THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV • No. 1913 • February 23, 1976

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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VOL. LXXIV, No. 1913
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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

The Permanent Challenge of Peace: U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

America enters its third century and its 48th Presidential election with unmatched physical strength, a sound foreign policy design—yet scarred by self-doubt. In the past decade and a half, we have seen one President assassinated, another driven from office, and a third resign. We have lived through the agony of Viet-Nam and Watergate. We are still struggling to overcome the bitterness and division that have followed in their wake. We face no more urgent task than to restore our national unity and our national resolve.

For we, the strongest free nation, cannot afford the luxury of withdrawing into ourselves to heal our wounds. Too much depends upon us—peace or war, prosperity or depression, freedom or tyranny. Too much is at stake for America to paralyze itself tearing up the past, seeking sensational headlines in the present, or offering panaceas for the future. For our own well-being—American lives and American jobs—will be affected if we permit our domestic disunity and turmoil to cause us to falter in meeting our international responsibilities.

And so it is imperative that the national debate in this election year—the greatest demonstration of how free people govern themselves—strengthen, not undermine, our confidence and our capacity to carry out an effective national policy. It is essential that we quickly rebuild our national unity, the sense that we are all part of a shared enterprise.

It is in this spirit that I intend today to discuss America's relations with the world's other superpower, the Soviet Union. In recent months that relationship has become, as it should be, an important part of our national debate. I want to explain the Administration's view of the conditions that gave rise to the policy known as détente, the goals we seek, and the relationship of our Soviet policy to the overall design of American diplomacy.

The United States is today confronted by one challenge unprecedented in its own history and another challenge without precedent in the history of the world. America finds itself for the first time permanently and irrevocably involved in international affairs. At the same time, the catastrophic nature of nuclear war imposes upon us a necessity that transcends traditional concepts of diplomacy and balance of power: to shape a world order that finds stability in self-restraint and, ultimately, cooperation.

For the first century and a half of our history, our peace and security were provided for us by two oceans, the shield of the British Navy, and equilibrium among the European powers. The success of our democracy at home, and the absence of direct threat from abroad, nourished our sense of uniqueness and fostered the illusion that it was up to America to choose whether and when we would participate in the world.

Since De Tocqueville it has been a cliche that Americans, as a people, are slow to arouse but that, once aroused, we are a tre-

[1] Made at San Francisco, Calif., on Feb. 3 before a luncheon sponsored by the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco and the World Affairs Council of Northern California (text from press release 44).

mendous and implacable force. Thus, even when we ventured forth in foreign affairs, we identified our exertion as a temporary disruption of our tranquillity. Our history, except for the Civil War, was without the tragedies and the sense of practical external limits that so colored the experience of almost every other people.

Our successes seemed to teach us that any problem could be solved once and for all by determined effort. We considered peace natural, stability normal, and foreign involvement appropriate only so long as needed to remove some temporary threat or disorder. We entered World War I as "the war to end war" and to "make the world safe for democracy." We fought World War II until "unconditional surrender."

Even in the first 25 years after World War II, an era of great creativity and unprecedented American engagement in foreign affairs, we acted as if the world's security and economic development could be conclusively insured by the commitment of American resources, know-how, and effort. We were encouraged, even impelled, to act as we did by our unprecedented predominance in a world shattered by war and the collapse of the great colonial empires. We considered our deployment of troops in Europe and elsewhere to be temporary. We thought that the policy of containment would transform the Soviet Union and that a changed Soviet society would then evolve inexorably into a compatible member of a harmonious international community.

At the same time, the central character of moral values in American life always made us acutely sensitive to the purity of means—and when we disposed of overwhelming power we had a great luxury of choice. Our moral certainty made compromise difficult; our preponderance often made it seem unnecessary.

Today, while we still have massive strength, we no longer enjoy meaningful nuclear supremacy. We remain the world's most productive and innovative economy—but we must now share leadership with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan; we must deal with the newly wealthy and developing nations; and we must make new choices regarding our economic relations with the Communist countries. Our democratic principles are still far more valued by the world's millions than we realize, but we must also compete with new ideologies which assert progressive goals but pursue them by oppressive methods.

Today, for the first time in our history, we face the stark reality that the challenge is unending, that there is no easy and surely no final answer, that there are no automatic solutions. We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it for so many centuries—without escape and without respite, knowing that what is attainable falls short of the ideal, mindful of the necessities of self-preservation, conscious that the reach of our national purpose has its limits. This is a new experience for Americans. It prompts nostalgia for a simpler past. As before in our history, it generates the search for scapegoats, holding specific policies responsible for objective conditions.

It is precisely because we no longer predominate but must pursue a long-term course that there is a premium today on our constancy and purposefulness. We cannot afford to swing recklessly between confrontation and abdication. We must not equate tough rhetoric with strong action, nor can we wish away tough realities with nostalgic hopes. We can no longer act as if we engage ourselves in foreign affairs only when we choose, or only to overcome specific problems, so that we can then shift our priorities back to our natural concern with ourselves. The reality is that there can be no security without our vigilance and no progress without our dedication.

It is in this context that U.S.–Soviet relations must be seen.

The Contemporary Challenge of Relations

The issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union has been a central feature of American policy for three decades. What is new today is the culmination of 30 years of postwar growth of Soviet industrial, technologi-

cal, and military power. No American policy caused this; no American policy could have prevented it. But American policy can keep this power from being used to expand Soviet influence to our detriment; we have the capacity to enable allies and friends to live with a sense of security; we possess the assets to advance the process of building an international order of cooperation and progress.

We must do so, however, in unprecedented conditions. In previous periods, rivalry between major powers has almost invariably led to war. In our time, when thermonuclear weapons threaten casualties in the hundreds of millions, such an outcome is unthinkable. We must manage a fundamental clash of ideologies and harness the rivalry of the nuclear superpowers, first into coexistence, and then mold coexistence into a more positive and cooperative future. For as President Kennedy once said: [2]

> . . . in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

In the period after World War II, our nightmare was that the Soviet Union, after consolidating its occupation of Eastern Europe, might seek to spread its control to other contiguous areas in Europe and Asia. Our policies therefore sought to build alliances and positions of military strength from which we could contain and isolate the Soviet Union. In this manner the Soviet Union might be forced to settle for peace; transformations might occur within Soviet society that would curb expansionist tendencies and make the U.S.S.R. over time into a more cooperative participant in the international system.

These policies served us and our allies well. Soviet expansion was checked. Behind our shield of security and with our assistance, our friends and allies in Western Europe restored their economies and rebuilt their democratic institutions.

Yet the hope that these policies would produce permanent stability, positive evolution of the Soviet system, and greater normality was only partially realized. In the immediate postwar period, the aggressiveness of Soviet ideology in the Stalinist era obscured some of the real weaknesses of the Soviet state. Indeed, as late as 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States enjoyed a five-to-one superiority in strategic missiles, a three-to-one superiority in strategic bombers, total naval superiority everywhere, and rough equality on the ground in Europe.

Gradually, with the acquisition of nuclear technology and the transformation of the international system through decolonization, the Soviet Union began to emerge as a first-class military power.

In strategic military terms the U.S.S.R. has achieved a broad equality with the United States, as was inevitable for a large nation whose rulers were prepared to impose great sacrifices on their people and to give military strength the absolute top priority in resources. With only half of our gross national product, Soviet military expenditures exceed those of the United States.

For the first time in history, the Soviet Union can threaten distant places beyond the Eurasian landmass—including the United States. With no part of the world outside the range of its military forces, the U.S.S.R. has begun to define its interests and objectives in global terms. Soviet diplomacy has thrust into the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This evolution is now rooted in real power, rather than a rhetorical manifestation of a universalist doctrine which in fact has very little validity or appeal.

Coping with the implications of this emerging superpower has been our central security problem for the last several years. This condition will not go away. And it will perhaps never be conclusively "solved." It will have to be faced by every Administration for the foreseeable future.

Our policy must deal with the consequences. The emergence of ambitious new powers into an existing international structure is a recurrent phenomenon. Historically, the adjustment of an existing order to the

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[2] For President Kennedy's address at American University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

arrival of one or more new actors almost invariably was accompanied by war—to impede the upstart, to remove or diminish some of the previously established actors, to test the balance of forces in a revised system. But in the nuclear era, when casualties in a general nuclear war will involve hundreds of millions in a matter of days, the use of force threatens utter catastrophe. It is our responsibility to contain Soviet power without global war, to avoid abdication as well as unnecessary confrontation.

This can be done, but it requires a delicate and complex policy. We must strive for an equilibrium of power, but we must move beyond it to promote the habits of mutual restraint, coexistence, and ultimately cooperation. We must stabilize a new international order in a vastly dangerous environment, but our ultimate goal must be to transform ideological conflict into constructive participation in building a better world.

This is what is meant by the process called détente—not the hunger for relaxation of tension, not the striving for agreements at any price, not the mindless search for friendly atmosphere which some critics use as naive and dangerous caricatures.

The policies pursued by this Administration have been designed to prevent Soviet expansion but also to build a pattern of relations in which the Soviet Union will always confront penalties for aggression and also acquire growing incentives for restraint. These goals are well within our capacities. Soviet power is evolving with considerable unevenness. Soviet society is no longer totally cut off from contact with or the influences of the world around it, nor is it without its own needs for outside relationships. It is the great industrial democracies, not the Soviet Union, that are the engine of the world economy and the most promising partners for the poorer nations.

The industrial democracies, if they face their challenges with confidence, if they do not mesmerize themselves with the illusion of simple solutions, possess vast strengths to contain Soviet power and to channel that power in constructive directions.

Our essential task is to recognize the need for a dual policy that simultaneously and with equal vigor resists expansionist drives and seeks to shape a more constructive relationship. We must prevent the Soviet Union from translating its growing strength into global or regional preponderance. But we must do so without escalating every crisis into a massive confrontation. In recent years, the United States has firmly resisted attempts by the Soviet Union to establish a naval base in Cuba, to impede the access routes to Berlin, to exploit the explosive situation in the Middle East. Recently we have sought to halt blatant intervention in Angola—until prevented from doing so by congressional action.

At the same time, we have a historic obligation to mankind to engage the Soviet Union in settlements of concrete problems and to push back the shadow of nuclear catastrophe. At the very least we owe it to our people to demonstrate that their government has missed no opportunity to achieve constructive solutions and that crises which have occurred were unavoidable. For whatever the rhetoric, Americans will not support confrontations they consider contrived.

This is why the United States has set forth principles of responsible relations in the nuclear age: Respect for the interests of all, restraint in the uses of power, and abstention from efforts to exploit instability or local conflicts for unilateral advantage. The United States has sought to give life to these principles in major negotiations on arms control, the prevention of accidental war, and in the settlement of political issues such as Berlin. And we have begun to construct a network of cooperative agreements in a variety of functional areas—economic, scientific, medical, environmental, and others —which promise concrete benefits if political conditions permit their full implementation and further development.

It has been our belief that, with patience, a pattern of restraints and a network of vested interests can develop which will give coexistence a more hopeful dimension and make both sides conscious of what they would stand to lose by reverting to the poli-

tics of pressure, confrontation, and crisis.

This policy reflects the deepest aspirations of the American people.

In the early 1970's when current U.S.–Soviet relations were shaped, our nation had already passed through traumatic events and was engaged in an anguishing war. There were riots in the streets and on the campuses demanding rapid progress toward peace. Every new defense program was challenged —including the ABM [antiballistic missiles], which was approved by only one vote, the development of multiple warheads, the Trident submarine, and the B–1 bomber. Successive Congresses passed resolutions urging the Administration to reorder our national priorities away from defense. We were continually attacked for not making concessions in the SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. The Congress and many interest groups pressed continually for the opening up of East–West trade and agitated against the Administration's approach of linking progress in economic relations with prior progress in political relations. Throughout the course of 1970 and 1971, we were involved in a series of crises with the Soviet Union and were often accused of provocation or bellicosity in the process.

Thus, only a few short years ago, the pressures in this country and from our allies were overwhelmingly to move rapidly toward better relations with Moscow. We resisted these pressures then, just as we now refuse to let ourselves be stampeded in the opposite direction. In the Administration's view the country needs a balanced policy, combining firmness and conciliation, strong defense and arms control, political principles and economic incentives. And it must be a policy for the long term that the American people can sustain, offering promise of a constructive future.

It is therefore ironic that our national debate seems now in many respects to have come full circle. The conditions in which détente originated are largely forgotten. Those who pressed for concessions and unilateral restraint toward Moscow now accuse the government of being too conciliatory. Those who complain about our failure to respond with sufficient vigor to Soviet moves are often the very ones who incessantly seek to remove this country's leverage for influence or action—through restrictions on trade and credit, through weakening our intelligence capabilities, through preventing aid to friends who seek to resist Soviet aggression.

The restrictions on trade and credit are a case in point. The human rights issue is a matter of deep and legitimate concern to all Americans. But the congressional attempt to link it openly with economic relations, without subtlety or understanding of Soviet politics, both deprived us of economic levers and sharply reduced Soviet emigration. Other industrial countries have stepped in to provide credits and technology, with less concern for the objective of inducing political restraint which we had envisaged.

So let us understand the scope and limits of a realistic policy:

—We cannot prevent the growth of Soviet power, but we can prevent its use for unilateral advantage and political expansion.

—We cannot prevent a buildup of Soviet forces, but we have the capacity, together with our allies, to maintain an equilibrium. We cannot neglect this task and then blame the Soviet Union if the military balance shifts against us.

—We have the diplomatic, economic, and military capacity to resist expansionism, but we cannot engage in a rhetoric of confrontation while depriving ourselves of the means to confront.

—We must accept that sovereign states, especially of roughly equal power, cannot impose unacceptable conditions on each other and must proceed by compromise.

—We must live with the reality of the nuclear threat, but we have it in our power to build a new relationship that transcends the nuclear peril.

So let us end the defeatist rhetoric that implies that Soviet policy is masterful, purposeful, and overwhelming while American policy is bumbling, uncertain, and weak. Let us stop pretending that somehow tough

rhetoric and contrived confrontations show confidence in America. The opposite is true. Those who are prepared to base their policy on reality, those who assert that the American people will support a complex policy of firmness and conciliation and that this policy will succeed, show a real faith in our capacities and our future. We have a design and the material assets to deal with the Soviet Union. We will succeed if we move forward as a united people.

Against this background let me discuss two current issues that illustrate the two strands of policy that we are concurrently pursuing:

—The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, in which we are seeking to shape a more positive future.

—The Angolan situation, where we are attempting to curb Soviet expansionism.

Strategic Arms Limitation

There is one central fact that distinguishes our era from all previous historical periods: the existence of enormously destructive weapons that can span unlimited distances almost instantaneously. No part of the globe is beyond reach. No part of the globe would be spared the effects of a general nuclear exchange.

For centuries it was axiomatic that increases in military power could be translated into almost immediate political advantage. It is now clear that new increments of strategic weaponry do not automatically lead to either political or military gains. Yet, in the nature of things, if one side expands its strategic arsenal, the other side will inevitably match it. The race is maintained partly because a perceived inequality is considered by each side as politically unacceptable even though it has become difficult to define precisely what purely military purpose is served.

We thus face a paradox: At current and foreseeable levels of nuclear arms, it becomes increasingly dangerous to invoke them. In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic weapons of the two sides determined the outcome. Today these arsenals increasingly find their purpose primarily in matching and deterring the forces of the opponent. For under virtually no foreseeable circumstance could the United States—or the Soviet Union—avoid 100 million dead in a nuclear exchange. Yet the race goes on because of the difficulty of finding a way to get off the treadmill.[2]

This condition imposes a unique and heavy responsibility on the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers. Sustaining the nuclear competition requires endless invocations of theoretical scenarios of imminent or eventual nuclear attack. The attempt to hedge against all conceivable contingencies, no matter how fanciful, fuels political tensions and could well lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fixation on potential strategic arms imbalances that is inherent in an unrestrained arms race diverts resources into strategically unproductive areas—particularly away from forces for local defense, where shortfalls and imbalances could indeed be turned rapidly to our disadvantage. If no restraint is developed, the competition in strategic arms can have profound consequences for the future of international relations and indeed of civilization.

The United States therefore has sought and achieved since 1963 a series of arms control agreements which build some restraint into nuclear rivalry. There was a significant breakthrough to limit strategic weapons in 1972. If the 1974 Vladivostok accord leads to a new agreement, an even more important advance will have been made.

