THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV • No. 1911 • February 9, 1976

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXIV, No. 1911
February 9, 1976

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

The State of the Union

Address by President Ford to the Congress (Excerpt) [1]

. . . . . .

The protection of the lives and property of Americans from foreign enemies is one of my primary responsibilities as President. In a world of instant communications and intercontinental ballistic missiles, in a world economy that is global and interdependent, our relations with other nations become more, not less, important to the lives of Americans.

America has had a unique role in the world since the day of our independence 200 years ago. And ever since the end of World War II we have borne successfully a heavy responsibility for insuring a stable world order and hope for human progress.

Today, the state of our foreign policy is sound and strong.

—We are at peace, and I will do all in my power to keep it that way.

—Our military forces are capable and ready. Our military power is without equal. And I intend to keep it that way.

—Our principal alliances, with the industrial democracies of the Atlantic community and Japan, have never been more solid.

—A further agreement to limit the strategic arms race may be achieved.

—We have an improving relationship with China, the world's most populous nation.

—The key elements for peace among the nations of the Middle East now exist.

—Our traditional friendships in Latin America, Africa, and Asia continue.

—We have taken the role of leadership in launching a serious and hopeful dialogue between the industrial world and the developing world.

—We have helped to achieve significant reform of the international monetary system.

We should be proud of what America, what our country, has accomplished in these areas, and I believe the American people are.

The American people have heard too much about how terrible our mistakes, how evil our deeds, and how misguided our purposes. The American people know better.

The truth is we are the world's greatest democracy. We remain the symbol of man's aspiration for liberty and well-being. We are the embodiment of hope for progress.

I say it is time we quit downgrading ourselves as a nation. Of course it is our responsibility to learn the right lesson from past mistakes. It is our duty to see that they never happen again. But our greater duty is to look to the future. The world's troubles will not go away.

The American people want strong and effective international and defense policies.

In our constitutional system, these policies should reflect consultation and accommodation between the President and the Congress. But in the final analysis, as the framers of our Constitution knew from hard experience, the foreign relations of the United States can be conducted effectively only if there is strong central direction that allows flexibility of action. That responsibility clearly rests with the President.

---

[1] Delivered on Jan. 19 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 26).

I pledge to the American people policies which seek a secure, just, and peaceful world. I pledge to the Congress to work with you to that end.

We must not face a future in which we can no longer help our friends, such as Angola, even in limited and carefully controlled ways. We must not lose all capacity to respond short of military intervention.

Some hasty actions of the Congress during the past year—most recently in respect to Angola—were, in my view, very shortsighted. Unfortunately, they are still very much on the minds of our allies and our adversaries.

A strong defense posture gives weight to our values and our views in international negotiations; it assures the vigor of our alliances; and it sustains our efforts to promote settlements of international conflicts.

Only from a position of strength can we negotiate a balanced agreement to limit the growth of nuclear arms. Only a balanced agreement will serve our interests and minimize the threat of nuclear confrontation.

The defense budget I will submit to the Congress for fiscal year 1977 will show an essential increase over the current year. It provides for real growth in purchasing power over this year's defense budget, which includes the cost of the all-volunteer force.

We are continuing to make economies to enhance the efficiency of our military forces, but the budget I will submit represents the necessity of American strength for the real world in which we live.

As conflict and rivalry persist in the world, our U.S. intelligence capabilities must be the best in the world.

The crippling of our foreign intelligence services increases the danger of American involvement in direct armed conflict. Our adversaries are encouraged to attempt new adventures while our own ability to monitor events and to influence events short of military action is undermined.

Without effective intelligence capability, the United States stands blindfolded and hobbled.

In the near future, I will take actions to reform and strengthen our intelligence community. I ask for your positive cooperation. It is time to go beyond sensationalism and insure an effective, responsible, and responsive intelligence capability.

Tonight I have spoken about our problems at home and abroad. I have recommended policies that will meet the challenge of our third century. I have no doubt that our Union will endure—better, stronger, and with more individual freedom. We can see forward only dimly—one year, five years, a generation perhaps. Like our forefathers, we know that if we meet the challenges of our own time with a common sense of purpose and conviction, if we remain true to our Constitution and to our ideals, then we can know that the future will be better than the past.

. . . . .

Letters of Credence

Benin

The newly appointed Ambassador of the People's Republic of Benin (formerly Dahomey), Setondji Thomas Boya, presented his credentials to President Ford on January 23.[1]

Nepal

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Nepal, Padma Bahadur Khatri, presented his credentials to President Ford on January 23.[1]

Papua New Guinea

The newly appointed Ambassador of Papua New Guinea, Paulias N. Matane, presented his credentials to President Ford on January 23.[1]

[1] For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Jan. 23.

he Executive and the Congress in Foreign Policy: :onflict or Cooperation?

Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll [1]

Almost a year ago Secretary Kissinger poke to this Council. He spoke of the arival of a new era of interdependence in orld affairs; the inextricable relationship etween American security and prosperity nd that of the world; and our need, despite ie foreign policy setbacks of the past decde and the public preoccupation with omestic problems, to continue a responsible nd active American role in world affairs. [e recalled the bipartisan consensus of the nmediate postwar period which had prouced such creative and successful Ameriin world leadership and invited the Conress to a new national partnership in the onduct of our foreign policy.

