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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXIII, No. 1902
December 8, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Leaders of Major Industrial Democracies Discuss Economic Issues

President Ford and President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany, Prime Minister Aldo Moro of Italy, Prime Minister Takeo Miki of Japan, and Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the United Kingdom met at the Chateau de Rambouillet near Paris November 15-17. Following are remarks made by President Ford at the conclusion of the meeting, the text of the Declaration of Rambouillet issued on November 17, and opening remarks from a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger and Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon aboard Air Force One on November 17 en route to Washington.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT FORD

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Nov. 24

Mr. President: I wish to express my appreciation for the gracious hospitality of you and the French Government and the French people. My appreciation also goes to my colleagues for the spirit of good will, the spirit of friendship, which they have demonstrated during this meeting.

It has been a highly successful meeting in every respect.

In our sessions, we have covered the range of economic issues of concern to the industrialized world and challenging our democratic societies.

These meetings have been rewarding in a number of important ways. They have deepened our understanding and appreciation of our mutual economic interdependence. They have enabled us to harmonize our views on key issues, and they have strengthened our determination to solve the problems that we confront. Finally, and most

importantly, they reaffirmed our mutual confidence in a sustained and full recovery from the deepest recession since the 1930's.

Perhaps our most important accomplishment over the past several days has been our recognition that the objective of sustained, stable economic growth will be facilitated by our common efforts. As leaders of major democratic nations, we reached substantial agreement on a number of issues concerning monetary policy, trade, energy, and our relations with the developing world as outlined in our joint declaration.

Over the past three days, in this beautiful setting, we have found a new spirit, a spirit of cooperation and confidence stemming from a deeper understanding of our common destiny and our joint conviction that free peoples can master their future.

As a result of the work that we have started, the people of our countries can look forward to more jobs, less inflation, and a greater sense of economic security.

We conclude this conference with a sense of determination to carry forward this work which has been so promisingly begun.

TEXT OF DECLARATION OF RAMBOUILLET

The Heads of States and Governments of France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, met in the Chateau de Rambouillet from 15th to 17th of November 1975, and agreed to declare as follows:

1. In these three days we held a searching and productive exchange of views on the world economic situation, on economic problems common to our countries, on their human, social and political implications, and

on plans for resolving them.

2. We came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. Our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to democratic societies everywhere. We are each responsible for assuring the prosperity of a major industrial economy. The growth and stability of our economies will help the entire industrial world and developing countries to prosper.

3. To assure in a world of growing interdependence the success of the objectives set out in this declaration, we intend to play our own full part and strengthen our efforts for closer international cooperation and constructive dialogue among all countries, transcending differences in stages of economic development, degrees of resource endowment and political and social systems.

4. The industrial democracies are determined to overcome high unemployment, continuing inflation and serious energy problems. The purpose of our meeting was to review our progress, identify more clearly the problems that we must overcome in the future, and to set a course that we will follow in the period ahead.

5. The most urgent task is to assure the recovery of our economies and to reduce the waste of human resources involved in unemployment. In consolidating the recovery it is essential to avoid unleashing additional inflationary forces which would threaten its success. The objective must be growth that is steady and lasting. In this way, consumer and business confidence will be restored.

6. We are confident that our present policies are compatible and complementary and that recovery is under way. Nevertheless, we recognize the need for vigilance and adaptability in our policies. We will not allow the recovery to falter. We will not accept another outburst of inflation.

7. We also concentrated on the need for new efforts in the areas of world trade, monetary matters and raw materials, including energy.

8. As domestic recovery and economic ex-

pansion proceed, we must seek to restore growth in the volume of world trade. Growth and price stability will be fostered by maintenance of an open trading system. In a period where pressures are developing for a return to protectionism, it is essential for the main trading nations to confirm their commitment to the principles of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] pledge and to avoid resorting to measures by which they could try to solve their problems at the expense of others, with damaging consequences in the economic, social and political fields. There is a responsibility on all countries, especially those with strong balance of payments positions and on those with current deficits to pursue policies which will permit the expansion of world trade to their mutual advantage.

9. We believe that the multilateral trade negotiations should be accelerated. In accordance with the principles agreed in the Tokyo Declaration, they should aim at achieving substantial tariff cuts, even eliminating tariffs in some areas, at significantly expanding agricultural trade and at reducing non-tariff measures. They should seek to achieve the maximum possible level of trade liberalization therefrom. We propose as our goal completion of the negotiations in 1977.

10. We look to an orderly and fruitful increase in our economic relations with socialist countries as an important element in progress in détente, and in world economic growth.

11. We will also intensify our efforts to achieve a prompt conclusion of the negotiations concerning export credits.

12. With regard to monetary problems, we affirm our intention to work for greater stability. This involves efforts to restore greater stability in underlying economic and financial conditions in the world economy. At the same time, our monetary authorities will act to counter disorderly market conditions, or erratic fluctuations, in exchange rates. We welcome the rapprochement, reached at the request of many other countries, between the views of the U.S. and

France on the need for stability that the reform of the international monetary system must promote. This rapprochement will facilitate agreement through the IMF [International Monetary Fund] at the next session of the Interim Committee in Jamaica on the outstanding issues of international monetary reform.

13. A co-operative relationship and improved understanding between the developing nations and the industrial world is fundamental to the prosperity of each. Sustained growth in our economies is necessary to growth in developing countries: and their growth contributes significantly to health in our own economies.

14. The present large deficits in the current accounts of the developing countries represent a critical problem for them and also for the rest of the world. This must be dealt with in a number of complementary ways. Recent proposals in several international meetings have already improved the atmosphere of the discussion between developed and developing countries. But early practical action is needed to assist the developing countries. Accordingly, we will play our part, through the IMF and other appropriate international fora, in making urgent improvements in international arrangements for the stabilization of the export earnings of developing countries and in measures to assist them in financing their deficits. In this context, priority should be given to the poorest developing countries.

15. World economic growth is clearly linked to the increasing availability of energy sources. We are determined to secure for our economies the energy sources needed for their growth. Our common interests require that we continue to cooperate in order to reduce our dependence on imported energy through conservation and the development of alternative sources. Through these measures as well as international cooperation between producer and consumer countries, responding to the long term interests of both, we shall spare no effort in order to ensure more balanced conditions and a harmonious and steady development in the world energy market.

16. We welcome the convening of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation scheduled for December 16. We will conduct this dialogue in a positive spirit to assure that the interests of all concerned are protected and advanced. We believe that industrialized and developing countries alike have a critical stake in the future success of the world economy and in the co-operative political relationships on which it must be based.

17. We intend to intensify our cooperation on all these problems in the framework of existing institutions as well as in all the relevant international organizations.

