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America's Destiny: The Global Context

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

It is good to be here in the West. The people of this land remind me once again that America is not the cynical, confused, and tired nation so many in Washington would have us believe it is. Instead, as I have so often seen in my trips, the American people continue to have pride in their country. They know that America has done more for the world, and for peace, over the past 30 years than any nation in history. They know we have given more of our resources, fed more of the starving, taken in more immigrants, and educated more people from other lands than any other nation before us.

The American people are tired of hearing how evil we are, how terrible are our mistakes, and how misguided our purposes. They know better. And they want better.

It is true that we have passed through a decade and more of tragedy—we have been witness to assassination; we have suffered through a tragic war that shattered our domestic unity; and we have endured our greatest constitutional crisis since the Civil War.

But we have come through these difficult times with our institutions as strong as ever. We remain the world's greatest democracy; we continue to be the bastion to which other nations look for their protection; and we remain the symbol of hope to the millions around the world who live in tyranny and poverty but yearn for freedom and prosperity.

America, from its birth, has meant much to the world. The Founding Fathers were animated by a sense of obligation, and of mission, to other peoples and to posterity. Our Revolution, our independence, and our democracy set examples which excited and encouraged imitation around the globe. America represented an inspiration and the most important political experiment of modern history—the spectacle of successful self-government, economic opportunity, social equality, civil and religious liberty, and the tremendous capacities of a free people to shape their own destiny.

Later in our history these values affected the world in a new way—as a powerful magnet drawing great tides of immigration. It was a movement of ideas as well as people, which not only shaped this nation but vastly altered the assumptions and social structures of the Old World.

In recent decades, America's impact on the world has been more immediate. For much of this century, global peace and prosperity have depended upon our contribution. When World War II ended, we took the lead in helping a shattered globe rebuild from devastation. We shaped the commercial and financial system that spread prosperity and economic opportunity to far corners of the world. We built peacetime alliances to maintain global stability and defend the values we share with the great industrial democracies. We resisted aggression. We mediated conflicts. We helped ease the process of decolonization. And we led the fight against disease, hunger, ignorance, and the forces of oppression and terror that have scarred this century.

[1] Made at the University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyo., on Feb. 4 (text from press release 47).

No other nation has made such a contribution. No other nation can make such a contribution now. The best hope for a planet still beset by war, poverty, and tyranny is a strong, committed, vigilant America.

We must never forget that in serving peace and progress we both serve ourselves and live up to our best traditions.

We declared our independence in "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." Our Founding Fathers were sophisticated statesmen who understood the European balance of power and knew how our country could profit from it. Our independence was not won by American arms alone. The shrewd diplomacy of Franklin and Jefferson led to the involvement of Britain's enemies—France, Spain, and Russia—and eventually engineered the only defeat Britain suffered in the modern era. We then cut loose from our temporary allies when John Jay won the British Crown's recognition and liquidated the residual problems of our war with England.

For more than three decades after we gained our independence, we lived in an age of international turmoil that saw us go to the brink of war with France and suffer the capture of our capital by Britain. Again, alert to new opportunities provided by changes on the international scene, we moved astutely to take advantage of them. The effective elimination of France and Spain from the hemisphere, the expansion of Russia in the Pacific Northwest, and the growing disaffection of Great Britain from the European powers led us in 1823 to concert the Monroe Doctrine with Great Britain.

Thereafter, for the hundred years between Waterloo and 1914, America benefited from the existence of a world balance of power, presided over by Britain, which maintained global stability and prevented international war. In the words of Prime Minister Canning, the doctrine "called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

Thus, the balance of power in Europe and our skill in using it protected the young United States; it enabled us, in reliance upon the British Navy, to turn our back on the Atlantic and open the continent befc us.

Theodore Roosevelt noted that long l fore Jefferson negotiated an end to t French claim to Louisiana, foreign clai had been effectively undermined by t great western movement of Americans a the free communities they quickly found But the consolidation of their pioneeri achievement was made possible by thc negotiations and by the subsequent series remarkable diplomatic successes. The a nexation of Florida, the Oregon bounda settlement with Great Britain, the Trea of Guadelupe Hidalgo, the Gadsden Purcha Secretary of State Seward's purchase Alaska from Russia—all were triumphs diplomacy during decades when most citize believed America did not have, or need, foreign policy.

Indeed, our very achievements in deali with the world brought Americans under t sway of a shared mythology. As a socie made up of men and women who had fled t persecutions and power politics of the C World, Americans—whether Mayflower d scendants or refugees from the failed revo tions of 1848—came to assume that we we beyond the reach of the imperatives of t ditional foreign policy.

While our security continued to be assu by our place in the international structu of the time, we became bemused by the po lar belief that President Monroe's obligat to defend the Western Hemisphere and, deed, almost any obligation we might cho to assume, depended on unilateral Americ decisions to be entered into or ended entir at our discretion. Shielded by two oceans a enriched by a bountiful nature, we p claimed our special situation as universa valid even while other nations with a n rower margin of survival knew that th range of choice was far more limited.

The preoccupation of other nations w security only reinforced our sense of uniq ness. We came increasingly to regard dip macy with suspicion. Arms and allianc were seen as immoral and reactionary. N gotiations were considered less a means reconciling our ideals with our interests th

device to entangle us in the endless quarrels of a morally questionable world. Our native inclination for straightforwardness brought increasing impatience with diplomacy, whose essential attribute is ambiguity and compromise.

In this atmosphere even the purchase of Alaska—which excluded Russia from our continent—was regarded in its day as a wavering folly explainable only in terms of American gullibility in the face of Old World diplomatic guile. Congress was prevailed upon only with the greatest difficulty to provide the $7 million to complete the deal. The mythology of American ineptitude in its diplomatic pursuits has carried into the 20th century. Will Rogers was always assured of a laugh when he cracked, "America never lost a war and never won a conference." With the humility for which I am famous, I of course reject this attitude.

Forgetful of the wisdom and skilled statecraft by which the Founding Fathers won our independence and secured our safety, and disdainful of the techniques by which all nations—even the United States—must preserve their interests, America entered the 20th century—the most complex and turbulent time in history—largely unprepared for the part we would be called upon to play.

As Lord Bryce said in his "American Commonwealth," America had been sailing "on a summer sea," but a cloud bank was "on the horizon and now no longer distant, a line of mists and shadows, wherein dangers may be concealed whose form and magnitude we can scarcely conjecture."

U.S. Ascendancy: Maintaining Global Stability

In the early years of this century, America seemed to face a choice between continued detachment and active involvement in world affairs. But this was more apparent than real, for the Pax Britannica on which we had relied for so long was coming to an end. We had become—almost without noticing it—the world's major economic power. Increasingly, we were the only democratic nation with sufficient power to maintain a precarious world balance. But nothing in our experience had equipped us to recognize our new responsibility. We continued to reject the demands of the politics of security and abhorred alliances as contrary to American principles. In the place of foreign policy we fell back on our tradition of law, in repeated and unsuccessful attempts to legislate solutions to international conflicts. Many thought that power and principle were forever incompatible.

Our entry into World War I was produced by real geopolitical interests, such as freedom of the sea and the threat of the domination of Europe by a hostile power; but we chose to interpret our participation in legal and idealistic terms—we fought the war "to end war." The inevitable disillusion with an imperfect outcome led to a tide of isolationism. We responded again with moral and legal gestures—humanitarian relief, new disarmament schemes, the Kellogg-Briand Pact to ban war—at a time when the very nature of the international order was being brought into question by the convulsions of the new century. We sought security in aloofness, just as we looked for scapegoats—rooting out the so-called "munitions makers"—to explain why we had ever engaged in such an undertaking as the First World War. The Great Depression drew our energies further inward to deal with the problems of our own society, even while economic upheaval simultaneously generated overwhelming perils abroad.

Our refusal to admit that foreign policy should be related to interests led us, in the years between the wars, to treat allies as rivals, whose armaments had to be limited because they contributed to international tensions. On the brink of World War II, isolationism had been transformed from a comfortable assumption to a deeply felt conviction. Just as the world was about to impinge upon us as never before, we had virtually abandoned the basic precautions needed to preserve our national security. Only with the greatest difficulty could President Franklin D. Roosevelt begin to assert international leadership openly and take steps against the mounting global threat by preparing America for war.

World War II was well underway before we were shocked out of isolation by external attack. Total victory, and the refusal to consider the security of the postwar world in terms of any notion of equilibrium, ill prepared us for the war's aftermath—when the destruction of Europe's traditional power centers suddenly drew Soviet power into the heart of the European Continent.

Yet in the first postwar years America found within itself extraordinary capacities of statesmanship and creativity. Leaders of both parties and many backgrounds—Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg and Marshall, Acheson and Dulles—built a national consensus for responsible American world leadership, for a foreign policy based on both principle and pragmatism.

Albert Einstein said at the outset of the nuclear age that "everything has changed, except our mode of thinking." To cope with a world whose basic conditions were so radically altered was a task comparable in magnitude to that which faced the Founding Fathers. When Dean Acheson said he was "present at the creation," he referred not only to the creation of our postwar policy but to a new era in the history of mankind.

American foreign policy had come full circle. With sophistication, the Founding Fathers had manipulated the balance of power to gain our independence and then drew on the international system to assure our survival. A century and a quarter of almost total security had tempted us into isolationism. And now, after two World Wars in this century, we have learned that the responsibilities—and the burdens—of world leadership are inescapable.

Americans can be enormously proud of what their country has accomplished in the postwar decades to build a more stable, secure, and prosperous world. The recovery of Western Europe and Japan, the creation and revitalization of peacetime alliances, the shaping of the global trade and monetary system, the economic advance of newer and poorer nations, the measures to control the nuclear arms race—these comprise an enduring achievement of American statesmanship.

America has been thrust into the rol global leadership with a dual responsibil we must maintain our security and g peace by the traditional methods of bal of power and diplomacy. But we know nuclear war could destroy civilization, therefore we must go beyond traditi foreign policy to shape a more coopera world reflecting the imperatives of in dependence and justice.

The Traditional Agenda of War and Peace

Our well-being begins with strength home. To keep America strong and sec we will maintain the military power ne to meet any challenge. But security ca be achieved in isolation. Our close ties the industrial democracies of Western rope, Canada, and Japan have been cornerstone of world stability and peace a generation. We share a common con tion of human dignity, a common interes peace and prosperity, and a common cor tion of linked destiny. Today we and allies look beyond military issues to j endeavors across a broad range of hu activity: we have coordinated our diplon to ease global tensions, our policies for o nomic growth, and our efforts in new fi such as energy.

A secure and stable world requires as that we seek a reconciliation of inte with potential adversaries. We shall n lose sight of the fact that in an age th ened by thermonuclear extinction, the se for peace is a moral imperative; witho nothing else we do will be of enduring v

Peace, to be stable and durable, must p on a more reliable basis the relations tween nations that possess the powe destroy our planet. The suspicion and riv of two generations will not soon be s away, and we have no illusions about continuing moral and ideological con But we will spare no effort to seek reli reciprocal measures for containing the s tegic arms race; we will continue to pu cooperative arrangements across a range of technical, cultural, and comme fields to deepen the mutual stake in peac

rogress toward relaxation of tensions, our overall attitude toward those who ld oppose us, have always depended upon rained and responsible conduct on their —on issues where America's interests affected directly, as in Europe, as well n peripheral conflicts, such as Angola. no nation misconstrue America's com- ment to an easing of tensions as a license ish in troubled waters. Let no country eve that Americans will long remain in- erent to the dispatch of expeditionary es and vast amounts of materiel to im- minority governments—especially when expeditionary force comes from a nation he Western Hemisphere. Americans may low to rouse, but they will do their duty lacably once a threat is clear.

the world is to remain at peace and ance in progress, an active American role he world is essential. The Middle East is aps the most critical example. We must nvolved there because of our historical moral commitment to Israel, because of important interests and friendships in Arab world, because continued instabil- in the Middle East strains our relations allies and risks severe global economic cation, and because continuing crisis s direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

ne broad implications and imminent dan- of regional conflicts such as those in ola and the Middle East have compelled o play an active part. But it would be ng to conclude from this that the United es seeks to operate as the world's police- . There are innumerable local conflicts nd the globe in which we neither have seek any role. We do not seek to police world—but neither will we accept it if Soviet Union attempts to do so.

he Soviet and Cuban pattern of conduct frica, if continued in other areas, could vel global security. The tensions of the dle East, if not overcome, could threaten al peace. With prudence and wisdom, we prevent dangers to our wider interests engaging ourselves now at far less cost we will inevitably have to pay later if abdicate responsibility. We cannot escape fundamental reality that it is the United States, alone among the free nations of the world, that is capable of—and therefore responsible for—maintaining the global balance against those who would seek hegemony and shaping a new world of hope and progress.