Together with new conceptions of foreign policy he said), we must define new principles of executive-legislative relations—principles which reconcile ie unmistakable claims of congressional supervision and the urgent requirements of purposeful merican world leadership.

Today I would like to talk to you about nuch the same subject—the relationship etween the executive and the Congress in oreign policy.

I do not intend simply to repeat Secretary Kissinger's remarks. Still less would I want o disagree with what he said. But the fact s, as you all know, that 1975 has not been he year in which the era of national partnership on foreign policy began. Rather, 1975 has been a year of conflict and tension between executive and legislative branches on foreign policy issues. Many would anticipate that 1976, an election year, promises more of the same.

But the importance of responsible American involvement in world affairs has not diminished during the past year, nor will the world stop while we conduct our quadrennial election ritual. And bipartisan cooperation and national consensus are as vital as ever to the effectiveness of any foreign policy we pursue. So I think this subject deserves another look today.

In these remarks I will examine the underlying causes of the continuing differences between the Congress and the executive and discuss some of the specific institutional problems which arose or continued during the past year, such as the coherence of congressional foreign policy actions, the effect of legislative restrictions aimed at modifying the behavior of foreign governments, and the handling of classified information.

Finally, I will try to assess prospects for foreign policy bipartisanship in 1976 and beyond.

Underlying Causes of the Differences

The possibility of conflict and tension between the executive and legislative branches over foreign policy was built into the Con-

[1] Made before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council at Los Angeles, Calif., on Jan. 22 (text from press release 21).

stitution. Many years ago the constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin wrote:

> What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer upon the President certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and certain other powers of the same general nature upon the Senate, and still other such powers upon the Congress; but which of these organs shall have the decisive and final voice in determining the course of the American nation is left for events to resolve.

Sometimes I go back to the office and reflect on this thought after a particularly tough day on Capitol Hill.

Of course, the Constitution does not actually require conflict between the Presidency and the Congress. Nor do political party rivalries such as our present one lead inevitably to foreign policy disputes. It was an unelected President and an opposition-controlled Congress, locked in confrontation on many other issues, which together launched the creative foreign policy initiatives of the 1946–48 period. But what permitted bipartisan cooperation in that era, after the experience of isolationism, appeasement, and war, was broad national consensus on our fundamental policy objectives of containing Soviet Communist expansionism and assisting the economic and political recovery of the European democracies.

Conversely, what inhibits bipartisan cooperation today is the divisive and chastening experience of Viet-Nam and Watergate and the lack of public consensus about America's future role in the world.

Ten public opinion analysts recently told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Americans are increasingly preoccupied with domestic matters. For example, in a 1964 survey of what most concerned the American people, international issues preempted the top five spots. A decade later, in 1974, no foreign policy issue ranked higher than 17th. More recently, NBC's excellent three-hour special on foreign policy on the evening of January 5 finished third in the ratings, behind the CBS situation comedy lineup and an ABC program on the Olympics, even though NBC had prudently waited until the Monday-night football season was over before putting on the special. Perha it should have been narrated by Howa Cosell.

The pollsters indicated that America want a close correlation between overse involvement and American national inte ests, are not enthusiastic about military a to foreign governments, and are extreme skittish about any commitment which cou lead to the use of American troops abroad.

Other public opinion surveys indicate general decline in confidence in government institutions. So it is only fair to say that th Congress elected in 1974—and taking offi in early 1975 just before Secretary Kissing spoke to you—has probably been reflectir public opinion in ending our military i volvement in Indochina, opposing any i volvement in Angola, viewing with skept cism any commitments we made in conne tion with the Sinai agreement, seeking t limit and attach restrictions to our securit assistance program, and exhibiting gre dislike for secrecy in our foreign relations.

On the other hand, the pollsters reporte that the public was aware of the relatio ship between events and trends overseas an in the United States and rejected a retur to isolationism. The Administration, course, shares that view, believing that eve though we can no longer dominate the worl as we did for many years after World War I we cannot ignore it either.

I will not attempt to convince you in d tail of the relationship between America security and prosperity and that of th world, and the need for a responsibly activ foreign policy, since I note that Secretar Kissinger covered these points in last year' speech. If he couldn't convince you, no on can; and if an audience such as this does no believe it, then the country is in deepe trouble than any of us had suspected.

Another cause of the lack of consensu and bipartisanship is the increasing com plexity of the foreign policy issues we face with the new agenda of international eco nomic interdependence superimposed on th traditional agenda of political and militar

valries. We can no longer overwhelm these roblems with the application of superior ilitary power or economic resources and herefore must often pursue subtle policies deal with them, policies which are inher-ntly difficult to explain to the public.

It is most difficult to explain, and to gen-rate popular enthusiasm for, today's more uanced policies:

—Détente with the Soviet Union calls for fering the Soviets positive incentives for oderate behavior and cooperation with the Vest, but at the same time it calls for con-nuing firmness in dealing with Soviet op-ortunism in places like Angola and the Middle East.

—The defense of our economy and foreign olicy from excessive foreign pressure re-uires us to try to improve relations with ne oil-exporting countries to give them a ositive stake in the health of the world conomy; yet at the same time we are try-ng to coordinate actions with the other oil-nporting countries to reduce OPEC's [Or-anization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-ies] control of the price of oil.