OPENING REMARKS FROM NEWS CONFERENCE OF SECRETARIES KISSINGER AND SIMON¹

Secretary Kissinger

The overall purpose of the meeting was to bring together the leaders of the industrial democracies at a time when their economies were in various states of recession.

When it was proposed, it was suggested that these leaders ought to meet to give confidence to their peoples and to convey to their peoples the sense that they were in control of their future and were not simply waiting for blind forces to play themselves out.

So we thought it was a matter of great importance; one, because for two years we have been maintaining that the political and economic cohesion of the industrial democracies was central to the structure of the non-Communist world; secondly, because we believed that the interdependence of these economies makes isolated solutions impossible; and thirdly, because we believed that there were a number of concrete issues on which work had to begin and in which common action was important.

We spent a great amount of effort within our government to prepare for this meeting, and there are always many stories when there are disagreements in the government;

¹ Text from press release 572, which also includes questions and answers.

but this has been an unusual occasion, an unusual way in which all the departments working together worked out common positions, common philosophies, and achieved the basic proposals that were put before the other leaders.

When this conference was called, I think it is safe to say that some of our friends wanted to use it as an occasion to blame us, or at least to imply that their economic difficulties could be solved primarily by American efforts, and others may have had the idea that, especially in the monetary field, it could be used to bring about rapid solutions in which the heads of government overruled the long negotiations that had gone on.

But as the preparation developed, I think a more sober spirit grew also, and one of our big themes was that economic recovery was meaningless if it started another spurt of inflation and that what we had to aim for was stable growth.

The second theme we had to get across is that the American economy was doing well and that therefore the concerns of other countries that our recovery was too slow for their own was unjustified.

Thirdly, we had in a number of areas, specific ideas on how the interdependence of these countries could be carried out—in the field of trade, in the field of economic relations with the Socialist countries, in the field of monetary affairs, in the field of energy, and in the field of development.

The discussions took place in a really unusually harmonious spirit. The fears which some of us had that the others would bring pressure on us to accelerate what we think is a well-conceived economic program proved unfounded, and after the President made his extensive intervention of the first day explaining our economic program, the other countries substantially accepted this and, indeed, seemed to be appreciative of it.

I think this was a very important event because it meant that they had more confidence that in looking ahead to their own future they could count on steady growth in the United States, and since everybody agreed that a substantial percentage of the

recession was psychological, I had the sense that a consensus emerged that this confidence that developed in our ability to handle the economic problems was a very major factor. In fact, the confidence of the leaders in this process was shown by the fact that they would talk about general principles and then turned over the drafting to either Ministers or experts and that the leaders only spent about an hour on the declaration. At first we didn't want any declaration because we were afraid we would spend our whole time drafting it; and it didn't turn out that way, and that was important.

In the field of trade, there was an agreement, first, that the negotiations on the multilateral trade negotiations should be completed next year; secondly, a commitment by all of the countries there to bring about a substantial reduction of trade barriers, including in the agricultural field, and no attempt to hide behind Community mandates or other obstacles.

There was also an agreement to accelerate or to foster the negotiations concerning export credits. Bill will talk about the agreements in the monetary field—which put an end to a debate of years about the nature of the floating system and the relation between floating and stability, which should end in January in an agreement that should at least put the field of international finance on a more stable basis than it has been in a long time.

In the field of energy, there has been an agreement to cooperate closely or actively on the alternative sources and on conservation, and I believe this will show up in the program of the International Energy Agency, which is in the process of being negotiated and which we hope to conclude by December 15.

In the field of development, we identified the balance-of-payments deficits of the developing countries, or their current account deficits, as one of the major problems on which we would work jointly, but we also pointed out that there is a close relationship between that and the action that is taken with respect to oil prices. So we believe that the consuming countries are in an excellent

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position for the beginning of the talks on international economic cooperation that are beginning in the middle of December. And we agreed to work together in all existing institutions.

To sum up, this unusual meeting of the heads of government of the countries that between them produce 70 percent of the world trade represented a commitment to the conception that our economic problems were long term, that there were no quick fixes to them, that they required a steady cooperative effort, that their political relationship affected their economic relationship, and that their economic relationship in turn assisted their political cooperation.

And so the free countries vindicated the concept of their interdependence and laid out a program and a method for cooperation which we hope will accelerate the recovery of all of the peoples as well as their cooperation with the less developed countries for the benefit of everybody.

But I think Bill ought to explain the monetary agreement because that is perhaps the single most significant thing that happened there.

Secretary Simon

There is no doubt that it was a significant agreement reached between the French and the United States which, I believe and most everyone believes, is going to pave the way for agreement at the [IMF] Interim Committee on overall monetary reform in January. I think that the agreements that we have reached are a fair and balanced compromise. Neither side won nor neither side lost.

Each has protected its very critical national interests in a spirit of cooperation. We have sought to bring a convergence of views, and this is important. What we are trying to do is build and expand on these areas of convergence, and as we succeed in doing this, the whole world community at large is going to benefit from this.

Now, I think that the disparity of views of the past few years between the French and the United States in particular on various amendments to the articles of agreement

[of the IMF] has obscured the deep mutual-ity of interest to return to stable economic and financial conditions in the world and more orderly and stable exchange rates, and that is very significant because this instability that we have had contributed to as well as resulted from tremendous institutional financial strains.

Also, the instability created great problems for many of the countries in the world in taking care of the erratic price movements and setting economic policies and restoring stable growth in their own economies.

Now, having said this, because one must look at the fundamental cause of the problem before we can begin to look for any of the solutions, which is important, it has been clear that the French and the United States share some fundamental agreements on the monetary system; there is no doubt about that. We both agree that the diversity of financial arrangements—the floating system, if you will—has served us well. Under the present circumstances, it is actually necessary to take care of the stresses and the strains that have been brought about by the severe inflation, recession, and of course the extraordinary oil increase.

So having identified the causes, we then must set about in curing the fundamental problems of this economic instability, and therefore the communique, as it said, dealt with two aspects of the monetary issue: one, the operational and, two, the reform of the system.

On the operational side we have reached an understanding that to achieve durable and meaningful stability in the underlying economic and financial conditions, we have to provide for mutually cooperative and conciliatory policies among ourselves but that national domestic economic policies must indeed be compatible. The world economy has suffered from all of the ills that I have spoken about, and the underlying problem remains with the severe inflation and of course the recession which was caused by this inflation.

On exchange markets, we are going to deal with erratic movements in exchange

rates, which of course create, again, an instability. Erratic movements can be defined as movements that have no underlying economic reason. Ours is not an attempt to peg any of the currency rates at artificial levels; but there are erratic movements in financial markets on occasion that are not directly attributable to fundamental economic events, and at this point intervention policies will become mutually cooperative and compatible to smooth out these unstable periods.

