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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 14 *125*

THE LESSONS OF THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION AND THE 30th U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Statement by Ambassador Moynihan in the Closing Plenary Session of the 30th General Assembly 139

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

VOL. LXXIV, No. 1910
February 2, 1976

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of January 14

'ress release 13 dated January 14

Secretary Kissinger: I have two statenents, a brief one and a somewhat lengthier ›ne.

I was grieved to learn this morning of the leath of Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia. He was a good friend of the United States, a most effective leader of his country, and he voice of peace and moderation in Southeast Asia. We are extending our condolences o his widow and to the Government of Malaysia.

The second statement deals with the U.S. attitude toward Soviet actions in Angola and oward the SALT negotiations.

The United States holds the view that the essence of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, if it s to proceed toward a genuine easing of ensions, is that neither side will seek to obtain unilateral advantage vis-a-vis the other, that restraint will govern our respecive policies, and that nothing will be done hat could escalate tense situations into confrontation between our two countries.

It is the U.S. view that these principles of mutual relations are not simply a matter of abstract good will. They are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era.

It must be clear that when one great power attempts to obtain a special position of influence based on military intervention and irrespective of original motives, the other power will sooner or later act to offset this advantage. But this will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction typical of other historic eras in which great powers maneuvered for advantage only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in major crises and, indeed, in open conflict.

It is precisely this pattern that must be broken if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved.

Whatever justification in real or alleged requests for assistance the Soviet Union may consider to have had in intervening and in actively supporting the totally unwarranted Cuban introduction of an expeditionary force into Angola, the fact remains that there has never been any historic Soviet or Russian interest in that part of the world. It is precisely because the United States is prepared to accept principles of restraint for itself that it considers the Soviet move in Angola as running counter to the crucial principles of avoidance of unilateral advantage and scrupulous concern for the interests of others which we have jointly enunciated.

The United States considers such actions incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions. We believe that this is a wholly unnecessary setback to the constructive trends in U.S.-Soviet relations which we cannot believe is ultimately in the Soviet or the world interest.

The question arises whether, in the light of Angola and its implications for Soviet-American relations, it is consistent with our policy to go to Moscow and to negotiate on SALT. There are two points that need to be made in this context.

First, we have never considered the limitation of strategic arms as a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the ebb and flow of our relations. It is clear that the continuation of an unrestrained strategic arms race will lead to neither a strategic nor a political advantage. If this race continues, it will have profound consequences for the well-being of all of humanity.

Limitation of strategic arms is therefore

a permanent and global problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, it must be understood on both sides that if tensions increase over a period of time, the general relationship will deteriorate, and therefore the SALT negotiations will also be affected.

Second, we must consider the long-term consequences of a failure of the SALT negotiations. If the interim agreement lapses, the Soviets will be free of several severe restraints. They can add heavy ICBM's without restrictions. They can build more submarines without dismantling old ICBM's. There will be no equal ceiling of 2,400. The immediate impact would be that the numerical gap frozen in SALT One, and equalized in Vladivostok, would again become a factor, facing us with the choice of either large expenditures in a strategically and politically unproductive area or a perceived inequality with its political implications.

Of course we will not negotiate any agreement that does not achieve strategic equality for the United States and that we cannot defend as being in the national interest. Nor does it mean that Angola or similar situations, will, if continued, not impinge on SALT as well as the general relationship. But it does mean that the general objective of a more orderly and stable nuclear relationship is in the interests of the United States and in the interests of the world and cannot be easily abandoned. This is why the President has decided that I should go to Moscow to negotiate on SALT, and we expect that the talks will be conducted in the same spirit by the Soviet side.

Now I will go to your questions.

U.S.-Soviet Relations and Angola

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the fact that you are going to Moscow now mean that you have forwarded a new proposal to the Kremlin on SALT?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet forwarded a new proposal to Moscow on SALT, but we expect to do so before I go there, within the next day or two.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is standing in th way of a compromise that would point th way to a treaty at this point?

Secretary Kissinger: The obstacle to a agreement results primarily from issues tha could not be considered fully at Vladivostc because the technology was not yet deve oped at that time. Primarily the issues co cern how to deal with the Soviet "Backfire bomber and how to deal with the America cruise missiles; whether and how to cour them; whether and what restraints to ac cept. These are fundamentally the outstan ing issues. Most other issues have eithe been settled in principle or in detail.

Q. Excuse me, if I may follow up. But tha was the case several months ago, and yo didn't go to Moscow. Now you are going Does this mean that at least these two ou standing issues are pretty much settled?

Secretary Kissinger: There has been n discussion with the Soviets except that th Soviets have assured us that they are pre pared to modify their last position, and o that basis, we hope to be able to work ou some solution.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that yo are making Soviet restraint in Angola a qui pro quo for any successful conclusion to th SALT treaty, or are you not saying that?

Secretary Kissinger: I am saying tw things: I am saying that Soviet actions i Angola, if continued, are bound to affect th general relationship with the United States that a substantial deterioration of that rela tionship can also, over time, affect the stra tegic arms talks.

At this point, however, I would also main tain that the limitation of strategic arms i not a concession we make to the Sovie Union but it is an objective that is in ou interest and it is in the world interest and i is in the interest of world peace. So we wil pursue the negotiations in the presen framework.

Q. To follow up, if there is no change in the Soviet position on Angola, would you then expect that there could be a successfu SALT Two negotiation later on?

Secretary Kissinger: We would have to face this in the light of the circumstances that may exist later.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been sending this message—you and the President have been sending this message to Moscow now for several weeks. Have you had any indication whatsoever that the Soviets might be interested in a diplomatic solution to Angola, and secondly, are you willing to discuss this with the Soviets when you go to Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a close race between the messages we send and the deterioration of our domestic position; and messages that are not backed up at home lose a fair amount of their credibility.

We are prepared to discuss Angola, and we have had some exchanges with the Soviet Union on Angola in recent weeks which we will have to clarify.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the fact that you are going to Moscow—can that be taken as a sure thing that you will reach an agreement, or is there still the possibility of failure?

Secretary Kissinger: There is the possibility of failure. We do not know the details of the Soviet position, and on the other hand, we assume that the Soviet Union would not invite the Secretary of State to negotiate with Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] unless a major effort would be made to come to an agreement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation that if things go as you anticipate that you will be able to conclude an agreement in Moscow? Will you set out for us what you are aiming at? Are you aiming at an agreement in principle?