—Our desire to strengthen world prosper-y and stability leads us toward a dialogue ith the less developed countries on energy, ommodities, development, and other issues; et at the same time we are reacting rongly against confrontationist rhetoric nd double moral standards from the Third Vorld.

Even though we naturally believe these olicies are the best suited for the problems ney address, we recognize that they may ot make an audience stomp and cheer.

leed for Coherent Foreign Policy in Congress

Whatever the reasons for the lack of con-ensus and bipartisanship, it is clear to all hat the Congress is determined to play a nore active role in the formulation and the mplementation of foreign policy:

—The War Powers Act, passed in 1973, equires Presidential reporting to the Con-gress on the commitment of American troops overseas, as we did during the *Mayaguez* incident, and permits the Congress to force their withdrawal.

—Executive agreements must now be reported to the Congress, and the Congress tends to insist that any important agreement be submitted as a treaty, which must be approved by two-thirds of Senators present and voting.

—An increasing number of restrictions have been placed on security assistance, including a congressional veto of any specific arms transaction over $50 million to any specific country. An overall ceiling is being proposed for arms transfers.

—1974 legislation requires the Administration to report covert foreign policy operations to six congressional committees.

But just as the Congress has increased its activity and assumed new responsibilities in foreign policy, its internal mechanisms and structure for dealing with these tasks are breaking down:

—The traditional hierarchy of the leadership and committee chairmen has been challenged by the newer members, but no alternate structure has been erected in its place.

—The complex nature of international issues has blurred existing lines of committee jurisdiction and led to the creation of new select committees, such as the two committees on intelligence.

—Interest groups such as the Democratic Caucus, the Black Caucus and other ethnic groups, the group led by Congressman [Donald M.] Fraser which is concerned with greater attention to human rights, and other ad hoc coalitions on specific issues cannot focus their influence on any single leadership group or committee. The Administration finds it difficult to respond quickly and effectively to their concerns.

The general result has been that the executive, in attempting to inform or to consult with the Congress, is often unsure as to whom to contact or which committees to work with.

There is an ever-increasing series of demands for Secretary Kissinger himself to testify or meet personally groups and individuals. He recently estimated that he spends about one-fourth of his time on congressional relations. It seems he spends more time shuttling between the Department and Capitol Hill than between Cairo and Tel Aviv. The Secretary, and many of us, are involved in seemingly countless informal meetings and working meals at the Department and elsewhere. But no matter how hard we try, we keep getting caught in jurisdictional disputes among congressional committees or criticized for not consulting with some committee or group.

But what is more serious for the nation as a whole is that the structural confusion leads to incoherence in congressional foreign policy.

For example, I think most Americans, including the Administration and Congress, share a desire that the Soviet Union conform more closely to internationally accepted norms of behavior, in both internal and foreign policies. More specifically, we favor freedom of emigration. And we oppose Soviet meddling in the affairs of developing countries like Angola, in areas heretofore relatively free of great-power intervention.

The Administration is pursuing a policy, generally known as détente, which seeks to achieve this goal by providing incentives for moderate and reasonable Soviet behavior and at the same time discouraging Soviet troublemaking.

Yet one temporary coalition in the Congress imposed the Soviet emigration amendment—the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act—which, without increasing emigration, has made it much more difficult for us to use increased U.S.-Soviet trade to create vested interests in the U.S.S.R. who have a stake in cooperation with the United States and, therefore, restraint in Soviet foreign policy. Now another temporary coalition wants to stop activities in Angola which were intended to demonstrate to the Soviets that they cannot exploit détente for unilateral advantage.

Taken together, these congressionally imposed policies strike both the carrot and th stick from the Administration's hands; ye it is difficult to imagine what positive an coherent alternative policy these congre sional coalitions could agree on in our rel tions with the Soviet Union. It seems to m that the greater the role the Congress i sists on playing in foreign policy, the greate its obligation to see that its actions are co sistent one with another.

Impact of Legislative Restrictions

The legislative process can contribute e fectively to the definition of our foreig policy goals. But congressional efforts t legislate day-to-day and week-to-week co duct of foreign relations have often prove detrimental because they were too publi too drastic, or too undiscriminating. The r sults of such legislative sanctions during th last year tend to confirm this view. Fo example:

—The Trade Act provision which exclude OPEC members from the generalized syste of tariff preferences for less developed cou tries has not prevented a further increase i the official price of oil. But it has complicate our relations with OPEC members such a Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria, Venezuela, an Ecuador, all of which sold oil to us throug out the Arab boycott. Latin American cou tries have taken the side of Venezuela an Ecuador on this issue.

—Because of the Trade Act provisio which links most-favored-nation treatme and export credits to explicit Soviet assu ances on emigration, the bilateral trad agreement has not taken effect. Soviet len lease repayments, which are linked to th agreement, have been suspended by Moscov The American share in Soviet trade with th West has dropped from 20 percent in 197 and 1974 to 15 percent in 1975; and fro what American businessmen tell us, the lost over $1 billion in Soviet orders last yea Meanwhile, Soviet emigration is down fro 35,000 in 1973, to 20,000 in 1974, to onl 13,000 in 1975.

