



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXIV • No. 1908 • January 19, 1976

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The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes select press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic \$42.50, foreign \$53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 23

Press release 627 dated December 23

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that continued U.S. aid to the anti-Soviet factions in Angola seems doubtful, are there any other ways the United States can bring pressure to bear on the Soviets to stop supporting the Popular Movement [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)]?

Secretary Kissinger: We should not have the idea that we can substitute in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union for the situation on the ground. As far as the situation on the ground is concerned, the United States will make every effort with what is in the pipeline and what is still available. It will also continue the diplomatic efforts that were started prior to the events of last week and that have become severely complicated by the congressional action. If these do not succeed by the time that the Congress returns, we will go back to the Congress and present the situation as it then exists.

As far as our relations with the Soviet Union are concerned, we consider the actions in Angola incompatible with a relaxation of tensions, and they are certain to affect our relationship unless a diplomatic solution is found.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you plan to go to Moscow sometime after the first of the year?

Secretary Kissinger: My present plans are to go to Moscow in the second half of January to discuss primarily SALT and other issues, but we will have to see what the situation is in January.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect that visit to be complicated by the events in Angola, specifically the congressional action on Angola? Will that make it harder?

Secretary Kissinger: The congressional action on Angola makes the situation in Angola much more difficult. As a result, it will also hurt our negotiating position with the Soviet Union. We will have to make a judgment later on, when the diplomatic moves that are now in progress will have had an opportunity to play themselves out, just how serious the effect will have been.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it true, as published this morning, that the CIA has found that Israel's request for American aid has been greatly inflated and that, should it receive the \$2.3 billion requested in U.S. assistance, it would have a budget surplus of \$500 million?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I don't know who is on the distribution list for what reports. I don't know whether I am on all the distribution lists that some of the press people are.

The reports that I am familiar with and the studies that I have seen indicate that, even at the level of \$2.3 billion that we have requested, Israel will have to engage in an austerity program in order to make ends meet. And our figure was based on an inter-departmental study which came to the conclusion that the figure that we requested from the Congress enables Israel to meet its needs on an austerity basis. We have never heard of a figure that enables Israel to achieve a surplus. And of course we would not support that. But we have no evidence whatever for that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you say you consider the Soviet actions in Angola incompatible with détente, what does that mean? What is the "or else," and how incompatible?

Secretary Kissinger: Let us make a few observations here about détente. And let us separate two things: The relationship with the Soviet Union that is inherent in the relation of two superpowers and, secondly, those relations that are subject to decisions and that we can regulate in terms of Soviet behavior.

The basic problem in our relations with the Soviet Union is the emergence of the Soviet Union into true superpower status. That fact has become evident only in the 1970's. As late as the Cuban missile crisis, the disparity in strategic power between the United States and the Soviet Union was overwhelming in our favor. In the seventies and eighties the Soviet Union will have achieved, and is on the road to achieving, effective strategic equality, which means that whoever may be ahead in the damage they can inflict on the other, the damage to the other in a general nuclear war will be of a catastrophic nature.

This being the case—in the past the emergence of a country into superpower status, such as, for example, imperial Germany vis-à-vis Great Britain, has generally led to war. Under the conditions of the nuclear age, it must not lead to war. That is a fact of the period that any Administration, and any opponent of the Administration, would have to face if they had to assume responsibility. How to manage the emergence of Soviet power without sacrificing vital interests is the preeminent problem of our period. That part of the Soviet-American relationship cannot be abolished. That is inherent in the relationship.

The second problem we have is whether we can accelerate this process of moderating this potential conflict by conscious acts of policy. This has been called détente. In this respect, it requires conscious restraint by both sides. If one side does not practice restraint, then the situation becomes inherently tense. We do not confuse the relaxation of tensions with permitting the Soviet Union to expand its sphere by military means. And that is the issue, for example, in Angola. The danger to détente that we face now is that our domestic disputes are depriving us

of both the ability to provide incentives for moderation, such as in the restrictions on the Trade Act, as well as of the ability to resist military moves by the Soviet Union as in Angola.

If the Soviet Union continues action such as Angola we will, without any question resist. And failure to resist can only lead other countries to conclude that their situation is becoming increasingly precarious because in Angola we are not talking about American participation; we are talking about giving military and financial assistance to people who are doing the fighting to local people who are doing the fighting.

To return to your question, unless the Soviet Union shows restraint in its foreign policy actions, the situation in our relationship is bound to become more tense, and there is no question that the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in a democracy, where there is this kind of conflict between the executive branch and the legislative branch and the legislative branch is not moving and is not responding to your requests and your entreaties, how is that eventually solved? I mean, you can't act without Congress.

Secretary Kissinger: It will become solved when the consequences of these actions become apparent. The danger is that they usually become apparent too late.

We warned and warned about the implications of the amendments with respect to Soviet trade. The end result was that the Trade Act could not be implemented, or the trade agreement could not be implemented and the people who were supposed to be helped were hurt in the sense that Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union fell from 38,000 to 10,000.

We warned and warned about the implications of the Turkish aid cutoff, and it is now perfectly evident that our relations with Turkey have been damaged beyond any immediate hope of recovery, though we have made some progress.

And we are warning now that what is

happening in Angola has nothing to do with the local situation in Angola. We were prepared to accept any outcome in Angola before massive arms shipments by the Soviet Union and the introduction of Cuban forces occurred. We are not opposed to the MPLA as such. We make a distinction between the factions in Angola and the outside intervention. We can live with any of the factions in Angola, and we would never have given assistance to any of the other factions if other great powers had stayed out of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if these congressional constraints on action in Angola by us, or for Angola, are not removed—and there isn't any sign that they are going to be—how can you make your statement stick that the United States will not accept Soviet military expansion of any kind? It ties your hands, does it not?

Secretary Kissinger: It ties our hands, but it is my conviction that if one does not discharge one's responsibilities in one place, one will be forced to do so elsewhere under more difficult circumstances. The problem will not go away. The situation will become more difficult.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, if I could ask a complicated question on that: I thought that one of the lessons of Viet-Nam was that the United States is no longer going to be the policeman for the world. There are no vital U.S. interests at all in Angola. You said that publicly. The Russians have a long history of failures in Africa. Why is it necessary every time the Russians get involved anywhere in the world, even in places where American interests are not affected, that you feel that you are compelled to go confront them?

And in connection with that, if you consider it so important, why do you do it in a clandestine way? Why don't you take it to the Congress and say, "This is important; we need money for it," and have it debated from the beginning, instead of having it blow up in your face?

Secretary Kissinger: May I separate out some of the strands of this exposition?

First, the phrase that the United States cannot be the world's policeman is one of those generalities that needs some refinement. The fact of the matter is that security and progress in most parts of the world depend on some American commitment.

Now, with respect to Angola, the issue, I repeat, is not whether a pro-Soviet faction is becoming dominant in Angola. The U.S. policy until well into the summer was to stay out of Angola, to let the various factions work out their own arrangements between themselves. We accepted in Mozambique without any difficulty a pro-Marxist faction that came to power by indigenous means, or perhaps with some minimum outside support, in the Frelimo [Front for the Liberation of Mozambique]. What happened between March and the middle of the summer was a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment, which was then followed by Soviet advisers and large numbers of Cuban troops—large at least in relation to what it takes in Angola to affect the situation.

Therefore the issue is not whether the country of Angola represents a vital interest to the United States. The issue is whether the Soviet Union, backed by a Cuban expeditionary force, can impose on two-thirds of the population its own brand of government. And the issue is not whether the United States should resist it with its own military forces. Nobody ever suggested the introduction of American military forces. The President has made it clear that under no circumstances will we introduce American military forces. The issue is whether the United States will disqualify itself from giving a minimal amount of economic and military assistance to the two-thirds of the population that is resisting an expeditionary force from outside the hemisphere and a massive introduction of Soviet military equipment.

If the United States adopts as a national policy that we cannot give even military and economic assistance to people who are trying to defend themselves without American military forces, then we are practically inviting outside forces to participate in every situation in which there is a possibility for

foreign intervention. And we are therefore undermining any hope of political and international order.

Now, as far as the Congress is concerned, let us keep in mind we are talking about trivial sums. We are talking about tens of millions of dollars. And there is something wrong if one says that, if one approves tens of millions of dollars, the next thing you know is you will have spent \$150 billion and have 500,000 troops there. A country must know how to make distinctions. We are talking about tens of millions of dollars in a situation in which our whole strategy was to produce a negotiated solution, of which the first step was going to be the speech I made in Detroit at the end of November.

We did it in a clandestine way because we did not want to have a public confrontation if we could avoid it.

Nor is it correct to say that the Congress did not know about it. Congressional committees were briefed on 25 separate occasions about what we were doing in Angola. Every stage of additional expenditures was put before the six congressional committees that have supervisory responsibilities. Some of them have designated only two members to receive these briefings; others have designated as many as 13 members to receive these briefings. But the designation is not the Administration's decision; it is the decision of the Congress. But six congressional committees were briefed at least 25 times. In addition, the two intelligence committees were briefed, I believe, a total of four times, two each. And I briefed the Church committee myself for two and a half hours.