Secretary Kissinger: No, there cannot be a final agreement in Moscow. The most that is achievable in Moscow is an agreement in principle similar to the Vladivostok agreement but covering the outstanding issues such as Backfire and cruise missiles and to relate them to Vladivostok. And then there will have to be technical discussions at Geneva to work out the detailed provisions. And that, under the best of circumstances, would take another two to three months.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am curious as to how you are going to conduct these parallel negotiations with the Soviets. On the one hand, you are indicating that the success of SALT may hinge on Soviet activities in Angola. On the other hand, you are going to Moscow in a few days presumably to conclude an agreement in principle. How can you do that without knowing what the Soviet reaction in Angola is?

Secretary Kissinger: I have made clear in my statement that the regulation of nuclear arms in the strategic field between the United States and the Soviet Union is not a benefit we confer on the Soviet Union. It is a generic problem of world order that must be settled at some point and for which conditions are propitious now because of a long record of negotiation and because technology is at a point where it is possible to accept certain restraints now which might then have to wait for another cycle of technology before they can be made effective.

The point I am making is that if there is a general deterioration in our relationship, it could affect SALT. In any event, whatever is agreed in Moscow will take several months to negotiate in greater detail.

Q. If I could just follow up for a second, please—in other words, you are not saying, then, that if there is not some Soviet pullback in Angola before the termination of your trip to Moscow, that that is going to have an adverse effect on SALT.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that messages not backed up at home lose certain credibility, I think. We are now entering a Presidential election year. Isn't it likely that those messages will continue not to be backed up, and what impact will that have on foreign policy in general?

Secretary Kissinger: I have always believed very strongly that the foreign policy of the United States must reflect the permanent values and interests of the United

States. It is not a partisan foreign policy. And to the best of my ability, I have attempted to conduct this office in a manner that can make it achieve bipartisan support.

It would therefore be a tragedy if during this election year we did not find some means to put some restraint on our domestic debates in the field of foreign policy and to find some means of common action.

As soon as the Congress returns I will talk to several of the leaders to see what cooperation is possible to put at least some restraint on partisan controversy, because the penalties we will pay for lack of unity will have to be paid for many years.

But it is a problem. I agree with you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what exactly is it that you are asking the Soviets to do in Angola? Are you asking them to totally cease arms shipments to the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]? Are you asking them to get the Cubans out of there? Or would you be satisfied with something less than that—that they, for example, moderate the amount of arms that they are sending and take some of the Cubans out?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let us get some idea of the dimensions of what the Soviet Union has done.

The Soviet Union has sent close to 200 million dollars' worth of military equipment to Angola in the last nine months, which equals the total amount of all military equipment sent to all the rest of sub-Saharan Africa by all other countries. So that is not a minor infusion of military force. In addition to that, between 5,000 and 7,000 Cuban military forces are in Cuba—are in Angola—in fact, they seem to be everywhere except in Cuba. The fighting in the northern front in Angola is conducted almost entirely by Cuban forces and without even a pretense of any significant MPLA participation.

Now, that is a significant international event for which there are no clever explanations and from which other countries must draw certain conclusions.

As far as the United States is concerned, our position is that there should be a ceasefire; that all foreign forces should be withdrawn. We are even prepared to discuss a phasing, by which South African forces are withdrawn first, if there is a stated brief interval after which all other forces are withdrawn; that there should be negotiations between the main factions; that all outside powers, including, of course, the United States, cease their military intervention. And we are prepared to agree to the end of all military shipments.

If the issue comes down to nominal shipments for a normal government by African standards, this is something about which we are prepared to negotiate.

We want to get the great powers out of Angola. We want to return it as an African problem. And we are prepared to accept any solution that emerges out of African efforts.

Our concern about Angola is the demonstration of a Soviet willingness to intervene with what for those conditions is a very substantial military infusion of military force—plus an expeditionary force—while the United States paralyzes itself by declaring a fraction of this as a "massive involvement" of the United States, when we have declared that there is no possibility of any American military forces or advisers going there. And that is an event of considerable international significance—both the Soviet action and the American reaction.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, you spoke of the need to break the pattern of action and reaction that could build toward crisis. Isn't that what the Senate was trying to do, to break that pattern?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you can always break the pattern of action and reaction by yielding. Our idea is to maintain the international equilibrium—not to give temptation for aggressive and irresponsible action—and at the same time to establish principles of mutual restraint. Certainly it is always possible to solve these problems in the short term by declaring that they do not exist.

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions. I am not sure I have this exactly right, but didn't you say at a previous press conference that the United States would not table another SALT

roposal unless the Russians tabled another ne first? And secondly, have all the mem- ers of the NSC [National Security Council] nd the Verification Panel signed off on this ew proposal that we plan to offer in Mos- ow?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the irst question, I said that the United States annot table a new proposal simply because he Soviets had rejected the old one. We ave been given a clear promise that there vould be a significant modification in the Soviet position. Under these conditions, we re prepared to put forward a modification f our position, because we would prefer to egotiate from our position rather than rom some other.

We have made clear—and I can repeat it ere—that if the Soviets do not modify their ast position, there can be no agreement. And the position which we will forward to hem will be substantially different from the ast Soviet position. So it will require—

Q. Substantially different from their last osition?

Secretary Kissinger: It will also be some- vhat different from our position. It is an onest attempt to find a solution that takes nto account the real concerns of all sides.

With respect to our internal discussions, will not have a clear picture until I have ead all the newspaper articles that will emerge over the next few weeks, which are nvariably more dramatic than the discus- sions which in fact take place.

But my impression is that there is una- nimity on the course that we are pursuing. We have had very good meetings. We have had two Verification Panel meetings, two NSC meetings. There will probably be an- other NSC meeting before I go, just to review the bidding. And I would say that the government is operating, until the Sun- day editions, with complete unanimity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff don't provide much drama for you, but are they signing on to this proposal?

Secretary Kissinger: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are signing on to this proposal, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you recommend conclusion of a new SALT agreement with the Soviets if Soviet and Cuban forces are still in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to Mos- cow in order to see whether the deadlock in these negotiations can be broken. We should not play with the strategic arms limitation negotiations. It is a matter that is of pro- found concern for the long-term future. It is in an area in which no significant advan- tages can be achieved by either side but in which the momentum of events can lead to consequences that could be very serious. And therefore we will not use it lightly for bargaining purposes in other areas.