—Last year's foreign aid legislation co tained an amendment, section 502B, statin

the sense of Congress that "except in extraordinary circumstances, the President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance"—that is, military training or the sale or grant of equipment—"to any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights . . . ." The President must tell the Congress why security assistance to such governments should not be reduced or ended. Thus 502B requires the U.S. Government to hold friendly and allied governments to human rights standards rarely attained by their potential adversaries or indeed by the present-day majority of U.N. members. If they fail to measure up, we are required to end military aid or cut it from the level which the Congress has already authorized in pursuit of our national security interests. In other words, the left hand of Congress seeks to take away what the right hand of Congress has given. In our view, few governments can be expected to respond as we might desire to such public U.S. Government judgments on their internal affairs, and therefore this provision advances neither human rights nor security.

—Last February, despite our pleas, the Congress cut off arms transfers to Turkey, including items that nation had already paid for, to force concessions on Cyprus. The cutoff triggered a wave of Turkish anti-Americanism and a later Turkish Government decision to suspend American use of a number of Turkish bases. Now the Congress has partially lifted the embargo, but the damage will never be completely repaired. Our current base negotiations with them are extremely tough. This affects the security of the southern flank of NATO and of the eastern Mediterranean, as as well as intelligence gathering important to our efforts to protect our own security and monitor compliance with arms control agreements. Meanwhile, there has been no progress in Cyprus; in fact, some would suggest that the embargo stiffened the Turkish bargaining position.

We realize of course that the Congress has taken these actions partly because of frustration at executive branch efforts to achieve the same objectives through quiet diplomacy. We would contend that given the inherent limits on the ability of the United States to modify the behavior of sovereign governments, we have done about as well as could be expected on these issues. But legislative restrictions, because they are inherently provocative, tend to create a backlash from the governments we are seeking to influence; because they are enacted in isolation, without adequate consideration of our overall foreign policy interests, they often have unintended adverse consequences in other areas.

The Handling of Classified Information

As congressional oversight of foreign policy increases, so do problems relating to the handling and public release of classified information transmitted from the executive to the Congress. This Administration has provided unprecedented amounts and kinds of classified information to the Congress in recent months. Some committees have respected the confidentiality of this information; other committees, or their individual members, have not. I am not adopting a "less-leaky-than-thou" posture toward the Congress. Nevertheless we are distressed to see some of this information find its way into the press shortly after we transmit it to the Congress or published by Congress without our concurrence.

We know that there are dangers in overclassification and that the "national security" justification for secrecy has been abused in the past to protect erring officials. But we cannot ignore the dangers arising from the inability to protect properly classified information.

The publication of information revealing intelligence-gathering methods and their effectiveness, as one committee did in a report on the 1973 Middle East war, over our protest, allows the unwitting sources of such intelligence to take effective countermeasures in the future.

Likewise, the publication of the texts of diplomatic exchanges, as one committee did, despite our objection, in its report on the 1975 Sinai agreement, can freeze the positions of the protagonists and inhibit the process of negotiation and compromise.

The leaking of covert operations by individual Congressmen—who themselves are unwilling to take public responsibility for their actions—makes these operations impossible. The Administration believes that we should maintain a covert action capability, for certain situations and under appropriate congressional oversight, as an alternative to either inaction or open involvement. But in effect, our foreign policy in these areas can gyrate out of executive and congressional control and become subject to the veto by leak of individual members of Congress.

Conclusion

The lack of bipartisanship and consensus I have described should be a source of concern to all Americans who are interested in effective American participation in world affairs. This deficiency requires action by the executive, the Congress, and the public, particularly foreign-policy-oriented organizations such as the World Affairs Council.

For our part, the Administration recognizes that the Congress has a proper constitutionally based role in the formulation of foreign policy through advice and consent to nominations and treaties, through legislation and appropriations. It also has responsibilities for oversight of policy implementation. We are complying with current legislation requiring us to inform or consult with the Congress. We are determined to pursue partnership with the Congress, and we are involving an increasing number of officers at all levels of the Department in these consultations so that both sides will understand each other's attitudes and requirements.

We hope that the Congress will find a way to organize itself to exercise its foreign policy responsibilities more effectively. The structures and procedures are for the Congress to decide, but I would suggest two possibly relevant models:

—The first is the recently created Budget Committees of both Houses, which are now charged with establishing budget ceilings and an overview of the budgetary process which was previously diffused among many different committees.

—The second model is the executive branch's National Security Council, including representatives of all interested departments and agencies, which studies national security issues and gives the President coherent analysis and recommendations on the policy options available to him.

If the Congress could establish a structure to deal with the overall foreign policy picture, as well as related procedural issues such as consultation with the executive and the handling of classified material, its actions would be less piecemeal, less subject to special pleading, and more internally consistent.

It is the conventional wisdom that nothing much can be accomplished on major foreign policy issues in an election year. But our electorate need not—indeed, should not—passively accept this traditional state of affairs. I believe that organizations such as the World Affairs Council can play a useful role in the election debate by asking candidates their views not only on substantive foreign policy issues but also on the institutional and procedural problems I have discussed today.

America would benefit from a serious national dialogue among the people and between the branches of government about the international challenges we face, the limits and possibilities of American action, the proper division of authority and responsibility for our foreign policy, and the relationships among the responsible institutions.