The New Agenda

True progress requires more than security. We must seek to break past patterns of confrontation and response. It is no longer possible for America or any other nation to achieve its purposes by physical power alone; in today's world, influence derives not only from military strength but also from economic, social, and political factors, from the ability to inspire other nations with the conviction that they have a stake in a shared future.

On a shrinking planet of diffused power and linked destinies, we are called upon to demonstrate vision and patience. Our generation has the opportunity to shape a new international order. If we succeed, the prospects for America and the world are bright. If we fail, the world will be shaped by others who do not share our principles; our period will witness mounting conflict and suffering.

We can approach these new challenges with confidence. Our technological advance, our managerial genius, our achievements in science and medicine, the productivity of our farms and industries, our physical resources, our commitment to the rule of law, insure for us a role of leadership. And we have been demonstrating the resiliency of our economy by emerging from a global recession faster and more steadily than any other nation.

Fundamental to our well-being is international economic cooperation. In the past few years, Americans have seen clearly just how much international economic relations determine the progress of all nations, including our own. The oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent price increases with their devastating global consequences have reminded us to what extent far-off events affect our prosperity and how important international economic cooperation is for our

own well-being and for the prosperity of the rest of the world.

The United States has taken far-reaching steps to lay the foundations for international economic cooperation:

—We have worked closely with the other great industrial democracies on trade, energy, and monetary reform.

—We have organized a comprehensive international program to expand food production in developing countries and to channel resources, including the new wealth of the oil producers, into improving the financing, production, storage, and distribution of food.

—We have developed and implemented a strategy to end our domestic and international energy vulnerability. We have joined with the other industrial consuming countries in solidarity programs to protect us against further oil embargoes and against destabilizing movements of assets held by oil-producing countries. Only last week the International Energy Agency, a group of industrial consuming countries brought together at our initiative, adopted a sweeping program of cooperative action. We consider this one of the most significant cooperative efforts of the past decade. The industrial democracies will now begin to coordinate their research and development effort to develop alternative supplies of energy, both nuclear power and the more exotic sources such as synthetic and solar energy.

—And the United States has presented to the U.N. General Assembly special session a comprehensive and practical program for a multilateral effort to promote economic development.

Thus we have not only tackled the traditional issues of peace and war but made a good beginning in helping to fashion more cooperative relationships in new dimensions of world concern.

The structure of our foreign policy is sound and ready to encounter the future.

But America cannot hope to shape the future of the world unless we are a confident and united people.

America's Imperative: Domestic Unity

For more than three decades America
despite setbacks and mistakes, condu
a remarkably effective foreign policy.
have done so because we recognized, e
when we disagreed, that what we did bey
our borders was done in the name of
nation as a whole. Partisan interests v
channeled into positive accomplishments.
acted as a confident people. We did not d
ourselves; we did not consume ourselve
self-hatred.

That was the ultimate underpinning
the role of world leadership that was th
upon us; it was the true measure of
greatness. It is a strength we must not

History has made America the reposi
and guardian of the best values of mank
for no other free nation is strong enoug
replace us. Without our commitment t
can be no progress. We must have the st
ness to oppose military pressures and
vision to work for a more peaceful inte
tional order. Moderation has meaning
when practiced by the strong, and stre
has purpose only when tempered by
ciliation.

These twin strands of firmness and
ciliation reflect the permanent interest
our nation. Yet our ability to pursue e
course has been, in recent months, inc
ingly threatened. A strong, coherent,
effective international role is jeopardize
acrimonious controversy which thv
serious discussion of the great issues
by the growing tendency of too many i
Congress not only to supervise but to l
late the day-to-day conduct of foreign p

The slogans of a past we thought we
transcended are suddenly reappearing.
now hear again that suffering is prolo
by American involvement, that injusti
perpetuated by American commitments,
defense spending is wasteful at best and
duces conflict at worst, that Americar
telligence activities are immoral, that
necessary confidentiality of diplomacy
plot to deceive the public, that flexibili
cynical, and that tranquillity is someho
be brought about by an abstract purit

ive for which history offers no example. these attitudes shape our policies, we deprive our diplomacy of its essential s; conciliatory policies and firm measures e will be undermined by growing doubt t the steadiness of our national will. An osphere of suspicion and a lack of even most elementary confidentiality will e impossible the management of the gov- nent and the conduct of negotiation. If ational consensus does not exist, our y will be driven by narrow interest ps and short-term political considera- s.

an era when the danger of war has reduced but the rivalry of communism freedom continues, the gray area be- n foreign policy and overt conflict con- es to be important and, indeed, takes on easing significance. Yet leaks, sensa- l investigations, and the demoralization r intelligence services—at a time when adversaries are stepping up their own ts—are systematically depriving our rnment of the ability to respond.

effective foreign policy requires a g national government which can act assurance and speak with confidence on lf of all Americans. But when the exec- e is disavowed repeatedly and publicly, r governments wonder who speaks for rica and what an American commit- t means. Our government is in danger rogressively losing the ability to shape ts, and a great nation that does not e history eventually becomes its victim.

o much depends upon a strong and con- t America to allow this state of affairs ontinue. When America abdicates from ing the future, when its policy falls to the passions of the moment and the of pressure groups, it disheartens ds, emboldens adversaries, and gives e to the wavering and thus undermines national order.

e must restore our unity while the es- ial structure of our foreign policy is sound and before irreparable damage is e to it. We retain the capacity, if we have will, to prevent military expansion by our adversaries. Our alliances with the industrialized nations have never been more solid. A further agreement to limit the strategic arms race is within reach. We are well launched on a durable and improving relationship with the world's most populous nation. The elements for peace in the Middle East exist. A dialogue with the developing world has begun on a hopeful note. The threat of war around the globe has been reduced. The principal danger we face is our domestic divisions.

The American people have a right to demand of their leaders in and out of government an end to the destructive debate that has in recent months come to mark our political process. They know, as the world knows, that the United States is still a great country. And they know how much damage these continuing attacks on their country's institutions have done and will do to undermine America's ability to keep the peace.

We have every obligation to draw the right lessons from our past mistakes and to see that they never happen again. But we have an equally compelling duty to remember that a faltering of will on the part of a country that has for decades been the principal guarantor of peace and progress can have disastrous consequences for the prospects of a better and safer world.

America now finds itself in a world of proliferating, often competitive, and sometimes threatening power. We must often make choices that will not solve but only manage problems; we must occasionally make compromises that by definition will not produce ideal results. We need confidence in ourselves to master a complicated period in which the United States can no longer overwhelm problems with resources—when it needs purpose, firmness, coherence, flexibility, imagination, and above all, unity.

The formulation and conduct of our foreign policy must of course be the product of consultation and accommodation between the Congress and the President. Neither branch can, alone, determine the course we will pursue abroad. The Congress, entitled by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and by

the practices of 200 years, must be an equal partner in the process.

But if that partnership is to flourish, each branch must respect the role of the other, and each must recognize the limitations—constitutional and practical—on its authority. The Congress can set broad guidelines and decide basic policies. But the Congress does not have the organization, the information, or the responsibility for deciding the tactical questions that arise daily in the conduct of our foreign relations or for executing a coherent, consistent, comprehensive policy. The President has this responsibility and must be permitted to exercise it on behalf of the entire nation. For in the last analysis, the United States, when it deals with other nations, must speak with one voice.

It is time we recognize that, increasingly, our difficulties abroad are largely of our own making. If America is to be safe, we must cease dismantling and demoralizing our intelligence services. If America is to preserve its values and maintain the global balance of stability, we must have a strong defense. And if America is to help build a world environment in which our citizens can thrive and be free, we cannot deny ourselves the essential tools of policy. Without these our only option is to retreat, to become an isolated fortress island in a hostile and turbulent global sea, awaiting the ultimate confrontation with the only response we will not have denied ourselves—massive retaliation. Our branches of government, special interests, and ordinary citizens must pursue their legitimate concerns with an understanding that there are basic overriding national interests which, if neglected, will render pointless all else we do.

In our age, whose challenges are without precedent, we need once again the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. Our pragmatic tradition must help us understand reality and shape it, rather than be diverted by an obsession with technical detail or method without purpose. Our love of our country must inspire us to persevere with dedication and unity and not to consume our substance in civil strife. Our idealism should remind us that we remain the beacon of hope to all those who love liberty and that this imposes a heavy responsibility upon us.

Our international role is not a burden that protects the lives and well-being of our people. It has been a historical success. In our first two centuries we have done great things as a united people. We can accomplish even more in our third century. America remains the strongest nation in the world; our government continues to be the noblest experiment undertaken by man; we still are an inspiration to all the world's millions who are much less fortunate than we. Our past achievements should be the prologue to the exciting future that crowds in upon us. It is, in the final analysis, up to us.

Letters of Credence

Barbados

The newly appointed Ambassador of Barbados, Maurice A. King, presented his credentials to President Ford on February 9.[1]

Central African Republic

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Central African Republic, Christophe Maidou, presented his credentials to President Ford on February 9.[1]

Peru

The newly appointed Ambassador from the Republic of Peru, Carlos Garcia-Bedoya, presented his credentials to President Ford on February 9.[1]

Thailand

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Thailand, Upadit Pachariyangkun, presented his credentials to President Ford on February 9.[1]

[1] For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Feb. 9.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Laramie

P s release 48 dated February 4

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you could establish o guiding principle for the conduct of American foreign policy for the next 200 yrs, what would that rule be?

Secretary Kissinger: In my job you do ll if you can establish the principle for the nt 200 hours. [Laughter.]

would say that the guiding principle we uld have to have is to have the wisdom to derstand the world in which we live and, a the same time, to develop a vision of the k d of world we want to bring about. The p blem in foreign policy is always to main- n enough of the structure that exists v hout explosion and yet not permit stagna- n to arise, because the greatest creations a those that were revisions when they v re originated. So I would say the guiding p nciples would have to be a combination o realism and vision of the future, and that i not easy to achieve.

Q. If my history serves me correctly, 10 yrs ago there were only five countries in t world that possessed nuclear capabilities. I has already been shown by India, which h exploded its first nuclear device, and t re are approximately nine other countries t t are in the process of developing theirs. A I correct, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Q. In relationship to these countries, par- t ularly Egypt, Israel, Pakistan—those sit- t tions are critical there—how would the l ited States, under the nuclear prolifera- t n act, control these countries?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me not get into i lividual countries, because it touches great s nsitivities among the countries I mentioned and the ones I don't mention are offended because they are excluded. [Laughter.]

But I agree with you that one of the basic problems of our period is the spread of nuclear technology. If we think we had a difficult world to manage in the last 30 years with two, three, four, and then five nuclear powers, what it will be like when scores of countries have nuclear weapons—if that should come about—is a nightmare.

What we are attempting to do is to encourage all the world's nuclear exporters to set up common standards that would govern the conditions under which nuclear technology is being exported so that countries cannot use peaceful nuclear technology which is acquired abroad, as India did, to develop nuclear explosives.

We have made rather good progress in developing some agreement in which the nuclear exporters will establish common principles. The problem is whether the pace of negotiations will keep up with the pace of technology, and if it doesn't, then many countries, including some of those you mentioned, will acquire nuclear weapons, and we would live in a very unstable world.

Q. This morning Secretary of Transportation William Coleman announced that he was giving partial permission for the supersonic transport to land in this country. I understand that he gave 16 months' temporary approval for the SST to land at JFK Airport in New York and at Dulles Airport near Washington. I was wondering if you could tell us when you heard this decision and also what effect do you think this will have on international relations, particularly with Britain and France.

Secretary Kissinger: I heard about this

decision for the first time in my motel room here in Laramie, just as I was walking out the door to go to a very fine lunch with your president. I had no advance warning of the decision.