Yet, at this critical juncture, the American people are subjected to an avalanche of charges that SALT is a surrender of American interests. There are assertions that the United States is falling behind in the stra-

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[2] To be sure, there exist scenarios in planning papers which seek to demonstrate how one side could use its strategic forces and how in some presumed circumstance it would prevail. But these confuse what a technician can calculate with what a responsible statesman can decide. They are invariably based on assumptions such as that one side would permit its missile silos to be destroyed without launching its missiles before they are actually hit—on which no aggressor would rely where forces such as those possessed by either the United States or the U.S.S.R. now and in the years ahead are involved. [Footnote in original.]

tegic competition and that SALT has contributed to it. There are unsupportable charges that the Soviets have systematically violated the SALT agreements.

None of this is accurate. What are the facts?

First of all, American policy decisions in the 1960's set the level of our strategic forces for the 1970's. We then had the choice between continuing the deployment of large, heavy-throwweight missiles like the Titan or Atlas or undertaking development and deployment of large numbers of smaller, more flexible ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles] or combinations of both types. The Administration then in office chose to rely on an arsenal of 1,000 small, sophisticated, and highly accurate ICBM's and 656 submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats, along with heavy bombers; we deployed them rapidly and then stopped our buildup of launchers unilaterally in the 1960's when the programs were complete. Only 54 of the heavy Titans were retained and still remain in the force.

The Soviets made the opposite decision; they chose larger, heavier missiles; they continued to build up their forces through the 1960's and 1970's; they passed our numerical levels by 1969–70 and continued to add an average of 200 missiles a year until stopped by the first SALT agreement.

Thus, as a consequence of decisions made a decade ago by both sides, Soviet missiles are superior in throwweight while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophistication and we possess larger numbers of warheads. In 1972 when the SALT agreement was signed, the Soviet Union was still building at the rate of 90 land-based and 120 sea-based launchers a year—while we were building none, as a result of our own repeatedly reaffirmed unilateral decisions of a decade previously. Since new American programs to redress the balance had only recently been ordered, there was no way to reduce the numerical gap before the late seventies when more modern sea-based missiles and bombers were scheduled to become operational.

The interim SALT agreement of 1972 froze overall numbers of launchers on both sides for five years, thereby limiting the momentum of Soviet programs without affecting any of ours. It stopped the Soviet buildup of heavy missile launchers. It forced the Soviets to agree to dismantle 210 older land-based missiles to reach permitted ceilings on missile-carrying submarines. The agreed-upon silo limitations permitted us to increase the throwweight of our own missiles, if we decided on this avenue of improving our strategic forces. We have so far chosen not to do so, although, through research and development, we retain the option. By any measure, the SALT agreements prevented the then-evolving gap in numbers from widening while enabling us to retain our advantage in other categories and easing the problem of redressing the balance when new programs became operational. What no negotiation could do is reverse by diplomacy the results of our own longstanding decisions with respect to weapons design and deployment.

Moreover, the SALT agreements ended for an indefinite period the prospect of a dangerous and uncertain competition in antiballistic missile defense—a competition that promised no strategic advantage, but potentially serious instabilities and the expenditure of vast sums of money.

The first SALT agreements were therefore without question in the American national interest. In the five-year respite gained by the 1972 interim agreement, it was our intention to negotiate a long-term pact on offensive weapons that would firmly fix both sides at an equal level once our new programs became operational. This is precisely what President Ford achieved at Vladivostok in November 1974.

In this accord in principle, both sides agreed on a ceiling of 2,400 strategic weapons covering strategic systems and heavy bombers—but not counting any of our forward-based aircraft in Europe, or our allies' strategic weapons, many of which can reach Soviet soil. The ceiling of 2,400 is lower than the level the Soviet Union already has reached; it would require the dismantling of many Soviet weapons, while the planned

levels and composition of our forces would not need to be reduced or changed. An equal ceiling of 1,320 was placed on numbers of strategic weapons with multiple warheads. Soviet heavy missile launchers will remain frozen. These limits would cap the strategic competition in numbers for a 10-year period, yet preserve all the programs we need to assure deterrence and strategic sufficiency.

Obviously no single agreement can solve every problem. This is not a question of loopholes, but of evolving technology, with respect to which we intend to remain vigilant. We will negotiate carefully to make certain that the national interest and national security are protected. But if we succeed in turning the Vladivostok accord into a 10-year agreement, we will have crossed the threshold between total unrestrained competition and the difficult but promising beginning of long-term strategic equilibrium at lower levels of forces. The United States and the Soviet Union have already agreed to turn to reductions in strategic forces in the next phase of the negotiations, starting in 1977.

One would have thought that these accomplishments would speak for themselves. Instead, they have triggered a flood of charges which mislead the American people and our friends, give a wrong impression of irresoluteness to our adversaries, and complicate the prospects for a new agreement that is in the overriding national interest.

No charge is more irresponsible and potentially more dangerous than the allegation that the United States has knowingly tolerated violations of the first SALT agreements.

What are the facts? A Standing Consultative Commission was created by the agreements of 1972 precisely to consider disputes or ambiguities in implementation. Such incidents were almost certain to arise in a first, quite limited agreement between longstanding adversaries possessing weapons systems of great complexity whose growth is verified not by some neutral policing mechanism but by each side's own intelligence systems. Every questionable activity that has arisen has been systematically analyzed by this government and considered by the President and his advisers. Whenever any question remained, it was then promptly raised with the Soviets. All instructions to the American representative on the Consultative Commission reflected the unanimous views of all U.S. agencies concerned and the data and assessment produced jointly by them. No one had a bias in favor of absolving the Soviets—an inherently malicious charge. No one prevented all questionable or suspicious activities from being raised with the Soviets. And not all the questioned activities were on the Soviet side.

All of these issues have been and will continue to be seriously handled and dealt with through a process that has proved effective. Yet irresponsible charges continue to lump together incidents that have been explained or are still being considered with wild allegations that have no foundation. They sometimes put forward inaccurate figures and data which often can be refuted only by divulging sensitive intelligence information. Yet with all the recent flurry of allegations, no recommendations are made of what countermeasures we should take or how to assess the significance of any given alleged violation.

In what way do the alleged violations affect the strategic equation? In what manner, if any, have we been foreclosed from protecting ourselves? Would those who inaccurately allege violations simply throw over all the agreements regardless of the benefits they provide the United States? Would they halt the negotiation of further agreements? What purpose is served by leading our public and the Soviet Union to believe—totally incorrectly—that the United States is blind to violations or that its government deliberately deceives its people? Can anyone seriously believe that this Administration which has strenuously resisted Communist advances in every part of the world—and is often strongly criticized for it—would ignore Soviet violations of a formal agreement?

I can assure you that this Administration will not tolerate violations. It will continue to monitor Soviet compliance meticulously. It will pursue energetically all ambiguities or signs of noncompliance. But it will not

be driven by demagoguery to make false or hasty judgments. No department or agency charged with responsibility for this problem holds the view that any violations have occurred.

As we assess SALT we must face squarely one question: What is the alternative to the agreement we have and seek? If the SALT process falters, we must consider what new or additional strategic programs we would undertake, their likely cost, and above all, their strategic purpose.

An accelerated strategic buildup over the next five years could cost as much as an additional $20 billion. Failing a satisfactory agreement, this will surely be the path we must travel. It would be a tragically missed opportunity. For in the process of such a buildup, and the atmosphere it would engender, it would be difficult to return to serious negotiations for some time. Tensions are likely to increase; a new, higher baseline will emerge from which future negotiations would eventually have to begin. And in the end, neither side will have gained a strategic advantage. At the least, they will have wasted resources. At worst, they will have increased the risks of nuclear war.

Of course the Soviet Union must ponder these alternatives as well. Their sense of responsibility must equal ours if there is to be an equitable and durable agreement based on strict reciprocity. We consider a SALT agreement important, but we will take no chances with our national security.

Let me sum up:

—We will never stand for the violation of a solemn treaty or agreement, and we will remain alert.

—We will never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us—by violations of agreements, by unsatisfactory agreements, or by neglect of our own programs. We will spend what is necessary to maintain strategic sufficiency.

—The President is determined to pursue the effort to negotiate a saner strategic balance on equitable terms—because it is in our interest and because we have an obligation to our own people and to world peace.

The Soviet Union and Angola

As the United States strives to shape a more hopeful world, it can never forget that global stability and security rest upon an equilibrium between the great powers. If the Soviet Union is permitted to exploit opportunities arising out of local conflicts by military means, the hopes we have for progress toward a more peaceful international order will ultimately be undermined.

This is why the Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of Africa with nearly 200 million dollars' worth of military equipment, its advisers, and its transport of the large expeditionary force of 11,000 Cuban combat troops must be a matter of urgent concern.

Angola represents the first time that the Soviets have moved militarily at long distance to impose a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the United States has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside the immediate Soviet orbit. And it is the first time that Congress has halted national action in the middle of a crisis.

When one great power tips the balance of forces decisively in a local conflict through its military intervention—and meets no resistance—an ominous precedent is set, of grave consequence even if the intervention occurs in a seemingly remote area. Such a precedent cannot be tolerated if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved. And if the pattern is not broken now, we will face harder choices and higher costs in the future.

The United States seeks no unilateral goals in Angola. We have proposed a cease-fire; withdrawal of all outside forces, Soviet, Cuban, and South African; cessation of foreign military involvement, including the supply of equipment; and negotiations among all three Angolan factions. This approach has the support of half the nations of Africa.

Last summer and fall, to halt a dangerously escalating situation, the United States provided financial support through African friends to those in Angola—the large majority—who sought to resist Soviet and Cuban

domination. Using this as leverage, we undertook an active diplomacy to promote an African solution to an African problem. We acted quietly, to avoid provoking a major crisis and raising issues of prestige.

At first it was feared that the Soviet-backed faction, because of massive Soviet aid and Cuban mercenaries, would dominate totally by Independence Day, November 11. Our assistance prevented that. African determination to oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention became more and more evident. On December 9 the President warned Moscow of the consequences of continued meddling and offered to cooperate in encouraging a peaceful outcome that removed foreign influence. The Soviet Union appeared to have second thoughts. It halted its airlift from December 9 until December 24.

At that point, the impact of our domestic debate overwhelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. It was demanded that we explain publicly why our effort was important—and then our effort was cut off. After the Senate vote to block further aid to Angola, Cuba more than doubled its forces and Soviet military aid was resumed on a large scale. The cooperativeness of Soviet diplomacy declined. Since then the situation has continued to deteriorate.

As our public discussion continues, certain facts must be understood. The analogy with Viet-Nam is totally false; this nation must have the maturity to make elementary distinctions. The President has pledged that no American troops or advisers would be sent to Angola, and we were prepared to accept legislative restrictions to that effect, in addition to the War Powers Act which already exists. What was involved was modest assistance to stabilize the local balance of forces and make possible a rapid political settlement in cooperation with African countries.

It is charged that the Administration acted covertly, without public acknowledgment. That is correct; for our purpose was to avoid an escalated confrontation that would make it more difficult for the Soviets to back down, as well as to give the greatest possible scope for an African solution. Angola was a case where diplomacy without leverage was likely to be impotent, yet direct military confrontation would involve needless risks. This is precisely one of those gray areas where unpublicized methods would enable us to influence events short of direct conflict.

And we complied totally with Congress' new standard of executive-legislative consultation on secret activities. Beginning in July, and through December, we discussed the Angolan situation and what we were doing about it with more than two dozen Senators, 150 Congressmen, and over 100 staff members of both Houses. Eight congressional committees were briefed on 24 separate occasions. We sought in these briefings to determine the wishes of Congress, and there was little sign of active opposition to our carefully limited operations.

It is said that the Russians will inevitably be eased out by the Africans themselves over a period of time. This may or may not prove true. But such an argument, when carried to its logical conclusion, implies that we can abandon the world to interventionist forces and hope for the best. And reliance on history is of little solace to those under attack, whose future is being decided now. The degree of Soviet and Cuban intervention is unprecedented; they will have effectively determined the outcome. There is no evidence to support the claim that they will be quickly removed or that other nations may not draw damaging conclusions dangerous to our long-term interests.

It is maintained that we should meet the Soviet threat in Angola through escalated methods of pressure such as altering our position on SALT or grain sales. But these arrangements benefit us as well as the Soviet Union and are part of the long-term strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. History has proved time and again that expansion can be checked only when there is a local balance of forces; indirect means can succeed only if rapid local victories are foreclosed. As the President has pointed

out, the Soviet Union has survived for nearly 60 years without American grain; it could do so now. Cutting off grain would still lose Angola. We would duplicate the experience of the Trade Act, which interrupted the trade relationship with the U.S.S.R. to insure emigration—and ended up with neither.

Let us not bemuse ourselves with facile slogans about not becoming the world's policeman. We have no desire to play such a role. But it can never be in our interest to let the Soviet Union act as the world's policeman. There are many crises in the world where the United States cannot and should not intervene. But here we face a blatant Soviet and Cuban challenge, which could have been overcome if we had been allowed to act prudently with limited means at the early stage. By forcing this out onto center stage, our divisions simultaneously escalated the significance of the crisis and guaranteed our impotence.

To claim that Angola is not an important country, or that the United States has no important interests there, begs the principal question. If the United States is seen to waver in the face of massive Soviet and Cuban intervention, what will be the perception of leaders around the world as they make decisions concerning their future security? And what conclusions will an unopposed superpower draw when the next opportunity for intervention beckons?

Where are we now? The government has a duty to make clear to the Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola sets no precedent, that this type of action will not be tolerated again. It must reassure adjacent countries they will not be left exposed to attack or pressure from the new Soviet-Cuban foothold. Congress and the executive must come together on this proposition—in the national interest and in the interest of world peace.

The Administration will continue to make its case, however unpopular it may be temporarily. Let no nation believe that Americans will long remain indifferent to the dispatch of expeditionary forces and vast supplies of arms to impose minority governments—especially when that expeditionary force comes from a nation in the Western Hemisphere.

National Strength and the Debate at Home

We live in a world without simple answers. We hold our values too dear to relinquish defending them; we hold human life too dear to cease the quest for a secure peace. The first requirement of stability is to maintain our defenses and the balance of power. But the highest aim of policy in the nuclear age must be to create out of the sterile equilibrium of force a more positive relationship of peace.

America has the material assets to do the job. Our military might is unmatched. Our economic and technological strength dwarfs any other. Our democratic heritage is envied by hundreds of millions around the world.

Our problems therefore are of our own making—self-doubt, division, irresolution. We must once again become a confident, united, and determined people.

Foreign countries must be able to deal with America as an entity, not as a complex of divided institutions. If our divisions paralyze our international efforts, it is America as a whole that will suffer. We have no more urgent task than restoring the partnership between the American people, the Congress, and the executive. A new partnership can enable the President of the United States, in his constitutionally determined role, to address the world with the central authority of the spokesman of a united and purposeful America.

Debate is the essence of democracy. But restraint is the cement of national cohesion. It is time to end the self-torment and obsession with our guilt which has threatened to paralyze us for too many years. It is time to stop dismantling our national institutions and undermining our national confidence.

Let us learn—even in an election year—the self-discipline to shape our domestic de-

bates into a positive, not a destructive, process.

One of the forgotten truths of our history is that our Founding Fathers were men of great sophistication in foreign affairs. They understood the balance of power; they made use of the divisions of Europe for the advantage of our own Revolution. They understood the need for a strong executive to conduct the nation's diplomacy. They grasped that America required economic, political, and moral links with other nations. They saw that our ideals were universal, and they understood and welcomed the impact of the American experiment on the destinies of all mankind.

In our age, whose challenges are without precedent, we need once again the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. Our ideals must give us strength—rather than serve as an excuse for abdication. The American people want an effective foreign policy. They want America to continue to help shape the international order of the coming generation according to our ideals. We have done great things as a united people. We have it in our power to make our third century a time of vibrancy and hope and greatness.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at San Francisco

Press release 44A dated February 3

John B. Bates, president, Commonwealth Club: . . . I would like to first say that this, too, is a shared responsibility between the Commonwealth Club and the World Affairs Council. We have tried to screen out the many questions we have received and not duplicate them and get down to what we believe is representative of all of the questions that have been submitted to us.

First of all, Mr. Secretary, quite a few questions on what has happened to Ambassador Moynihan [U.S. Representative to the U.N. Daniel P. Moynihan]. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me say first of all that Ambassador Moynihan is a close friend of mine over many years. Like many Harvard professors, he has his temperamental side and is unusually sensitive to criticism. [Laughter.]