Such a debate can lay the foundations for a consensus on the broad outlines of a foreign policy for the early years of our third century.

President Urges Redoubled Efforts Against Illicit Drug Traffic

Statement by President Ford[1]

Drug abuse is a tragic national problem which saps our nation's vitality. It is also a major contributor to our growing crime rate. All of us must redouble our efforts to combat this problem.

Earlier this week I met with Representative Charles B. Rangel and other Members of the Congress to discuss the problem of drug abuse. The Congressmen reported the growing availability and use of illicit drugs and expressed their concern about the continuing flow of drugs across the southwest border from Mexico and their continuing concern about a possible resurgence of heroin traffic from Turkey.

Aware of the worsening situation, last spring I directed a high-priority review of the entire Federal effort in drug law enforcement, treatment and prevention, and international control. The resulting White Paper on Drug Abuse contained a frank assessment of where we are in these efforts, as well as a number of comprehensive recommendations to improve our response to this critical problem. I endorse the white paper, and the budget I will submit in January will request sufficient funds to implement all of its major recommendations.

This Administration already has begun to take strong action to deal with the mounting threat, however. I have spoken with Presidents Echeverría of Mexico and Lopez Michelsen of Colombia and with Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey in an effort to strengthen cooperation of other nations involved in the fight against illicit drug traffic.

Because of my particular concern about the problem of Mexican heroin, I am directing Secretary of State Kissinger to express to the Mexican Government my personal concern that we explore opportunities for improved control. I have also directed the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force to present me with specific recommendations for improving our ability to control drug trafficking along the southwest border.

I call upon the Congress to enact my proposal for mandatory minimum sentences for drug traffickers so those who are spreading this evil throughout our communities will be put behind bars, where they belong. And I urge the Congress to ratify the Convention on Psychotropic Substances so we can fulfill our obligations to the other nations of the world to see that strong international controls exist for all drugs. In the weeks ahead I will send to the Congress a comprehensive message on drug abuse establishing a framework for a broad government response to the problem.

[1] Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 26 (text from White House press release, Vail).

U.S. Relations With Sri Lanka: Friendship and Mutual Respect

Following are remarks by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, which were recorded at Washington for broadcast on December 16 by the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation.

I am pleased to extend my congratulations to the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation on the completion of 50 years of service. As the United States begins to celebrate its Bicentennial year, I am happy to have this opportunity to talk about the friendship and good relations which our two countries enjoy.

As we approach the last quarter of the 20th century, the world is entering a new era, one quite different from the post-World War II period which saw the end of colonialism in Asia and Africa and a global cold war. The challenges ahead will be those of cooperation rather than confrontation—how to maintain and strengthen the structure of global peace in a multipolar world and how

to provide a more satisfactory standard of living for all nations.

What Ceylonese and Americans have learned in building our own bilateral relationship can be of value in meeting these broader challenges. At times, in the 1950's and 1960's, discord and disagreement existed between us. Fortunately, we have both come to accept that our common interests, aspirations, and shared values transcend the differences between us. Today our relations are friendly because we have learned to appreciate and to respect each other's interests and views.

What are the principles that guide America's policies toward Sri Lanka? They are:

First, we accept your commitment to nonalignment and recognize the important position your country holds as the host for the 1976 nonaligned summit conference. Dr. Kissinger summed up our views in a speech last year when he said: [1]

> The United States accepts nonalignment. In fact, America sees a world of free, independent, sovereign states as being decidedly in its own national interest. Support of national independence and the variety that goes with it has become a central theme of American foreign policy.

Second, we seek no special privileges or special role in South Asia or Sri Lanka. We want the nations of the region to live at peace with one another and to develop their distinct national identities free from external interference. We welcome Sri Lanka's policy of seeking balanced relations with the United States and with other powers.

Third, we support your efforts to accelerate national development. We have sought to play a constructive role through our economic assistance in backing your programs to provide a better standard of living for all of your citizens. Nineteen seventy-five, in fact, marks the 25th anniversary of economic cooperation between our two countries.

Finally, Americans feel a special affinity toward Sri Lanka because of our common adherence to the democratic principles of government and all that these imply. We may live halfway around the globe from one another, but as your Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike, has said: "Our two countries have many things in common, including a devotion to the parliamentary system of government and free elections."

Common interests, mutual respect, and shared endeavors are thus the foundations on which our friendship rests. The United States will do its part to sustain this relationship.

The world today is marked by the interdependence of all nations, a common fate for all mankind, and by problems which transcend national boundaries and thus cannot be solved by purely national efforts. As our two governments address the problems of our time, the dialogue between the United States and Sri Lanka contributes significantly to the search for agreement and compromise between developed and developing countries. A willingness to take into account other views in spite of differences is a fundamental necessity if the world is to settle the critical issues facing it through peaceful means.

The United States values its relations with Sri Lanka and has every expectation that they will remain warm and friendly. We can aim at nothing less than continued cooperation and dialogue if we are to meet the requirements of our time, the requirements of our two nations.

May the friendship of America and Sri Lanka prosper in the years ahead.

[1] For Secretary Kissinger's address at New Delhi on Oct. 28, 1974, see BULLETIN of Nov. 25, 1974, p. 740.