So we followed the procedures that had been established. We were expecting to bring this matter to a negotiated solution, without a huge controversy, in a reasonably brief period of time.

And again, we should remember that this whole controversy is breaking out about American equipment asked for by African countries to support other Africans, and which amounts to some tens of millions of dollars.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I just want to check. You have left the impression that if the

Soviets continue in their current support of Angola, your trip to Moscow would be in jeopardy later this month, or it might not take place.

The second point is, if indeed the Angola situation is really a test between the Soviet Union and the United States, why not go to the heart of the issue on a question like grain shipments to the Soviet Union and things like that, in which the Soviet Union has direct interest and some pressure can be brought to bear?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a rather curious method to say "You go ahead and take over Angola with 5,000 foreign troops, but in the meantime we will start harassing you with some other things."

We are talking to the Soviet Union within the context of our overall relationship, and there is no question that our overall relationship will suffer if we do not find an adequate solution to the Angolan problem. Where it will suffer and in what ways, I am not prepared to say. I have not said that the trip to Moscow will be in jeopardy. I say we will have to look at the situation close to the time of the trip before we can answer the question whether it is in jeopardy or not.

The question of strategic arms limitation is a matter that is in our mutual interest and that should not be lightly discarded.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have often said that no policy can be effective without American public support. Unless you can show some clear and compelling national interest involved in Angola, how do you propose to win American public support?

Secretary Kissinger: I think I have shown—in my view, what I have said here this morning shows—a clear and compelling American national interest to do the thing that we had wanted to do, which were minor expenditures compared to what is involved internationally.

We are talking about, I repeat, tens of millions of dollars. We are not talking about an American expeditionary force. We are not talking about a major American involvement.

The debate has been misrepresented, and

which American assistance to indigenous forces becomes an American commitment to fight a war. That is not the case.

And therefore, if we do not succeed in convincing the public or the Congress, then we will certainly lose. And then the question is—then we will certainly lose on this issue. And then we will face the problem that is always faced in these cases. Those who are trying to resist are doing so because they want to prevent a worse contingency. If they could prove that worse contingency without any question, everybody would agree with them. A danger avoided can never be demonstrated.

Therefore, if those of us who hold the view that I have described here are correct, we will face more serious dislocations and dangers further down the road. And when the dangers become serious enough, they will unify the American people and the Congress and the executive.

We are trying to avoid that contingency from arising. If we turn out to be wrong and the Congress is right, I will be delighted.

Q. Mr. Secretary, implicit in all of these questions, though, is the fact that Viet-Nam began as a very minor involvement, began with material assistance, not just military assistance. Implicit in all of this is the understanding that if in fact you are not successful with the tens of millions of dollars, that the next request then will be for hundreds of millions of dollars. How do you respond to that?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, the situations in Angola and in Viet-Nam are totally different.

In Viet-Nam, we were involved with a state of some size that had fought a civil war for decades and that had shown a substantial ability to conduct its own war against the French and against its own opponents in the country. In Viet-Nam, in fact, the analogy, if there is any, is the Soviet support for Hanoi. And if the Soviet Union had taken the position the Senate is now taking vis-a-vis Hanoi, namely, that they could not support them once we got involved,

then we would certainly have won the war.

Now, in Angola we are dealing with three factions, none of them very large, none of them very well organized. Without outside support, the war would end on the basis that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has proposed, through some sort of coalition among the local forces. That is all that we want. We have no permanent interests in Angola and, I repeat again, we have no objection to the MPLA as long as it is an African organization.

Now, the only way we would have to come back for more and more funds is if the Soviet Union decided, on its side, to put hundreds of millions of dollars into Angola. If the Soviet Union were prepared to do this in an area 8,000 miles away from its borders in which it has no historical interest, if it were willing to fight a proxy war with the United States that far away from its borders, then we better know about it. Then we can make all sorts of decisions.

It was our belief, and it remains our belief, that this is a situation that can be solved by negotiation. And if we have the minimum degree of unity in this country and the minimum degree of confidence in ourselves, it will be resolved. But if a country is afraid to spend \$10 million lest it spend \$10 billion, then it is getting itself into great difficulties.

And let us not fool ourselves about what happened in Viet-Nam. We did not start in Viet-Nam with a few hundred men and wake up one morning and have 500,000 troops there. Every step in Viet-Nam was a conscious decision that was publicly known and to which there was no significant objection when there was time to do something about it.

There is no possibility that the same thing could happen in Angola, when even the first step has produced such an intense debate. And therefore I would warn against our putting ourselves—against drawing such facile analogies to Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we switch to the Middle East for a minute and ask you if the United States has asked the Rabin [Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel] govern-

ment not to allow further settlements in the Golan Heights or, indeed, if the United States has suggested anything in this regard to the Rabin government?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to comment about Presidential messages. It has been our general policy to point out that the creation of new settlements on the Golan Heights and elsewhere complicates the diplomatic process. And we have from time to time brought this to the attention of the Israeli Government.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke earlier of the emergence in this decade of the Soviet Union as a superpower, and you also spoke about détente as an effort to modify Soviet behavior by conscious acts of policy. Why are you waiting to affect the overall relationship of détente through those means by which we reinforce the Soviet ability to grow as a superpower—in other words through economic and food shipments, in which the Soviets can then divert their resources into becoming a military superpower?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, American credits to the Soviet Union have been minimal and have always been tied to specific projects which, in our judgment, did not affect the basic Soviet strategic position. The major amounts of credits to the Soviet Union from the outside world have come from the West Europeans and Japan, and not from the United States.

With respect to grain shipments, the sale of grain to the Soviet Union does not enable them to divert resources. It affects their standard of consumption and the happiness of the population, but it would not basically affect the Soviet strategic position.

The fact we have to face is that the Soviet Union, as a major industrial power, will develop, inevitably, associated military capabilities. The Soviet Union has been prepared to spend a greater percentage of its gross national product for military forces than the United States and has therefore been able to translate it into stronger forces for each new conflict than the United States. That is not a result of détente; that is a result of domestic priorities in the two coun-

tries which we have it in our power to change and which we should change.

We have to make a decision whether, with an emerging superpower, we should conduct our foreign policy entirely on the basis of unbridgeable hostility or whether, through a combination of moderation or creating incentives for moderation, and firmness when challenged, channel the inevitable competition into a direction which prevents what has generally happened when a new superpower emerged—namely, a war. And a war under present circumstances would have catastrophic consequences for all of humankind.

Now, this is the problem of détente. And I must stress again we are being deprived now of both the incentives for moderation and the capacity to resist, and this must lead to an extremely dangerous situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is Cuba's military intervention in Angola going to result, in your view, in an indefinite postponement of our normalization of trade and diplomatic relations?

Secretary Kissinger: We will not continue the process of normalization until Cuban forces return to Cuba.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how can you say you are going to continue to press for more and freer trade and to change the trade reform act to get rid of some of the restrictions on trade with the Soviets at the same time we are trying to meet them with firmness in Angola?

Secretary Kissinger: We are not likely to press for that at this time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the confrontation between Congress and the Administration over Angola crucial enough for you to resign over?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to give them an incentive for more confrontation. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say anything about those diplomatic moves you were mentioning in order to achieve the solution in Angola? Can you say what they are? Are

key especially in the direction of the Organization of African Unity?

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that the appropriate solution in Angola should be sought by the Organization of African Unity. It should be done on the basis that the three factions in Angola should agree among themselves on an appropriate coalition or anything else that they agree among themselves—that foreign forces, as I said the other day, from the Soviet Union, from Cuba, and from South Africa should be withdrawn from Angola. Under those conditions, Angola will cease being a significant interest of the United States, and we will cooperate with its economic development as part of our overall African policy.

We have no national objectives in establishing a pro-American or pro-Western government in Angola. We want an African government that is not imposed by anybody from the outside.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the Soviet response when you talk about the need for restraint in Angola and suggest that broader détente relations, bilateral relations, may be endangered by this?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we were only at the beginning of the diplomatic process when we got diverted into congressional hearings. But so far, obviously, the response has not been conclusive.

Q. Do you see any sign of moderation, of reduction of arms shipments?

Secretary Kissinger: My view was that a solution was achievable in the relatively near future, especially if we could have pursued it with quiet diplomacy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on your basic problem here with the Congress and the public, isn't it going to be necessary, in order to have a prayer of marshaling any support, for the Administration to come cleaner with the public than it has about what it is involved in in Angola—the time sequence, exactly what it has put in, whether there is any attempt to recruit mercenaries, the numbers of advisers? You say the Soviet Union is

blocking an attempt at a coalition government. The Soviet Union claims that it is the United States that foreclosed an attempt to have a coalition government in the earlier period of this year.

Secretary Kissinger: That is untrue.

Q. Well, the public is really bereft of facts on the record here to deal with this situation. Is it not possible to have some more candor about it? You said that the basic situation in Viet-Nam was open and known. Certainly, that cannot be said very clearly here about Angola.

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in Angola, you have to remember, was not a major enterprise. The situation in Angola was one that was resolvable by diplomatic means.

It is absolutely untrue that a coalition government was offered by the Soviet Union earlier this year, or by anybody else earlier this year, and rejected by the United States. It has been the fixed American policy to foster a coalition among the parties. It has been the fixed American policy to support the OAU in its efforts to bring about conciliation among the parties. And at no time has the United States attempted for any particular group to prevail. It was only massive Soviet intervention that has prevented this.