U.S. Welcomes Release by Viet-Nam of Nine Americans

A group of foreign nationals including nine Americans arrived in Bangkok from Viet-Nam on October 30. Following is a statement read to news correspondents that day by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations.

We welcome the return of this group of Americans and other foreign citizens from Viet-Nam and look forward to their being reunited quickly with their families. We appreciate the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in this repatriation.

At the same time, we remain concerned about the approximately 50 other Americans who remain in South Viet-Nam. From news reports and from others who have left Viet-Nam recently, we understand many of the remaining Americans would like to leave but thus far have not been able to do so. We hope that humanitarian considerations will also prevail here and enable these people to be repatriated soon.

U.S. Lauds Mexico's New Campaign Against Illicit Drugs

*Department Statement*¹

Yesterday, November 13, the Attorney General of Mexico, Pedro Ojeda Paullada, after meeting with President Echeverría, described to the press in Mexico City his government's strengthened and expanded campaign to eradicate opium poppy growth and to control heroin traffic. The Mexican Attorney General announced that an eradication campaign will begin November 15, employing greatly expanded materiel and manpower resources that are expected to substantially reduce the heroin traffic to the United States.

Secretary Kissinger wishes to emphasize the concern that the U.S. Government places on the drug abuse problem and the need to increase efforts to control illicit drugs at home and abroad. The U.S. Government is determined to resolve this most serious and tragic problem, which burdens our nation with ruined lives and results in violent crimes against our citizens and costs us up to \$17 billion a year.

On behalf of the U.S. Government, the Secretary expresses his appreciation to the Government of Mexico for its efforts to curb illicit drugs and confirms the commitment of the United States to work with Mexico and our other friends abroad to achieve our common goals of reducing drug abuse and controlling the traffic in illicit narcotics.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Nov. 14 by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations.

The Role of Technology Trade in the U.S. Policy of Detente

*Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll*¹

I am pleased to welcome you to the Department of State and to serve, at the invitation of the Department of Commerce, as the keynote speaker for this symposium.

Over three years ago, we entered a new stage in our relations with the Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe, and the People's Republic of China. This symposium provides an opportunity to take stock of the situation in an area of major significance—trade involving technology.

It is important that we in government and those of you in the private sector share the experience that has been gained, weigh the difficulties that have been encountered, and assess together the opportunities—and problems—that lie ahead. There is a division of responsibility between the government and the private sector. And we need to be on the same wavelength.

As keynote speaker, my assignment is to place in perspective the matters you will be considering in greater detail later today.

The proper starting point is, I believe, to recognize that economic issues have come to form a central focus of the global political agenda and to recognize also that our political, economic, and security interests are intimately related.

The economic summit, just concluded, reflected a determined effort to achieve greater cohesion in the economic policies of the major industrialized democracies. Such cohesion is imperative if our political and security ties with our allies are to be safe-

guarded against strains caused by domestic and global economic conditions.

We have initiated also a wide-ranging dialogue on economic issues with the developing countries. The next step will be the Conference on International Economic Cooperation to be held in December. The outcome of this dialogue will determine whether the international community will move toward cooperation and progress or toward confrontation and decline. Here, too, our long-term political, economic, and security interests are deeply involved.

Viewed in this context, efforts to improve our relations with the Soviet Union, the East European countries, and the People's Republic of China form part of a major reshaping of our international relationships on many fronts. Our purpose in all of these undertakings is to advance our national interest in encouraging the growth of a peaceful and stable international order in the face of continuing political divisions and pressing global problems. This objective can be accomplished only if we proceed in a manner consistent with the realities of the world as it exists today.

And among these realities is the basic fact that the character of our relations with the Communist countries will in large measure determine whether a peaceful world order can be constructed. Therefore, we have sought to move away from the confrontation and isolation that characterized the past and toward a normalization of our relationships.

You know that this is not an easy task. Neither the United States nor our allies are prepared to relinquish basic interests or fundamental principles. This is true also of the

¹ Made before the Symposium on East-West Technological Trade on Nov. 19 (text from press release 573).

Communist countries. So the search for common ground is being pursued with great caution by all concerned. But it is proceeding.

Increased Trade and the National Interest

When we started down this road, we did not assume that longstanding differences would suddenly disappear, that new issues would not arise, or that a durable relaxation of tensions would emerge overnight. No timetable was set and none can be set today. What is involved is an evolutionary process, not a rapid about-face.

But we have moved over the past several years from a stage where new openings were created to the stage where we expect that continued exploration of the contours of our changing relationships with the East can be accompanied by consolidation of the improved relationships thus far achieved.

It was envisaged at the outset that as progress in political relationships advanced, economic relationships would also move ahead. This is the pattern we have followed.

We did not seek political openings to expand commercial opportunities. But it would have been contradictory to pursue, on the one hand, a policy of political normalization of relationships and broadening cooperation while, on the other, seeking to maintain a policy of economic isolation of the East. Moreover, most if not all of the other industrialized countries had, over time, become involved in trade with the East. Any U.S. policy which had sought to reverse this trend would have foundered. We would have lost economically without gaining politically.

And over the longer term, if progress on both fronts can be sustained, there may occur a reduction in the autarkic tendencies of Communist countries, a broader interaction between their economies and the global economy, and the growth of additional incentives to exercise restraint and cooperate in the search for peaceful solutions to outstanding issues.

From the standpoint of our own national interests, it is clearly preferable to continue moving in this direction than to generate again the hostile atmosphere of the past.

Trading relationships between East and West have in fact expanded. Although this symposium is concerned with a special aspect of trade, it is well to recognize that total trade between the OECD [Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development] countries and the nonmarket Communist countries has grown from \$16.5 billion in 1970 to some \$49 billion in 1974. In 1970, the U.S. share was \$580 million. In 1974 this increased to \$3.2 billion. This represents a respectable advance over where matters stood several years ago. At the same time, the fact that our share of the total remains modest suggests that there may be opportunities our private sector should explore.

Problems Inherent in Technological Trade

There are inherent difficulties in measuring with any exactness the "technological" component of this trade. Moreover, some technology moves through other routes as well as through trade; for example, through governmental cooperative agreements and exchanges.

Sales of machinery and equipment embodying technology have risen substantially. Imports by the Communist countries amounted to some \$7 billion in 1974, with the U.S. share being \$533 million.

This element of trade should be considered as trade in the products of technology rather than trade in technology as such, although the two cannot be wholly divorced.