I think that the decision will be well received in Britain and France. While I have no responsibility for weighing all of the factors, I put before Secretary Coleman the foreign policy considerations that he should weigh. I have not seen the actual text of it yet, but if it is what I have been told, I think it will have a favorable impact.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the draftsmanship of the ABM [antiballistic missile] and SALT One agreements was under great attack by Mr. Schlesinger [James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense], Admiral Zumwalt [Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations], and others. They are claiming the final agreements were so poorly and sloppily drafted by our side that a number of violations have come from this.

We know, Mr. Secretary, that you did in fact have to secretly patch up the SALT One agreement by concluding a "backchannel protocol" between Ambassador [Anatoliy F.] Dobrynin and yourself on the issue of whether SALT One language prohibits the Soviets from arming 210 of their diesel-class submarines with SSM–13 missiles.

By the way, you concealed that "backhand protocol" for 11 months. It was not known to our SALT negotiators until it was told them by the Russians. Yet you adamantly maintained that the documents of SALT and ABM treaties are competently drafted, and at the same time the many alleged violations of the SALT and ABM you have dismissed—and continue to dismiss—even though some clearly violated unilateral statements you gave the Congress and the American public. There are specifics—you will not go into them, but the question is coming. This is the question the Republican Party has had to face on Watergate and has to face now. Is there any integrity in those documents? Were they properly drafted, or are you ignoring and trying to hide the violations of the Soviets in this important, critical area to our defense?

Secretary Kissinger: For a few moments I thought I was back at Harvard. [Laughter.]

Let me answer the various statements that have been made. First, the SALT agreement was drafted by the SALT delegation in Helsinki, a delegation which contains members of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Every word of that agreement was drafted by the delegation, and it was backed up in Washington.

Secondly, some of the people whom you mention, when they were in a position of high responsibility, did not make any of the charges that they are making now that they are out of office. Incidentally, Secretary Schlesinger has never made the charges that you have mentioned. So, under the impact of their own political aspirations, they have suddenly discovered things that, when they were in high military positions, they never called to the attention of the President or anybody else. I will not get into that sort of dispute.

What I want to say is this. In 1972, the United States faced this situation—in the 1960's a series of decisions had been made by which the United States was going to build missiles that were small, sophisticated, and flexible. In the 1960's, the decision was made that we would build a thousand of these land-based missiles called Minuteman and 650 submarine-based missiles. We built those and stopped the buildup in the 1960's. The Soviet Union made the opposite decision. The Soviet Union made large missiles and did not stop the buildup.

In the 1970's, when this Administration came into office, there were no strategic programs. We started a whole new set of strategic programs that, however, could not become operational until the late 1970's. Therefore, in 1972, a SALT agreement was negotiated which froze the buildup on both sides. That meant in practice that a Soviet buildup that was going on at the rate of 2

missiles a year was stopped. No single American program was stopped.

Now, with respect to violations, this is an issue of enormous technical complexity, and it is an issue about which it is easy to be demagogic. But nobody in his right mind can believe that an Administration that has resisted Communist expansion every place in the world would deliberately collude with the Soviet Union in hiding violations.

Every violation, every charge of violation, is systematically examined by the government and by all of the agencies that are responsible for the SALT project. Every allegation of noncompliance is then brought to the attention of the Soviet Union. All of these issues are being dealt with, and no serious administration will stand for violation. But no serious American should engage in demagoguery that gives the impression that we would stand for a violation and gives the impression that a serious effort has not been made to deal with the fundamental questions of the arms race.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, I'd like to know if you think Mr. Ford will be reelected, number one; and if he is not, in what direction will you turn your energies later?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me say first of all that I consider foreign policy a nonpartisan effort. I personally believe that President Ford will be nominated and elected, so that the premise of your question will not inevitably arise. But when I do leave office, I would like to dedicate myself to helping whoever is in office or whoever succeeds me to obtain the national consensus and the national unity behind our foreign policy which I have described as essential in our foreign policy and which we need to deal with the problems of our period.

Q. I would like to ask about our commitment to NATO, and how much it is supported by us. Our son is in Turkey in a NATO unit and has had quite a time with—

Secretary Kissinger: I could not hear that.

Q. They have a hard time with supply.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two problems here: our relationship to NATO and our relationship to Turkey.

Our relationship to NATO belongs to the foundation of our foreign policy, and therefore we have always believed that to keep our European allies free of the danger of military attack is the condition for everything else we do. Therefore those Americans who serve abroad in fulfillment of our NATO commitment are laying the basis for everything else that is being done in our foreign policy.

At the same time, we have had strains in our relationship with Turkey as a result of the conflict between Greece and Turkey and as a result of some congressional actions that were taken last year in which we cut off military supplies to Turkey. And Turkey in retaliation closed down the operation of our bases and in some respects made conditions there somewhat more difficult.

We are making a major effort to restore this relationship, and we expect the Turkish Foreign Minister to come to Washington next week. We hope that we can settle at least some of the outstanding issues then.

Senator McGee: The next question is here in the press section. And will you identify yourself as you ask your question?

Q. My name is Saundra Gustow, and I work with the Laramie Daily Boomerang.

Secretary Kissinger: I beg your pardon. Senator McGee was giving me the answer before I addressed the question. [Laughter.]

Q. I'm Saundra Gustow with the Laramie Daily Boomerang. My question is this: In the past, the French have had to give up Algeria, and now both French and Americans are out of Viet-Nam. Do you think Russian support in Angola will backfire, too? Do you think the Angolans will not want any foreign power, including Russia?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that basically the African countries want to determine their own future. But I think also that under conditions in Africa, the presence of 11,000

Cuban combat forces, backed up with hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet equipment, has the practical effect of imposing a minority government on a population which will find it very difficult to shake it off. And even if after five or some other period of years they should do it, other countries that are threatened now or in the immediate future will have to draw some lessons from these events.

Therefore the United States must insist that the sending of expeditionary forces, the imposition of minority government, whatever may happen in Angola, not become the pattern of international relations. And, if we can achieve this, then perhaps the evolution in Angola can be in a direction where later on the Russians and Cubans will play a lesser role.

But our basic concern is that—in a world in which there are so many explosive local situations—if we permit the Soviet Union to exploit this, together with Cuban expeditionary forces, we could have a very dangerous world in which to live.

Q. How involved do you think we will get in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: The President has repeatedly stated that— Well, right now we are barred by the Congress from even giving money. But the President has repeatedly stated that we would not send troops. He is willing to accept any legal restrictions on the use of troops, and it may well be very late in the day to do anything in Angola. But we should not draw great comfort from this, because failure to act in time in one area may mean that we will have to do more some other place, sometime later.

But our basic concern now is not with the past. Our basic concern is to make sure this does not become a precedent for other areas.

Senator McGee: We have a wheels-up commitment that the Secretary is a prisoner of and to, and we will set the ground rule now: two more questions as the terminal point. The next question is over here to the left.

Q. I was wondering why isn't or why can't our agricultural products be used more as a bargaining chip in our dealings with othe countries?

Secretary Kissinger: We hear that que tion quite often, why we are not using o agricultural products more as a bargainin chip.

To some extent they are being used as bargaining chip. But what one has to r member is that when you use products as bargaining chip you are then interferin with the free market system because th only way you can use them as a bargainin chip is to restrict our farmers from sellin their grain. Otherwise you are not doin anything. If we do this, as indeed we di last year for a period of four months, not b law but through a voluntary restraint pr gram, we face enormous domestic oppositio And if you had to sit through some of th congressional hearings that I do, you wou find that even that voluntary restraint pr gram that we had in force for four month last year was extremely unpopular in certa parts of the country.

I find this sort of proposition which yc have made is usually made in nonagricultur parts of the country. But the long-ter agreement which we have made with th Soviet Union is in part designed to enab us, before large purchases can be made the United States by people who are not tr ditional purchasers—we have an opportuni to negotiate it and therefore have an oppo tunity to bring other considerations in play.

Q. How do you answer assertions in t press, most notably the Eastern press, th outgoing U.N. Ambassador Moynihan d not have the full support of the State D partment and hence felt like he could not his job at the United Nations?

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Moyr han is a very good friend of mine. He w appointed as Ambassador to India on m recommendation. When I was made Secr tary of State, I offered him two positions the State Department, but he was not wi ing at that time to leave the Embassy India.

He then returned to Harvard, since he had been very reluctant to give up his secure position at Harvard, and within six months we called him back in order to serve in the United Nations.

In the United Nations he performed a job which he foreshadowed in an article in Commentary magazine on the basis of which he was offered the job to begin with. In other words, what Ambassador Moynihan did at the United Nations was exactly what he was sent there to do.

Now, inevitably, in an organization that is rather traditional, as is the State Department, a man of the artistic temperament and words of Ambassador Moynihan is not considered the usual occurrence. And therefore it is quite possible that here and there some subordinate official mumbled that the normal processes of diplomacy had not provided for this kind of methods in which Ambassador Moynihan specializes.

I do not pay great attention to it, because I hear mumble about me, too. I think that Ambassador Moynihan had full support among the people who mattered and whose support he needed. That is, he had the full support of the President, he had my full support, he had the full support of the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations.

Since what he was doing was novel, it was controversial. That is inevitable. But Ambassador Moynihan did a distinguished job. We are proud to have had him in this position. He has told us that he resigned from it because once again he did not want to give up his tenure position at Harvard. I have no reason to doubt this; and I wrote him a letter yesterday in which I told him that as long as I am in public service and in a position to do so, he would be called on again and again to serve his country.

Q. In the consideration of his replacement, though, will his methods be pursued at the United Nations?

Secretary Kissinger: There are no two Pat Moynihans in the country. [Laughter.]

But the basic American policy, which I have already outlined in a speech in July last year before Moynihan accepted his position—or started his work in his position—the basic American policy of resisting bloc confrontation, the basic policy of standing up against unfounded allegations, which was the reason that he was sent there—that policy will certainly be continued.

Senator McGee: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

IEA Governing Board Adopts Long-Term Energy Program

Press release 43 dated February 2

The Governing Board of the International Energy Agency on January 30 decided to adopt a program of long-term cooperation in the field of energy. The United States was represented by Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs Thomas O. Enders.

The new program provides a framework within which national efforts to reduce our excessive dependence on imported energy can be tied together and reinforced. It is intended to insure that the costs and benefits of these efforts are shared equitably. It asserts the solidarity of the consuming countries in the energy crisis and is intended to help accelerate the shift in supply and demand for world energy that will eventually end our vulnerability to arbitrary OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] control over world oil prices. The program expires in November 1984, the term of the agreement founding the International Energy Agency. Under the new program, the IEA member countries have agreed:

—To create a framework to facilitate the execution of joint energy development projects drawing together technology, capital, and manpower from two or more IEA countries;

—To consider on a case-by-case basis guaranteeing access to a portion of the offtake to other IEA countries that join in large-scale projects which substantially increase energy production over what it otherwise would be;

—To undertake not to allow imported oil to be sold in our domestic economies below a common fixed price of $7 per barrel. This minimum safeguard price is a standby system designed to protect our commitment to the development of new conventional energy in Alaska, the North Sea, etc., against disruption from dumping or predatory pricing by oil-exporting countries;

—To cooperate in conservation through the fixing of joint conservation targets and the intensive review of national conservation programs to maintain progress toward these targets, reinforce national efforts, and exchange conservation experience and expertise;

—To cooperate in energy research and development, including assistance in developing-country R. & D. programs, the elaboration of an overall IEA R. & D. strategy, intensified information exchanges, and joint projects; and

—To make best efforts not to introduce new discrimination against other IEA members as regards access to energy technology, investment opportunities, and production.

This long-term cooperative program calls for reviews, exchanges of information, and the setting of group targets which are clearly within the authority of the executive. With respect to the commitment on nondiscrimination and access, it is understood in the International Energy Agency that the "best endeavors" formula applies to the executive but does not bind the Congress. We would not be under any obligation to seek elimination of any existing legislation or regulations. The executive branch has been given the authority to permit exports of energy to foreign participants in joint projects in certain circumstances. In some cases, congressional authorization would be required. The United States has made clear to its IEA partners that we are willing to consider possible joint projects in all areas, although environmental and other factors constrain the United States more in some areas than in others.

The commitment to maintain a minim safeguard price is subject to the availabi of appropriate authority; that is, the c mitment is to maintain the minimum s guard price if authority is available or seek authority at an appropriate time in li of oil market developments if such autho is not available.

