragmatism without moral direction is like a rudderless ship. The true optimists are those who are prepared to face complexity and who have the faith that their people can master it by dedication and vision.

If democracies like America and Israel are to survive and flourish in a world of sovereign states and competing wills, we must stand firmly for our belief in human dignity; otherwise we will lose our bearings. There is no way to make these choices and to navigate between the shoals of temptation and danger without a strong inner moral conviction. Equally, we need a mature and hardheaded understanding of the difficult choices that must be made, lest we substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of survival.

For Americans, foreign policy has always been more than the search for stability. Americans have a vision of a world of justice that drives all our efforts. A pragmatic policy alone would be empty of humanity; it would lack direction and roots and heart.

But, equally, if policy becomes excessively moralistic, it can turn quixotic or dangerous. A presumed monopoly on virtue can make impossible any solution or negotiation. Good results may be given up or sabotaged in the quest for the elusive ideal. Some of this country's most serious errors—of both involvement and abdication—were driven by misguided moral arguments. Some interventions began as crusades to reform other societies; and we were isolationist in the 1930's to preserve our purity and register our distaste for the balance of power.

Our responsibility to conduct a moral, far-sighted, and realistic policy has grown in recent years. In a world made smaller by technology and communications, events anywhere are instantly known and have effects in distant places. Never before have the destinies of nations been more intertwined—not only practically but morally.

And so we have a stake in a peaceful world and an environment where man's aspirations for justice and liberty and dignity have the greatest chance of fulfillment. The ultimate safety of every minority, every oppressed

people, lies in a world where respect for human dignity governs the affairs of nations. Peace can be said to exist only when the insecurity of nations is eased, the hopes of people for economic advance are fulfilled, international habits of restraint and conciliation are nurtured, and men experience at last the blessings of a world of justice and progress.

Peace in the Middle East

I have spoken at some length about the moral foundation of our foreign policy to this group which is so concerned and serious about the survival of Israel. For the relationship between America and Israel depends ultimately not on formal assurances, but on the links of our peoples and the reality of our values.

The survival and security of Israel are unequivocal and permanent moral commitments of the United States. Israel is a loyal friend and a fellow democracy whose very existence represents the commitment of all free peoples. The moral strength of the people of Israel, which has so often meant the margin of victory in war, gives us confidence that Israel will also win peace. No people has earned it more.

Time and events have brought us to a threshold in Middle East history—an unprecedented opportunity to realize the peace of which we all have dreamed, a peace in the interest of all the peoples of a region that has experienced enough anguish for this generation.

—Israel, having proven by its own courage that it is here to stay, has taken equally courageous steps toward peaceful resolution of the conflict.

—Some of its Arab neighbors, for the first time ever, are now speaking openly and wisely of making peace and ending generations of conflict.

—The United States has demonstrated to both sides its commitment to continue to promote a just and enduring solution.

—The relationships among the major outside powers, if conducted with reason and

firmness, can create a global environment of restraint that will enhance security and the possibilities of peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

Israel obviously faces profound problems—not the least of which is that in any negotiation with its neighbors, it will be asked to yield the physical buffers of territory in exchange for intangible pledges. Indeed, Israel's gains will be intangible even as it achieves its own stated objectives of a formal peace treaty and diplomatic recognition by its neighbors. So the process of peace inevitably presents it with many anguishing decisions—and the pain is shared by all of us who are friends of Israel and who are dedicated to further progress toward peace. Throughout this process we owe Israel our compassion and support.

The risks and obstacles are many. Steps taken must be carefully thought out and realistic. But we must move together with courage and with a vision of how reality can be shaped by a vision of peace. And we must not paralyze ourselves by a suspiciousness that deprives our relationship of dignity and our cooperation of significance.

The United States will help keep Israel strong—to insure that peace is seen clearly to be the only feasible course. We will never abandon Israel—either by failing to provide crucial assistance or by misconceived or separate negotiations or by irresolution when challenged to meet our own responsibility to maintain the global balance of power.

We will never forget that America's responsibility for peace includes, above all, responsibility for the fate of smaller nations who rely upon us as the ultimate defender of their survival and freedom and that Israel's fate is inseparable from the future of human dignity. America will not abandon a friend, because to do so in one part of the world would shake confidence in every part of the world. There will be no American weakness or abdication, for this can only tempt adversaries, confuse allies, and undermine security in the world, ultimately to the grave peril of our country.

Moral ideals and practical interest thus come together. Peace in the Middle East is a goal shared by Americans and by Israelis alike. The road toward it will be a common one. And so, in truth, as we pursue the course of peace, our guarantees rest not so much in any formal agreements or reassurances endlessly repeated as in the deeper ties of emotion and morality, history and principle, that can never be sundered.

The dream of peace is the dream of the prophet Isaiah: "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." It is written in the Book of Numbers: "The Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace." This dream is both an inspiration and a duty. And those who strive for it know both the pain and the exhilaration of man's noblest endeavor.

The United States and Israel will have the courage and the faith to seek this dream and fulfill it.

The World Population Crisis and the American Role

*Address by Marshall Green
Coordinator of Population Affairs*¹

The world population passed the 4 billion mark last Saturday, according to the Population Reference Bureau. It took us from the dawn of time until about the year 1830 to reach the 1 billion mark. A hundred years later, in 1930, we were 2 billion; 30 years later, in 1960, 3 billion; and today we are 4 billion. It now looks as though we will reach 5 billion in 1987 and 6 billion in 1997. Longer range projections of population at current growth rates produce horrendous results. "Someday there will be standing room only," announced one of our officials to an audience in Vermont. From the back of the room an elderly lady observed: "Well, that ought to slow 'em down a little."

