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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 9

Press release 596 dated December 9

*Secretary Kissinger:* Ladies and gentlemen, before I go to your questions I thought it would be helpful to review some of the SALT issues that have been raised. I will not get into a debate with aspirants to political office, either statewide or national. Therefore I will not deal with specific testimony that may have been given except to note that no opportunity was presented to any member of the Administration to present the truth. What I would like to do is to deal with categories of assertions that have been made and then to explain the real state of affairs with respect to them.

The assertions have been made that there have been massive Soviet violations, that the Administration colluded with the Soviet Union in masking these violations, that the Administration has not pursued the issue of violations diplomatically, and that senior officials, especially the President, have not been kept informed about the facts with respect to these violations.

I would like to discuss with you the procedures that the government is following with respect to SALT compliance and illustrate them with one or two examples.

First of all it is important to keep in mind that with respect to SALT or with respect to the strategic forces on both sides, we are dealing with military establishments of great technical complexity that are constantly engaged in military activities. These military establishments, moreover, on both sides are in the process of constant change so that there is great fluidity in what one observes. We are not dealing with a static situation; we are dealing with a fluid situation. Therefore, too, the information that is obtained has to go through various stages of analysis.

The first information about any event is usually extraordinarily illusive and ambiguous, and one part of the process of the government is to refine the information until we reach a point at which senior officials can make a reasonable decision. I believe it is a good working hypothesis to assume that government is not run by conspiracy but by serious people trying to come to serious conclusions about difficult topics, especially when the charge of a violation of a formal agreement is not a minor matter to be introduced into the diplomatic discourse.

Now, first of all, what is meant by a violation? There are several meanings that can be attached to the notion of violation that are being used interchangeably in the current debate.

A violation can be a deliberate violation of a SALT limitation, aimed at increasing the Soviet strategic capability in ways which the agreement was intended to preclude.

Second, a violation can be an action inconsistent with the sense or the spirit of the agreement and tending to undermine its viability even though it is not prohibited by the agreement. There can be borderline situations where a technical violation cannot be established but where the activity strains the interpretation of particular provisions.

Third, there can be unintended violations occurring, for example, through negligence of higher officials responsible for insuring compliance by their subordinate organizations.

Fourth, there can be actions not banned by an agreement but which complicate verification of the agreement.

Fifth, there can be ambiguous activities resulting from differing interpretations of the provisions of the agreements.

Sixth, there can be activities that are

assessed as ambiguous due to inadequate information or misinterpretation of information which suggests a violation where in fact none exists.

I want to repeat that many compliance issues will arise initially as ambiguous activities which could apply to any of these categories. Our policy is to seek clarification of ambiguous situations as soon as there is a tangible basis for doing so and to resolve ambiguities as quickly as possible in order to preclude development of a more serious situation.

Now to go to the procedures for handling allegations of violations. Any one of these categories would be initially reported in intelligence channels, either from the Central Intelligence Agency or from the Department of Defense. The Department of State and the White House have no independent means of acquiring any of this information.

There is no instance in which a reported violation was not immediately—an alleged violation—was not immediately reported to the President. And we have searched all the files of all the incidents.

I will in a minute discuss the handling of intelligence, and I would like to talk now about the procedures that are followed.

In order to deal with the problem of compliance, there are four institutions. There is a special intelligence committee, which was established by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the summer of 1973. This committee makes a quarterly report on the problem of SALT compliance. This committee—I'm looking now for how many meetings it has held—well, it has met quarterly since July '73, so you can figure it out for yourselves, and all of its reports have gone directly to the President as well as to every senior member of the Administration that is dealing with the problem of strategic arms.

In addition, there are three other bodies. There is the Verification Panel of the NSC [National Security Council]. There is the Verification Panel's Working Group. And there is, of course, the NSC itself.

The Verification Panel Working Group of the NSC has met on SALT matters 11 times

since the middle of 1973. The Verification Panel has met four times on SALT matters—has met four times on compliance issues exclusively since 1973. But in addition, it has met 40 times on SALT matters since 1973. Each of these meetings, each of these 40 meetings, is preceded by a CIA briefing that includes all compliance issues. So that, in addition to the four formal meetings, there were 40 meetings of the Verification Panel where whatever compliance issues existed at the time were brought to the attention of the Verification Panel.

The President has been briefed on compliance matters 10 times since the middle of 1973, six times in the Administration of President Ford. There has been one NSC meeting solely devoted to compliance issues, and parts of others.

The procedure is that the working group will attempt to determine what is going on and will devise either options or recommendations for consideration by the Verification Panel. The Verification Panel then reviews it and makes a recommendation or defines options.

In all the meetings that I have described of the Verification Panel there was never a split decision. The allegation that individuals or departments have held up consideration of compliance issues, have obscured consideration of compliance issues, have refused to deal with compliance issues, is a total falsehood. All the decisions of the Verification Panel with respect to compliance have been unanimous. That is to say, they were agreed to by the Department of Defense, by the Chiefs of Staff, by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, by the Central Intelligence Agency, and by the State Department.

There is no doubt that there may have been differences of opinion in the working group as these papers were being considered. I am not familiar with these disagreements, because unless they are passed on to the Verification Panel there would be no particular reason for me to deal with them.

Let me now turn to the handling of intelligence. First of all, I think it is important to understand how the flow of informa-

tion to the President is handled, because it is a rather grave matter if it can be alleged that information is being kept from the President of the United States. The flow of information to the President is handled in the following way.

The President receives daily, unabbreviated and without a covering summary, the President's daily brief and the daily intelligence bulletin of the Central Intelligence Agency. These are placed on his desk together with separate notes from various departments every morning and waiting for him when he comes to his office.

In the period of the Presidency of President Ford he has had, until recently, the practice of reading those two intelligence summaries in the presence not of a member of the National Security Council staff, but in the presence of a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency. Therefore any intelligence item that would deal with compliance would come to his immediate attention. And in compiling a list of the various compliance issues, it is apparent that the President's daily bulletin would reflect the information of the Central Intelligence Agency, as you would expect, within no more than two weeks of its first appearance on a technical level.

Secondly, any memorandum from a Cabinet member or from the head of an agency is transmitted to the President, usually in those cases with a summary by the NSC staff on top of it. But never is the summary alone sent to the President. Therefore, any Cabinet member, any member of the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, all have the opportunity, and know they have the opportunity, to address the President directly. Never has the Assistant to the President held up any memorandum from any of these individuals or any other memorandum addressed to the President by the head of an agency.

However, there is no memorandum in the files by any of these individuals, by any Chief of Staff of any of the services, by any head of any department, raising any of the issues that have been alleged in recent

testimony. There is nobody who has claimed that the issue of compliance was not being adequately pursued. There is nobody who has objected to the handling of the information. There has been no reclama of any of the decisions of the Verification Panel, except in one case where one department that had first recommended one course of action—that course of action being not to protest a seeming issue of noncompliance because it wanted to protect its sources of intelligence—later changed its mind and recommended that the issue be raised in the Standing Consultative Commission.

When that Department changed its mind, the President agreed with that new position, and the decision of the Verification Panel was changed.

The reason there have been so few NSC meetings on the subject is because the decisions of the Verification Panel have always been unanimous and because no member of the Panel has ever appealed to the President with a contrary view.

With respect to the handling of intelligence, all intelligence concerning alleged noncompliance was immediately distributed to all the members of the Verification Panel and by them to those of their senior members that were concerned with SALT.

For the period that a preliminary investigation was going on, the intelligence was not distributed in the technical publications that were addressed to those whose primary responsibility was not concerned with SALT at a level below the Cabinet level. The longest time this ever took place was a period of two months, and usually the so-called hold has been for a period of about a week or two to permit the refinement of intelligence.

There has been no case in which the intelligence was not distributed in the quarterly intelligence publication that was concerned with the question of SALT monitoring. And in no case was intelligence kept from members of the Verification Panel.

Even during the period that this refinement was going on, the United States did not feel itself precluded from taking diplomatic action. For example, in one instance, which I will get into in a minute in greater detail,

in one instance there were reports of unidentified construction in Soviet missile fields. We received this report on June 20 [1973] at a time when Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] was in the United States. It seemed improbable that the Soviet Union would violate the agreement by blatantly building additional missile silos, and therefore a further study of the subject was ordered.

Nevertheless, on June 26 the United States sent a note to the Soviet Union in the Presidential channel raising the issue of that construction, even before we had begun our detailed examination of the issue. In that case the distribution of that information was kept out of those journals that went to individuals not concerned with SALT matters until August 8, when it was generally distributed. In that interval two American notes had been sent to the Soviet Union in the Presidential channel raising that issue.

Now, as I have pointed out, the issue of compliance is an extremely complicated one, and in rummaging through the files of various departments it is not difficult to find memoranda written by subordinates who have no idea of what is going on in the overall picture, who will write down their own perceptions of what they think is happening—usually in the modern form of memoranda of conversation to themselves that nobody ever sees, on which no one can ever comment, and which appear three years later in a context that no one can ever discover.

But let us take the case of these missile silos. There appeared in the summer of 1973 in a number of Soviet missile fields, the beginning of some construction that clearly looked like additional silos. If these had been converted into missile silos, there was no question that they would have represented a clear violation of the agreement.

The construction of a silo generally takes two years to complete. And it is important for you to keep in mind in any event that almost any of these noncompliance events extend over a time span that, to be signifi-

cant, is months and usually years, so that those of us who are engaged in policymaking, and not rhetoric, must have an opportunity to study the problem before we draw any final conclusions, and we do have this opportunity.

Now, when we approached the Soviet Union within six days of receiving that information in the White House, we were told that these would be command and control silos and that as the construction proceeded it would become increasingly evident that they would be command and control silos.

This, incidentally, was also the judgment of our intelligence community. Our intelligence community believed that almost certainly these were command and control silos. The question being raised was whether, at some later time, they could be converted into missile silos.

It is also fair to point out that the Soviet Union in reply raised certain questions about certain ambiguities in American practices which we were not excessively anxious to have publicized and which accounted for the fact that these exchanges were conducted in a rather less dramatic manner than some people might have thought appropriate.

There were six exchanges in this channel of increasing specificity, in which we began to advance criteria which could be met in order to assure us that these silos were in fact intended for command and control. This extended over a period of a year. At that point in 1974, we moved the discussion from the Presidential channel to the Standing Consultative Commission and made formal representations building on the previous exchanges.

We have since received assurances, and I believe it is the unanimous opinion of all agencies, that we are dealing with command and control silos. We have been given criteria which seem to us for the time being adequate; and there is no agency that today disputes that this issue is for the time being quiescent, though we will be vigilant in making certain that any unusual construction activity at these silos would raise profound questions.

For a variety of reasons, including the

fact that the information about alleged non-compliance inevitably involves sensitive intelligence, I cannot go through all of the allegations that have been made; though I would perhaps mention one other, which is the most serious one and which comes closest to the borderline of a possible violation, which has to do with the testing of certain anti-aircraft radars in what might be considered an ABM [antiballistic missile] mode.

The issue is complicated by the fact that, at American insistence, the ABM treaty includes a provision that anti-aircraft radar could be used—could be tested—in a manner in space for range-instrumentation purposes. It might point out that this was our idea, and if we had not included that, that issue of the SA-5 radar could have been more rapidly resolved.

We received information that some testing was going on with respect to the SA-5 radar in 1973. At that time it was routinely distributed, and nobody paid any attention to it because it was not put into connection with a possible ABM testing program. Between April and June 1974 some more tests took place which at least raised the problem that the radar might be tracking incoming missiles. That clearly is not permitted by the treaty, though it raises an ambiguity with respect to whether this is done for range-instrumentation purposes.

