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Foreign Policy and National Security

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

I have come here today to talk to you about the vital and intimate relationship between America's foreign policy and our national security. It is appropriate that I do so in Texas, a state so long dedicated to a strong and resolute America, a state that has given our nation three distinguished Americans who presently serve in Washington and whom I am proud to consider friends—Bill Clements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; George Mahon, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives; and John Tower of the Senate Armed Services Committee. All three of these men have worked long and hard to assure a strong defense for America. All three deserve the grateful thanks of their countrymen.

As Secretary of State I am not, of course, directly involved in the preparation of our defense budget or in decisions regarding particular weapons programs. But as the President's principal adviser on foreign policy, no one knows better than I that a strong defense is crucial for our role in the world. For a great and responsible power, diplomacy without strength would be empty. If we were weak we could not negotiate; we could only hope or accommodate. It is the confidence of strength that permits us to act with conciliation and responsibility to help shape a more peaceful world.

Other nations must not be led to doubt either our strength or our resolution. For how others see us determines the risks they are prepared to run and the degree to which they are willing to place confidence in our policies. If adversaries consider us weak or irresolute, testing and crises are inevitable. If allies doubt our constancy, retreat and political shifts are certain.

And so as Secretary of State, I am inevitably a partisan of a strong America and a strong defense as the underpinning of a strong foreign policy. I have a responsibility to make clear to the American people and to other nations that our power is indeed adequate to our current challenges, that we are improving our forces to meet changing conditions, that America understands its interests and values and will defend them, and that the American people will never permit those hostile to us to shape the world in which we live.

I do not accept the propositions that other nations have gained military ascendancy over us, that the Administration has neglected our defenses, or that negotiations to reduce the threat of nuclear war are unwise. These charges sound remarkably like the "missile gap" claims which aroused anxieties in 1960, only to dissolve suddenly a few weeks after the election.

Ladies and gentlemen, we do face serious challenges to our security. They derive from the unprecedented conditions of the thermonuclear age, the ambiguities of contemporary power, and the perpetual revolution in technology. Our task is to understand the real and permanent requirements of our security, rather than to be seduced by the

[1] Made at Dallas, Tex., on Mar. 22 before a dinner meeting sponsored by Southern Methodist University, the World Affairs Council of Dallas, and other local organizations (text from press release 141).

outmoded vocabulary of a simpler time.

What are the national security issues we face? What is the true condition of our national defense?

—First, the inevitable growth of Soviet economic and military power has produced essential strategic equality. We cannot halt this growth, but we must counterbalance it and prevent its use for political expansion.

—Second, America remains the most powerful nation in the world. It will remain so, if the Congress approves the President's proposed defense budget. But evolving technology and the military programs of others impose upon us the need for constant vigilance and continuing major effort.

—Third, technology has revolutionized the instruments of war and introduced an unparalleled complexity into the perceptions of power and the choices that we must make to maintain it. The defense establishment we have today is the product of decisions taken 10 to 15 years ago. Equally, the decisions we make today will determine our defense posture in the eighties and beyond. And the kind of forces we have will determine the kind of diplomacy we are able to conduct.

—Fourth, as nuclear arsenals grow, the horrors of nuclear war become ever more apparent while at the same time the threat of all-out nuclear war to deter or resist less-than-all-out aggression becomes ever less plausible. Under the umbrella of strategic equivalence, testing and probing at the local and regional levels become more likely. Hence over the next decade we must increase and modernize the forces—air, land, and sea—for local defense.

—Fifth, while a weak defense posture produces a weak foreign policy, a strong defense does not necessarily produce a strong foreign policy. Our role in the world depends as well on how realistically we perceive our national interests, on our unity as a people, and on our willingness to persevere in pursuit of our national goals.

—Finally, for Americans, physical strength can never be an end in itself. So long as we are true to ourselves, every Administration has the obligation to seek t control the spiral of nuclear weapons and t give mankind hope for a more secure an just future.

The Long-Range Challenge of Defense

Let me discuss each of these challenges

To cope with the implications of Sovie power has become a permanent responsibil ity of American defense and foreign policy Sixty years of Soviet industrial and ecc nomic growth, and a political system tha gives top priority to military buildup, have— inevitably—brought the Soviet Union to position of rough equilibrium with th United States. No policy or decision on ou part brought this about. Nothing we coul have done would have prevented it. Nothin we can do now will make it disappear.

But while we cannot prevent the growt of Soviet military strength, we can and mus maintain the strength to balance it and in sure that it will not be used for politica expansion. There is no alternative to a sul stantial defense budget over the long tern We have a permanent responsibility an need a steady course that does not chang with the fads of the moment. We canno afford the oscillation between assaults c defense spending and cries of panic, betwee cuts of $40 billion in Administration defens budget requests over seven years an charges of neglect of our defenses.

This claim on our perseverance is a ne experience for Americans. Throughout mos of our history we have been able to mobiliz urgently in time of war and then to disarn unilaterally when victory was achieve After World War II we rapidly demob lized our armies, relying largely on our nu clear monopoly to preserve the peace. Thu when the Korean war broke out we wer little better prepared than we had been 1 summers previously. Only recently have w begun to understand—and then reluctantl —that foreign policy and military strateg are inextricably linked, that we must main tain defense preparedness over the lon term, and that we will live for as far ahea

as we can see in a twilight between tranquillity and open confrontation. We need a defense posture that is relevant to our dangers, comprehensible to our friends, credible to our adversaries, and that we are prepared to sustain over the long term.

The Imperatives of Technology

Technology has transformed the conditions and calculations of military strength in unprecedented fashion.

The paradox of contemporary military strength is that a momentous increase in the element of power has eroded the traditional relationship of power to policy. Until the end of World War II, it would never have occurred to a leader that there might be an upper limit to useful military power. Since the technological choices were limited, strength was largely defined in quantitative terms. Today, the problem is to insure that our strength is relevant to our foreign policy objectives. Under current conditions, no matter how we or our adversaries improve the size or quality of our strategic arsenals, one overriding fact remains: an all-out strategic nuclear exchange would kill hundreds of millions on both sides in a matter of hours and utterly devastate the nations involved.

Thus the current strategic problem is virtually the diametric opposite of the historic one. Planners used to pursue increased overall power. Today we have a total strength unimaginable a generation ago, but we must design, diversify, and refine our forces so that they are relevant to—and able to support—rational foreign policy objectives. Historically, military planners could treat the technology of their time as stable; today, technology revolutionizes military capabilities in both strategic and tactical forces every decade and thus presents policymakers with an ever-increasing spectrum of choice.

And yet, the choices we make now will not, in most cases, really affect the structure of our forces for from 5 to 10 years—the time it takes to design new weapons, build them, and deploy them. Thus the policies Administrations are able to carry out are largely shaped by decisions in which they took no part. Decisions made in the 1960's largely determined our strategic posture for the 1970's. We can do little to change the impact of those earlier decisions; the Administration in power in the eighties will be able to do little to change the impact of the decisions we make today. This is a sobering challenge, and it turns national security policy into a nonpartisan responsibility.

In choosing among the options that technology gives, we—and every Administration—must keep certain principles in mind:

—First, we must not simply duplicate Soviet choices. The Soviet Union has a different geopolitical problem, a different force structure, and perhaps a different strategic doctrine.

—Second, because of the costs of modern forces, we face complex choices. In many areas we face a trade-off between quantity and quality, between numbers and sophistication.

—Third, because of our higher wage scales, particularly for our volunteer forces, any increase in our forces will weigh much more heavily on our economy than on that of adversaries whose pay scales are only a fraction of ours. For this reason, and the value we place on human life, we have always had an incentive, *indeed an imperative*, to put a premium on technology—where we are superior—rather than on sheer numbers.

—Fourth, we must see beyond the numbers game. Quality confers advantages as much as quantity and can sometimes substitute for it. Yet even we cannot afford every weapon that technology makes possible.

—Fifth, at some point numbers count. Technology cannot substitute indefinitely for numerical strength. The belief that there is an unlimited amount of fat to be cut in the defense budget is an illusion. Reductions almost inevitably translate into a reduction of effectiveness.

America possesses the economic and tech-

nological foundation to remain militarily preeminent; we can afford whatever military forces our security requires. The challenge we face is not to our physical strength—which is unequaled—but to our will to maintain it in all relevant categories and to use it when necessary to defend our interests and values.

Strategic Forces

Our nation's security requires, first and foremost, strategic forces that can deter attack and that insure swift and flexible retaliation if aggression occurs.

We have such forces today. Our technology has always been ahead of the U.S.S.R. by at least five years; with appropriate effort we can insure that this will continue to be the case.

We are determined to maintain the strategic balance at whatever level is required. We will never allow the balance to be tipped against us either by unilateral decision or a buildup of the other side, by a one-sided agreement or by a violation of an agreement.

But we must be clear what maintaining the balance means. We must not mesmerize ourselves with fictitious "gaps." Our forces were designed according to different criteria than those of the Soviet Union; their adequacy must be judged by our strategic needs, not theirs.

In the middle sixties we could have continued the deployment of heavy throw-weight missiles, following the Titan or the Atlas. But the Administration then in office decided instead to rely—in addition to our large bomber force—on an arsenal of 1,000 new relatively light, sophisticated, and extremely accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles and 656 submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats. We deployed these systems rapidly, halting our buildup of launchers in the 1960's when it was judged that technological improvements were more important than an increase in numbers.

The Soviet Union chose a different course. Because of its more limited technological capabilities, it emphasized missiles whos greater throw-weight compensated for thei substantially poorer accuracy. But—con trary to the expectations of American offi cials in the 1960's—the Soviets also chose t expand their numbers of launchers beyon what we had. Thus, the Soviets passed ou numerical levels by 1970 and continued t add an average of 200 missiles a year—unti we succeeded in halting this buildup in th SALT agreement of 1972.

Therefore—as a consequence of unilatera decisions made a decade ago by both sides— Soviet missile forces today are somewha larger in number and considerably heavie in throw-weight, while ours are superior i reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophisti cation. We possess far larger numbers o warheads—8,500 to their 2,500—and w have several hundred more strategi bombers.

Whether we move in the direction c greater throw-weight will largely depend o recommendations made by the Departmer of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; i is not essentially a foreign policy decisio But in making it we will be governed by ou needs, not by a compulsion to duplicate th Soviet force structure.

The destructiveness of missiles depends o a combination of explosive power and accu racy. For most purposes, as accuracy in proves, explosive power becomes less impo tant—and heavy land-based missiles becom in fact more vulnerable. Since we hav stressed accuracy, we may decide that w do not need to approach the level of throv weight of Soviet weapons, though nothing— certainly no SALT agreement—prevents u from substantially increasing our throv weight if we choose.

Whatever our decision regarding technic issues, no responsible leader should encou age the illusion that America can ever agai recapture the strategic superiority of th early postwar period. In the forties, we ha a nuclear monopoly. In the fifties and earl sixties, we had overwhelming preponderanc As late as the Cuban missile crisis of 196 the Soviet Union possessed less than 10

strategic systems while we had thousands. But today, when each side has thousands of launchers and many more warheads, a decisive or politically significant margin of superiority is out of reach. If one side expands or improves its forces, sooner or later the other side will balance the effort.

The Soviet Union first developed an ICBM; we matched it. We then added a lead in numbers of strategic missiles to the lead we already had in bombers; they caught up and surpassed us in missile numbers, though we still remain far ahead in numbers of bombers. When our Trident submarines are in production by the end of this decade, we will begin to redress that numerical imbalance as well as improve the flexibility and survivability of our forces.

We were the first to put modern ballistic missiles on submarines, and we were the first to put multiple warheads on missiles. Though we remain ahead in both categories, the Soviets found ways to narrow the gap. And the same will be true in the future, whether in missile accuracy or submarine, aircraft, or cruise missile technology.

The pattern is clear. No net advantage can long be preserved by *either* side. A perceived inequality could shake the confidence of other countries even when its precise military significance is difficult to define. Therefore we certainly will not permit a perceived or actual imbalance to arise against us and the Soviet Union is likely to follow similar principles.

The probable outcome of each succeeding round of the strategic arms race will be the restoration of equilibrium, at a higher and costlier level of forces and probably with less political stability. Such temporary advantages as can be achieved are not strategically decisive.

The long leadtimes for the deployment of modern weapons should always permit countermeasures to be taken. If both sides remain vigilant, neither side will be able to reduce the effects of a counterblow against it to acceptable levels.

Those who paint dark vistas of a looming U.S. inferiority in strategic weapons ignore these facts and the real choices facing modern leaders.

No nuclear weapon has ever been used in modern wartime conditions or against an opponent possessing means of retaliation. Indeed, neither side has even tested the launching of more than a few missiles at a time; neither side has ever fired them in a north-south direction as they would have to do in wartime. Yet initiation of an all-out surprise attack would depend on substantial confidence that thousands of reentry vehicles launched in carefully coordinated attacks—from land, sea, and air—would knock out all their targets thousands of miles away with a timing and reliability exactly as predicted, before the other side launched any forces to preempt or retaliate, and with such effectiveness that retaliation would not produce unacceptable damage. Any miscalculation or technical failure would mean national catastrophe. Assertions that one side is "ahead" by the margins now under discussion pale in significance when an attack would depend on decisions based on such massive uncertainties and risks.

For these reasons, the strategic arsenals of the two sides find their principal purpose in matching and deterring the forces of the opponent and in making certain that third countries perceive no inequality. In no recent crisis has an American President come close to considering the use of strategic nuclear weapons. In no crisis since 1962—and perhaps not even then—has the strategic balance been the decisive factor. Even in Korea, when we possessed an overwhelming superiority, it was not relevant to the outcome.

Strategic Arms Limitation

It is against this background that we have vigorously negotiated mutual limitations in strategic arms. These are compelling reasons for pursuing such talks.

—Since successive rounds of competitive programs will almost certainly yield only equilibrium, we have sought to regulate the

competition and to maintain the equivalence that will exist in any case at lower levels.

—Stabilizing the strategic balance frees resources to strengthen our forces in areas where they are most needed; it will ease the problem of enhancing our capabilities for regional defense and in seapower, the areas where an imbalance could have serious geopolitical consequences.

—Agreed limitations and a more calculable strategic relationship will facilitate efforts to reduce political confrontations and crises.

—And, finally, the American people expect their leaders to pursue every responsible approach to peace and stability in the thermonuclear era. Only then can we expect them to support the sacrifices necessary to maintain our defensive strength.