The world population crisis has been generated not by any general rise in birth rates around the world but, rather, through a sharp drop in death rates. Thus, one of mankind's greatest successes—a massive reduction in death rates over the past century, due largely to scientific and technological advances—has paradoxically provided the seeds of what could be mankind's greatest disaster: excessive population growth.

There seems to be a general widespread awareness of this fact but not enough action. For it is also paradoxical that this issue, so intimately involved in sex, seems to have so little "sex appeal."

There is a certain intractability about the population problem that defies analogy with any other issue on the world's agenda. En-

vironmental pollution, for example, smart our eyes, fouls our rivers and lakes, creates health hazards. We are accordingly compelled to take immediate action, even legal action. The arms race and nuclear buildup involve massive risks that demand the immediate attention of world leaders and entail enormous costs.

But the population explosion? It can even be heard. Yet every day it produces a net increase of 200,000 inhabitants on this limited planet.

Too many people still see population as someone else's problem, not their own—something that we can think about tomorrow for today there are too many other issues demanding our full attention. Such procrastination can only lead to disaster for us all wherever we may live.

Effects of Rapid Population Growth

Impact on Food Supplies. Perhaps the most recognizable challenge of rapid population growth will be whether there will be enough food in the years ahead, particularly for poorer nations which are not now self-sufficient in food production. What will be the fate of those countries as population pressure increasingly against the limits of available land, water, and agricultural capital as well as other resources? Some commentators believe that today between 10 and 20 million people die annually from causes directly or indirectly related to undernourishment. World food reserves are at their lowest levels.

¹ Made before the Cleveland Council on World Affairs at Cleveland, Ohio, on Mar. 30.

in years. Fish stocks and catches have peaked and are now declining.

Yet population growth entails ever-growing demands for food. Whether or not these demands can be met will depend not only on increasing food production but also on success in limiting population growth. Unless the developing countries can do this, their annual import requirements of cereals will exceed 100 million tons by the end of the century. Apart from the question of whether developing countries could pay for such levels of food imports, there is the question of whether such levels would be available for export. Much of the world is increasingly dependent on the United States and Canada—one geographic-climatic zone—for food imports. North American grain exports for 1976 are estimated at 100 million tons, but most of these exports go to Europe and Japan. So how can anticipated food demands be met in the decades ahead? Only through increasing worldwide food production and lowering population reproduction.

Impact on Environment. No doubt the main cause of global pollution has been industrialization and rising living standards. It is thus the developed, not the developing, countries which have been the principal polluters. But in the developing countries, efforts to increase food production for growing numbers of people often result in deforestation and floods, the overgrazing of land and the advancing of deserts, and the encroachment of expanding urban areas on former food-producing land.

Social and Political Impact. Less evident are the social, political, and strategic consequences of excessive population growth. Today, migration from rural areas to cities is often a disruptive factor in developing societies. The current surge of humanity into already overcrowded cities overtaxes social, educational, and sanitary services and contributes to urban unemployment, juvenile delinquency, crime, and social unrest. The latter often translates into political difficulties resulting either in chronically weak and therefore politically unstable re-

gimes or increasingly authoritarian governments. Friction and even wars between nations have often been marked by population pressures, and we now live in a world where nuclear weapons are proliferating.

Impact on Economic Development. Many developing nations argue that the key solution to reducing population growth rates is economic development, and it is true that economic development has usually—but not always—been attended by drops in birth rates. On the other hand, population growth rates in many countries make it all the more difficult for those nations to achieve their economic goals.

Rapid population growth has an adverse effect on almost every aspect of economic and social progress. Specifically, it:

- Lowers per capita GNP growth rates;
- Absorbs large amounts of resources needed for more productive investment in development;
- Increases the income disparity between rich and poor;
- Reduces family savings and domestic investment;
- Absorbs large amounts of scarce foreign exchange for food imports (or the loss of food surpluses for export); and
- Intensifies unemployment and underemployment in many developing countries where not enough productive jobs are created to absorb annual increases in the labor force.

Virtually all countries have population problems of sorts. We in the United States are no exception, as the recent report on "Population Growth and the American Future" by the Rockefeller Commission points out. In the United States, there has been a drop in the birth rate to parallel the drop in the death rate, so that our rate of increase is now only about 0.7 percent (including net immigration). But we do have population distribution problems so that some areas, particularly our larger cities, are showing strains in providing government services to an increasing number of people within lim-

ited budgets, have serious pollution problems, and seem increasingly threatened by crime. We also face some increasingly serious issues created by the rapidly growing populations of countries to the south of our own. Yet our interest is focused most sharply on the population problem around the world for the many ways in which it will affect the entire planet.

U.S. Approach to World Population Issues

Perhaps we spend too much time dwelling on the magnitude of the population problem and not enough time focusing on the real question: What can be done about it? It is my conviction that something can be done about it—otherwise I would not have taken on the assignment of coordinating population affairs and chairing the newly established U.S. Interagency Task Force on Population Policy. This task force, which includes representatives of 16 U.S. Government agencies, has international (not national) responsibilities. Its creation exemplifies our concern with worldwide population issues.

It would be dangerously simplistic to suggest that the many problems I have already discussed, like food shortages, environmental deterioration, static economic development, social unrest, and political extremism, can be solved by controlling population growth alone. There are many other issues that must be taken into account, but population problems are deeply involved in them all.