In any event, several meetings of the working group and the Verification Panel took place. The first decision in December 1974 was, on the recommendation of the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, that this issue not be raised because we did not wish to reveal the source of our intelligence.

In January 1975 the Defense Department reversed itself and recommended that the issue be raised. As a result, the issue was raised in February 1975. Since then, within a 17-day period after we had raised the issue, this activity has stopped—has not since been resumed. It was at the borderline of violation, but it has now stopped.

There are other issues, some having to do with unilateral American statements which the Soviet Union specifically disavowed. I

think it is at least open to question whether the United States can hold the Soviet Union responsible for its own statements when the Soviet Union has asserted that it does not accept that interpretation. Therefore the issue of SALT compliance has been handled in a serious manner. It stands to reason that no responsible U.S. official could wish to make an agreement with the Soviet Union and permit the Soviet Union to violate it with impunity. It stands to reason that the United States would not accept non-compliance with an agreement that had any conceivable impact on the strategic equation.

I would, in fact, suggest that this debate of the allegation in which some violations are invented, and in which the lack of vigilance of the Administration is asserted, may tempt the very non-compliance which it claims to seek to avoid, because it may create the impression that the U.S. Government would make a serious agreement on a matter affecting the survival of the United States and that its senior officials would then collude in a violation of this agreement.

Let no foreign government believe that this is conceivable. And I think the time has come that we deal with each other more seriously.

I want to make just one other point before I go to your questions. That point concerns the endless allegations that a secret agreement was made with the Soviet Union respecting 70 missiles to be placed on submarines that by now are 30 years old, or 25 years old, that have not been off the coast of the United States since 1967.

On the face of it this charge should be too absurd to require any commentary. I dealt with it at great length in a press conference on June 24, 1974, and June 26, 1974. It concerned a highly technical issue: which missiles were eligible for retirement as part of those that had to be dismantled in order to shift from land-based to submarine missiles and whether and what kind of new missiles could be placed on submarines without being counted.

I refer you all to this press conference if you want to go into the technical complexities of this issue, except to say there was no

secret agreement, that whatever there was in that interpretative statement was stated publicly by me at the press conference that I gave in Moscow the night the SALT agreement was signed on May 26, 1972. It was repeated in a discussion of the Verification Panel on June 5, 1972. It was contained, practically verbatim, in a note distributed to all the agencies on June 19, 1972, and it was testified to by Gerard Smith [then Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] before the Jackson committee in July 1972. There was no secret agreement.

Some overawed technocrats found what they thought was a loophole by which, if the Soviets wanted to design a missile that they didn't have anywhere for just that one category of diesel submarines that was 25 years old, they might conceivably place it on that submarine. We, of course, would never have accepted this.

When we raised this loophole with the Soviet Union, even though they thought it was—shall we put it kindly—a rather strained interpretation, they nevertheless closed the loophole, and despite some rather excited testimony last week, let me say flatly that no price was paid for closing a loophole that did not exist and that we would never have accepted and that ran counter to the whole record of the discussion.

I think I can stop at this point and take your questions on this or any other topic.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent is politics interfering today with your attempts to work out a new SALT agreement? And do you see a deadline beyond which it would be, because of the political campaigns, impossible to make any real progress on a treaty?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As Secretary of State it is my obligation to recommend to the President what I believe to be in the national interest. My recommendations are not affected by the political situation; and I have, so far, seen no evidence that his decisions are affected by the political situation.

I cannot say that the debate that is going on greatly enhances the atmosphere of con-

fidence in the country, but our recommendations are not affected by the political situation. We are not operating against a deadline.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can I just change the subject for a moment? Have you proposed to the Israeli Government, as reported today, that it should drop its boycott of the Security Council debate? And also, do you see any indications the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] may be shifting its attitude with regard to its recognition, or nonrecognition, of Israel's right to existence?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I will answer this question, but may I then recommend that we take all SALT questions and then go to all other questions? I will answer this one though.

The United States has indicated to the Israeli Government that it would be better served if it participated in the Security Council debate, though it is of course clear that the Israeli Government may not wish to be in the room while the PLO delegate is actually speaking.

This position of ours has been clear. Our attitude with respect to the PLO is unchanged. I haven't reaffirmed it for about 4 hours, so it is about time that I do it again. We will not deal with the PLO, negotiate with the PLO, or urge Israel to deal with the PLO, as long as the PLO does not recognize the existence of Israel and as long as the PLO does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

That will be our attitude during the Security Council debate, and I would like to stress again that the only resolutions that the United States considers relevant for the Security Council debate are Resolutions 242 and 338 and we will not accept any resolution that tries to introduce any element that goes beyond 242 and 338.

Now on SALT?

*Q. Yes, now on SALT—do you have any evidence today that the Soviet Union is prepared to offer, in your own words, a reasonable and serious counterproposal to the last American proposal that was made to the Russians?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The exchanges which we have had with the Soviet Union since November indicate that the Soviet Union realizes that no settlement is possible on the basis of its present proposal and that it is willing to negotiate on the basis of the proposition that it must modify its position and that we are then also prepared to look at our position. And it is on this basis that a trip by me to Moscow has been discussed.

*Q. Are there plans for such a trip in the immediate future?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would expect such a trip to take place within the next four weeks—

*Q. Mr. Secretary—*

*Secretary Kissinger:*—four to five weeks.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion earlier, you made some reference to the fact that at one point—as I recall, after the evidence had emerged that the Soviets were building a certain kind of silo—at one point the Soviets raised some questions about American practices that we, as I understood you, were not anxious to publicize. Could you tell us any more about what those practices might have been?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, the basic point that I wanted to make is this: It was in our interest—we were interested, as long as there was no conclusive evidence, to keep the debate on the confidential level and to permit both sides to raise with each other technical issues in which they could raise questions and clarify questions.

I would say that the issues that the Soviet Union raised did not in fact involve violations of the agreement by the United States, but from the point of view of Soviet photography, they might not have been self-evident. And it is therefore one of those issues where ambiguous evidence is produced in good faith that can be clarified by further exchanges.

There have been no American violations of the agreement, except in the technical sense that I have described.

*Q. Are they satisfied with your response to that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is still being discussed, but I think we are making progress.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you touched most lightly on the strongest issue, which is a continuing one in Congress, which is a claim that Soviet performance on the agreement has failed to live up to your own assurances of what you told Congress the Soviet Union was expected to do.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I said—

*Q. You referred to the unilateral agreements—one of the issues which is a continuing one up there, of course, is the question of conversion of Soviet light missiles to heavy missiles. Could you deal broadly with the question which you only touched on earlier, of the unilateral statements and the Soviet nonagreement and nonperformance on those unilateral statements?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* All right, let me first deal with another issue. One of the arguments that is being made is that the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated—between myself and Dobrynin [Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States], usually—and that we are now suffering from the draftsmanship, from that draftsmanship.

Well, first of all, I do not believe that the SALT agreement was sloppily negotiated. But in any event, the text of the agreement was negotiated in Helsinki. There is not one paragraph in that document that was drafted by any other group than the negotiating teams in Helsinki, which included representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department, the State Department—and indeed all interested agencies—and which was backstopped by a technical panel here.

So that the charge that documents were drafted in the absence of technical advisers is absolutely ludicrous.

Now, the exchanges that took place between Dobrynin and me, first of all, were confined to very few matters and usually concerned a question of principle, such as whether offensive weapons should be dealt

with simultaneously with defensive weapons or whether they should be dealt with separately. That question, strange as it may seem today, took three months of exchanges to settle, and those of you who followed SALT matters will remember that at the end of May 1971, it was settled with an agreement in principle that offensive and defensive negotiations should proceed in parallel. That did not require great technical knowledge.

As soon as that decision was made, it was shifted to the SALT delegation in Helsinki, and all the implementing negotiation of that was conducted in Helsinki.

Then on my visit to Moscow in April 1972, the Soviet Union made a proposal and for the first time—in which for the first time they agreed to include submarine missiles in the offensive count and proposed a procedure by which this could be accomplished by the retirement of land-based or other missiles.

I might add that one of the most ardent advocates of this particular solution is a prospective candidate for the Senate—from Virginia, in case any of you have any question of whom I am talking about [laughter]—because he did not wish to build any additional nuclear submarines at that time.

This general proposal was brought back by me from Moscow, was put before the National Security Council at a meeting in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Arms Control Agency and our chief negotiator were represented. Specific instructions were given how to work out the technicalities of it, and it then was worked out in detail in Helsinki.

Those were the two areas in which I was most active.

Now let us deal with the specific issue of the conversion of light to heavy missiles.

In the agreement there is a provision which was also put in, in part at our request—but at any rate which we accepted without any difficulty—to the effect that the existing silos could be increased by 15 percent in the process of modernization. This is the only legal requirement of the agreement; that is, if either side increased any of its

silos by more than 15 percent it would be in violation of the agreement.

There is no charge that this has been done. In fact, it has not been done. The intelligence community agrees that the increase in silo dimensions in the modernization program of the Soviet Union does not exceed 15 percent.

The United States added another unilateral statement to the effect that if in these SS-11 holes a missile were placed which was significantly larger than the SS-11 that we—I don't know what phrase we used, at any rate, that we—

*Q. "Significantly larger"?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* "Significantly larger" was the phrase. I don't know whether we used the phrase, "We consider this a violation—"

*Q. Substantially larger?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, "significantly larger" is the phrase. But I don't know whether we said it's a violation or what we said, what the specific—incidentally, that statement was drafted by the delegation.

*Q. But wasn't it on your instruction from—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That unilateral statement?

*Q. That was issued by the delegation, as I recall, the last day of the negotiations, just to finish up the piece of paper.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Wait a minute, let me make clear—I don't want to play a game

I agreed with everything the delegation did. I think the delegation did a good job. Everything that the delegation did was finally approved in the White House.

The text of it, however, was not drafted by me, but approved by me; and I am therefore fully behind it. I am simply trying to get the sequence straight.

Now, for about a year, our intelligence indicated that the two new Soviet missiles that were being developed, the SS-17 and 19, were about 15 to 20 percent larger than the ones that had existed in 1972.

Q. Yes.

*Secretary Kissinger:* Fifteen to twenty percent—don't hold me to these precise figures, because I am doing it from memory. But it is in that range, and it is always with an inaccuracy factor.

Starting in the middle of 1974, it became apparent that at least one of them, the SS-19, could be as much as 40 percent larger. So we had the dilemma that we have a missile that is larger, by that percentage, than the SS-11 put into a hole that is not, however, in violation of the agreement, by a better utilization of existing space and more efficient use of fuel; and that raises a serious question.

We are attempting—the assurances I gave in 1972, which were based on the provision of the agreement, obviously dealt with the missiles we then knew. We obviously did not know in '72 what missiles the Soviet Union would be testing in '74; and the questions I was asked were always concerned with whether the Soviet Union would be able to put the SS-9 into the SS-11 hole, the SS-11 hole being the smaller one. And all of my answers, obviously, had to be directed toward the missiles I knew and not toward the missiles that came along two years later.

With respect to the SS-19, we are attempting to put limitations on this in the current round of SALT negotiations; and it is in that category, which Secretary Schlesinger [James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense] has also described, of no specific violation but of being sufficiently ambiguous to raise some questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a three-part question. What evidence do you have that the Soviet Union realizes no settlement is possible on the basis of its last known existing proposal? Secondly, do you have reason to believe that there is now, or soon will be, a new Soviet proposal? And what are the prospects for a new SALT agreement within the next three or four months?