Sales of technical data offer a closer measure. In 1974, the United States issued 156 licenses for the export of technical data to the Communist countries. About one-third were for exports to the Soviet Union. However, based on previous experiences, a large percentage of such licenses will not be followed by actual sales.

Although overall quantitative measures are lacking, it remains important to consider the implications of the movement of technology. In doing so, we should bear in mind two considerations which affect the perspective in which this matter should be viewed.

The first is that the desire for technology

developed by the industrialized democracies is a recurring theme in our dialogue with countries throughout the world. It is not surprising that the Communist countries also desire our machinery, our equipment, and our know-how. We should be worried if they did not.

The second consideration is that the managerial skills of American industrial firms, as well as our technology, account for much of the difference between our strong position in the global economy and that of many other countries, including the Communist countries. This difference will persist even as trade in technology and technologically advanced goods expands.

Technological Trade and National Security

Although trade has expanded, it continues to be subject to controls. These affect in particular advanced products, equipment, and technical data which fall within the area of our continuing security concerns.

Protection of our security interests has long been a basic objective of our export control legislation. The most recent amendments of the Export Administration Act require a determination whether exports of goods and technology will significantly increase the military capabilities of our adversaries.

The responsible agencies of the executive branch are fully committed to the effective implementation of this requirement.

There is, to be sure, a grey area where products and technology have potential applications both for the civilian economy and for military purposes. The most difficult cases are considered by the Export Administration Review Board, chaired by the Secretary of Commerce.

For example, a number of cases involving sales of computers have come before the board. Each is weighed in the light of the risk that the computer might be diverted to strategic or other purposes which we do not wish to assist. Where there is adequate assurance against such diversion—as in the case of a major installation for the Soviet Union's Kama River truck factory—all of the

interested departments of the government have agreed that the sale could proceed. On the other hand, all of the interested departments have agreed that certain other installations in various Communist countries could not be approved.

Changes in our political relations with the Communist countries have had the effect of insuring that major cases are considered at a high level. But political considerations are only one factor—and not the decisive factor—in determining the outcome.

The Department of Commerce, in consultation with its various advisory bodies, is seeking ways to expedite this process, which, I am sure, seems unduly prolonged to many American firms. But we must continue to weigh each case with care and to give our security interests the benefit of any doubt.

In developing and administering export control guidelines, we recognize that technology is not static, that it changes over time and in its availability. In setting the limits, we draw on the technical expertise of industry as well as the government. This is obtained through the Technical Advisory Committee of the Department of Commerce. But we would be also glad to receive your views directly.

The process of setting guidelines and considering exceptions entails coordination—through COCOM—with countries of Western Europe and Japan. Maintaining a common approach is important to the security of all concerned. And it is important to your interests as well that your competitors abroad observe ground rules similar to those which affect your own transactions.

We do not invariably see eye-to-eye with other participants in COCOM. However, all participants continue to accept the basic need for collective consideration of these matters.

And I am sure that some of you may also not see eye-to-eye with us when we consider it necessary to disapprove a proposed transaction or when guidelines are set which you consider too restrictive.

We are always prepared to listen to your views. However, the burden of decision rests with the government. This is a protection to you. Any criticism of exports that are ap-

proved should be directed at us, not at you.

A balanced view of trade in advanced goods and technology must take into account the needs of the Communist countries. They have recognized that they can move ahead faster with their economic development plans if they import a wide range of machinery and equipment—and sometimes know-how—from the industrialized democracies. Their purchases are directed toward improving their agricultural production, developing their natural resources, modernizing their transportation and communications systems, expanding their production of consumer goods.

Much of the trade in these areas is not of concern from the standpoint of our security interests. And where our security interests do not require the intervention of the government, the main burden of decision rests with you. You should be guided by sound business practices, not by political considerations.

Surely few if any of you would be tempted to enter into one-sided deals—that is, favoring the other side—as a “contribution to improving East-West relations.” Durable improvements cannot be based on one-sided commercial bargains any more than on one-sided political concessions.

We should, however, consider three questions:

—Whether an adequate framework exists for conducting business with the East;

—Whether the commercial bargaining leverage is tilted in favor of the large state trading organizations with which we are now dealing; and

—Whether, overall, the results are, in fact, mutually beneficial.

Framework for Trading With the East

As to the adequacy of the framework, you will recall that in the fall of 1972 we concluded a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. It had been recognized that differences between our philosophies, our economic systems, and our ways of doing business presented substantial hurdles to normalization

of trading relationships.

Since not all problems could be foreseen, we sought a framework within which problems might be resolved. And after much hard bargaining on both sides, agreement was reached. As a collateral step, agreement was reached on settling the 25-year-old lend-lease debt. These arrangements were aimed at providing safeguards against the possible disruption of our markets, at facilitating the conduct of business, and at insuring the availability of credit.

I am sure you are familiar with the subsequent chain of events which led the Soviet Union to conclude that it could not proceed with the implementation of the agreement. Congressional action linking most-favored-nation treatment and the extension of U.S. Government credits with increased emigration was viewed by the Soviet Union as an effort to intervene in its internal affairs. The Soviet Union also considered that it was being subjected to unequal treatment—treatment inconsistent with the direction in which we were seeking to move.

We understand the humanitarian concerns which led the Congress to take such actions. We were, indeed, proceeding to deal with the emigration issues through other means. But to treat this difficult problem as if it could be resolved through our own domestic legislation offered no prospect of success. Emigration has dropped, and U.S.–Soviet trade has not expanded to the extent that might have been the case had the trade agreement come into effect and credit been available.

We continue, of course, to try to work out specific commercial problems with the Soviet Union as they arise, but an agreed framework for doing so is still needed.

In the case of Romania, we have been able to proceed with a trade agreement which provides safeguards against disruptive imports and provides U.S. companies with extensive rights and assurances. The agreement marks a significant step in establishing a workable relationship between Romania's nonmarket economy and the trading system of the West.

In addition to Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are also moving into a closer economic relationship with the West

through adherence to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Surely this is a trend that should be encouraged.

In the case of the People's Republic of China, the Shanghai communique of 1972 envisaged the progressive development of trade. A broad understanding of how our trading relationships should be conducted is not attainable at this stage of our relationship. However, specific problems are explored as they arise.

Efforts to establish a basic framework for trading with the East have therefore not proceeded very far. But it is clear that the reasons are not all on the Eastern side of the ledger.

It would be helpful to us to have your thoughts on special problems affecting commercial aspects of technology trade with the countries of the East which need to be ironed out. And both the Department of Commerce and the commercial and science offices in our Embassies, consulates, and missions in the area are ready to assist U.S. firms.