On the other hand, obviously if the gen- eral relationship deteriorates, then it could over a period of time even affect the Stra- tegic Arms Limitation Talks. But I think we should make every effort to avoid that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you and your people have been talking to the Soviet Union about what they are doing in Angola. How would you describe—or what are your impressions of the Soviet attitude toward a lessening or a decrease of their role there that would be satisfactory to us?

Secretary Kissinger: We are exploring with the Soviet Union now what steps can be taken in the wake of the OAU [Organi- zation of African Unity] meeting, and we have had some exploratory talks, some of which would offer the possibility of progress. But we would have to be sure that we under- stand the meaning that the Soviets attach to some of their ideas.

Q. One followup. If the Soviet Union wants the Cuban expeditionary force out, would that bring about its departure?

Secretary Kissinger: That's their problem.

Q. But you must have an opinion.

Secretary Kissinger: I think major powers have a responsibility to think about the con- sequences they will face when they engage their troops or troops of their friends. It is a lesson we have had to learn; it may be a lesson that the Soviet Union should learn.

Q. Mr. Secretary, two additional points on Angola. There have been totally contradictory reports from the United States and from the Soviet Union about the presence of Soviet vessels off Angola. U.S. officials say they are there. The Soviet Union says this is a total fabrication.

Secondly, the outcome of the OAU meeting—what is the U.S. perception of whether that has enhanced or retarded the prospect of a diplomatic movement from here on?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no question that there are some Soviet vessels off Angola—or at least they were yesterday. I haven't seen today's report.

There was a cruiser heading south, which is now in port in Guinea. So we don't know whether it will continue to head south or whether it will move to another destination. That would be the largest Soviet vessel that has been off southern Africa in many years. But we are not sure yet whether it will continue to move south. When the original announcements were made, it was heading south. It has since put in at the port in Guinea.

What was your other question?

Q. The Soviet Union has denied that it has any ships there. Where do you go from that kind of a standoff?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if there are no ships there and if we should wake up one morning and find there are no ships there, we will agree with them. And that will end the debate. We are not going to pursue—it's a good way to make the ships disappear.

Q. The second point was your perception of the outcome of the OAU meeting. Has that advanced or retarded the diplomatic prospects?

Secretary Kissinger: I think—considering events in this country in recent weeks and the difficulty we have had to give a clear indication of what the United States could do, considering the massive Cuban and Soviet lobbying effort that went on at the OAU meeting—it is remarkable that half of the members of the OAU substantially agreed with our perception of the problem which is to say, not to recognize any of the factions and to bring about an end of foreign intervention.

We think, moreover, that a vast majority of the OAU members favor an end of foreign intervention, if one can separate that problem from some of the local issues.

So we think that there is a considerable African support for the main lines of our policy, which is, after all, to leave African problems to the African nations and to insulate Africa from great-power confrontation.

We do not want anything for the United States. We are not opposed to the MPLA as an African movement; we are opposed to the massive foreign intervention by which a victory of the MPLA is attempted to be achieved.

So I believe that this position—which in its totality is supported by, after all, half of the African states in the face of much discouraging news from here—is in its major elements supported by more than half of the African states. And we hope that a diplomatic solution can be built on that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East—could you take a question on the Middle East now?

Q. Well, more like Angola.

Secretary Kissinger: All right. Let me get somebody there. Henry [Henry Trewhitt, Baltimore Sun].

Q. Mr. Secretary, given the congressional attitudes on foreign affairs in general, do you intend to talk to any leaders of Congress before you go to Moscow to negotiate further, and is there any danger that a repudiation by Congress of a SALT agreement might be counterproductive to the very objectives you're seeking for the long term?

Secretary Kissinger: I have been briefing congressional leaders on SALT negotiations consistently. There has been no significant new development in the negotiating process,

but I will no doubt be in touch with some of the senior members of the Senate.

As far as repudiation of an agreement is concerned, it would of course be a very serious matter since, in any event, one of the biggest foreign policy problems we now face is the question from other countries of who speaks for the United States. Somebody has to speak for the United States, and there can be no foreign policy without authority.

So if an agreement were repudiated, it would accelerate this very dangerous tendency; but we do not have an agreement yet.

U.S.-People's Republic of China Relationship

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your assessment, how will the death of Prime Minister Chou En-lai affect relations between the United States and China and between China and the Soviet Union, and how do you view the return of the helicopter pilots by the Chinese to the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is based on the permanent interests of both countries, and even though my admiration for Prime Minister Chou En-lai is well known, I do not believe that it was his personality, alone or principally, that was the basis of that relationship. So I would think that the main lines of our relationship to the People's Republic of China can continue along well-established lines. And, certainly, as far as the United States is concerned, as I said in my speech to the General Assembly, there is no relationship to which we attach greater importance than the relationship with the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, we should have no illusions on what that relationship is based. There is no question that the interest the People's Republic of China has in a relationship with the United States depends on its assessment of the relevance of the United States to problems of concern to the People's Republic of China. And to the degree that the United States seems less able to play a major international role, for whatever reason, to that extent the leaders in Peking, who are extremely sophisticated, will draw conclusions from it.

And it is this, and not the issue of personalities, that will affect the final judgments that will be made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that last point then, how can there be no movement on Taiwan, as there has been none over the last couple of years—how is that relationship then relevant for China?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, I am not saying there has been no movement over recent years.

Secondly, one would have to say that there are other issues that are considered more important by the People's Republic of China, in the present phase of its relationship with the United States, than Taiwan.

Q. Can you give us some examples?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the overall performance of the United States with respect to the world equilibrium.

Middle East Issues

Q. Do you see any chance that in the U.N. Security Council debate that is now going on in the Middle East that anything constructive could come out, either for Israel or for the United States; and would you say that the polarization that seems to be occurring as a result of that debate between Israel and the Palestinians, the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], has hastened the need for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United States supports the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or of a preparatory conference to discuss the reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

I do not want to prejudge the outcome of a debate which is still going on, but from what we have seen, the resolutions that are at this moment being talked about seem not too promising.