*Secretary Kissinger:* If I go to Moscow—or the fact that I say that I will in all probability go to Moscow indicates that I have evidence that the Soviet Union will not in-

sist on its last proposal, because otherwise there would be no point in going.

Q. But is there a new one in the works?

*Secretary Kissinger:* When that proposal will be surfaced—whether it will be surfaced then, when I am there, or whether it will be surfaced ahead of time—that remains for discussion.

Your second question? What was it?

Q. The second part: Is there a new proposal?

*Secretary Kissinger:* At any rate, since I have stated that we will not accept their last proposal, if there is no new proposal, there will be no settlement. There is no possibility of our accepting the last Soviet proposal.

Now, what do I think the chances are? I believe that if both sides make a serious effort that the differences should be solved. The Soviet Union must make a serious effort, and we are prepared to make a serious effort. I am moderately optimistic.

Q. Well, even to be talking about going to Moscow, you must know something that we don't. You would not go there just for the winter weather. Do you have a reason to believe that if you—

*Secretary Kissinger:* I said I had reason to believe that they will not insist on their last proposal.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the news reports in connection with Admiral Zumwalt's [Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations] testimony carry the phrase here that the admiral suggested that "Mr. Kissinger's lack of candor"—and I am quoting from a news report, sir—"sprang from a personal and political commitment to the success of the détente policy" which made him, quote, "reluctant to report the actual facts." How do you react to that, sir?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have stated how we have handled information, and I think my statement makes it absolutely clear that the admiral got carried away by his political ambitions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned, among

*the possible violations, Soviet interference with national means of inspection. Have they interfered with our—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, I have listed that as a—

*Q. A possibility, yes. Have they interfered, or are they now attempting to interfere, with our national means of inspection? And while I have the floor, how are you doing on the threshold test ban, and what are the prospects in that agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The question of interference with national means of detection: there has been a Soviet program from the middle—it dates back from the middle of the 1960's—to make photography and other means of detection more complicated.

There have been some actions since the SALT agreement in that category. Several of those have been raised with the Soviet Union. Some of those that have been raised have been ended. None of those, up to now, have fundamentally interfered with our national means of detection.

*Q. Are they currently trying to interfere?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, you know there are so many separate things going on, there is always an effort. We have several things before them at this moment. I have said that, up to now, nothing has decisively interfered with our national means of detection.

And the second question is: How are we doing on the test ban?

*Q. And what are the prospects of getting a settlement on that quickly? There is a deadline on that, I believe, coming up.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are negotiating it. There are only one or two issues left, and therefore it can be settled any time, but it hasn't been settled yet.

*Q. Aren't those the same issues, though, that existed last July?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That's true. And so either they will be settled, or they will not be settled. And I know that is going to be the headline tonight. [Laughter.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I think you know that this issue to which you have addressed yourself here this afternoon is so complex that many of us—and probably most of the members of the public—are unable to understand the details that you are referring to. I wonder if—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, but they can understand the procedures to which I am referring, and those are perfectly plain.

*Q. I am just wondering, Mr. Secretary, if you would address yourself to the various political charges, or the various charges that you claim arise from political motives, and in simple language, categorically deny them, if that be the—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I am not saying all of them arise from political motives. Some do, some don't.

But I don't want to go into the question of motives. I think I have dealt with all the essential charges. The charge that information has been deliberately withheld is false. The charge that the President was not briefed is false. The charge that either I as Secretary of State or as Assistant to the President have refused to deal with compliance issues is false. The charge that there were secret agreements is essentially false.

And I think these are the major items; if there is anyone else who wants to ask or if I have left one out I will be glad to—

*Q. If I may just follow up: Why do you say "essentially" false?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Because there was an interpretative statement that for some reason was not distributed to the bureaucracy, even though the essence of it was distributed to the bureaucracy, and even though the bureaucracy was instructed to testify as to its contents. Why it was not distributed, I cannot for the life of me remember now. But the bureaucracy was told that such an interpretative statement would be negotiated, its content was distributed to it, so technically speaking this was not seen, but the content was known.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions. On SALT Two—just so that I am clear—you said you*

would probably go to Moscow within four to five weeks. Is it a fair assumption that you are not going on this trip you leave on, tomorrow?

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is correct.

*Q. And if so, what has happened? I think you left the impression you would go to Moscow before Christmas. Was there some slip-page or some bureaucratic problem here or in the Soviet Union?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think there is no sense going to Moscow until we have our positions prepared in great detail and until we are confident also that on the Soviet side there is sufficient understanding of what is needed. And given the travel schedules of all of the key members here, it seemed on the whole best not to hurry the process and to move at a pace that permitted a very detailed examination of all of the issues.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the second part of that question deals with another ambiguity, or what-have-you; it's the charge that the Soviets have perhaps built another ABM test site at Kamchatka. Can you address this?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This is an issue that is now under discussion with the Soviet Union, and I simply want to explain the issue. It is one of these technical issues.

There is no dispute that the radar in Kamchatka faces the Soviet Union, and not the United States. And therefore we are dealing with a test radar. The ABM treaty requires that ABM testing could take place only at agreed test ranges, and we listed ours. The Soviet Union didn't list theirs.

*Q. You listed one for them.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We unilaterally listed one for them, and the Soviet Union gave an ambiguous reply to that, saying what their test ranges were was generally known; but they would not confirm or deny the one we gave for them. And I think we claimed two for ourselves.

If the Soviet Union had claimed the Kamchatka range for itself at that time, there would be no problem. If the Soviet Union told us today that the Kamchatka

range is an ABM test range, then—supposing we were satisfied about the characteristics of the radar—there would be no significant problem.

So here we are dealing with a technical issue of what an agreed test range is—since there is no disagreement that the radar in Kamchatka faces into the Soviet Union and therefore must be used for some sort of internal tracking.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you wouldn't have made these very important announcements here today and this report on intelligence and evaluation and how it all works if it hadn't been for the investigations on Capitol Hill?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I didn't say anything about the investigations on Capitol Hill.

*Q. Yes, I know you didn't—but I mean this obviously is a reply to them. Right?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I did not criticize the investigations.

*Q. No, I didn't say you did. But I say, isn't it a good thing that we have had all this come out today, and isn't it true that it wouldn't have come out had it not been for the investigations up there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, then the question is whether it could have come out without some of the wild charges that were made.

But be that as it may, I am not criticizing the effort of the Congress to get clarity about how the intelligence process operates. And to the extent that my briefing today was elicited by the Congress, I have no objection if you give some credit to them.

*Q. Do you think this will take care of the subpoena now? You say you think this will be—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, no, on the subpoena—the subpoena has nothing to do with this. The subpoena concerns covert operations and recommendations of Secretaries of State when I was not in office—it has nothing to do with any recommendations I made—recommendations of a previous decade, to previous Presidents.

The President has exercised executive privilege with respect to that. I am under instructions from the President with respect to it. The resolution of this issue is between the White House and the committee. It is not an issue that concerns any actions while I have been Secretary of State, and it has nothing to do with the SALT issue. It has to do with the subject of covert operations, and the reason the President has exercised executive privilege is because he believed that recommendations of Cabinet members to the President should be protected.

But I am not expressing a personal opinion on that subject.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can we turn to another subject?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Can we wind this up fairly soon? I have some luncheon guests upstairs who are getting restless.

*Q. All right, Mr. Kissinger, on the subject of Angola, you and the President have made some accusations. A protest has been made to the Soviet Union about alleged intervention. There's comments about Cuban intervention there. Isn't it about time that you told us roughly what the United States has done in the way of helping forces in Angola, and since when?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have said that the United States has tried to be helpful to some neighboring countries. Whatever we have done has started long after massive Soviet involvement became evident. So this is not a case that really lends itself to great dispute on that subject, because the Soviet Union has been active there in this manner since March. But I would rather not go any further until we see what can be done in the present diplomatic effort.

*Q. What can be done, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, that's what we are trying—

*Q. What are the available opportunities open to the United States—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That's what we are trying to find out. We have stated repeatedly

that outside powers should stay out of Angola and, especially, extracontinental powers should stay out of Angola.

*Q. What do you mean, Mr. Secretary, when you say whatever we have done started long after the massive—what has the United States done?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have said that we try to give some assistance to neighboring countries—not South Africa—but I don't want to go any further.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, before we say "thank you"—some of my colleagues seem about to bury Mr. Brezhnev. Can you give us your latest estimate of the state of his health?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have received no communication from the Soviet Government about the health of Mr. Brezhnev, as has been alleged. My visit to the Soviet Union has absolutely nothing to do with any comments regarding his state of health. Our impression is that he is in active charge and that he will continue beyond the Party Congress.

## **U.S. Replies to Soviet Proposal on Middle East Peace Conference**

*Following is the text of a note delivered to the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. at Washington on December 1.*

The Government of the United States has carefully examined the message received from the Government of the Soviet Union on November 9, 1975, on the subject of reconvening the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva and wishes to convey the following reply.

The United States shares the concern for further progress toward a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. The United States is also of the view that all of the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian issue, must be resolved if a lasting peace in the Middle East is to be achieved. The issue is how most

ffectively to move toward that goal.

The United States agrees that a resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference after careful preparation would serve the goal of achieving progress in the settlement of the conflict. The goal of a reconvened Conference should be the achievement of a comprehensive political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

The Soviet Union has proposed that the U.S. and the USSR as Co-chairmen take a joint initiative to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference. The United States is consulting with the parties to determine their views and will be prepared to consult with the Soviet Government on how best to prepare the agenda and procedures for a reconvened Conference and to deal with the question of participation in the Conference.

With respect to the Soviet position on Palestinian participation at the Geneva Conference, the U.S. has always held the view that legitimate Palestinian interests must be taken into account in an overall settlement. The United States cannot agree, however, that the Co-chairmen of the Conference can alter the definition of the participants at the Conference initially agreed to by the original participants.

The Soviet Union will recall that the identical letters presented by the Permanent Representatives of the U.S. and the USSR to the Secretary General of the United Nations on December 18, 1973 stated: "The parties have also agreed that the question of other participants from the Middle East area will be discussed during the first stage of the Conference." As no decision was reached at the Conference in December 1973 concerning possible additional participation, this remains a subject for discussion among the original participants. It also remains the view of the United States that the appropriate UN resolutions to serve as the basis for negotiations leading toward a peace settlement, and the ones which the parties have accepted for this purpose, are Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It would therefore not be appropriate to introduce other resolutions not accepted by all parties for this purpose.

As a practical way of proceeding, the United States proposes a preparatory conference of those who have participated so far in negotiations looking toward a settlement within the Geneva Conference framework. In addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, such a preparatory conference could include Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel and could consider agenda, procedures, and the matter of participation in a subsequent full conference, with a view toward laying the foundation for negotiation of an overall settlement. The United States is also prepared to consider holding bilateral consultations with the USSR in advance of such a preparatory conference, and solicits the views of the Soviet Union on this possible approach.

## **United States and Poland Hold Talks on Northeastern Pacific Fisheries**

### *Joint U.S.-Polish Communique*<sup>1</sup>

Delegations of the Polish People's Republic and the United States met in Washington, D.C., December 3-6 to discuss fisheries matters of mutual concern in the Northeastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States. The Polish delegation was headed by Vice Minister Edwin Wisniewski of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Shipping. Head of the American delegation was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne L. Ridgway.

A new Agreement concerning 1976 Polish fishing activities off the United States Pacific coast was initialed on December 9 and 10, 1975. The new Agreement will be signed in Washington at an early date.

Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the new Agreement, which represents continuing significant cooperation between the two Governments and substantial progress in the conservation of fisheries stocks off the Pacific Coast of the United States.