We had hoped that on the relatively small scale that the operation was conducted—and with the very extensive congressional briefing that was going on—that to escalate the problem too much would complicate its solution.

It is perfectly clear now that, if we go back to the Congress for additional support, we will have to put the facts in all their details before the Congress.

But I would also point out that there is an area in which confidential diplomacy must have an opportunity to operate or every problem becomes that much more difficult.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Binder [David Binder, New York Times] first.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it a fact that a year ago the primary outside forces engaged in Angola—that is, the supplies and advisers—were China and the Soviet Union and that the Chinese withdrew sometime in the summer and that the United States more or less filled the gap left by the Chinese?

Secretary Kissinger: That is, with all respect, a rather superficial way of putting it. Our involvement—and again, I must repeat—our involvement is relatively small financial support to African countries that have asked us to help other Africans. It is not a commitment of American forces in Angola. Ours occurred when a very substantial influx of Soviet forces, extending over many months, beyond any capacity of the Chinese to match, seemed to create a situation where an outside power imposed its solution on the country. It was not coordinated with the Chinese. It was not discussed with the Chinese. It was done for our own reasons.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you consistently minimize any reference to South Africa's involvement in your statements on Angola? Are you less concerned about South African involvement than Soviet involvement? And what diplomatic pressures, if any, are you taking to get South Africa to withdraw?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the removal of South African forces is a relatively simpler matter than the removal of Cuban and Soviet forces. And the United States, I have stated publicly, and I have repeated it today, is in favor of the removal of both Cuban and South African forces, and of all outside intervention.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any realistic hope or expectation of getting money from Congress to continue your efforts in Angola; and two, if you do not, these dangers that you warn of, what practical consequences might there be?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are going to make a major effort, both diplomatically and on the ground, to make do with what we have, to generate as much support from

other countries as we can. And we have had very positive responses from many African countries over the last few days. And we will also make our views known to those countries that will attend the OAU summit meeting on January 10 and 12. So we are not operating on the assumption that it must necessarily fail.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you can have a diplomatic dialogue with the Soviet Union by hinting that détente or SALT or other initiatives are threatened. But what pressure points do you have with the Cubans, who have 5,000 or 6,000 expeditionary troops there?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let us keep in mind one thing: that SALT and what I described as détente is in our common interest. It is not a favor we grant to the Soviet Union. It is an inherent necessity of the present period. Avoiding nuclear war is not a favor we do anybody. Avoiding nuclear war without giving up any interests is the problem that we face now.

As far as Cuba is concerned, we have no particular additional pressure points. And on the other hand, we do not believe that Cuba would do what it is doing except under Soviet advice.

President Deplores Senate Cutoff of Additional Funds for Angola

*Statement by President Ford*¹

The Senate decision to cut off additional funds for Angola is a deep tragedy for all countries whose security depends upon the United States. Ultimately, it will profoundly affect the security of our country as well.

How can the United States, the greatest power in the world, take the position that

¹ Made to correspondents in the press briefing room at the White House on Dec. 19 (text from White House press release).

the Soviet Union can operate with impunity many thousands of miles away with Cuban troops and massive amounts of military equipment, while we refuse any assistance to the majority of the local people, who ask only for military equipment to defend themselves?

The issue in Angola is not, never has been, and never will be a question of the use of U.S. forces. The sole issue is the provision of modest amounts of assistance to oppose military intervention by two extracontinental powers; namely, the Soviet Union and Cuba.

This abdication of responsibility by a majority of the Senate will have the gravest consequences for the long-term position of the United States and for international order in general. A great nation cannot escape its responsibilities. Responsibilities abandoned today will return as more acute crises tomorrow.

I therefore call upon the Senate to reverse its position before it adjourns. Failure to do so will, in my judgment, seriously damage the national interest of the United States.

President Ford's News Conference December 20

Following is an excerpt relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the press briefing room at the White House on December 20.¹

Q. Mr. President, yesterday you issued a statement about your sentiments on what the Senate has done on Angola.

President Ford: I said it fairly strongly.

Q. You sure did. After you did it, Dr. Kissinger said something a little more—even

stronger over at the State Department around five o'clock. He said the responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy is not altered or affected simply because Congress has taken an action. I don't know quite how to read that, but I can read that once you spend the money that is in the pipeline there isn't any more. What is the U.S. policy toward Angola going to be, given the fact that you are going to run out of money in about two months?

President Ford: Our fundamental purpose in Angola was to make sure that the people of Angola decide their own fate, establish their own government, and proceed as an independent nation. We think it is fundamentally very unwise, very harmful, for any foreign power, such as the Soviet Union is obviously doing and as Cuba is doing, to try to dominate any government in that country. All we want is for the majority of the people in Angola to decide for themselves what they want.

Now, unfortunately because the Soviet Union has spent literally millions and millions of dollars and unfortunately because Cuba has anywhere from 4,000 to 6,000 combat troops in Angola, we think this is a setback for the people in Angola. Now, I take this problem very seriously.

Q. Well, what is to be done with your hands tied, so to speak?

President Ford: Well, the Congress unfortunately has tied our hands, and I think it is a serious mistake. I feel very strongly that a great country like the United States should have flexibility to help those people in any one country to decide their own fate. And the action of the Congress is crucial in that it has deprived us of helping a majority of the people in Angola to make their own decisions.

And the problem that I foresee on a broader basis is a good many countries throughout the world consider the United States friendly and helpful, and we have over a period of time helped to maintain free governments around the world. Those coun-

¹For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 29, 1975, p. 387.

tries that have depended on us—and there are many—can't help but have some misgivings because the Congress has refused any opportunity for us in Angola to help a majority of the people. And they can't help but feel that the same fate might occur as far as they are concerned in the future.

I hope the House of Representatives will have a different view, and we are certainly going to try and get the House of Representatives to reverse the Senate action.

Q. If not, are we through there?

President Ford: I never say we are through; but the action of the Senate has seriously handicapped any effort that we could make to achieve a negotiated settlement so that the people of Angola could have a free and independent government.

Q. Mr. President, on that subject, why did we not start earlier in making public our opposition to what the Soviet Union was doing there and telling this country how much money and what effort we were making there, and can you tell us how much money we spent there?

President Ford: I don't think it is wise for me to discuss in any detail what we have done or contemplated doing. It was a legitimate covert operation where not one American military personnel was involved in the operation, and we had no intention whatsoever of ever sending any U.S. military personnel there. But to discuss any further details than that I think, in this case as in any other covert action case, the President just should not discuss it publicly.

Q. Mr. President, now that the Soviet Union is persisting, despite what the Congress did on our side, in pouring equipment and material into Angola, do you see now the possibility that this might seriously harm any chance for a completion of SALT Two?

President Ford: The persistence of the Soviet Union in Angola with a hundred million dollars' or more worth of military aid

certainly doesn't help the continuation of détente.

Now I will add another comment. As said earlier, there are between 4,000 and 6,000 Cuban combat military personnel in Angola. The action of the Cuban Government in sending combat forces to Angola destroys any opportunity for improvement in relations with the United States. They have made a choice. It, in effect, and I mean very literally, has precluded any improvement in relations with Cuba.

Q. Mr. President, do you see any possibility that this matter could be taken to the United Nations or worked on from the diplomatic standpoint now?

President Ford: We certainly intended to try to get diplomatic efforts underway and to help in the diplomatic area, but I think our influence in trying to get a diplomatic solution is severely undercut by the action of the U.S. Senate.

Now, there is a meeting in early January of the Organization of African Unity [Unity]—the foreign ministers of that organization—they are meeting the first week or so in Africa. We hope that they will take some action to let the Angolans themselves decide this. In addition, there is a meeting later in January of the heads of governments of the OAU. That body, of course, is the one that could do the most. And I know that there are a number of African states who have apprehension about a foreign power dominating a country as rich and potentially strong as Angola. And so I can assure you to the extent that we can have any impact in diplomatic areas we are certainly going to maximize our efforts.

But I repeat that what the Senate action yesterday undercuts very, very seriously any impact we can have in the diplomatic field.

Q. Mr. President, a couple of months ago there were some efforts by the Administration to try and warm relations with Cuba. Dr. Kissinger made some statements, I

ere. It is apparent now that at that very time the Cubans had to be gearing up or knew that they were probably at least considering sending troops to Angola. Did our intelligence pick up this fact, and was there any cause and effect? Were we in effect trying to persuade them not to participate in Angola, and were we offering friendship to them in return for their not participating?

President Ford: The sending of military personnel by Cuba to Angola is a rather recent development in any magnitude. The statements made by the Secretary indicating that if there was a softening, a change on the part of Cuba, it would be reciprocated to us, was made before there was any significant military involvement by Cuba in Angola.

I wanted to be on the record and as forcefully as I can say. The action of the Cuban Government in the effort that they made to get Puerto Rico free and clear from the United States and the action of the Cuban Government to involve itself in a massive military way in Angola with combat troops and, as far as I am concerned, any efforts at all to have friendlier relations with the Government of Cuba.