The U.S. approach to world population issues is based on mutuality of concerns and respect for the rights and responsibilities of other countries in developing their own policies and programs. Every country faces somewhat different problems, whose solutions must accommodate to the realities, peculiarities, and circumstances of that particular country.

We cannot solve the problems of Asia or Africa or Latin America. We can, however, help the problem solvers of Asia or Africa or Latin America. They are the ones that must take the lead, speak up clearly, and commit enough of their own resources in dealing

with their problems. We stand ready to help.

We also recognize that there is no single solution, no simple solution, and no short-term solution to the population problem. It is one that calls for the combined talents of scientists, economists, doctors, educators, government workers, and private voluntary organizations. Above all, it calls for greater involvement of leaders and diplomats than there has been over the past several decades.

The stage has at long last been set for more effective action by the nations of the world. One hundred and thirty-six nations agreed in late 1974 at the World Population Conference in Bucharest on a World Population Plan of Action, which calls upon nations to establish population policies and to recognize the right of every man and woman to plan the size of their families and to have the means for doing so. In short, family planning has gained worldwide acceptance.

Today, many countries have drawn up sound population policies and programs. Family planning has enlisted the active support of many leaders and a great many dedicated people—especially women working as doctors, demographers, midwives, motivators, as activists in family planning associations, and above all, as mothers. Knowledge of family planning is widespread, and means of contraception are ever more widely available, although they have not yet come within reach of most people in the more remote rural areas. As a result of these developments, there has been a gradual lowering of both birth rates and death rates in many countries and an actual decrease in population growth rates in some countries.

Having said all this, success or failure in dealing with excessive population growth lies, in the last analysis, with decisions and actions taken by the individual. What motivates the individual to have as many children as he or she has? What does family planning mean to the poor man or woman who sees many sons as the only road to old-age security? How do educational levels impact on the problem? To what extent do better health and nutrition, especially of children, tend to reduce fertility rates? All

these items and many other factors will have a direct or indirect bearing on the individual decision.

Thus, our general contributions to social and economic development will, at this most basic level, have a salutary impact on the population problem quite apart from their other virtues or advantages. But we also know that overall development is not likely to proceed fast enough to have a decisive effect on slowing population growth. Indeed, economic growth is sometimes not sufficient to keep up with growing population, with the result that per capita standards of living decline instead of improve.

The United States, accordingly, welcomes moves that are being undertaken in many countries to integrate family planning with health and nutrition. People are far more receptive to this approach, which is not only humane but also cost-effective in the long run, since all three—health, family planning, and nutrition—can be served by one administrative structure, with doctors and especially other health workers in a position to perform all three services.

The United States also welcomes movements in many countries of the world to strengthen the local communities—usually the village—and to create within that village a spirit of social and economic cooperation. Among many other advantages, family planning has better chances of success when it is rooted in community life and when people can see within their own visible horizons how limiting family size improves health and economic prospects for everyone in that community.

The very permanence of the community is an important consideration. National governments come and go. Individuals come and go. But communities go on forever. We all know how population programs must continue for many years to take real effect. A solid community organization also provides effective means for group involvement and “mutual handholding” as well as for making family planning services locally available and for monitoring and encouraging their use.

We recognize the great importance of increased efforts in the fields of biomedical and population sciences research. We will continue carefully to coordinate our efforts with those of other nations and international organizations with a view to finding family planning methods that are safe and widely acceptable and do not depend excessively on expensive medical structures.

Government and Private Assistance

In the long run, what we and other donors can do to be of help will be minimal compared to what a country does to help itself. Obviously, we cannot give support unless such support is requested. Types and amounts of support must then be determined on the basis of need and effective utilization, as well as what the assisted country is doing to help itself.

U.S. population assistance has totaled over \$800 million in the past 10 years, reaching a high of \$125 million in fiscal year 1973, decreasing to \$110 million in FY 1975. We aim to reverse this downward trend this fiscal year, though Congress will have the final decision. We are seeking to encourage other donor nations and international organizations to be more generous; and they are likely to do more if we do more, as indeed we should in terms of this critically important world issue.

We see this increasingly as an undertaking that requires the combined efforts and contributions of many countries and even greater involvement and support for the U.N. Fund for Population Activities, the World Health Organization, the U.N. Development Program, the World Bank and the regional banks, and UNICEF [U.N. Children's Fund], as well as private groups like the International Planned Parenthood Federation and the Population Council. I want to pay special tribute to the many Americans who give their support to private voluntary organizations that are doing a great service for humanity.

It so happens that countries facing the gravest population issues are the ones most

in need of help: not just in family planning, of course, but in food, agriculture, education, health, and development generally. For those who want our help and deserve it, we must not be found wanting. We all have too much at stake to do otherwise.

Prospects for the Future

Ladies and gentlemen, to this formal statement of our government's policy on world population issues, I wish to add a personal footnote.

I have just returned from a round-the-world trip that took me to the big-population countries of Asia. There, in the course of six weeks, I visited more villages and city slum areas than I did in my 37 years of diplomatic service. I finally saw the real Asia, which had always been there, but I had been passing on the other side of the street.

My travels deeply convinced me that we all must pay far greater attention to what is happening in the villages of the world, which is where most Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans live. Already there are dynamic stirrings in the villages of Asia for men to break free from apathy and hopelessness and for women to break free from the servitude of endless and mindless childbearing.

There are the beginnings of wide interest in responsible parenthood; and in some countries, like Korea and Indonesia, family planning is actually spearheading community development and promoting village political life. This is a vast undertaking and yet it does not depend on impossibly large sums of money—after all, worldwide, less than half the cost of one aircraft carrier is being spent each year on family planning by all the governments and private agencies of the world, donors and recipient nations alike.