On the other hand, the United States

strongly supports progress toward peace in the Middle East and will make efforts, when this debate is concluded, to begin the negotiating process in whatever forum can be arranged.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you see the possibilities now of either Syrian or Israeli intervention in Lebanon?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have stated repeatedly that we support the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and the right of the communities within Lebanon to lead their own lives. We would believe that any outside military intervention, from whatever quarter, would involve the gravest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East; and we have left the parties concerned in no doubt that the United States would oppose any military intervention from whatever quarter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier you said that the United States would favor a South African withdrawal even in advance of withdrawal by the other foreign forces. Can we infer from this that there's been some sort of work on a timetable or some coordination with South Africa about its presence there?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The United States favors the withdrawal unconditionally of all foreign forces—South African, Cuban, Soviet, and whatever other foreign forces could be there.

The United States in a general negotiation might even—could even support a phased withdrawal, as long as the interval were sufficiently short and it is not just an excuse to permit the Cubans to take over all of Angola, which is what the military fighting is now coming down to in Angola. But this refers to diplomatic possibilities; it does not refer to any understanding between us and South Africa.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this being the first news conference for 1975, I wonder if I could walk you out on the limb a bit. What do you think will happen in—

Secretary Kissinger: This is '76.

Q. Seventy-six. What do you think will happen in '76 insofar as a Syrian disengagement? Do you think in fact there will be a SALT agreement in '76? And how do you think the Angola crisis will eventually end? [*Laughter.*]

Secretary Kissinger: This is an absolutely no-win question.

I think we have the possibility of a SALT agreement that is in the national interest and that, with a rational debate in which the alternatives are clearly put, can be sold to the American public and to the American Congress.

At any rate, as far as the United States is concerned, we will be working in that direction. I cannot speak until I have seen the Soviet position; I cannot make a flat prediction.

With respect to Angola, I think the major powers have a responsibility to show great restraint, and I think the African countries have a great opportunity to keep great-power rivalries out of their continent and have an opportunity also not to permit outside expeditionary forces to become the dominant event. A greater degree of unity in this country would help us achieve this objective. And under present conditions we have severe difficulties due to our domestic situation.

With respect to a disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, we of course support negotiations between Syria and Israel on this subject. Syria has declared so repeatedly that it would not negotiate alone —and only in an Arab context—that I would think that a separate agreement between Syria and Israel, without involving some other parties, is now less likely than would have seemed the case a few months ago.

Do you still say "Thank you"?

Q. I do again. Thank you very much.

Death of Premier Chou En-lai of People's Republic of China

Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China died at Peking on January 8. Following are statements by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger issued on January 8.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated January 8

Premier Chou En-lai will be long remembered as a remarkable leader who has left his imprint not only on the history of modern China but also on the world scene.

We Americans will remember him especially for the role he played in building a new relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States. We are confident that this relationship will continue to develop on the foundation of understanding and cooperation which he helped to establish.

The United States offers its condolences to the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 7 dated January 8

It was with a deep sense of loss that I learned of the passing away of Premier Chou En-lai. The People's Republic of China has lost one of its great leaders, and the world has lost one of the most remarkable statesmen of modern times.

It was my privilege to have had many discussions with Premier Chou when our two countries were first establishing, and then developing, a new relationship to supplant the suspicion and hostility that had existed for so many years. I was impressed by his dedication to the interests of his country, by his deep understanding of world affairs, and by his rare combination of intellectual acuity and personal charm.

The United States is pledged to continue to develop our relationship with the People's Republic of China on the basis of the principles and objectives which Premier Chou helped establish.

Death of Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia

Following is a statement by President Ford issued on January 15.

White House press release dated January 15

I was saddened to learn of the untimely death of Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak on January 14. Prime Minister Razak, distinguished Southeast Asian leader, was well known and respected for his vision and dedication to peace. Malaysia's many friends will feel his loss deeply. The American people join me in extending condolences and sympathy to his widow and to the Government and people of Malaysia.

I have designated our Ambassador to Malaysia, Francis T. Underhill, Jr., as my special representative at Prime Minister Razak's funeral in Kuala Lumpur January 16.

Foreign Minister Allon of Israel Visits Washington

Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel, visited Washington January 7–8. Following is an exchange of toasts between Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon at a dinner at the Department of State on January 7.

TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Yigal, who is an old friend of mine and a good friend of all of us here, is in the United States for one of his periodic visits in order to prepare with us the discussions at the Security Council, which will take place next week.

And there has been, in the press and elsewhere, a great deal of discussion about what we may be facing at the Security Council in our meetings this week. But I think that anybody who knows our relationship, as countries and as individuals, can be sure that this meeting that takes place at the Security Council next week deals with one of the objectives that's dear to the hearts of Israel and dear to the hearts of the United States—which is how to promote peace in the Middle East.

The United States has been committed to producing progress toward peace on the basis of two Security Council resolutions: Security Council Resolution 242, Security Council Resolution 338.

This is the only basis on which the United States will move toward peace. It has provided a reliable framework that can account for the interests and concerns of all of the parties. And therefore what Yigal and we have to discuss this week concerns only the essentially technical question of how the Security Council discussions can lead to the reopening of the Geneva Conference, or perhaps a preparatory conference to the Geneva Conference, which we'll then negotiate on the basis of those two resolutions.

But this, as I pointed out, is an essentially technical diplomatic question. The more fundamental question is how to move an area that for 30 years has been torn by war toward some consciousness of peace. And there can be no people in the world that more yearns for peace than the people of Israel.

Some of you have heard me talk about my visits to Yigal's kibbutz in 1961. Yigal and I met at Harvard in 1957, right after the war of '56. We've been close friends since. And I visited him at his kibbutz in 1961. And I saw the fishermen out on the lake right under the Golan Heights, and I will never forget what the courage meant to me of these people who went out night after night. And I remember being taken around this kibbutz, where every square inch reminded somebody of somebody who had died for it or suffered for it.

And therefore we of course understand what this process of peace must mean to a people whose country was a dream before they could ever have the courage to go there and whose margin of security is so narrow that they cannot afford many of the experiments that are given to more favored nations.

And since we're close friends, we sometimes disagree. We can afford to disagree, because we know that as far as the United States is concerned, there can be no settlement that does not assure a secure Israel that can survive in recognized borders—and recognized by all, by people in the area and by anybody who aspires to become a party to any negotiation.

We have always known that only a strong Israel can afford to run the risks inherent

in the peace process. And I think, however, that every American has to know that only a strong America can contribute to the peace process and that to the degree that other countries begin to question America's ability to shape events, to the degree that America ceases to be a relevant factor in world affairs, somebody, somewhere along the line, will have to pay in blood and sacrifice—Americans and friends of America.