We have made progress toward these goals. In the 1972 SALT agreements we froze antiballistic missile systems in their infancy and thus avoided potentially massive expenditures and instabilities. We halted the momentum of the Soviet missile buildup for five years—a period in which, because of the long leadtimes involved, we had no capacity for deployment of our own. We intended to use that five-year interval to negotiate a longer term and more comprehensive agreement based on numerical equality and, failing that, to close the numerical gap by our own efforts as our modernization programs developed.

This is precisely what President Ford achieved at Vladivostok a year and a half ago and what we are trying to enshrine in a binding treaty that would run through 1985. Both sides would have equal ceilings on missiles, heavy bombers, and on multiwarhead missiles; this would require the Soviets to dismantle many weapons, while our planned forces would not be affected. And neither the weapons of our allies nor our forward-based nuclear systems, such as carriers and tactical aircraft, would be included; these had been Soviet demands since 1969.

These are major accomplishments which are overwhelmingly in our interest, particularly when we compare them to the situation which could have prevailed had we failed t achieve restraints on Soviet programs. Nev ertheless, very important issues remain to b resolved. We will make every effort to con clude a satisfactory agreement, but we wil be driven solely by the national interest an not by arbitrary or artificial deadlines.

The SALT agreements are the opposite o one-sided concessions to the U.S.S.R., as the are so often portrayed. Soviet offensive pro grams were slowed; none of ours were af fected. Nor has the Administration counte nanced Soviet violations of the first SAL agreement, as has been irresponsibl charged. In fact we have carefully watche every aspect of Soviet performance. It is th unanimous view of all agencies of our gov ernment—only recently reconfirmed—tha no Soviet violation has occurred and tha none of the ambiguous actions that we hav noted and raised has affected our security But we will remain vigilant. All ambiguou information will be carefully analyzed. N violations will be tolerated. We will insist o full explanations where questionable activit has occurred.

We will maintain the strategic balance a whatever level is required—preferably with in the limits of successful SALT negotia tions but, if necessary, without those limit We will not heed those who maintain that a that is required are limited, minimum dete rence forces—to threaten the Soviet civilia population. To follow their advice would de prive us of all options save capitulation an the massive destruction of civilian life; i would create a large numerical imbalanc against us, which could have significant po litical consequences, possibly tempting ou adversaries and upsetting our friends.

But neither will we be deflected by cor trived and incredible scenarios, by inflate versions of Soviet strength, or by irrespor sible attacks on SALT into diverting defens resources away from vital areas—the force for regional and local defense and our Navy For these are the areas where shortfalls an imbalances can rapidly turn into geopoliti cal shifts that jeopardize our fundamenta interests and those of our allies.

Military Strength for Regional Defense

Under conditions of nuclear parity, world peace is more likely to be threatened by shifts in local or regional balances—in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, or Africa—than by strategic nuclear attack. Thus, our forces that can be used for local defense deserve our particular attention and increased resources.

The issue is not the simplistic one of the size of the Soviet Army. There is nothing new about the size of the Soviet Army. During the entire postwar period, the Soviet standing army has always been larger than ours; at times it has been three times the size. The Soviet Union has a much greater landmass to defend and perceives major defense problems both in Eastern Europe and on its Asian front, where nearly half of the Soviet Army is now stationed. We, by contrast, enjoy the shields of friendly neighbors and wide oceans. And we are linked with close allies with substantial forces of their own.

The new and long-foreseen problem is that under conditions of nuclear balance our adversaries may be increasingly tempted to probe at the regional level. This temptation must be discouraged. If leaders around the world come to assume that the United States lacks either the forces or the will to resist while others intervene to impose solutions, they will accommodate themselves to what they will regard as the dominant trend. And an unopposed superpower may draw dangerous conclusions when the next opportunity for intervention beckons. Over time, the global balance of power and influence will inevitably shift to the advantage of those who care nothing about America's values or well-being.

Thus our strong capability for local and regional defense is essential for us; and together with our allies, we must build up these forces. In a crisis, the President must have other choices than capitulation or resort to strategic nuclear weapons.

We are not the world's policeman—but we cannot permit the Soviet Union or its surrogates to become the world's policeman either, if we care anything about our security and the fate of freedom in the world. It does no good to preach strategic superiority while practicing regional retreat.

This was the issue in Angola. The United States had no significant stake in a purely Angolan civil war. The issue was—and remains—the unacceptable precedent of massive Soviet and Cuban military intervention in a conflict thousands of miles from their shores—with its broad implications for the rest of Africa and, indeed, many other regions of the world. The danger was, and is, that our inaction—our legislatively imposed failure even to send financial help to Africans who sought to resist—will lead to further Soviet and Cuban pressures on the mistaken assumption that America has lost the will to counter adventurism or even to help others do so.

It is time, therefore, to be clear that, as far as we are concerned, Angola has set no precedent. It is time that the world be reminded that America remains capable of forthright and decisive action. The American people know that the United States cannot remain aloof if basic principles of responsible international conduct are flouted and the geopolitical balance is threatened by a pattern of outside interventions in local conflicts.

The United States has made clear its strong support for majority rule and minority rights in southern Africa. We have no stake in, and we will give no encouragement to, illegal regimes there. The President and I have made clear that rapid change is required and that the opportunity for negotiated solutions must be seized. We will make major efforts to promote these objectives and to help all parties to return to the negotiating table. The proposals made today by Foreign Secretary [of the United Kingdom James] Callaghan in the House of Commons seem to us a most constructive approach. We welcome them.

But let no one believe that American support can be extorted by the threat of Cuban troops or Soviet arms. Our cooperation is not available to those who rely on Cuban troops.

The United States cannot acquiesce indefinitely in the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in distant lands for the purpose of pressure and to determine the political evolution by force of arms.

We have issued these warnings before. I repeat them today. The United States will not accept further Cuban military interventions abroad.

We are certain that the American people understand and support these two equal principles of our policy—our support for majority rule in Africa and our firm opposition to military intervention.

Ladies and gentlemen, Angola reminds us that military capabilities by themselves cannot solve our foreign policy problems. No matter how massive our arsenals or how flexible our forces, they will carry little weight if we become so confused in our decisionmaking and so constrained in defining our interests that no one believes we will ever act when challenged.

The issue is not an open-ended commitment or a policy of indiscriminate American intervention. Decisions on whether and how to take action must always result from careful analysis and open discussion. It cannot be rammed down the throats of an unwilling Congress or public.

But neither can we avoid decisions when their time has clearly come. Global stability simply cannot survive the presumption that our natural choice will always be passivity; such a course would insure that the world will witness dangerous challenges and major changes highly inimical to our interests and our ideals.

The Strength and Will of America

If America's defense is to match the nation's needs, it must meet three basic requirements:

—Our strategic forces must be sufficient to deter attack and credibly maintain the nuclear balance.

—Our forces for regional defense, together with those of our allies, must be clearly capable of resisting threat and pressure.

—And at home we must once again unite behind the proposition that aggression unresisted is aggression encouraged. We must be prepared to recognize genuine threats to the global balance, whether they emerge as direct challenges to us or as regional encroachment at a greater distance. And we must be prepared to do something about them.

These are the real issues our leaders now face and will surely face in the future. They require answers to some hard questions, such as the following: Where can our defense dollars be most productively spent? What programs are needed that are not already underway? What would be the costs of these programs and over what period of time? What, if anything, would we have to give up? What are the premises of our defense policy—against what threats and with what diplomacy?

Administration and critics alike must answer these questions if we are to have an effective national policy. And in this spirit I have spoken today about the relationship between defense and foreign policy.

Ladies and gentlemen, military strength is crucial to America's security and well-being. But we must take care not to become so obsessed with power alone that we become a "Fortress America" and neglect our ultimate political and moral responsibilities.

Our nation is the beacon of hope to all who love freedom not simply because it is strong but because it represents mankind's age-old dream of dignity and self-respect. Others before us have wielded overwhelming military power and abdicated moral responsibility or engendered fear and hatred. Our resources—military, industrial, technological, economic, and cultural—are beyond challenge; with dedication and effort they shall remain so. But a world of tenuous balance, of a nuclear equilibrium constantly contested is too barren and perilous and uninspiring. America has always stood for something deeper than throwing its weight around; we shall see to it that we shall never relinquish

r moral leadership in the search for a just d lasting peace.

We have gone through a difficult decade t because we were weak, but because we re divided. None of our setbacks has been used by lack of American power, or even k of relevant power. The fundamental allenge to America therefore is to generate e wisdom, the creativity, and the will to dicate ourselves to the peace and progress humanity.

America's ultimate strength has always en the conviction and basic unity of its ople. And despite a decade and more of ting—despite assassination, war, and institutional crisis—we still remain a vital and imistic and confident people.

It is time once again for Americans to d their heads high. It is important to recall once again some fundamental truths:

—We are still the strongest nation on the face of the earth.

—We are the most generous nation in tory; we have fed the starving, opened arms and our hearts to refugees from er lands, and given more of our substance to the poor and downtrodden around the world than any other nation.

—We are needed to maintain the world's security.

—We are essential to any hopes for stability and human progress.

—We remain the bulwark of democracy and the land of promise to millions who yearn for freedom and a better life for themselves and their children.

—We therefore have a responsibility to hold high the banner of freedom and human dignity for all mankind.

Our record of achievements should be but prologue to what this generation of Americans has it within its power to accomplish. For the first time in history, we can work with others to create an era of peace and prosperity for all mankind.

We shall not fail. With faith in the goodness and the promise of America we shall master our future. And those who celebrate America's tricentennial will look back and say that this generation of Americans was worthy of the ideals and the greatness of our history.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Dallas

P s release 141B dated March 23

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what are the possibilities o a shooting war in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in the Middle East is extremely complicated.

You have the tensions between the Israelis a l their neighbors that have plotted for e r generations. You have internal tensions i many countries, such as Lebanon, which c spark a conflagration without any partular plan by any country. And therefore t problem in the Middle East is extremely dficult.

On the other hand, in the last two years re progress has been made toward peace in the Middle East than in the entire postwar period. So if we can create the penalties for irresponsible conduct that I tried to describe in my speech, and if we can continue the efforts to promote negotiations among the parties that we have done in the last two years, I think that considerable progress can be made toward peace and a shooting war can be avoided.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that Egypt's turn to the West is complete and they have renounced the Soviet Union, what in your opinion are the Soviet Union long-range goals now in regard to the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union has

had a historic interest in maintaining a position of influence in the Middle East, and it will no doubt continue to maintain that interest. The problem is what it can do concretely to bring it about.

As far as the United States is concerned, our principal objective in the Middle East is not to play big-power politics with the hopes of the people in the Middle East but to help them find their way toward a peaceful solution.

If the Soviet Union has any ideas of how to bring about a peaceful solution, we will be glad to hear it. But basically the decision of Egypt gives us a great opportunity and imposes on us a heavy responsibility, because we have to demonstrate that those men who relied on us are also going to see some possibility for having their aspirations fulfilled.

But on the whole, I would consider it a very positive development.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you consider appointing a task force to implement an equitable and diplomatic solution for the handling of the illegal aliens and poverty?

Secretary Kissinger: I can tell you that the State Department is throbbing with task forces. [Laughter.] And no promise is easier to make than to appoint another task force. [Laughter.] The problem is what a task force can do concretely about it.

I think, from what I understand, most people know what the problem is. The difficulty is to find the personnel to do something about it. But in principle, yes, I considered establishing a task force.

Q. I was particularly thinking about getting input from the various sectors of the community, the various groups that would have a direct interest in the problem. I know that task forces are very effective in Dallas, and I was wondering if you would consider such a task force on a national level.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to disillusion you, but task forces are not very effective in the State Department. [Laughter.]

Q. Coming back to Lebanon, what is President Asad [of Syria] up to in the current conflict in Lebanon? He seems to be counteracting the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] there.

Secretary Kissinger: The basic conflict in Lebanon has arisen because the balance between the Christian community and the Moslem community has been upset by the large influx of Palestinians that have created, in effect, their own organization and that probably has the most effective—"probably"—it certainly has the most effective—army that operates today in Lebanon.

As a result, the political structure in Lebanon, which was weighted slightly in favor of the Christians, maybe by a margin of 55 to 45, is being altered to at least equality for the Moslems and perhaps a reversal of the balance—a condition which the Christian community in Lebanon finds very difficult to accept.

Now, Syria has actually attempted to play a moderating role in Lebanon. It has attempted to prevent the pendulum from swinging so far over to the Moslem side that the Christians, in despair, will secede or that an open and prolonged civil war would break out.

This has led to the paradox that some of the Syrian efforts have been to curtail the PLO power.

On the other hand, after the Lebanese army has disintegrated under the impact of upheaval, there is no effective force there to bring up to enforce whatever has been achieved in the negotiations. So we face a very complex situation in which the danger of an Israeli attack becomes very great if the Syrians move their own forces in somewhere, however, there are no other countries clearly visible.

We are telling all parties that the United States is interested in the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and in the coexistence there of the two communities. And we are in touch with all of the parties in order to urge restraint and to act, if we can, as a mediator. But it is an enormously complicated situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what meaning do you ace on a recent uprising in Ramallah, and you think that President Sadat [of Egypt] s the power to unify the Arabs and ing about peaceful coexistence with the aelis?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is a great moil in the Arab world, and there it has e prospects for negotiation development. l of the groups that will be subject to negtiation have a temptation to demonstrate ir power or their influence, and events on e West Bank are a reflection of tendencies the Arab world.

One of the reasons why the United States ieves, and has repeatedly asserted, that gnation in the Middle East is in nobody's erest—not of the Arabs, and not of Israel, ause the longer these forces are conued, the bigger will be the inevitable exsion—and these events underline the imtance of making progress toward a settlent in the Middle East.

Now bringing about the unity of the abs is a task which, up to now, has eluded ny states.

President Sadat has taken a very tesmanlike approach. He has been the t Arab leader to move toward peace with ael; he has been willing to take steps on own.

And therefore, if the peace prospects conue and the other Arab states see that it is only way to achieve some of their aspirans, I think his moral influence in the Arab rld will survive.

He is now under very great attack for the y courageous decisions he took last year, I believe that he will be vindicated by nts, and it will be seen that it was an vitable step to promote further progress ward peace in the Middle East.

Q. Mr. Secretary, of course energy is of eat concern to us here in Texas. Would u please comment on the status of domestic f-sufficiency in energy as related to the rld energy market and particularly to our tional defense requirements?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has become progressively less self-sufficient in energy throughout the sixties and also in the seventies. The increase in consumption has outpaced new discoveries of energy for new technology. And this is a process that must be reversed if we are not going to run major risks with our national security. So I believe it is essential that the United States substantially reduce its dependence on imported oil and on imported energy. And the program that has been recommended by the Administration, or any other program that brings about conservation and a rapid development of alternative resources, is essential, because if current trends continue, by the late 1970's we will be more dependent on foreign oil than we are today, and then in a crisis very serious consequences could occur.