What it does require is the involvement of people in solving their own problems. Unquestionably, the two most encouraging things I saw on my trip were: the great numbers of people—especially women—interested in responsible parenthood and the opportunities for improving conditions of life through strengthening the political, social, and economic life of the villages—in

other words, community development, including family planning.

I am convinced that while the community approach may not be *the* answer, it is an important part of any answer. It is often surprising what people can do collectively when they are given a bit of leadership and encouragement. That will probably have to come from the outside at the outset, but it will unlock in many communities capabilities that are already latent and only need to be released.

Let me take you finally to the poorest country of Asia, to a country sometimes referred to as a "basket case": Bangladesh. This is a nation of 83 million souls living in the deltas of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers—a nation the size of Wisconsin that hasn't got a rock, a stone, or a pebble, for it is all alluvial soil. Our Embassy's fact sheet will tell you that there are 1,200 people to the square mile, but during the annual floods, there are 25,000 people to the square mile of unflooded land, which is then shared with even greater numbers of cattle and snakes. Many of these people are condemned to die if family planning is not far more widely practiced than it is today. The Bangladesh Government knows it and is realistically seeking to act, though the time is late.

I look back from the extremities of my trip haunted by a memory, an ineffaceable memory, of the visit to a little riverine village in the heartland of Bangladesh. I was surrounded by swarms of children, and I remember particularly the upturned face of a little girl who never looked away, smiling, and holding in her arms a baby brother plagued with an eye infection. He kept rubbing his inflamed eye with the back of his hand. But the little girl kept smiling—a madonna of tomorrow. I can never accept that these children are "basket cases."

There is hope, but only if there is responsible parenthood. This is our concern and everybody's concern, but it is up to the nations and people of Asia and elsewhere to get on with the job.

We stand ready to help to the extent they seek, need, and properly use that help.

President Determines Import Relief for Specialty Steel Industry

Following is a statement issued by the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (STR) on March 16.

TR press release 220 dated March 16

President Ford has determined to grant import relief to the specialty steel industry, Ambassador Frederick B. Dent, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, announced on March 16. This is the first affirmative action taken under the escape clause provisions of the Trade Act of 1974.

The United Steelworkers of America and the Tool and Stainless Steel Industry Committee petitioned the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) on July 16, 1975, for import relief. On January 16, 1976, the USITC found that the industry was seriously injured substantially due to increased imports. During most of 1975, 25 percent or more of the industry's 30,000-person workforce was laid off, and less than half of the industry's production capacity was utilized, causing profits to plummet. At the same time imports rose slightly in tonnage terms and significantly increased their share of the U.S. market.

The President has directed the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations to attempt to negotiate orderly marketing agreements with key supplying countries for specialty steel products covered by the USITC's affirmative finding of injury. It is intended that these agreements limit imports over a three-year period while the domestic specialty steel industry recovers from the high unemployment and depressed operating levels of 1975. Should orderly marketing agreements not be negotiated successfully, the President will proclaim import quotas for a period of three years to take effect no later than June 14, 1976. Such quotas would be set at overall levels comparable to those recommended by the USITC.

This should be sufficient for the industry

to recover a healthy employment and profit position. Relief will be reduced or discontinued when the President determines, with the advice of the USITC and the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor, that this recovery is taking place.

International consultations have been requested by the United States in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to discuss the problems of our specialty steel industry and the proposed U.S. actions. The United States has notified the specialty steel case under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and it is expected that consultations will take place under the provisions of the GATT. Bilateral discussions with key supplying countries are being initiated.

In recognition of the special problems of the specialty and carbon steel industry, the President has directed the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, in the multilateral trade negotiations, to negotiate on a sectoral basis solutions to the problems of cyclical distortions in steel trade, while liberalizing the conditions of this trade.

Finally, the President has directed the Secretary of Labor to expedite processing of trade adjustment assistance petitions, to assist the large number of unemployed specialty steel workers. About 3,400 of 8,500 workers laid off are already eligible for such assistance.

The decision not to implement at this time the USITC's proposed remedy of quotas for the next five years is based on several considerations. This remedy is too inflexible in view of the rapid expansions and contractions of the specialty steel market and is not well suited to the needs of the industry during recovery from a recession period. The U.S. Government also desires to avoid unilateral restrictive action by trying to resolve specialty steel import problems through agreements with the other major nations involved. In this manner, the disruption to trade can be reduced and the special concerns of other nations can be taken into account, while the injury to the domestic industry is remedied.

Standardization of NATO Equipment Discussed by Department

Following is a statement by James E. Goodby, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, made before the Subcommittees on Research and Development and on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on March 31.¹

I welcome this opportunity to meet with the distinguished members of this committee and with our friends from various European parliaments in an exchange of views on NATO rationalization, standardization, and interoperability. My prepared statement deals mainly with the foreign policy aspects of these issues.

A set of events is now in motion which could have a profound effect on NATO's defense capabilities in the future. In the face of intransigent budgetary realities, we cannot afford to let NATO's defense efforts continue as a collection of individual national efforts. Business as usual will not counter the erosion. Clearly rationalization, standardization, and interoperability are ideas whose time has come.

The development of U.S. policy on rationalization, standardization, and interoperability represents bipartisan statesmanship between the executive branch and the Congress reminiscent of the Vandenberg era, which spawned NATO. Speaking at the NATO summit on May 29, 1975, President Ford said:

A generation after its creation, the alliance wastes vast sums each year, sacrificing military effectiveness. We have simply not done enough to standardize our weapons. We must correct this. We must also agree

among ourselves on a sensible division of weapon development programs and production responsibilities. And we must do more to enhance our mutual capacity to support each other both in battle and logistically. The pressures on defense budgets throughout the alliance should by now have convinced each of us that we simply must rationalize our collective defense.