Over the past two years a central elem of U.S. international energy policy has b the development of an overall framework consumer country cooperation. The adopt of this long-term agreement completes basic design of this policy. Other element the framework already in place include:

—Creation in 1974 of the Internati Energy Agency, which provides an inst tional center for energy cooperation;

—Establishment in 1974 of an integra emergency program committing the in trial countries to large-scale oil stockpi and common allocation and conservation forts in the event of a new oil embargo;

—Agreement in 1975 on a $25 bil OECD [Organization for Economic Coop tion and Development] Financial Supp Fund to meet the threat posed by the h financial accumulations of the oil-produ countries.

Energy policy has become a central ture in our relationship with West Europe, Japan, and other industrial countries. With this cooperative framew completed, these countries will now ent new comprehensive multilateral dialo with the oil producers and non-oil-produ developing countries.

Under the auspices of the Conference International Economic Cooperation, Energy Commission, jointly chaired by United States and Saudi Arabia, will hold initial meeting in Paris on February 11. United States believes that the new com sion provides a forum for constructive sideration by consumer and producer co tries of energy-related issues in an effor arrive at pragmatic and mutually accept results.

cretary Kissinger Interviewed by Panel at Los Angeles

ollowing is the transcript of an interview h Secretary Kissinger by a panel at a eting at Los Angeles, Calif., on February ponsored by the Blue Ribbon 400. Mem- s of the panel were Robert O. Anderson, irman of the board, Atlantic Richfield ; Edward W. Carter, chairman of the rd, Carter, Hawley and Hale Department rcs, Inc.; Anthony Day, editor of the edi- ial page, Los Angeles Times; Simon mo, chairman of the executive committee, W Inc.; and Paul Ziffren, Los Angeles rney, moderator.[1]

s release 45 dated February 2

Ir. Anderson: Mr. Secretary, with Am- sador Moynihan's resignation from the ited Nations, it would appear that the ective use of that organization continues decline. I wonder if there is any possibil- of a continuation of the meetings that President had outside of Paris with the ds of state—with the developed countries rating as an ad hoc committee or as a up that would be able to get some of the gs underway that are of utmost urgency a more interdependent world.

ecretary Kissinger: First of all, let me this occasion to say I am glad to be ere I spent so many pleasant hours and ere I have so many friends. And I want thank Mrs. Chandler for inviting me.

Now, with respect to your question, first all, as I have repeatedly stated, Ambas- or Moynihan is a close personal friend of me who was appointed to this position er I read an article of his in Commentary magazine, in which he said what should be done at the United Nations. And we thought the best thing to do would be to let him do it.

So there was no surprise about his actions there. And they carried out our policy; they had our full support. And given the fact there's only one Pat Moynihan on hand, they will be carried out by his successor—though I'm sure with less flamboyance and verve.

Now, as far as the United Nations is concerned, we stated that the bloc voting—the tendency to pursue fixed positions—would damage the United Nations. This was said already in a speech by me last July. This is a policy we will continue. The United Nations cannot do many of the things which originally were claimed for it. On the other hand, it has uses, and we must not give up on it.

But it cannot substitute for the close association of the industrial democracies. This is what happened outside of Paris at Rambouillet, where the heads of government—of the United States, Britain, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy—met. They dealt with the relationship between the economic progress and the democratic institutions of their countries. I think it was an extremely successful meeting. We plan to continue this kind of meeting. And so I would expect that there will be others in the years—in the months to come. And this kind of cooperation, while it isn't exactly dealing with the subject that the United Nations was designed for, will be at the core of our foreign policy.

Mr. Carter: Mr. Secretary, are there ways in which you believe the United States could consider modifying its laws or practices to strengthen the ability of the State Department, the White House, to conduct the na-

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Introductory remarks by Mrs. Norman Chandler, orary president of the Blue Ribbon 400, and Mr. Ziffren are not printed here.

tion's foreign policy while adequately preserving accountability to Congress and the public?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it's a question of legal procedures. It is a question of the practices that have developed and are developing. I think we have to keep in mind what it is that the Congress can do and what it is that the executive must do. The Congress is designed to pass laws. It passes these laws by various interest groups coming together on specific subjects that are trading off various considerations.

The essence of foreign policy is design, timing, sense of proportion—the proportion in the long-range view. The attempt by the Congress to conduct day-to-day foreign policy must lead to a lack of coherence and to a set of random actions. The Congress must participate in the setting of the guidelines and in the approval of basic direction. But if the tendencies of the last year or two continue, if there are a series of legislative actions that prescribe specific steps, the authority of the United States and the conduct of its foreign policy will decline to a point where crises are inevitable and where foreign governments will deal not with the Administration in office but will set up a series of liaison offices to deal with the Congress.

It is clear that the pendulum had swung too far toward executive authority in the sixties. It is equally clear that we are in great danger of its swinging in the other direction. And I want to stress this has nothing to do with this Administration. The consequence of what I fear will not show up for a year or two. The erosion that will occur will not be visible for a year or two—or maybe even three—but foreign governments must be able to know whom they deal with. There must be some consistency in our action, and we do not have it by present procedures.

Western European Communist Parties

Mr. Day: Mr. Secretary, there's a tremendous debate going on in Washington about the nature of the West European Communist parties 30 years after the war, with the Italian Communists—now the head the Spanish Communists—some of t French say that they are fundamentally d ferent than they were 30 years ago in t hot days of the cold war. They say the dem crats essentially will cooperate with NAT What is your view of this? Do you think t change is fundamental or not?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are t separate problems. One is the role of t participation of these Communist parties the political lives of their country, which essentially a decision that the country has make. The second is: What is the view of t Administration with respect to either t nature of the Communist parties or th role in government—even if we can't much about our views?

Now, whether the Communist parties ha changed or not is something that no c can really know at this moment, because this moment prudence coincides with t policy that they're adopting. It is in th interest to claim that they have chang

I personally find it hard to believe th Communist parties, which after all dist guish themselves from the other Socia t parties because they insisted that a mino r had to seize power and advance the course f history—that those parties have sudde r become democratic Socialists or have u l the democratic process in coming to pov r, which will permit the democratic proces s reverse the course of history.

But leaving that issue aside, I have e gravest doubt whether the participation f Communists in West European governme s is compatible with the nature of the Atla c alliance which we have now. These par s reflect a set of social priorities which m t weaken Western defense. They reflect a t of attitudes which will make it extrem y difficult to participate in the NATO Cou l, for example, in the kinds of frank briefi s and exchanges that have grown up o r years. Even if one moderate power gets i o office in one of these countries, it will se a precedent for many of the other countri s.

Finally, we ought to remember that e n if they are relatively independent of M s-cow—which may or may not be true—it

ven if they are, the foreign policy—say, of ugoslavia—while oriented toward independnce, is certainly not as close to us, to put mildly, in other parts of the world—and I ay this only because we are here in public laughter]—as that of our NATO allies. o, on the whole, if Communist parties paricipate in a major way in the governments f Western Europe, it will, in our view, lead a substantial change in the nature of llied relationships.

I want to make clear that it is not a decion that the United States can make. But we are asked, as you ask me, then we ave to express our view. And our view is nat this will make a major change in the elationships of the Western World.

Dr. Ramo: Mr. Secretary, if you had it to o over again on any major policy decision which you have participated—not counting the decision to go to Washington in the rst place—would you do it differently? Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: That's—

Dr. Ramo: That's part one. [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: That—no; I think ou should have skipped it. [Laughter.] I ink it's a very good question, which I've een too busy to ask myself systematically tely. [Laughter.]

I have no doubt there are some things that might have done differently—especially as ll the decisions that one makes are taken nder an enormous pressure of time and ometimes with incomplete information. But, n the whole, I'd have to say that the major nes of the policy I would do again.

Mr. Anderson: The disposition of Arctic as has been an issue of considerable interst here on the West Coast for the last few –six to eight months. One is the so-called ll-American route through Alaska—that's y water to the West Coast—and the alternaive is a land route essentially through Canda to the Midwest. I don't want to put you n the spot on this; but from the point of iew of the State Department, is there any preference to an all-U.S. route?

Secretary Kissinger: To tell you the truth, I was in Alaska a few weeks ago and someone asked me this question—a few months ago—and I didn't even know what the problem was. And I danced around in an extraordinary manner. Now I know what the problem is, but I know I shouldn't give an answer to it. [Laughter.]

Soviet and Cuban Involvement in Angola

Mr. Carter: Mr. Secretary, would you care to speculate on what political, military, or economic effects might fall from both public and congressional pressure on the Administration to diminish U.S. involvement in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make clear what our concern has been in Angola. The United States was not opposed to the group that is backed by the Soviet Union because it is Marxist. In fact, it wasn't opposed to this group at all. A similar group took over in Mozambique—the so-called FRELIMO [Front for the Liberation of Mozambique] group—without any opposition by the United States and with immediate recognition by the United States once the government was established after independence.

Our concern in Angola is that the Soviet Union, between March 1975 and the end of the year, introduced 200 million dollars' worth of military equipment into Angola—which is more than all of the military equipment that all other countries sent to black Africa. Secondly, it introduced, or it participated in the introduction of, 11,000 Cuban combat troops.

So what we are seeing in Angola is not a war of national liberation, out of which the United States would have stayed totally, but the attempt by two countries that are far away, that have no historical role there, to impose a minority government. And the impact of this happening unopposed on other African countries, on Asian countries—and also European countries—is a matter of the gravest concern. If the Soviet Union, using expeditionary forces of its allies, can operate in this manner over long distances, then the

areas closer to home, where it is even more difficult militarily to resist—a very dangerous precedent is set.

So there was never any question of the introduction of American forces. We were dealing with relatively small amounts of money to be given to black African countries at their request, to assist the majority of the Angolan population—which did not want to be taken over in this manner.

Congress has now decided that this cannot be done, and the consequences will be what I described. Now that this has occurred, we have an obligation to make clear that this action does not set a precedent, or we will remember that Angola set in motion a train of events that could be potentially extremely serious.

I know that there has been relatively little public support. I know that there has been no congressional support. But we in office had an obligation to describe the situation as we saw it. And I think when the consequences become apparent, it will be realized that the concerns were justified.

Mr. Day: Mr. Secretary, since Congress has already turned you down and since there's to date no sign of support for the Angolan proposal which you make, why then did you go back last week and at least suggest the idea of overt support for Angola? Do you think there's a chance in the world that you would get it? If not, why say our prestige is in some way committed to our actions here, if you don't really think that the Congress is going to support your version of the prestige? In other words—

Secretary Kissinger: It's not a question of our version of prestige. It is a question of what the consequences of certain actions will be. Those consequences will occur whether we predict them or we don't predict them; to pretend that by predicting certain consequences you bring them about is simply putting your head in the sand.

I was asked. I didn't volunteer to go to the Congress. I was asked by Senator Clark, who's head of the African Subcommittee, to appear. It was an occasion I would not have minded missing. [Laughter.] But having been asked to appear, I had to give, no our version of prestige, but our view of th national interest and of the interest of worl peace.

We believed—and I continue to believe—that under the conditions that existed i December, we had a good chance of endin the foreign involvement in Angola by th methods which we were then pursuing through obtaining a resolution at the mee ing of the Organization of African Unit that would have ended foreign intervention We had no intention of being involved ther in any substantial way. All that we wer talking about were some tens of millions c dollars of American financial assistance t black African countries.

Having been asked to testify, I had t state our views. In stating our views, I ha to say that since the secret funding was r longer possible—a secret funding that ha been discussed with some 25 Senators ar over a hundred Congressmen before w undertook it, in which eight congression committees have been briefed 24 differen times, so the real secrecy was extreme limited [laughter]—having been precluded from this version of secret operations, I ha to say that if we proceed we will do overtly. I did not say we would ask for it; said we would have to consider asking for i

And I must say if one looks at the dipl matic situation which we now face, wh 11,000 Cuban troops with massive Sovi equipment—a fantastic force for Africa—a moving through Angola, I think the publ must understand that we must do certa things to retain a minimum of diplomat influence over events, even though our rea ing of the congressional mood is not like to be very different from yours.

Mr. Day: Are you going then to ask f overt money?

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't decide yet. We haven't asked yet.