Now, we believe, we hope, the energy bill will give us various tools, including the storage of oil, that will make an embargo less dangerous to us. But we must make a major effort to reduce our dependence by the late seventies and early eighties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please describe the credit terms of payment proposed by your five-year agreement to sell grain to the Soviet Union and the reasons for providing those terms?

Secretary Kissinger: There are no credit terms associated with the grain sale. It is substantially for cash. The reason for the five-year grain agreement is the following: The Soviet Union, before the grain agreement, was operating in our market as a free purchaser. Therefore, through a period of shortage in the Soviet Union, they would make massive purchases and drive up our domestic prices. But then, in years when the Soviet Union has no need for it, they would stop their purchases. So we constantly oscillated between massive Soviet invasions of the American grain market, which we could not affect, to periods when they would not. So, the five-year agreement is designed to give some stability to our farmers, but also, in periods of extreme shortage in the Soviet Union, to force the Soviet Union to

negotiate for additional purchases beyond what is in the agreement, which is in the range of 6 to 8 million tons a year, far below what they need in an emergency period. And it is therefore better, it seems to us, to meet our economic needs, the needs of our farmers, as well as other national needs. But no credit terms are involved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what would be the impact on Middle East negotiations as the result of major oil reserves in the Sinai and Gulf of Suez by Israel—peace, war, or favorable negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it depends, of course, where these oil reserves are located. I pray that they are not on the dividing line between Israel and Egypt. [Laughter.]

So, anything that contributes to the Egyptian balance-of-payments problem—or to the solution of the Egyptian balance-of-payments problem is helpful.

Israeli oil explorations in the Gulf of Sinai raised for the Arabs the problem that they do not recognize the Israeli right to operate in the Gulf of Sinai, nor has Israel raised that as part of a peace settlement. They would want to control the shoreline that is basically the Gulf of Sinai. So, by the definition of both sides, this would be a temporary phenomenon.

I think, on the whole, these oil explorations will not affect the prospects of negotiations one way or the other.

Q. Mr. Secretary, again in the Far East, in Thailand, we all know about the elections coming up there in April. What is the short- and long-term outlook for Thailand? Is it the standup domino?

Secretary Kissinger: I will have to tell you frankly the complexities of Thai domestic politics have eluded me, and I thought I would study it after the elections are ov when the number of parties will be a lit bit reduced. [Laughter.]

But, leaving aside the threatening of pol ical dialogue—which, of course, is uniq to the Thai traditions—the basic situati in Thailand is that, with the collapse of o efforts in Indochina, the Thais, who we loyal allies during the war and who reli on the United States, are looking for a diff ent angle.

And if you look at Thai history, Thaila is the only Asian country, the only count in South Asia, that was never colonized a that managed to maintain its independe by careful adjustment to dominant tren Now, their assessment of the present sitt tion is that the dominant trend in Indochi in that part of the world, is North Viet-Na and that it must be counterbalanced, if it c be counterbalanced at all, by the Peopl Republic of China. It does not reflect hos ity to the United States. The leaders of Th land we know are basically well dispos toward the United States.

It is their assessment that the risks th they would run by maintaining signific American military forces there are grea than the benefits that would come fr them. And it illustrates what Senator Tov said earlier: A foreign policy decision ha multiplier effect. If we want to maintain defense far from our shores, other countr must have the conviction that the Uni States is relevant to their problem. If th does not exist, they will not run what see to them an unnecessary risk. That is the r structure of what is going on in Thaila And which of the various factions domin is really less important than their percept of the lessons of Viet-Nam.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Dallas March 23

Press release 145 dated March 23

Secretary Kissinger: I will take questions first from local reporters before I expose you to the savage folkways of Washington. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night you issued some rather stern warnings against Cuba—warnings stemming from Cuba's adventure in Africa. What measures is this country willing to take to make sure that these kinds of adventures don't happen again, or what would we do if, in fact, they did?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not prepared at this time to go beyond what I said yesterday. We have made clear that we are opposed—we cannot accept—any further Cuban military adventures.

We have also made clear that we stand strongly for a majority rule and a rapid political change in southern Africa, but not to be brought about by outside military forces.

What we will do in concrete circumstances, I do not think I should say under present conditions. And we are still studying this.

Q. What options are open to you?

Secretary Kissinger: It is impossible for any senior official to put out, ahead of time, all the things that the United States will or will not do in all the circumstances that may arise. But we have pointed out the dangers to Cuba. We are serious about what we have said, and we hope that it will not be necessary to answer your question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will we rely on military intervention or a possible invasion of Cuba?

Secretary Kissinger: I just do not want to go into any specific measures, from which you should not draw any conclusions either for or against.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you think you will have the backing of Congress in the things that you said last night?

Secretary Kissinger: The first duty of people in responsible positions is to put forward their best judgment of what the situation requires before a crisis occurs. We were accused in the case of Angola of not having made the issues clear. We are now making the issues clear; and we think that if we persist in this, we will have the support of Congress. But there is no concrete decision that we are asking the Congress to take at this moment.

Q. But with all due respect, you are not making the issues clear. You are making them deliberately ambiguous, whereas if you wanted to make them clear, you could rule out the military option.

Secretary Kissinger: We are making the issues clear. We cannot state ahead of time what we will do in what circumstances when we don't know what the circumstances yet are.

We have made clear our opposition and our nonacceptance of further Cuban military actions. And beyond this, we will not now go.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, what is the United States doing to make sure that the transition from a minority government in South Africa and Rhodesia comes about? Why is the United States—like $1 billion—why is $1 billion invested in South Africa if the United States is concerned about that government becoming a majority-ruled government?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States in recent weeks, both the President and I, have strongly supported a majority rule in Rhodesia. Yesterday we publicly backed the proposals of the British Foreign Secretary, which go in the same direction in a very concrete way—and we have declared them constructive.

I plan to go to Africa at the end of April, and I will have further talks there with African leaders about means to achieve these objectives. I stated in my speech yesterday that the United States will work for these objectives. I have also stated that we will not work under the pressure of Cuban threats. This is the framework of our basic policy.

Question of Israeli Boundaries

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your attempts to get Israel to withdraw fully back to 1967 boundaries, don't you think that is leaning more toward Egypt's needs rather than Israel's needs?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not stated a position on where the final boundaries should be, and the United States has exercised no pressure with respect to any specific final boundaries.

Up to now, the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states have concerned intermediate steps in which the issue of final boundaries has not arisen, and there is no negotiation going on now in which final boundaries have been discussed, nor has the United States stated a position on final boundaries.

Q. Why was the word "détente" recently dropped from your vocabulary?

Secretary Kissinger: Because the President ordered it. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Kissinger, Senator Byrd [Senator Robert C. Byrd, W. Va.] said today that your statements about Cuban intervention should have come from the President himself. We can assume, can we not, that you are talking with the full approval of the President?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, my statements were read by the President, were discussed again with the President shortly before I left Washington. And of course I would not make such statements without the full and detailed approval of the President.

Desirability of Foreign Policy Debate

Q. Mr. Secretary, you seemed to indicate in your Boston speech that campaign rhetoric regarding the relevant implementation of our foreign policy was detrimental to that issue. Do you mean by that that it is not a viable campaign issue for the President to—

Secretary Kissinger: I think if you read the entire text of my Boston speech, I did not say that debate of our foreign policy was undesirable. In fact, I stated very clearly that debate on our foreign policy was useful and, indeed, essential.

What I did say was that certain misleading statements did not help the conduct of foreign policy, and I tried to explain why I believe this.

I do believe that essentially the foreign policy of the United States ought to be nonpartisan. I believe this because foreign countries that have to deal with us should not have to worry that every four to eight years there will be radical changes in the direction of our foreign policy, because that itself is an element of insecurity.

And therefore, I feel very strongly, whichever party is in office, that a major effort should be made to conduct foreign policy on as nonpartisan a basis as is possible. That does not mean that issues cannot be discussed, but it means that the issues should be separated as much as possible from strictly partisan controversy. So I dealt with certain charges, specific charges, that had been made.

I specifically believe that there are many issues of foreign policy that are important to discuss, and must be discussed, and I have attempted in my speeches to lay out in great detail, and in some complexity, how the Administration views its foreign policy and its relationship between defense policy and for-

eign policy. And in that framework, I think discussions with that degree of detail can be extremely helpful.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we did not act in Angola, and we didn't, to a certain extent, act in Viet-Nam before the fall. Why should the Cubans believe that we will act if they invade Rhodesia, for example? What precedent is there to convince them?

Secretary Kissinger: I can only state the policy of the United States—what we will do, how we will do it.

You have called attention to an important problem, which is that the credibility of the United States is one of the issues in the conduct of our foreign policy. It is one of the problems we now have. But we cannot do more than to state, as solemnly as we can, what the framework of our policy is.

Q. You are becoming increasingly a political target in this election year. Would you consider resigning if Henry Kissinger becomes a political liability to the Ford Administration?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that is such an inconceivable idea to me that I haven't addressed it. [Laughter.]

But I think that I am not holding office simply to hold office. I am trying to serve the country, and if I should not be able to serve the country properly, then I would of course resign.

Position on Southern Africa

Q. Mr. Secretary, if Cuba were to move against Rhodesia or South West Africa and the United States were to take action to thwart those Cuban moves, how could the American action be kept separate from the appearance of support for a white minority rule?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we cannot possibly go into the details of a situation that has not yet arisen and that it is our purpose to keep from arising.

The United States will support the U.N. resolution on Namibia.

The United States supports the British initiative on Rhodesia.

The United States will put forward its own conceptions on the occasion of my visit to Africa. That is our positive program.

Now, what we will do in circumstances which I hope will not arise and which cannot arise unless the Soviet Union gives support to Cuba and unless Cuba is determined on adventurous courses—that I do not believe is fruitful now to discuss.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have Cuba and the Soviet Union been advised in some degree of specificity the consequences of such action?

Secretary Kissinger: I am assuming that our public comment will be read in the various embassies, and I think that, in addition, they know what our views are.

The Conflict in Lebanon

Q. On the Middle East, Dr. Kissinger, would you assess the idea that Syria, being heavily backed by the Soviet Union, and Egypt, now having renounced its alliance with the Soviet Union, that Israel in the Middle East might be called forward as a balancing factor in favor of the Syrians?

Secretary Kissinger: That Israel—?

Q. Excuse me. That Israel, in favor of the Egyptians, that Israel might be introduced into the Lebanon conflict in some manner as a balancing factor in favor of the Egyptians.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Egypt is not directly involved in the Lebanon conflict, and any parallel action between Israel and Egypt, on any Arab problem, seems to me out of the question.

We have urged all of the parties in Lebanon and concerned with Lebanon to exercise maximum restraint. The United States could not understand unilateral military action by any party. We support the coexistence of the two communities—Christian and Moslem—in Lebanon, and we are using our influence to bring about or to encourage a negotiated

outcome with no outside intervention by any side.

Q. But this would be unprecedented—without precedent—because didn't Israel exercise influence for King Hussein in some of these disturbances in Jordan? Isn't that pretty well known, really?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, not by me. But in any event—

Q. But it has been in the papers.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to be offensive, but not everything in the papers is necessarily known by me. [Laughter.] But our position is that we warn all countries, Israel or Syria or any other country, against unilateral military moves in the Lebanese situation, for any reason.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will General Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] visit the United States this spring? Or will that be delayed, given the problems with détente?

Secretary Kissinger: It has always been understood that General Secretary Brezhnev would not visit the United States unless there is a SALT agreement. We cannot tell yet whether or when there will be a SALT agreement, and therefore the question of a possible visit cannot arise until that decision has been made.

Panama Canal Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, Ronald Reagan has accused the Ford Administration of negotiating to give away the Panama Canal. What are the State Department's goals in the Panama negotiations? And, in effect, are you negotiating to give away the Panama Canal?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a tough campaign, and we can understand that it is necessary to summarize some issues so that they are out of recognition.

First of all, the State Department is not negotiating by itself. The State Department, most of the time, is an organ of the U.S. Government. Our negotiations on Panama are conducted on the basis of a joint position developed between the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The issue is not between Panama and the United States, but the issue is the relationship of the United States to the whole Western Hemisphere. And therefore what we are exploring, on the basis of a joint position of all of the agencies, is whether it is possible to negotiate an agreement that preserves the essential American interests in the defense of the Panama Canal and the essential American interests in the safe operation of the Panama Canal while taking into account some of the Latin American concerns with respect to the water and land rights and some of the jurisdictional issues. This is the issue that is now being negotiated.

Q. Well, why did you change the 1903 treaty?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet changed the 1903 treaty. That is the subject of negotiations. The negotiations have not been concluded. When they are concluded, they must be approved by the Congress. The Congress is being kept fully informed about what is being negotiated. And only then can a judgment be made. But the issue emphatically is not to give away the Panama Canal.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what was the 60-page report that the State Department and other officials received from President Nixon? Did it have any significant or helpful information?

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated that it was generally helpful, and it gave a full account of President Nixon's conversations and his impressions. And since he was the first American to have extensive talks—he was the only American to have extensive talks—with the new Acting Premier of China, and because he had extensive talks with Chairman Mao, we found the report generally helpful.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt has

said that, based on personal conversations with you, he feels that your view of America's role in future history is pessimistic, that America is on the downgrade, and that you have to get the best kind of deal you can from the Soviet Union because of America's inferior position. If you feel that this is an incorrect assessment, what precisely is your view of America's future role?

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to nominate the good admiral for the Pulitzer Prize for fiction. And he has not yet fully realized that his opponent in the Virginia senatorial campaign is called "Byrd," not "Kissinger."

I do not believe that the United States will be defeated. I do not believe that the United States is on the decline. I do not believe that the United States must get the best deal it can.

I believe that the United States is essential to preserve the security of the free world and for any progress in the world that exists.

In a period of great national difficulty, of the Viet-Nam war, of Watergate, of endless investigations, we have tried to preserve the role of the United States as that major factor. And I believe that to explain to the American people that the policy is complex, that our involvement is permanent, and that our problems are nevertheless soluble, is a sign of optimism and of confidence in the American people, rather than the opposite.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please comment on the recent book written by Mr. Golan, particularly on the fact that he accused you of negotiating in bad faith in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is an industry now of books about me. I have not read the Golan book, and I do not intend to read the Golan book.

I have read excerpts in various newspapers. I have yet to find one that is not either totally inaccurate or substantially distorted or so taken out of context that it has no meaning. For that reason—and on the doctor's advice to keep my blood pressure within some reasonable ranges—I have decided not to read the Golan book.