But let me say that I recommended Ambassador Moynihan for his present position after reading an article in Commentary magazine that he had written in which he outlined the policy that he thought we should pursue at the United Nations. We therefore knew exactly what he would do; and he was sent to New York to carry out the policies which he, in fact, carried out. Indeed, last July before he assumed office I made a speech in Milwaukee in somewhat more pedantic language than he uses. [Laughter.] I outlined essentially the same considerations.

So Ambassador Moynihan carried out with very great distinction the instructions of the President and the Secretary of State and gave them his own inspired cast. [Laughter.]

I think he made a major contribution to American foreign policy. He has told us that he wishes to return to Harvard because if he did not at this time he would lose his tenure position irrevocably. And with the most enormous reluctance, the President and I had to go along with a repeatedly and insistently made request that we accept his resignation. There were no policy disagreements, and his successor will be instructed to carry out the same policies—though, of course, there's only one Pat Moynihan in the United States. [Laughter.]

Q. There was a recent article in Pravda somewhat critical of you, Mr. Secretary, and I have this question. Did the recent Pravda article lose anything in its translation? Why do you think the article was printed at this time?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, I don't think that the editors of Pravda

understand the policies of my father in clipping newspaper articles or they wouldn't have written it, because my father has the rule that any author is given two chances. The second time they write an unfavorable article he deletes it from the scrapbooks he keeps. [Laughter.] So I want to make clear to Pravda that if they want to stay in my father's clipping file, they better stop here. [Laughter.]

I don't know whether the article lost anything in the translation, but I think I got the message. [aughter.]

There is no complete unanimity of views between us and the Soviet Union on Angola, but I can only repeat: The United States is dedicated to improving its relationship with the Soviet Union. The United States believes that it has a historic obligation, even in the face of domestic pressures here, to construct a new international set of relationships which reduces the risk of war. But the United States will not let this effort be used by any country to try to achieve unilateral advantages or to exploit local instabilities by its military forces. So the Soviet Union will have to choose. We are prepared for a positive policy of genuine coexistence, but we are not prepared to have coexistence used as a cover for seeking unilateral advantages in various parts of the globe.

Q. We've spent a lot of your time discussing Angola, Mr. Secretary, but this may be a little different twist to it. Is it possible that the Angola issue is an internal matter? If so, why not let the Soviets find out, as we did in Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: There are two big differences. The first is the United States would never have got itself engaged even financially—which is all we have ever done in Angola, with very modest sums—but we would not have done even that much in an internal struggle in Angola.

In Mozambique—another Portuguese colony of a similar evolution—the United States, immediately after independence, recognized a government very similar in composition to the one the Soviet Union is now supporting in Angola.

We are prepared to work with any government that emerges by African processes. What concerns us in Angola is the massive introduction of an amount of Soviet military equipment larger than all the other African countries received from all sources in the last year and the introduction of 11,000 Cuban combat troops who are doing all of the fighting—the fighting is not done by Africans; the fighting is done mostly by Cubans. So what we face is the imposition of a minority government by a foreign force.

Now, the analogy to Viet-Nam would be correct if we were permitted to give financial assistance to those who are resisting—which is what the Soviet Union did for the North Vietnamese. In that case, the Soviet Union and Cuba might well have found out in Angola that this kind of action does not pay. But when massive forces are introduced and the United States does not even contribute financial support, then the outcome is inevitable. And the inevitable outcome, we must now make sure, should not lead to similar situations in other countries. That is our overwhelming concern. And the reason I speak so much about Angola is not to affect decisions which the Congress has already made but to prevent similar situations from arising in other parts of the world.

Q. One more question on Angola, Mr. Secretary, and then we'll leave Angola aside: Why have the Cubans become involved?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want to pretend that I can read the inscrutable Cuban mind. [Laughter.] I think the Cubans have become involved in Angola through revolutionary zeal, through their belief that they are a pristine revolutionary force that must support revolutions everywhere. And this is a phenomenon which we must reflect about very seriously. There are Cuban forces of much smaller size all over Africa. There are some Cuban forces in South Yemen.

These are matters to which we cannot be indifferent, because it can lead to enormous instabilities all over the world, especially when it is done by a small Caribbean coun-

try backed by revolutionary zeal and Soviet logistics.

Q. To what extent has the secrecy abrogation in the United States adversely affected our diplomatic endeavors?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that every democracy has to strike a balance between giving its public enough information so that they can make meaningful decisions and to make sure that the public understand the real reasons for governmental actions but, on the other hand, retain a capacity for some secrecy in its diplomacy.

Nobody in this audience who runs a business or a law office or any other enterprise could possibly conduct his affairs if every memorandum that is written internally, if every communication with some other organization, were immediately put on the public record. And yet this is the condition we increasingly face in Washington today. Every memorandum that comes across one's desk one has to look at not just from the point of its merit but from the point of view of how it looks in the newspapers, and the result of that will be not more openness. The result will be that no memoranda will be written [laughter] and that the business will be conducted largely orally and then people will put unilateral memoranda in their files and even more confusion will result. [Laughter.]

So I believe that other governments must be able to tell us their candid assessments without having to worry that every communication to us immediately gets into the public domain.

Now, how to strike a balance between necessary secrecy and the temptation of governments to cover up their mistakes behind the cloak of secrecy—which is a legitimate concern—this is something to which we now have to address ourself. But an element of secrecy is absolutely essential.

Q. To what extent do you think that the KGB has infiltrated the U.S. Congress? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: I may be courageous, but I'm not reckless. [Laughter.]

Q. When all is said and done, isn't your Near East diplomacy basically a matter of taking American money and paying both sides not to fight? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: We experienced in 1973 that a Middle East war can have the most drastic consequences. The Middle East war in 1973 cost us about $3 billion directly, about $10–$15 billion indirectly. It increased our unemployment and contributed to the deepest recession we have had in the postwar period. So we know what the cost of a war is.

Secondly, the aid we are giving to Israel is not a payment for agreements. In the postwar period, supporting the survival and security of Israel has been a fundamental national policy. And therefore it would have to be continued whether or not there are agreements. So the aid to Israel should not be considered as a payment for agreements but as a part of a fundamental national policy.

The only other large recipients in the Middle East are Egypt and Jordan. We believe that it is overwhelmingly in our national interest that Egypt has broken its longstanding intimate ties with the Soviet Union and that it has contributed to a moderate and peaceful evolution in the Middle East. And there again we're not paying Egypt for this. We're not paying Egypt for an agreement. We are contributing to the possibility of Egypt concentrating on a more moderate course because the alternatives for the United States would be much more drastic. Every war in the Middle East has involved the risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Every war in the Middle East has strained our relations with our allies and created enormous international turmoil.

Our policy is not to pay people not to fight; our policy is to construct a more peaceful relationship in the Middle East and to use the sums that we would have to pay anyway under conditions of tension in a constructive way to bring about a peaceful settlement.

Q. What mutual concessions would enable

Israel and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] to establish détente?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have taken the position that until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel, we cannot ask Israel to negotiate with it—nor can we ourselves participate in a diplomatic process involving the PLO. So we believe that the minimum condition is that the PLO accept the existence of Israel and accept the validity of the U.N. Security Council resolutions on which the peace process in the Middle East is based.

Q. Why does not this country use American wheat as an instrument of foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: We find very often that we are told abstractly that we should use American economic power in order to influence foreign policy decisions of other countries. But we also find that when we attempt to do so, we would inevitably interrupt private markets and private arrangements because there is no way of using our economic power without some degree of governmental control.

Now, with respect to the wheat deal to the Soviet Union, it is not generally realized that there was a voluntary restraint on sales to the Soviet Union from July through October while we were negotiating a long-term agreement and that in many parts of the country and in many sections of the Congress this voluntary restraint is looked upon with great disfavor. We believe that the long-term agreement that was made with the Soviet Union over a five-year period introduces some stability into our markets. It creates a cutoff point during emergency situations in which further negotiations would have to be conducted before we would agree to the sale of additional wheat.

We believe that the circumstances that have so far existed have not justified the cutoff of wheat, because the cutoff would not have been effective in any time frame relevant to, for example, the issues of Angola.

We believe that—and we have said so repeatedly—if the relations with the Soviet Union deteriorate drastically—which we would hope strongly to avoid—it will affect our other relationships. But at the present time it was an excessive reaction which would not have helped in relation to the Angola problem.

Q. I have questions on what is our Latin American policy—which is a general question—and then, specifically: Do we continue to plan to give the Panama Canal away?

Secretary Kissinger: I could make a great headline by saying "Yes." [Laughter.]

Let me explain what is at issue in the Panama Canal negotiation. Our concern with the Panama Canal issue is to avoid a situation in which the United States is drawn into a confrontation with all of Latin America, in which American military force will have to be used to fight a guerrilla war in the Western Hemisphere, as long as an honorable alternative presents itself. What we are negotiating now—and incidentally, with the agreement of all of the agencies of the U.S. Government—is an arrangement in which the defense of the Panama Canal will be jointly exercised between the United States and Panama for an extended period of time—for a very extended period of time—while the operation of the canal is turned over during a shorter period of time.

But the essential American defense interests can be maintained, in our view, through this cooperative arrangement while avoiding a situation in which the Panama Canal becomes a rallying ground of all of Latin American resentment against the United States. We will not make an agreement in which our essential interests in free transit through the Panama Canal are jeopardized, but we will make a serious effort to see whether we can make a stabler arrangement. All of this will have to be put before the Congress and will be explored in the greatest detail with the Congress while we're negotiating it, and the negotiations are likely to take some period of time.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at San Francisco February 3

Press release 46 dated February 3

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my question is—some critics of the cause of détente seem to take the view in this case that the Soviet Union may be less strict in its overt relationship with the United States. I take it from your remarks today that you do not share this view?

Secretary Kissinger: I say that it's not a question to be settled in the abstract. We have concrete ideas of what is needed to have an equitable SALT agreement. We have specific ideas of the restraint that is needed in the conduct of international affairs.

We will pursue these ideas. If we can realize them, this will be a test of whether the Soviet Union is interested in real relaxation of tension. If not, they are not; but what we want to avoid is an abstract debate in this country. We want to keep people's attention focused on the fact that, beyond all our internal controversies, we do have an obligation to build a stabler world and that we cannot give up on that.

Q. [*Inaudible.*]

Secretary Kissinger: They have already gone, and we have always proposed that South African forces should go. And we have made it clear that all foreign forces—South African, Cuban, and Soviet—should go. In fact, we have publicly proposed that we would support a negotiation in which South African forces would leave first, and the others follow. It is our understanding that the South African forces have withdrawn to their border.

Q. [*Inaudible.*]

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what sources close to Ambassador Moynihan that could be. I have stated innumerable times my high regard for Ambassador Moynihan. I think the Washington press corps knows what I have said about Ambassador Moynihan. I don't believe anybody will be able to cite one example of my undercutting Ambassador Moynihan, disagreeing with Ambassador Moynihan. In fact, I would happily trade his press for mine. [Laughter.] And if I could confine the leaking against me in the State Department to the level of the leakage against him, I would be in great shape.

Q. What did you mean when you said he's overly sensitive?

Secretary Kissinger: I think all of us Harvard professors are very sensitive to criticism. We are used to adoring students.

Q. [*Inaudible.*]

Secretary Kissinger: We hear little about Peru?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to be visiting Peru in the near future. Their Foreign Minister, as it happens, is a good personal friend of mine. He was the first foreign minister, as it happened, whom I saw after I was sworn in as Secretary of State. I have high regard for him.

I have respect for the foreign policy of Peru. And I think that a constructive nonalignment is one that the United States has never opposed.

What we oppose is rigid bloc voting in the United Nations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the late Rabin visit to Washington, what's your concept of the future of peacemaking efforts in the Middle East? Would it be Geneva or quiet diplomacy—or what's your concept?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know what our capacities for quiet diplomacy are at this particular moment. I am going to see Prime Minister Rabin again tonight in Los Angeles, and we will have a sort of a wrap-up session.

What forum will be chosen depends of course on what is possible. The United States is prepared to go to Geneva. The United States is also prepared to encourage other steps that the parties could agree upon.

After further talks with the Prime Minister and after his return to Israel for an opportunity to talk to his colleagues, we will then approach other countries. And only out of that can we be sure of what process is going to develop.

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the strength of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in Angola, do you think the additional U.S. aid you've asked for will make a significant difference in the new emerging government of Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: So far we have not asked for any aid. We have simply indicated what would be needed. We have not made any formal request.

Secondly, I think it is technically incorrect to speak of the strength of the MPLA. I think it is correct to speak of the strength of the Cuban forces which do most of the fighting for the MPLA. But we have not made a formal request to the Congress. We do have a concern, however, that what is happening in Angola not set a precedent in other parts of the world or in Africa.

Q. Could you, Mr. Secretary, amplify those remarks? Where else could Angola set a precedent? What area is a trouble spot?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to predict where it could happen. We simply want to make clear there are many local situations, there are many places of tensions where the introduction of outside forces could tip the balance, or where the introduction of massive military equipment could.

I do not want to indicate those ahead of time, but we want to make clear what our general concern is.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you attempt to comment on Rita Hauser as a replacement for Ambassador Moynihan?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not had a chance to review the list with the President. I have had some exchanges with the White House, but until the President has made a decision I do not think I should comment on possibilities.

Q. Mr. Secretary, tomorrow the Secretary of Transportation is going to announce a decision on whether the landing rights on the Concorde are granted. What's your position on the Concorde? What would be the diplomatic consequences of the granting of landing rights?

Secretary Kissinger: We were asked by the Secretary of Transportation to state our view on the foreign policy implications. He has the responsibility to make his judgment on the basis of those, plus environmental factors, plus all the other considerations for which he is responsible.

We stated to him that the foreign policy implications of depriving Britain and France of access to American airports, on a vehicle of high technology of which they're rather proud, would be difficult. But, on the other hand, the decision is one that Secretary Coleman has to make and he has to consider many considerations—many factors—in addition to the factors that I am responsible for.

Q. [Inaudible.]

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated the foreign policy considerations. He is the one that has to make the final decision.

Q. Will the United States have an easier time of it in the United Nations without Daniel Patrick Moynihan as our representative?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that Ambassador Moynihan did a distinguished job. I think Ambassador Moynihan carried out what he was sent there to do. He was sent there on

the basis of an article in Commentary that outlined exactly in fact what he did, so nobody was surprised by his actions.

I think his impact was useful and healthy, and I think that his successor will carry out essentially the same policies.

Therefore I think our role in the United Nations will be no easier than it was when Ambassador Moynihan was there, except as the success of the policies with which he was identified takes hold.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States any view on the reported conflict between Mr. Rabin and Peres regarding the military needs of Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not aware of any conflict between Prime Minister Rabin and Defense Minister Peres. I must say we are so busy in our own internal problems that we cannot get involved in those of Israel.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the course of your frequent contacts with your NATO allies, what is your opinion—to let the Western European governments know that the United States would be adamantly opposed to any coalition governments which would bring in any such major parties as the Communist parties of Italy or France? What makes you think that the European governments relish or even adhere to such domestic criteria on the part of the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, your basic premise is wrong. On my return from Moscow, the issue of the participation of Communist parties in the governments of Western Europe did not arise at all. The meeting with the NATO allies was confined entirely to a report on my visit to Moscow. On previous occasions, when we were asked for our opinion, we have given it—but never in a governmental context. It is up to the governments concerned to make those decisions.

If somebody asks our view of what the consequences will be—we are usually asked by the press—we give those views. But we have not done it in the NATO Council.

Q. The State Department reportedly proposed the filing of an antitrust suit against Bechtel Corporation in relation to the Arab boycott. The State Department also has proposed amendments that will change the language of the export-most-favored act which makes the boycott against Israel against the law. Why does the State Department propose these antiboycott amendments?

Secretary Kissinger: This is not exactly correct. It is in the nature of things that when other agencies in the government undertake steps which they think may have a foreign policy implication they will ask our views.

In the case of the Bechtel case, the Attorney General asked the view of the State Department as to what the foreign policy implications would be. We made clear, both publicly and in our opinion to the Attorney General, that we did not claim any right to interfere with the judicial process, or that our opinion should affect the judicial process. But being asked what our view was—I think anybody can tell you that the impact on Saudi Arabia and Saudi-U.S. relations will not be all that favorable.

Having stated our opinion, the Attorney General then proceeded—as was his duty—with applying the law as he sees it.