So the deep problem we face if we want to move the world toward peace is not only whether America will be reliable—which is guaranteed by our affection, by our knowledge, and by the fact that nobody could face himself if he had impaired the survivability or security of Israel—but also the question is whether with all the good intentions in the world America can stay relevant and strong enough.

That is not a problem for Israelis; that is a problem for Americans, and they should remember that our capital is not inexhaustible.

But I want you to know, Yigal, that on the course of moving toward peace, we will move together. We will reconcile our views. We can afford to discuss them in complete frankness.

And, after all, when we think back to where we were at some times in 1970 and during dark days in 1973 and how we've come through the war and how far we've really come already on the road toward peace, we know we can go the rest of the way together—arduously, painfully, confidently, and successfully.

So it is always a joy to welcome you here. And I'd like all of you to join me in a toast to our friend, the Foreign Minister of Israel, and to the friendship of Israel and the United States.

TOAST BY FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON

It was very kind of Henry to remind me of our good days at Harvard, when both of us were a little younger and probably none of us thought the day might come when we may negotiate relations and plans between our two countries. But I remember at the end of that exciting seminar Henry gave me a lift from Boston to New York, and he drove the car and I took the risk [laughter] and joined him, and on our way we discussed the last war—which unfortunately was not the last—the war of 1956 in Sinai, and I made a complaint. I said, "You see, Henry, twice we won the war—in 1948–49 and in 1956. And twice we lost the peace."

And my complaint was directed not against Henry but against the Secretaries of State of those respective years who made us withdraw from Sinai without getting peace first. And Henry said, "You know, Yigal, if Heaven forbid, and there is another war and you take Sinai again, don't withdraw unless you get peace." [Laughter.] Henry, this was one of the lessons I learned from you [laughter], and you are going to pay for it now. [Laughter.]

Really, that seminar was for me a revelation. It was one of my very first visits to this great country. It gave me an opportunity to get to know a little bit of America, some idea about international relations, and to get acquainted with many friends who remained friends from all over the world—including some of the Arab countries. Maybe, when a day comes and we shall be able to exchange Ambassadors with our neighbors, one or two of them may show up—I hope not in Tel Aviv but in Jerusalem—as Ambassadors.

Meanwhile, until this dream is being materialized, the great problem is, first, how to avert another war and, secondly, how to progress toward peace.

I read in the papers a couple of weeks ago that one of your experts gave a testimony to a joint committee of the Congress in which he tried to persuade his listeners—I hope not successfully—that as far as the balance of strength between Israel and her neighbors is concerned, the Israelis have already enough means of warfare, or means of defense.

When I took the details of that testimony, I found out that it wasn't quite a correct analysis. When it came to the Israeli side, he brought into account also the weapons

we ordered and which will supply us through the pipeline for the next few years, while he ignored the pipelines of the other countries. Secondly, he excluded a few of our neighboring countries by explaining they were not important.

But, basically, I think, his conclusions were wrong in one particular aspect which I would like to stress here and now: When the Israelis speak about a "balance of strength," we never even pretend to have a numerical balance. We take it as an axiom that if numerically the balance is one against two and a half—or one against three—in favor of the other side, this can be considered as a balance of strength.

But not only this. What is needed in our particular situation is not only to secure Israel's victory in case it is being attacked but, if possible, to deter the other side from attacking altogether.

And therefore it would be wrong to judge or to measure the balance of strength only in terms of whether the Israelis can win or —God forbid—may lose. The major problem —and this is the statesmanship—is how to avert war, how to deter the other side from taking the initiative.

Henry has done a great job in both ways, first, to help us to help ourselves—ever since he entered the White House and later on in his dual capacity—and, secondly, how to clear the way toward a political settlement in the area.

And this is exactly the combination which is needed for the Middle East.

As far as we are concerned, we have to combine both: the possibility of a war and the perpetual effort to achieve peace or, in other words, to prepare for war as if it is inevitable but at the same time to work for peace as if it is attainable.

And thanks to the fact that we have a rationalistic society, we can combine those contradictions—which really do not contradict each other; they complement each other.

Only a strong Israel which can defend itself—by itself, for itself—may convince the other side that any other war will be futile and there is no alternative to peace.

As a farmer I know that there is a similarity between diplomacy and farming. First, you need a lot of patience to plow the soil, to seed it, to cultivate it—in our country, to irrigate it—and sometime in the future, if there are no troubles, you may harvest it.

And when Henry undertook upon himself, on behalf of this great country, to bring about a political settlement in our area, he mobilized his patience, his skill, his vision. And, indeed, we mustn't underestimate the importance of the three agreements which have been signed during the last one and a half years: two disengagement agreements, one with Egypt and one with Syria, and one special agreement, which is being called wrongly an "interim agreement"—but it really isn't of an interim nature—between Israel and Egypt. And all of us hope that this is not the last achievement. This is a hopeful beginning.

If these agreements were possible, why should we count out further agreements in the future? If we are strong enough, if there is the good will—and wherever there is the will, there is a way. And I truly and sincerely believe that peace is badly needed by all countries in our region. We need it badly; I'm sure our neighbors need it badly.

What is necessary is a trustworthy friend of ours and of our neighbors, at one and the same time, who can help to pave the way toward an agreement. But this can be done not only by a skillful person. This skillful person should represent a strong, united power. History determined that the United States of America, thank God, is a major power in the world.

And the future of democracy of many societies, many countries, and the future of freedom and happiness of many people in the world depend on the credibility and prosperity of the United States of America.

America cannot afford isolationism. America must not isolate herself from her many friends who look upon her in many corners of the world, in many continents—practically all continents. They need America, and

America needs them. And I see no reason on earth why the United States should isolate itself.

This is not an accidental comment. Many of us in the world, in all continents, are watching events in this country and cannot but hope that you will overcome the difficulties which will enable America—as Henry said—to shape events in the world. This is a tremendous historical responsibility, and I'm pretty sure that America will live up to its historic duty.

I don't want to elaborate now on the forthcoming debate of the Security Council. I listened with great interest to what Henry had to say about it, and I couldn't agree more. We have to do our best that the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council will reopen the way for further progress in our area. And I am pretty sure that once the political momentum is being regained, further achievements will be gained by all parties concerned for the benefit of all of us.

And I do wish this country and the rest of the world that Henry will be able to come back this great effort—one of the greatest efforts toward peace in our area, as well as in other areas of the world. Even for this alone we deserve to have another toast.