Q. Sir, I don't think you answered my question. Can you tell me if the efforts were connected in any way with the Cuban efforts?

President Ford: I thought I answered it.

Q. I am sorry.

Q. Mr. President—

President Ford: To be very specific and sort, no.

Death of Generalissimo Franco, Chief of State of Spain

Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Chief of State of the Spanish State, died at Madrid November 19. Following are statements by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger issued on November 20.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated November 20

It was with sorrow that I learned of the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, who led his country for almost four decades through a significant era in Spanish history. With his passing, I express deepest sympathy to his wife and family on behalf of the Government and people of the United States.

We wish the Spanish people and the Government of Spain well in the period ahead. The United States, for its part, will continue to pursue the policy of friendship and cooperation which has formed the touchstone for the excellent relations existing between our two countries.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 575 dated November 20

The death of General Franco ends an era in Spanish history. At this solemn moment, I offer my sincere condolences to the widow and family of the Chief of State, to Prince Juan Carlos, and to the Spanish people.

U.S. Discusses Angola in U.N. General Assembly

Following is a statement made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan on December 8 during the debate on proposed amendments to a resolution recommended by the Special Political Committee under agenda item 53, Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa.¹

USUN press release 180 (corr. 1) dated December 8

Mr. President, fellow delegates: The General Assembly of the United Nations is approaching another moment of truth, a test of our capacity to meet the obligations which the Charter of the United Nations imposes upon us, reposes in us. And we shall see, perhaps before this day is out, whether, faced with this moment of truth, the General Assembly of the United Nations settles for a big lie—the big lie that intervention in the country of Angola is that of one nation only, in the face of the enormous fact that this is not true.

¹ On Nov. 28 the Assembly had postponed the vote on draft resolution F, Situation in South Africa, recommended by the Special Political Committee in its report on agenda item 53 (U.N. doc. A/10342). On Dec. 8 the Representative of Madagascar introduced amendments (U.N. doc. A/L.784) cosponsored by seven African countries to add a preambular paragraph referring to "direct intervention of South African armed forces in Angola" and an operative paragraph condemning that intervention. On Dec. 8 the Representative of Zaïre introduced subamendments (U.N. doc. A/L.786) rewording the preambular paragraph to refer to "direct intervention of certain foreign Powers, including South Africa, in Angola" and the operative paragraph to condemn "all foreign intervention in Angola, including the intervention of South African armed forces . . ." The amendments and subamendments were withdrawn on Dec. 10 and the resolution was adopted by a rollcall vote of 101 to 15 (U.S.), with 16 abstentions (A/RES/3411 G (XXX)).

This moment of truth comes at a particularly poignant time for each of us. We have reached a moment long desired, long worked for, when one of the great injustices of modern history was being righted. Step by step and with their own proud cooperation, honorable cooperation, the European nations which in the course of the late 18th and the 19th, and some earlier, centuries had taken over every inch of the African Continent save only the ancient kingdom of Ethiopia—the European colonizers who had come to conquer every square foot of Africa save only Ethiopia—have now left Africa. Most have left in good repute and with good and strong and friendly feelings and ties that endure with the areas, now nations, which they had come to occupy. And with the departure of Spain from Sahara on the 28 of February next, there remains but only a tiny area of European-controlled territory in all of the continent. In effect the era of colonization has ended. The General Assembly has played an honorable and distinguished role in bringing about that termination.

But at just the moment when the European colonizers of the 17th and 18th and 19th centuries have departed—at just this moment—a new European colonizing, colonial, imperial nation appears on the continent of Africa, armed, aggressive, involved in the direct assault upon the lands and the people of Africa. The European colonial power is back, a new colonial power more mighty than any that ever preceded it. It has come with its arms, with its armies, with its technology, with its ideology; and as the colonization of Africa commences, or more accurately, the effort now to recolonize Africa commences.

The question is whether it will succeed. The enormous and critically important question is whether African nations themselves will allow themselves to be parties to a new European conquest.

Now, Mr. President, we are very much aware of the alleged role, as it is asserted to be, of the nation of South Africa in some of the goings-on right now in Angola. We have not seen evidence presented to this Assembly, but no doubt it can and will be; otherwise we could not imagine there would have been the amendment which we have before us and which we are discussing. We assume the sponsors of that amendment will bring evidence before us and we can consider it. My government will consider it with no difficulty whatever, considering its view, which is shared by almost all of the members of this Assembly, about the nature of the regime in South Africa.

Our detestation for the abominable practice of apartheid does not need to be repeated. I would just call your attention to the fact that it is a member of the U.S. delegation to this General Assembly who this year was denounced by name by the Prime Minister of South Africa. Only an American delegate was denounced by South Africa so far in this Assembly, so far as I am aware. There may be others; but there is no question that my good friend, and a great American, Clarence Mitchell was denounced by name. And there is equally no question that, accused of having stated untruths by the Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. Mitchell, a free American in a free assembly, came to this podium and in a lawyer-like and detailed way spelled out, named names, cited dates and places and laws, spelled out our profound disagreement with that system, and answered the charge that our disagreement was not based upon facts. The facts were presented from this podium by an American delegate.

We are proud of that delegate and proud of his presentation, and we are not unaware of the fact that it was one of the first occasions in this General Assembly in which such facts have been brought to this podium.

Now, as I say, we have not yet had the

facts about South African intervention. We will welcome such information as it appears before the Assembly.

My purpose, however, is to introduce some facts about the whole of the situation. Now, it is well known to the members of this Assembly that the Organization of African Unity has condemned all intervention in Angola—all intervention. The OAU has done this and was right to have done it. The United States of America for one has condemned all intervention in Angola, and we are happy to join the OAU in that matter.

Which of the great powers, as they are called, of the world has not condemned all intervention in Angola? You know very well which has not. It is the Soviet Union which has not, the European power now engaged in colonial expansion in the continent of Africa.

In Pravda, on December 4, a commentary by Mr. E. Kapskiy, and the Soviet Deputy Permanent Representative Kharlamov's statement here on November 26, the Soviet Government, far from condemning intervention, has acknowledged it, saying that it is assisting its friends in Angola and saying that it would continue to do so. Europeans on the continent of Africa with European arms, fighting Africans—this is what is happening, gentlemen.

Two African Presidents have spoken of illegal Soviet overflights bringing equipment over their lands to the area. Angolan freedom fighters have captured some of the invading force; photographs have appeared in the press. No secret. But let me be more specific, and let me share with you information which is known to all the world. It would be well for me to stand here and report what American diplomatic or intelligence services might have gathered as information, and many of us here could do more, or at least as well; but that would be in the nature of somewhat arcane information.

Let me read to you from the front page of the New York Times, certainly one of the world's great newspapers and, I need hardly remind the members of this Assembly,

hardly a spokesman for the U.S. Government.

What is on the front page of today's New York Times? The article is headed "Cubans"—which are a Western Hemisphere nation, of course—"with Soviet Arms"—that's a European nation—"Said to Turn Angola Tide." I will read to you the report from Washington by Mr. David Binder, a distinguished American journalist who has covered European affairs as well as American affairs. Mr. Binder writes:

A Cuban expeditionary force equipped with Soviet armored vehicles and rocket launchers is turning the tide of civil war in favor of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, according to American officials.

The officials, who are assigned to watching developments in Angola, made this estimate on the basis of information reaching here through intelligence channels as well as from friendly governments.

They said Cuban infantry and artillery units had spearheaded columns of the Popular Movement in their advance north of Luanda, the old Portuguese colonial capital (you change masters but not capitals, is that it?) against the National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

The National Front has set up a coalition government in Huambo—formerly Nova Lisboa—with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Both the National Union, known as Unita, and the National Front have been fighting the Soviet-armed and Cuban-aided troops of the Popular Movement, which has proclaimed itself sovereign and has its capital in Luanda.

Now, listen to this, fellow delegates:

The Popular Movement has pushed more than 50 miles up the coast during the last 10 days . . . capturing the town of Caxito and moving toward the Atlantic port of Ambriz.

Cuban infantry and artillery units, the American officials said, have been responsible for advances in the south-central battle area where they are contesting for control of the 896-mile Benguela railroad, which links the countries of Zaire and Zambia to the large Angolan harbor of Lobito.

Understand that the two nations, Zambia and Zaire, will find if this movement is successful that their port of exports for their products and imports or other matters is controlled by the new colonial power.

In that area, the Popular Movement's forces, stiffened by the Cubans, have been fighting sizable numbers of men of the National Union, who are said

here to be supplemented by soldiers from South Africa.

Did you read that? There appear to be soldiers from South Africa working with the National Union.

The Cubans and the Popular Movement are said to have taken the town of Cangumbe, which is on the rail line.

Then it says:

[Correspondents in Angola, however, say they have seen no evidence that South African soldiers are actually fighting there, though the South African Government has admitted giving training and logistical support.] [Brackets in original.]

So we have a dispute about how many South Africans, if there are any. But we can get evidence. We have an amendment which assumedly is based on evidence.

"The Cubans are involved everywhere," an American official observed. A Latin-American official who has just arrived here from Havana said today that Cuban officials had told him that 3,100 soldiers are now serving in Angola. He said Cuban soldiers had also been seen south of Luanda in a third battle region, centered around the rich agricultural belt between Gabela and Quibala.