Relations With People's Republic of China

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is reported that you and President Ford have lost the chance for the United States to get a China-U.S. agreement, although President Nixon and you got us in a very advantageous position in that regard, in that you and the President did not take action at a point when you were able to —also, that détente with the Soviets is virtually ineffective without a China-U.S. agreement. Is that true?

Secretary Kissinger: We are pursuing the basic policy that was set out in the Shanghai communique, which is to move toward normalization with the People's Republic of China. We are doing that at the pace that is consistent with the American national interests, and it is essentially the policy that was also pursued in the previous Administration.

As far as using one of the Communist countries against the other is concerned, this is beyond the scope of American foreign policy. Both of these countries are led by leaders of some experience. They will pursue their own interests. We cannot manipulate them to serve our own. We will normalize our relations with the People's Republic of China, as we have indicated in the Shanghai communique, but we are not going to do this on the basis of anti-Soviet maneuvers, anymore than our policy toward the Soviet Union is motivated by anti-Chinese intentions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night you were asked, following the dinner, about the problems of "wetback" labor in Texas and Arizona and other border states. Where on the spectrum of priorities does this lie in the State Department?

Secretary Kissinger: I will tell you, it is a big organization—the State Department is a big organization—and I would be misleading you if I gave you the impression that when I

come in in the morning at 8 o'clock, my first question is: What is happening to the "wetback" problem on the Texas-Arizona border? [Laughter.] We recognize it as a problem. It is being worked on, but—

Q. On a scale of 1 to 100, where would it lie? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I can't count that high, not without taking off my shoes. [Laughter.]

Jewish Emigration From the Soviet Union

Q. What is the Administration's current position on the Jews of Soviet Russia who are desirous of leaving but meet with restrictions?

Secretary Kissinger: The Administration, in a way, started this whole issue of Jewish emigration.

In 1969, there were 400 Jews leaving the Soviet Union. As our relationship with the Soviet Union developed, we made it clear in a quiet, nongovernmental fashion—or nonconfrontational fashion—that our own judgment of the sincerity of the Soviet Union in improving relations would be affected by what they did in what was essentially a domestic problem. By these methods, the emigration rose from 400 in 1969 to 35,000-plus in 1973. At that point, it became an issue of government-to-government confrontation as a result of legislative pressure, and the rate of emigration declined.

We continue to believe that the best methods for achieving progress are those of quiet diplomacy and not of government-to-government confrontation.

Q. Is this still a concern of the Administration, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Kissinger: It has always been a concern of the Administration, and it remains a concern of the Administration.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, looking back at the Nixon Administration, the buck has been passed back and forth in regard to wiretapping. Who ordered the wiretapping, you or Mr. Nixon?

Secretary Kissinger: Look, it is highly improper to discuss publicly a complicated issue in which depositions are taken over many hours and for any of the parties to this controversy to give their version, as has been done. The versions that have been given to the press do not, in my view, reflect what is in the documents. But beyond that, I do not want to go.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how significant was the revelation of multinational payoffs to countries like Japan and Italy to their continued survival and our relations with them?

Secretary Kissinger: The revelations have had a very serious effect on the domestic situation of many of these countries. That is not to condone what went on there—that is not to condone the actions that are implicit in these revelations. But it has produced complicated domestic issues in many of these countries.

We are pursuing the investigation now by judicial means, and we are making available to the countries concerned in their judicial processes what we find out. We do not believe that these issues should be tried in public.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, what is the status of the NSSM 39 [National Security Study Memorandum] deal, and why was it nicknamed the "tarbaby memo"?

Secretary Kissinger: You have got me. I have never heard of the phrase "the tarbaby memo." In fact, I don't even know what it is.

Q. The policy on southern Africa that you wrote—

Secretary Kissinger: No. First of all, I am flattered to be given so much credit—and if you gave me half a chance, I would probably take more.

But you have to understand what these memoranda were. They were written in the early days of the Nixon Administration by an interdepartmental process. I did not write it. I did not participate in the writing of it. They reflected an interdepartmental process by which various options were put before

he President that stated in a general way—n a very general way—what the basic direc-ions of the policy would be. Of three or four ptions—I do not remember the details—the President chose one. But the papers were not vritten by me, nor did I participate in their vriting. Nor can you deduce the foreign pol-cy of this government by a paper that was vritten early in the Nixon Administration nd which indicated just a very general ori-ntation in a period more than seven years go.

Certainly what has been said on southern Africa in recent months is quite different rom what is in that document.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is the eighth or ninth top recently for you. Is this politically in-lined to help President Ford's campaign, articularly with the criticism that opponents ave leveled at his foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: I have been making a rip about once a month since January 1975. usually give speeches of reasonable com-lexity, in which you don't get to the verb ntil about the third page, so they do not nd themselves to easy political rhetoric.

What I am attempting to do in these peeches and in these private meetings that have is to put before the public and the eadership groups in various cities our ap-roach to foreign policy. And I deliberately ry to put it in all its complexity so that hey can see how it looks to those who have decision to make.

I spend much of my time—I spent about our hours today—answering questions so hat I can learn what is on the minds of eople in these towns.

I have done this long before the campaign tarted. I am attempting to do it in a non-artisan manner. I do not attack people. I ave to respond if somebody criticizes an spect of our foreign policy. I have to ex-lain what our foreign policy is. But I do ot participate in the political campaign. I vill not participate, and I will not give par-isan speeches.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the Mexican Govern-ment complained in any manner to the government of this country on the jailbreak in Piedras Negras a couple weeks ago, in which it was reported that possibly a couple from across the border in this country participated in the jailbreak?

Secretary Kissinger: This is not my day for Mexican problems. [Laughter.]

This morning, I was asked a question about something in a private meeting, something that happened that I didn't know about, and I frankly haven't heard about that jailbreak—from which I assume that the Mexican Government has not complained to us. But maybe it was considered too complicated by our Assistant Secretary for Latin American affairs for me to handle. [Laughter.]

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

U.S. Makes Pledge to U.N. Program for Education in Southern Africa

Following is the text of a letter dated March 19 from William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Kurt Waldheim, U.N. Secretary General.

USUN press release 34 dated March 19

The Permanent Representative of the United States presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honor to inform him that the United States hereby pledges the amount of $50,000, subject to United States Congressional approval, to the United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa for 1976, with the stipulation that this contribution is to be specially earmarked for training for Namibians. The United States fully recognizes the United Nations' unique responsibility for Namibia and considers it a necessary and appropriate effort to aid some of the territory's people.

The United States makes its pledge on the condition that its contribution shall not exceed one-third of the total voluntary contributions to the United Nations Educational and Training Program for Southern Africa.

Secretary Kissinger Addresses Foreign Diplomat Travel Program

Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger on March 22 at a Travel Program for Foreign Diplomats, Inc., luncheon at the Department of State, together with the transcript of the questions and answers which followed.

Press release 143 dated March 22

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Chairman [Robert B.] Anderson, Chairman [Melvin] Laird, ladies and gentlemen: No one who has been in and out of Washington over the past few decades can fail to be impressed with the exceptional caliber of diplomatic representation here and, indeed, at consular posts around our country. Many of the diplomats stationed here are graduates of American universities. Most of them speak English almost as well as I do. And, most importantly, they are impressively—indeed, sometimes disconcertingly—familiar with the complexity of America's institutions, the variety of our people, and the range of American opinion.

Diplomacy has changed markedly since the days of my old friend Metternich. In those days diplomats could learn all they needed to know about the country to which they were accredited by attending the right salons and dances or courting the Grand Duchess.

Today, though we might all regret it, that is not enough. Today the people count. And the people are increasingly aware of the impact of government and international relations on their lives. Interdependence, they know, is not a slogan but a reality. This has imposed on diplomats everywhere a new and complex but fascinating responsibility to know more about the culture and people of the country to which they are posted.

The enormous impact of public opinion o American foreign policy is sufficient reaso for foreign diplomats to take advantage o the travel program—and for me to seek t spend as much time as I can listening to th American people and exchanging views wit them.

Since I became Secretary of State, I hav given nearly 20 speeches around the country The format usually includes a major speec before regional groups interested in foreig policy, a press conference, and other oppor tunities for dialogues, so that I have bee listening as well as talking. Let me tell you little of what I have learned:

—First, it is clear to me that the America people neither share nor understand th cynicism and hypocrisy and the pretens which seem to afflict Washington. Our pe ple know that their economic well-being i tied to a global economy. They know tha their security depends on global stabilit And they know that their values must be de fended, and their hopes must be shared an fulfilled through cooperation.

Americans still believe that their countr has a vital role to play in the world. The are convinced that our problems and th world's problems can be solved only with constructive American contribution. The know that America has permanent interest and purposes that go beyond partisanshi and reach far into the future and must b sustained long after the issues and the pas sions of an election year are past.

—Second, there is a continuing awarenes of the importance of our relations with ou traditional friends and allies among the in dustrial democracies of the North Atlanti community and East Asia. Our shared mora and cultural heritage and the similarity o the domestic and international challenge

facing our societies make coordination among us ever more essential to the success of our efforts, whether in relations among ourselves or with other nations of the world.

—Third, there is a consensus in this country on the need for peace through strength. Reasonable people may disagree over how much American strength is enough to protect our security or the precise balance of advantage one should seek or expect in our relationship with potential adversaries. Our people know we must be strong—in strategic and in conventional forces—if the global balance of stability is to be maintained. They know as well that our power must be usable and that the world must know we have the will to use it when needed. The American people seek security, peace, and stability, without either confrontation or capitulation.

—And finally, I have found an increasing realization of the importance of relations between America and other industrial nations and the developing world. Foreign assistance legislation, which had become increasingly unpopular in the country and the Congress in recent years, has regained support. The traditional generous impulses of the American people always will be aroused by human tragedies such as the recent devastation in Guatemala. And our concept of fairness will, I believe, support changes in the international economic system to improve opportunities for developing countries to share in its management and its benefits. We are, of course, tired of the confrontationist rhetoric often directed against us, but we realize that there is, after all, only one world. Problems such as population, the environment, and the use of the oceans can only be solved by international accommodation and cooperation—no one country alone has the resources or the ability to do what must be done. If we are met fairly and in a sense of mutual respect and practical cooperation, America stands ready to respond positively and to help build a new era of international cooperation.

Ladies and gentlemen, all of the nations represented here today—all of the nations that have at one time or another benefited from the travel program—have much to do together. International cooperation is no longer an idea; it is an inescapable necessity. The traditional patterns of international conduct are no longer sufficient. Ambition, threat, and oppression can only delay our common progress and hasten our mutual decline. We have no more urgent task than to get to know each other better—to understand that the positive aspirations of all our peoples can be reconciled and that, together, we can build a better world for ourselves and the generations that follow after us.

We here today represent different cultures, different governments, and different interests—but the common ground for our effort is the well-being of humanity, and our common responsibility is to find ways to promote that well-being. The travel program that many of you here today have so generously sponsored and others of you have participated in is an important contribution to mutual understanding and a common determination to rise above the issues that divide nations so that we may, together, work for the brotherhood of man and the progress, with justice and freedom, of the human community.

My congratulations to those diplomats who have been able to take advantage of the travel program; and my grateful thanks, on behalf of the Department of State and the President, to the sponsors of the program for their unique and valuable private contribution to understanding among peoples and nations.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Mr. Laird: Ladies and gentlemen, the Secretary of State has agreed to respond to a few questions. And we are going to open up the program for four questions—three or four—and I would like to present the Secretary of State to answer those questions at this time. Who will be first?

Secretary Kissinger: When I agreed to do this, I didn't realize that there would be so many diplomats here who now will write reports of truly staggering profundity and so many newsmen who can now put a dateline

on what they have already written. [Laughter].

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you like to comment on your trip to South America and conclusions or any observations of how we can better work with our neighbors down south?

Secretary Kissinger: This was my first visit to Latin America, except for visits to Mexico and one trip to Brazil many years ago—about 15 years ago.

I was very impressed by the eagerness of the host countries to work with us on finding some means of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere and the realization that here in the Western Hemisphere we have many common problems and a tradition of working together that could be an example for relations between developed and developing countries.

There are, of course, special issues, which we all know—the transfer of technology, a great concern with what is considered to be growing protectionism in the United States, some concern over provisions of our trade legislation. I visited Latin America in the aftermath of Angola, and I would say that there was a profound concern with the long-term intentions of Cuba.

As far as the United States is concerned, we are now working on a program which we will submit at the meeting of the OAS in June, as I had indicated we would do when I stopped in Venezuela. We will see whether we can work out some answers to the concerns of Latin Americans. We have suggested for a long time some code of conduct for multinational corporations which would spell out, on the one hand, the responsibilities of the multinational corporations but, on the other hand, the responsibilities of the host governments to the multinational corporations, because in the long term it will have to be private investment that will have to supply the technology and the transfer of capital that so many of the countries there need for an accelerated economic growth.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment on Lebanon and any part that we are playing to arrange a peace in that war-torn country?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the question is the situation in Lebanon and what part we can play to bring peace to that country.

The basic problem in Lebanon is that the traditional balance between the Christian community and the Moslem community has broken down, partly as the result of the influx of Palestinians, so that probably the Palestinians are the best organized—certainly the best armed—group in the country, and that therefore the slight preponderance of influence that the Christian community enjoyed until last summer is now being contested.

In the process of the civil war, the Lebanese Army has been gradually reduced in effectiveness so that there is no local force that can maintain the peace—or no effective local force that can maintain the peace—and therefore various outside Arab countries have attempted to influence events, always keeping in mind the danger that there might be an Israeli move if substantial outside forces were introduced.

The United States is interested in the unity and sovereignty of Lebanon. It believes that both communities should find a way to live together as, after all, they have through most of Lebanon's history. We have made efforts to be diplomatically helpful. We have talked to many of the Arab states. We have of course been in touch especially with Syria, which has played a mediating role, and with Egypt, with which we exchange ideas on all subjects of mutual concern.

There is nothing we can do physically, but we are trying to bring home to all of the parties concerned the consequences of irresponsible action.

When there is a promising course, we have occasionally taken it up with one or the other of the parties; and we have strongly warned all outside countries, including Israel and including Syria, against rash military moves, because the United States could not support unilateral intervention—indeed, would oppose unilateral intervention.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you find that governments have a tendency to hold back or delay

ommitments in the year of the Presidential lection?