Bargaining Factors in Trade Negotiations

The question of the leverage exerted by the state trading organizations starts with the assumption that such organizations have all the bargaining power on their side and that this can lead U.S. firms to enter into disadvantageous arrangements. This in turn generates suggestions for more direct government intervention in commercial transactions or for modifying our antitrust legislation.

Some of these so-called remedies call for government intervention in particular commercial transactions. I would think that you in the private sector would have serious reservations about such proposals. And for my own part, I question whether the government could conceivably be in a better position than the private sector to pass on such matters as the profit involved in a specific transaction.

Like other buyers, state trading organizations, which have monopoly buying power for their countries, will certainly seek to stir competition among suppliers. You do it in all the rest of your purchases. However, while

the market they represent may be attractive—as is any new market—it is also limited in comparison with other markets.

In the technology area, U.S. firms should themselves have significant bargaining power. They have a strong position in many technological fields and this, in turn, supports a strong position in the world market. Certainly no firm should accept terms in dealings with a state trading organization that are less desirable than those obtainable from other customers abroad.

Many U.S. firms are indeed confronted with competitors here, in Western Europe, or Japan. But I question whether eagerness to make a particular sale to a state trading organization is sufficiently strong to lead many American firms into arrangements they would not otherwise accept.

I certainly am not aware of evidence that U.S.—or foreign—firms regard profit as less important in transactions with the countries of the East than in the case of other transactions. Should disadvantages result from transactions with state trading organizations, U.S. firms will not continue to be interested in such business. But our desire, of course, is that disadvantageous arrangements simply be rejected.

There are certainly some risks. It is clear that by stirring competition among suppliers, state trading organizations may hope to extract proprietary data for which they may not, in the final analysis, pay. They may ask for detailed proposals, and after receiving data, fail to buy from anyone. The need for being on guard against such tactics is evident. You are used to it in your commercial transactions, I am sure.

But even where exports of technology may bring short-term gains, what about the longer run? The possibility exists that what may be advantageous for a single firm may not be advantageous on an industrywide basis. But this possibility exists in the course of transactions with other industrialized countries and developing countries. It is certainly not unique in our dealings with Communist countries.

In addition, concern is sometimes voiced that the Communist countries may engage in

commercial competition with us. There is probably no way of ruling out this as a possibility, but neither should we exaggerate the threat. If and when such competition emerges, our own products should have reached a still more advanced stage.

The basic answer to many of the concerns that have been expressed is, therefore, to be sure that our own industry continues to hold the track record for technological innovation. The sale of existing nonstrategic technology can assist us to accomplish this, since the revenues can be turned, at least in part, to increased support of research and development. Those of us in the government trust that you in the private sector will, indeed, deploy a substantial part of your revenues to maintain a technologically innovative position.

There also exist possibilities for obtaining some reverse flow of technology. We are aware of some 21 agreements involving the import of Soviet technology by U.S. firms. And promising areas have been identified in a number of our governmental cooperative agreements; for example, cooperation with the Soviet Union in fusion research holds great promise.

Future Areas of Trade Agreement

Both for industrial firms and for the government, it is important to press ahead with efforts to identify additional areas where a useful reverse flow of technology can be achieved.

And it is important to find effective ways of dealing with disruptions which may occur.

Trade in one area—that is, grains—has been characterized by disruptive Soviet buying practices. We have recently reached agreement with the Soviet Union to establish a sounder basis for conducting these transactions.

And negotiations for an agreement under which the Soviet Union would sell us oil are continuing. We see an opportunity to diversify somewhat our sources of supply. The Soviet Union sees an opportunity to earn foreign exchange to pay for grain and other imports, including technology. We both know

that for this potentially beneficial trade to develop, price incentives will be essential. Should it be possible to conclude this agreement, the way would be opened to explore imaginative new ways of energy cooperation which would be mutually beneficial over the long-term.

Monitoring the overall evolution of our trading relationships with the East—including trade in technology—is the responsibility of the East-West Foreign Trade Board, chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. The feedback from this monitoring process—and from your own experience—will provide a firmer basis for insuring a mutuality of benefit.

But even though we gain economically from trade, including trade in technology, sometimes the argument is advanced that, in return for our willingness to trade with the Communist countries, we should receive not only commercial concessions but political or security concessions as well.

I have made clear that our approach has been to facilitate trade as our political relations have improved. But there are clearly limits to the extent to which trade can be used to advance other objectives. And where trade in technology is concerned, the needs of the Communist countries—which might prefer to be self-reliant—do not appear to us so fundamental that these countries would be prepared, in order to obtain technology, to trade political or security interests which they consider essential. Why would anyone expect them to do so?

In the three years since the political openings were made in our relations with the Communist countries, progress has been made on a number of fronts.

In the case of the Soviet Union, our political dialogue has broadened. This does not, to be sure, always lead to agreement. But greater insights into the reasons for our differences, where they occur, also have value. Mutually beneficial practical cooperation is now proceeding in a number of technical fields. The agreements to limit strategic arms contribute to our own security and to the prospect for maintaining world peace. Present difficulties in negotiations on this

front can be resolved, and we will continue to pursue a balanced and reciprocal agreement.

This period has also brought broader contacts and cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe.

In the case of the People's Republic of China, the discussion of fundamental issues and international events has helped in determining where a certain parallelism in our policies exists as well as in defining differences.

In the case of all of these countries, trade has progressed.

The overall score is, we believe, one of mutual benefit. And sustaining improved relations will be possible through continued endeavors of mutual benefit—but only on that basis. We will work closely with you to insure that such benefits flow from trade in technology as we continue the normalization of relations with the East on other fronts as well.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Reaffirms Call for Negotiations by All Parties in Korea

Following are statements made by U.S. Representative Daniel P. Moynihan in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 23 and 28 and by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., in plenary on November 18, together with the texts of opposing resolutions adopted by the committee on October 29 and by the Assembly on November 18.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN, COMMITTEE I, OCTOBER 23

USUN press release 128 (corr. 1) dated October 23

The central issue of this debate is the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula. It is an issue which has required the attention of the United Nations—both the General Assembly and the Security Council—for 27 years. I remind the committee that this organization has sought during the last few years to contribute to the reduction of tensions on the peninsula by encouraging discussion and contacts between the two Korean Governments.

My government has been particularly interested in this effort of the United Nations because we recognize that any renewal

of hostilities on the peninsula could have immediate and serious consequences for the peace of the entire world. We recognize that the role which our organization can and should play changes with the passage of time and the rise of new circumstances. We are therefore prepared to examine suggestions which members believe can contribute to a peaceful resolution of this issue.

Any meaningful discussion of the Korean problem must begin with the consensus resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1973.¹ This resolution contains the principles which the two parts of Korea decided should govern their relationship and contains the goal which this General Assembly decided should govern its own relationship with the South and the North of Korea. For its part the General Assembly stated the hope that the South and the North of Korea would be urged to continue their dialogue and widen their many-sided exchanges and cooperation so as to expedite the independent peaceful unification of the country.