Well, this story goes on this way—but remember, we are now getting stories from American officials, so you can discount them a little bit perhaps:

Both officials said there was clear evidence that the Soviet Union was continuing large-scale shipments of military supplies directly to Luanda by sea and by air.

Of course Pravda has confirmed this European arms landing, supporting European expeditionary forces in Africa, gentlemen. That is what is happening today.

The last big Soviet airlift to Luanda occurred last Monday, the officials here said, when several huge AN-22 transports came in.

Now, that is a summary of news from Washington. The New York Times also had this morning a report from Angola itself from Huambo, an area not under Popular Movement control, by an American journalist, Michael T. Kaufman. I wonder if our anti-imperialists would listen to me while I talk about this, please, for another moment

those of us who are so enthusiastic to see imperialism end, will they pay a little attention to this new imperialism?

From Huambo, December 4:

As seen from here, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, aided by vast quantities of Soviet arms and by Cuban fighting men, has made sharp military advances on three fronts in recent days.

Now note, fellow delegates, I am not trying to persuade you to take the winning side in this argument. It is not clear which is the winning side. We are talking about what is the right side, the claim which every act of this General Assembly in 30 years surely attests, which is that the European colonization of Africa must end. But it says here, "aided by vast quantities of Soviet arms"—European arms—"and by Cuban fighting men, there have been great advances"—

[Ambassador Moynihan was interrupted on a point of order by the Representative of Madagascar.]

Thank you, Mr. President. As I understand your ruling, sir, the distinguished representative from Madagascar will speak following me or shortly thereafter. Thank you, Mr. President; thank you, sir.

I do not wish extensively to incur upon the delegates' time or the Assembly's time, but I simply do want to make the point which Mr. Holden Roberto, the President of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, made—a freedom fighter if ever there was one, a distinguished member of his people—and this is what he has to say: "This is a war of men against weapons—we have the men and they have the weapons."

Now, if ever there was a man who appeared in the country of Angola, a leader of his people, it is this very Holden Roberto. And what has he said? He said, "This is a war of men against weapons—we have the men and they have the weapons." And who are the men? They are African men. And what are the weapons being used against them? They are European weapons—European weapons. And if this Assembly will not face this fact, then what is the good of this place?

Now, I think we will. I think there are

men and women of courage in this room who will. But if we then do not, think of what history will say about us. And they will not face only the colonization of southwestern Africa, they will perhaps one day even face up to the colonization by the same nation on the northeastern coast, Somalia, where the Institute for the Study of Conflict has noted that this same European nation has landed 150 T-35 tanks, up to 100 T-54 tanks, 300 armored personnel carriers, 200 coastal batteries, 50 MIG's, a squadron of Ilyushin-28 bombers, six patrol boats, and two guided-missile patrol boats, and a batch of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles.

Now, let me sum up. We are faced with a situation properly the concern of this Assembly. An independent nation has been invaded by foreigners, foreign troops, foreign arms. One group of African countries has brought to our attention the prospect that a nation, South Africa, has been involved. We await their evidence. That evidence will be carefully considered by my delegation. And I remind the delegates that my delegation has insistently and in detail stated its abhorrence of the social system in South Africa. And we have other information of invasion by another country, two other countries.

Now, are we going to pay attention to those? I think we should pay attention to the words of my distinguished colleague and my predecessor at this podium, Ambassador Mutuale of Zaïre, who spoke with pride of his nation's role in the liberation of the African people from the colonial yoke. Those were his words, and he clearly meant that his nation did not mean to be party to the reimposition of that colonial yoke by a great European power with its armies and its weapons already on the northeast coast and southwest coast of that continent.

Ambassador Mutuale said, how can two different standards, two different treatments, discriminatory treatments, be admitted to so fundamental a norm of international relations, he said, as the duty to avoid interference in the internal affairs of another country? He asked, how can it be tolerated? Ambassador Mutuale said no

intervention can be justified in Angola. He said there cannot be two yardsticks.

Fellow delegates, if the strong and true words of the Ambassador of Zaïre are ignored today, do not be surprised if the pronouncements of this General Assembly are ignored by the rest of the world from today on. We face a moment of truth. It is time to tell the truth. If we settle for a big lie, we will have earned the contempt which the world will heap upon us and which history will record as having been our due.

U.S. Gives Views on U.N. Resolution on Human Rights in Chile

Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly on November 11 by U.S. Representative Leonard Garment, counselor to the U.S. delegation, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on November 11 and by the Assembly on December 9.

STATEMENT BY MR. GARMENT

USUN press release 142 dated November 11

The United States will vote for the resolution before us. The vote of the U.S. delegation in favor of the draft resolution dealing with the protection of human rights in Chile is a vote for human rights, a vote in support of the purpose assigned to this organization under the charter "to achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all . . ."

Our vote reflects deep concern over reports which continue to come to this organization from many credible sources about violations of basic human rights taking place in Chile. My government is of the opinion that these reports deserve to be addressed by appropriate U.N. action.

It was because of our desire to find the best means for bringing the influence of world opinion to bear in a positive way on

that situation that my government gave its strong support to the establishment of an ad hoc working group by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The promise of that government to welcome the visit of the ad hoc working group to Chile was, we thought, a hopeful sign that more rapid progress in bringing about an improvement of the situation there would occur. Consequently, my government was deeply disappointed that the visit of the working group to Chile did not take place. The position we take today has been greatly influenced by that development.

I should point out that, unlike other drafts on the situation in Chile which have been informally circulated and to which my delegation has objected because of their objectionable intervention in the internal affairs of that government, the draft resolution before us draws attention to specific provisions of international instruments to which Chile as well as other members of the United Nations is party. These international instruments are among the most important achievements of this organization during its existence. We regard this resolution as a positive attempt to give meaning to these human rights instruments through its call on the Chilean authorities to give full respect to them.

Mr. Chairman, having noted the reasons why my government has voted for this resolution, I wish to record some of the doubts we have had about the resolution.

First of all, we have been hesitant about the approach embodied in the resolution which focuses specifically upon certain conditions which are stated to exist in that country. I reiterate our concern that resolutions of this nature must not go too far in their prescription of specific measures of correction. We raise this point to draw attention to the importance of avoiding actions which can be seen as attempting to involve the organization too directly in matters of domestic concern, as against resolutions which correctly apply agreed human rights principles.

We also note that this Assembly by this resolution singles out for particular atten-

tion the human rights situation in one country. This leaves the impression that the United Nations is willing to overlook situations involving gross violations of human rights in other countries, some of which are among the loudest and most belligerent critics of Chile.

We object to this approach because it is not evenhanded. To put it bluntly, for some it is an act of blatant hypocrisy. In our view, the United Nations should address problems of this nature in a more general fashion which will emphasize the need to protect human rights on a worldwide basis rather than adopt a selective and necessarily one-sided approach. However, while we reject and abhor the flagrant application of a double standard in the field of human rights, we cannot say that the United Nations should remain silent in the case of Chile.

My delegation reached its decision to vote for this resolution after a careful weighing of the resolution's positive and negative aspects. We cast our vote in the manner we hope will have the best influence in promoting the cause of human rights. We are hopeful that the Government of Chile will take heed of the strong concern in the world which the vote on this resolution reflects. We hope that its adoption will strengthen respect for human rights in Chile, a respect which has characterized the long and proud tradition of the Chilean people. We trust it will strengthen the cause of human rights everywhere.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ¹

Protection of human rights in Chile

The General Assembly,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,

¹ A/RES/3448 (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/10284/Add.1, report of the Third Committee (part II) on agenda item 12, Report of the Economic and Social Council); adopted by the committee on Nov. 11 by a rollcall vote of 88 (U.S.) to 11, with 20 abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by a recorded vote of 95 (U.S.) to 11, with 23 abstentions.

Recalling that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile or to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

Recalling that, in its resolution 3219 (XXIX) of 6 November 1974, the General Assembly expressed its deepest concern about reported constant and flagrant violations of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile and urged the authorities in that country to take all necessary steps to restore and safeguard those rights and freedoms,

Noting that the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, at its eighteenth session, the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation, at its sixtieth session, the World Conference of the International Women's Year and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, at its twenty-eighth session, called for the cessation of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile,

Noting that, in its resolution 8 (XXXI) of 27 February 1975, the Commission on Human Rights, after expressing its serious concern about the continuing reports of violations of human rights in Chile, decided to establish an *ad hoc* working group to inquire into the present situation of human rights in that country on the basis of all available evidence, including a visit to Chile, and appealed to the authorities of Chile to extend its full co-operation to the group,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General under resolution 3219 (XXIX)² and, in particular, the progress report submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile,³

Convinced that the progress report contains evidence on which to conclude that flagrant and constant violations of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms have taken place and continue to take place in Chile,

Expressing its appreciation to the Chairman and members of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group for their report which has been prepared in a commendable manner, notwithstanding the refusal of the Chilean authorities to permit the Group to visit the country,

Reaffirming its condemnation of all forms of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

1. Expresses its profound distress at the constant, flagrant violations of human rights, including the institutionalized practice of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, to which the progress report brings additional evidence, which have taken

² U.N. doc. A/10295. [Footnote in original.]