Secretary Kissinger: Most of all, our gov-rnment. [Laughter.] But I think there are lot of countries that are watching events. have noticed that with the primary victories f the President, the willingness to make ommitments by other countries is begin-ing to increase—not that they would ever nterfere in our domestic affairs. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the week of April 12–6, a meeting was planned, organized by the State Institute of Technology and Science rom Russia and the Stanford Research In-titute, to be held in San Francisco; and one y one the Soviet delegation indicated it will ot come. The meeting has now been canceled. Do you feel that this is part of a general reakdown of the agreements made [in-udible]?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think there has een a general breakdown in the agreements hat have been made in the last few years, nd I would like to stress that the basic direc-ion of, on the one hand, resisting aggressive noves but, on the other hand, looking for a tabler and more secure international envi-onment—that basic direction has not been hanged. And, indeed, there is no realistic lternative for it.

We have taken very strong objection to oviet actions and Cuban actions in Angola, nd we will not hold still for a repetition of imilar actions. We have made this clear, but ve believe that fundamentally the problem f peace, the problem of how to establish a afer international environment, when both ides have tremendous thermonuclear arse-nals, is a basic problem of our period which ny Administration would have to face and vhich must be solved in our time.

Mr. Laird: Would you take one more ques-ion, and then we'll be through.

Secretary Kissinger: As long as it isn't rom you. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of General Haig's ecent remarks—

Secretary Kissinger: He makes so many. Which ones?

Q. The last one, assessing the rise of Soviet power in its armed forces in Europe. And in view of the observations of other experts and by virtue of the certain political develop-ments in Western Europe, what do you fore-see [inaudible] America's role in Western Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first, let us get clear about the growth of Soviet power. Soviet power is undoubtedly growing—so, for that matter, is ours. It is inevitable that a country with the industrial base and the technology of the Soviet Union will gradually expand its military capability. And as Soviet forces are modernized, they also become more effective. Therefore, inevitably, Soviet power will grow. And if we want to torment our-selves, every four years some Administration can be accused that during its term of office Soviet power has grown, and that will be true. The problem is not whether Soviet power grows; the problem is whether we can resist it, whether we can balance it. For that, we have the capability.

Now, in Western Europe, as in many de-mocracies, there have been strong pressures on the defense program because of the re-cession, because of, in some countries, the domestic conditions. Therefore the buildup of European forces in some European coun-tries has not been as rapid as we would have wished and has certainly not kept pace with the growth of the Soviet forces.

Over a period of time this is going to pro-duce a weakness in the capacity for regional defense in Europe—and that at the precise moment when the thermonuclear forces, no matter what is done, are going to come more and more into balance. This is the strategic problem of the next decade, and the only thing we have to remember is that its solu-tion depends on the willingness of the West-ern countries—including the United States—to maintain adequate defense budgets and that we should not blame the Soviet Union for our own failure to maintain our defense budgets if we don't do it.

With respect to the domestic developments in various countries, I have been warned that I am talking too much about that as it is; but I have stated repeatedly that the United States considers that the advent of Communist parties to power in European countries, or in NATO countries, is bound to weaken NATO, and it is bound to lead to a set of domestic priorities which will enhance this defense problem which we have described, which will shift the spectrum of foreign policy more toward a neutralist direction, and which is therefore a source of great concern to us.

Ultimately, obviously, it depends on the voters of the countries concerned. But if we are asked, we are going to say what our prediction of the consequences is.

But, again, I would like to stress: The problem of defense of the West is soluble, and it is soluble by Western efforts.

Prime Minister Cosgrave of Ireland Visits the United States

Liam Cosgrave, Prime Minister of Ireland, made an official visit to the United States March 17–22. While in Washington March 17–18, he met with President Ford and other government officials and addressed a joint meeting of the Congress.[1] *Following is the text of a U.S.-Ireland joint communique dated March 17 and released March 18.*

White House press release dated March 18

1. The President welcomed the Prime Minister and stressed the significance he attached to the visit in connection with the celebration of the Bicentennial of American independence. The Prime Minister agreed with this view and thanked the President for his invitation. Both the President and the Prime Minister expressed the conviction that the visit would help to strengthen the ties of kinship, friendship, affection ai mutual interest which bind their countri so closely.

2. The President and the Prime Minist discussed matters of common concern inclu ing international political developments ai economic matters. The two leaders also di cussed the development of the Europea Economic Community and Ireland's place its progress.

3. On economic matters, both welcome the close relations that exist between the two countries, and the Prime Minister ind cated in particular the welcome of his Go ernment for American investment in Irelar and the benefits to the two countries whi could accrue from it. The President and tl Prime Minister reviewed the improvi economic picture on both sides of the Atlant and, in this connection, the President unde scored the importance of close consultatio and cooperation between the United Stat and the European Community.

4. The President and the Prime Minist noted with regret the continued violen arising from the Northern Ireland situatio They deplored all support for organizatio involved directly or indirectly in campaig of violence and reiterated in particular the determination to continue and to intensi their cooperation in the prosecution of illeg activities. They appealed to the America and Irish people to refrain from supportin with financial or other aid, this violence.

5. The Prime Minister invited the Pres dent to visit Ireland at a mutually agreeab future date, and the President accepted tl invitation with pleasure.

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[1] For exchanges of greetings and toasts betwe President Ford and Prime Minister Cosgrave Mar. 17, see Weekly Compilation of Presidenti Documents dated Mar. 22, 1976, pp. 438 and 443; f the Prime Minister's address before a joint meetir of the Congress, see Congressional Record of Mar. 1 1976, p. H 2006.

The Future and U.S. Foreign Policy

Statement by Secretary Kissinger [1]

There could be no better moment for the "dispassionate public discussion and national self-examination" in foreign policy for which you, Mr. Chairman [Senator John J. Sparkman], have called these hearings.

The moment is propitious not primarily because of the numerical happenstance of our 200th year, or of the political milestone of this Presidential election campaign, but because of the era we have entered in international affairs. It is a moment to take stock of our country's record and consider our future course, to reflect about the transformations of the international order which we can perceive from this vantage point—some already completed and some still in train—that have altered many of the circumstances in which American foreign policy is conducted.

Today I want to focus on what lies ahead of us: the international issues that will confront the American public, the President, and the Congress, regardless of party, as we enter our third century. For we must remember, amid all our debates, that this nation has permanent interests and concerns in the world that must be preserved through and beyond this election year. This nation faces objective conditions in the world that are not the result of the machinations of personalities nor even, often, the product of our national decisions. They are realities brought by the ebb and flow of history. The issues they raise must be addressed with seriousness, understanding, and objectivity if we as a people are to remain masters of events and of our own destiny.

As President Ford has said: [2]

> America has had a unique role in the world since the day of our independence 200 years ago. And ever since the end of World War II we have borne successfully a heavy responsibility for insuring a stable world order and hope for human progress.

That responsibility continues—not only as a task we shoulder for others or in fulfillment of our ideals, but as a responsibility to ourselves—to create a world environment in which America and its values can thrive.

Mr. Chairman, in foreign policy we stand on the firm ground of America's strength and clear purpose. We face the future with confidence. We have made considerable progress in strengthening partnership with our allies, in managing the global issues of peace and security, and in beginning a new era of cooperation on the global problems of interdependence. The potential for further advance is great.

But today the world looks anxiously to America to gauge whether we will choose to build upon this progress. They ask whether America will use its strength to respond to today's challenges. One of the greatest factors of uncertainty in the world today is concern about America's will and constancy. These doubts are not caused by statements made in the heat of a political campaign

[1] Submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Mar. 16 during hearings on foreign policy choices for the 1970's and 1980's (text from press release 127). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] For an excerpt from President Ford's state of the Union address made on Jan. 19, see BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1976, p. 145.

but, rather, by a decade of convulsions culminating in a serious question as to the basic direction of American foreign policy. These doubts must be dispelled. I am convinced that they will be dispelled—not by public statements, but by demonstrations of the purposefulness of national policy, the vigor of the American economy, and the renewed unity of the American people, on which all else depends. We are going through a period of adjustment and reappraisal. We must all work together, so that we are the stronger for it when it is completed.

The American people, and the Congress as their elected representatives, have a central part to play in the enterprise of national reaffirmation. Their contribution is essential as a matter of constitutional principle in the making of foreign policy, and as a matter of practical necessity in the implementation of any successful long-term course. As Senator Case has pointed out:

> Congress has an important role in helping voters make known their concerns and to guide the executive branch in its conduct of foreign policy. A democracy such as ours cannot hope to successfully carry out for any length of time a foreign policy which does not have firm domestic roots.

These hearings have already provided much insight into the American public's perceptions of foreign policy, which we have found extremely useful.

The International Environment

Through most of our history, Mr. Chairman, our peace and security were provided for us. The successful growth of our democratic society at home, and the absence of direct threat from abroad, nourished our sense of uniqueness and the belief that it was our own choice whether and when we would participate in the world. We entered wars only when overwhelming danger threatened. We identified exertion in foreign affairs as a temporary interruption of our domestic tranquillity. Once aroused, we were implacable, fighting "the war to end all wars," or until "unconditional surrender."

We had margin for error. Our history, except for the Civil War, was without tragedy, and our resources and good fortune left us without the sense of external limits that so colored the experience of almost every other nation. Our successes seemed to teach us that any problem could be solved—once and for all—by determined effort. The qualities on which all other nations in history depended to insure their survival in a hostile or ambiguous environment—subtlety, maneuver, imagination, consistency—were disparaged in America as cynical or immoral. The equilibrium of power which kept the peace for long periods in the turbulent history of Europe was denounced in this country as a preoccupation with power at the expense of moral principle.

Even in the first 25 years after World War II—an era of great creativity and unprecedented American engagement in foreign affairs—we acted as if the world's security and economic development could be conclusively insured by the commitment of American resources, know-how, and effort. We were encouraged—even impelled—to act as we did by our unprecedented predominance in a world shattered by war and the collapse of the great colonial empires.

At the same time, the central character of moral values in American life always made us acutely sensitive to the purity of means—and when we disposed of overwhelming power we had a great luxury of choice. Our moral certainty made compromise difficult; our preponderance often made it seem unnecessary.

Today, power takes many forms and our circumstances are more complex. In military power, while we still have massive strength, we no longer enjoy meaningful nuclear supremacy. In economic terms we remain the world's most productive economy; but we must now share leadership with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan; we must deal with the newly wealthy and developing nations; and we must make new choices regarding our economic relations with the Communist countries. Our moral influence, our democratic principles, are still far more valued by the world's millions than we realize; but we must compete with ideologies which assert progressive goals but

pursue them by oppressive methods.

All Americans have a right to be proud of what this nation accomplished in our past 30 years of world leadership. We assisted European and Japanese recovery; we built indispensable alliances; we established an international economic system; and we sustained global peace and global progress for a generation.

We have great things yet to do, requiring our unity, our dedication, and our strength. For we live, and our children will live, in a more complex time:

—First, we face the necessity of drawing on the new strength and vitality of our allies and friends to intensify our partnership with them. They have become, again, major centers of power and initiative. This is a lasting success of our foreign policy. And today, our unity with the great industrial democracies is fundamental to all we seek to accomplish in the world. It is we who maintain the global balance of power that keeps the peace. And it is our unmatched economic dynamism that is the best hope for a world of widening prosperity. Above all, our moral unity and commitment to the values of democracy are crucial to the fulfillment of our own dreams as well as to the creative use of man's energies in solving the problems of the future. In a complex world—of equilibrium and coexistence, of competition and interdependence—it is our ideals that give meaning and purpose to our endeavors.

—For we face, secondly, the age-old challenge of maintaining peace, but in the unprecedented dimension of an age of thermonuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, after 60 years of economic and industrial growth, has —inevitably—reached the status of a superpower. As a result, we must conduct a dual policy. We and our allies must restrain Soviet power and prevent its use to upset global stability. At the same time, our generation faces the long-term challenge of putting the U.S.-Soviet relationship on a more secure, constructive, and durable basis.

We must, as well, continue the progress we have made in fashioning a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. We consider the opening to the People's Republic of China one of the key elements of our foreign policy.

Beyond this, global security presents other permanent necessities. There is the continuing need to moderate and resolve regional conflicts which threaten global economic or political stability. And there is the urgent and growing challenge of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which gravely increases the risks of nuclear holocaust.

—The third central challenge is to build a wider world community out of the turbulent environment of today's nearly 150 independent nations. Two World Wars in this century and the process of decolonization have broken down the international order of previous centuries. For the first time in history the international community has become truly global. The new nations make insistent demands on the global system, testing their new economic power and seeking a greater role and more equitable share in the world's prosperity. A new pattern of relationships must be fashioned out of cooperation for mutual benefit, impelled by the reality of our global interdependence.

Our friendships with nations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, on the basis of mutual respect and practical cooperation, take on a new importance as the building blocks of world community. We must recognize that no world order will be stable over the last quarter of this century unless all its participants consider that they have a stake in it and that it is legitimate and just.

These are the basic challenges facing this nation as we enter our third century.

In such a world, Mr. Chairman, this country can no longer choose whether or not it is involved in international affairs. On a shrinking planet, there is no hiding place. There are no simple answers. This nation cannot afford to swing recklessly between abdication and confrontation; we must pursue a long-term course. Although we are stronger than any other, we cannot operate primarily by throwing our weight around. Lasting peace

is not achievable without an international consensus. We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it for many centuries, without escape and without respite. We must learn patience, precision, perspective—knowing that what is attainable falls short of the ideal, mindful of the necessities of self-preservation, deriving from our moral conviction the courage to persevere. For America finds itself, for the first time in its history, irrevocably and permanently involved in international affairs.

The world needs desperately our strength and our purpose. Without American strength, there can be no security; without American convictions, there can be no progress.

Americans have always regarded challenges as a test, not an obstacle. We have great opportunities for creative diplomacy, to shape from this turbulence and complexity a world community of greater stability and hope. We, more than any other country, are in a position to determine—or have a decisive impact upon—the evolution of the global order.

Forty years ago when the forces of democracy faced a great threat, the United States was waiting in the wings to come to Europe's rescue. Today there is no one waiting in the wings to come to *our* rescue.

Let me discuss at greater length some of the basic long-term challenges we face.

The Unity of the Industrial Democracies

The cornerstone of our foreign policy is—as it has been for a generation—our partnership with our principal allies in the Atlantic community and Japan. These partnerships began three decades ago as a means of collective security against aggression and of cooperation for economic recovery from the devastation of World War II. In the succeeding period our alliances have been the bulwark of the global balance of power. Our cooperation with the great industrial democracies has been the underpinning of the world economic system which has sustained global prosperity and spread it to the far corners of the earth.