Last year, in the spirit of the consensus I have described, the United States supported a resolution which endorsed the con-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1973, p. 775.

sensus call for dialogue and moved to the logical next step: an examination of those aspects of the Korean question which involve the peace and security of the peninsula, including the future of the U.N. Command. The resolution which was adopted properly points out that the United Nations has a continuing responsibility in accordance with the principles and purposes of the charter regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. The resolution made clear the willingness of my government, which has responsibility for the U.N. Command in accordance with the U.N. Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950, to consider alternatives to the U.N. Command, provided the armistice agreement was maintained.

In the intervening period there was no response from the other parties concerned which would permit consideration of the proposals set forth in that resolution. My government therefore, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Korea and with other interested governments, joined in sponsoring the resolution submitted on June 27, 1975, which is now before this committee. That resolution explicitly reaffirms our willingness to terminate the U.N. Command, provided the armistice agreement is maintained.

The U.N. Command today is comprised of those military personnel directly involved in the performance by the U.N. Command of its armistice agreement responsibilities and includes less than 300 non-Korean personnel. Most of these are U.S. military personnel assigned as staff personnel to the command itself and the remainder are part of the ceremonial honor guard of the command. American forces serving in Korea in accordance with the U.S.-Republic of Korea mutual security treaty of 1954 are not part of the U.N. Command.

In order to help make the distinction between the U.N. Command and these American forces, the use of the U.N.'s flag in Korea has been limited to those military installations in the Republic of Korea directly associated with maintaining the armistice agreement. My government for-

mally notified the President of the Security Council of this in my letter of September 22.²

Mr. Chairman, in considering the question of termination of the U.N. Command, the chief concern of my government is that the armistice agreement, which has been the basis for peace and security in the Korean Peninsula for over 20 years, be maintained in the absence of alternate lasting arrangements between the South and the North. I wish to emphasize that the armistice agreement is not merely a cease-fire, but a carefully designed structure for monitoring and policing the armistice itself. It remains the only legal basis for the present cessation of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.

The Military Armistice Commission, which is composed of all parties associated with the armistice agreement, is the only accepted forum for regular meetings of all the parties to the agreement. It would be a mistake to consider the armistice either a relic of little consequence or a fragile instrument of little authority. Whatever may be its shortcomings, it continues to be observed and to function.

The opposing resolution calls for termination of the U.N. Command and replacement of the armistice agreement by a peace agreement. Nothing is said of how the mechanisms of the peace agreement are to function and what is to act as a restraint on the parties in the interval while the peace agreement is being discussed.

This could take a good long time, when one considers that the other resolution calls for a "peace agreement" with the United States rather than with the Republic of Korea. The United States would not consider sitting down to such a negotiation without the Republic of Korea present. Whoever is familiar with the Korean problem knows that a situation in which the armistice agreement machinery is not functioning and where there is no assurance that any other agreement would take its place is a highly unstable one.

We cannot accept the view that the termination of the U.N. Command without pro-

² U.N. doc. S/11830.

vision for the continuation of the armistice would have little consequence for the peace and security of the peninsula. To the contrary, the armistice provides an agreed starting point for any discussion of a more lasting settlement of the Korean issue.

Our resolution, A/C.1/L.708/Rev.1, reflects the helpful amendments offered by the delegation of France in conjunction with delegations of Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, The Gambia, and Luxembourg and now proposes negotiations with the other side on the issue of the U.N. Command, reduction of tensions, and assurance of lasting peace in the Korean Peninsula.

Secretary Kissinger, in his address on September 22, called specifically for the convening of a conference of the parties directly concerned: the two Korean Governments, the United States, and China. He made clear that he was proposing a conference which would not only discuss means for preserving the armistice agreement while terminating the U.N. Command but which also could explore "other measures to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula, including the possibility of a larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental arrangement."

If there were to be a broader conference on more permanent arrangements, our view is that the composition of such a broader conference should be the topic of discussion of the smaller conference proposed by the Secretary of State to involve the four parties concerned with the armistice. We ourselves would have an open mind as to who might participate in any such broader conference.

Thus the conference of the four parties concerned with the armistice should be viewed not as an endpoint, but as the beginning of a process which can lead to a more lasting settlement. It would be in accordance with the responsibilities of this organization and the views it has expressed on the Korean question. The negotiations called for by our resolution are, I might add, the only proposal now before this body that recognizes that in matters relating to the future of Korea and to security in the peninsula

both Korean Governments should be included.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that this resolution, by calling for negotiations of this kind, provides a basis for discussion and action which will enhance the prospects for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula while preserving the present armistice arrangement, which remains so important.

It may appear that the other resolution before us has some similar provisions, but this appearance is not borne out on examination. The other resolution is not in accordance with past resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, since it does not encourage discussions by all the parties concerned with the problem of peace and security in the peninsula.

Indeed, it has the clear intention to exclude one of the principal parties, the Republic of Korea, from any such discussions. For our part, we will not accept any such exclusion of the Republic of Korea, which represents over two-thirds of the Korean people. Indeed, I wonder how many members of this committee would support a resolution which denied them the right to participate in the determination of their own future.

Mr. Chairman, let me turn now to a third question—one which is not dealt with in our resolution and should not be before this body—the question of U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea pursuant to the U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Korea. The other resolution and the letter which introduces it make clear that these forces are the forces which it wishes withdrawn from Korea. It presumes to make this a matter of U.N. business by referring to them as forces under the U.N. flag. The fact is, as I have already stated, that with the exception of those less-than-300 personnel in the U.N. Command, these troops are not under the U.N. flag and are not a matter of U.N. business.

The presence of U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea will continue to be a matter between the U.S. Government and the Government of the Republic of Korea under our Mutual Defense Treaty. They will remain

there as long as they are needed and as long as their presence is mutually desired by the Republic of Korea and the United States.

My government considers our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea a stabilizing influence in the peninsula. We and the Republic of Korea have periodically reaffirmed our commitment to those principles. We assume that North Korea takes a similar view of its security arrangements with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, although these were not mentioned by the North Koreans in their speech to the First Committee.

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken at some length on the matter before this committee. I have done this both to emphasize the importance my government attaches to the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and to make absolutely clear our views on the armistice agreement.

I turn finally to the prospects for a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. Fundamental to all I have said and to all that this organization has recommended is the essential requirement that the dialogue between South and North Korea be encouraged to resume. It is only in that context that step-by-step progress in dealing with the major issues dividing the two sides can be made.