With respect to boycott, I do not know exactly what specific provisions you are talking about. We have supported—strongly supported—the Presidential statement which sets down the basic guidelines on the boycott. On some specific measures we have the view that they would have a serious impact on our relations with the countries concerned and might interfere and complicate the process of a moderate evolution toward peace in the Middle East.

But, again, the State Department has the responsibility to express the foreign policy implications. Others that have other responsibilities can then weigh those in relation to other priorities.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is your estimation of the independent military strength of the MPLA without Russian aid? Would the combined forces of the FNLA [National Front for the Liberation of Angola] and UNITA

[*National Union for the Total Independenee of Angola*] *be a defeatable foree without a unilateral—*

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, now that the Cuban forces have been active, I would have thought that without the introduction of Cuban forces—without the introduction of any outside forces—the most likely result would have been a stalemate in which each of these Angolan forces would have dominated the area from which it drew its strength in terms of the tribal areas.

So in terms of numbers, probably UNITA —having the largest tribal area—would probably have had the largest numbers in a one-man-one-vote situation. The probable outcome, without foreign intervention, would have been a coalition between the three factions and some working out of the domestic processes by African standards, in which perhaps one or the other might have become dominant; and this is something we could have lived with.

We have made no effort in any African country to prevent the coming into power by indigenous means of any particular group. And we immediately established in Mozambique—as I pointed out previously—we immediately established relations with FRELIMO [Front for the Liberation of Mozambique], which has views not all that different from the MPLA.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on Angola, what do you expect the Soviet reaetion to be to the tougher policy that you outlined today in the speeeh?

Seeretary Kissinger: We hope that the Soviet Union will consider very seriously the consequences of actions that may have been taken for even understandable reasons in the early phases and to keep in mind that the two superpowers must restrain their conduct or else the potentiality for conflict, misunderstanding, and tension is too great. And we hope that this is a lesson that the Soviet Union will learn from Angola.

I cannot stress enough: We believe that the problem of peace must be solved at some time. We are prepared to do it now. But we are not prepared to do it on the basis of one side gaining unilateral advantages.

Q. What happens if the Cubans are not able to continue to receive aid to their side?

Seeretary Kissinger: I believe that the Cubans should be removed. I believe that the Cubans must cease their massive interventions in other parts of the world, and we will face the problem of what will happen if it continues when it arises.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, due to the activities of publications like Counterspy, has the State Department had to provide new eovers or withdraw some of its agents, or CIA agents, in Embassies around the world?

Seeretary Kissinger: The State Department does not have CIA agents.

Q. But would you say that there are no CIA agents in the Embassies—in certain Embassies around the world?

Seeretary Kissinger: I would not comment on how cover is provided for CIA agents. I must say that the conduct of intelligence is essential for any great power. It is conducted by every major country, and we will do our best to continue legitimate intelligence functions.

Q. Mr. Seeretary, can you say how you hope the Soviets will recognize détente?

Seeretary Kissinger: By showing restraint in the future and by ending the intervention in Angola as rapidly as possible.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what leverage or power do we have if the Congress is not going to financially support the anti-Communist factions there?

Seeretary Kissinger: We have played stronger hands since I have been connected with foreign policy. You cannot conduct foreign policy without leverage, and our leverage has been drastically reduced. But we have to deal with the situation that we confront.

Q. Do you mean that before further talks on SALT proceed, before the next step is

going to be realized, the Angolan situation will be stabilized—is that what you're saying?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I am saying—have stated previously—that to bring the strategic arms race under control is not a favor that we do for the Soviet Union. And I have attempted to explain why it is not a favor we do to the Soviet Union.

I have also stated that if relations keep deteriorating that obviously other relations will be affected—whether or not they are a favor to the Soviet Union. We are still prepared to persevere in bringing negotiations of strategic arms limitations to a conclusion. And I do not want to discuss in detail what specific steps will be taken if the restraint is not exercised by the other side.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you sounded in your speech a little bit frustrated with American policy in Congress. Can you give us an assessment of your own satisfaction with your job, and are you contemplating anything like Mr. Moynihan did? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: I have given up my position at Harvard [laughter], so I do not necessarily have that option.

No—I do not sound frustrated with the job. I believe it is the duty of national leaders to make clear to the public what the problems are that we face. The Congress has a major responsibility in the shaping of foreign policy. It has to be done in partnership between the executive and the legislative. It is my obligation to explain what the issues are.

I have no plan to follow Mr. Moynihan to Harvard or to follow him out of government.

The press: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

U.S. and Canada Initial Draft Text of Transit Pipeline Agreement

Joint Statement [1]

On January 28, the chief U.S. and Canadian negotiators initialed a draft text of a general agreement covering transit pipelines. This agreement would provide government-to-government assurances on a reciprocal basis regarding noninterference with and nondiscriminatory treatment of hydrocarbons transported in present or future pipelines which cross the territory of either country.

The ad referendum agreement will now be referred to the two Governments for their review and approval. As part of the U.S. procedure, consultations within the executive branch, with the Congress, and with interested parties will be undertaken prior to final approval.

[1] Issued on Jan. 29 (text from press release 41).

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits the United States

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the State of Israel made an official visit to the United States January 26–February 5. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington January 27–30. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and Prime Minister Rabin at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on January 27, toasts exchanged by Secretary Kissinger and the Prime Minister at a luncheon at the Department of State that day, toasts exchanged by the President and the Prime Minister at a dinner at the White House that evening, their exchange of remarks at a reception given by the Prime Minister on January 29, and an address made by Prime Minister Rabin before a joint meeting of the Congress on January 28.

REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY, JANUARY 27

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 2

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin: *Shalom*. Mrs. Ford and I are very delighted to welcome both of you to Washington, our good friends of many years, and we are delighted to see you on this occasion despite the weather. We hope your visit here and across our nation, Mr. Prime Minister, will renew many happy memories and deepen the relationship of our two countries. We are proud to have both of you as our guests.

As in the past, Mr. Prime Minister, we meet today in a spirit of warm good will. Your visit gives me the opportunity to reaffirm on behalf of all of the American people the enduring friendship of our two countries, the traditional commitment of the United States to Israel's security and survival, and the dedication of the United States to seek, with Israel's cooperation, a peaceful, comprehensive, and just solution to the conflict in the Middle East.

The United States and Israel share a very deep devotion to democratic ideals, a special affinity as two kindred peoples, and common moral and political values that flow from the great Judeo-Christian heritage.

Just as you and I have been friends for many years, Mr. Prime Minister, our two nations are friends. For almost 30 years since and even before your independence, our two peoples have worked together in many fields. My strongest desire is that we continue to work together in the future. Today our cooperation is more necessary than ever in the quest for an enduring peace in the Middle East.

In the agreements we have already achieved by working together, we have established a sound basis for further movement toward an ultimate peace settlement. With statesmanship and courage, Mr. Prime Minister, you have taken the first steps.

The wisdom and determination that you and your nation have so amply displayed thus far will be required in even greater degree in the days ahead. Our tasks remain urgent and important. I know that the people of Israel yearn for peace. All of us share a great responsibility—Israel, its Arab neighbors, and the United States. Our task is to realize this goal together, with realism and with justice. Let us seize this historic opportunity to help translate hopes into reality.

I welcome your visit, Mr. Prime Minister. We can in the next several days deepen our mutual understanding and trust. We can help to advance the process of peace. We can en-

hance even further the unique friendship of our two countries. And if other nations also do their part, this year will be recorded in history as another year of steady progress toward the fulfillment of our common dream —the peace that is so fervently desired throughout the Middle East and by the entire world.

Mr. Prime Minister, I look forward to our discussions and to the pleasure of your company. On behalf of all Americans, I extend our heartiest welcome to you and to Mrs. Rabin.

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford: My wife and I appreciate very much your personal welcome, especially on such a day. According to the Jewish tradition, rain means blessing.

It is a pleasure to be back in Washington and to see around me so many friends. My thanks go to you, Mr. President, for your invitation that enables me to meet with you to express to you respect and friendship.

I am looking forward to our talks, for I know they will advance our common purpose. The purpose is peace—peace in the world and, more specifically, peace between Israel and the Arab countries. Toward that end, the Government of Israel commits its energies.

Mr. President, when the history of this period will be written, your name will be given a permanent place as the leader of the free world who led the struggle for a better, more decent, and more peaceful world for people to live in. Your personal involvement in the cause for peace and stability in the Middle East has been untiring.

Your efforts have not been without results. Under your guidance, America has played an indispensable role in helping to bring about what we all hope will prove to be the beginning of the peace process. We know that it is complex. We know that it is not without risks. But I want to assure you, Mr. President, that we, Israel, will continue to do all that can reasonably be done to help to move that process along.

Your friendship, your wisdom, the energy you devote for peace, and the efforts you make for the welfare of my own democratic people move me to express to you our sincere gratitude.

I am told, Mr. President, that by your invitation I am the first head of government to visit the United States in your Bicentennial Year. This is a special honor for me. It affords me the opportunity to bring a particular message of friendship to all communities across your great country, including the Jewish community, with whom we have a profound historic spiritual tie.

The message I carry is "Shalom to America" on the occasion of your Bicentennial celebration. It is a celebration we are making in Israel, too. We do so because of the debt that Israel and the whole free world owes to this great country. We do so because of the spirit of liberty, peace, and democracy that gave birth to free America 200 years ago. And we do so because it is identical to the spirit that gave rebirth to my own free Israel 28 years ago.

Mr. President, I am deeply gratified for your invitation and hospitality which enables me to deliver this message to you personally.

TOASTS AT LUNCHEON GIVEN BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, JANUARY 27

Press release 34 dated January 27

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Rabin, distinguished guests: It is a great pleasure to welcome the Rabins, who are all old friends of ours, back to Washington. We have worked together for so long that when an Israeli party arrives here we meet old friends of many circumstances. For example, we could immediately identify all the security officers that took care of us. [Laughter.] And Nancy was looking for the security officer who could open coke bottles with his teeth, which will show you of the way we get intimidated when we visit Israel. [Laughter.] And Mrs. Rabin mumbles to me, "the quality of the security."

I haven't been defended by any security officer with his teeth in Israel yet. [Laughter.]

There are also so many members of the Israeli press here that I have a real dilemma —because I have a friend who hates flying, and he says that when a stewardess comes out of the pilot's compartment with a serious face he is convinced they are going to crash and that she can't even give the impression that things are going well, but when she comes out smiling, then he's in a real panic because then he is absolutely convinced that things are desperate and that she has been instructed to cheer them up. [Laughter.]

So what can I say about our meetings? [Laughter.]

The truth is that the Prime Minister and his friends here have worked together for a long time. I spent many hours with the Prime Minister when he was Ambassador here in discussing not only the problems of Israel in the Middle East but the relationship of the international situation to the prospects of peace. And when our other Israeli friends are here, it is a different relationship than we have with any other country because we know each other so well and we have talked together so much that we can afford occasionally this or that disagreement. And sometimes because it is a family quarrel it takes on an intensity that is exaggerated.

I want to emphasize right away that there are no quarrels going on at this moment and that I am talking about the past and not the present, although having given that assurance, I am positive that I have created many more doubts. [Laughter.]

But the fact of the matter is that no people can want peace more desperately than a country that has never known a state of peace in its entire history and that has had to fight wars at almost intervals of five years. So that the issue of whether there should be peace doesn't need to be discussed between us.

How to achieve peace in a situation of enormous complexity and how to balance the territorial changes, which are tangible, against the commitments to peace, which are intangible—that is a problem that requires great imagination and great dedication. And when one looks at the legacy of a generation of distrust and at the influence of outside powers whose intentions are not always benign, then we know, both of us, that we have a complex and long-term issue before us.

Now, our friend the Prime Minister is here this time when there isn't any immediate crisis, when there isn't a particular negotiation on which we must achieve a specific result. He is here to discuss with us how we imagine the evolution toward peace in the Middle East, how we can reach an objective on which we both agree. And we can talk in a relaxed atmosphere because we have the capacity for decision.

The United States made clear last night that it will not accept changes in the framework of negotiations that prejudge the outcome. We will not participate or encourage a negotiating process in which as an entrance price into negotiations the fundamental issues should already be determined by groups of countries that are not parties to the negotiation.

Now that we have made clear what we will not encourage, we can talk in a freer atmosphere about what can happen in the years ahead. I think the talks this morning were conducted in a very friendly atmosphere, and I am confident that this visit will be extremely helpful to both of our countries and to the long-term prospects for peace in the Middle East.

The United States is committed to the security and survival of Israel. The United States will work with Israel on joint policies to maintain the security and to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East. It is in this spirit that we welcome the Rabins here, in the consciousness that for all Americans it is a question of moral necessity to make certain that, whatever happens, this democracy in the Middle East that shares our values will be secured and maintained.

So I would like to propose a toast to the Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin and to the lasting friendship between Israel and the United States.

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Kissinger, distinguished guests: I would like to thank the Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger in the name of my wife and myself for this pleasant gathering and for the good meal. I have not spent since I have taken this post as a Prime Minister so many days in the United States as the Secretary spent in Israel; therefore I can't pretend that I know all the details that come with such a visit. But I would like also to open my remarks by saying something personally to the Secretary.

As he said, I believe that we have learned to know each other. When I served here as the Israeli Ambassador and after that, even though from time to time we have had some differences of opinion—but I believe that we have no doubt whatsoever in the way that he conducted the policy of this government in his capacity at the White House and now as Secretary of State, in the real efforts that he has made to bring about more stability, in the efforts to create better conditions for peace for all peoples in the area. And for that I would like to thank you, Mr. Secretary.

As you have said, there is something which cannot be always explained when it comes to the relations of the greatest democracy with the only democracy in the Middle East. It has started many years ago, and it has been developed to the kind of relations that we, as a small country, are very proud of. And I believe that the cooperation between our two countries has contributed to the stability in the area and to the encouragement of the prospects of peace. I believe that what has been done in the last year was an outcome of an effort, even though there were ups and downs through '75 but toward the end the results proved to be the right ones.

Still, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a very complicated one, and it is not so easy to offer simple formulas how to solve it. Sometimes it looks simpler than it is. From our point of view, we, as the Secretary said, have never entertained one day of peace. We have experienced many wars. And therefore please understand our sensitivity when it comes to our capability to be able to defend ourselves by ourselves.

Please understand the amount of suspicion that might seem to people from the outside a little bit exaggerated when we have to exchange words for something tangible, which is territories—not as real estate but as defensive lines that make our capability to defend ourselves better. But I can assure you, Mr. Secretary, and all those who are here that for the sake of a real peace, Israel will not shrink from any risks, will take upon itself many concessions, but one will be sure that the purpose is a real peace.

I believe that the way that the talks have been conducted through the years of cooperation between our two countries and especially today, I believe that this is the way to conduct talks when the common goal is the same—to achieve peace. But at the same time, as long as peace has not been achieved, to be in a position that those who want to exploit the tension in the area will not be able to pursue a policy of war with a hope of success.

I believe everywhere in the world you can't achieve peace but from the standpoint of strength. It is a struggle between totalitarian concepts and democratic way of life. And in coping with totalitarian concepts, democracies have to try their best to reach agreements and understandings. But it can't be done from the standpoint of weakness. I don't want to apply to anything except when it comes to our problem. And I know one thing for sure, with a weak Israel no one will negotiate, and only a strong Israel is a help for peace.

I would like to pray and hope that there will be continuation of the present understanding, continuation of the common effort to achieve peace, and continuation of the effort, as long as peace has not been achieved, to be able to overcome the differences whenever they come up.

And in this spirit I would like to raise my glass to the Secretary, to Mrs. Kissinger, and to the friendship between our two countries. And as we say in Hebrew: *"L'chaim."*

eekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 2

resident Ford

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin and istinguished guests: It is again a pleasure or us to say *shalom*.

Betty and I have, of course, and all of our uests feel a very special warmth as far as ou, Mr. Prime Minister, and Mrs. Rabin re concerned. And our friendship on a ersonal basis has been one of long stand- ng and a very enjoyable and very pleasant ne.

Your five years in Washington as the istinguished Ambassador of Israel created any and very warm friendships. Betty and are two of those friends, and we are deeply rateful for that relationship. And we are viously delighted to be your hosts tonight.

We are very proud that you are the first ead-of-government guest during our Bi- ntennial Year. And I think that tells us mething. The celebration of our nation's istory gives Americans a deeper appreciation of basic values that we share with the tate of Israel—the tribute that your country nd ours pay to these ideals you expressed Philadelphia last night.