President Ford Pays Tribute to Indochina Refugee Program

Statement by President Ford [1]

Eight months ago, I initiated a program designed to open America's doors to refugees from Indochina seeking a new life. To facilitate their entry, I ordered the estab-

[1] Issued at Vail, Colo., on Dec. 24 (text from White House press release, Vail).

lishment of four reception centers in the United States to house the refugees temporarily until sponsors came forward to assist them.

The last remaining refugees departed the reception center at Fort Chaffee, Ark., on Saturday, December 20. The closing of that reception center marks the successful conclusion of our organized resettlement program. Since its inception in April, over 130,000 refugees passed through these camps before settling in communities in every state of the Union.

The success of this massive undertaking was due mainly to the open-hearted generosity of the American people, who both individually and through their churches and civic groups came forward to sponsor these newest members of our society.

But the program could not have succeeded without the efforts of those who worked long hours in this humanitarian cause. The nation owes a special tribute to the Interagency Task Force for Indochina Refugees which I set up on April 18 to coordinate refugee evacuation, reception, and resettlement and to the voluntary agencies which handled the sponsorship of the refugees in American society. To those thousands of military and civilians, volunteers, and resettlement agency personnel who dedicated these past months to the refugees, we owe heartfelt thanks. Their work reflects the truly humanitarian achievement of public agencies and the private sector working in harmony. This demonstration of strength will continually reinforce the refugees as they begin their journey toward becoming fully self-sufficient and contributing members of our nation's communities.

Initial fears that the refugees would become an ongoing problem are now allayed. The refugees have proven themselves to be hard-working and industrious people with a thirst for education and a deep-seated desire to improve themselves. I am confident that they will follow the example of former immigrants who have so richly contributed to the character and strength of the American system.

The warmth and generosity that have characterized the welcome that Americans have given to the refugees serve as a reaffirmation of American awareness of the roots and the ideals of our society.

President Ends Temporary Limitation on Imports of Meat From Canada

A PROCLAMATION[1]

TERMINATION OF TEMPORARY QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION ON THE IMPORTATION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN BEEF AND VEAL FROM CANADA

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 4335 of November 16, 1974, issued pursuant to Section 252(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)) in response to unjustifiable restrictions imposed by Canada on meat imports from the United States, limited imports into the United States of certain cattle, beef, veal, swine and pork from Canada, and whereas that Proclamation inserted item 945.03 into subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS), and

WHEREAS, Canada has now lifted those unjustifiable restrictions on meat imports from the United States, and

WHEREAS, Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1885(b)) authorizes the President to terminate in whole or in part any proclamation made pursuant to Section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)), and

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 4382 of August 5, 1975, terminated those parts of Proclamation No. 4335 pertaining to the importation of cattle, swine and pork from Canada and

WHEREAS, I deem it necessary and appropriate to terminate the remaining restrictions proclaimed in Proclamation No. 4335, specifically those imposing temporary quantitative limitations on the importation into the United States of certain beef and veal from Canada, in order to encourage trade between the United States and Canada.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, acting under authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, including Section 255(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1885(b)) do hereby proclaim that:

1) Proclamation No. 4335 is terminated.

2) Subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the TSUS is amended as follows:

(a) By deleting the superior heading immediately preceding item 945.03.

(b) By deleting item 945.03.

---

[1] No. 4410, 41 *Fed. Reg.* 749.

3) This Proclamation is effective with respect to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption after 12:01 a.m. EST, January 1, 1976.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirty-first day of December in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-five and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundredth.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Formulation of Foreign Agricultural Policy

Statement by Charles W. Robinson
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs[1]

I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to comment on the process of foreign agricultural policy formulation.

Your invitation to the Department of State to participate in a hearing of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry highlights the increasingly important relationship between agricultural policy and our overall foreign policy.

In my present position, I am especially aware that agriculture is a central and important contributor to the success of U.S. foreign economic policy. Agricultural exports have accounted for a substantial share of total U.S. exports, and they have increased rapidly in recent years. In 1975 U.S. agricultural exports were valued at an estimated $21.8 billion, compared with $7.2 billion in 1970. The estimated $13 billion surplus in U.S. agricultural trade contributed mightily to our record trade surplus last year.

The splendid contribution of U.S. agriculture to American economic strength internationally has been possible under the Administration's policies of strengthening markets at home and abroad for our agricultural production. These policies have proved mutually beneficial for the American farmer, the American consumer, the American taxpayer, and for our trading partners abroad. The expansion of agricultural exports has permitted us to pursue a policy based on dismantling the decades-old system of production restraints. Fuller production has enabled us to serve the growing foreign demand for U.S. agricultural output while at the same time providing ample supplies for American consumers.

The competitiveness of U.S. agriculture in world markets has been enhanced by monetary adjustments during the 1970's. We intend to maintain the gains which American farmers have recently enjoyed abroad. To this end, the United States will insist that agriculture shares in the benefits of trade liberalizations which result from the multilateral trade negotiations currently underway in Geneva.

There have of course been a few limited exceptions to our open market policy for exports in recent years. In 1973 soybean exports to all countries were restricted briefly under the Export Administration Act, and in 1974 grain sales to the Soviet Union were temporarily suspended by exporters at the request of the Administration.