No one who is familiar with these problems can realistically expect that they can be solved quickly or easily. There is a need for caution, but there is need to break continued stalemate.

It appears to my government that the United Nations can contribute to an atmosphere conducive to reinitiation of meaningful discussions by insuring that no action is taken which would call into doubt the continuing commitment of the General Assembly to the maintenance of peace and security in the Korean Peninsula.

There are positive steps which can be taken. Secretary of State Kissinger said in his September 22 address that, if North Korea and its allies would move to improve their relations with the Republic of Korea, we would be prepared to take similar reciprocal actions.

My government is willing to enter into dis-

cussion with all the parties concerned to terminate the U.N. Command while preserving the armistice and to discuss other steps to ease tensions. We believe that this constructive approach will enjoy the support and understanding of most members of this Assembly.

However, we will not place in jeopardy the future stability of the peninsula by agreeing to actions which have as their inevitable consequence an increase in military tensions and uncertainty. That would be irresponsible and dangerous to the objectives which we all espouse. I therefore ask that each member of this committee carefully consider the consequences of its vote on the Korean item.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN, COMMITTEE I, OCTOBER 29

USUN press release 133 (corr. 1) dated October 30

I rise to speak briefly to a single point which was raised by my distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union with respect to the fact that there are indeed American troops in the Republic of Korea. These troops are there under a mutual defense agreement signed between the Republic of Korea and the United States. There are also, and this is the subject of our discussion, some 300 troops, 300 men, there under the U.N. Command.

It has been the intention of the United States and now, hopefully, of the General Assembly in a resolution we have just passed that the U.N. Command will now be dissolved. This is our desire. It is evidently the desire also of the General Assembly, and we welcome that. I believe the Republic of Korea does the same, as do those states that voted with us on this occasion.

I would simply, however, wish to remind this room, and the members here represented, of the facts which led to the presence of the U.N. Command in the Republic of Korea and of the American forces which are also there. It is the case that almost two-thirds of the members here tonight were not members of the United Nations when those events occurred, so that it may not be altogether inappropriate for me to remind

or recall to those who may have forgotten, to inform those who may not now even know, how this happened.

The U.N. Command, of which the United States was part, of which 16 member states of the United Nations contributed forces altogether, that command arose in the aftermath of a sudden, brutal, calculated invasion of the Republic of Korea by its neighbor to the north, an act of aggression—plain, unmistakable, unchallenged by world opinion at the time. The forces of one country brutally invaded another nation; and the General Assembly—in one of the genuinely honorable acts in defense of the charter and in pursuit of the responsibilities each nation undertakes when it becomes a member of the United Nations—the General Assembly called this “aggression” and called upon the nations of the world to come to support the Republic of Korea, which had been invaded.

Sixteen nations responded, the invaders were thrown back, the status quo ante was restored—a fact clear to history. In the long history of the world rarely has an aggression been so naked, so unambiguous, so clear for all the opinion of the world to see. And it was—to the honor of the United Nations—rebuffed. It failed.

In order that this should not recur, a command was established on the armistice line. That command continues almost a quarter century later. It was not the desire of the United States to be in South Korea. It is not the desire of the United States to be in South Korea. But let no one suppose we are embarrassed by our presence or apologetic about it. We were there in defense of the principles of independence and the territorial integrity of a state, the protection of which is the fundamental purpose of this body.

**STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT,
PLENARY, NOVEMBER 18**

USUN press release 151 dated November 18

Unfortunately, as we all know, this house is deeply divided on the issue before us. I regret that this is the fact. With your permission, I would like to review briefly some

of the facts and developments which have brought us to this point.

As recorded in document A/10142, which was the document accompanying the submission of the resolution that my government and others cosponsored, a number of member states including the United States have sought to implement fully the consensus of the 28th session of the General Assembly and to encourage discussions which would lead to the dissolution of the U.N. Command in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain the armistice agreement. Thus, on June 27, 1975, these states requested inclusion in the agenda of the 30th session of the General Assembly of an item entitled: “Urgent need to implement fully the consensus of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the Korean question and to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula.” The member states requesting inclusion of this item urged that it be treated as a matter of high priority and addressed early in the 30th session.

Document A/10327 of November 3, 1975 conveyed the report of the First Committee’s consideration of the question of Korea at this 30th session of the General Assembly. Now, Mr. President, as we take up this report in plenary, permit me to address myself to the draft resolution cosponsored by 28 member states which was recommended to the General Assembly for adoption as draft resolution A in section IV of the First Committee report.

This resolution, first tabled on June 27, was later modified by several helpful amendments. It takes note of the letter of June 27, 1975 (document S/11737), addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Government of the United States, offering to terminate the U.N. Command on January 1, 1976, provided that the other parties directly concerned reach agreement on alternative arrangements mutually acceptable to them for maintaining the armistice agreement. The resolution also takes due note of the statement of June 27, 1975, of the Government of the Republic of Korea affirming its willingness to enter into arrangements

for maintaining the armistice agreement.

Turning to the operative paragraphs of this resolution, allow me to underline, Mr. President, that each of these four paragraphs stresses dialogue and discussion between the parties directly concerned. Such dialogue and discussion would be directed at new arrangements designed to replace the armistice agreement, dissolution of the U.N. Command, reduction of tensions, and insurance of lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Let me recall that Secretary Kissinger, in his address to this Assembly on September 22, called specifically for the convening of a conference of the parties directly concerned: the two Korean Governments, the United States, and China. Secretary Kissinger made clear that he was proposing a conference which would not only discuss means for preserving the armistice agreement while terminating the U.N. Command but which also could explore "other measures to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula, including the possibility of a larger conference to negotiate a more fundamental arrangement."

Mr. President, the draft resolution of which my government is proud to have been one of the 28 cosponsors is one looking objectively and responsibly to the future. It leaves open all avenues to dialogue and discussion. Our side, Mr. President, has at all times been prepared for dialogue and discussion. Indeed, it is the objective of the resolution which we cosponsored.

It is the other side, I regret to say, which has been unwilling to engage in dialogue and discussion, which has sought to impose its arbitrary will on this Assembly. The contrast between the two sides is clear for all those willing to see.

In looking toward attainment of the goal of peaceful reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people, this resolution is based squarely on principles of sovereignty and independence which are fundamental to the Charter of the United Nations.

While draft resolution B in section IV of the First Committee's report may appear to have some similar provisions, permit me to

repeat here in the plenary that it is not in accord with past resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. It does not encourage discussions by all the parties concerned with peace and security on the peninsula. Indeed, as has been made clear in public statements, it has the intention to exclude one of the principal parties, the Republic of Korea, from any such discussions.