The President also said:

We must make more effective use of our defense resources. We need to achieve our longstanding goal of common procedures and equipment. Our research and development efforts must be more than the sum of individual parts. Let us become truly one in our allocation of defense tasks, support, and production.

In the Congress, the so-called Nunn amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974, directed the Secretary of Defense to assess the cost and loss of military effectiveness resulting from failure to standardize weapons in NATO. Furthermore, the Secretary of Defense was directed to come up with a list of actions to advance standardization in NATO and submit an annual report to the Congress on the subject.

The so-called Culver-Nunn amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1976, states in section 814 (a):

It is the sense of the Congress that equipment procedures, ammunition, fuel and other military impedimenta for land, air and naval forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be standardized or made interoperable with that of other member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the maximum extent feasible. In carrying out such policy the Secretary of Defense shall, to the maximum feasible extent, initiate and carry out procurement procedures that provide for the acquisition of equipment which is standardized or interoperable with equipment of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization whenever such equipment is designed primarily to be used by personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Clearly the Congress has laid the keel upon which the U.S. rationalization, standardization, and interoperability policy has been built.

Drawing on the policy basis that I have just outlined, the Administration has opened a dialogue with our NATO allies aimed at developing agreed procedures and a program of action. Early last fall, we proposed that work begin in NATO on the development of a set of guidelines on standardization to which all members could adhere. In effect, we viewed these agreed guidelines as forming the "rules of the game." The types of issues and considerations which we suggested might be incorporated in such guidelines included the following:

- Military benefits that would result from greater standardization, interoperability, and flexibility among allied forces.

- Standardization as a long-term commitment.

- Coproduction of standard systems, with at least one production line in the United States and one in Europe in most cases; but when coproduction doesn't make sense, facilitate direct purchases.

- Rationalizing the European defense production base, including the need to rationalize European R. & D. [research and development], seek economies of scale in production, and avoid protectionism as a way to prop up efficient industries.

- Harmonization of weapons requirements and military doctrine.

- Early identification of opportunities for standardization and the need for long-term R. & D. planning.

We emphasized the importance of a mechanism which included France to address these issues and suggested that a senior ad hoc committee working closely under the North Atlantic Council prepare basic principles and guidelines for ministerial consideration in December, looking forward to development of a more specific plan of action that would be approved by ministers in the spring. We indicated that the initiative for rationalizing European defense production efforts within

the alliance rested with the Europeans.

At the same time the United States was preparing its initiative, the Eurogroup members (the European allies less Iceland, Portugal, and France) were attempting to organize themselves on issues of procurement and production and also include France in the process. Meeting in The Hague on November 5, 1975, Eurogroup defense ministers agreed to establish a European defense procurement secretariat, to seek to establish armaments collaboration in an independent forum open to all European members of the alliance, and to open a dialogue with the United States and Canada with a view to developing specific proposals for transatlantic cooperation.

At the NATO ministerial meetings in December 1975, we agreed with our allies to set aside our initiative temporarily to give the European allies an opportunity to coordinate among themselves on a European basis first. Subsequently, the members of Eurogroup, together with France, met in Rome on February 2 and established an Independent European Program Group, which is working toward harmonizing national equipment schedules and replacement dates, reaching agreement on joint projects, and eliminating duplication of development efforts.

We are sympathetic to such European efforts to rationalize their defense procurement and production. We also believe such efforts should ultimately serve to strengthen overall alliance defense. We await with interest a fuller elaboration of the views of the Independent European Program Group's plan of action and expect that relevant discussions with the United States and other allies will take place as the program and its objectives become more clear.

We also believe that it is important to take advantage of the current high-level interest and political momentum for rationalization, standardization, and interoperability and resume, at an appropriate time when our allies are prepared and willing, a discussion within NATO of the broad aspects of the subject matter, aimed at more clearly defining a possible framework for transatlantic cooperation.

Currently in NATO, efforts are being concentrated on interoperability. While in some ways interoperability is more involved with "nuts and bolts" and conceptually less dramatic than standardization, nevertheless it does offer the most immediate opportunity for achieving real progress. I might add that this work is being vigorously pursued in the North Atlantic Council with full participation of all members and with strong endorsement from the United States.

In sum, rationalization, standardization, and interoperability can make an important contribution by improving the military effectiveness of the alliance. Additionally, actions in these areas provide a strong sense of cohesion on the political side which in the long term may be equally important.

Security Relations With South Korea Discussed by Department

Following is a statement by Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 8.¹

I welcome this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to discuss our security relationships with the Republic of Korea.

As the members of the subcommittee are aware, military tensions continue to exist on the Korean Peninsula. Large armed forces face each other on each side of the demilitarized zone, and unfortunately the promising South-North dialogue which began several years ago has withered away. North Korea remains intransigently committed to unification on its own terms and has em-

barked on a major campaign to isolate the Republic of Korea internationally.

In this situation we believe, however, that with our force presence a rough military balance prevails and that none of the major powers would wish to see a major outbreak of hostilities. At the same time, the possibility of a major incident or accident remains.

In the security area, the United States has a clear single objective—to preserve peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. In pursuit of this objective we have a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea and substantial American forces are present there. In addition, we have had over the years a military assistance program which has supported the efforts of the Republic of Korea to strengthen its own ability to defend itself. Our policies have been—and remain—key elements in maintaining the military balance in Korea and in preserving peace on the peninsula.