Rarely in history have alliances survived as ours have survived, and indeed flourished, through so many vast changes in the international environment. And in the last few years, we and our allies have not only continued to strengthen our common defenses; we have extended our collaboration successfully into new dimensions of common endeavor—in improved political consultation, in coordinating our approaches to negotiations with the Communist countries, in developing a common energy policy and strategy, in reinforcing our respective economic policies for recovery from recession, in environmental cooperation, and in fashioning common approaches for the dialogue with the developing countries.

All these efforts to build peace and promote progress reflect our common belief in freedom and our common hope of a better future for all mankind. These are permanent values of this nation, and therefore our alliances and friendships that are based on them and designed to further them are permanent interests of the United States.

Our cohesion has a more than technical significance. While foreign policy is unthinkable without pragmatism, pragmatism without moral purpose is like a rudderless ship.

Our ties with the great democracies are thus not an alliance of convenience, but a union of principle in defense of democratic values and our way of life. It is our ideals that inspire not only our self-defense but all else that we do. And the resilience of our countries in responding to all our modern challenges is a testimony to the spirit and moral strength of our free peoples.

As we look to the future, there is no higher priority in our foreign policy than sustaining the vitality of democracy and the unity of democracies. The world will become more, not less, complex; our power will grow more, not less, interwoven with others; our values will be more, not less, challenged. In such a world, the solidarity of our relations with those who share our heritage, our way of life, our ideals, takes on more, and not less, importance for as far ahead as we can see.

Our responsibilities are, first, our common efense. The closeness of our collaboration n defense matters is greater today than at ny time in the past decade. We must main- ain it because it is the stability of the mili- ary balance that has brought about what- ver hope there is of easing tensions in urope and in Asia.

There is greater sharing of responsibility n North Atlantic defense today. The Presi- ent has taken the initiative in promoting ich improvements as improved standardiza- on of equipment and more effective force ructuring. But the United States must re- ain conscious of its own special responsi- lity in the alliance—to maintain the stra- gic balance and to contribute its crucial are to maintaining the conventional bal- nce in Europe and the Mediterranean, and ore generally.

Our security is a precondition of all else at we do. On this foundation, we will face er the coming period a broad range of sks beyond the traditional enterprise of llective defense.

We will continue to seek to enhance our curity and general peace through arms ntrol and negotiation of political conflicts. e hope to see progress in the talks on mu- al and balanced force reductions in Europe. e expect that the 1971 Quadripartite greement on Berlin, which ended a chronic isis of more than two decades, fore- adows an era of enhanced security in entral Europe.

In the coming decade, the collaboration of ie industrial democracies can be the dy- amic force in the building of a more secure d progressive international order. We have ade a remarkable beginning. New steps ave been taken in the last few years, and rther will be taken, to strengthen Euro- ean unity; this has the strong support of ie United States. The new institutions and rograms of our collective energy strategy re in place. We have discussed and devel- ped common approaches to the new dialogue ith the developing nations. The passage of ie Trade Act of 1974 enabled this country enter into a new round of trade negotia- ons with Europe and Japan to make basic improvements in the world trading system. In recent months, the Rambouillet economic summit and the Jamaica reform of the international monetary system demonstrate that the future of our cooperation among the industrial democracies will be as fruitful as the past.

In this regard, I want to mention an important item of business before this committee: approval of our participation in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] Financial Support Fund. This is the contingency mechanism, proposed by the United States, to insure mutual support among the industrial nations in the face of financial disruptions or pressures by actions of the oil cartel. At little cost, this mechanism will provide a financial safety net, combat protectionism, and promote our cooperation on energy policy. It is vital for the industrial nations' independence. Seven other OECD members have ratified it, and the rest are expected to do so by the middle of this year. I hope the Congress will move quickly to do the same, to reinforce the solidarity of the industrial democracies.

It is our belief that in an era when our democratic values are under challenge in the world and our societies have been buffeted by economic difficulties at home, the solidarity and cooperation of the great democracies are of crucial importance for giving impetus to all our efforts. We have proved what we can do and vindicated the faith of our people in the values and future of our societies. We have proved that our unity can be as dynamic a force for building a new international order today as it was 30 years ago.

The new solidarity we are building can draw its inspiration from our hopes and ideals, rather than merely our common dangers. A thriving Europe and Japan and North America will not only be secure and prosperous but a magnet to the Communist countries and to the developing world. And so we can enter the last quarter of this century confident that we are masters of our own destiny—and making a decisive contribution to the world's destiny.

Of the challenges that the democracies face, none are more fundamental than the issues of peace and war. These issues—the traditional foreign policy agenda—take on in this era an unprecedented dimension.

There are three principal aspects to this problem of peace:

—Relations with the major Communist powers;

—The effort to resolve regional conflicts and disputes peacefully; and

—The increasing danger of nuclear weapons proliferation.

We live in a world in which this country must now deal with a country of roughly equal power. This is not a familiar world for modern Americans. Yet it is the kind of world in which we will live for the rest of this century and beyond, no matter what we do in the military field.

Thirty years ago, the United States, alone among the major nations of the world, emerged from the Second World War with its economy and society undamaged by war. We enjoyed a tremendous preponderance in economic power and a monopoly on nuclear weapons. This great physical strength gave impetus to the willingness of the American people to take responsibility for helping to shape a better postwar international order. The creativity and generosity that this nation displayed in that period are a lasting tribute to the American spirit.

Today, because of the inevitable recovery and growth of our allies—and our adversaries—the United States now finds itself in a world of relative kinds of equilibrium. In strategic military power, the world is still bipolar. Economic power is more widely dispersed among many major nations, including the wealthier of the developing nations. In moral and ideological influence, many nations and philosophies contend. The task of consolidating peace thus presents itself in this era as a far more complex problem than ever before, both practically and morally.

With our allies, we have learned to share responsibility and leadership, and this has enhanced our collaboration in every dimen sion of common endeavor. But with our a versaries, we face the imperative of coexis ence in an age of thermonuclear weapons ar strategic parity. We must defend our inte ests, our principles, and our allies, while in suring at all times that international confli does not degenerate into cataclysm. We mus resist expansionism and pressures, but w must on this foundation seek to build habit of restraint that will over the long term lea to a reliable reduction of tensions.

This government has therefore move with energy and purpose over the last se eral years, and in concert with our allies, t consolidate and transform our *relationshi with the major Communist powers,* for new era and for our long-term future.

We have established a new and durab and hopeful relationship with the People Republic of China, a nation comprisin nearly one-quarter of mankind. This ne relationship has made an important co tribution to peace in Asia and in the worl President Ford is committed to continue th process of normalization of our relations accordance with the principles of the Shan hai communique.

And this country in the last several yea has opened up positive relations with cou tries in Eastern Europe. Two America Presidents have visited Poland, Yugoslavi and Romania, to demonstrate that, in ou view, European security and relaxation tensions apply to Eastern as well as Weste Europe. This remains, and must remain, basic principle of American policy.

In an age when two nations have th power to visit utter destruction on the who planet in hours, there can be no greater in perative than assuring a rational and secu relationship between the nuclear supe powers. This is a challenge without prec dent. Historically a conflict of ideology an geopolitical interest such as now characte izes the international scene has almost in variably led to war. But in the age of strat gic equality, humanity could not survi such a repetition of history. War woul mean mutual suicide.

Therefore, with respect to the Sovi

ion, the United States faces the necessity a dual policy. We must preserve stability not rest upon it. We must firmly resist l deter adventurism. But at the same time must keep open the possibility of more nstructive relations between the United tes and the Soviet Union—resolving polit- l disputes by negotiation, such as Ber- ; working out stable agreements to limit ategic arms on both sides, as in the SALT e agreements and the accord at Vladivo- k; and when political conditions permit it, eloping our bilateral cooperation in eco- nic and other fields to give both sides a ted interest in continuing and improving itical relations.

We have an obligation to mankind to work a more secure world. We have an obliga- n to the American people to insure that a sis, if it is imposed upon us, does not re- t from any lack of vision of the United tes.

We face a long-term problem, and we must hion and maintain a long-term policy. An ilibrium of power is indispensable to any e of peace. But a balance of power con- ntly contested is too precarious a founda- n for our long-term future. So this coun- , in its third century, must avoid the twin ptations of provocation and escapism. We st maintain a steady and confident rse; it must be a policy that our adver- ies respect, our allies support, and our ple believe in and sustain.

By whatever name we call it, the U.S.-viet relationship must be founded on cer- n fundamental principles, which this coun- has affirmed consistently for the last ven years:

—First, we will maintain our military *ength*. The United States must maintain equilibrium of power through a strong tional and allied defense. The United tates will do what is necessary to maintain e balance in all significant categories of litary strength, including conventional as ll as strategic forces.

—Secondly, this country is prepared to *gotiate solutions* to political problems. The 71 agreement on Berlin is an example. And both superpowers share a basic responsibility to insure that the world is spared the holocaust of a nuclear war. Strategic arms limitation is therefore a permanent, mutual, and fundamental interest. At Vladivostok in 1974, President Ford reached agreement on the outline of a comprehensive agreement putting an equal ceiling on strategic forces on both sides for a 10-year period. The issues that remain in completing that agreement are soluble. An agreement on the basis of strict reciprocity is attainable.

—Both sides have vital interests, but have an overriding interest in avoidance of major conflict. Therefore long-term peace can only be founded on the practice and habit of *restraint*. Exploiting local crises for unilateral gain is not acceptable. This nation will not seek confrontations lightly, but we are determined to defend peace by systematic resistance to pressures and irresponsible actions. The growth of Soviet economic and military power could not have been prevented; what can be prevented is the use of that power to upset the global balance. Without restraint there is no possibility of a meaningful relaxation of tensions.

—If we preserve security on this basis, opportunities exist for creative diplomacy to engage the Soviet Union more firmly in constructive participation in the international system. We are prepared to hold out the prospect of increasing *bilateral cooperation* in the economic, technical, and other fields to give both sides an increasing stake in positive political relations. Over the long term we have it within our capacity to make our coexistence durable and secure and to turn it into cooperation.

This is the broad agenda for the future of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. More specifically:

—We cannot prevent the growth of Soviet power, but we can prevent its use for unilateral advantage and political expansion.

—We must accept the reality that sovereign states, especially ones of roughly equal power, cannot impose unacceptable conditions on each other, and ultimately and inevitably must proceed by compromise.

—The United States will never stand for violation of a solemn treaty or agreement.

—We can never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us, either in unsatisfactory agreements or violations of agreements or by neglect of our own defense requirements.

—We are determined to pursue the effort to negotiate a saner and more secure strategic balance on equitable terms because it is in our interest and in the interest of world peace.

Any Administration conscious of the long-term requirements of peace will find itself implementing the same dual approach of firmness in the face of pressure and readiness to work for a more cooperative world. Of course, differences are inevitable as to the practical application of these principles. But as President Kennedy said: [3]

> . . . in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

As the United States and Soviet Union have taken important steps toward regulating their own competition, *the problem of local conflicts* persists and indeed, to some extent, increases. The world begins to take for granted the invulnerability of global stability to local disturbances. The world has permitted too many of the underlying causes of regional conflicts to continue unattended until the parties came to believe their only recourse was to war. And because each crisis ultimately has been contained, the world has remained complacent. We cannot forget the ominous lesson of 1914. Tolerance of local conflict tempts world holocaust. We have no guarantee that some local crisis will not explode beyond control. We have a responsibility to prevent such crises.

This must be a permanent preoccupation of statesmen who are concerned for the preservation of peace over the next decades. In the modern era, global communications have shrunk our planet and created a global consciousness. Nations and peoples are creasingly sensitive to events and issues other parts of the globe. Our moral princi extends our concern for the fate of our f low men. Ideological conflict respects boundaries and calls into question even t legitimacy of domestic structures.

We cannot expect stability to continue definitely unless determined efforts are ma to moderate and resolve local political c flicts peacefully.

The United States is not the world's liceman. But we have learned from bit experience—as recently as 1973—that c flicts can erupt and spread and directly tou the interests and well-being of this count Helping to settle disputes is a longstand American tradition, in our interest and world interest.

Nowhere is there greater urgency than the Middle East. The agreements negotia between the parties over the past few yea in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 3 are unprecedented steps toward an ultim peace. These efforts must and will contin Both sides must contribute to the proce the United States remains committed to sist. The elements for further progress ward peace exist. Stagnation runs a gr risk of further upheaval, of benefit to neit side and of grave implications for the pe and economic well-being of the world.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons techn ogy could add a more ominous dimensio a world in which regional political confl persist. The dangers so long predicted n be coming closer at hand. As I said to U.N. General Assembly in September 19

> The world has grown so accustomed to the ex ence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they never be used . . . .
>
> In a world where many nations possess nuc weapons, dangers would be vastly compounded would be infinitely more difficult, if not impossi to maintain stability among a large number of clear powers. Local wars would take on a new dim sion. Nuclear weapons would be introduced into gions where political conflict remains intense the parties consider their vital interests overwhe ingly involved. There would, as well, be a va heightened risk of direct involvement of the m nuclear powers.

[3] For President Kennedy's address at American University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

Therefore, halting proliferation is a major foreign policy objective of this Administration, as it has been for all previous Administrations since the dawn of the nuclear age. As I explained to your colleagues on the Senate Government Operations Committee just a week ago, we have intensified our efforts, in international bodies, with other nations who are principal exporters of nuclear materials, with potential nuclear powers —and with Congress—to insure that the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy can be spread widely without at the same time spreading the perils of holocaust. It is a challenge to statesmanship to see beyond the immediate economic gains from unrestrained competition in nuclear exports and to act to halt a mushrooming danger.

Shaping a World Community

The upheavals of the 20th century have bequeathed to us another fundamental task: to adapt the international structure to the new realities of our time. We must fashion constructive long-term relationships between the industrial and developing nations, rich and poor, North and South; we must adapt and reinvigorate our friendships in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, taking into account their new role and importance on the world scene; and together with all nations, we must address the new problems of an interdependent world which can only be solved through multilateral cooperation.

A central issue of foreign policy over the next generation will be the relationship between the industrial and developing nations. Decolonization and the expansion of the world economy have given birth to new countries and new centers of power and initiative. The world environment of the next decades can be the seedbed of political instability, ideological confrontation, and economic warfare—or it can become a community marked by international collaboration on an unprecedented scale. The interdependence of nations, the indivisibility of our security and our prosperity, can accelerate our common progress or our common decline.

Therefore, just as we must go beyond maintaining equilibrium if we are to insure peace, so must we transcend tests of strength in North-South relations and seek to build a true world community. In international forums, the United States will resist pressure tactics, one-way morality, and propagandistic assaults on our dignity and on common sense. We will defend our interests and beliefs without apology. We will resist attempts at blackmail or extortion.