In 1975, large Soviet purchases (nearly 10 million tons) early in the crop year and the prospect of even larger, potentially disruptive purchases by the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European countries required a temporary suspension of U.S. grain transactions with the Soviets. This permitted the overall assessment of supply and demand which was necessary to assure that additional sales to those countries would not bring about significant grain shortages elsewhere in the world. The suspension also provided the time necessary to obtain a long-term commitment from the Soviets on annual purchases from the United States. Both decisions—to request suspension of sales to

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on Jan. 22. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

the Soviets and to conclude an agreement with them—were taken by the President after full consultation with appropriate Cabinet officers and White House staff. Time has confirmed the wisdom of these decisions.

This agreement will moderate the single most volatile factor in the international grain market. As a result, American farmers can plan on a Soviet market for at least 6 million metric tons of wheat and corn annually. This factor supports our objective of strong foreign markets. In regularizing Soviet purchases from year to year, the agreement will measurably reduce the prospect of unpredictable and massive swings in Soviet purchasing patterns. This improvement in international markets will make it easier for the United States to maintain an open market policy. This was a unique agreement to handle a unique situation.

We have witnessed an evolution in the world agricultural situation in recent years as governments, in most developed countries, at least, have turned attention away from the problems of agricultural surplus toward the problems of shortages.

It is obviously vitally important that the United States respond effectively to developments in the evolving world agricultural situation and that we anticipate future problems and opportunities. Thus we have sought institutional mechanisms which would bring together the various elements of the Administration which have responsibility for the diverse aspects of economic, agricultural, and foreign policy. We have begun this process with the knowledge that certain responsibilities cannot be delegated. The Secretary of State, for example, could not "spin off" a portion of his overall responsibility for foreign policy any more than the Secretary of Agriculture could relinquish an important portion of his authority in agricultural policy. Balanced decisionmaking is necessary to serve the national interest, and we have carefully designed coordinating mechanisms which bring together key responsible officials to consult on solutions to problems that span the interests of more than one agency.

These consultations have been used to reach joint decisions or to formulate recommendations to the President for decision. The principal examples of such coordinating groups are:

—The Economic Policy Board-National Security Council Food Committee created last September by the President. It includes the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce; the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs; the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy; and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Established to monitor sales of feed grains and wheat to the Soviet Union, the Committee played an important role during the U.S.-Soviet grain negotiations in formulating instructions to the U.S. negotiators. It has a continuing mandate to develop and maintain data on grain production and exports.

—The Food Deputies Group of the Economic Policy Board meets weekly, bringing together representatives of all domestic and foreign agencies with a substantial interest in food policy.

—The International Food Review Group, chaired by the Secretary of State with the Secretary of Agriculture as Vice Chairman. The IFRG and its working group at the assistant-secretary level were established to coordinate U.S. followup activities to the World Food Conference.

We found during the summer months that the formulation and execution of grain export policy required several high-level interagency meetings. These took place both before August 11, when Secretary [of Agriculture Earl L.] Butz announced the temporary suspension of sales to the Soviet Union, and frequently thereafter until the President announced conclusion of the grain agreement on October 20. This process was successful in insuring that the agreement served both the interests of domestic producers and consumers and foreign policy considerations.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. grain agreement which resulted removed a major element of uncer-

tainty from international grain markets. We expect that this agreement will simplify both foreign policy and agricultural policy issues involving foreign grain trade. We do not anticipate a need to depart from the policies of full production and open markets which have created unprecedented agricultural productivity in the United States and made this country the largest exporter of food the world has known. It is our firm intention to avoid such a departure.

We believe that the long-term agreement with the U.S.S.R. will provide substantial benefits for U.S. food producers and consumers and for our maritime industry, which will participate in grain shipments. The interagency process which guided these negotiations assured balanced consideration of both domestic and foreign policy interests.

President Ford Urges Continuation of Grant Military Assistance

Message to the Congress [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, enacted by the 93rd Congress on December 30, 1974, expresses the sense of the Congress that the policies and purposes of the military assistance program should be "reexamined in light of changes in world conditions and the economic position of the United States in relation to countries receiving such assistance." Section 17(a) of the act expresses the view that the program, except for military education and training activities, "should be reduced and terminated as rapidly as feasible consistent with the security and foreign policy requirements of the United States."

To give effect to section 17(a) of the act, the Congress directed that I submit to the first session of the 94th Congress a detailed plan for the "reduction and eventual elimination of the present military assistance program." In the intervening period, the two foreign affairs committees are considering draft legislation that would arbitrarily terminate grant military assistance programs after September 30, 1977, unless authorized by the Congress.

I have stressed repeatedly in my messages to the Congress and in my reports to the American people, the need for constancy and continuity in our foreign policy, and, in particular, in our relationship with nations which turn to us for necessary support in meeting their most pressing security needs. Since World War II, the United States has extended such assistance to friends and allies. This policy has contributed immeasurably to the cause of peace and stability in the world. Many countries which once received grant military assistance have achieved self-sufficiency in providing for their security interests, and grant military assistance to a number of current recipients is being reduced or eliminated.