For your health, Henry, for peace in the Middle East and in the world at large. *L'chaim.*

U.S. Regrets U.K. Measures Restricting Imports

U.S. Statement [1]

The United States regrets that the British Government has taken restrictive import actions. Such actions are a matter of concern anytime they are taken. They are a matter of particular concern when economic difficulties around the world are subjecting most governments to pressures to solve their domestic employment problems by restricting imports.

We note that the United Kingdom is experiencing a particularly difficult economic situation and the announced measures are limited, and we assume that they will be temporary. We expect a detailed explanation of these measures in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

We are evaluating the impact of these measures on our own trade. In our consultations in the GATT and the OECD, we will review the potential impact of the announced measures on the overall trading system. In the course of these discussions, we will examine with the British authorities how distortions to international trade can be kept to a minimum. We will seek continuing international surveillance of these measures to assure that they are removed at the earliest possible time.

We note that footwear and textiles covered by the proposed restrictions are particularly sensitive, not only for the United Kingdom but for the United States and many other countries as well. In this connection, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement exists to provide both order and expanding markets in textiles. It would be particularly unfortunate if these measures were to weaken the Multi-Fiber Arrangement. We hope that all countries, particularly the European Community, will meet their responsibilities under the arrangement.

With respect to color TV tubes and sets and portable monochrome sets, we note that no restrictions were actually imposed. The proposed system of surveillance should not be used as a device to restrict imports.

Protectionism is a serious danger in a world economy weakened by recession. No trade restrictions can therefore be taken lightly. Any restrictions that are imposed must be strictly justifiable in terms of the problem faced and must be consonant with domestic laws and international rules. There

[1] Issued on Dec. 18 (press release 621).

can be no complacency even by those not directly affected.

The shared objective of all countries at this critical juncture should be to avoid the spread of restrictive import actions and reactions. Countries should therefore reinforce their efforts to adhere to the OECD trade pledge. In the longer term, safeguard procedures to deal more effectively with situations such as this should be developed in the multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva.

U.S. Policy on Foreign Investment and Nationalization Reiterated

Department Statement[1]

There have been significant developments during the past year concerning foreign investments by U.S. private firms. The Secretary, at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly on September 1 and at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation on December 16, emphasized the U.S. belief that foreign private investment can make a very substantial contribution to economic development. There have also been a number of actual or contemplated nationalizations involving U.S. firms, and ensuing settlement negotiations. In these circumstances, the Department wishes to reiterate pertinent U.S. policy.

The President of the United States, in January 1972, drew attention to the importance which the United States attaches to respect for the property rights of its nationals. He stated that the policy of the United States concerning expropriatory acts includes the position that:

> Under international law, the United States has a right to expect:
>
> —That any taking of American private property will be nondiscriminatory;
>
> —That it will be for a public purpose; and
>
> —That its citizens will receive prompt, adequate, and effective compensation from the expropriating country.

[1] Issued on Dec. 30 (text from press release 630).

With regard to current or future expropriations of property or contractual interests of U.S. nationals, or arrangements for "participation" in those interests by foreign governments, the Department of State wishes to place on record its view that foreign investors are entitled to the fair market value of their interests. Acceptance by U.S. nationals of less than fair market value does not constitute acceptance of any other standard by the U.S. Government. As a consequence, the U.S. Government reserves its rights to maintain international claims for what it regards as adequate compensation under international law for the interests nationalized or transferred.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Reappraisal of Project Independence Blueprint. Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee. March 18, 1975. 120 pp.

U.S. Defense Contractors' Training of Foreign Military Forces. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. March 20, 1975. 55 pp.

The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the House Committee on International Relations. June 5–September 30, 1975. 330 pp.

Atlantic Convention Resolution. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on H.J. Res. 606, Joint Resolution to call an Atlantic Convention. September 8, 1975. 121 pp.

The Press and Foreign Policy. Panel discussion before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the House Committee on International Relations. September 24, 1975. 34 pp.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Ex. L, 93–2. S. Ex. Rept. 94–10. October 22, 1975. 4 pp.

Towards Project Interdependence: Energy in the Coming Decade. Prepared for the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy by Dr. Herman T. Franssen, Ocean and Coastal Resources Project, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. December 1975. 249 pp.

The Lessons of the Seventh Special Session and the 30th U.N. General Assembly

Following is a statement made in the closing plenary session of the 30th U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan on December 17.

USUN press release 190 dated December 17

None will learn with surprise that for the United States, at very least, the 30th General Assembly has been a profound, even alarming disappointment. This splendid hall has, since the opening of the Assembly, been repeatedly the scene of acts which we regard as abominations. We have not sought to conceal this view. Nor is it our view alone. Throughout the world individuals and governments have observed this General Assembly with dismay.

Unquestionably, our distress was deepened by the contrast between this regular Assembly session and the special session which preceded it. In the recent history, perhaps in the whole history, of the United Nations there has not been a more striking, even exhilarating example of what the General Assembly can accomplish than the example of the seventh special session. In two weeks of intensive, determined, and hardheaded negotiations, we worked out a set of principles and programs for the economic advance of the poorer nations of the world that will take us a decade to put into practice.

The United States took a lead in this enterprise, from the opening statement of the Secretary of State to the concluding dense and detailed agreement, which incorporated no fewer than 28 proposals we had initially set forth.

In the general debate of the 30th session that followed, one speaker after another rose to extol the achievement of the special session. Praise was unanimous—from every bloc, from nations of every size and condition. The Assembly was honored this year by the visit of His Majesty King Olav of Norway, who appropriately made the last such general statement:

> The successful conclusion of the seventh special session of the General Assembly has initiated a universal and cooperative process to effect changes in international economic relations which may have a far-reaching impact on the daily life of millions around our globe.

Both Assemblies are now concluded, and the time is at hand to ask whether anything can be learned from them. For we do not want them forgotten. To the contrary, there are events that occurred in the 30th Assembly which the United States will never forget. Even so, we turn our attention just now to the question of whether it will be possible to avoid such events in the future. In that spirit, we would like to offer two general comments. We offer them in a spirit of reconciliation and of shared concern. We are trying to learn, and we ask if others will not seek to learn with us.

Limitations of the General Assembly

The first lesson is the most important, which is that the General Assembly has been trying to pretend that it is a parliament, which it is not. It is a conference made up of representatives sent by sovereign governments which have agreed to *listen* to its recommendations—recommendations which are, however, in no way binding.