U.S. Forces in Western Europe

Dr. Ramo: Mr. Secretary, let's move a fe thousand miles north to Western Europ

hc way things are moving there—I'm inking of Portugal, Greecc, and Turkey—nd with the way Congress is moving, is it uite likely that you will face important op-osition to the continuation of American oops in Western Europe on this whole con-pt of a tie with Western European nations r the defense of Europe in which they dividually spend a smaller fraction of their oss national product for defense than we ?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, actually, in ortugal the situation has improved enor-ously over the last year, and democratic ocesses are beginning to work there. I be-ve that our ties to Western Europe are e essence of our foreign policy and that if estern Europe should feel insecure it ould then adopt a position of semineutral-m in which its Communist parties would come much more active and we would find at a continent like this, with its economic wer, could be an extremely disturbing ele-ent in the world.

It is imperative for us to keep our close litical and military and economic ties with estern Europe, and for that the presence American troops is essential. So I hope ese tendencies you describe do not de-lop. And if they develop, we would have resist them.

ain Sales to the Soviet Union

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Secretary, the new So-et five-year plan is not the document of a ghly successful country and is a rework d a reappraisal of the objectives. And rgely growing out of their agricultural ilures and the tremendous shortfall in eir grain crop last year, and climatic con-tions at the moment look as if this would repcated again.

They have limited financial resources for sh purposes—may be needing credit and lp. I just wonder if they fall on more diffi-lt days, as it would appear particularly in e food sector, if this is going to drive them the wall and make them more dangerous -or do you think they might become more operative?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is hard to predict, and it depends on the alternatives that were presented—that are presented. I think that if the Soviet Union needs grain from the West—if it needs economic bene-fits, this should be used by the West to nego-tiate the political arrangements which we consider to be desirable, particularly to move things toward a more stable and peaceful world.

And we have the possibility of doing that in the new grain agreement because that agreement does not provide for purchases of an emergency nature but, rather, for regular purchases in ordinary conditions. So if a new emergency develops, a new negotia-tion would have to be conducted; and the same is true in the case of economic credits. So our policy has generally been to tie eco-nomic events to political progress, and we would continue to do that.

The Middle East

Mr. Carter: Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment on the probable impact of the present internal unrest of Lebanon on the prospects for, and the timetable for, final settlement of the Israeli conflict?

Secretary Kissinger: What is happening in Lebanon is a terrible tragedy, because here was the most peaceful country, the country that most enjoyed a condition of peace in the Arab world and maybe in the entire Middle East. Its two communities, Christian and Moslem, coexisted with rela-tive ease.

Since the civil war started we estimate that more than 10,000 people have been killed and some 20,000 have been wounded—and if you consider that the total population of the country is only about 2½–3 million, this is an enormous number of casualties.

The conflict in Lebanon has of course ab-sorbed the energies of the surrounding coun-tries. Syria has played a major role. Israel has not played an active role; but it is gen-erally understood that if there should be a major invasion from Syria, the danger of an Israeli move would be very grave.

So the problem in Lebanon is to keep the situation from involving the surrounding countries and at the same time to end the civil war.

The recent armistice seems to have helped; but on the whole, the situation in Lebanon is a disturbing influence and one that is not helpful to move them toward a Middle East settlement, because it raises very serious danger that Lebanon may become a confrontation state, with the large number of Palestinians that live there.

Mr. Ziffren: What are the prospects in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: What do I think in terms of the Middle East prospects?

The Middle East—we have two problems: the procedural problem of who is to do the negotiating and the substantive problem of what should be negotiated.

The procedural problem of who should do the negotiating generally revolves around the issue of whether the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) should participate at a reconvened Geneva Conference.

Substantive issues are so manifold—frontiers, Palestinians, Jerusalem, the reciprocal guarantees of peace on the part of the Arab countries, international guarantees, and so forth.

Our view with respect to the Palestinians has been that unless the Palestinians recognize the existence of Israel and its right to exist as a state, it is impossible to ask Israel to participate in the negotiations with them. We cannot ask Israel to negotiate with a group that is dedicated to their destruction.

With respect to frontiers and all the other issues, our policy up to now has been to try to segment them into as many individual issues as we can, because we thought this was more manageable, it would maintain a momentum of progress, and it would give the possibilities that later on we could settle the remaining issues in the best possible framework.

For a variety of reasons, this has become much less likely now. So what we will probably find at some point is some large international conference in which all internationals—in which all of these issues will b handled simultaneously. And the grou which brings together all these strong-wille people will certainly test the sanity of an mediator. [Laughter.]

Mr. Day: Mr. Secretary, on the Midd East, Israelis say—at least some Israelis sa —that the PLO, even though it may someda say it recognizes the State of Israel, wi never really, in its heart, concede that. An so to establish a Palestinian state of the domination is really just to put a dagger in Israel's heart.

But do you think it is possible that th forces of history and circumstances are g ing to force the PLO to live in some kind uneasy, but nevertheless, relationship wit Israel? Do you think everything is tendin that way?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is very har to predict. Until 1973, no Arab state wa willing to accept the existence of Israel- even the 1967 frontiers. Then several of th Arab states changed. What the PLO may in the future, I wouldn't want to predict.

The U.S. position is, and will remain, th until the PLO states that it definitely a cepts the existence of Israel and the U.N Security Council resolutions that set out th negotiating framework, we have no decisio to make. After that, we will look at th circumstances as they exist.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Dr. Ramo: This question is about déten with the Soviet Union. I think you will fo give anyone who suggests that it is a contr versial subject in the United States. [*Laug ter.*]

There are those who believe that w haven't gotten very much out of efforts détente—and that moreover it is very da gerous to pursue such a policy.

*Can you tell us what you think are th principal gains that we have gotten fro pursuing détente and what you consid under reasonable, favorable, but realist circumstances the maximum that you wou hope the United States would get from pu

suing such a policy—and if there are any alternatives to détente?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, you have to ask me what détente is.

Curiously—one of the curious aspects of the present situation is the mercurial change of the mood. When we came to Washington in 1969, there were hundreds of thousands of people in the street demonstrating for peace. For three years we were assailed monthly with the accusation that the government was too tough, it was reckless, risking the American future. Now, suddenly, three years later, the mood has changed; and the impression is created that the government is giving away needlessly concessions to the Soviet Union.

Let's get clear, first of all, what we are trying to do. We face a historic problem we did not create and which no American Administration can remove—which is the fact that after 60 years in power, through the evolution of technology and industry the Soviet Union has become a superpower. It has weapons that can reach every part of the globe, for the first time in Russian history. It has a navy that can traverse the seas, for the first time in Russian history. It has the largest land army in the world.

These are facts which we did not create, which no American policy can remove. It is an uncomfortable experience for Americans to deal with a country of roughly the same strength. We have never had to do this in our history.

Secondly, we face the fact that nuclear weapons are destructive in a way that is absolutely unprecedented in history. A war fought with nuclear weapons would kill hundreds of millions in a matter of days. If you think of the impact that the two World Wars have had on Europe, in which the casualties would be minor, really minor to what would occur in a nuclear war, you can see the responsibility that any American leader concerned with the future of this country must have.

Therefore we have two problems. The first problem is to prevent the Soviet Union from using this growing power to achieve political gains. The second problem is to manage these relationships in a way that is different from the way it used to be, traditionally. Traditionally, when two countries of roughly equal magnitude competed with each other, a war was inevitable. Now a war must not happen; and therefore we must contain Soviet power and at the same time we must look for new international arrangements that go beyond power politics to a more cooperative international structure.

This is what we mean by the policy of détente.

And therefore, when you ask what is America getting out of it, what we intend to get out of it is an option for a more peaceful and saner and safer world. This cannot be measured every day.

Many of the things that people complain about are the inevitable result of the growth of Soviet power that I described. This newest of them could have been avoided by American action.

When the Soviet Union makes a move toward expansion, we resist, as we are trying to do in Angola—against public and congressional opposition—as we did in Jordan in 1970 and as we did in Cuba in 1970 and as we did in 1973 during the Middle East crisis. But at the same time we are trying to build a more constructive relationship.

I do not see any unilateral advantage that the Soviet Union has gained from this. This is not a favor we do for the Soviet Union, and I do not know what the alternative is. I don't know whether the people want to go back to the confrontations of the Berlin crisis, whether a country that has just gone through Viet-Nam, Watergate, the intelligence investigations, and endless domestic turmoil wants to contrive crises in which its domestic structure will be tested. If the Soviet Union behaves aggressively, we will resist.

But I must say that whether this Administration brings it to a completion or not, some Administration must deal with the problem of peace. Because in a nuclear age, tough rhetoric unsupported with a vision of the future is just too dangerous.

The People's Republic of China

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Secretary, you justified the shift in the Soviet posture from one of a defensive military position to one of a very, very powerful offensive, external capability. Do you see a similar pattern developing in China? Or is China more interested in maintaining their current internal defensive position?

Secretary Kissinger: China is at the beginning of its industrial and economic evolution; and therefore its present position—the reach of China's power—is confined to the immediately contiguous areas and the perils to China's security impel it to keep its military force within the country.

What China may do if in 20 years it has the same capabilities or analogous capabilities to what the Soviet Union possesses today, I would not want to speculate. But the policies of the country are inevitably related to its physical strength, and the Chinese are an extraordinarily talented, extraordinarily sophisticated, and extremely tough people.

Mr. Ziffren: Do you think that Chou en-Lai—the death of Chou en-Lai will make a difference in China?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course personal relations are not supposed to play a role in foreign policy. But I had very great affection for Chou en-Lai, and I thought he was one of the greatest men that I have dealt with in public life, or in any other context.

But I think as far as the main lines of policy are concerned, they will not be affected by the death of Chou en-Lai—but his style and skill, the subtlety, will certainly be missed; and that will certainly make it, personally, somewhat more complicated.

But the main lines of Chinese-American relations depend on the mutual interests of the two countries. We were brought together by necessity and we are held together by certain shared interests.

Mr. Carter: Mr. Secretary, if you don't mind, I would like to turn to the Angolan question for just a minute.

Are you more concerned about the effect of the congressional unwillingness to support the Administration's policy there with respect to the symbolism that it projects for our other friends and allies around the world? Or are you more concerned about the creation of a beachhead there? Or are you even more concerned about some natural resources that are to be gained by the other side or perhaps some combination of these or other things?

Decisive Feature of Angolan Situation

Secretary Kissinger: The natural resources are important, but they are not the decisive feature.

The decisive feature is that in the conditions of the growing power that I have described, when the Soviet Union engages in an adventure at such long distances on such a substantial scale, but nevertheless on a scale easily manageable because it is at the very far end of their supply line, if the United States does not do what is necessary—and I repeat, what was necessary was absolutely trivial compared to other foreign policy efforts we have made—then the precedent may be set that will affect the foreign policies of many other countries, in Africa in Asia. It is something that China will watch, and it is something that Europe will watch.

I am confident that it will be seen, as the months and years develop, that it would have been relatively easy to do what was necessary in Angola. But failing to do it there will cost us more somewhere else.

Defense Expenditures

Mr. Day: Mr. Secretary, after the Secretary of Defense, Mr. [James R.] Schlesinger left office one of his supporters very strongly argued that the Ford Administration was not providing enough money in its budget for defense and not as much as Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs wanted, and there was a whole argument raging on this. What—in your view of the responsibility for meeting the Soviet Union—what is your view of the general level of the American defense budget?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course we have one massive handicap in our defense budget. This is that we have to spend nearly 60 percent of our budget on personnel. The Soviet Union spends only about 30 percent, less than 30 percent, of their budget on personnel. So at comparable levels of expenditure, the Soviet Union can translate it much more effectively into useful military hardware.

The second problem is to determine what kinds of weapons are most useful for the purposes of foreign policy. Or to put it another way—what sorts of threats are they most likely to face? Now, it is my view that from the point of view of foreign policy, the threats we are most likely to face are in so-called "peripheral areas"—well, I don't want to list them, but certainly in the Middle East —and that America's capacity to intervene locally is of decisive or potentially decisive importance. Therefore, over the next 10 years, in my view, we have to strengthen our conventional forces.

I do not believe that in the field of strategic forces it is so easy to calculate what a decisive advantage is, and at the level of casualties that I have described earlier it is very complicated to believe that any responsible national leader would easily resort to strategic nuclear weapons. So this is why I believe that that area should be constrained by arms limitations negotiations.