I firmly believe that grant military assistance in some form will remain a basic requirement for an effective U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future. In the Middle East and elsewhere, we must maintain our flexibility to respond to future assistance requirements which cannot now be reckoned with precision. It will continue to be in our interest to be able to meet the legitimate security requirements of countries who cannot shoulder the full burden of their own defense and grant assistance will continue to be needed to assist countries that provide us essential military bases and facilities. These requirements will not disappear; they are the necessary result of the unsettled state of the world and of our role as a world power.

Nevertheless, in recognition of the expressed sense of the Congress, I have, in preparing the 1977 budget and legislative program, reexamined the policies, purposes, and scope of the military assistance program with a view to reducing or terminating any country programs no longer essential to the security and foreign policy interests of the

[1] Transmitted on Jan. 20 (text from White House press release).

United States. As a consequence of this review, the 1977 military assistance budget request will reflect a 28 percent reduction below the 1976 request, the termination of grant materiel assistance to Korea, and elimination of five small grant programs in Latin America. Furthermore, our preliminary estimate of the 1978 requirements indicates that additional reductions and some additional program terminations should be feasible in the absence of unfavorable security or economic development in the countries concerned.

I must emphasize, however, that offsetting increases in foreign military sales credits will be required in most instances to meet the legitimate military needs of our friends and allies at a time when much of their military equipment is reaching obsolescence and prices of new equipment are increasing drastically. Moreover, the capacities of many of these grant military aid recipients to assume additional foreign exchange costs because of reduced military aid are limited by the necessity to cope with higher oil prices as well as the impact of the recession in the developed countries on their exports. In these circumstances, I believe the interests of the United States in the continued security of these countries are better served by a gradual reduction of grant military assistance attuned to the particular circumstances of each country than by an arbitrary termination of all such assistance on a given date.

Finally, I must emphasize that in this uncertain and unpredictable era we must maintain our national strength and our national purposes and remain faithful to our friends and allies. In these times, we must not deny ourselves the capacity to meet international crises and problems with all the instruments now at our disposal. I urge the Congress to preserve the authorities in law to provide grant military aid, an instrument of our national security and foreign policy that has served the national interest well for more than 30 years.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 20, 1976.*

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974. Entered into force October 1, 1975.
Acceptance deposited: United States, January 7, 1976.
Ratification deposited: Haiti, December 29, 1975.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris November 18, 1974.
Notification of consent to be bound deposited: United States, January 9, 1976.
Entered into force: January 19, 1976.

Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Ethiopia, January 9, 1976; Paraguay, January 15, 1976.

Telecommunications

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.[2]
Senate advice and consent to ratification, with declarations: January 22, 1976.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.[2]
Senate advice and consent to ratification, with declarations: January 22, 1976.

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.[2]
Senate advice and consent to ratification, with declaration: January 22, 1976.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976.[2]

[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.

Senate advice and consent to ratification, with reservation: January 22, 1976.

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.[1]

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 15, 1976.

War

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, respectively.

Notification of accession: Qatar, January 12, 1976.

Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.[2]

Senate advice and consent to ratification: January 22, 1976.

Inter-American convention on the granting of political rights to women. Signed at Bogotá May 2, 1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.[2]

Senate advice and consent to ratification: January 22, 1976.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972. Entered into force December 17, 1975.

Ratification deposited: Morocco, October 28, 1975.

BILATERAL

Egypt

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles and cotton textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo December 30, 1975. Entered into force December 30, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, as extended (TIAS 7828, 8004). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 10, 1974. Entered into force May 10, 1974.

Terminated: January 1, 1975.

Thailand

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool and man-made fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok December 29, 1975. Entered into force December 29, 1975; effective January 1, 1976.

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with annex, as amended (TIAS 7299, 8053). Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok March 16, 1972. Entered into force March 16, 1972; effective April 1, 1972.

Terminated: January 1, 1975.

[1] Not in force.

[2] Not in force for the United States.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—$23.10; plastic binder—$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Andorra	Cat. No. S1.123:AN2 Pub. 8578 4 pp.
Chad	Cat. No. S1.123:C34 Pub. 7669 4 pp.
China, People's Republic of . .	Cat. No. S1.123:C44 Pub. 7751 11 pp.

Nuclear Proliferation—Questions and Answers. Questions and answers concerning the problems related to nuclear proliferation, its technical aspects, the IAEA and international safeguards, the dual nature of nuclear technology, and future initiatives. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Pub. 80. 24 pp. 45¢. (Stock No. 002–000–00050–4).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with Guatemala. TIAS 8105. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8105).

Trade—Meat Imports. Agreement with Honduras. TIAS 8106. 9 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8106).

Name Index

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: January 19–25

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†18	1/20	Kissinger: departure, Andrews Air Force Base, Jan. 19.
†19	1/20	Kissinger, Jorgensen: news conference, Copenhagen.
†20	1/21	Kissinger: luncheon toast, Moscow.
21	1/22	Ingersoll: Los Angeles World Affairs Council.
*22	1/22	U.S. and U.S.S.R. to resume oil negotiations Jan. 26.
*23	1/22	Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission, Jan. 26.
*24	1/22	Kissinger: remarks, Moscow.
†25	1/23	Kissinger: news conference, Brussels.
*26	1/23	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on fishing vessels, Feb. 20.
*27	1/24	Program for official visit of the Prime Minister of Israel, Jan. 26–Feb. 6.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.