³ U.N. doc. A/10285. [Footnote in original.]

place and, according to existing evidence, continue to take place in Chile;

2. *Calls* on the Chilean authorities to take, without delay, all necessary measures to restore and safeguard basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and fully to respect the provisions of the international instruments to which Chile is a party and, to this end, to ensure that:

(a) The state of siege or emergency is not used for the purpose of violating human rights and fundamental freedoms, contrary to article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(b) Adequate measures are taken to end the institutionalized practice of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in full respect of article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(c) The rights of all persons to liberty and security of person, in particular the rights of those who have been detained without charge or in prison solely for political reasons, as provided for in article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are fully guaranteed and steps are taken to clarify the status of those individuals who are not accounted for;

(d) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed, contrary to article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(e) No one, in accordance with article 15, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, shall be arbitrarily deprived of Chilean nationality;

(f) The right to freedom of association, including the right to form and join trade unions, shall be respected in accordance with article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(g) The right to intellectual freedoms, as provided for in article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, shall be guaranteed;

3. *Deplores* the refusal of the Chilean authorities to allow the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile to visit the country, notwithstanding previous solemn assurances given by the authorities in this regard and urges them to honour these assurances;

4. *Invites* the Commission on Human Rights to extend the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group established under resolution 8 (XXXI), as presently constituted, to enable it to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session and to the Commission on Human Rights at its thirty-third session on the situation of human rights in Chile and, in particular, any developments which occur to re-establish respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;

5. *Requests* the President of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to assist in any way they may deem appropriate in the re-establishment of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile.

U.S. Welcomes Adoption by U.N. of Declaration on Torture

Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Carmen R. Maymi on November 28, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on November 28 and by the Assembly on December 9.

STATEMENT BY MS. MAYMI

USUN press release 164 dated November 28

In his address before the General Assembly September 22, Secretary of State Kissinger underscored the persistent and serious problem of torture in the world. He urged the Assembly to adopt the draft declaration on protection of all persons from being subjected to torture. He also encouraged this Assembly to go further and tackle the problem of implementation. His proposal was progressive. He suggested that a group of experts be appointed by the Secretary General to study the nature and extent of torture in the world today and to report back to the next Assembly.

My delegation welcomes the adoption of the declaration. This is a step of major importance. It is an accomplishment which underlines the gravity of the problem of torture in the world and demonstrates our collective determination to do something about it. This declaration reinforces the complete and unconditional prohibition against torture set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Now there can be no possible loophole through which government officials responsible for

torture can escape condemnation by the international community.

Drafting of texts, however, is but the first step the United Nations must take to combat the problem of torture. Now that the principles have been set forth, we must consider the most effective approach to insure that they are observed. The challenge still before us is to organize and concentrate the concern of the world community.

My delegation had hoped that this committee might have decided upon measures for implementation. The inexorable factor of time, however, has forced us to conclude that this committee would not be able to give adequate attention to a major progressive proposal in the area of implementation. We intend to pursue this matter again in this Assembly and perhaps in other human rights forums. We will be consulting with other interested delegations to develop our ideas in a form which we hope will receive widespread support.

The resolution contained in document A/C.3/L.2187 Rev.1, introduced by the Greek delegation, contains a number of requests to various U.N. bodies to carry forward the work to eliminate the practice of torture. My delegation wholeheartedly supported it. We note in particular the request addressed to the Commission on Human Rights in operative paragraph 2.¹

The resolution recognizes that our task is not finished. Much remains to be done. We hope that during this coming year our work in this area will go ahead as called for by this resolution and also that the Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities will continue to make its important contribution. With such

progress the 31st General Assembly will be in a better position to decide upon further measures to combat the practice of torture.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ²

The General Assembly,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Considering that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,

Considering also the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 55, to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which provide that no one may be subjected to torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

Adopts the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution, as a guideline for all States and other entities exercising effective power.

ANNEX

Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Article 1

1. For the purpose of this Declaration, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanc-

¹ Draft resolution A/C.3/L.2187/Rev.1, as orally amended, was adopted by the committee on Nov. 28 and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 without a vote (A/RES/3453 XXX). Operative paragraph 2 requests the Commission on Human Rights to study the question of torture and any necessary steps for "Ensuring the effective observance of the Declaration . . ." and "The formulation of a body of principles for the protection of all persons under any form of detention or imprisonment. . . ."

² A/RES/3452 (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/10408, report of the Third Committee on agenda item 74, Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment); adopted by the committee on Nov. 28 and by the Assembly on Dec. 9 by acclamation.

tions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 2

Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Article 3

No State may permit or tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 4

Each State shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Declaration, take effective measures to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment from being practised within its jurisdiction.

Article 5

The training of law enforcement personnel and of other public officials who may be responsible for persons deprived of their liberty shall ensure that full account is taken of the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This prohibition shall also, where appropriate, be included in such general rules or instructions as are issued in regard to the duties and functions of anyone who may be involved in the custody or treatment of such persons.

Article 6

Each State shall keep under systematic review interrogation methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons deprived of their liberty in its territory, with a view to preventing any cases of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 7

Each State shall ensure that all acts of torture as defined in article 1 are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply in regard to acts which constitute participation in, complicity in, incitement to or an attempt to commit torture.

Article 8

Any person who alleges he has been subjected to

torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by or at the instigation of a public official shall have the right to complain to, and to have his case impartially examined by, the competent authorities of the State concerned.

Article 9

Wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture as defined in article 1 has been committed, the competent authorities of the State concerned shall promptly proceed to an impartial investigation even if there has been no formal complaint.

Article 10

If an investigation under article 8 or article 9 establishes that an act of torture as defined in article 1 appears to have been committed, criminal proceedings shall be instituted against the alleged offender or offenders in accordance with national law. If an allegation of other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is considered to be well founded, the alleged offender or offenders shall be subject to criminal, disciplinary or other appropriate proceedings.

Article 11

Where it is proved that an act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has been committed by or at the instigation of a public official, the victim shall be afforded redress and compensation, in accordance with national law.

Article 12

Any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment may not be invoked as evidence against the person concerned or against any other person in any proceedings.

United States Supports Admission of Surinam to the United Nations

Following is a statement made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly on December 4 by U.S. Representative Pearl Bailey, Special Adviser to the U.S. delegation.

USUN press release 173 dated December 4

Just as we warmly supported Surinam's candidacy in the Security Council, the United States has cosponsored wholeheartedly the resolution on the admission of Surinam to membership in the United Na-

tions. We extend our enthusiastic greetings to Surinam as the newest member of the United Nations.¹

Surinam's achievement of independence is a tribute to the dedication and capacity of her elected leaders and their commitment to the well-being of their people. It is also a tribute to the progressive policies of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The United States and Surinam have historical links which go back to the early colonial days of the Western Hemisphere. In fact, in 1667 the colonies of Surinam and Nieuw Amsterdam, as New York was called at the time, were exchanged by the then metropolitan powers. The U.S. consulate in Surinam, established in 1790, was elevated to an Embassy on November 25, 1975, when Surinam became an independent nation.

Mr. President, as host country representative, my delegation extends a warm welcome to Surinam's representatives at this headquarters. My delegation offers a particularly cordial welcome and greeting to Prime Minister Arron, Mrs. Arron, and the other members of the Surinam delegation who have come to the United Nations on this historic occasion.

It is the sincere hope of my delegation that this day marks the beginning of even closer and friendlier ties between the Government of the United States and the Government of Surinam as we engage in a common effort to realize the goals of the Charter of the United Nations.

Surinam's diverse and capable population, rich natural resources, and varied agricultural production, along with a commitment to liberal trade policies, provide the basis for continued economic development. The new republic's long history of democratic traditions and self-government, including the establishment of a legislative council over a century ago, are grounds for anticipation that Surinam will make important contributions to the United Nations.

¹ The Assembly on Dec. 4 adopted by acclamation a resolution (A/RES/3413 (XXX)) admitting Surinam to membership in the United Nations.

Mr. President, my delegation wishes Surinam all the benefits of independence and membership in the United Nations. We look forward to a strong Surinam contribution in the deliberations and activities of our organization.

Once again: Welcome, Surinam.

And before this is over, I would like to say something, gentlemen. I watched your delegation, dear Surinam, walk in. I watched you as you proceeded around there and down the aisle. You walked very proudly, and I felt very proud to watch you walk in, because you walked with something that men should walk with. It is called dignity. No one looked back; everyone looked forward. That's the only way that men should walk.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.

General Assembly

Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Report of the Secretary General. A/10196. September 9, 1975. 8 pp.

Succession of states in respect of treaties. Report of the Secretary General containing comments and observations of member states. A/10198. September 11, 1975. 26 pp.

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. Report of the Secretary General containing replies received from governments. A/10221. September 12, 1975. 7 pp.

Letter dated September 4, 1975, from the Permanent Representatives of Ghana and Italy, as representatives of the countries exercising the chairmanship of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) and the presidency of the European Economic Community (EEC), transmitting the text of the ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, signed on February 28, 1975. A/AC.176/7. September 16, 1975. 84 pp.

United Nations Fund for Namibia. Report of the Secretary General. A/10229. September 23, 1975. 10 pp.