In the military assistance field, our programs have changed as the Republic of Korea has been able to increasingly bear the economic costs of its own defense. As you know after fiscal year 1976 we will provide no further grant materiel assistance. We hope also, if our requests before the Congress are approved, to meet our modernization-planning objectives in fiscal year 1977. The Republic of Korea has recently embarked, on its own initiative and with its own resources, on a major force-improvement plan, to be accomplished over the next five years, to further modernize its armed forces. For our part, we expect to continue to request significant levels of FMS [foreign military sales] guaranteed loans in support of our mutual security objectives in Korea.

While seeking to maintain the military balance on the Korean Peninsula, we have also tried both publicly and privately to reduce tensions and promote more durable arrangements for peace in Korea. As Secretary Kissinger noted in his November 2 Detroit speech, we and the Republic of Korea desire to move to a more permanent solution. We have proposed a conference including the

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Republic of Korea, North Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China to discuss the dissolution of the U.N. Command while preserving the armistice agreement. And in that context we are willing to consider other measures to reduce tensions, including a wider conference to negotiate more fundamental arrangements for peace in Korea.

We will not, however, acquiesce in any proposals which would exclude the Republic of Korea from discussions about its future. And we will not allow our military presence, which derives from bilateral agreements, to be dictated by third parties. But we are prepared—now—to transform the armistice arrangements into a permanent peace.

Also as part of our efforts to reduce tensions on the peninsula, we have publicly indicated our willingness to reciprocate moves by North Korea and its allies to improve their relations with the Republic of Korea. And in support of seeking an improved dialogue between North and South Korea, we have suggested dual entry of both Koreas into the United Nations without prejudice to their eventual reunification.

The President in his East-West Center speech on December 7, 1975, reaffirmed our support for the Republic of Korea and noted that the United States was ready to consider constructive ways of easing tensions on the peninsula. Unfortunately, we have received no constructive response to any of our efforts from the other side.

In the present circumstances, we believe our continued security relationship with the Republic of Korea remains a crucial element in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region as a whole, including Japan. As you are aware, the Government of Japan shares fully our view on the importance of the U.S. security relationship with the Republic of Korea. Further, our current security policies support our broader efforts to reach a more lasting arrangement on the Korean Peninsula, whatever the short-term prospects.

At the same time, we do recognize the

problems caused for the United States by the domestic policies of the Park government. Obviously, the Korean human rights situation is an important element in our policy considerations.

We have made clear that we are not happy over what has happened recently in South Korea. We have strongly and unequivocally made known our views to the Korean Government, both in public and through diplomatic channels. And we have stressed to them the unfavorable impact of their actions within the United States. There should be no doubt about the strong concern of the American people and the U.S. Government over the human rights issue. It should be noted, however, that our basic security relationship with the Republic of Korea is not an issue between President Park and his domestic critics.

In sum, our Mutual Defense Treaty commitment, military presence, and military assistance relationship with the Republic of Korea have been and remain essential elements in maintaining the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. We recognize—and this has been the consistent U.S. Government position—that the specific level of our forces in Korea is not immutable. It is a function of the North Korean threat, the ability of the Republic of Korea forces to meet that threat, and the prevailing international situation. However, in the present period in particular, we have stressed our continuing interest in East Asia and have assured our allies that we intend to honor our commitments and maintain our presence in the area. In that context the United States has no present plans for significant force reduction in Korea.

We understand that pending fiscal year 1976 congressional legislation would require an annual report on various aspects of our security relationship with the Republic of Korea. We believe that such an annual assessment will provide a useful framework for both the executive branch and the Congress in addressing the specific future questions relating to that relationship.

U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution on South African Forces in Angola

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative William W. Scranton on March 31, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON

USUN press release 40 dated March 31

The U.S. delegation has listened with deep interest to the statements that have been made in this Council on the agenda item that is before us. Our delegation welcomes the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. The exchanges which resulted in this announcement are encouraging both because they suggest that the situation on the frontier can be dealt with by peaceful means and because they mark the withdrawal of a foreign military force from an area where it does not belong.

The withdrawal of South Africa from Angola can only serve to highlight for the international community the tragic fact that there remain other, even larger, foreign interventions in southern Africa. I fully understand, Mr. President, the appeal you have made, and the appeal that has been supported by the Representative of Tanzania and others, that the Council remember the subject of our agenda and focus attention thereon. We do not, of course, interpret this appeal to mean that this debate should proceed as if the end of one case of wrongful international behavior in southern Africa should somehow blind us to others.

A number of speakers have already referred, quite rightfully, to another case of such wrongful behavior: the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. The United States, for its part, continues strongly

to support the Security Council's resolution on this subject unanimously adopted on January 30 of this year. The United States holds firm to its policy of support for majority rule in southern Africa.

But there is still another case of unacceptable international behavior which must be brought to an end. I refer of course to the presence on the African Continent of a large Cuban expeditionary force, now numbering over 13,000 men—an adventure which could never have been begun and could not be continued now without the support of the Soviet Union, a permanent member of this Council. It is an adventure which is based on an assumption that Cuba can introduce itself as an arbiter of intra-African affairs, using the most modern weapons and a trained expeditionary force to that very end. This is a peculiarly and particularly dangerous precedent, not only for Africa but for the entire world.

The attempt by the Cuban Representative to distort the tragic history of foreign intervention in Angola's civil war is a self-serving misstatement of the facts, which are themselves by now well known to many of the members and the observers at the Council. Cuban armed intervention in Angola began long before the date cited by the Cuban Representative, which was November 5.