Now, on the whole, our defense budgets, though large in absolute numbers, have been on the skimpy side in terms of our needs. I have generally agreed with Secretary Schlesinger about the order of magnitude of what was required. I might quibble about the distribution within this. And I support a substantial military establishment, especially in the field of conventional forces.

Foreign Assistance

Dr. Ramo: A slight shift away from that question, but based on it: we have in the past supported numerous nations, both with military products from the United States and also economic aid, peacetime aid. Now, we didn't much care, when we were very powerful, whether they supported our world policy or not. It didn't matter if they didn't. And we even, perhaps, obtained a subtle kind of advantage by having the image with them of being philanthropists or being idealists, of not being concerned about their position.

But now the situation is somewhat different. Why do we go on supporting nations who disturb the world situation by opposing our obviously superior world policies? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I suppose there is an element of masochism involved. [Laughter.]

I don't know exactly what nations you are talking about and what sort of support you have in mind. In general, I would like to think, though it is probably not correct, that in helping other nations we serve our own purposes and that there is a reason related to our own national interests.

But we have made clear, and I have said it again last week in congressional testimony, that we will certainly gear our own relationships to other countries to the degree of support they give us on the issues that we consider essential.

So on the whole, I think the condition you describe is no longer quite so valid. There are some countries in the world in whose independence we have an interest, however obnoxiously they may behave, because the alternative to their independence is worse. So in both cases we may have to give support, not because we like their policies but because we prefer their existence.

Improvement in the International Situation

Mr. Anderson: Mr. Secretary, you have been on the firing line for seven years on national policy which particularly is related to security. The big changes—détente, Russia, China, the end of the war in Viet-Nam —have been major changes.

Are you more secure now in the world that you live in today or less secure in the world you live in today—1969 versus 1976?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is important to compare the world of 1969 with the

world today, because we do have a tendency to take things for granted.

In 1969 the Soviet Union had just occupied Czechoslovakia. In the first two years of being in office we had two crises on the access routes to Berlin. We had a Soviet submarine base being built in Cuba. We had two Middle East crises, one of which brought us to the verge of war. We had not only "no relations," we had absolutely no contact with the People's Republic of China—we didn't even know how to contact them, and spent a year trying to figure out how to do it. We had 550,000 troops in Viet-Nam. We had serious problems in our relations with Europe.

Now, since then, whatever you may say about détente, it is at least a healthy thing —or at least some progress—that we are arguing about whether we are getting enough out of an improving relationship with the Soviet Union. We have a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. We managed to extricate ourselves, even if people think it took too long, from Southeast Asia. We have a new approach to the developing nations. And for the first time in 30 years, progress has been made toward peace in the Middle East.

It is not enough. A lot more has to be done. But above all, we have to remember what I said earlier—that the biggest unsolved problem of our time is to build a new international structure which is less dependent upon the accidents of power politics. That task we have just begun.

But on the whole I think that the building blocks for a new world are there, and the international situation is much better than it was. The domestic situation—faith in ourselves—is much worse than it was, as a result of Viet-Nam, Watergate and its aftermath. Our biggest problem is to restore our national confidence so that we can build the world that I have tried to describe.

Mr. Carter: Mr. Secretary, there seems to have been historically a very disappointing coordination between the foreign policy and the economic policy of the United States. Having viewed in recent years the dramatic coordination practiced in these fields by Japan, by others around the world, and recognizing the interrelationship being forced upon the world economically, I am wondering if we should not be moving perhaps even more swiftly toward using economics as an instrument of foreign policy than we have in the past, and I recognize that you have appointed a strong Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and perhaps you are moving in that direction.

Coordination of Economic and Foreign Policy

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is absolutely true that as war becomes less likely, other forms of power or interrelationships become more important. It is also true that our economy is one of our greatest assets.

But it is finally true that we have the dilemma that when you use your economic strength for foreign policy purposes, it means that somebody must husband it and somebody must have the right to use it—which means that somebody in the private sector cannot do what he wants. Because if you permit the private sector to do whatever they want, then you mostly get a sort of a generalized benefit from your economy but not one that you can target on a specific problem.

Therefore you find the situation that you get great editorials on cutting off grain sales to the Soviet Union on either seacoast; but when last summer we induced the grain traders to exercise voluntary restraint for four months, for many reasons, including the impact it would have on our consumers —and to help our negotiations for the long term—that we were getting under the most extreme pressure from the Midwestern states.

And when I appeared before the Senate Finance Committee last week, I was not treated too gently because—precisely, I believe—allegedly I was attempting to use agriculture or whatever for foreign policy purposes.

On the whole, I believe that it is important to establish a closer coordination between economic policy and foreign policy. The meeting in Rambouillet to which Mr

Anderson referred was really quite a success in this regard.

We get into the most unbelievable donnybrooks in Washington about jurisdiction when one tries to establish a relationship between foreign policy and economic policy. But in fact, good progress is being made in this direction. Though how we can use that tremendous economic power that we have and how we can use a private economy for public purposes—this is one of the problems that we have not yet fully solved.

Mr. Carter: Should the coordination be in the White House, the State Department, or the Treasury?

Secretary Kissinger: How can you ask? [Laughter.]

Mr. Carter: I only asked, just so it could be reconfirmed.

Secretary Kissinger: Since November, I am against having it in the White House. [Laughter.]

Prospects for Building a World Community

Mr. Day: Mr. Secretary, if President Ford is elected in November, will you plan to continue in your current job? Or is this your last year, no matter how the election comes out?

Secretary Kissinger: Inconceivable as it may be to my father, I may not be asked. [Laughter.] My problem is that I don't want to make myself a lameduck too early. [Laughter.]

Mr. Day: Not in anticipation of your return to university life, Mr. Secretary, nevertheless a long-range and more philosophical question than the others that have been raised: if you take a long-range look at the world with your scholarly hat on and look at the population problems and the underdeveloped world coming into its own in the sense of finding tools for an aggressive action now for control of the limited natural resources of the world, with economic war ready to replace, at any time, the military warfare—I guess my question is asking what your feeling is about a hope for the world, because it would appear, would it not, that all the elements are still there and are going to be there, and if all of your policies have been perfect and if, indeed, great progress has been made, it would appear that it would be very easy for a successor of yours to have a lesser record.

Secretary Kissinger: I would think, looking at it as a professor, that over a historic period we have enormous potentiality for chaos.

We have the developing nations at the very beginning of their evolution, with great resentment and great temptation to band together for economic warfare. We have the unsolved problem of nuclear weapons; we have the emerging problem of nuclear proliferation. We have the growth of Soviet power; the beginning of the growth of Chinese power; the fact that Europe and Japan, though our relations with them now are better than they have been in decades, still have to find a permanent orientation. All of this has great danger.

On the other hand, we do have the possibility to shape that future. We showed last year how one speech laying out a program of relations with the developing countries managed to create a new atmosphere, which is not due to the brilliance of the speech but to the necessities that exist and to the fact that if one recognizes these necessities they can still be shaped.

The United States, while it is no longer predominant, is still a country that is powerful enough to shape the course of world events in the economic and political fields and to put some restraint on proliferation and on military competition.

And I have to say quite candidly that my biggest worry now is what is going on in the United States domestically—that we can never do this unless we can rebuild some degree of national unity, unless we can understand that without the United States there can be no security and there can be no progress and that these long-term dangers and opportunities cannot be realized without it.

So I would say that, however successful

whatever may have happened in the last few years, it is just the first mile on a very long road which cannot be carried out without an informed and a dedicated and a united public. And that is all the more necessary because the qualities of our leaders—the quality is apt to fluctuate, and therefore unless we have this degree of public support and public demand we may have great di culties.

But if we do have it, I genuinely belie that we can build for the first time in hum history a world community in which m nations feel a sense of participation a most people will feel more secure than th have in the past.

THE CONGRESS

Congress and the U.S. Intelligence Community

Statement by Secretary Kissinger [1]

I welcome this opportunity to appear before this committee to give you my views on the relationship I hope will develop between the Congress and the U.S. intelligence community.

It is essential that a sounder relationship between the executive and the Legislature evolve. The present relationship has reached a point where the ability of the United States to conduct a coherent foreign policy is being eroded. This is certainly true in the intelligence field. One has only to look at the recent leakage—indeed, official publication—of highly classified material and the levying of unsubstantiated charges and personal attacks against the executive to see the point the relationship has reached and the harm we are doing to ourselves.

This situation must be unacceptable to us in both branches of the government, and t must be unacceptable to the Ameri n people.

Fundamental changes are taking place n the world at an unprecedented rate. N v centers of power are emerging, altering r - tions among older power centers. Grow g economic interdependence makes each of s vulnerable to financial and industrial t - bles in countries formerly quite remote fr n us. And, most important, we are work g hard to establish more rational and reli e relationships with powers whose values d interests are alien and inimical to us d who, in some cases, have the power o destroy us.

The conduct of foreign policy in this c - plex and fast-changing situation requ s that there be close coordination and mut l trust between Congress and the execu e branch and a large measure of trust in b h branches by the American people.

I am aware of the benefits of a cert n amount of dynamic tension between e branches of our government. Indeed, e

[1] Made before the Senate Committee on Government Operations on Feb. 5 (text from press release 51). The complete transcript will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Public Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

bunding Fathers designed this into the onstitution with the principle of the sepa- tion of powers. But there is an adverse im- ct on the public mind in this country and our national image abroad when this bene- ial tension deteriorates into confrontation. e have recently seen this happen. This is ny I hope this committee and the Congress a whole, with help and suggestions from e executive, can construct an oversight echanism for U.S. intelligence that can ing an end to the strife, distrust, and con- sion that have accompanied the investiga- ons of the past year.

I look to the development of means by nich Congress can participate more fully the guidance and review of the intelligence tivities of this government and by which e executive can direct and conduct those tivities with the confidence of being in ep with Congress in this vital area of our reign affairs.

Our foreign policy must cope with com- ex problems of nuclear and conventional ms races; traditional and ideological dis- tes which can trigger wider wars and eeping economic dislocations; emerging w nations which can become the arena for eat-power contests; environmental pollu- n, food shortages, and energy maldistribu- ns which affect the lives of hundreds of llions; and financial shifts which can reaten the global economic order. In the ce of these great challenges our goals are foster the growth of a rationally ordered rld in which states of diverse views and jectives can cooperate for the common nefit. We seek a world based on justice and e promotion of human dignity.

We cannot pursue these goals in this haz- dous world unless we are secure, and we nnot be secure unless we are strong and ert. Our ability to be both strong and alert pends in part on good intelligence.

To be strong, we must know as precisely possible how we are threatened. In this e of highly sophisticated and expensive apons systems, we cannot afford to arm rselves against all possible threats; we ust concentrate on those that are most tely in order to save our resources for other programs that make our country economically, socially, and morally strong.

To be alert is not just a matter of knowing where the dangers of war and change are increasing, basic as that knowledge is. We must have the knowledge essential to our ability to try to help reduce the dangers to peace. Intelligence is crucial to the future of this nation.

To help construct a more cooperative world we must understand trends and possibilities. Intelligence is an indispensable tool in this effort.

The intelligence on which such judgments must be based can come only from a highly professional intelligence service supported by Congress and the people of this country. President Ford expressed it very well in the state of the Union address when he said:

> As conflict and rivalries persist in the world, our U.S. intelligence capabilities must be the best in the world.
>
> The crippling of our foreign intelligence services increases the danger of American involvement in direct armed conflict. Our adversaries are encouraged to attempt new adventures while our own ability to monitor events and to influence events short of military action is undermined.
>
> Without effective intelligence capability, the United States stands blindfolded and hobbled.

Let me give you just two examples.

Our policy to establish a more rational and reliable relationship with the Soviet Union—commonly referred to as détente—would be impossible without good intelligence. Indeed, our confidence in the SALT agreements is based in large measure on the specific provisions which permit each side to check on the compliance of the other through national technical means of verification.

Similarly, without excellent intelligence the United States would not have been able to play the leading role in seeking to bring about a negotiated settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. All agree that a new conflict there could bring the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of war.

As I have repeatedly said, this nation's foreign policy must reflect the values, aspirations, and perceptions of its people; it must have broad public support. The American

people must have confidence not only in our policies but also in the institutions which formulate and carry out those policies. This means that our foreign policy must reflect consultation and accommodation between the executive and legislative branches. But each branch has its special responsibilities as well. The executive must provide strong central direction of foreign policy and must consult with the Congress. Congress must provide mature counsel and must protect the confidentiality of its consultations with the executive.