We know that world order depends ultimately on cooperative efforts and concrete solutions to the problems in our relations. The price and supply of energy, the conditions of trade, the expansion of world food production, the technological bases for economic development, the protection of the world environment, the rules of law that govern the world's oceans and outer space—these are concerns that affect all nations and that can be satisfactorily addressed only on the basis of mutual respect and in a framework of international collaboration. This is the agenda of an interdependent world.

We have much reason for confidence. It is the West—and overwhelmingly this country —that has the resources, the technology, the skills, the organizational ability, and the good will that are the key to the success of these international efforts. In the global dialogue among the industrial and developing worlds, the Communist nations are conspicuous by their absence and, indeed, by their irrelevance.

Therefore we have begun the dialogue with the developing nations. At the World Food Conference in 1974, which was called at our initiative, and at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly last September and in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation now underway in Paris, the United States has taken the role of leadership. We have undertaken it with a strong contribution from the Congress and in the spirit of the highest ideals of the American people. This must continue.

The United States has presented a wide range of proposals for practical cooperation that could shape a constructive long-term economic relationship between the developed and developing countries: to safeguard ex-

port earnings against economic cycles and natural disasters, to accelerate growth and agricultural production, to improve conditions of trade and investment in key commodities, and to address the urgent needs of the poorest countries. In every area of concern we have proposed methods of cooperation among all countries, including the other industrial countries, the newly wealthy oil producers, and the developing countries. Many of our proposals of last September have already been implemented. More can be done. If we are met in a constructive spirit, we will respond. There is a full agenda before us, implementing proposals that have already been made, and going beyond.

The United States has longstanding friendships on a bilateral basis with the nations of *Latin America, Asia, and Africa* which we seek to adapt, improve, and build upon.

Latin America, which I have recently visited, is for the United States a region of special ties and special interest. It is as well a continent in a process of transition. Hemispheric relationships—bilateral, regional, multilateral, and global—are in flux. An earlier community of the Americas bounded by exclusivity has given way to a more open relationship which turns not on convention but on mutual respect, common interests, and cooperative problem-solving and a more active role in the events outside the region. At the same time, the importance of Latin America to the United States is steadily increasing—as elements of the global economy, as participants in the world's political forums, and in their new role as the most developed of the developing nations.

The United States must adapt to these changing realities, and it has begun to do so. Equally, we maintain our conviction that the Americas must not reject, but build upon, the precious heritage of our tradition of cooperation. This is the formula for our future progress. The great issues of global interdependence are before us; with this special advantage, and on the basis of respect and sovereign equality, we here in this hemisphere can cooperate to find mutually beneficial solutions. If we succeed, our collaboration can be a model for the wider world community that we seek.

Our relations with Asia are crucial as well, for in Asia the interests of all the major powers in the world intersect. The stability of the region will be as central to world peace over the coming decades as it has been in past decades. President Ford's trip to Asia in December both reaffirmed America's fundamental stake in Asia and opened a fresh chapter in our relations with the nations of the region. He set forth the premises of our country's future approach to Asia:

—American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific and therefore to global stability.

—Partnership with Japan is a pillar of our Asian policy.

—The process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China is indispensable. America's ties with one-quarter of mankind are inevitably of crucial importance to the world of the future.

—We have a continuing stake in stability and security in Southeast Asia, an area of great dynamism and promise.

—Peace in Asia depends upon the resolution of outstanding political conflicts, most prominently that of the Korean Peninsula.

—Economic cooperation among the peoples of the Pacific Basin is essential to fulfilling the aspirations of the peoples of the region for a better future.

And very soon I will visit another area of great change and importance: Africa. The dramatic spread of national independence in Africa has had a major impact on world institutions and on the scope of international affairs. Africa's economic importance and its economic relations with other continents are growing. And America's traditional concern for the cause of independence and self-determination and racial justice, and the identification of many Americans with their African heritage, have given a more profound dimension to our interest in the continent's future.

Our African policy over the coming decade will be guided by these principles and concerns:

—We want to see Africa attain prosperity

for its people and become a major participant in the international economic system.

—We support the desire of African nations to chart their own course in domestic, regional, and international affairs, to choose their own social system and a nonaligned foreign policy.

—We want to see self-determination, racial justice, and human rights spread throughout Africa. As President Ford has recently made clear again, majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia is the unequivocal commitment of the United States.

—We want to see the African continent be free of great-power rivalry or conflict. We have our own interest in seeing that local conflicts there not be exploited and exacerbated by outside forces intervening for unilateral advantage.

A broader range of issues facing this country in the coming years has to do with the multilateral challenges of an era of increasing *global interdependence.*

There are many urgent and unprecedented issues that can be addressed only on a global basis and whose resolution will fundamentally shape the future of this planet. A central example is the Conference on the Law of the Sea, which resumes its work this week in New York. In this unprecedented negotiation, over 100 nations are seeking to write new rules of law governing the use of the world's oceans. The implications for international security, for the use of vast resources, for scientific research, and for the protection of the environment are vast. The United States will continue its work with others to assure that the oceans become an arena of global cooperation and enrichment rather than global conflict.

Also of great importance is the use of outer space, which presents us as well with the potential for conflict or the possibility of collaboration. We have the opportunity to substitute international law for power competition in the formative stage of an important international activity.

The modern age has not only given us the benefits of technology; it has also spawned the plagues of aircraft hijacking, international terrorism, and new techniques of warfare. The international community must stand together against these affronts to mankind. The United States has promoted and must continue to promote the strengthening of international organizations and international law to deal with these issues.

Compassion for our fellow man requires that we mobilize international resources to combat the age-old scourges of disease, famine, and natural disaster. And concern for basic human rights calls upon the international community to oppose violations to individual dignity wherever and by whomever they are practiced. The practice of torture must be discredited and banished. Human rights must be cherished and promoted regardless of race, sex, religion, or political belief.

We must extend the scope and reach of international institutions for cooperation. The United Nations, an organization in which the American people have invested great hopes, must be a mechanism of practical collaboration instead of an arena of rhetorical confrontation if it is to fulfill the mission of its charter and its responsibilities for peace in the modern era. Procedural abuses and one-sided resolutions cannot be accepted. The value of this organization, if properly used, remains considerable—in peacekeeping, dispute settlement, and promoting cooperation for economic development and health and scores of other endeavors.

Only through a pattern of international cooperation can all these problems be successfully addressed. And only in a structure of global peace can the insecurity of nations, out of which so much conflict arises, be eased, and habits of compromise and accommodation be nurtured. Social progress, justice, and human rights can thrive only in an atmosphere of stability and reduced international tension.

Our Debate at Home

This, then, is the design of our foreign policy:

—To promote, together with our allies, the

strength and ideals of freedom and democracy in a turbulent world;

—To master the traditional challenges of peace and war, to maintain an equilibrium of strength, but to go beyond balance to a more postive future; and

—To shape a long-term relationship of mutual benefit with the developing countries and to turn all the issues of interdependence into the cement of a new global community.

These are the challenges of our third century.

Since this nation was born in struggle 200 years ago, Americans have never shrunk from challenge. We have never regarded the problems we face as cause for pessimism or despair. On the contrary, America's traditional spirit and optimism have always given millions around the world the hope that the complex issues of today can and will be solved. The world knows full well that no solutions are possible without the active participation and commitment of a united American people. To describe the complex and long-term tasks we face is therefore the greatest expression of confidence in America.

We remain the world's greatest democracy; we are the engine of the global economy; we have been for 30 years the bulwark of the balance of power and the beacon of freedom. The physical strength, the organizational skill, the creative genius of this country make us—as we have always been since our Revolution—the hope of mankind.

What we face today is not a test of our physical strength, which is unparalleled, but a qualitative challenge unlike anything we have ever faced before. It is a challenge to our will and courage and sense of responsibility. We are tested to show whether we understand what a world of complexity and ambiguity requires of us. It is not every generation that is given the opportunity to shape a new international order. If the opportunity is missed, we shall live in a world of increasing chaos and danger. If it is realized, we shall have begun an era of greater peace and progress and justice.

A heavy responsibility lies with us here in Washington. The Congress and the executive owe the American people an end to the divisions of the past decade. The divisive issues are no longer with us. The tasks ahead of us are not partisan or ideological issues; they are great tasks for America in a new century, in a new world that, more than ever, impinges upon our lives and cries out for our leadership. Even more than our resources, the creative vitality of this nation has been a tremendous force for good and continues to be so.

We can accomplish great things—but we can do so only as a united people. Beyond all the special concerns and special interests lies the national interest. Congress and the executive, Republicans and Democrats, have a common stake in the effectiveness and success of American foreign policy. Most of the major initiatives this government has taken on fundamental issues—with our allies, with the People's Republic of China, with the Soviet Union, with the developing nations, in the Middle East—have had broad and deep support in the Congress and in the country.

Therefore, just as we have the capacity to build a more durable international structure, so we have the capacity and opportunity to rebuild the consensus among the executive and legislative branches and among our people that will give new impetus to our responsible leadership in the world in our third century. This is the deepest desire of the President and the strongest commitment of all his Administration.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I hope that this discussion of what we see as the issues of the future will be helpful in the building of such a consensus. The issues are complex; the degree of public understanding required to deal with them is higher than at any time in our historical experience. And even if we can reach a consensus on objectives and priorities, our resources and options are limited and we cannot hope always to prevail or to be right.

These hearings are a wise and welcome step in promoting the understanding and consensus that are required. Our gift as a people is problem-solving and harnessing the capacities of widely diverse groups of people

arge-scale common endeavor. This is ex- y what is required of us, both in building ew international structure and in develop- the public support needed to sustain our ticipation in it over the long term.

n the last analysis, we must come to- her because the world needs us, because horizons that beckon us in the decades ome are as near, or as far, as we have the rage to seek them.

partment Discusses Issues n Southern Africa

tement by William E. Schaufele, Jr.
istant Secretary for African Affairs [1]

am pleased to have this opportunity to uss southern African issues with you y. In the wake of the Angolan experi- e, I think it is generally accepted that the e of events in the region has recently kened. The demand for change has been nsified because of the failure so far to h a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, stration over lack of real progress toward e-determination in Namibia, and the lack significant change in the practice of rtheid in South Africa. The objectives of e-determination and majority rule are as valid as they ever were, but the con- ued recalcitrance of minority regimes has le their realization more complicated, e likely to be achieved by violence. We st identify ways in which we can help the ples of southern Africa attain their right- places among the nations of the world.

would like to give you a brief descrip- n of the present situation, as we see it, southern Africa and then an outline of sent U.S. policy.

The situation in southern Africa today sents the prospect for both progress and disaster. The isolation of the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia has been dramatized by Mozambique's imposition of economic sanctions. The reports of increased guerrilla activity on the border between those two countries makes the need for settlement more urgent than ever. As for the other side of the continent, a new Security Council resolution passed in January calling again for an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia only serves to emphasize, if that is necessary, the painfully slow process of self-determination there. Guerrilla movements in both areas continue to build their arsenals and the regimes concerned continue strongly to resist just and constructive change.

I would not say there is no progress toward a peaceful resolution of the three great issues in southern Africa. What positive aspects we do see, however, are few. The talks between the African National Council and the Smith regime continue, although some have given up hope for success. In Namibia the constitutional conference sponsored by the illegal South African administration seems to be making some progress toward breaking down some apartheid practices in the territory.

We still have hope for a peaceful resolution in Rhodesia and that South Africa will make a strenuous effort to comply with the Security Council resolution on Namibia before the August 31 deadline.

Overall U.S. policy toward southern Africa is based on several considerations:

—An unequivocal support for majority rule;

—An equally firm condemnation of those governments which perpetuate the political and economic inequality on the basis of race;

—A strong preference for a peaceful realization of self-determination and majority rule; and

—The determination that the area should not become the arena for superpower rivalries.

Wednesday of this week we joined the Security Council in unanimous passage of a resolution of support—moral and material—

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[1] Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Mar. 19. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

for Mozambique to help that country through the hardships it will incur in implementing U.N. sanctions.

State Department officers both here in the United States and overseas maintain contact with liberation movements.

We maintain diplomatic relations with South Africa. Both bilaterally and through international organizations, we are constantly trying to convince that government that it is in its own best interests to make progress toward independence for Namibia and elimination of apartheid.

Mr. Chairman, that is basically how we see the situation and our policy in Southern Africa. Now I would like to say a few more specific things about our policy toward liberation movements. There are liberation movements active in all three areas we have mentioned, Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa. Let me address each country separately.

In *Namibia* we have identified 13 "nationalist" organizations and 27 political parties. Only one organization, however, is active both within the country and, as a liberation movement, outside Namibia. That organization is SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], which maintains offices in New York, London, and Dakar as well as its headquarters in Lusaka. It is the only Namibian organization which has organized itself to field a military force—its goals, Namibian independence and the formation of a democratic unitary state. It has gained OAU [Organization of African Unity] recognition as the legitimate "independence movement" for the Namibian people. State Department officials both here and abroad have maintained contact with SWAPO representatives.

We are also in communication with other Namibian nationalist movements such as SWANUF [South West African National United Front], which maintains an office in New York and with the Namibian National Convention, whose leader, Chief Clemens Kapuuo, was in this country recently.

One of the characteristics of the nationalist movement in *Rhodesia*, particularly si 1963, has been its factionalization—based much or more on the personality of lead as on ideological or tribal grounds.

The present Rhodesian African Natic Council (ANC) might best be described an umbrella organization, under which f former separate nationalist organizatic the African National Congress, the Z babwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), Zimbabwe African National Union (ZAN and the Front for the Liberation of Z babwe, were fused into a new African tional Council in 1974.

Temporary leadership of the ANC vested originally in Bishop Abel Muzor in order to eliminate the divisions caused the intense rivalries between ZAPU, led Joshua Nkomo, and ZANU, led by the R erend Ndbaningi Sithole.

In September 1975 the ANC split into factions, roughly following the for ZAPU–ZANU split. An "internal wing" led by Mr. Nkomo, while an "external wi was led by Bishop Muzorewa and the R erend Sithole.

The Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZL composed of some 4,000 to 6,000 milita from both the former ZANU and ZAPU tions, is now training in Mozambique.

Since mid-December last year the "in nal," or Nkomo, faction of the ANC has b engaged in negotiations with Ian Smith an attempt to work out a peaceful neg ated transition to majority rule. These t are continuing. In anticipation that Nkomo-Smith talks would break down or to produce an acceptable settlement, "external" wing of the ANC and the Z have been concentrating on building up training the nationalist guerrilla forces an expanded armed struggle.

We are in contact with (and have b since the early 1960's) the leadership of various factions, both at our embassies ov seas and in Washington.