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<sup>1</sup> Issued on Dec. 10 (text from press release 600).

## Three Aspects of U.S. Relations With Latin America

*Address by William D. Rogers*

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Governor [Reubin] Askew, Congressman [Dante B.] Fascell, Congressman [Claude D.] Pepper, Mayor [Maurice] Ferre, distinguished guests: I was delighted that you should ask me to come to Miami today to say a word or two by way of *despedida* to those of you who are setting off this afternoon on your goodwill trip to Colombia and Venezuela.

Your visit is important. You will carry the message to Latin America of the central significance of Florida and particularly of this great city to our relations with the hemisphere. You will see once again the vibrance and subtlety of these two great nations. And your being there, as leaders of this country, most significantly will symbolize once again for Latin America the importance we attach to Latin America.

I intend to touch on three aspects of that relationship. The first is Panama; the second, our economic relations; and finally, the future of the inter-American system.

First, Panama. President Lopez Michelsen of Colombia, whom you will see I gather, recently made a state visit to Washington. It was a considerable success.

At the White House banquet, in his meetings with House and Senate leadership, and elsewhere, he said, with the tact and sensitivity which is his trademark, that Panama is the one continental problem we face. He meant, by that, that the need to design a new relationship between Panama and the United States is the single issue of inter-

American relations on which all the nations of Latin America are most united.

As you know, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker is now engaged in an effort to work out a new canal treaty with Panama. It would replace the existing treaty of 1903 which no longer corresponds to the reality of today's world; it does not accommodate the enormous changes which have occurred during the past 70 years.

We are negotiating because we are convinced that a new and more equitable treaty is essential to best protect our national interest in Panama. In essence our fundamental interest is a canal that is open, secure, neutral, and efficiently operated.

In today's world the extensive rights the United States acquired in 1903 to act as "the sovereign" over a strip of Panamanian territory are not only unnecessary to that fundamental national interest, but this also flies in the face of the need to maintain an open canal. The 1903 arrangement is an increasing source of conflict not only in Panama but in the entire hemisphere as you will certainly hear in both Venezuela and Colombia. In recent years Panamanian consent to our presence in the original form prescribed in the 1903 treaty has declined significantly. Failure to recognize this reality and to adjust our relationship could threaten the very interests we are seeking to preserve—the availability of the canal to the world's waterborne commerce.

The February 1974 statement of principles signed by Secretary Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack provides the framework for a new treaty relationship

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce and the International Center of Greater Miami at Miami, Fla., on Dec. 4.

which we believe will restore the important ingredient of Panamanian consent to our presence while giving us the treaty rights we need. In essence the principles provide that:

—Panama would grant the United States the rights, facilities, and lands necessary to continue operating and defending the canal for the treaty period;

—For its part the United States would return to Panama jurisdiction over its territory and arrange for Panamanian participation over time in canal operation and defense;

—The new treaty would provide for any expansion of canal capacity that may eventually be needed and give Panama a more equitable share of the benefits resulting from use of its geographic location.

Substantive negotiations on the major issues within the framework of these principles have been underway since June 1974. We have already reached general agreement on some issues, such as jurisdiction, the rights we shall require for operation and defense, and Panamanian participation in these functions. Some of the most difficult questions, such as duration, the lands and waters we shall require for operation and defense, and economic benefits to Panama, are still unresolved.

But we are persuaded that a new treaty embodying the concept of constructive partnership contained in these principles should provide a practical means of reconciling our national interests and assuring that the canal remains open, efficient, and secure.

As the President said on October 7 in Knoxville:<sup>2</sup>

For three Administrations—President Johnson, President Nixon, and myself—negotiations have been going on with the Government of Panama concerning the problem. If you will refresh your memory, you will recall there were serious riots in Panama, I think in 1965. Around 30 people were killed, including some Americans. Now, these negotiations are going on. I have taken the position that we will not accept

—and I would not recommend to the Senate—a proposal that interfered with the national security of the Canal, that would interfere with the operations of the Canal.

I would not, under any circumstances, do anything in the negotiations or submit a proposal to the Senate that undercut our national security.

The negotiations, he added, are going forward within these principles. The Administration is dedicated to the success of this effort. We think we can find, in those negotiations, a new treaty relationship with Panama which will indeed protect and enhance the fundamental national interests of both parties.

I think you will see no better evidence during your visit of the relevance of this venture to our relations throughout the hemisphere, and most particularly with Venezuela and Colombia. We had better succeed, for the consequences are not pleasant to contemplate.

#### Latin American Development Needs

Now let me turn to a second area of importance to our relations with the hemisphere—economics. Here, we have something to show for our recent efforts.

The inter-American issues of the future are largely economic issues. Political and security problems have dominated our relationships within the hemisphere in the past. Today the burning aspiration of Latin America is development. It is in terms of whether they bode well or ill for Latin America's economic growth that our own policies are now being tested.

In general, the Latin American countries are not among the "poorest of the poor" in global terms. They are the middle-class countries; they have already achieved a considerable degree of industrial development. These are nations which are fully part of the world economy. Their future economic development depends on broad relationships with the economies of industrialized countries, and they are better able to take advantage of such a relationship than those lowest on the development ladder.

Thus the development needs of Latin America are not less than those of the poorer countries. But they are different.

<sup>2</sup> For the transcript of an interview with President Ford recorded at Knoxville, Tenn., on Oct. 7 for television broadcast that evening, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 13, 1975, 1129.

They must have trade opportunities that reflect their needs and possibilities. Without exporting they cannot import.

They also need capital. Investment is the key to growth; and in many, probably most, of these countries, because they still have only a modest standard of living, domestic savings are not adequate to maintain satisfactory levels of growth.

Thirdly, they need technology. They must be able to draw on the technological advances made in the industrial countries to increase their productivity and reach higher levels of industrialization.

### **New U.S. Economic Policies**

It is in this context that the initiatives of the recent U.N. General Assembly seventh special session take on special importance for the nations of Latin America. As Secretary Kissinger stated, many of the U.S. proposals delivered at the beginning of that session were particularly designed with the needs of Latin America in mind. The proposals, many of which were included in the final agreed resolution of the session, are largely directed at improving the functioning of the market to better serve the needs of the LDC's [less developed countries] rather than at creating new mechanisms to meet development needs. The successful implementation of these proposals will be a difficult, long-term task. I would like to review with you the progress being made on some of the major initiatives as they relate to Latin America.

One of the major concerns of the developing countries of the area has been the wide year-to-year fluctuations in export earnings, particularly for primary products. These swings in earnings have badly disrupted development plans and are doing so now. For many of the Latin American countries, the vulnerability to cyclical changes in exports was not only a matter of primary products; several have become significant exporters of manufactured goods, the demand for which is sharply affected by economic conditions in the industrialized countries. So as a result of the current world economic crisis, in part caused by the huge increase in the

cost of energy last year, many Latin American countries are now experiencing severe balance-of-payments problems.

As a partial answer to this problem, Secretary Kissinger at the special session proposed the creation of a development security facility within the International Monetary Fund. The facility would provide protection against disruption of overall export earnings for both primary and manufactured products. The Executive Directors of the IMF have this proposal, as well as a proposal for creation of a trust fund to finance grants for the poorest countries, under active consideration. We hope they can reach agreement within the next few months.

The development security facility, if established, would be a step toward ameliorating the problem of unstable export earnings from primary commodities. In addition, the Secretary also proposed that there be a producer-consumer forum for consideration of key commodities and that we move on a case-by-case basis in an effort to strengthen the market functions for both buyers and sellers. This represents a major advance in U.S. policy.

Because of the importance of the U.S. market for Latin America, the implementation of our generalized system of preferences on January 1 will also be of special significance. It will provide new export opportunities for the hemisphere.

There are other proposals made at the seventh special session which, when developed, will be valuable to the Latin American countries. A special working group of the IMF-IBRD [International Monetary Fund-International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] Development Committee is considering means of facilitating access to world capital markets by LDC's. As Latin America moves beyond large-scale concessional lending, capital market borrowings will be a major source of development funds. They could obtain special benefit from the proposed expansion of the International Finance Corporation to strengthen its support for private investment in LDC's, and the creation of an International Investment Trust which would attract capital for invest-

ment in public, private, and mixed enterprises in LDC's.

These proposals represent some of the important economic initiatives set forth, in major part in the Kissinger address of September 1 at the U.N. seventh special session. They meet some of the concern of the nations of the hemisphere.

There is no more important issue, as I have said, for our relations with the hemisphere. It is vital that we support, and cooperate with, the development aspirations of the hemisphere, as you will see in the course of your trip. So we tend to think we scored something of an important breakthrough with these new U.S. economic policies this fall.

### **Wide Range of OAS Activities**

The same cannot be said for the third matter I would like to touch on—the Organization of American States and its charter.

For the better part of the last three years, representatives of 24 American states have been trying to draft a new charter for the Organization of American States. Their goal: to modernize the organization, which is the centerpiece of the inter-American system.

The OAS, oldest surviving international organization, traces its roots back to 1890, and its history has been one of high accomplishment. In its best known role, the organization has traditionally provided a place the governments of this hemisphere can meet to consult on common problems, including some thorny ones—human rights, family planning—sometimes as an adjunct to bilateral or other multilateral fora, but more often as the prime locus for discussion.

The inter-American system began that way—as a series of conferences. In the past, these high-level meetings, now called Assemblies, have produced agreements in a number of sensitive security, political, and economic areas.

Almost 30 years ago in Rio de Janeiro, one of these meetings yielded a hemispheric mutual security pact, the Rio Treaty. Although born in response to the Nazi threat,

the treaty during the 1950's drew renewed vitality from the commonly held apprehensions of the cold war. But even today, in a world of reduced military tension, the Rio Treaty has demonstrated its staying power, perhaps attributable more now to recognition of growing power imbalances within Latin America itself than to fear of extra-territorial aggression. The member states reaffirmed their support for an updated Rio Treaty at San José this last summer.

A 1948 agreement on the peaceful settlement of disputes symbolized the commitment within the inter-American system to reduce and control strife among the member states, just as the Rio Treaty was conceived primarily as a defense against extrahemispheric aggression. The organization's successful efforts to stop quickly the fighting in 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras show the continuing need for the OAS as a peacekeeper and its ability to act with dispatch.

But more and more, especially during the last decade, as I have said, economic problems have become the central issues of the hemisphere. A 1967 revision of the OAS Charter set down some general principles of economic relations, and it provided for some new machinery to relate to the development process. But, as we shall see, formal agreements do not guarantee success.

The OAS has also served as an umbrella for the activities of a myriad of technical organizations which bring together specialists from throughout the hemisphere. These have produced concrete benefits in, for example, telecommunications, tourism promotion, ports and harbors, and trade facilitation.

I have used these examples because they happen to be the subjects of OAS meetings going on at various places in the hemisphere at this very moment. A complete list of OAS technical activities would reveal an astounding range of subjects under consideration at the expert level. This fact is a unique feature of the organization.

Finally, the OAS carries out numerous additional projects. Specialized organizations work in the fields of health; agriculture; the problems of women, children, and Indians;

as well as social and economic development; educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation; and human rights.

The organization, in short, is big. And it does a great deal. It spends almost \$100 million a year, \$65 million of which comes from the United States. It employs 1,500 people stationed throughout the member states.

As you can see from this, a gamut of hemispheric concerns has found their way into the inter-American system. This span of involvement has created a unique heritage. Can it be sustained in a world of change?