Both of our nations have had a very pain- l birth as well as growth. As havens for en and women fleeing persecution, both of ur nations find their vitality as well as their rength today in a commitment to freedom nd a commitment to democracy and the pirit of free peoples.

Both of our nations, Mr. Prime Minister, ave tasted the bitter fruits of war and the truggles that are necessary to preserve ndependence and security. Both of us know ll well in today's world that eternal vigi- nce is the price of liberty. And we, indi- idually and collectively, will not fail.

I applaud your statesmanship, Mr. Prime linister. You have shown it over and over gain. It has contributed so much that has een achieved so far. I am gratified that our ersonal friendship and relationship now acilitates the closest consultation on the very complex problems that we face in the problems ahead.

From the moment of Israel's independence, all of America's Presidents, as well as the major political parties, have identified with your freedom and your progress.

America now completes its second century. Israel counts its heritage in thousands and thousands of years and its modern history in decades. Yet our heritage—your country and mine—are the same.

I think we must take inspiration from the Founding Fathers of both our nations and the principles of justice and freedom which they have passed down to you as well as to myself for the survival of those principles, which is our major responsibility. You are dedicated to that end, Mr. Prime Minister, and all of your people are likewise. And they are an inspiration to all of us.

Israel, Mr. Prime Minister, like the United States, has stuck to its principles and persevered with courage and determination. The unbreakable spirit of the people of Israel remains its strongest defense. And as we reflect on this Bicentennial Year, we are both mindful of the indispensable role that the United States has played in the world as a guardian of stability and defender of freedom.

I want to tell you, Mr. Prime Minister, that I am determined, as I think most Americans are, that America will remain strong and America will remain committed to its allies and to its world responsibilities.

I know that Israel and our other friends and allies depend upon America's strength and America's commitment. Our two nations have been working together for peace in the Middle East. No peacemaking process, as you well know, is easy, but important steps have been taken. And we are proud of the role that America has played in working with your country.

I know that all Americans deeply desire to see the process continued toward its goal of a just and secure peace.

The United States has demonstrated many, many times, including yesterday in the United Nations, that we will oppose measures

that we consider unrealistic or unworkable or that make peace harder to achieve. But we have demonstrated at the same time we are committed to seek and to support positive measures, positive moves toward peace.

We will continue the hopeful effort in which we are jointly engaged.

You and I began our discussions this morning in a spirit of friendship and a spirit of common desire for peace. You stated this morning, and many times otherwise, your nation's views eloquently and persuasively.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask that you join me in a toast to the Prime Minister of Israel and to Mrs. Rabin, to the enduring friendship between Israel and the United States, and to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In the ancient toast of the Jewish people: "*L'chaim.*"

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. President and Mrs. Ford, distinguished guests: First allow me in the name of my wife and myself to thank you, Mr. President, and you, Mrs. Ford, for your kind invitation to come over to this country as your guests.

We also cherish our personal friendship for the time that I served here as the Israeli Ambassador. I remember that many times I used to come to your office as the Minority Leader in the House to ask for your advice, to get a better understanding about what was going on in this country. And I always came out of your office more encouraged about America, about the Congress, about your determination to do what you believed that should be done here in this country as well as this country's policies toward the world, toward securing peace and freedom wherever and whenever it is possible.

Since you took this office, awesome responsibility of the President of the United States, this is the third meeting between us here. And we have discussed through this period every possibility, everything that can be done to encourage every option, every avenue to move from war toward peace, to achie tranquillity and stability in the area as lo as peace has not been achieved. And I a preciated always your attitude that whe ever there is a confrontation the efforts bring about peace must be done from t standpoint of strengths because no tota tarian regime will tolerate a weak dem racy. And only a strong democracy can e pect to achieve peace with dignity, pea that is worthwhile.

I am especially glad, as you mentione Mr. President, that I am the first head government to be your official guest in th Bicentennial Year. I am glad, especially, l cause I think I represent even though a ve small democracy but it is the only one th exists in the Middle East.

Before we came over, I found that wh you got your independence 200 years ago, t total population of then the United Stat was 3 million, which is exactly [laughte the population of Israel today. And I fou that your growth came as a result of the termination of the Founding Fathe to build a country, but in addition to that, maintaining the basic principle of open ga to waves of immigrants. And your count grew up by the waves of immigrants th came to this great country. We maintain t same policy. And we have grown throu immigration and will continue to gr through immigration.

In the last 1½ years we have taken certa steps through the good offices of the U Government under your guidance in the fort to bring about certain moves towa peace. I believe that on our part we did c share. We have taken risks in the hope th a better future might be built not only f Israel but for the whole Middle East, for countries and for all peoples there.

We are in a country in which war mig be imminent. We have fought four maj wars in the last 28 years, and between the we have never entertained one day of pea And after 28 years of war, believe me, M President, if there is something that

pire to, that we desire, that we are longing
r, it is to achieve a real peace.

Allow me to add that when I stayed in
is country I learned one thing—that the
guest word in the English dictionary is
eace" because so many interpretations are
ven to this word. And therefore one has
be careful when the word is uttered and
practical and meaningful interpretation is
ven to that.

And, therefore, for us the meaning of
ace that we want to achieve is peace that
ill give us, as well as to our neighbors, a
nse of security to live the way that we pre-
r to live in our own country and they in
eir own.

We have done something to bring stabili-
tion to the area, but still the road to peace
nfortunately is still long. And it will require
urage, determination, and skill to navigate
e ship of hope of peace until it will be a
al one. And in facing all these complex
oblems one has not to lose his hope but at
e same time to have no illusions in coping
th the difficulties that should be overcome.

After the first talk that I had with you,
r. President, I believed that we realize the
fficulties. We are determined to do every-
ing to find ways to cope with these diffi-
lties. And I can assure you, Mr. President,
at on the part of Israel every effort will
done to find ways to cooperate with you
the efforts to bring about peace to the
ea which has suffered so much from wars
the last years.

Allow me also, Mr. President, to thank you
rsonally in the name of the people of Israel
r your support through the years, to your
pport to Israel and to the cause of peace in
e area in your capacity as the President
the United States. You mentioned what
ppened yesterday, and I am encouraged
what happened today. And I would like to
ank you very, very much.

And allow me to raise my glass to the
resident of the United States and to the
iendship between our two countries.
'chaim.

REMARKS AT RECEPTION GIVEN BY PRIME MINISTER RABIN, JANUARY 29

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 2

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for your kind invitation to come as official guests of you to this country. I would like to thank you very much for the time that you have allotted for the discussion that we have had in the last three days about the problems that we face in our region and in the effort to move toward peace.

I am sure that the talks have helped and I hope will advance the cause of peace. I think these kind of relations that you offer to me on a personal basis as well as in the relations between our two countries will be an encouragement to the cause of peace in the area. And I would like to thank you very, very much for your personal interest, personal help, in doing so.

And, Mr. President, toward the end of my visit in Washington, again thank you very, very much.

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin: I am delighted to be here and to see so many, many of your friends. We, of course, are very pleased that you are in the United States. I feel, as you do, that the discussions we have had in the three days have been very meaningful. I believe they will be very productive. It has been a fine experience for me to renew our personal friendship that existed over a period of years when you were the Ambassador for Israel. It has been for you, I am sure, a great experience to renew your acquaintances with your many, many friends on Capitol Hill. And I am certain, from what I have heard from some of my old friends, your presentation to the Congress yesterday in joint session was outstanding. In fact, I heard it was so good that

I am not sure I want to make a state of the Union up there. [Laughter.]

But let me reiterate what we have said both privately and publicly. The United States, at the present time, as it has been under five previous Presidents, is dedicated to the survival and the security of Israel. We mean it. At the same time, we are dedicated to working with you in moving forward to real peace in the Middle East.

You have been staunch and steadfast in your dedication on behalf of your country and at the same time have shown great statesmanship and leadership in that very difficult area of the world. I can't thank you enough for the opportunity to work with you in the efforts that involve both your country and ours aimed at the achievement of the kind of life that is needed and necessary for all peoples in the Middle East.

You have done an outstanding job as an Ambassador, and it is a great pleasure and privilege for me to work with you on behalf of what we all have to do in that very difficult area, the Middle East.

I thank you for the hospitality tonight. I hope and trust, as I am sure it will be, that as you travel around the United States in the next seven days, you will receive as warm a welcome everywhere as you have received in our Nation's Capital.

Thank you very much.

ADDRESS BY PRIME MINISTER RABIN TO THE CONGRESS, JANUARY 28 [1]

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished Members of Congress: I come to you from Jerusalem with the greetings of my people in this, your Bicentennial Year.

Two days ago, I stood before Independence Hall to pay tribute in the name of Israel to the Fathers of the American Revolution. There, I saw the Biblical inscription on the Liberty Bell which is so familiar to me in its original Hebrew—*Ukratem dror ba'aretz l'chol yoshveha*—"Proclaim Liberty Throughout All the Land Unto All the Inhabitants Thereof." We, Israel, celebrate with you that great message Ameri proclaimed 200 years ago.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, I thank you for the invitation that has brought me here tod and I appreciate your expressions of welcome.

Standing here in this great hall, I am aware th you are the heirs of a two-century-old tradition free government by the people. Free people ever where acknowledge their debt to your Declaration Independence, which emphasizes the natural right all peoples to establish governments of their o choosing.

Our declaration of independence, building on th right, adds to it the principle that the Jewish peo shall preserve its integrity and restore its natio existence in its own land, despite the holocaust history.

The first principle reflects the essence of the Ame can Revolution, the second the essence of the Zion Revolution.

The war of 1776 and the war of 1948 were bo battles of liberation. What made them into revo tions was the human vision that fired them. It w a vision not only to win freedom but also to constr new societies in freedom. In our case, it was the rev of an ancient nation to put an end, once and for all, homelessness, helplessness, and holocaust. It was t assertion of our right to self-determination, to retu to Zion, to reclaim it of the desolation of 20 centuri to gather in the oppressed of our scattered sons a daughters, and to build there a new society inspi by the values of the old.

This is the Zionist vision.

From the days when John Adams expressed hope for the return of Jewish independence, from days when Mark Twain first saw the land of Israel "a land of ruin," to the present day, the United Sta has shown sympathy for this vision. Congress as expression of America, has consistently acted to g that sympathy substance. For this, I extend to you gratitude of the people of Israel.

Israel could well say of itself what Thomas Jeff son said of America:

" . . . our ancestors . . . possessed a right, wh nature has given to all men, of departing from country in which chance, not choice has placed the of going in quest of new habitations and of th establishing new societies. . . ."

When these words were spoken, America was the midst of its nationbuilding through immigrati It was to continue for another 150 years. We are century into ours. Our Statue of Liberty is a refug immigrant barge.

For both of our new societies, immigration beca pioneering. Israel's contemporary folk heroes, l yours, are those who mastered wastelands and w out to build communities in empty places.

In a society of pioneering, democracy springs fr

[1] Text from the *Congressional Record* of Jan. 28, p. H398.

t frontier itself. Our common heritage—founded on the Biblical ethic—gave the democratic experience its unique expression. It proclaimed the dignity and worth of every individual. Though different in form, our respective institutions share this common objective.

There are all too few nations in the world that uphold these democratic forms and objectives. We are a rather small family. We did not expect to be so a generation ago.

A generation ago, the world was engulfed in a great war. In the contest between nations, it was perhaps the greatest of battles between the forces of good against the forces of evil. When it was over, a conscious effort was made to extend the principles of international justice and decency to all peoples, large and small. Its concrete expression was the Charter of the United Nations.

At the generation's end, the United Nations finds itself in crisis. The words of its charter have been abused and devalued. Israel has learned that it can expect no justice from the United Nations in its present form. Its moral resources have been eroded by extortion and appeasement which again intrude upon the international scene. None of us in the free world have fared well in this climate.

The present combination of circumstances has placed my own people in the front line. But I believe that the consequences extend to the whole democratic family and, ultimately, to the peace and welfare of mankind. Given the acute political, economic, and social stresses of our times, never has the interdependence of our democratic community been greater. Benjamin Franklin might well have been speaking to us when he said: We must all hang together or we will all hang separately.

I say this as a representative of a small democracy to the representatives of the biggest and strongest of us all. President Ford's leadership is making a crucial contribution to the peace of the world and to the cause of peace in the Middle East. His efforts hold out the hope for a more secure and stable world and a better place for people to live in.

There is no freedom, nor shall there be peace in this world, without a United States strong and confident in its purpose. World peace rests upon your fortitude. Upon it rests the hope that honest dialogue can move forward with societies having other systems of rule. We welcome any form of international dialogue to reduce the suspicions and tensions between nations. For in the end, our common cause as democracies is a struggle for mankind and not against any portion of it.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, from this rostrum I declare that, however difficult the road, however hard the challenge, and however complex the process, Israel will strive with all its being to contribute to the peace of the world by pressing ahead with its effort for peace with the Arab countries. This is the driving goal of all our policies.

We know of your concern and national interest in the stability of our area, and I wish to say to you that we seek to be sensitive to them. I believe that certain steps we have pursued have also contributed to that interest. We see the expression of that interest —through the advancement of the human and economic welfare of the peoples of our region—as a positive development and as a hope for progress toward peace itself.

We express our confidence that such developing ties need not be, and must not be, at the cost of Israel's vital interest of liberty and security. And if, in the pursuit of our shared goals, differences do arise from time to time, then let us recall Jefferson's wisdom that "every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle."

The principle of which I speak is the resolution of a conflict that has lasted too long. Let me share with you my thinking on what has, thus far, stood in the way of a solution to it.

If I were to be asked to state in a word what is the heart and the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I would say this: It is the refusal of the Arab countries to reconcile themselves to the right of existence of one small viable sovereign Jewish state in the land of our people's birth; by Jewish state I mean an independent, democratic society, secular in the equality of all its citizens, Jew and non-Jew alike, before the law and founded upon historic Jewish values.

By stating this, I am saying that the question of territory, the matter of boundaries, the issue of maps, were not, and are not, the true obstacles to peace.

Twenty-nine years ago, in 1947, we accepted a very truncated partitioned territory upon which to rebuild our Jewish statehood. It was not because of its shape or size that the Arab leaders rejected that United Nations partition plan. They went to war against us because they rejected our very right to freedom as an independent people.

Against great odds and with much sacrifice, we won our war of independence. The stakes were incredibly high. Defeat would have meant national holocaust and the eclipse of the Jewish people in history.

And just as every war reaps its inevitable tragic crop of refugees, so did the Arab war against Israel produce two refugee problems of almost equal size —an Arab one, and a Jewish one from Arab countries.

After our war of independence, in 1949 we signed armistice agreements with our neighbors. We believed, naively, that these would soon lead to a negotiated peace. They did not. We were ready to settle for the fragile armistice lines as peace boundaries. But as a matter of principle, the Arabs would not negotiate the end of the conflict because they refused to reconcile themselves to a Jewish independent state.

So, in 1956, another war was imposed upon us. Again we won it. At its end, we agreed to evacuate the Sinai Peninsula. Did Israel's withdrawal from all

the territories occupied in the war lead to peace? It did not even lead to a negotiation.

So, in 1967, Arab armies again massed along those fragile frontiers that had invited past aggression. Again we won a victory in a war we did not seek.

Then came 1973. Again we were attacked—this time a surprise attack. But this time we were not exposed to those weak armistice lines which our neighbors had recognized only as targets of invasion. Israel now had defensive depth.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, until 1967, Israel did not hold an inch of the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or the Golan Heights. Israel held not an acre of what is considered disputed territory. And yet we enjoyed no peace. Year after year Israel called for—pleaded for—a negotiated peace with the Arab governments. Their answer was a blank refusal and more war.

The reason was not a conflict over territorial claims. The reason was, and remains, the fact that a free Jewish state sits on territory at all.

It is in this context that the Palestinian issue must be appraised. That issue is not the obstacle to peace, as some would suggest. Certainly it has to be solved in the context of the final peace. But to assert that this is the key to peace, the formula for peace, or the breakthrough to peace is to misread the realities. It is to put the legendary cart before the horse.

The Palestinian issue began with, and is a product of, the overall Arab posture on the legitimacy of a Jewish State of Israel. Only when that posture changes will the Palestinian issue be constructively and finally tackled.

The clock of history cannot be put back. It was not Israel that prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state in 1947, as the partition plan had proposed. What did prevent it was the Arab declaration of war on the plan itself because it called for the creation of a Jewish state.