Department Discusses the Role of East-West Trade in U.S. Foreign Relations

Statement by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before the committee today to speak about the role of East-West trade in our foreign relations.

As you are aware, our relations with the Communist countries entered a new phase more than three years ago. Progress in political relations was marked by the Berlin settlement, advances in the arms control negotiations, and the Moscow summit in the spring of 1972. This opened the way for progress in trade and economic relations, which led to the conclusion of the commercial agreements with the Soviet Union later that year. Not only in the U.S.S.R. but in China and East Europe as well, we have regarded the development of trade and economic relations as the natural outgrowth of political progress.

The development of East-West trade brings important economic benefits. Our exports of industrial and agricultural goods to this fast-growing market still represent less than 3 percent of our total exports, but they create earnings for American firms and jobs for our farmers and workers. These countries are sources of valuable raw materials, like metals and petroleum products. The economic benefits of this trade have been described by other participants in these hearings in detail.

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Commerce on Dec. 12. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

East-West trade also improves the environment for future progress on political issues. Trade relations, like cultural and scientific relations, can bring expansion of contact, continuing interchange, and a degree of interdependence, which contribute to the growth of shared interests, greater stability, and mutual restraint.

We must be careful, however, to assess the political implications of East-West trade realistically. We should not overestimate the political leverage we can obtain from our economic relations with these countries. The U.S. share in East-West trade is relatively small. For the vast majority of traded goods the Communist countries can find sources of supply outside the United States.

In order to insure that any of the specific restrictions we may place on trade and financial relations with Communist countries are effective, we should keep our policies and practices reasonably consistent with those of other Western industrialized countries.

We should also not try to tie individual trade transactions to specific political concessions, for example, concessions on arms control issues. The temptation to do this can be great if we have something to sell that the other side wants very badly. Even political concessions could be extracted in this way, they would be likely to evaporate once the terms of the commercial transaction had been met. We would then be left with a business deal in which we had given away some real economic benefits in return

or vague political promises. Trade transactions, like political and arms agreements, must be able to stand on their own merits.

We also have to remember that neither the United States, nor its allies (who are heavily engaged in trade with the Communist world), nor the Communist countries themselves are prepared to relinquish basic interests or fundamental principles for the sake of trade.

We recognize that Communist governments, some more than others, engage in practices which are incompatible with our ideals. We and the Communist states still regard ourselves as engaged in a struggle between antagonistic systems.

But the existence of differences between us and the Communists, profound as they may be, should not deter us from cautiously seeking ways to discover and cultivate our common interests. This applies to restraining the strategic arms race, to dealing with the global problems of food, energy, and the environment, and to the expansion of our trade and economic relations. It also contributes to confining the struggle between our systems so that we avoid resorting to force and armed conflict.

If we approach East-West trade in this realistic way, I believe that it can have an direct, but broad and long-lasting, payoff.

It has benefits above and beyond the sum total of the transactions involved. Over time, increased trade can erode the autarkic tendencies of the Communist countries and draw them more closely into the world economic system.

East-West trade can have a real impact on the economies of the Communist countries and on their economic decisionmaking. To increase their exports to the United States—as all of them, and especially the Soviet Union, wish to do—they must devote resources and skills to production and marketing of the kinds of goods and services which are salable on the American market. Increased acceptance by these countries of the responsibilities inherent in more normal trade relations would reduce their capacity for, and their interest in, disrupting the trade and economic system created by the

Western countries over the past 30 years.

Thus, over time, U.S. trade with Communist countries can help to build a continuing relationship—a relationship which the Communist countries have an interest in maintaining and which they would find costly to repudiate. In this way, trade adds an element of restraint and stability to our overall relations. The failure to permit trade to develop normally not only reduces our potential economic gains but also inhibits progress toward these political goals.

Structure of Policy and Legislation

It is logical that if we seek to expand trade with the Communist countries over the coming years, we will need at the same time to develop a structure of policy and legislation to support this expanded trade. Such a structure must permit steady progress toward more normal relations, on the basis of mutual benefit. Since not all problems can be foreseen, the structure must also permit the resolution of disputes and take into account the very basic differences between market and nonmarket systems.

The Trade Act of 1974 offers such a structure. It provides that most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment can be extended to non-market-economy countries only on the basis of a trade agreement. Such a trade agreement must provide safeguards against the possible disruption of our markets; it must protect industrial property rights and copyrights; it must insure arrangements for the settlement of commercial disputes; it must facilitate trade promotion; and it must be subject to suspension or termination for reasons of national security.

To protect our security interests, the present structure of unilateral and multilateral strategic export controls must also be maintained.

Some changes in existing legislation are required, however, if we are to create a legal structure which will permit improvement in our trade relations with the non-market-economy countries. For example, we favor legislation to allow for nondiscriminatory,

nonconcessional financing of trade, which is essential to the maintenance of our competitive position. We also favor modification of section 408 of the Trade Act to give us greater flexibility in our relations with Czechoslovakia. Since the Johnson Debt Default Act of 1934 no longer serves its original purpose of protecting American investors against defaulting governments, consideration might be given to its repeal. The repeal of section 511 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, which embargoes the importation of certain furs from the U.S.S.R. and China, would remove an obsolete impediment to trade.

Varied Effects of Existing Legislation

In East Europe, the effect of existing legislation has varied from country to country. Poland and Yugoslavia, with which the United States has had GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] relations for a number of years, were exempt from the provisions of section 402 of the Trade Act, and our trade and political relations with those countries have continued to progress.

Romania, continuing to pursue its independent foreign policy, negotiated a trade agreement with us under the provisions of the Trade Act; and so the general improvement in U.S.-Romanian relations noted over several years continues.

Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic, following the Soviet lead, have stated that they are not prepared to negotiate trade agreements under the emigration provisions of the Trade Act. Although U.S. trade with most of these countries has increased in recent years in the absence of MFN, the full potential of their markets cannot be enjoyed by American exporters so long as we are not in a position to extend MFN to their products coming into our country.

It is not easy to quantify these losses, but we do know the extension of MFN is clearly encouraging trade expansion with Poland and Romania, where total trade turnover in each case is expected to triple between 1974

and 1977. Our inability to proceed toward normalization of trade relations with these other four countries reduces our flexibility and our capacity for developing appropriate and effective policies. It thus involves not only economic loss for both sides but also a political irritant.

The Trade Act has not directly affected our trade or political relations with the People's Republic of China. The Shanghai communique of 1972 continues to serve as the framework for the development of our trade. At this stage of our relationship with the P.R.C., a broad understanding of how trade relations should develop is not yet attainable.

The Administration fully supports the objectives of section 402 of the Trade Act, and we share the views of those who believe that the United States must work to bring about increased emigration from the U.S.S.R.

Lost Opportunities in U.S.-Soviet Trade

Since the passage of the Trade Act, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have tried to sustain trade. We have, however, paid an economic and political price in opportunities lost. The rise in overall trade in 1975 points not to a continuing dynamism in our commercial relationship, but to greatly increased grain sales and deliveries of industrial goods ordered before 1975. Several major orders have been diverted from American companies this year, and in some cases we have been told plainly that the switch was politically motivated.

While we have cut off the flow of government-sponsored credits to the U.S.S.R., Western Europe and Japan have been competing with each other to offer more, and the total available to be drawn on is now some \$10 billion. Not surprisingly, trade flows along the same lines as these credits. Since the last Eximbank loans were extended in May of 1974, the U.S. share of new Soviet orders of machinery and equipment from Western countries has fallen from its 1973 level of about 22 percent to about 14 percent in the first 10 months of 1975.

Our inability to use the facilities of the Export-Import Bank to finance our trade with the Soviet Union also has broader implications. Providing access to Eximbank facilities is not a one-way concession. Eximbank loans are tied to U.S. exports and to specific projects, whereas the credits that the Soviet Union can obtain commercially at only slightly higher interest rates are not. Through the Export-Import Bank, we can also control the flow of credit in ways that we cannot in private financial markets.

Our inability to grant most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union also involves lost opportunities. The Soviets would prefer to pay for their imports with increased exports, instead of financing them with costly credits. By discriminating against Soviet exports, we limit the expansion of our mutual trade. In doing so, we inhibit the growth of our own exports, and we forgo some of the indirect political benefits that come from an expanding trade relationship. The absence of MFN also makes long-term projects, in which repayment takes the form of products produced, less attractive with the United States than they are with countries which apply a nondiscriminatory tariff.

An additional economic price has been the cessation of Soviet payments of their lend-lease obligations. The lend-lease agreement reached in 1972 provided for the payment of three installments totaling \$48 million by July 1, 1975. These have been paid in full. The repayment of the balance of \$674 million was made conditional on our granting most-favored-nation tariff treatment to the Soviet Union. This will not be paid until MFN is extended.

Finally, the trade agreement would have protected American industry more fully against market disruption resulting from Soviet imports. It would also have encouraged the use of procedures for the arbitration of commercial disputes. These benefits are not available to us as long as the agreement remains in abeyance.

We regret these lost opportunities. We also recognize, however, that Soviet emigration policies are a matter of continuing concern to the public, the Congress, and the

Administration. The future evolution of these policies will be watched closely. We share the urgent desire of the Congress to find a way out of the dilemma which will achieve our primary humanitarian purpose. Our concern for basic human rights is lasting, not transient.