In 1973, a mere three years after the last major modification of the charter entered into force, uneasiness over the organization's relevance to a changing world led members to agree to yet another study of the organization. Why so soon? What are the factors promoting this presumed need for frequent self-examination? And what were the results?

The OAS groups a diverse polity. It brings together 25 distinct nations. The differences among us are marked, though we share the same hemisphere and all won our independence from extracontinental overlords. Most of the members are, economically speaking, among the world's middle class, but some are truly poor. In terms of size, consider Brazil and Grenada. The four major languages mirror different cultural heritages. Alaska and Argentina are almost poles apart, in more than just geography. The diversity has been growing.

These variations have introduced a new and significant element to inter-American relations for the future. In an earlier, less complicated time, it was an unquestioned principle that all member states should aspire to liberal representative democracy. This consensus has given way to acceptance of what in the OAS has been dubbed a plurality of ideologies. At San José in July, we agreed to incorporate the principle of ideological pluralism in the Rio Treaty.

Moreover, fast-moving events in the rest of the globe during this decade have also

begun to strain the inter-American system: the emergence of a multipolar world, new economic power centers such as the oil producers, the spectacular growth of transnational enterprises, the boom of the early seventies, and the bust that we are now suffering through. These have affected traditional perceptions of international relationships in the hemisphere.

U.S. global policies during the last few years have also been noted by the Latins. Détente has changed the context of inter-American security cooperation. Many saw President Nixon's proposal for a "mature partnership" as a form of neglect anything but benign. Economically, bilateral assistance to Latin America from the United States stagnated; Colombia has just decided to phase out direct U.S. aid entirely, for example. Various congressional amendments sought to protect U.S. private ventures abroad by threatening reduction or elimination of assistance. The 10 percent surcharge imposed on all imports in 1971 applied equally to our OAS allies and struck at the "special relationship" concept we had touted. The slow-paced implementation of trade reform, at least until the Secretary's special session address, was viewed by Latins as belying our promises to give their economic interests special weight.

#### **Issues in Charter Reform**

The study to revise the structure and purpose of the OAS was begun in 1973 at Latin initiative, in the context of those world changes.

The Latins were motivated to the study in large part as a reaction to policy in the economic realm, which, as I have said, is the key to our future relationship.

The United States looms large in the economic life of Latin America—so large in fact that it is not surprising that the special committee created by the 1973 mandate concentrated on curbing specific U.S. actions which they regard as interfering with their own ability to cope with foreign economic forces.

One of these efforts became known by the

code phrase "collective economic security." Peru took the lead in urging that collective economic security be written into the OAS Charter. It advanced the theory that when a state takes measures which have negative effects on another's economy, it may commit a form of aggression. A tribunal of other states should sit in judgment. If a majority agrees that an offense has occurred, the tribunal should assess damages.

A draft treaty placed before the study committee made clear this potential equation of economic policy with military aggression. The drafters had in mind such examples as our 10 percent surcharge and Congress' requirement that we cut assistance in cases of uncompensated confiscation of U.S. property or fishing vessels. We of course do not believe that these actions can be labeled aggression. We could hardly agree, therefore, to create a court and a judge and jury to try us for actions which we consider to be sovereign acts to defend legitimate U.S. interests.

Another charter-reform sticking point relates to the conduct of transnational enterprises. The issue here is Latin America's venerable Calvo doctrine. This juridical notion holds that foreign investors may have no recourse to their own governments in disputes over expropriation. The decisions of host country courts are final. We of course recognize that local law obtains; but we believe that international obligations, including the responsibility of a state to protect its citizens, must be taken into account.

But, more importantly, we do not believe that these contentious issues of principle and doctrine, as important as they are, can be injected into the OAS Charter in the absence of any agreement between ourselves and the Latin Americans regarding their validity.

On the other hand, we do believe that a modernized inter-American system can continue to play a significant and creative role in inter-American relations even in the absence of agreement on the concepts of international law relating to certain economic issues. This is so in terms of peacekeeping

and conflict management. It is so in terms of support for the development efforts of Latin America.

And it is so in the area of human rights, where, we are persuaded, the organization can make a major contribution. The standards of human rights are international standards, laid down in the Inter-American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and it is particularly appropriate, therefore, that the determination whether countries are abiding by those standards be in the first instance through international machinery.

In short, we find that the charter-reform effort to date, which has cost several million dollars, has raised more questions than it has answered about the extent to which we can agree on the nature and type of cooperative relationship we want within the inter-American system. The final draft which has emerged from the OAS labors of the last three years does little to advance the common vision of an OAS which is an effective instrument of regional cooperation. As the Mexican Representative has said in recent days, the organization faces its "moment of truth."

The United States therefore proposed late last week that we drop the new OAS Charter draft and begin over again. This time, we should embrace the objective of making the OAS capable of responding to the hemisphere's aspirations for the future, within the limits of those goals and objectives upon which we and Latin America can agree.

We are now approaching other governments of the hemisphere. Our Ambassador to the OAS, William Mailliard, and Deputy U.S. Representative Robert White are in Latin America now. They will be visiting capitals throughout the hemisphere during your own trip, including both Caracas and Bogotá. I will be going to Mexico in a few hours. Our purpose will be to explore with other foreign ministries whether there exists a consensual vision of a truly effective, relevant OAS for the future.

There is no more important common effort on the inter-American agenda.

## **U.S.-Yugoslav Board on Scientific and Technological Cooperation Meets**

*Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

The U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Board on Scientific and Technological Cooperation met at the Department of State, Washington, D.C., December 4-5, for its regular semiannual meeting.

The Board reviewed over 100 ongoing projects in a wide range of fields, such as agriculture, health, basic sciences, technology, ecology, transportation, and others. The Board also approved additional funding for 16 projects, worth approximately 8.5 million dinars (\$500,000), to be financed from the U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Fund established in accordance with the agreement on scientific and technological cooperation which the two countries signed on May 18, 1973.

The Board reiterated its belief that scientific and technological cooperation between the U.S. and Yugoslavia has been very successful; and it expressed the hope that new sources of funding can be found to extend the program beyond 1977-78, when most of the current projects will expire.

The United States was represented by Mr. William A. Root, Acting Director, Office of Soviet and Eastern European Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, and Dr. Herman Chinn, Scientific Attache, American Embassy, Belgrade.

Yugoslavia was represented by Dr. Edo Pirkmajer, Secretary General, Research Community of Slovenia, and Chairman of

the Board, and Mr. Milos Rajacic, Scientific Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy, Washington.

The Board tentatively scheduled its next meeting in Yugoslavia in late June 1976.

## **U.S. and Argentina Establish Bilateral Working Groups**

Press release 611 dated December 16

Argentine Ambassador Rafael M. Vazquez and Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers met on December 16 to implement a series of bilateral working groups between Argentina and the United States. The meeting resulted from a decision made by the Argentine Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State when they met in New York last September, to place greater emphasis on areas of potential collaboration between the two countries.

Ambassador Vazquez and Assistant Secretary Rogers moved to establish informal working groups in the fields of trade, investment and finance, culture and tourism, agriculture, and science and technology. These working groups will be constituted both in Buenos Aires and Washington, to permit representatives of the private sector, as well as government officials, to participate in the task of improving U.S.-Argentine relations.

The Ambassador and the Assistant Secretary pointed to the bilateral memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the health sciences, which is to be signed shortly in Buenos Aires, as the kind of mutually productive relationship which can be fostered by the working groups.

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Dec. 5 (press release 593).

## U.S. Vetoes Unbalanced Security Council Resolution Concerning Israeli Air Attacks in Lebanon

*Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan on December 4, 5, and 8, together with the text of a draft resolution which was vetoed by the United States on December 8.*

### STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN

#### First Statement of December 4

USUN press release 174 dated December 4

The U.S. delegation has insisted upon a vote on the issue of inviting representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization to appear before the Security Council.<sup>1</sup> As a matter of principle, we shall vote against their being invited to appear.

We have witnessed a concerted attempt to disregard the rules of procedure and to accord to the Palestine Liberation Organization a role greater even than that which over the years the Council has granted to observer governments and a role greater by far than has in more recent times been granted to the spokesmen of legitimate national liberation movements invited here under rule 39.

<sup>1</sup> The Council had before it a letter from the Permanent Representative of Egypt requesting "an urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon" and "the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the debate during the discussion of this item" (U.N. doc. S/11893), as well as a letter from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon requesting an urgent meeting of the Council (U.N. doc. S/11892).

The United States is not prepared to agree to an ad hoc departure from the rules of procedure tailored to meet the asserted needs of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

What is more important, my government is not prepared to acquiesce in an action which will undermine the negotiating process, which is the only process that can lead to peace. For the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization have repeatedly, and as recently as the day before yesterday, told the General Assembly of their disdain for systematic negotiation.

They have openly declared their hostility, indeed their contempt, for the work of this Council. They categorically rejected Security Council Resolution 242, which for years has served as the only agreed basis for serious negotiation. And now we find the Palestine Liberation Organization citing actions taken in the General Assembly and the Security Council as the basis for still further erosion of the negotiating process.

For these fundamental reasons, we are totally opposed to inviting the Palestine Liberation Organization. To do so will disserve the search for peace in the Middle East.

The noblest and most fundamental aim of the Security Council is to achieve peace and security. In the case of the Middle East, my government is dedicated to active leadership in the pursuit of that goal. My government has long maintained that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people must be reflected in the arrangements that will bring peace and security to the Middle East.

The effort which has been made to flout

the procedures of this Council and to disregard entirely the sensitivities of the people of the State of Israel can only complicate the search for peace. We urge all who share the hope for a just peace in the Middle East to withhold their support from this egregious attempt to use this body to deal with an amorphous terrorist organization as though it were a concrete entity with the attributes of a sovereign government.

The United States will vote "No."<sup>2</sup>

### Second Statement of December 4<sup>3</sup>

USUN press release 175 dated December 4

I intervene briefly in the interest of keeping the record straight with respect to some of the things which have been said here this afternoon.

The distinguished Representative of Iraq asserted that the decision of the Security Council in September to hear the two Viet-Nams is a precedent for the proposal to invite what is called the full participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Mr. President, the Vietnamese case was entirely different. First, what the Council did in that case was to invite the Viet-Nams to make a statement to the Council after the vote, not to participate fully.

Second, that invitation was extended on a nonobjection basis. The President very properly paused and, after a moment, said, "Since there is no objection, it is so decided." There are objections here.

Third, although the then President of the Council made no reference to any rule of the Council's rules of procedures when the Council invited the Viet-Nams, there was no reason for him to have done so. We knew under what rule we acted. The fact is that

the legal basis of the invitation was rule 39. As the distinguished Representative of Italy has said today, there can be no other basis under the rules as they so stand.

Finally, in this regard, Mr. President, whether we believe there are one or two Vietnamese states, there certainly is at least one such state. But there does not now exist any state of Palestine, nor does the Palestine Liberation Organization claim that there exists a state of Palestine. The PLO cannot therefore be treated properly as the government of a state.

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to adumbrate certain concerns about references which have been made here this afternoon to what was agreed or not agreed in the private consultations which the Council has held prior to this formal meeting.

I regret to say, Mr. President, that the recollections of the U.S. delegation are very much at variance at a number of points with the recollections of other members of this Council. I regret this because it must surely be a sign that we have a faulty memory.

I do not in any way mean to suggest that there has been misrepresentation, much less that there has been deliberate misrepresentation. But there is on our part some distress that our recollections and understandings should be so at variance with those of other members of the Council.