It is usual to use the term "recommendatory" to describe the Assembly's powers, but for present purposes it seems more useful simply to say that there has been an agreement to take into consideration—to listen to—such proposals as the Assembly may make. For this directs our attention to the reality that unless such recommendations have the effect of persuading, they have no effect at all. Resolutions that condemn, that accuse, that anathematize, do not bring us any nearer to agreement. They have the opposite effect.

Hence the lesson of the seventh special session. What took place among us on that occasion was a negotiation. It was self-evident—money is said to clear the mind!—that no party to the negotiation was going to pay the least subsequent attention to any proposal to which he had not agreed. On the other hand, the authority of the unanimous agreement reached at the end of the session was very considerable. The United Nations on that occasion had served as a setting for reaching consensus—a very different thing from recording division, which is what so often happens.

Why is this lesson not self-evident, as it clearly was to those who drafted the charter? Here we come to the second of the general comments the United States would wish to offer in this closing statement. It is not an agreeable matter of which we now speak, nor yet one easily explained. Yet we must make the effort to state our views fully if we are to ask others to seek to understand them.

The Nature of the Crisis of the U.N.

The crisis of the United Nations is not to be found in the views of the majority of its members. Rather, it resides in the essential incompatibility of the system of government which the charter assumes will rule the majority of its members and the system of government to which the majority in fact adheres.

The charter assumes that most of the members of the General Assembly will be reasonably representative governments, committed at home no less than abroad to the maintenance of representative institutions.

It may be asked: How do we know? The answer has no greater—or lesser—authority than that of history and experience. The charter was conceived by an embattled American President and his British comrade-in-arms. American statesmen helped to draft the charter. American scholars may just possibly claim preeminence in their study and interpretation of the charter. Certainly the bulk of such scholarship has been American.

This is not, perhaps, surprising. Among the nations of the world we are the one most to be identified with constitutional government, in the sense of a written charter setting forth the powers and duties of government, a charter that is repeatedly amended and continuously interpreted. We would like to think that our long and really quite dedicated concern with constitutional representative government has given us at least some sense of such matters.

There are others whose experience of representative government is just as long or just as intense, and we feel that such nations may also be expected to speak with knowledge and insight. They have, in a sense, earned the right to do so.

Such nations or, more accurately, the governments of such nations, being of necessity sensitive to the nature of their own national institutions, will be similarly sensitive to the claims made by larger, multinational bodies.

Observe, for example, the great care and lengthy debate which has attended the development of multinational bodies among the nations of Western Europe. Genuine power, true authority, has been transferred from national to international bodies, but only with great and deserved caution. The parliaments of European nations slowly satisfied themselves that political and social conditions in that region had indeed evolved to the point where individuals were prepared, for certain purposes, to submit to the authority of supranational bodies. But they came to this judgment slowly and on the basis of fact.

Those who have submitted to this discipline—and obviously, at the level of individuals, this is not a variety of understanding confined to citizens of parliamentary states—will readily enough understand that the General Assembly has not attained to anything like the degree of acceptance and authority among its constituent members that warrants any transfer of genuine power of a parliamentary nature.

Now, and for the foreseeable future, it can only be a recommendatory body, a conference which adopts positions to which governments have agreed to listen. There is a certain evolution in these matters, and clearly the General Assembly has made some tiny movement in a parliamentary direction. But to pretend we are further than we are will serve only to set back what progress has in truth been made.

This goes to the question of legitimacy. What powers does an assembly have? How have they been conferred? How is it periodically reconfirmed that the population—be it of individuals or governments or whatever—over which such powers are exercised does indeed consent to that exercise?

This process—of definition, of conferral, of confirmation—is the essence of a representative institution. Those who understand it will readily enough understand what can and cannot be accomplished through the instrumentality of the General Assembly.

The Heart of the Matter

And now to the heart of the matter. Many governments—most governments—now represented in the General Assembly seem disposed to use this body as if it had powers which the General Assembly does not have, to enforce policies of a nature which the General Assembly ought not, at this stage, even to consider.

It took our 18th-century Congress well into the 19th century before it felt that political society in America had advanced to the point where an income tax could be imposed, and even then the act was declared unconstitutional; so that Congress was forced to await the 20th century to successfully impose such a tax in peacetime. Now, some see that as progress; others do not. But all see that the evolution of true consent is the first process of effective government. By contrast, before its third decade was out the General Assembly of the United Nations was proclaiming a New International Economic Order.

There is a reason for this, of which we speak at the risk of offense but having no desire to offend; the reason is that most of the governments represented in the General Assembly do not themselves govern by consent. Assemblies for them, and for their peoples, are places in which decrees are announced. Where it is felt that "majorities" are needed to attest to the decree, well, such majorities are readily enough summoned.

We put the simple test. In how many of the 144 members of the United Nations is there a representative body which both has the power and periodically exercises the power of rejecting a decision of the government? Only a handful. By one competent count, there are now 28, possibly 29, functioning, representative democracies in the world, and one is not a member of the United Nations. Such governments will by instinct pay the greatest heed to winning consent, including winning consent in the General Assembly. Consent is the very essence of their being. Other governments will not pay such heed. At home they rule by decree, and it seems wholly natural to seek to emulate the same practice in the General Assembly.

We dare to believe that this reality is better known and understood in this Assembly than it might at first appear. If only a handful of the nations represented here have representative governments today, most of them—truly!—have had such in the life of the United Nations. This is a mournful fact for those of us committed to democratic institutions.

At their height, perhaps 15 years ago, there were two or three times as many democratic governments in the world as there are today. But this very fact suggests that there are still memories in most of the

nations of the world as to just what representative institutions were like and that correspondingly there exists a much more widespread understanding of their nature than might at first appear.

Let it be clear that we do not entertain any delusions about a grand revival of democracy. We do not expect a reversal of its decline in the near term. (What we do hope to see, and hope to encourage, is more societies which will do something to protect some civil rights, even if they deny most political rights.) But we do think it is possible for there to be a greater understanding among members at large of the nature of a representative institution and the corresponding limits of the General Assembly. We would seek this understanding not to restrict what the United Nations can accomplish but, rather, to accentuate the positive and concentrate on real possibilities rather than to squander the opportunity that does exist by the mindless pretense of legislative omnipotence.