That brings me to the question this committee is addressing: How should a democracy provide for control of its intelligence activities which, if they are to be effective, must operate in secret?

It is not my place as Secretary of State to recommend how the Congress should organize its oversight effort; but for oversight to be effective and constructive, conditions must be created which will promote mutual trust in dealing with the necessarily sensitive aspects of intelligence information and operations. Both overseers and those overseen must be able to feel sure that information given in confidence will remain in confidence. No other single condition for success is as important as this. The system cannot function in the atmosphere of distrust that has prevailed in recent months.

Rather than make specific proposals for oversight, I would prefer to set forth some general principles which I believe are important and should be given serious consideration.

First, I believe that the goal of congressional oversight should be to insure that the intelligence activities of the United States are grounded in the basic values, perceptions, and aspirations of the people of this country as well as in a clear view of the national interest.

Congress has a particular responsibility in insuring that this is so, because intelligence does not lend itself to extensive public or media debate. This requires that the public have great confidence in the congressional oversight mechanism. Americans must be assured that their constitutional rights wi not be abridged by intelligence operation I welcome congressional oversight because believe it will build public confidence in ou intelligence system, and we in the executiv branch can benefit from the wise couns oversight can provide. But correction of th errors of the past must not take the for of controls in the future that would stif intelligence.

Second, I believe we must maintain th proper constitutional perspective.

Under the Constitution the conduct foreign relations is the responsibility of th President as the nation's chief executiv officer. Congressional oversight must not in fringe on the President's responsibility fo intelligence in a way which would violate th principle of the separation of powers. Th Constitution is written as it is for practic as well as for political reasons.

Congress is a deliberative and lawmakin body, not an executive organ, and it is no organized to provide day-to-day operation direction to ongoing intelligence program Any proposal based on the idea of executiv management by Congress is, in my jud ment, a mistake.

Existing legislation requires the Preside to determine that covert action operatio are important to national security and to gi timely notice of those operations to appr priate bodies of the Congress. I believe th is adequate for oversight. I recommend th this or a similar arrangement be continu but that it be concentrated in the oversig committee.

Third is the crucial matter that the i formation provided to the congressiona oversight body must in many cases rema secret.

Much of this information is highly clas fied and is gathered from intelligen sources and methods whose continued exis ence must be protected by secrecy at times. Much of the information is suppli us in confidence by foreign governments a services whose cooperation could be lost b public exposure. Some of it also bears U.S. plans or policies whose effectiveness d

ends on continued protection from disclosure.

Unauthorized release of such information ould do great damage to national security nd our foreign policy. Protection of it is a esponsibility both the Congress and the xecutive must share.

I strongly believe that any legislation to stablish an oversight committee must inlude safeguards for the protection of this ensitive and important information. Classied information given to the Congress should ot be made public without the concurrence f the President or his representative.

As a related point, I would like to state ıy agreement with Mr. Colby [William E. olby, former Director of Central Intelligence] that it is essential to establish proedures and sanctions to prevent unauthorzed disclosure of classified material. Legislaıtion for this purpose is currently under onsideration in the executive branch. It ould provide for the prosecution of governıent employees, in both the Congress and the xecutive, who disclose such information ithout authority.

Fourth, and last, I believe the best overight is concentrated oversight—ideally by joint committee.

The benefits of such an arrangement are umerous: it would permit rapid responses oth ways between the Congress and the ıtelligence community when time is crucial; ; would reduce the chance of leaks by limitıg the number of people with access to senitive information; it would encourage maxiıum sharing of information; and it would ermit a rapid development of expertise to acilitate penetrating and effective overight.

If a joint committee is not possible, I ask hat you keep the principle and benefits of oncentration in mind and limit oversight to he minimum number of committees required o conduct oversight effectively.

In concluding, I would like to express gain my fervent hope that we can rapidly nd the divisive debate over the intelligence ommunity which has been so harmful over he past year. I hope this committee will quickly complete its task of establishing effective oversight so that we can all turn to the real challenges that face us in this dangerous world.

I stand ready to help in any way I can, and I am ready to answer any questions you may have.

Supplementary Extradition Treaty With Spain Transmitted to Senate

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a supplementary treaty on extradition between the United States and Spain, signed at Madrid on January 25, 1975.

The supplementary treaty modifies our treaty on extradition with Spain by increasing from 30 to 45 days the period of time during which a person may be provisionally arrested and detained pending presentation, through diplomatic channels, of documents in support of an extradition request. This change is in keeping with modern extradition treaties and is intended to prevent the release of an arrested person for lack of properly prepared extradition papers.

I transmit also for the information of the Senate the report of the Department of State with respect to this supplementary treaty.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the supplementary treaty, and give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *February 3, 1976.*

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[1] Transmitted on Feb. 3 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. B, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and the report of the Department of State.

The African Dimension of the Angolan Conflict

Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs [1]

Mr. Chairman [Senator Richard C. Clark]: When Secretary Kissinger met with you and your distinguished colleagues on January 29, he asked you to look at what is happening in Angola in its larger global context. He discussed the implications of Moscow's effort to obtain a position of special influence in central Africa through military intervention by Cuban proxy. There is little that I can say either to add to or detract from this global analysis of what Angola means in the context of our future relations with the U.S.S.R.

What I would like therefore to do today is to examine the African dimension of this conflict in greater detail. At the risk of boring you with some history, I would like to convey our perception of how the Angolan conflict developed from being an African to being an international problem.

As you know, a part of our basic policy for many years in Africa has been to do what we could to insulate that continent from great-power conflicts. We have sought to avoid confrontation except when it was forced upon us. In the case of the Soviet and Cuban thrust into Angola, we feel that the confrontation was forced upon us.

Within a purely African context, we are not opposed to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In fact, before our consulate officers left Luanda las November, they had more contact with rep resentatives of the MPLA than with th other two political movements, the Nationa Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA and the Union for the Total Independence o Angola (UNITA). What we oppose is th MPLA's effort, as a minority political move ment, to impose itself as the government o Angola, with the help of Soviet arms and Cuban proxy army, on the majority i Angola.

A few words will perhaps help us unde stand why the U.S.S.R. and Cuba should b prepared to underwrite a minority politica movement thousands of miles from hom According to a Soviet handbook, "Afric Today," published in 1962, the MPLA wa founded in 1956 "on the initiative of th Communist Party and the allied Party o Joint Struggle of the Africans of Angola a clandestine anti-Portuguese organizatio This was a period of growing Soviet intere in Africa, where the process of decoloniz tion was unfolding and Moscow evident saw opportunities to implant its influence place of the departing metropole powers.

There are obvious parallels between Sovi efforts to move in on the Congo after ind pendence in 1960 and Moscow's behavior Angola today. In that case, the Sovie worked through the Belgian Communi Party and their own Central Committee a paratus concerned with relations with foreig Communists. This time Moscow worke through the Portuguese Communist Part following the overthrow of the Caetan

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Feb. 6. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

regime and the temporary ascendancy in Portugal of a radical military leadership with close ties to the Communists.

In 1964 the MPLA began to receive financial and military assistance through Portuguese Communist Party leaders. Moscow had previously financed an MPLA leader, [Daniel] Chipenda, who now is allied with the FNLA. Moscow slackened its aid in the early 1970's when the MPLA was in the middle of one of its periodic power struggles but at a time when the "national liberation" struggle against Portugal was still in full swing. When the Soviets decided to renew full-scale assistance to the MPLA in 1974, this was no contribution to "national liberation" with independence around the corner; it was a cynical move for political power after Portugal had already agreed to Angolan independence.

Based on my 17 years of work with Africa, I am convinced that the Africans could have worked out some consensus agreement bringing the factions together in Angola if they had been left to themselves. It was the Soviet decision, in my judgment, to step up arms aid to what it apparently regarded as an organization in which it had influence which destroyed Portugal's effort through the Alvor accord of January 1975 to establish a provisional coalition government embracing the three factions. With the prospect of being a minority partner in a post-independence government and the promise of Soviet arms, the MPLA had no incentive to compromise.

It was precisely this sort of lack of restraint in pursuit of unilateral advantage in a situation of opportunity which the U.S.S.R. and this country solemnly agreed to avoid in the declaration of principles which they signed in May 1972 in Moscow.

To argue that the Soviet and Cuban intervention represented a response to action taken by this government, by Zaïre, or by South Africa ignores the facts and the chronology. I would suggest this line of argument begs the question of our unwillingness to face our responsibilities as the only power in the world able—if willing—to protect weaker nations against Soviet intervention in their domestic political quarrels.

Chronology of Events

A succinct chronology of events in Angola that led up to our decision to provide assistance to the FNLA and UNITA forces and subsequent developments should make perfectly clear—and I want to emphasize these points—that our actions were *reactive* to those of the Soviet Union and Cuba, *independent* of those of South Africa, and designed to achieve a military situation which would promote a government of national unity composed of all three factions.

The Soviet Union began extensive rearming of the MPLA, then based in Congo (Brazzaville), in October 1974. Previous to this, we had *rejected* requests to provide military support to the FNLA. The Soviet arms shipments continued up through the January 1975 independence talks among the Portuguese and the three liberation movements which culminated in the Alvor accord.

In January 1975 we provided funds to the FNLA for political purposes, reflecting our judgment that the FNLA was at a disadvantage operating in Luanda, an MPLA-dominated city. This sum was to be doled out over many months and was insignificant compared to Moscow's military aid.

During the skirmishes between the FNLA and MPLA in February and the major battles of March and April, we noticed an increasing tendency on the part of the MPLA forces to *ignore* the cease-fires called for by the leaders of all three movements and to act independently to achieve their maximum military goals. From March through May, not only did the quantity of the Soviet and Communist-bloc arms flow increase, reflecting delivery decisions taken several months earlier, but the nature of the weaponry escalated as well, with quantities of large mortars and several armored vehicles showing up inside Angola by May.

MPLA intransigence increased along with the Soviet aid in June and July, and on July 9 the MPLA drove the FNLA and UNITA

completely out of Luanda, thereby destroying even the pretext of a coalition government. After separate pleas from Zambia and Zaïre, each of which saw their security threatened by the specter of a Soviet-supported MPLA, we reversed our earlier decision not to provide military support to any faction, and on July 18 we authorized the use of covert funds for the FNLA and UNITA forces. Our goal was to strengthen the two movements sufficiently to *preserve* a military balance and thereby encourage the establishment of a compromise coalition government. We hoped, at the same time, to signal the seriousness of our concern by this decision to the Soviets and allow them to scale down their intervention without open confrontation.

After our decision was made but before any U.S. assistance could become apparent, the first Cuban forces arrived in Angola in August as part of an arrangement among the Soviet Union, the MPLA, and Cuba to enable the MPLA to extend its military control over all of the nation.

It was at about this same time that South African forces occupied several damsites inside Angola that are connected with a joint Portuguese–South African hydroelectric project in Angola and Namibia. Later, probably in late September, the South Africans apparently decided to intervene militarily in the conflict. We had nothing to do with their decision, were not consulted, and were not aware of their involvement in the fighting until *after* their entry. Large numbers of Cuban forces, including combat units, arrived in Angola almost *simultaneously* with the South Africans. This coincidence, plus reports from Cuban prisoners taken in Angola, indicates that the Cuban decision to intervene with combat forces was made, and forces dispatched, before the South Africans undertook their own intervention.

Commencing in late October, there was again a marked increase in the quantity and sophistication of the Soviet weapons, with tanks, rockets, and a large number of armored vehicles pouring in to be manned by the Cuban forces. This escalation has continued until now, except for a halt of some two weeks from December 9 to 25 when the Soviet Government may have been reevaluating its position in the light of ever firmer U.S. military and diplomatic signals which the Secretary has already outlined to you. However, the vote of this body on December 19 provided a general indication to everyone that U.S. ability and willingness to provide assistance was highly questionable.

At this point the FNLA has been driven back to the northern corner of its previously held territory and UNITA forces are still strongly resisting the MPLA advance in the south even with reduced resources and against over 11,000 well trained and equipped Cuban troops. Savimbi [Jonas Savimbi, of UNITA] has said that he will carry on the battle against the MPLA again from the bush if he cannot get any outside assistance.