And it must be the fact, Mr. President, that if the creative practice which the Council has evolved of meeting in private and without the maintenance of a record is to become the source of subsequent confusion, even disagreement and conceivably even the quest for advantage in consequence of the absence of a record, then clearly the disposition of some members of this Council to continue that practice will have been diminished, and a creative innovation in our procedures will perhaps commence to decline.

I make that point only, Mr. President, in the most open and nonaccusatory manner, simply to say that it seems to me that it is not useful in this debate to make reference to earlier agreements which are now at this point not a matter of record.

<sup>2</sup> The Council on Dec. 4 adopted by a vote of 9 to 3 (Costa Rica, U.K., U.S.), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy, Japan), the procedural proposal for the participation of the PLO in the debate. Under article 27 of the U.N. Charter, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.

<sup>3</sup> For further statements made by Ambassador Moynihan on Dec. 4, see USUN press release 175.

## Statement of December 5

USUN press release 176 dated December 5

Once again we meet to consider the tragedy of violence and counterviolence in the Middle East and the dilemma which it poses for all of us. Surely no one can listen to the accounts of actions which involve the maiming and killing of innocent civilians without feeling the utmost compassion for those concerned. How satisfying it would be if we felt that through what we say and do here we could break this vicious circle which has brought so much tragedy to so many people over the last quarter century.

Surely, however, as responsible members of the international community charged with serious obligations under the U.N. Charter, we must recognize we do not accomplish this by condemning isolated acts. The attacks we are considering today do not occur in isolation. There is always cause and effect.

My delegation considers that all loss of innocent human life is reprehensible, and we are prepared to deplore it in strong terms whether it occurs from the acts of organized groups or of governments.

We would remind the Council that organizations which carried out recent acts of violence against citizens of Israel have publicly acknowledged their responsibility for those acts, just as the Government of Israel has acknowledged its responsibility for the attacks which are now before us. I make these points not to condone or excuse Israel's recent massive air attacks, which by their nature could not avoid taking innocent victims. We neither condone nor excuse them. But we must deal with them in context and not in isolation.

So let me be quite clear, Mr. President: the United States deeply deplores these attacks, just as we have consistently deplored those despicable terrorist incidents which have caused the loss of life in Israel.

We are prepared to support an appropriate resolution which registers the strongest disapproval of this Council of all acts of violence in the Middle East, particularly those which result in the death of innocent civil-

ians, and which calls on all parties to refrain from any action that might endanger peace negotiations.

Certainly there is nothing all of us would wish to see more than an end to this senseless slaughter. But on reflection I think most of you would agree that there is only one way to do this, and that is to bring peace to the area.

That, Mr. President, is precisely what my government has been devoting its most intensive efforts to try to do over the past two years. We remain committed to that goal. We will persevere in our efforts to achieve it. We believe we have made progress, but we recognize that much remains to be settled.

One of the unhappy features of the situation we are dealing with today is the disruptive effect it has on the efforts to move further toward a peace agreement. The tensions and passions generated by the recurring cycle of violence are hardly conducive to the type of atmosphere that will permit the parties concerned to arrive at that accommodation of opposing views which is the prerequisite of a peace agreement.

Our task is to weigh deliberately how our reactions can best advance that reconciliation of views. It will not be accomplished through the adoption of one-sided resolutions which leave one party believing it is the victim of discrimination and bias on the part of the United Nations. It will be facilitated if this body renders impartial, reasoned, and reasonable judgments on the issues properly within its competence. It is our duty to react in the most responsible and constructive way that we can conceive.

## Statement Before the Vote, December 8

USUN press release 182 dated December 8

At the outset of this present debate in the Security Council concerning the complaints of Lebanon and Egypt about Israeli raids in Lebanon, the United States spoke briefly but, we hope, consistently—consistent with a position we have maintained throughout the

long and often heartbreaking duration of this conflict which is nearly coeval with the existence of the United Nations itself.

We stated that we considered that all loss of innocent human life was reprehensible, that we were prepared to deplore in strong terms such loss of life, whether it occurs from the acts of governments or from the acts of organized groups. We made no distinction, as indeed no distinction could be made, with respect to the value or the extent of the loss of the life of a Lebanese child any more than the loss of the life of an Israeli or Syrian or Egyptian child.

We asked on that occasion, Mr. President, if it were not possible for the Council to join in this perception which all of us shared. None of us around this table in this Council chamber think otherwise; none of the nations or that organization seated at this table would share a different view.

We said on that occasion that:

We are prepared to support an appropriate resolution which registers the strongest disapproval of this Council of all acts of violence in the Middle East, particularly those which result in the death of innocent civilians, and which calls on all parties to refrain from any action that might endanger peace negotiations.

Now, Mr. President, we said this in our capacity as a member of the Council, but I think it will be granted that ours is a special concern in this regard owing simply to the fact that we are also the member of the Council which is seeking, in the role of mediator, to bring about peace in the Middle East. We are trying to mediate this seemingly unending conflict. And we cannot see mediation as in any way advanced by a one-sided resolution, a resolution which would persuade one party or another party that an imbalance had occurred, that an injustice was being done. It is only the evenhandedness of the United Nations, just as it is the evenhandedness of the mediator, that bears any promise of success.

In the past, Mr. President, this Council has seen and understood and acted upon this fundamental requirement of responsible behavior; to wit, the requirement of even-

handedness and balance. The most recent occasion on which a Security Council resolution of this kind has been before us was in April of 1974, when we adopted Resolution 347 in a context not dissimilar from the present context: violence and counterviolence, and violence counter to the counterviolence, then violence counter to that. It is not new to human history, certainly not to that of the Middle East.

On that occasion the Security Council acted in a manner which was resolute but fair, concrete but balanced. Resolution 347 was adopted by 13 votes to none in opposition, such that the whole of the Council may be said to have approved this course of action. And, Mr. President, nothing a year and a half later should suggest to us that there was anything imprudent about what we did. To the contrary, it stands as an example of responsible behavior, seeking effective results. We all know this; there is no government at this table that does not know this.

It is not required of me to do anything more than to say what we also all know, which is that the resolution before us is not balanced, will not be perceived as fair; it will not advance the cause of peace, and to that extent it cannot be seen as responsible.

We speak not just as a government but as a government seeking to bring peace in the role of mediator. That is our role in the Middle East. It is never an easy one. We find ourselves called upon to make pleas to you for perspective and balance.

We fully understand that there are governments at this table that do not feel balanced at this moment. We can understand why they would not. Yet we as mediators say, even so, it is not the moment that matters, it is the progress we are making toward a just and lasting peace. The question is: Will the action we take today add to that progress, encourage it, facilitate it, or will it do otherwise?

And so, Mr. President, the United States, the mediator country, would like to suggest two simple amendments to the resolution before us. We have asked the Secretariat to circulate the amendments without delay;

and I am sure it is doing its very best, as it always does, and here indeed they are.

Mr. President, these are not unfamiliar amendments. To the contrary, the language will be familiar to you, sir, and to a number of the members of the Council, to most of the members of the Council, for the very simple reason that most members of this Council have already voted for these amendments. These amendments have won the approval of every permanent member of this Council which voted on them. They won the approval of all those members elected to the Council who were here last year, and they won the approval of all the other elected members who were there at the time, all of this with the exception of one permanent and one elected member who chose not to participate in the vote. But among the participating nations, the vote was unanimous.

Mr. President, the U.S. amendments would add to our present resolution, which has three operative paragraphs, a fourth and a fifth. The fourth paragraph reads as follows:

*Condemns* all acts of violence, especially those which result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any further acts of violence;

Paragraph 5 reads:

*Calls upon* all parties to refrain from any action which might endanger negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

I repeat, sir, these are operative paragraphs which the Security Council has already voted upon and did so in a similar situation—a not dissimilar situation—a year and a half ago. There is no one present at this table who opposed those paragraphs.

The purpose of the fourth paragraph, very simply, would be to provide balance in those acts which we condemn, reflecting nothing more than our true feelings and our stated position—that we condemn all acts of violence.

I cannot imagine that any government would not be willing to condemn and deplore violence which leads to the loss of innocent lives, and I simply point out that there is not a government at this table which did other-

wise when faced with the possibility—more than the possibility, the necessity—of doing so a year and a half ago.

Finally, the fifth operative paragraph would call on all parties to refrain from any action that would endanger the negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I remind you, sir, these negotiations have not failed in the year and a half since this resolution was adopted. To the contrary, extraordinarily difficult, dense, but in the end successful negotiation has brought the condition of peace, the absence of violence, stability, to the Sinai, and similar efforts are soon to be undertaken, we cannot doubt, with respect to the Syrian-Israeli border and their relations.

In those circumstances, Mr. President, in the name of sanity, in the name of peace, the United States proposes these amendments and asks for a vote.

#### **Statement After the Vote, December 8**

USUN press release 183 dated December 8

As has been clear in what I have said here tonight and what my delegation has done today, this is an outcome which is disappointing to the United States. On December 4, when this matter first arose, we spoke briefly, plainly, and we asked for balance. All day long, as my distinguished friend the Representative from the Cameroon has said, we spoke in private meetings with members of this Council, asking for some measure of balance in this resolution. We were not successful.

We introduced measures familiar to the Council, part of the Council's record, which we thought would provide balance. The distinguished Representative of Italy asked for 12 hours that we might recess, adjourn if you will, to talk further about these proposals, and we voted with five other members of the Council for such an adjournment. But it was not the wish of a majority.

Mr. President, the United States strongly deplores the Israeli actions which were brought to our attention by the Governments of Lebanon and Egypt through the

offices of their distinguished Ambassadors who are with us tonight. But we also believe that the problem of the loss of innocent life from incursions from Lebanon and other neighboring states of Israel should also be condemned. This is part of the cycle of violence with which we are dealing and which the United States, as a mediating power, hopes to bring to an end.

We worked strenuously for a balanced resolution, and we have reluctantly had to veto the resolution as it now stands, which as we have made clear from the beginning, we did not consider to be balanced.

#### TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION <sup>4</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the question inscribed in its agenda at the 1859th meeting,

*Having noted* the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/11892) and of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Egypt (S/11893),

*Having heard* the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon, Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization,

*Recalling* its previous relevant resolutions,

*Deploring* Israel's defiance of these resolutions,

*Grieved* at the tragic loss of human life caused by indiscriminate and massive Israeli air attacks,

*Gravely concerned* about the deteriorating situation resulting from Israel's violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and of Security Council resolutions,

*Convinced* that Israeli massive air attacks against Lebanon were premeditative in nature,

1. *Strongly condemns* the Government of Israel for its premeditated air attacks against Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the United Nations Charter and of Security Council resolutions;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks against Lebanon;

3. *Issues once again* a solemn warning to Israel that if such attacks were repeated, the Council would have to consider taking appropriate steps and measures to give effect to its decisions.

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<sup>4</sup>U.N. doc. S/11898; the draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council, the vote being 13 in favor, 1 against (U.S.), with 1 abstention (Costa Rica).

## U.S. Votes Against General Assembly Resolution on the Middle East

*Following is a statement made in plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on December 4, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on December 5.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT

USUN press release 171 dated December 4

This General Assembly plenary continues to focus our attention on one of the most sensitive and difficult problems we face as a global community: the situation in the Middle East. We have already discussed aspects of this issue on various occasions during the current session, and the Security Council and committees of the Assembly are at this moment working on Middle Eastern issues. I therefore do not need to dwell on the seriousness of the Middle East situation nor on its importance to us all; the issue is heavy upon us.