There are a number of organizations side *South Africa* which represent Afri

spirations in one form or another. These clude political parties associated with omelands" structures, as well as organitions affiliated with the "Black Consciousss Movement," such as the South African udents Organization and the Black Peo-e's Convention, which have developed in e urban areas in recent years.

The South African organizations which e most active on the international scene e the African National Congress and the n Africanist Congress. They are recogzed as representatives of the people of uth Africa by the OAU and most African untries. Both organizations led passive restance campaigns against apartheid laws South Africa; and after the Sharpeville ootings in 1960, both were banned. In rent years, they have been headquartered road.

Since their exile, both organizations have me to believe that armed struggle will be cessary to eliminate white minority domation in South Africa; however, neither, our knowledge, has been very effective in ploying these tactics so far.

U.S. officials assigned to capitals where rican National Congress and Pan Afrinist Congress representatives are located ve met with them. However, the U.S. nnot endorse or support the tactics esused by African National Congress and e Pan Africanist Congress. A resort to rce would involve incalculable costs in man life and suffering. As long as there any prospect for peaceful change, no reponsible government could promote such a velopment.

I have tried briefly, Mr. Chairman, to address myself to some of the issues in which understand you have expressed a particu- interest. You may rest assured that the ited States supports the objectives of selftermination and majority rule in southern frica, and as the President said the other y, majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia the unequivocal commitment of the United ates.

U.S.-Swiss Treaty on Assistance in Criminal Matters Sent to Senate

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith the Treaty between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed at Bern on May 25, 1973, six exchanges of interpretative letters of the same date, and an exchange of interpretative letters dated December 23, 1975. I urge that the Senate advise and consent to ratification of the Treaty and related matters.

The Treaty is the first major international agreement by the United States aimed at obtaining information and evidence needed for criminal investigations and prosecutions. Cooperation of this kind with Switzerland is uniquely important because of its position as an international financial center. Despite the general cooperation of Swiss authorities in criminal cases, the procedures for obtaining needed information have been generally ponderous and inadequate. Despite this cooperation, United States law enforcement and investigative agencies have frequently encountered severe difficulties in obtaining needed information from Swiss banks because of banking secrecy laws.

The new Treaty, as implemented by Swiss legislation, should open up new avenues of cooperation in Switzerland and greatly facilitate the work of the United States law enforcement and prosecutive agencies, especially in dealing with cases involving organized crime. Assistance will extend to ascertaining the whereabouts of persons, taking testimony, producing and preserving judicial and other documents, records and evidence, and serving and authenticating

[1] Transmitted on Feb. 18 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. F, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and interpretative letters and the report of the Department of State.

judicial and administrative documents.

The Treaty is expected to provide a useful and significant tool in combating crime and bringing offenders to justice. I recommend that the Senate give the Treaty and related letters prompt consideration and consent to their ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *February 18, 1976.*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Assistance to Mozambique

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on March 17, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT

USUN press release 33 dated March 17

The delegation of the United States is pleased to join with the other delegations who have spoken to commend the Government of Mozambique for its decision to enforce fully mandatory sanctions against the illegal government in Rhodesia. We believe this decision represents a major step forward in the efforts of the United Nations to enforce sanctions and thereby bring an end to minority rule in Rhodesia.

It is the sincere hope of my government that the enforcement of sanctions by Mozambique will be coupled with the adoption by this Council of a resolution on assistance to Mozambique which is placed in the context of article 50 of the U.N. Charter. We believe that the support of this Council for Mozambique will be a clear sign to the regime in Salisbury that the United Nations is committed to the peaceful transition to majori rule which is so urgently needed in th country.

Accordingly, the United States will vote favor of the resolution before us because v take its purpose to be twofold:

—First, to issue an appeal for assistance Mozambique under article 50 of the charte Mozambique has properly and commendab imposed sanctions on Rhodesia's minori government and accordingly has reason seek recourse under article 50.

—And second, to demonstrate that tl Council speaks with one voice on Rhodesi matters. There should be no doubt that th Council favors the urgent implementation majority rule in Rhodesia.

I shall have to say frankly that we are di appointed that the resolution contains a nur ber of elements which do not bear on its ma objectives. The charges of aggression in tl third preambular and second operative par graphs undoubtedly deserve careful attentio But my government wishes to make cle that it does not regard them as related to tl appeal which the Council is making on beh of Mozambique under article 50. We view t appeal as premised solely on Mozambiqu compliance with Security Council Resol tions 232 and 253 and the costs which ens from that compliance. We would normal have abstained on this resolution becau of the insertion of these references. In fa we did so in a similar situation in the Coun in 1973. Today, however, we shall vote favor, with the explanation I have just give in order to leave no doubt that we support tl principal purpose of this resolution as w as the purpose of Security Council Resol tions 232 and 253, which it reinforces.

Mr. President, my government will gi favorable consideration to assistance to M zambique in offsetting the heavy financi burdens it will incur by closing its bord with Rhodesia.

The United States remains unequivocal its support for the efforts of the British Go ernment to bring an end to the rebellion Rhodesia. We continue to believe strongl

at majority rule is a vital and urgent cessity in Rhodesia. I call the Council's rticular attention to the statement in icago by President Ford on March 13 [in interview for the Chicago Sun-Times] at:

The United States is totally dedicated to seeing to that the majority becomes the ruling power in Rodesia.

The President added that:

f we believe in the right of the majority to rule that situation, there has to be a change in the wer as far as the Government is concerned. Whether it can be done is a question that we have face. The British Government has tried for years get Smith to move. The United States has been shing. I think they just have to move and if they n't . . . we have to be on the right side morally l the right side morally is to be for majority rule.

On March 16, yesterday, Secretary of State ssinger made the following statement to e Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

n Southern Rhodesia we are not supporting the ite government or the white authorities . . . I, in s statement before the committee, again made ar that we stand for majority rule and we will nothing to support the white minority to continue exercise authority in Rhodesia.

So what we can do about it in any given instance pends on the circumstances, but we have to make ar what we stand for and then we have to work ward it.

I believe these statements make very ear where the United States stands on the Rhodesian question. It is time for true self-determination and for majority rule in Rhodesia.

XT OF RESOLUTION [1]

The Security Council,

Taking note of the statement made by the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique on 3 arch 1976 (S/12005),

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Mozambique,

Gravely concerned at the situation created by the ovocative and aggressive acts committed by the egal minority régime in Southern Rhodesia against e security and territorial integrity of the People's epublic of Mozambique,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to self-determination and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 imposing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia,

Recalling further its resolutions 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970 and 318 (1972) of 28 July 1972,

Noting with appreciation the decision of the Government of Mozambique to sever immediately all trade and communication links with Southern Rhodesia in accordance with the decision of the Council and in strict observance of economic sanctions,

Considering that this decision constitutes an important contribution to the realization of the United Nations objectives in Southern Rhodesia in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing that the action of the Government of Mozambique is in accordance with resolution 253 (1968),

Bearing in mind the provisions of Articles 49 and 50 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Commends* the Government of Mozambique for its decision to sever all economic and trade relations with Southern Rhodesia;

2. *Condemns* all provocative and aggressive acts, including military incursions, against the People's Republic of Mozambique by the illegal minority régime of Southern Rhodesia;

3. *Takes note* of the urgent and special economic needs of Mozambique arising from its implementation of resolution 253 (1968), as indicated in the statement by its Foreign Minister;

4. *Appeals* to all States to provide immediate financial, technical and material assistance to Mozambique, so that Mozambique can carry out its economic development programme normally and enhance its capacity to implement fully the system of sanctions;

5. *Requests* the United Nations and the organizations and programmes concerned, in particular the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and all United Nations specialized agencies to assist Mozambique in the present economic situation and to consider periodically the question of economic assistance to Mozambique as envisaged in the present resolution;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in collaboration with the appropriate organizations of the United Nations system, to organize, with immediate effect, all forms of financial, technical and material assistance to Mozambique to enable it to overcome the economic difficulties arising from its application of economic sanctions against the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia.

[1] U.N. doc. S/RES/386; adopted unanimously on ar. 17.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign New Agreement on Middle Atlantic Fisheries

Joint Communique [1]

Representatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics met in Washington February 17 to March 1, 1976, to renegotiate the agreement between their two governments concerning fisheries in the Middle Atlantic Ocean off the coast of the United States and discuss related matters. The United States was represented by Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs. The Soviet Union was represented by Vladimir M. Kamentsev, First Deputy Minister of Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.

The two representatives succeeded in completing negotiations on a new agreement that will provide improved protection to stocks of fish in the Middle Atlantic region in the interests of sound conservation and management and based on the best available scientific evidence. The new agreement was signed on March 1, 1976.

The new agreement also provides for an expanded joint research program on the principal fish stocks of the region. Progress on these studies will be reviewed later in the year at a special meeting of American and Soviet scientists and statistical specialists.

Taking into account anticipated legal and jurisdictional changes in the field of fisheries off the coasts of the United States, and the need to provide for an orderly transition to the future regime, both sides agreed to meet at a convenient time for the purpose of discussing questions of mutual interest regarding the principles that will apply to th future fisheries relations.

Both sides expressed their satisfacti with the new agreement and their inter in continued mutually beneficial cooperati in the field of fisheries.

[1] Issued on Mar. 1 (text from press release 110).

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the developme production, and stockpiling of bacteriologi (biological) and toxin weapons and on their struction. Done at Washington, London, and M cow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 1975. TIAS 8062.
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, March 1976.

Customs

Customs convention on the ATA carnet for the te porary admission of goods, with annex. Done Brussels December 6, 1961. Entered into fo July 30, 1963; for the United States March 3, 19 TIAS 6631.
Accession deposited: South Africa, December 1975.[1]

Energy

Memorandum of understanding concerning coope tive information exchange relating to the devel ment of solar heating and cooling systems in bu ings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 1 1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975.
Signature: Department of the Environment of United Kingdom, February 6, 1976.

Long-term cooperation program in the field energy. Adopted at Paris January 30, 1976. I tered into force March 8, 1976.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720.
Notification of succession: Surinam, November 1975.

Amendments to the international convention on lo lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted London October 12, 1971.[2]
Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, Februa 12, 1976.

[1] Effective April 1, 1976. Applicable to entire cu toms area which includes Botswana, Lesotho, Swa land, and South Africa.

[2] Not in force.

Notification of succession: Surinam, November 25, 1975.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Portugal, March 17, 1976.

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.
Notification of succession: Surinam, November 25, 1975.

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.[2]
Notification of succession: Surinam, November 25, 1975.

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.[2]
Acceptance deposited: Iraq, March 11, 1976.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.[2]
Accession deposited: Uruguay, March 16, 1976.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109.
Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, December 9, 1975.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.[2]
Acceptance deposited: Spain, February 25, 1976.

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.
Ratifications deposited: Panama, January 7, 1976; Yugoslavia, February 3, 1976.
Notification of succession: Surinam, November 25, 1975.

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.[3]
Extended by the United Kingdom to: Bailiwick of Jersey, Bailiwick of Guernsey, and the Isle of Man, February 1, 1976; Bermuda, February 3, 1976.

Safety at Sea

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea held at London from May 17 to June 16, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.
Notification of succession: Surinam, November 25, 1975.

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 30, 1966.[2]
Acceptances deposited: Iran, February 27, 1976; Nauru, November 25, 1975.

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.[2]
Accession deposited: Syria, February 16, 1976.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.[3]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: March 23, 1976, with declarations.
Notification of approval: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 9, 1975.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.[3]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: March 23, 1976, with declarations.
Notification of approval: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 9, 1975.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976.[3]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: March 23, 1976, with reservation.
Notifications of approval: Denmark, November 20, 1975; Federal Republic of Germany, November 26, 1975;[4] Japan, November 18, 1975; Uganda, November 11, 1975; United Kingdom, including Antigua, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis, Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom, as well as the State of Brunei, the Solomon Islands, and, within the limits of jurisdiction therein, the Condominium of the New Hebrides, November 19, 1975.

Trade

Arrangement regarding international trade in textiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which entered into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.
Acceptance deposited: Spain, February 27, 1976.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat

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[2] Not in force.
[3] Not in force for the United States.
[4] Applicable to Berlin (West).

agreement) 1971. Open for signature at Washington from March 17 through April 7, 1976. Enters into force on June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.
Signatures: Algeria, March 25, 1976; Brazil, March 24, 1976; Peru, March 22, 1976.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Open for signature at Washington March 17 through April 7, 1976. Enters into force on June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

Women—Political Rights

Inter-American convention on the granting of political rights to women. Signed at Bogotá May 2, 1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.[3]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: March 22, 1976.

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.[3]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: March 22, 1976.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement relating to consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to the United States, with annexes. Signed at Washington March 3, 1976. Enters into force upon notification by each government that certain legal requirements have been met.

Canada

Treaty on extradition, as amended by exchange of notes of June 28 and July 9, 1974. Signed at Washington December 3, 1971.
Ratifications exchanged: March 22, 1976.
Entered into force: March 22, 1976.

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 28, 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo March 6, 1976. Entered into force March 6, 1976.

France

Agreement extending the agreement of February 26, 1971, as amended, for the coordination of preventive and repressive action against illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs. Signed at San Francisco March 9, 1976; entered into force March 9, 1976.

Japan

Agreement relating to procedures for mutual assistance in administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter. Signed at Washington March 23, 1976; entered into force March 23, 1976.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol to the treaty of May 26, 1972 (TIAS 7503) on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems. Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974.[2]
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: March 19, 1976.

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: March 22–28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*140	3/22	Advisory Panel on Music, Apr. 20.
141	3/22	Kissinger: World Affairs Council of Dallas, Tex.
*141A	3/23	Cox, Tower, Kissinger: introductory remarks, Mar. 22.
141B	3/23	Kissinger: questions and answers following address, Mar. 22.
*142	3/22	U.S. and Hungary terminate textile agreement.
143	3/22	Kissinger: Travel Program for Foreign Diplomats luncheon.
*144	3/24	U.S. National Committee for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee, Apr. 20.
145	3/23	Kissinger: news conference, Dallas, Tex.
*146	3/24	U.S. and Philippines to resume economic talks, Mar. 29.
*147	3/25	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Apr. 19.
*148	3/25	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, working group on segregated ballast in existing tankers, Apr. 22.
*149	3/25	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on radiocommunications, Apr. 15.
*150	3/25	SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watchkeeping, Apr. 20.
*151	3/25	SCC, SOLAS, working group on bulk chemicals, Apr. 21.
*152	3/25	Thirtieth anniversary of Fulbright-Hays scholarship program to be observed by alumni.
*153	3/26	Kissinger: Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

[2] Not in force.
[3] Applicable to Berlin (West).

Name Index