Regardless of how you judge the Cuban intervention, one cannot ignore the public statement of Cuban Deputy Premier Carlos Rodriguez that Cuba dispatched 250 military advisory personnel to Angola in the late spring of 1975. This move coincided with the arrival of massive amounts of weapons supplied by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the available evidence indicates that Cuba decided no later than mid-August 1975 to commit sufficient numbers of combat troops to Angola to impose the movement they supported as the only government of Angola. I state this with confidence since we know that during September 1975 five Cuban vessels transported around 1,500 combat troops from Cuba to Angola and that by late October at least 2,000 Cuban combat troops were deployed inside Angola.

This intervention into an indigenous African struggle was occurring at the same time the OAU [Organization of African Unity] Conciliation Commission on Angola was calling for all states to refrain from intervention in Angola, a call that my government supported.

From the beginning of the struggle in Angola the U.S. Government sought three principal goals: an end to bloodshed, the opportunity for all competing factions through their own efforts to be represented in the government of an independent Angola, and the cessation of all foreign military involvement. And just as the end to South Africa's wrongful intervention is very welcome, so the continuing Cuban and Soviet intervention is wrong:

—Wrong because it deprived the Angolan people of the ability to exercise self-determination freely, uncoerced by foreign military intervention.

—Wrong because of its massive size. Soviet aid to Angola in 1975 and early 1976 far exceeded the entire amount of military aid to sub-Saharan Africa from *all* sources in 1974.

—Wrong because it can no longer be related to any of the alleged purposes it pretended to serve.

—Wrong because of its implications for the future, in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

What are the implications of the presence of such combat forces in Africa supplied and equipped by a great power?

First, the central development in the entire history of modern Africa has been the emergence of African nations from colonial status to independence. In area after area, in country after country of Africa, the end of foreign domination has resulted in the removal of foreign troops. Proudly, and rightly proudly, independent governments have arisen instead. This has been a powerful trend in modern African history and a trend which all friends of Africa welcome and support. Thus, in Angola the Cuban military presence in large numbers has been and con-

tinues to be inconsistent with this history, with the great traditions of modern Africa, and with the firmly stated convictions of Africa's leaders.

Second, the radical departure from modern African tradition represented by the massive Cuban movement in Angola must be terminated. The continued presence of Cuban combat forces in Africa risks establishing a pattern of action and competition for foreign sponsorship which can fundamentally undermine what has been achieved in Africa these past 20 years. The involvement of Cuban troops in Angola, if not terminated, can only serve to turn back the clock of history to an earlier epoch.

I say this because the United States supports African independence. We support the principles of nonintervention and of territorial integrity and of the nonuse of force in Africa. President Ford has made clear that rapid change is required in southern Africa and that the opportunity for negotiated solutions must be seized and moved forward. The United States supports majority rule in southern Africa. Our dedication to these objectives and our friendship for Africa impels us to point to this continuing anomaly of the Cuban presence:

—We believe the African nations are aware of the threat to their independence and sovereignty posed by the presence of those who purport to be their disinterested friends.

—We believe they recognize that Cuban and Soviet actions are designed to serve Cuban, and Soviet, global objectives which have nothing to do with peace and progress in Africa.

—We believe the African nations, and all members of this Council, know what is required: the immediate and total withdrawal of *all* foreign military forces from Angola.

The United States strongly supports the motivations inherent in this resolution that is before us for African independence but shall abstain from the vote on this draft resolution because of its failure to apply to other, continuing foreign interventions.

The resolution purports to reflect a con-

clusion by the Council on the situation in Angola and asks for responsive action by South Africa. It says nothing whatsoever about the irresponsibility of those who employed by far the most destructive weaponry there. Furthermore, the operative part of the resolution unaccountably fails to set forth what should be a key requirement: that all states refrain from intervening in the affairs of Angola.

Thus, to the extent that the resolution reflects the efforts of this Council to deal with the problem of foreign involvement in Angola, in our judgment it falls badly short of that mark. It cites South Africa's unwarranted violation of Angola's territorial integrity, yet the resolution is totally silent on the continuing presence of the Cuban expeditionary force in Angola. Such a blatant disregard of facts, such a double standard, such an exercise in hypocrisy cannot further, in our judgment, this Council's discharge of its own responsibilities. Accordingly, the United States will abstain on this resolution, as strongly as we feel about the independence of African states.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ¹

The Security Council,

Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Kenya on behalf of the African Group of States at the United Nations (S/12007),

Having heard the statement of the representative of the People's Republic of Angola,

Recalling the principle that no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State,

Recalling also the inherent and lawful right of every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to request assistance from any other State or group of States,

Bearing in mind that all States Members of the United Nations must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of an State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

Gravely concerned at the acts of aggression committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola and the violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity,

Condemning the utilization by South Africa of the international Territory of Namibia to mount the aggression,

Gravely concerned also at the damage and destruction done by the South African invading forces in Angola and by their seizure of Angola equipment and materials,

Noting the letter of the Permanent Representative of South Africa regarding the withdrawal of South African troops (S/12026),

1. *Condemns* South Africa's aggression against the People's Republic of Angola;

2. *Demands* that South Africa scrupulously respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola;

3. *Demands also* that South Africa desist from the utilization of the international Territory of Namibia to mount provocative or aggressive acts against the People's Republic of Angola or any other neighbouring African State;

4. *Calls upon* the Government of South Africa to meet the just claims of the People's Republic of Angola for a full compensation for the damage and destruction inflicted on its State and for the restoration of the equipment and materials which its invading forces seized;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of this resolution.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Amendment of article V of the agreement of September 25, 1956 (TIAS 4049), on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands to increase the financial limit for services. Adopted by the ICAO Council at Montreal March 17, 1976. Entered into force March 17, 1976.