Nor do I really need to tell you what U.S. policy is in the Middle East. Since the signing of the new Egyptian-Israeli agreement of September 4, 1975, U.S. policy in the Middle East has been elaborated several times by Secretary of State Kissinger, most notably in his address before this Assembly on September 22. He has explained our view of that agreement and what the United States is prepared to do next. It may be useful, nevertheless, to reiterate here some of the main points of that position in order to demonstrate once again the determination of the United States to go forward in the pursuit of a peaceful settlement.

Our conclusion after the October war of 1973 was that to have approached all the issues pertaining to all the countries involved was nearly futile until a minimum of confidence had been established. The United States believed that we should proceed step by step with the parties that were ready to

negotiate, and on issues that allowed some room for maneuver. We believed that, once into the process, the parties would have a stake in its success and that momentum would be created which could produce benefits and agreements that would be kept. We considered that in the end this step-by-step approach would bring about conditions which could then lead to a final overall settlement. This has been our goal from the beginning and remains our goal today.

Since October 1973, there has been more progress toward peace than at any time since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United Nations has played an important role in making that progress possible and in assuring that gains achieved were not lost. Security Council Resolution 338 launched a negotiating process and the first Geneva Conference. Agreements to separate forces and to create buffer zones in support of the cease-fires were negotiated between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and between Syria and Israel in May 1974. A further agreement, not the direct outcome of war but as a step toward peace, was signed in September 1975 between Egypt and Israel.

We have said and we will say again that these are only steps in a continuing process. We have made notable progress, but the task is in no way finished. We are determined to persevere.

The question before us all is: Where do we go from here and how? The United States is convinced answers to this question can be found.

President Ford has made it clear that the United States will assist the parties in any way it can, as the parties desire, to achieve a negotiated settlement within the framework established by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We are fully aware that all the basic issues must be met and that there will be no permanent peace unless it deals with the concern of the parties for their territorial integrity, political independence, and right to exist in peace and takes into account the legitimate interests of all concerned, including the Palestinians. We

remain ready to help in further negotiations between Syria and Israel. We are ready to consult and discuss the possibilities of a reconvened Geneva Conference. We are ready and willing to explore any practical method of advancing the cause of peace, including a preparatory conference of the original participants in the Geneva Conference to discuss agenda procedures, participation, and other matters relevant to a resumption of the Geneva Conference. This is the policy of the United States. We shall execute it vigorously.

The resolution before us for our consideration does not, in the view of the United States, help us in the process toward peace we support. We shall vote against it. Its one-sided condemnation of one of the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute and its departure from the accepted negotiating framework established by Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 make further settlement between those parties more difficult. It calls upon the Security Council to implement certain resolutions that deal with problems that can only be solved by negotiation. That is the task before us all: to get to the serious work of negotiation among the parties in which real progress can be made. Resolutions such as the one before us today can only exacerbate the situation.

Further, it adds to the series of one-sided resolutions which are a disservice to ourselves and to this institution. It would take us one step further in destroying credibility throughout the world that the General Assembly is truly going about its business. These irresponsible resolutions do not take into account the legitimate concerns of one of the parties and lead us into a domain removed from the reality where a settlement can be achieved.

Let us turn away from empty rhetoric and resolutions. Let us commit ourselves to a practical process of negotiations, which continues to hold out the best hope for reaching that objective so essential to the peoples of the Middle East and indeed of the entire world.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of the United Nations as well as those principles of international law which prohibit the occupation or acquisition of territory by the use of force, and which consider any military occupation, however temporary, or any forcible annexation of such territory, or part thereof, as an act of aggression,

*Gravely concerned* at the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories and Israel's persistent denial of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people,

*Recalling* relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, particularly those concerning the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and its right to participate in any efforts for peace,

*Convinced* that the early reconvening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region,

*Convinced* that the present situation prevailing in the Middle East continues to constitute a serious threat to international peace and security, and that urgent measures should be taken in order to ensure Israel's full compliance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the questions of Palestine and the Middle East,

*Recognizing* that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the question of the Middle East must be based on a comprehensive solution under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into consideration all aspects of the Middle East conflict, including, in particular, the enjoyment by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights, as well as the total withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967,

1. *Reaffirms* that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and therefore all territories thus occupied must be returned;

2. *Condemns* Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and repeated United Nations resolutions;

3. *Requests* all States to desist from supplying Israel with any military or economic aid as long as it continues to occupy Arab territories and deny the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people;

4. *Requests* the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all

necessary measures for the speedy implementation, according to an appropriate time-table, of all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region through a comprehensive settlement, worked out with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, and within the framework of the United Nations, which ensures complete Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well as full recognition of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the attainment of those rights;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, and to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and report thereon to the Security Council and to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

## U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-Syria Sector Extended

*Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council on November 30 by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.*

### STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN

#### Statement Before the Vote

USUN press release 165 dated November 30

Mr. President [Yakov Malik, of the U.S.S.R.]: I should like to express my gratitude to you for the opportunity I now have to be the first of the many members—first, I am sure, of what will prove to be all of the other members of this Council—to express appreciation to my brother from Guyana, and his colleagues from Mauritania, from Tanzania, and Cameroon, for the valiant efforts which they have made to bring about this result. These required a great deal of them and were an expression of their commitment to the work of this Council, which we all share and, in their performance this past three days, certainly admire.

Mr. President, with respect to the resolution before us, the United States wishes

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/3414 (XXX) adopted by the Assembly on Dec. 5 by a rollcall vote of 84 to 17 (U.S.), with 27 abstentions.

to make clear that we are not agreeing to this resolution, which includes a provision calling for a Security Council debate on the situation in the Middle East, out of any desire for such a debate in this setting—much less out of any intention, howsoever remote, of seeing a transfer of the negotiations between the two parties to the UNDOF [U.N. Disengagement Observer Force] arrangements to the Security Council.

We have agreed, we are agreeing, solely out of deference to the right of the Security Council to take up any matter it desires to take up. We consider that this resolution is taken without prejudice whatsoever to the Geneva formula or to the negotiations by the parties through intermediaries.

With respect to the matter of relevant U.N. resolutions, the United States considers that only Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are in fact relevant to the situation in the Middle East.

#### Statement After the Vote

USUN press release 166 dated November 30

I am sure you would agree, sir, that the only words which would truly serve to express the admiration and the gratitude and the respect which we all have for the Secretary General at this moment would be brief words. His labors have been herculean, and I assume, if today is no different from other days, they are not yet concluded. My government, sir, would join wholly in the tributes paid to you.

My delegation wishes also to make clear that the United States, Mr. President, does not support the statement of the Council President—of yourself, sir—indicating that the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] will be invited to participate in the January session.<sup>1</sup> This statement in any

<sup>1</sup>The following statement was read by the President of the Council after the vote:

“It is the understanding of the majority of the Security Council that when it reconvenes on 12 January 1976 in accordance with paragraph (a) of Security Council resolution 381 (1975) the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization will be invited to participate in the debate.”

event did not report a decision, but was merely a summation of the views of some members of the Council. We do not consider that the extraneous matters which have been introduced into the Council's action today can have the effect of changing either the negotiating framework, the basis for these negotiations, or the participants in them.

Mr. President, I should like also to note that subparagraph (a) of the operative paragraph, properly read, declares the intention of the Security Council to debate the question of whether or not the Middle East problem does in fact include the Palestinian question. Such, Mr. President, is the role of the comma in English composition.

Nonetheless, and finally, to the parties concerned and to this Council, the United States pledges its continued efforts to further the process toward peace in the Middle East. We do that with the indispensable support of UNDOF, of its commander, its officers, and its men, and of course, once again, you, Mr. Secretary General, and those not less valiant colleagues whom you have brought as your associates on the 38th floor.

#### TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>2</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General (S/11883 and Add.1) on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF),

*Having noted* the discussions of the Secretary-General with all parties concerned on the situation in the Middle East,

*Expressing concern* over the continued state of tension in the area,

*Decides:*

(a) To reconvene on 12 January 1976, to continue the debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions;

(b) To renew the mandate of UNDOF for another period of six months;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on further developments.

<sup>2</sup>U.N. doc. S/RES/381 (1975); adopted by the Council on Dec. 1 by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not participating in the vote.

## United States Urges Increase in Contributions to UNRWA

*Following is a statement made in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Barbara M. White on November 18, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on November 20 and by the Assembly on December 8.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WHITE

USUN press release 152 (corr. 1) dated November 18

Sir John Rennie, the distinguished Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), has told us that the Agency is facing a crisis unequaled in its 25 years of existence. My delegation believes that this somber warning is one which must be heeded by every nation represented in this room today. We are faced not solely or even predominantly with the possibility that an organization of tested merit is in deep trouble. No, Mr. Chairman, the prospect we face is much more important, much more pressing, and potentially much more tragic; for we are discussing the lives of the million and a half refugees who depend so directly on UNRWA. In very practical terms, we must face the fact that unless very strenuous efforts are made, the lives of the refugees could be dramatically changed for the worse, particularly by the elimination of the major part of UNRWA's educational services.

It is UNRWA's schools which will suffer especially if expenditures must be reduced to the level of contributions which UNRWA estimates for this year and the years ahead. There can be no other way in 1976, for example, to reduce a budget of \$140 million to accommodate a deficit of \$55 million. We cannot allow this to happen.

UNRWA's schools mean more than a quarter of a million schoolchildren and over 4,300 vocational students—of whom 92 per-

cent will be employed upon graduation. UNRWA's schools also mean over 8,000 teachers, all of them refugees themselves. UNRWA's schools mean, finally, the employment now and upon graduation of thousands of refugees each year, providing better and useful lives not only for themselves but for the thousands more who are or will be dependent upon them.

And there is yet a further consequence: the education provided by UNRWA is a dynamic in what for 25 years has been an otherwise static situation. While the search for a political solution for the future of the refugees continues, UNRWA has already addressed that future by giving the refugees and their children some of the resources to meet it.

Mr. Chairman, education is among the most vital services that UNRWA provides. With the strong support of the refugees themselves, UNRWA has decided to give the maximum support to its schools, even at the cost of greater austerity in its other services. It is for this reason that for many years UNRWA expenditures on education have equaled 37 percent of the total budget, an amount roughly equal to that spent on relief.

The Commissioner General was quite correct, in noting UNRWA's anniversary this year, that 25 years of refugee status can be no occasion for celebration. However, to UNRWA's great credit, it is also true that although that status tragically continues, the Agency has made it possible for thousands of the refugees to acquire the modern skills to support constructive lives. The members of the United Nations must not allow this possibility to be destroyed.

In 1975 half of those members, including many countries well able to give, contributed nothing to UNRWA. Many other members have made only nominal contributions. The Commissioner General has asked, with every justification, that UNRWA's chronic financial weakness be ended. This requires—let us acknowledge it here and now—that

UNRWA's income must rise annually to meet the increases in costs from factors such as inflation and currency devaluation over which the Agency has no control.

Let me note here that the United States has responded to the appeals by the Secretary General and the Commissioner General in 1975 with two special contributions in addition to our regular pledge.<sup>1</sup> The total amounted to nearly 40 percent of all government contributions to UNRWA. However, all members of the United Nations must now respond if regular increases of this size are to be met. Undercontributors and noncontributors must take their part of the responsibility which their votes in the General Assembly for UNRWA resolutions over the years have created.

It is our challenge, our commitment, and our responsibility to sustain the hope UNRWA has brought to those it serves. Let us, all of us, discharge that duty together.

The U.S. delegation introduces draft resolution A/SPC/L.335 in full recognition of the situation described by Commissioner General Sir John Rennie. In doing so, we call upon *all* member states of the United Nations to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of UNRWA.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>2</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 3331 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974 and all previous resolutions referred to therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

*Taking note* of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near

<sup>1</sup> On Nov. 26 in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, announced the U.S. pledge of \$26.7 million to UNRWA for calendar year 1976. For his statement in the ad hoc committee, see USUN press release 160 dated Nov. 26.