Reactions in Africa

Our African friends—and even some countries which are not so friendly—are acutely aware of the implications for the security of Soviet and Cuban intervention including a massive expeditionary force in Africa. After all, there are few developing countries which do not have to deal with radical internal factions which would be quite capable of calling upon the U.S.S.R. to assist them in the name of "proletarian internationalism."

Even some of our critics are visibly disturbed by the turn of events in Angola. The weekly magazine *Jeune Afrique* [Paris] which is usually quite critical of the United States, sharply attacked the MPLA in its January 30 edition for allowing itself to become a pawn on the Soviet international chessboard, stating that it did "not believe that the MPLA, very much a minority movement, politically and ethnically, will be able to govern all of Angola alone or to preserve the independence of the country." In its issue a week earlier the *Jeune Afrique* editorial, which also criticized U.S. policy, stated:

> The strategy of the MPLA that we cannot support is: The monopolization of power on the very day of independence, at the predictable, therefore accepted price of a civil war by a minority and Commun

olitical party, with massive military and human sistance from far-off foreign places (except ideo- gically), against all the neighboring countries. It is absolutely without precedent and one cannot e how it can succeed or, in addition, how it can be fended.

The Nigerian Herald complained on Janu- y 30 of the uncritical view then taken of oviet activity in Africa. It argued that if ngola were to go Socialist, it should not be / force of arms. There are many other xamples I could cite of public support for ur position, not the least of which was the rticle in the New Republic, reprinted in the 'ashington Star last Sunday, by Colin legum, a highly respected authority on frica often critical of our African policy.

I can tell you frankly from my meetings th five chiefs of state during my visit to frica in December, and from numerous ports from our Ambassadors, that the 22 untries which followed existing OAU pol- y to recognize no faction during the sum- it of the Organization of African Unity eeting in Addis Ababa this past January e watching closely to see whether the nited States will be prepared to support its iends in Africa—or whether they should w adjust their policies to what they con- ive of as new realities.

No one questions our power; but certainly any leaders around the world—friends, itics, and adversaries—question whether e still have the will to use our power in fense of what appear to them as obvious nerican, not merely African, interests. As e distinguished African leader expressed to our Ambassador, it is ironic that when lf of Africa is for once actively looking to e United States for support and leadership, e U.S. Government has its hands tied and nnot respond. Pleas to "do something" can heard from all corners of Africa.

In the first place, of course, it is the coun- ies neighboring the Communist military ildup in Angola and Congo (Brazzaville)— mely, Zaïre, Zambia, and Gabon—which e particularly concerned for their security. supporting the FNLA and UNITA, and e idea of a coalition government, Zambia d Zaïre wish to insure that Angola, which ntrols an important outlet for their econo- mies, the Benguela Railroad, is run by a sovereign African government which is not dependent on foreign powers who pursue their own special interests in central and southern Africa.

Extension of Soviet Influence

We are told that we are overreacting—that the Africans will never be Communists and we should not worry about what the Soviets are doing. This argument misses the whole point of Moscow's strategy in less developed areas like Africa. When the Soviets speak about changing the "correlation of forces" in the world, they are talking about extending their influence in countries where it has not been strong before and, conversely, neutralizing Western influence in countries where it was previously dominant. It is true that Moscow claims to see this as a long, slow process growing out of internal social and other conflicts. It also believes, however, that Communist countries have a certain role to play as "midwives of progress" assisting leftist forces in each country.

We know well from other Soviet press articles this year that the FNLA and UNITA forces are what the upside-down Soviet lexicon calls "reactionaries" and "splitters." The same sort of language was used to describe the vast majority of the Czech people when they also resisted Soviet efforts to impose a minority Soviet-style democracy.

Angola is an illustration of how the U.S.S.R. now feels it can behave in one of these conflict situations in Africa. The issue here is not merely one of principle: real democracy versus totalitarianism, something which used to concern American liberals. But it is also a basic question of how social change is to come about in the developing world. We and the Soviets can both agree that many changes are needed, and we also thought we had agreed to use mutual restraint and avoid trying to take unilateral advantage of each other in future conflict situations; but certainly the sending of a 12,000-man Cuban army to Angola to promote "progressive" social change is a curious form of restraint.

Now we are hearing from various MPLA leaders, reputedly the more moderate ones, that they have no intention of selling out to the Russians, that they will respect our economic interests, that they want to have close relations with us, et cetera. I would simply note that these statements come at a time of divisive internal debate in the United States and when the MPLA feels sure it will win the conflict but is aware of other African concern about the foreign presence. No one knows exactly what will happen in Angola. But it is reasonable to assume that countries with an expeditionary force in place are in the best position to call the shots.

Some say that African nationalism will take care of the Russians and the Cubans and cite countries where excessive Soviet influence has been eliminated.

But there is no precedent in Africa for a government of a newly independent African state which owes its very existence to the Soviet Union. Certainly the fact that the Soviet Union was permitted to mount such a massive intervention from neighboring Congo (Brazzaville) would not indicate that its influence has seriously diminished in the 10 years it has had a privileged position there.

Certainly the fact that there are some 3,300 Soviet military and civilian advisers in certain African states would not indicate that this influence is diminishing. Certainly the fact that Soviet military assistance deliveries have been three times their delivery of economic assistance is a clear indication of what they really seek in Africa.

I will not pretend to predict in what category an MPLA government might fall, except to note that with the obligations it will have incurred it may become one of the most dependent African governments on the continent. This dependence and Soviet-Cuban ambitions in Africa lead me to question whether we will be seeing any early departure of this foreign army. I hope I am wrong.

Only now are many Americans and Africans beginning to see the implications of the presence of 12,000 Cubans in Angola. When the Cuban Deputy Prime Minister announced during the OAU summit meeting that Cu would continue to send its troops to Ango as long as Neto [Agostinho Neto, of t MPLA] wanted them, the Daily Mail Lusaka exploded at this arrogant insisten that Cuba "would continue to send troops Angola to kill Africans whether the OA liked it or not."

Risks in U.S. Failure To Respond

I tell you very frankly, as one who h spent many years in Africa and with Af cans and who has also spent the equivale of many days talking to African leaders different viewpoints about the Angolan pr lem, I am very concerned. I believe that had a good chance in the fall to persuade t Soviets that they would have to choose tween the priorities of détente and th self-assumed role as champion of "natio liberation" in central and southern Afri. But we never had the opportunity to find o

On the ground in Angola, the lack of phisticated military equipment in quantit sufficient to handle Soviet rockets, tan and now planes has placed the FNLA a UNITA forces in an increasingly desper situation. Further recognitions of the MP flow directly from this deteriorating milit situation and the belief that the Uni States will not provide the response to l ance Soviet-Cuban intervention.

The results are too easily predictable:

—Two groups representing a majo of Angolans are prevented from their rig ful participation in the government of n independent nation because of outside in vention and the inability of the Uni States adequately to respond.

—Moscow and Havana may see themsel s shortly in a position to pursue their an tions elsewhere under the dangerously r taken notion that in succeeding once t y can succeed again.

—In the post-Angolan atmosphere of i security and disillusionment with the lac f U.S. support, the states neighboring Ang a —Zaïre and Zambia—would be under gr t pressure to seek an accommodation s

dvantageous to them or see their vital
s to the ocean threatened.

-Other African states would adjust to
realities of power so vividly demon-
ted in Angola by the Soviet airlift and
Cuban expeditionary force.

-Those Soviet officials who pushed this
tional liberation" struggle on the heels
Viet-Nam will have been proven right.
ed, the sweeping returns in Africa from
olvement in a single internal power strug-
ecan only encourage similar adventures
where.

--And in the last analysis we risk bring-
g on other confrontations in the future
er conditions less advantageous to us and
e dangerous to us all.

I share what I think is your wish, Mr.
rman, that such problems could be re-
ed without the use of arms, that Afri-
be allowed to solve their own problems,
the United States not get involved in
rnal politics in Africa or elsewhere, that
attention be devoted to peaceful and
essful evolution in Africa. But it takes
to tango—and while we are gyrating on
floor, the Soviet Union has taken some-
down the garden path. The African at-
le, based on its perception of Soviet
er, will make it even more difficult for
cans to realize their own legitimate as-
ions without outside interference.

this juncture, if the Congress is deter-
d not to provide the wherewithal suc-
fully to resist this Soviet-Cuban effort to
blish their influence by force in this
of Africa, I believe it is imperative that
bers of this Congress express their deep
ern about the possibility that either of
e two countries might engage in similar
ntures elsewhere. To my knowledge that
ern, which I know exists, has not sur-
d in any public hearings in which I have
icipated. In fact the debate has largely
directed at U.S. involvement. Secondly,
ge you seriously to consider what the
ed States can and should do to counter
effects of our unwillingness to meet our
onsibilities in Angola on our relation-
s in Africa and on the security of our
nds there.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

The U.S. Proposal for an International Grain Reserves System. Report of a staff study mission to the September 29–30, 1975, meeting of the International Wheat Council Preparatory Group submitted to the House Committee on International Relations. November 1975. 20 pp.

International Commodity Agreements. A Report of the U.S. International Trade Commission to the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Committee on Finance. November 1975. 189 pp.

A Resolution to Protect the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance to accompany S. Res. 265. S. Rept. 94–444. November 5, 1975. 5 pp.

Tax Conventions With Iceland, Poland, and Romania. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. E, 94–1; Ex. A, 94–1; Ex. B, 93–2. S. Ex. Rept. 94–15. November 11, 1975. 14 pp.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1976. Conference report to accompany S. 1517. H. Rept. 94–660. November 13, 1975. 32 pp.

Extradition Treaty With Australia. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. F, 93–2. S. Ex. Rept. 94–16. November 18, 1975. 4 pp.

Extradition Treaty With Canada. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. G, 93–21. S. Ex. Rept. 94–17. November 18, 1975. 4 pp.

Protocols for the Further Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. C, 94–1. S. Ex. Rept. 94–18. November 18, 1975. 17 pp.

Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. An interim report of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities together with additional, supplemental, and separate views. S. Rept. 94–465. November 20, 1975. 349 pp.

Sense of the House Regarding Status of the Baltic States. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H. Res. 864. H. Rept. 94–677. November 20, 1975. 4 pp.

Veto of Act Providing for Protection of Foreign Diplomatic Missions and Increasing Size of the Executive Protective Service. Message from the President of the United States vetoing H.R. 12. H. Doc. 94–312. December 1, 1975. 4 pp.

International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975. Conference report to accompany H.R. 9005. H. Rept. 94–691. December 4, 1975. 41 pp.

Fisheries Management and Conservation Act. Report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, together with supplemental and minority views, to accompany S. 961. S. Rept. 94–515. December 8, 1975. 14 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Astronauts

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.
Acceptance effective: European Space Agency. December 31, 1975.

Exhibitions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, relating to international expositions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.[1]
Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic (with reservation and declaration), December 16, 1975.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720.
Accession deposited: Ecuador, January 12, 1976.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of October 17, 1972 (TIAS 7479), on the regulation of passenger charter air services. Effected by exchange of letters at Brussels December 29, 1975, and January 16, 1976. Entered into force January 12, 1976.

[1] Not in force.

Fiji

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. E
fected by exchange of notes at Suva December
1975, and January 9, 1976. Entered into fo
January 9, 1976.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Convention on matters of taxation, with rela
letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973. E
tered into force January 29, 1976, effective Ja
ary 1, 1976.
Proclaimed by the President: January 22, 1976

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: February 9–15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*56	2/9	U.S.-Egypt textile agreement.
*57	2/10	Anthony C. E. Quainton sworn in as Ambassador to the Central African Republic (biographic data).
*58	2/9	Galen L. Stone sworn in as Deputy U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (biographic data).
*59	2/10	Robert Anderson sworn in as Ambassador to Morocco (biographic data).
*60	2/11	Joseph A. Greenwald sworn in a Assistant Secretary for Economi and Business Affairs (biographi data).
*61	2/12	Study Group 1, U.S. National Com mittee for the International Tele graph and Telephone Consultativ Committee (CCITT), Mar. 11.
*62	2/12	Study Group 1, U.S. National Com mittee for CCITT, Mar. 10.
*63	2/12	30-day seminar on adult and con tinuing education with repre sentatives of 11 nations beginnin Feb. 15.
†64	2/12	Kissinger: news conference.
*65	2/13	Albert B. Fay sworn in as Ambas sador to Trinidad and Tobag (biographic data).

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Name Index