For 19 years no Arab government saw fit to establish a Palestinian state, even though the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were under Arab control. Neither was there a Palestinian demand to do so. In January 1964, the organization that calls itself the PLO was established by the Arab heads of state. Yet, even then, statehood in those territories, then held by Jordan and Egypt, was never the objective. We know what the objective is. It is written large into the Palestinian covenant, which is their binding constitution. Every paragraph of it spits out the venom calling for Israel's destruction.

These are the truths that lie at the heart and the core of the Arab-Israel conflict. And since, to date, the Arab version of peace does not depart from these truths, no honest being can blame us for refusing to cooperate in our own national suicide.

Peace will come when the Arab leaders finally cross the Rubicon from aggressive confrontation to h monious reconciliation. Then, there is no problem tween us that cannot be solved in negotiation. T includes, too, the Palestinian issue, within the g graphic and political context of peace with Jord When I say Jordan, I do not discount Palestin representation in the peace delegation of that co try. And when I say geography, I do not discoun negotiation concerning the future final peace bou aries of the territories involved.

For the genuine peace we seek, Israel is ready give up much and to compromise much on territo In a negotiation whose sincere shared goal is fi reconciliation, we shall go more than halfway assure its success.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, a short time a from this very rostrum, President Sadat wisely clared: "there is no substitute for direct person person contacts that go deep into the heart of all problems which invoke our common concern and c ture our imagination."[2] I wish that he would di those words to me as well as to you, the Congres the United States. I would then know that the w of true peacemaking has finally begun.

I today declare: I am ready to meet with any A head of government, at any time and at any pl for the purpose of peace talks.

I do not know when peace will finally come. Bu this I am certain: It will be our future strength will largely determine the resources of peace in region. Weakness is no prescription for negotiat If it be perceived that Israel is not weak, so shall neighbors perceive the wisdom of mutual compron reconciliation, and peace.

What, therefore, does Israel propose as the step in the effort for peace? Israel proposes the convening of the Geneva Peace Conference in acc ance with the letter of invitation from the Secretary General to the parties to the conferenc

The basis for the conference has to be founde two fundamental principles—on Security Co Resolutions 242 and 338 as they were accepte Israel and by the other parties and powers concer The second principle is that the parties to the cor must be the parties to the peacemaking process. negotiations for peace must be conducted bet ourselves—the Government of Israel and the ne boring Arab governments.

There are some who tell us that—here and t —a change toward realism is perhaps slowly e ing. I pray there is some truth to this.

Israel is determined to encourage what

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[2] For an address by President Anwar al-Sada of the Arab Republic of Egypt made before a j nt meeting of the Congress on Nov. 5, 1975, see BU E TIN of Nov. 24, 1975, p. 728.

mptoms there may be to move that process along. is is why we entered into the interim agreement th Egypt. We did so to encourage the trend to- rd greater realism. Our aim in the agreement is promote conditions of stability and trust which, hope, will produce, in time, a climate for genuine ace negotiations.

In the light of what I said and under the given ditions of regional tension, the pursuit of this licy calls for taking risks. It has required our king tangible concessions for concessions far less gible. We have done so because we believe it is essary to take measured risks not only in case of r but also for the sake of peace.

Thus, in a very few weeks' time, the defense forces Israel will carry out a withdrawal in Sinai. We have eady handed to Egypt proper the oilfields on the lf of Suez and the coastal link to them. With that, ael has given up its single oil resource. We have reed to these measures not in return for peace, even in return for an end to the state of war. We what we did in the hope that it will move us ne steps closer to peace.

Congress, I know, is familiar with these measures. ey are major elements of the recent Israel-Egypt reement, negotiated through the good offices of United States. May I say that the limited Ameri- civilian technical presence—requested by both ties—and which Congress authorized in the con- t of this agreement is a contribution toward the se of peace. That presence has no function or re- nsibility in case of war. And I wish to add with phasis that if a condition of hostilities does arise, will be the first to call for its removal. This is a tter of fundamental doctrine for Israel. We alone responsible for our own defense. This is how it been; this is how it must be. I believe it to be the ence of our political relationship.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, throughout the rs, we have found here, in Congress, a wisdom and p understanding of our nationbuilding and defense ds and the economic burdens arising from them. t as a people, we turn to ourselves before we turn others.

The Government of Israel is engaged in a tough gram of economic measures.

Last year we reduced private consumption by al- st 5 percent, and we will reduce it by another 5 cent this year. We have put on ourselves a heavy rden of taxation. This year the government will lect in taxes some 70 percent of all our national come. I am told this is almost twice as much as it in America.

I mention these as only a few of the many ex- ples within a comprehensive economic policy in- cing more austerity and higher production. We all continue this policy—difficult though it be— this is what we require of ourselves to do.

Peace, not war, is our tradition. We see no glory in battle. I was once a soldier, not by choice but by necessity. I know the horrors of war, the waste, and the agony. I know what peace can bring to all the peoples of our region through open boundaries, projection of economic cooperation, the conquest of disease, and the free flow of ideas, people, and products.

Even now, before peace, we declare our readiness to promote its climate by unilaterally opening our ports for the free passage of goods to and from our immediate neighbors.

We open our hospitals to our neighboring sick. We declare open our institutions of research for all the countries in the Middle East wishing to share knowledge in the fields of agriculture and water development.

We, the people of our region, are destined to live together for all time, for never again shall there be a Middle East without a State of Israel.

The going has not been easy, and the challenge ahead will not be easy. But we are an old people, and there is no sacrifice too great to protect the freedom we have won and the new society we have created. I believe Americans, above all, can understand this truth.

Three hundred years ago, celebrating their first years of survival after much suffering, your Pilgrim Fathers wrote these lines:

"We have made a clearing in the wilderness; and another year will see a broader clearing, a better garnering. We have made a good beginning in a hostile world."

So do we, the first generation of free Israel, descendants of 2,000 years of unhappy wandering, declare we have made a good beginning in a rather hostile world.

America has helped us greatly. In loyalty to its Founding Fathers, this Republic of the United States has given tangible meaning to human values in the charting of its policies. By virtue of this, Israel pays you tribute as you enter into the third century of independence.

Permit me to express that tribute to the Congress through the words of an American Jew, a soldier in the Revolutionary War. Jonas Phillips, in 1787, wrote this prayer:

"May the almighty God of our fathers Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, imbue this noble assembly with wisdom . . . and may they have the satisfaction to see that their present toil and labor for the welfare of the United States be approved throughout all the world and particularly by the United States of America."

This is the sincere sentiment of friendship Israel brings you this day.

U.S. Sinai Support Mission Established

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER[1]

Establishing the United States Sinai Support Mission

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the Joint Resolution of October 13, 1975 (Public Law 94–110, 89 Stat. 572, 22 U.S.C. 2441 note), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2151 *et seq.*), including but not limited to Sections 531, 621, 633, 901, and 903 thereof (22 U.S.C. 2346, 2381, 2393, 2441, 2443), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. (a) In accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and notwithstanding the provisions of Part I of Executive Order No. 10973, as amended, there is hereby established the United States Sinai Support Mission, hereinafter referred to as the Mission.[2]

(b) The Mission shall, in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Joint Resolution of October 13, 1975, and the provisions of this order, carry out the duties and responsibilities of the United States Government to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" in connection with the Basic Agreement between Egypt and Israel, signed on September 4, 1975, and the Annex to the Basic Agreement, subject to broad policy guidance received through the Assistant to the President for national security affairs, and the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)).

(c) It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Mission to ensure that the United States role in the Early Warning System enhances the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and thereby promotes the cause of peace.

(d) At the head of the Mission there shall be a Director, who shall be appointed by the President.[3] The Director shall be a Special Representative of the President. There shall also be a Deputy Director, who shall be appointed by the President. The Deputy Director shall perform such duties as the Director may direct, and shall serve as the Director in the case of a vacancy in the office of the Director, or during the absence or disability of the Director.

(e) The Director and Deputy Director shall receive such compensation, as permitted by law, as the President may specify.

Sec. 2. (a) The Director shall exercise immediate supervision and direction over the Mission.

(b) The Director may, to the extent permitted by law, employ such staff as may be necessary.

(c) The Director may, to the extent permitted by law and the provisions of this order, enter into such contracts as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.

(d) The Director may procure the temporary intermittent services of experts or consultants, in accordance with the provisions of Section 626 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2386), and section 3109 of title 5 of the United States Code.

(e) As requested by the Director, the agencies of the Executive branch shall, to the extent permitted by law and to the extent practicable, provide the Mission with such administrative services, information, advice, and facilities as may be necessary for the fulfillment of the Mission's functions under this order.

Sec. 3. (a) In accordance with the provisions of Section 633 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2393), it is hereby determined to be in furtherance of the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, that the functions authorized by that act and required by this order, may be performed, subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this Section, by the Director without regard to the following specified provisions of law and limitations of authority:

(1) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes as amended (31 U.S.C. 529).

(2) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 8).

(3) Section 2 of Title III of the Act of March 3, 1933 (47 Stat. 1520, 41 U.S.C. 10a).

(4) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 13).

(5) Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes as amended (31 U.S.C. 665, Section 3732 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 11), and Section 9 of the Act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 763, 41 U.S.C. 627), so as to permit the indemnification of contractors against unusually hazardous risks as defined in Mission contracts, consistent, to the extent practicable, with regulations prescribed by the Department of Defense pursuant to the provisions of the Act of August 28, 1958, as amended (50 U.S.C. 1431 *et seq.*) and Executive Order No. 10789 of November 14, 1958, as amended.

(6) Section 302(a) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (41 U.S.C. 252(a)), so as to permit the Sinai

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[1] No. 11896; 41 *Fed. Reg.* 2067.

[2] For text of Executive Order No. 10973, Administration of the Foreign Assistance Act and Related Functions, see BULLETIN of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 90

[3] On Jan. 15 President Ford announced the appointment of C. William Kontos as Director of the United States Sinai Support Mission and Special Representative of the President. For biographic data, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 19, 1976, p. 39.

rt Mission to utilize the procurement regulations promulgated by the Department of Defense pursuant to Section 2202 of Title 10 of the United States Code.

(7) Section 304(b) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (41 U.S.C. 254(b)), so as to permit the payment of fees in excess of the prescribed fee limitations but nothing herein contained shall be construed to constitute authorization hereunder for the use of the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting.

(8) Section 305 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (41 U.S.C. 255).

(9) Section 901(a) of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended (46 U.S.C. 1241(a)).

(b) It is directed that each specific use of the waivers of statutes and limitations of authority authorized by this Section shall be made only when determined in writing by the Director that such use is specifically necessary and in furtherance of the purposes of this Order and in the interests of the United States.

SEC. 4. (a) There is hereby established the Sinai Interagency Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall be composed of the following:

(1) The Secretary of State or his representative.

(2) The Secretary of Defense or his representative.

(3) The Administrator, Agency for International Development, or his representative.

(4) The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or his representative.

(5) The Director of Central Intelligence or his representative.

(6) The Director of the United States Sinai Support Mission or his representative.

(b) The Director of the United States Sinai Support Mission or his representative shall be Chairman of the Board.

(c) The President may from time to time designate others to serve on, or participate in the activities of, the Board. The Board may invite representatives of other departments and agencies to participate in its activities.

(d) The Board shall meet at the call of the Chairman to assist, coordinate, and advise concerning the activities of the United States Sinai Support Mission.

SEC. 5. The Secretary of State shall, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 10973, as amended, including Part V thereof, and this order, provide from funds made available to the President the funds necessary for the activities of the United States Sinai Support Mission.

SEC. 6. All activities now being undertaken by the Secretary of State to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" shall be continued until such time as the Mission has become operational and the Director requests the transfer of those activities to the Mission. The Secretary of State may exercise any of the authority or responsibility vested in the Director, by this order, in order to continue the performance of activities related to the Early Warning System until transferred to the Director. All such activities undertaken by the Secretary of State shall be deemed to have been taken by the Director.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 13, 1976.*

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Protocol for the Continuation in Force of the International Coffee Agreement of 1968, as extended. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. B, 94–1. S. Ex. Rept. 94–11. October 22, 1975. 11 pp.

The 1975 Brazilian Shrimp Agreement. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. D, 94–1. S. Ex. Rept. 94–12. October 22, 1975. 6 pp.

The Amendments to Certain Articles of the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. F, 94–1. S. Ex. Rept. 94–13. October 22, 1975. 4 pp.

Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1975. Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to accompany S. 2145. S. Rept. 94–432. October 22, 1975. 16 pp.

Security Supporting Assistance for Zaïre. Hearing before the Subcommittees on African Affairs and Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. October 24, 1975. 49 pp.

United States Grain and Oil Agreements With the Soviet Union. Hearing before the House Committee on International Relations. October 28, 1975. 71 pp.

The United States and China. A report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee by the seventh congressional delegation to the People's Republic of China. October 28, 1975. 68 pp.

Implementing Patent Cooperation Treaty. Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary to accompany S. 24. H. Rept. 94–592. October 29, 1975. 32 pp.

Two-Hundred-Mile Fishing Zone. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. October 31, 1975. 443 pp.

Resolution Relating to the President's Trip to China and American MIA's and POW's. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Res. 251. S. Rept. 94–457. November 18, 1975. 2 pp.

U.S. Responsibilities in a Changing World Economy

Statement by Secretary Kissinger[1]

I welcome this opportunity to testify before this distinguished committee which plays such a critical role in a wide range of international economic issues. Continuing exchange between this committee and the State Department is essential if our policy is to reflect the totality of our national interest. I hope my testimony today will signal the beginning of a process of more active collaboration.

Our foreign economic policies affect vitally every American: the farmer, the workingman, the entrepreneur, and the consumer. They affect our economic prosperity and our security as a nation.

Our economic policies are a critical element in the construction of a stable world order. The maintenance of peace, historically a function of our military strength, is increasingly dependent as well on our economic strength.

The 20th-century revolution in technology, transportation, communication, and world economic development has multiplied the pressure points among nations and the potential for conflict. It has stirred a ground swell of demands from those nations and peoples that have not shared fully in the world's economic progress. It has inspired growing concern about access to the world's natural resources and disputes over the distribution of the economic benefits that come from these resources. Our economies, insti tions, and daily lives are vulnerable to economic policies of others.

At the same time, the United States the world's most powerful economy. Togetl with our allies among the industrial dem racies, we are the engine of global prosp ity, technological innovation, and the b hope for widening economic opportunity millions around the globe.

We could withstand an era of internatio economic warfare better than any. But heritage and our aspirations demand m of us than the mere search for survival a world of resentment and despair. Inde such a world could not but ultimately und mine the stability and peace upon which else we seek to do in the world is based. prospect for our children's well-being and the future of the values we cherish will dim unless we take the lead in seeking a era of international economic cooperatior

Foreign economic policy is thus a crit element in our overall foreign policy and the pursuit of our broadest national ob tives.

At the present time we face a series economic challenges that must be met if are to have a stable world order:

—Inflation and recession have spr throughout the world, threatening world's trading and financial system and health of our social institutions. Recov is now underway in much of the indust world.

—The stunning increase in the price of has transferred massive wealth to a sn group of producer countries. It has inte

[1] Made before the Senate Committee on Finance on Jan. 30 (text from press release 42). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

world recession, exacerbated world in-
on, and created serious problems of debt,
acing, and balance-of-payments adjust-
t.

The premises of the postwar economic
em are being challenged by the nations
he Third World in a variety of interna-
l bodies. Their rhetoric is often bitter
accusatory, their tactics confrontational.

e must respond to these challenges firm-
nd constructively. The United States
t play a leading role if our basic national
ests are to be protected. If we fail to
the lead, our destiny may be determined
by the drift of events than by con-
s design.

ong with pursuit of our broadest foreign
y goals, we have very important economic
terests of individual Americans to pro-

Our international energy policies deter-
whether Americans will have regular
lies and stable prices for energy re-
ces so vital for our continued economic
perity.

Our relations abroad can provide the
rican farmer with stable and growing
rt markets and the American consumer
more stability in food prices.

Our commodity policy can assure us of
gular supply and reasonable prices for
critical raw materials that we import
stable and expanding markets for those
we export.