We hope to work closely with the Congress not only on overcoming the legislative impasse but on all aspects of our economic relations with non-market-economy countries. Congress should play a key role in East-West trade, as it does in other areas of trade policy. We would welcome any suggestions for improvements in the consultative arrangements between the Administration and the Congress so that we can work more closely together.

U.S.-Soviet Grain and Oil Arrangements

In addition to our efforts to develop an overall structure of policy and legislation to support the expansion of East-West trade, there are times when we need to develop special arrangements to deal with special problems. One such special case was the grain agreement which Under Secretary Robinson signed in Moscow on October 20. It is designed to deal with the recurrent problem of the sudden large grain purchases which the Soviets make when their harvests fall short of their needs. These purchases have periodically disrupted world markets, pushed up prices, and forced the President to impose various ad hoc restrictions on grain exports.

The Soviets have agreed to purchase at least 6 million tons of grain per year, and they can purchase an additional 2 million tons without government-to-government consultations. More, of course, can be purchased on the basis of such consultations. We are not obliged to sell if our grain supply falls below a specific level. Sales will be at market prices prevailing at the time of the purchase. The agreement involves no U.S. Government credits.

Under this agreement, our farmers will be able to take advantage of the large Soviet market on a regular basis without price ef-

fects harmful to the American consumer. At the same time, the U.S.-Soviet maritime agreement, which is still under renegotiation but which we hope will be renewed before the end of the year, enables U.S. shipping to carry a fair share of the grain cargoes at profitable rates.

The grain agreement is a positive step in our relations with the Soviet Union. It encourages a long-term interrelationship between our two economies, involving implicit political constraints.

The Department of State played a role in the negotiation of the grain agreement that was consistent with the role we play in other areas of international economic policy. Under Secretary Robinson led our negotiating team, pursuant to instructions developed in the White House by an interagency team. He worked closely at every stage with the Department of Agriculture, relying heavily on the expertise and sound judgment of the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture [for International Affairs and Commodity Programs], Richard Bell, who was with him in Moscow.

We decided that it was appropriate to conclude this as an executive agreement instead of a treaty. It does not affect U.S. law, and no new legislation is required to implement the commitments that we made. We also had a strong interest in obtaining a firm Soviet commitment upon signature.

At the time we signed the grain agreement, we exchanged letters of intent with the Soviets on an agreement for the supply of oil. We expect these negotiations to begin in the near future.

The oil agreement we envisage would give us an option—not a commitment—to purchase up to 10 million metric tons of Soviet crude or petroleum products each year. This would represent about 200,000 barrels per day—only 3 percent of our annual imports. We should not, however, underrate the significance of such an agreement. It would mean a net increase in the amount of oil available to the free world and would represent a further diversification of our sources of supply.

Although the U.S.S.R. is now the world's

largest oil producer, with production averaging about 9.5 million barrels per day, we do not expect it to become a major oil exporter. Its exports are now 2.3 million barrels per day. Most of this goes to Eastern Europe. Unless the Soviet Union can exploit major new sources, we expect its exports to diminish in coming years as its own economy develops and its consumption increases accordingly.

It is not realistic to expect the Soviets to give us a sizable discount on the oil that they sell us. They do, after all, have other potential hard-currency buyers, and we are not giving them a discount on our grain. However, the price will have to be set at a level that we find satisfactory in order for the purchases to be made.

In conclusion, the Department of State continues to believe that the Peterson report of August 1972 is the proper guide to our economic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.² The report states that

Closer economic ties bear both cause and effect relationships to relaxation of political tension. Improvement in political relationships is a prerequisite for improved economic relationships, but, once in place, economic ties create a community of interest which in turn improves the environment for further progress on the political side.

If political accords with the Communist countries are to endure, they must be buttressed by concrete progress, by tangible benefits, and by economic self-interest.

If we are to preserve the gains of the recent past we must improve the basis of our trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. As Secretary Kissinger said in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year:³

We face an opportunity that was not possible 10 years, or even a decade, ago. If that opportunity is lost, its moment will not quickly come again. Indeed it may not come at all.

In sum, I believe that we must take additional

² U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era, by Peter G. Peterson, then Secretary of Commerce (U.S. Government Printing Office).

³ For Secretary Kissinger's statement of Sept. 1, 1974, see BULLETIN of Oct. 14, 1974, p. 505.

tional steps to promote both liberalized emigration and improved economic and political relations with the East. If you in the Congress share this view I hope that you will make suggestions as to how and when we should proceed in order to move toward both these goals. They need not be contradictory objectives, as long as we concentrate on the results we seek and are pragmatic in the approach we adopt.

Senate Asked To Approve Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Seals

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, with Annex, done at London June 1, 1972. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention.

Though commercial sealing has not yet started in the water and on the sea ice in Antarctica, this Convention provides some valuable protection for seals of that region. It prohibits entirely the commercial taking of three species of Antarctic seals and sets conservation limits on the taking of three other species. It prohibits sealing in the water, except in limited quantities for scientific research. It sets aside reserves where no sealing can take place and forbids sealing entirely during six months of the year. More importantly, it sets up the machinery to give the necessary warning when catch limits are being approached. It obligates the Parties at that point to prevent further sealing by their nationals and vessels. Provision is also made for adoption of additional controls, including an effective system of inspection, if

commercial sealing starts in the area. There is nothing in the Convention to prevent a Party from adopting for its nationals and vessels more stringent controls than provided in the Convention. The United States has done this in the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. While that legislation is in effect, and until the Parties decide to adopt controls and inspection procedures, in accordance with Article VI, no new legislation is needed to implement the Agreement.

Unfortunately in recent years, it has often been only after a species or class of wildlife has become severely depleted or even endangered that international conservation measures have been initiated. This Convention represents a unique opportunity for the world community to put into practice the hard learned lessons of the past and to act prospectively to protect the seals of Antarctica. I urge the Senate to give the Convention its prompt and favorable consideration.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 17, 1975.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Early-Warning System in Sinai; hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; October 6-7, 1975; 264 pp. Report of the committee, together with individual views, to accompany S.J. Res. 138; S. Rept. 94-415; October 7, 1975; 20 pp. Potential Impact of the Proposed 200-Mile Fishing Zone on U.S. Foreign Relations. Special oversight report of the House Committee on International Relations, together with additional and minority views, on H.R. 200, the Marine Fisheries Conservation Act of 1975. H. Rept. 94-542. October 8, 1975. 18 pp.

Amending Sections 2734a(a) and 2734b(a) of Title 10, United States Code, To Provide for Settlement, Under International Agreements, of Certain Claims Incident to the Noncombat Activities of the Armed Forces, and For Other Purposes. Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary to accompany H.R. 7896. H. Rept. 94-543. October 8, 1975. 9 pp. The Amendments to the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Ex. K, 93-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-9. October 22, 1975. 3 pp.

¹Transmitted on Dec. 17 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 22); also printed as S. Ex. K, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the convention and the report of the Department of State.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Astronauts

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.

Accession deposited: France, December 31, 1975.

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974. Entered into force October 1, 1975.

Accessions deposited: Ireland, November 3, 1975; Liberia, December 12, 1975.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975.

Ratifications deposited: Ghana, November 14, 1975; Madagascar, August 20, 1975; Morocco, October 16, 1975; Niger, September 8, 1975.

Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic, October 9, 1975.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. Entered into force December 6, 1975.¹

Ratification deposited: Canada, December 10, 1975.

Expositions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, relating to international expositions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.²

Ratification deposited: Austria, October 21, 1975.

Accession deposited: Morocco, October 30, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975.

Ratification deposited: South Africa, December 16, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975.

Ratification deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, December 30, 1975.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

Accession deposited: France, December 31, 1975.

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.²

Signature: Denmark, December 12, 1975.

Ratification deposited: France, December 17, 1975.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement concerning shrimp, with annexes, agreed minutes, and exchange of notes. Signed at Brasilia March 14, 1975.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: December 22, 1975.

Japan

Agreement modifying the arrangement of September 27, 1974 (TIAS 7934), concerning trade in cotton wool, and man-made fiber textiles, with record of discussions. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 19, 1975. Entered into force December 19, 1975.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement extending the agreement of February 26, 1975 (TIAS 8021), on certain fishery problems or the high seas in the western areas of the middle Atlantic Ocean. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 18 and 30, 1975. Entered into force December 30, 1975.

Agreement regarding certain maritime matters, with related letters and memorandums. Signed at Washington and Moscow December 29, 1975. Entered into force January 1, 1976.

Convention on matters of taxation, with related letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973.

Ratifications exchanged: December 30, 1975.

Enters into force: January 29, 1976, effective January 1, 1976.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

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*629	12/29	Kissinger: Washington Star interview.
*630	12/30	Foreign investment and nationalization.
*631	12/31	Fine Arts Committee, Jan. 17.
*632	12/31	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Maritime Law, Feb. 3.
*633	12/31	U.S.-Japan textile agreement.
*634	12/31	Joan Braden appointed as Consumer Affairs Coordinator (biographic data).

* Not printed.