It may be that this objective would be well served if a "parliamentary caucus" were established within the General Assembly. This would be a group of nations constituted, let us say, along the lines of the membership criteria of the Council of Europe, which would attend not so much to policy issues as to institutional ones. Its concern would be to seek to encourage those practices and approaches which enhance the effectiveness of the General Assembly and to discourage, both by example and by pronouncement, those which do not.

Progress on Human Rights Issues

Surely we might especially hope to do this in the area of human rights. Let us accept the fact that the ideal of liberal democracy has sustained huge losses in the last decade. It is not likely that more than a few nations which are not democracies today will become democracies in the course of the last quarter of the century, so that we must expect continued difficulties in the General Assembly of the sort I have described.

Very well then, let us concentrate on things we can do. Of these, the most important is that of establishing some minimal international standards by which governments treat their citizens.

Let us, for example, try to agree that governments should not torture their subjects. Many do. Perhaps most do. And yet as Gaston Thorn, our wholly admirable and universally admired President, said yesterday, we did make progress on human rights at this Assembly.

Specifically we adopted, unanimously, a resolution against "torture and other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment." Citizens throughout the world may in years to come point to their governments concurrence with that resolution as they demand rights or beg for mercy and humanity in their own societies.

The United States hoped for more progress than we actually made. This year, for example, we introduced a new practice with respect to the venerable issue of apartheid. It has seemed to us that our standard practice of mere denunciation has suffered from diminishing effectiveness.

Instead, this year the United States brought into the General Assembly what was in effect a bill of particulars. With respect to violations of the standards of civil liberties which we would hope to see attained in South Africa—and throughout the world—we named prisoners, specified dates, cited statutes, quoted judges, described sentences, identified jails. There are indeed political prisoners in South Africa. But we feel they are no longer unknown political prisoners. We hope other nations may follow our precedent of lawyerlike, documented presentation of such issues.

For there are political prisoners the world over. Here again, the United States this year took an unprecedented initiative in submitting a resolution calling for amnesty for all political prisoners. We were not successful. But we said we would be back next year, and we will be. We will be there, and we may be equally sure that the political prisoners will be there also.

Confession is good for the soul, and we

onfess to not having handled this issue well nough. There are more members in this ssembly that would support an amnesty roposal than the half-dozen who told us hey would support ours. And if it should rove the case that it was American sponorship that held off many, then clearly we vill make no claims to sponsorship next ime. But our determination in this matter s, if anything, strengthened by the feeling hat we achieved so little this time.

We are not perfect, and we make no preense to perfection. What we hope for, what ome of us pray for, is simply that we hould be concerned and engaged.

And on the issue of political prisoners we re just that. We are strengthened by the xtraordinary statement of Andrei D. Sakharov, this year's winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and the recipient two years ago of the award of the International League for the Rights of Man. Speaking of his hope for the final victory of the principles of peace and human rights, he said:

> The best sign that such hopes can come true would be a general political amnesty in all the world, liberation of all prisoners of conscience everywhere. The struggle for a general political amnesty is the struggle for the future of mankind.

And so we will be back.

Farewell. We wish you peace in the New Year.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.
Extended to: Faroe Islands and Greenland, January 1, 1976.

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668.
Acceptance deposited: United Arab Emirates, January 15, 1976.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Accession deposited: Morocco, October 28, 1975.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946, as amended. Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086.
Acceptance deposited: Cape Verde, January 5, 1976.

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.[1]
Acceptances deposited: Burma, Morocco, December 30, 1975; Tanzania, Tunisia, Western Samoa, January 6, 1976.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Madagascar, December 29, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.[1]
Ratification deposited: Holy See, January 7, 1976.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975.
Ratifications deposited: Holy See, January 7, 1976; Monaco, December 30, 1975.

Program-Carrying Signals—Distribution by Satellite

Convention relating to the distribution of programme-carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974.[1]
Ratification deposited: Kenya, January 6, 1976.

[1] Not in force.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.[2]

Ratification deposited: Italy, January 5, 1976.

Sea, Exploration of

Protocol to the convention of September 12, 1964 (TIAS 7628), for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen August 13, 1970.

Ratification deposited: Spain, November 12, 1975.

Entered into force: November 12, 1975.

Seabeds Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, January 14, 1976.[3]

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.[1]

Accession deposited: Cyprus, December 24, 1975.

United Nations Charter

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

Admission to membership: Surinam, December 4, 1975.

BILATERAL

Ecuador

Agreement supplementing the commercial air transport agreement of January 8, 1947, as amended (TIAS 1606, 2196). Effected by exchange of notes at Quito December 31, 1975. Entered into force December 31, 1975.

Germany, Federal Republic of

Agreement extending the agreement of April 13, 1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7605, 7804) relating to travel group charters and advance booking charters. Effected by exchange of letters at Bonn-Bad Godesberg December 30, 1975. Entered into force December 30, 1975.

Agreement on social security, with final protocol. Signed at Washington January 7, 1976. Enters into force on the first day of the second month following the month in which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

Hong Kong

Agreement amending the agreement of July 25, 1974 (TIAS 7897), relating to trade in cotton, wool and man-made fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Hong Kong December 15 and 22, 1975. Entered into force December 22, 1975.

Mexico

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of August 15, 1960, as amended and extended (TIAS 4675, 7167). Effected by exchange of notes at México and Tlatelolco December 10 and 15, 1975. Entered into force December 15, 1975.

Netherlands

Agreement extending the agreement of July 11, 1973 (TIAS 7771), relating to travel group charter flights and advance booking charter flights. Effected by exchange of letters at The Hague December 11 and 30, 1975. Entered into force December 30, 1975.

Philippines

Agreement relating to the continued operation of Loran-A stations owned and operated by the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila November 3 and December 15, 1975. Entered into force December 15, 1975, effective January 1, 1975.

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[1] Not in force.

[2] Not in force for the United States.

[3] Extended to Netherlands Antilles.

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Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: January 12–18

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*9	1/12	Regional foreign policy conference, Houston, Tex., Jan. 28.
*10	1/13	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Feb. 12.
*11	1/13	Advisory Committee on Transnational Enterprises, Feb. 5.
*12	1/10	State Department receives Franklin portrait.
13	1/14	Kissinger: news conference.
*14	1/14	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on ship design and equipment, Feb. 11.
*15	1/15	Advisory Committee for U.S. Participation in the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat), Feb. 5.
*16	1/15	SCC, SOLAS, working group on container operations, Feb. 11.
17	1/16	Joint State-Treasury statement on commodities.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.