Our foreign policies in money, trade,
investment can give growing opportuni-
for Americans whose livelihood depends
xpanding export markets for manufac-
d and technology-intensive items. Our
ies can provide the American consumer
ide range of goods and services from
h to choose and protection against high
es and the monopolistic practices of
ial interest groups.

here may be occasions, however, when
ific economic interests are in opposition
ur larger foreign policy goals and eco-
ic disputes with a particular country are
onflict with our larger foreign policy in-
terests in that particular country. This points up the need for effective coordination within our government of our specific and larger policy goals. It is not surprising that the positions of departments and agencies may clash. Indeed, it would be strange if they did not. Each department looks at issues from the perspective of its interests and goals. What is necessary is to bring these conflicts to a resolution.

We have various formal and informal mechanisms for resolution of differences. The formal mechanisms include the Council on International Economic Policy, the Economic Policy Board, the National Security Council, and the Trade Policy Committee. In fact, interagency consultation takes place on a continuing basis and at all levels. The agencies try to reach agreement without burdening the President needlessly. But when serious conflicts cannot be resolved, the President makes the decision. He does so on the basis of our total national interest and objectives.

It has been my experience that the coordination of foreign economic policy in this Administration has been outstanding, and it is a misreading of the situation to believe that occasional differences mean disarray. Differences lead to compromise and decision. The end result of the process is a coherent foreign economic policy.

Our approach to foreign economic policy has three basic elements:

—Building stronger economic ties with our industrial allies;

—Constructing a stable and mutually beneficial economic relationship with the Communist nations; and

—Providing opportunities for the less developed nations to share in both the benefits and the responsibilities of the world economic system.

The meeting of the leaders of six major industrialized democracies in Rambouillet, France, last November was a significant foreign policy event. They agreed to coordinate their economic policies more closely to assure a stable and durable recovery. They confirmed their commitment to the OECD

[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] trade pledge. And they concurred in the basic elements of an agreement on monetary reform that was accepted by the IMF [International Monetary Fund] Interim Committee in Jamaica on January 9.

Our relations with the Communist nations can be stabilized and more prudent behavior on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies can be encouraged by closer economic ties.

The grain agreement that we negotiated with the Soviet Union was a major step in building a better relationship. It provides an assured export market for our farmers. Yet by putting our grain trade with the Soviet Union on a more regular basis, it protects our consumers from the wild swings in grain prices caused by large and erratic Soviet purchases. And it puts the Soviet Union on notice that the economic benefits of our relationship require an atmosphere of accommodation and understanding between East and West.

Unfortunately, the ability of this country to use the process of normalizing trade with the Communist countries as a flexible and constructive element in East-West relationships is reduced by the provisions of title IV of the Trade Act. These provisions, in establishing a single issue in East-West relations as the governing condition for normalizing trade, close the door on the use of the trade relationship over a wider range of issues and interests.

The relations of the industrialized nations with the developing world is a problem of particular concern at the moment, and our policy deserves a fuller elaboration to this committee.

Relations With Developing Countries

Over the last few years the industrial countries have been the object of mounting criticism by much of the developing world, which believes that the international economic system and the policies of the industrial nations have denied them opportunities for advancement. The hostility of some Third World spokesmen and bloc voting have made constructive discussion in U.N. forums tween the industrial and developing wo almost impossible.

The developing countries are not a nat bloc. They comprise more than 100 coun which differ widely in income, econ structure, and level of development. In re years they have not pursued their real varied interests in U.N. forums. They l combined instead to confront and accuse developed world of exploiting them.

The radicalization of the Third World its consolidation into an antagonistic bl neither in our political nor our economi terest. A world of hostile blocs is a worl tension and disorder. Developing coun can play a spoiler's role in the world e omy, attempting to restrict the suppl critical materials, subjecting foreign in ment to harassment and confiscation, thv ing our efforts to restructure the world t and monetary system. Clearly, it is in national interest—and in the world int —that economic relations between the veloped and developing nations be condu in a cooperative way and that each ha realistic appreciation of what can be do advance mutual interests.

In addressing this problem, our objec have been fourfold: to change the at phere in which discussions between th veloped and developing countries are from confrontation to cooperation; to ch the substance of the discussions from ology to consideration of practical act to encourage the developing countries to sue their real and varied interests in a istic way; and to shift the locus of di sions and actions insofar as possible t rums in which participants can be exp to act responsibly.

At the U.N. special session, we se agenda for future discussions between rich and the poor countries with a b range of practical proposals that serve mutual interests of both. Our proposals developed in consultation with Membe Congress who met with me during the mer months preceding the special ses I am aware of your concern, Mr. Chair

we did not at that time consult directly your committee, and I regret that we not do so.

ur initiatives were addressed to five s:

To moderate the instability in the world omy that impedes the development of poor countries;

To accelerate their economic growth by iding improved access to capital and hology and improvement in the condi- of private foreign investment;

To make the world trading system r serve the needs of development;

To improve the conditions of trade and stment in key commodities; and

To address the special needs of the poor- ountries.

each of these areas we offered concrete ions to developing-country problems are consistent with our own economic sophy and our own economic interests. tried to make the developing countries e that the existing economic system can ier their welfare and that they have a in its effectiveness. We were, I believe, ructive and forthcoming as is fitting great nation and as is necessary if we o encourage the developing countries to to the real, not the rhetorical, world. y view, we achieved our objectives at J.N. special session.

e special session was an important event ie slow process of encouraging the de- ing countries to pursue their varied in- ts in a realistic way; but it was only a ning.

e need to move ahead to give effect to initiatives, and we need to maintain a nuing dialogue with the developing d. We have begun a new dialogue with e countries and with the oil-exporting tries in the Conference on International omic Cooperation (CIEC) which met in s last December. We look to the confer- , with its four commissions on energy, materials, development, and related cial issues, to consider seriously many ir U.N. proposals that have not yet been emented.

Unlike the broad U.N. forums in which developing nations vastly outnumber the industrial democracies and vie with each other to escalate their demands, the commissions will be small—15 members in each —and focused on specific issues. We think the discussions will be more balanced as a result.

The CIEC and its commissions are a one-year experiment. The success of the experiment will depend on the willingness of member governments to use the commissions for discussions of practical solutions to concrete problems, solutions that take due account of the interests of all the countries concerned.

We are pursuing our special session initiatives and dialogue in many other appropriate forums—among them the International Monetary Fund, the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), the World Bank, and producer-consumer commodity groups—with some success. Thus, the IMF, with the support of its developing as well as industrialized members, has already acted favorably on several of our key initiatives, notably:

—The establishment of a Trust Fund to provide concessional balance-of-payments assistance to the poorest countries;

—The substantial liberalization of arrangements to stabilize the export earnings of developing countries; and

—Increased access to IMF credit (from 100 to 145 percent of quota).

I would like to put some of our other initiatives, especially those in the trade, commodity, investment, and energy areas, in proper context by outlining the general policies that guide us in these areas.

Trade

The multilateral trade negotiations represent a major foreign policy initiative. Their results will affect our relations with all our trading partners. They will affect our domestic—and international—prosperity. My colleagues have already discussed problems and progress in these negotiations. I would like to talk about the developing countries.

The developing countries have been playing an increasingly important role in our trade—a fact which I believe we tend to overlook. They now account for about one-third of our total trade and, more importantly, for 90 percent of our total trade surpluses in recent years. While recession has been depressing our exports of manufactures to developed countries, our exports of these items to developing countries have been increasing—supporting employment and income in the United States. Central to the development objectives of the developing countries is expanding markets for their exports. Without these opportunities to earn foreign exchange, they will not be able to continue taking an increasing share of our exports.

Trade, therefore, forms a vital and two-way link in our relations with these countries. The committee, I believe, fully appreciates this point and adopted section 106 of the Trade Act to stress the interest we have in mutually beneficial trade agreements with developing countries. To make this a reality, however, we must also recognize that the needs of the developing countries are different, requiring transitional special and differential treatment which accords with their individual development status.

This is the principle underlying the Congress' action in extending temporary generalized tariff preferences to these countries. It is the principle I stated in the U.N. special session. In both cases account is taken of the fact that our goal is the development of these countries to the point where they can participate more fully in the world trading system, sharing both its rights and obligations. Some are already nearer this point than others.

The different levels of development among these countries were taken into account by Congress in our generalized system of preferences (GSP). In that system, developing countries cease to enjoy preferential treatment for products they can sell in our market in substantial volume, as defined in the competitive-need provisions of the Trade indicating that they have become com tive as exporters of these products. We tend to see that similar provisions are n in other forms of special and differe treatment which may be agreed to.

With regard to our system of genera preferences, we continue to support ame tory legislation, such as that which has introduced by Senator Bentsen, which w waive the OPEC-exclusion [Organizatio Petroleum Exporting Countries] provisic title V of the Trade Act for those O members that did not participate in 1973 oil embargo.

The blanket exclusion of OPEC coun has had a noticeable adverse effect on relations with important countries suc Indonesia, Venezuela, and Ecuador—c tries that did not participate in the embargo—and has diminished the ov favorable impact of GSP on our rela with developing countries. The GSP d has become a major issue between the U States and practically all of Latin Am and is by all odds the most divisive fact the hemisphere in the trade field; it has affected United States relations with r bers of ASEAN [Association of Soutl Asian Nations]. Furthermore, it cas shadow on the North–South dialogue th just beginning in the Conference on I national Economic Cooperation. The pr provision has led to support and symp among other LDC's [less developed tries] for the OPEC countries. Amend of the OPEC-exclusion provision is ir United States national interest.

Commodities

The United States has assumed the le ship role in the area of international modity policy. The reason is clear: w the world's largest producer, consumer, trader of commodities. We are importin increasing amount of our raw material sumption each year. It is thus in our i

to insure that commodity markets function efficiently, that they offer incentives to plan and invest for the future and not result in shortages and inflationary prices tomorrow.

We have several specific concerns for which we are continuing to develop policies. *First*, as a major consumer we are concerned with security of supply at reasonable prices. While we are not generally concerned with the possibility of successful OPEC-type action in raw materials, we recognize that multilateral attempts to leverage industrial consumers may occur and could, in a few cases, be economically disruptive. We intend to address this issue through supply access negotiations in the MTN, as the Congress has clearly legislated.

Second, we are concerned that an uncertain investment climate in the developing world, as well as the increasing cost of mineral exploration and exploitation, will undermine adequate private investment flows for mineral development.

Our response has been on two levels. We have expressed a willingness to improve the investment climate in the developing world by discussing guidelines for the behavior of both multinationals and governments, by calling for a multilateral investment insurance agency, and by using what leverage we have to settle investment disputes by third-party arbitration. We have also proposed that the World Bank Group—both the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] and the IFC [International Finance Corporation]—become more involved in mineral financing in the LDC's. These institutions would mobilize private resources, act as where necessary as the middleman between foreign countries and U.S. companies.

Third, we must direct attention to those commodities whose prices fluctuate excessively with severe inflationary effects on our own economy. We are prepared to give consideration to means of moderating fluctuations, ranging from a better exchange of information between producers and consumers to formal arrangements in specific commodities, where appropriate.

Fourth, we recognize that for many commodities the dominant problem may not be volatile prices but competition from synthetics, declining or sluggish secular demand, or overproduction as new suppliers enter the market. The remedies in such cases would be measures such as diversification, improved productivity, or better marketing practices. Each commodity has its particular characteristics and problems peculiar to it and must be considered individually. We have therefore proposed that there be a producer-consumer forum for each key commodity to consider what can be done to promote the efficiency, growth, and stability of its market.

Negotiations have been completed on a new coffee agreement, which contains substantial improvements from both consumer and producer viewpoints. We will submit this shortly to the President for decision. The new cocoa agreement contains insufficient protection for consumers, and its price provisions are too rigid. We are asking for renegotiation. We will shortly submit the tin agreement, which is a treaty, for advice and consent by the Senate.

International Investment

Transnational enterprises have been important instruments for growth in both the industrial and developing countries. They contribute not only scarce capital but also scarce technology, management, and marketing skills. In recognition of these benefits, the industrial countries, including the United States, have maintained an open policy on international investment.

The developing countries are ambivalent about private foreign investment. They want it for the benefits it brings, but they are uneasy about it—and in particular about the transnational company, which is the major instrument for international investment—because of its power and global outlook.

Many of the most successful developing

countries have taken advantage of foreign private investment. In general the results have been more rapid modernization and a strengthened private sector. We remain convinced that developing countries would be well served by offering a secure climate for foreign investment, but the choice remains theirs, as do the costs of forgoing investment.

The benefits deriving from transnational enterprises make it important that governments deal with legitimate concerns about these companies. One major concern is that these enterprises may deviate from proper standards of business behavior. There have also been serious instances of apparent disregard for national law with respect in particular to illicit payments. I am aware of the keen interest of members of this committee on this issue as reflected in Senate Resolution 265.

The United States has taken the lead in dealing with these concerns because of our commitment to an open international system for investment and trade. We are active in efforts within the OECD to work out guidelines defining reasonable standards of business practices for transnational enterprises. Our delegation to the multilateral trade negotiations has also raised this issue in that forum. Such guidelines can provide the basis for better understanding between governments and enterprises and thus assist in preserving a favorable climate for international investment.

In my address to the U.N. special session, I said that the United States is willing to pursue discussion of international guidelines for transnational enterprises within the United Nations. We are willing to address the concerns of developing countries, in particular that transnational enterprises contribute to the development process. At the same time, we believe that any U.N. guidelines should be balanced. In particular they should include not only the obligations of enterprises but also those of governments to treat the enterprises equitably and in accordance with international law; they should apply equally to domestic and international enterprises and to private and public firm wherever appropriate; they should stress t obligation of all parties to carry through undertakings freely entered upon.

Energy

Two years have passed since the o exporting countries sent shock wav through the world economy by the abru and enormous increase in the price of oil. those two years we have:

—Created the International Ener Agency, a potentially dynamic center f energy cooperation;

—Established a comprehensive emergen program to increase the ability of IEA me bers to withstand the economic impact another embargo;

—Negotiated a Financial Support Fund meet problems posed by the huge financ accumulations of the oil-producing countrie and

—Established the long-term IEA progr to accelerate the shift in supply and dema for world energy that will eventually end o vulnerability to arbitrary OPEC control ov world prices.

The 18 countries of the Internatio Energy Agency are meeting today in Paris the establishment of a program for lo term cooperation in the field of energy. T long-term program will tie together and inforce our respective national efforts to duce our excessive dependence on impor oil.

The adoption of this long-term progr will complete the basic design for consun country cooperation in energy which is a c tral pillar of U.S. international energy poli Having completed this framework for operation among the industrial democraci we are now ready to begin a dialogue w the oil producers and the non-oil-produci developing countries.

On February 11, the Energy Commiss of the Conference on International Econor Cooperation will meet in Paris under the chairmanship of Saudi Arabia and the Uni

tates. We approach this dialogue in a spirit f constructive cooperation, aware of our vn vital interests but convinced that our terests and those of the oil producers can harmonized.

ext Steps

The attainment of our objective of substiting cooperation for North-South confrontion will depend importantly on the ability the Administration and the Congress, orking together, to translate our proposals to concrete policies and action.

We will need authority from the Congress replenish the resources of the regional nding institutions and to subscribe new pital to the International Finance Corporaon.

In the commodity area, we will be seeking ie advice and consent of the Senate to .S. membership in the International Tin greement and in other international comodity agreements that we determine are nsistent with our interests. We will be com- g to this committee for implementing legslation where such legislation is required. offee is an example.

In the trade area we are acting in full mpliance with the letter and spirit of the rade Act of 1974, and our proposals will me to the Congress in accordance with the rms of that legislation. We will be conlting with the Congress and this committee a continuing basis.

Clearly, the success of our efforts in orth-South diplomacy depends on partnerip between the Administration and the ongress. The role of this important commite is critical.

The success of our efforts in North-South plomacy depends also on more systematic forts by us to insure that each developing untry understands that our bilateral relaons with it include that country's behavior ward us in international meetings and, in articular, its votes there on issues of highest nportance to us. I have asked each of our mbassies overseas to make clear to its host overnment that one of the factors by which we will measure the value which that government attaches to its relations with us will be its statements and votes on that fairly limited number of issues which we indicate are of importance to us in international forums. In view of the growing importance to us of certain issues, of both economic and political significance, now dealt with increasingly in multilateral forums, it must be expected that the United States will be weighing this factor more heavily in making new commitments within bilateral relationships.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, we have major economic interests abroad to promote, interests on which many American jobs and American prosperity depend.

Generally speaking, those interests are best promoted by encouraging among countries the same freedom of economic exchange we have within this country. Because we have by far the greatest economy, only we can take the lead in moving the international economy in this direction. We must not fail to exercise that responsibility.