East, covering the period from 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975,

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and to the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued dedicated and effective efforts under difficult circumstances to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Notes with regret* that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of that paragraph and to report as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1976;

4. *Directs attention* to the continuing seriousness of the financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the Commissioner-General's report;

5. *Notes with profound concern* that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions, this increased level of income to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is still insufficient to cover essential budget requirements in the present year, and that, as presently foreseen levels of giving, deficits will recur each year;

6. *Calls upon* all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficits projected in the Commissioner-General's report, and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute regularly and contributing Governments to consider increasing their regular contributions.

<sup>2</sup> A/RES/3419 B (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.335, draft resolution); adopted by the committee on Nov. 20 by a vote of 79 to 0, with 2 abstentions, and by the Assembly on Dec. 8 by a vote of 121 to 0, with 1 abstention.

## Department Discusses Grain Exports and Reserves Negotiations

*Following is a statement by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations on December 3.<sup>1</sup>*

Mr. Chairman [Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr.]: I appreciate the committee's invitation to appear today to comment on the Administration's policy on grain export sales and management. In these comments, I will seek to respond, within my competence, to the issues raised in your letter of October 30 to Assistant Secretary [for Congressional Relations Robert J.] McCloskey. Those were:

—The basis for determining availability of grains for concessional exports under the Food for Peace program.

—The importance of grain exports as a source of foreign exchange.

—The policy process as applied to food matters and grain exports.

—The status of grain reserves negotiations.

I would like to begin with a few general comments about U.S. export policy as it applies to grain. The same principles of multilateralism and nondiscrimination apply to grain as to the export of other U.S. products. Full production and improved competitiveness over the past several years have allowed American farmers to expand grain exports in response to growing world demand, and our policy is to maintain the

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

gains that we have recently enjoyed on world markets.

The large majority of foreign buyers of American grain have generally free access to our market. The one exception to this policy is the agreement with the Soviet Union. In this case, because of the Soviet record of highly irregular and potentially disruptive grain purchases, it was necessary to obtain a long-term commitment from them on annual demand and to establish an arrangement to monitor purchases during years of peak demand. The Soviet commitment to purchase at least 6 million tons is unconditional. On the other hand, the agreement enables the United States to lower the amount it will supply below 6 million tons, should expected supply in this country fall below the 225-million-ton level.

With respect to the food aid program, Public Law 480 (the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended), provides that the Secretary of Agriculture shall determine the type and quantity of commodities available for concessional sales. This determination only sets the limits for what may be programed as food aid. It is the budgetary decision of the President that determines the size of our food aid program. Since it is the prerogative of the Secretary of Agriculture to make food aid commodity determinations, I believe it would be more appropriate for further comment on this aspect of the committee's interest to be made by the spokesman for that Department.

Export of agricultural commodities has long been one of the mainstays of U.S. foreign trade. The export of grains, always a significant item in our balance of payments, has been an increasingly important foreign exchange earner in recent years. Grain export earnings grew from \$2.6 billion to \$10 billion between 1970 and 1974, almost a fourfold increase—against a 130 percent gain in the value of our total exports, from \$43 to \$98 billion. Without the \$10.3 billion earned from grain sales abroad last year, the \$3.4 billion deficit we experienced on current account would have been

much greater. Our ability to sustain the import of raw materials and fuels required by industry and other foreign goods sought by the American consumer would have been diminished. In addition to an increase in unit value, the volume of grain exports has doubled in this decade, and the United States, this year, will supply about 50 percent of world wheat exports and 55 percent of feed grains. The significant increase expected in grain exports this year from record crops in wheat and corn will further strengthen our balance of payments and allow us to meet a growing world demand for food.

These facts underscore the important position of agriculture, and grains in particular, in our foreign economic policy. I believe that some of the discussion we have heard in recent weeks about who makes foreign agricultural policy simply reflects a greater public awareness of the international importance of U.S. agriculture. The formulation of policy and the decisionmaking process within the Administration have not changed. Our delegation that negotiated the agreement with the Soviet Union on grain supply was headed by Under Secretary of State Robinson and included senior Department of Agriculture officials. Our participation in international efforts undertaken over the past year to solve world food problems has been fully coordinated, involving the participation of all interested agencies. The Department of Agriculture retains its traditional role in both the domestic and foreign aspects of agricultural policy.

In response to your expressed interest, Mr. Chairman, and because it is a major U.S. initiative in dealing with world food needs, I would like to summarize the status of work on establishing a grain reserves system.

Building on the principles outlined by Secretary Kissinger in his September speech to the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly, the United States presented a detailed proposal for a system of nationally held food grain reserves to a working group of the International Wheat Council (IWC) that has the negotiation of elements

of a new wheat agreement under consideration. Our proposal is designed to establish a system to increase assurance that adequate food supplies will be available to all countries despite global production fluctuations. Twice in this decade unpredictable shortfalls in world grain production have sharply reduced available supplies, causing widely fluctuating prices and altered consumption and trading patterns. In those situations, with food-importing countries competing for scarce supplies, the most seriously affected have been the more economically vulnerable developing countries. Our proposal for a 30-million-ton world security reserve stock of wheat and rice, held by importers and exporters alike, would create a reserve adequate to offset at least 90 percent of production shortfalls in food grains.

As I have stated, our reserves proposal is currently before the IWC working group, and those discussions have not yet reached a conclusive stage. We hope that the Wheat Council, meeting this week in London, will agree to accelerate the pace of those discussions so that we can move to actual negotiations early next year.

There is an important procedural obstacle, however, posed by the European Community. The EC has taken the view that proposals having to do with grain stocks should be negotiated in the context of trade issues in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) and has not been willing to continue discussions in London. We prefer the Wheat Council forum for negotiation of a grain reserves system because of its functional experience and expertise in grain matters and because of its membership, which includes the U.S.S.R. We also believe that a reserves system aimed at improving world food security is urgently required and therefore should be determined apart from other contentious issues involving international grain trade. To meet the EC's concerns, we have stated our willingness to take the results of a food security reserves negotiation into full account in the MTN. But so far this offer has not unblocked the reserves negotiations. We wonder whether the EC is

really committed to acting to improve world food security. Our bilateral contacts with the EC have continued up to this time in an effort to convince it that progress on a reserves system is an essential part of the common commitment to attacking the food problem the EC and we made at the World Food Conference one year ago.

## **Polar Bear Conservation Agreement Transmitted to the Senate**

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

I am pleased to transmit for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, done at Oslo, November 15, 1973.

I am also transmitting, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the agreement.

This agreement, negotiated by the five circumpolar nations, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway and the Soviet Union, provides a plan of protection for polar bears consisting of a prohibition of hunting, killing or capturing the mammals subject to specified exceptions. It also provides for the countries involved to cooperate and consult with each other on research involving management and conservation of polar bears.

This agreement implements one of the mandates of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 which, in Section 108, calls for development of bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection of marine mammals, including polar bears. No legislation is necessary to implement the agreement, since the protections of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 exceed the requirements of the agreement.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Nov. 28 (text from White House press release dated Nov. 29); also printed as S. Ex. I, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of the agreement and the report of the Department of State.

In addition to being the first international agreement to focus on the conservation of polar bears, this agreement is the first to be negotiated by the circumpolar nations exclusively. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this agreement.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *November 28, 1975.*

### **TREATY INFORMATION**

## **Current Actions**

### **MULTILATERAL**

#### **Aviation**

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

*Adherence deposited:* Papua New Guinea, December 15, 1975.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Rome September 15, 1962. Entered into force September 11, 1975.

*Proclaimed by the President:* December 16, 1975.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192.

*Notification of succession:* Papua New Guinea December 15, 1975 (with a reservation).

Convention for the suppression of unlawful act against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

*Notification of succession:* Papua New Guinea December 15, 1975 (with a reservation).

#### **Consular Relations**

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1968. TIAS 6820.

*Notification of succession:* Papua New Guinea December 4, 1975.

#### **Customs**

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15

1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.  
*Accession deposited:* Sierra Leone, November 6, 1975.

## Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.

*Notification of succession:* Papua New Guinea, December 4, 1975.

## Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Accessions deposited:* Iceland, December 5, 1975; Qatar, December 8, 1975.

## Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

*Accession deposited:* Guinea, December 3, 1975.

## Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

*Accession deposited:* Papua New Guinea, December 15, 1975.

## Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.

*Ratification deposited:* Guatemala, December 9, 1975.

## Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975.

*Proclaimed by the President:* December 15, 1975.

## Privileges and Immunities

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.

*Notification of succession:* Papua New Guinea, December 4, 1975.

## Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of acceptance signed by the President:* December 12, 1975.

Amendment to chapter VI of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of acceptance signed by the President:* December 15, 1975.

Amendments to chapters II, III, IV and V of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of acceptance signed by the President:* December 15, 1975.

## Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

*Accession deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, December 18, 1975 (applicable to Berlin (West)).

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Poland, December 4, 1975.

## Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force January 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.

*De facto application:* Surinam, November 25, 1975.

## BILATERAL

### Australia

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington May 14, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* December 16, 1975.

### Canada

Treaty on extradition, as amended by exchange of notes of June 28 and July 9, 1974. Signed at Washington December 3, 1971.

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* December 12, 1975.

### Iceland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital. Signed at Reykjavik May 7, 1975. Entered into force December 26, 1975.

*Proclaimed by the President:* December 12, 1975.

### Poland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

taxes on income, with related notes. Signed at Washington October 8, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* December 15, 1975.

Agreement regarding fisheries in the northeastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States, with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Washington December 16, 1975. Enters into force January 1, 1976.

### Romania

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington December 4, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* December 15, 1975.

### U.S.S.R.

Convention on matters of taxation, with related letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Senate advice and consent to ratification:* December 15, 1975.

Convention on matters of taxation, with related letters. Signed at Washington June 20, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* December 17, 1975.

## PUBLICATIONS

### GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Trade—Meat Imports.** Agreement with El Salvador. TIAS 8104. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8104).

**Narcotic Drugs—Cooperative Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic.** Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8108. 19 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8108).

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

### Check List of Department of State

#### Press Releases: December 15–21

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†607	12/15	Kissinger: remarks, Fürth, F.R.G.
†608	12/15	NATO ministerial meeting communique, Brussels, Dec. 12.
*609	12/15	Learson sworn in as Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference (biographic data).
*610	12/15	Kissinger: arrival, Paris.
611	12/16	U.S. and Argentina establish bilateral working groups.
†612	12/16	Kissinger: Conference on International Economic Cooperation, Paris.
†613	12/16	U.S. and Poland sign new fisheries agreement.
*614	12/16	Kissinger: interview by ABC, CBS, NBC, Paris.
*615	12/17	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on radiocommunications, Jan. 15.
*616	12/17	Study Groups 10 and 11 of the U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), Jan. 15.
*617	12/17	Study Group 5 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Jan. 16.
*618	12/17	Kissinger, MacEachen: remarks, Paris.
†619	12/17	Kissinger, MacEachen: joint statement, Paris.
*620	12/18	Davis sworn in as Ambassador to Switzerland (biographic data).
†621	12/18	U.S. statement in response to announcement of U.K. import measures.
†622	12/18	U.S., Canada, U.K., Japan, and the U.S.S.R. continue discussions on the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals of 1957.
*623	12/18	SCC, SOLAS, working group on subdivision and stability, Jan. 28.
*624	12/19	Schaufele sworn in as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (biographic data).

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