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/387 (1976); adopted by the Council on Mar. 31 by a vote of 9 to 0, with 5 abstentions (France, Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.); the People's Republic of China did not participate in the vote.

onsular Relations

ptional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Pakistan, March 29, 1976.

iplomatic Relations

ptional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Pakistan, March 29, 1976.

onomic Cooperation

greement establishing a financial support fund of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.¹
Ratification deposited: Turkey, April 2, 1976.

ealth

stitution of the World Health Organization, as amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 8086.
Acceptance deposited: Surinam, March 25, 1976.

labor

strument for the amendment of the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Done at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 20, 1948. TIAS 1868.
Admission to membership: Surinam, February 24, 1976.

oritime Matters

endments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.¹
Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, March 30, 1976.

eteorology

vention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Comoro Islands, March 19, 1976.

afety at Sea

endments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 26, 1968.¹
Acceptance deposited: Belgium, March 19, 1976.

elecommunications

international telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremo-

linos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.

Ratification deposited: United States (with declaration), April 7, 1976.

Entered into force for the United States: April 7, 1976.

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.¹

Accession deposited: Pakistan, March 29, 1976.

Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of Colombia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva July 23, 1975. Entered into force January 22, 1976; for the United States May 1, 1976.

Acceptance deposited: United States, April 1, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Cuba (with declarations), April 6, 1976.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

Signatures: Japan, Portugal, South Africa, Switzerland, United States, April 5, 1976; Austria, Barbados, Bolivia, Cuba (with declarations), Finland, Guatemala, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Norway, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with statement), Vatican City State, April 6, 1976; Australia, Canada, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Iraq, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, Venezuela, April 7, 1976.

Ratification deposited: Vatican City State, April 6, 1976.

Declaration of provisional application deposited: Cuba, April 6, 1976.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

Signatures: Japan (with reservation), Switzerland (with reservation), United States (with statement), April 5, 1976; Finland, April 6, 1976; Australia, Canada, April 7, 1976.

¹ Not in force.

Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the United States July 7, 1976.

Accession deposited: United States, April 8, 1976.

BILATERAL

Australia

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington May 14, 1974.

Ratifications exchanged: April 8, 1976.

Entered into force: May 8, 1976.

Extradition treaty. Signed at London December 22, 1931. Entered into force June 24, 1935.

Terminated: April 8, 1976.

Canada

Extradition convention. Signed at Washington July 12, 1889. Entered into force April 4, 1890. TS 139.

Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into force of the treaty of extradition, signed at Washington December 3, 1971).

Supplementary extradition convention. Signed at Washington December 13, 1900. Entered into force May 2, 1901. TS 391.

Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into force of the treaty of extradition, signed at Washington December 3, 1971).

Supplementary extradition convention. Signed at London April 12, 1905. Entered into force February 22, 1907. TS 458.

Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into force of the treaty of extradition, signed at Washington December 3, 1971).

Supplementary extradition convention. Signed at London May 15, 1922. Entered into force November 3, 1922. TS 666.

Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into force of the treaty of extradition, signed at Washington December 3, 1971).

Convention to provide for extradition on account of crimes or offenses against narcotic laws. Signed at Washington January 8, 1925. Entered into force July 27, 1925. TS 719.

Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into force of the treaty of extradition, signed at Washington December 3, 1971).

Supplementary convention to the supplementary convention between the United States and the United Kingdom for the mutual extradition of fugitive criminals signed at Washington December 13, 1900. Signed at Ottawa October 26, 1951. Entered into force July 11, 1952. TIAS 2454.

Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into force of the treaty of extradition, signed at Washington December 3, 1971).

Haiti

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities relating to the March 20, 1975, agreement, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Port-au-Prince March 22, 1976. Entered into force March 22, 1976.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince March 22 and 23, 1976. Entered into force March 23, 1976; effective January 1, 1976.

Japan

Agreement on research participation and technical exchange in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission LOFT [loss-of-fluid tests] program. Signed at Tokyo February 23, 1976. Entered into force February 23, 1976.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of June 26, 1974 relating to trade in cotton, wool and manmade fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 24 and April 1, 1976. Entered into force April 1, 1976.

Correction

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following error which appears in the April 5 issue:

p. 451, col. 1: The last two lines should read: "there were concrete gains to be realized by all."

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Checklist of Department of State
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No.	Date	Subject
*160	4/5	Robert Strausz-Hupé sworn in as U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of NATO (biographic data).
†161	4/7	North Pacific Fur Seal Commission meets at Moscow.
162	4/8	Kissinger: Foreign Policy Association, U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, U.N. Association of the U.S.A., New York.
*162A	4/8	Carter L. Burgess: introduction of Secretary Kissinger.
162B	4/9	Kissinger: questions and answers following address, Apr. 8.
*163	4/9	U.S.-Philippine negotiations on military bases to begin Apr. 12.
*164	4/9	Kissinger: remarks following meeting with Ambassador Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, President, Law of the Sea Conference, New York, Apr. 8.
*165	4/9	Charles W. Robinson sworn in as Deputy Secretary (biographic data).
*166	4/9	Kissinger: remarks before heads of delegations, Law of the Sea Conference, New York, Apr. 8.
†167	4/9	General index to "Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949" released.
*168	4/9	Kissinger: remarks at presentation of Edward Weintal award to Peter Lisagor.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.