But our leadership role must not and does not prevent us from using our economic power to make sure that American traders and investors get a fair opportunity.

The developing countries are a special case. If we want them to join the open economic system of which the United States is the center, we have to make it more accessible to them. This is the key to the proposals I made at the seventh special session: to use new trading, investment, and commodity measures rather than large-scale new aid to accelerate their development.

These policies can bring important benefits to us: new trading and investment opportunities for Americans and better protection against inflation. To developing countries the impact of these policies can be crucial. But if it is right for us to adopt these policies, the developing countries must realize that they are not unconditional. They, too, must accept obligations as members of the international

system that grow as their economies grow.

By this approach I am hopeful that we can create between developing and industrial countries a new relationship of confidence and equality in which expanding investment and two-way trade will accelerate growth in both the North and the South.

U.S. Commodities Policy Restated by State and Treasury Departments

Joint State-Treasury Department Statement [1]

We have been asked for a restatement of U.S. commodity policy. Our policy, as set forth in Secretary Kissinger's statement at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly, is based on the following main interests:

1. We seek assured supplies at reasonable prices. This requires not only supply commitments from exporting countries but adequate investment in new production capacity.

2. We are concerned about excessive price fluctuations since, on the one hand, this can impede adequate investment and, on the other hand, can contribute to severe inflationary pressures.

3. We recognize the importance of commodity earnings to producing countries and especially to developing countries who are significantly dependent on raw material exports.

For these reasons we have proposed a number of measures in the commodity field:

1. We have proposed that the World Bank Group, especially the International Finance Corporation, take the lead in bringing together private and public capital as well as technical, managerial, and financial expertise to finance new minerals development.

2. We are seeking supply access commitments in the multilateral trade negotiations.

3. Because no one formula will apply to all commodities, we propose to discuss new arrangements for individual commodities on a case-by-case basis.

4. We have expressed our intention to participate actively in negotiations for new commodity agreements on tin, cocoa, coffee, and sugar.

—We will sign the new tin agreement, and it will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.

—We do not propose to sign the new International Cocoa Agreement in its present form. We consider the agreement to be deficient in a number of respects and have suggested that certain of its provisions be renegotiated. We are awaiting the reaction of other countries.

—We are reviewing the new International Coffee Agreement, which contains substantial improvements. An analysis of the new agreement and a recommendation for the President is being prepared.

—Negotiations for a new International Sugar Agreement will commence in September of this year.

5. We proposed a substantial improvement in the International Monetary Fund's compensatory finance facility. At the recent IMF meeting in Jamaica a substantial improvement was agreed upon to help stabilize the earnings from commodity trade.

6. We are continuing to examine in the IMF an improvement of its arrangements for financing buffer stocks.

As this enumeration of measures demonstrates, there is no one single approach to commodity trade problems. We reject price-fixing arrangements that distort the market, restrict production, and waste resources. But this should not be the central issue.

The main point is that we are prepared to consider measures that will improve the functioning of markets and will directly meet the problems of raw material producers and consumers. In this regard, we seek the establishment of consumer-producer forums for each key commodity to promote efficiency, growth, and stability of particular markets.

[1] Issued on Jan. 16 (text from press release 17).

. Supports U.N. Resolution on Situation in Namibia

llowing are statements made in the U.N. rity Council by U.S. Representative el P. Moynihan on January 29 and 30, ther with the text of a resolution adopted e Council on January 30.

EMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN HE SECURITY COUNCIL

ment of January 29

press release 13 dated January 29

e Security Council has before it four questions as it ponders what construc- steps it may take regarding the future Namibia. These four questions are as ane and timely today as they were a year ago—indeed, as they were almost cade ago when, as many of my distin- hed colleagues have remarked at this ncil table, the General Assembly de- d that South Africa had forfeited its date for Namibia. These four questions

Whether there is a real commitment by h Africa to a course of self-determina- for the people of Namibia and respect their rights;

The timing of steps toward self-deter- ation once that principle is accepted by h Africa;

The question of whether all Namibians whatever color, political affiliation, or al origin would have their voices heard in rmining the future of their nation;

The U.N. role in the process of self- rmination.

Over the past year there have been indications from the South African Government that it is finally recognizing its international obligations in Namibia and the need to implement a process of self-determination in that territory. Statements by the South African Government suggest that South Africa may finally be beginning to heed the international outcry against its continuing illegal occupation of Namibia. The distinguished U.N. Commissioner for Namibia [Sean McBride], who is present in this Council chamber, has told us that he, too, senses that differences over Namibia have narrowed, are narrowing, and can continue to narrow.

For our part the U.S. delegation has every expectation, given the temper and tone of the debate we have had so far, and the constructive nature of the suggestions that have been made, that we will emerge in agreement with a resolution that will indeed constitute a further narrowing such as the Commissioner has envisaged. I would not like to let this opportunity pass without expressing the enormous respect with which the U.S. Government holds the work of Mr. McBride.

Yet, despite these encouraging signs, we still have no clear answers from the South African Government on the four major questions I have posed. South Africa has remained silent or ambiguous in its response to these questions. There has been no definitive statement by South African authorities on the timing of steps toward self-determination—and here I allude to the comment of my distinguished colleague the Ambassador of Pakistan as to the uncertainty of the term "as soon as possible." Many Namibian groups have been excluded from the steps

so far taken; South Africa continues to deny the United Nations a role in the transition.

This past September, South Africa convened a constitutional conference in Windhoek to decide on the future of the territory. While representatives of ethnic groups took an active part in this conference, significant groups in Namibia were not allowed representation. Political groups including SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], the Namibian National Convention, and others having support of significant portions of the Namibian population were not permitted to participate. No U.N. observer was able to monitor the proceedings of the conference. For our part, the United States finds that this conference as presently constituted cannot be regarded as a definitive exercise of self-determination. We have told this to the South African Government in clear and unmistakable terms.

On the other hand, the constitutional conference at Windhoek *was* a start. The constitutional history of my own country goes back some two centuries, and I believe we have learned from that history to pay respectful attention to any beginning, whatsoever its patronage, howsoever uncertain. Nor is the United Nations today comprised of nations whose governments can boast such an impeccable constitutional pedigree as to warrant our collective disdain for whatever has so far occurred in Namibia. There is no democracy there; there is no democracy in most places. Yet still, in Namibia, men and women travel hopefully. This is no small thing; indeed it is a great thing, and the United States, for one, looks forward to welcoming them to the company of free people, and devoutly hopes to see their freedom flourish.

We believe accordingly that it is now more than ever incumbent on South Africa to announce a straightforward and unambiguous plan by which Namibians will be allowed to make a free choice of their political future. The United States believes that a single electoral process should be held throughout Namibia, with the careful supervision o United Nations, to allow the Namibian ple to decide on the future constitut structure of their country. Recognizing wide ethnic and political diversity of mibia—a condition of that nation whi by no means singular, but a condition theless—such a decision could come after a period in which all the peop Namibia and all political and ethnic g were allowed to elaborate their views a campaign for their views.

Only through an exchange of views a discussion of their political future wil people of Namibia ever be able to ma genuine choice over their future con tional status. Only through careful supervision will the international comm be assured that the self-determination ess has been executed freely without u pressure or interference by outside fo The United States believes that this s vision should be worked out as soon as pos between the United Nations and the Go ment of South Africa and encourages parties to meet and make the nece arrangements.

My government has made this pos clear to the Government of South Afri the highest levels. We have tried to im on the South African Government urgency of resolving the Namibian que quickly and peacefully. Most recentl October 23, my government, in coordin with the Governments of the United dom and France, outlined such an elec process to the South African Foreign ister. While continuing to press South A in diplomatic channels, we also have tinued to sustain our present policies to South Africa. We continue to discourage investment in Namibia. We continue to hold U.S. Government protection of A can investments based on rights acq through the South African Governmen ter 1966—which we have done since the resolution of the General Assembly term ing the South African trusteeship. Ir

ia, the U.S. Government continues to bit the shipment of American arms and ary equipment to South Africa. We con- to enforce and observe this embargo ecause we are required to do so by any national enactment—we are not. We nue, however, to invite all nations who sire to join us in this voluntary policy of ng arms to the South African Govern- which is our policy.

lso wish to put to rest at this point the e suggestion which we have heard with frequency in the halls—though happily this conference table—that the United s is in some way interested in establish- nilitary bases in Africa, even in that of Africa where Namibia is located. are suggestions that invite incredulity response, but as they continue to be they arouse not a little suspicion that is some quality of what psychoanalysts rojection—which is to say that there be people who, themselves desiring to ish bases, assume that everyone else as well. Well, the United States does

conclusion, Mr. President, let me say the United States believes that this il has a serious and unique responsi- for Namibia and a singular opportu- We believe that it is incumbent that the il reiterate the shared views of its ers on the future of Namibia. It is our to foster a peaceful resolution of the bian problem and to encourage publicly ocess of self-determination in the area, t territory, in that nation. While it is l discouraging that South Africa has oved quickly to bring the people of bia to self-determination with U.N. vision, we must not let up pressing Africa to make just that decision. Let t abandon our efforts to make a peace- lution to the Namibian problem and let ive to impress upon the South African nment the urgency and the justice of g the Namibian people decide their own e.

Statement of January 30

USUN press release 14 dated January 30

Mr. President [Salim A. Salim, of Tanzania]: In response to your appeal and to the superb example of leadership and constructive involvement which you have shown throughout this debate, my delegation limited our statement yesterday to a discussion of developments in Namibia and South African policies there.

I want to make it clear that it is in the context of Namibia, and in that context alone, that the United States has decided to vote affirmatively on the resolution which the Council has just adopted. In precisely the spirit of the statement just made by my distinguished colleague the Representative of the United Kingdom, let me say that had we been discussing Angola, as some of our distinguished colleagues have sought to do in spite of your discouragement, it would have been incumbent upon this Council to examine all foreign intervention, including the non-African forces which are currently fighting there.

The resolution we have adopted reflects the view long held by my government regarding South African presence in Namibia and the view that the Namibian people, under U.N. supervision, must promptly be allowed to exercise freely their right to self-determination.

The United States believes, Mr. President, that the correct interpretation of operative paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 concerning the means of U.N. supervision and control of the free elections in Namibia must be based on a reading of these three paragraphs together, as would be proper. It is clear that the Council is leaving open the exact form of U.N. supervision of these elections, leaving it to be worked out subsequently by the United Nations. We believe in this way the Council wisely avoids prejudging the exact nature of the U.N. role until this matter can be specifically considered.

. . . . .

TEXT OF RESOLUTION [1]

The Security Council,

Having heard the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

Having considered the statement by Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Administrative Secretary of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S–V) of 19 May 1967, which established a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular, resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

Concerned at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, and its aggressive military build-up in the area,

Strongly deploring the militarization of Namibia by the illegal occupation régime of South Africa,

1. *Condemns* the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa;

2. *Condemns* the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;

3. *Condemns* the South African military build-up in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries;

4. *Demands* that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of bantustans and the so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;

5. *Further condemns* South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of Security Council res 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974;

6. *Further condemns* all attempts by South calculated to evade the clear demand of the Nations for the holding of free elections under Nations supervision and control in Namibia;

7. *Declares* that in order that the people of bia be enabled to freely determine their own it is imperative that free elections under the vision and control of the United Nations be h the whole of Namibia as one political entity;

8. *Further declares* that in determining th time-table and modalities for the elections in ance with paragraph 7 above, there shall be ad time to be decided upon by the Security Cour the purposes of enabling the United Nations to lish the necessary machinery within Namibia pervise and control such elections, as well as to the people of Namibia to organize politically purpose of such elections;

9. *Demands* that South Africa urgently n solemn declaration accepting the foregoing pro for the holding of free elections in Namibia United Nations supervision and control, under to comply with the resolutions and decisions United Nations and with the advisory opinion International Court of Justice of 21 June 1 regard to Namibia, and recognizing the ter integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;

10. *Reiterates its demand* that South Afric the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, cordance with resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (196 366 (1974), of its illegal administration mainta Namibia and to transfer power to the pec Namibia with the assistance of the United N

11. *Demands* again that South Africa, pend transfer of powers provided for in the pr paragraph:

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice w provisions of the Universal Declaration of Rights;

(b) Release all Namibian political prisone cluding all those imprisoned or detained in co with offences under so-called internal securit whether such Namibians have been charged c or are held without charge and whether held in bia or South Africa;

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of cially discriminatory and politically repressiv and practices, particularly bantustans and hom

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibia rently in exile for political reasons full facilit return to their country without risk of arrest, tion, intimidation or imprisonment;

12. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter meet on or before 31 August 1976 for the pur reviewing South Africa's compliance with the of this resolution and, in the event of non-com by South Africa, for the purpose of consi the appropriate measures to be taken und Charter.

[1] U.N. doc. S/RES/385 (1976); adopted unanimously on Jan. 30.

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ial report of the Security Council committee ablished in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) ncerning the question of Southern Rhodesia on e expansion of sanctions against Southern Rho- sia. S/11913. December 15, 1975. 15 pp.

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eria governing multilateral financing of housing d human settlements. Report of the Secretary neral. A/10225. October 17, 1975. 59 pp.

Report of the Special Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. A/10272. October 27, 1975. 36 pp.

United Nations program of assistance in the teaching, study, dissemination, and wider appreciation of international law. Report of the Secretary General. A/10332. November 14, 1975. 24 pp.

Consideration of the economic and social situation in the Sudano-Sahelian region stricken by drought and measures to be taken for the benefit of that region. A/10346. November 14, 1975. 9 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Bills of Lading

Protocol to amend the international convention for the unification of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading signed at Brussels August 25, 1924 (51 Stat. 233). Done at Brussels February 23, 1968.[1]
Signature: Denmark, November 20, 1975.
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, November 20, 1975;[2] Switzerland, December 11, 1975.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.
Ratification deposited: Sweden, February 5, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, December 30, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.
Ratification deposited: Hungary, February 5, 1976.
Accessions deposited: Cuba, December 1, 1975; Zaïre, September 16, 1975.

[1] Not in force.
[2] Applicable to Faroe Islands.

Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.[3]
Ratification deposited: Panama, January 7, 1976.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Netherlands, December 29, 1975;[4] Panama, January 7, 1976.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Tunisia (with a reservation), January 12, 1976.

Publications

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications. Done at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force November 23, 1961; for the United States June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438.
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, November 21, 1975.[5]

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.[1]
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, December 22, 1975; Switzerland, December 30, 1975.

Amendments to chapters II, III, IV, and V of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.[1]

Amendment to chapter VI of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.[1]
Acceptances deposited: United States, February 3, 1976.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Qatar, February 2, 1976.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Qatar, February 2, 1976.

BILATERAL

Iran

Agreement extending the agreement of October 1947, as amended and extended (TIAS 1666, 1 2068, 2947, 3112, 3520, 6594, 6886, 7070, 7207, 7 7765), relating to a military mission. Effected exchange of notes at Tehran November 13, 1 and January 18, 1976. Entered into force J ary 18, 1976, effective March 21, 1976.

Romania

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Si at Washington December 4, 1973.
Ratifications exchanged: January 26, 1976.
Enters into force: February 26, 1976.

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: February 2–8

Press releases may be obtained from th Office of Press Relations, Department of Stat Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†43	2/2	IEA Governing Board adopts lon term energy policy.
44	2/3	Kissinger: Commonwealth Club San Francisco and the World A fairs Council of Northern Califo nia, San Francisco.
44A	2/3	Kissinger: questions and answe following address.
†45	2/2	Kissinger: panel discussion with Bl Ribbon 400, Los Angeles.
46	2/3	Kissinger: news conference, S Francisco.
†47	2/4	Kissinger: University of Wyomin Laramie, Wyo.
†48	2/4	Kissinger: questions and answe following address.
*49	2/4	U.S.-Thailand textile agreement.
*50	2/5	Thomas O. Enders sworn in as Ar bassador to Canada (biograph data).
†51	2/5	Kissinger: Senate Committee Government Operations.
*52	2/6	James W. Hargrove sworn in Ambassador to Australia (bi graphic data).
†53	2/6	Kissinger: Joint Committee Atomic Energy.
*54	2/6	Deane R. Hinton sworn in as U. Representative to European Cor munities (biographic data).
*55	2/6	Shipping Coordinating Committe Subcommittee on Safety of Life Sea, working group on radiocon munication, Mar. 18.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

[1] Not in force.
[3] Not in force for the United States.
[4] Extended to the Netherlands Antilles.
[5] Applicable to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles.

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