How many members of this General Assembly would support a resolution which denied them the right to participate in the determination of their own future? Since most members of this body believe firmly in the right of all people, any people, to self-determination—certainly my government does so—it is surprising that some here are arguing that two-thirds of the population of the Korean Peninsula should be denied a say in their own future. I would ask that all those who believe in self-determination would ponder seriously this grave omission in resolution B. Are we to assume that those who support resolution B in the committee report subscribe to a doctrine of limited sovereignty for the sovereign state of the Republic of Korea? This doctrine of limited sovereignty is, I believe, not unfamiliar to a number of the member states who cosponsored resolution B.

Mr. President, there is also the question of U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea pursuant to a bilateral arrangement between the United States and the Republic of Korea—our Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. These U.S. troops are there at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Korea. Many member states have similar bilateral arrangements between them concerning the stationing of military forces. However, the other resolution and the letter which introduced it make clear that it is these U.S. forces in Korea under a bilateral agreement which are the forces it wants withdrawn from Korea.

It seeks to make this a matter of U.N. business by referring to them as forces under the U.N. flag. As my delegation stated in the First Committee, the fact is that, with the exception of less than 300 personnel in the U.N. Command, the American troops in

Korea are not under the U.N. flag. These U.S. troops, I repeat, serve in the Republic of Korea under a bilateral agreement.

Many of those who cosponsored the other resolution have bilateral security arrangements which either permit the stationing of their military forces on the territory of another state or which cover the stationing of foreign military forces on their own territory. Are they now saying that such bilateral arrangements are illegal or improper?

I reemphasize that my government will not place in jeopardy the future stability of the peninsula by agreeing to actions which would have as their consequence an increase in military tensions and uncertainty. As we stressed in the First Committee, this would be irresponsible and dangerous to the objectives we all espouse. Again may I ask that each member carefully consider its vote on the Korean item.

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

Resolution 3390 A⁴

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the hope expressed by it in resolution 3333 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974,

Desiring that progress be made towards the attainment of the goal of peaceful reunification of Korea on the basis of the freely expressed will of the Korean people,

Recalling its satisfaction with the issuance of the joint communiqué at Seoul and Pyongyang on 4 July 1972 and the declared intention of both the South and the North of Korea to continue the dialogue between them,

Further recalling that by its resolution 711 A (VII), adopted on 28 August 1953, the General Assembly noted with approval the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953, and that, in its resolution 811 (IX) of 11 December 1954, it expressly took note of the provision of the Armistice Agreement which requires that the Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides,

⁴ A/RES/3390 A (XXX) (text from U.N. doc. A/10327, report of the First Committee on agenda item 119, Question of Korea); adopted by the committee on Oct. 29 by a vote of 59 (U.S.) to 51, with 29 abstentions; adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 18 by a vote of 59 (U.S.) to 51, with 29 abstentions.

Aware, however, that tension in Korea has not been totally eliminated and that the Armistice Agreement remains indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security in the area,

Noting the letter of 27 June 1975, addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Government of the United States of America, affirming that it is prepared to terminate the United Nations Command on 1 January 1976, provided that the other parties directly concerned reach agreement on alternative arrangements mutually acceptable to them for maintaining the Armistice Agreement,

Noting the statement of 27 June 1975 by the Government of the Republic of Korea affirming its willingness to enter into arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement,

Recognizing that, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations has a continuing responsibility to ensure the attainment of this goal on the Korean peninsula,

1. *Reaffirms* the wishes of its members, as expressed in the consensus statement adopted by the General Assembly on 28 November 1973, and urges both the South and the North of Korea to continue their dialogue to expedite the peaceful reunification of Korea;

2. *Expresses the hope* that all parties directly concerned will enter into negotiations on new arrangements designed to replace the Armistice Agreement, reduce tensions and ensure lasting peace in the Korean peninsula;

3. *Urges* all the parties directly concerned, as a first step, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued observation of the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the region, to embark on talks as soon as possible so that the United Nations Command may be dissolved concurrently with arrangements for maintaining the Armistice Agreement;

4. *Expresses the further hope* that these discussions will be completed and alternative arrangements for the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement will be made in order that the United Nations Command may be dissolved on 1 January 1976 so that by that date no armed forces under the United Nations flag will remain in the South of Korea.

Resolution 3390 B⁵

The General Assembly,

Noting that the reunification of Korea has not yet been achieved although 30 years have elapsed since

⁵ A/RES/3390 B (XXX) (text from A/10327); adopted by the Committee on Nov. 3 by a vote of 51 to 38 (U.S.), with 50 abstentions; adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 18 by a vote of 54 to 43 (U.S.), with 42 abstentions.

Korea was divided into the North and the South and 22 years since the establishment of the armistice in Korea,

Recalling the obligations assumed by States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations on respect for the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples and on refraining from intervening in matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any State,

Considering that it conforms with the principles of the Charter to encourage the Korean people to achieve the independent and peaceful reunification of their country at the earliest possible date on the basis of the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity and to create favourable conditions for it,

Hoping that the North and the South of Korea will promote their dialogue to accelerate the reunification of the country in accordance with the spirit of the joint statement of 4 July 1972 and with the decision adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session, on 28 November 1973, which welcomed the joint statement,

Considering that a durable peace cannot be expected so long as the present state of armistice is kept as it is in Korea,

Considering that, in order to guarantee a durable

peace in Korea and accelerate its independent and peaceful reunification, it is urgently necessary to take new decisive measures for terminating foreign interference in its internal affairs, removing tension and preventing armed conflicts in that region,

1. *Considers* that it is necessary to dissolve the "United Nations Command" and withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;

2. *Calls upon* the real parties to the Armistice Agreement to replace the Korean Military Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement as a measure to ease tension and maintain and consolidate peace in Korea in the context of the dissolution of the "United Nations Command" and the withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;

3. *Urges* the North and the South of Korea to observe the principles of the North-South joint statement and take practical measures for ceasing arms reinforcement, reducing the armed forces of both sides drastically to an equal level, preventing armed conflicts and guaranteeing against the use of force against the other side, and thereby remove the military confrontation and maintain a durable peace in Korea, conducive to accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.

United States Discusses Major Arms Control Issues Before U.N. General Assembly

Following is a statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 30 by U.S. Representative Joseph Martin, Jr., who is head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).

USUN press release 132 dated October 30

We begin the disarmament debate this year with the most extensive agenda in the First Committee's history. This heavy workload reflects the importance of the General Assembly as a focal point for disarmament efforts worldwide. It also reflects the increasing activity at smaller and more specialized disarmament forums in recent years.

In particular, there was a pronounced up-

turn in the activity of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The 1975 CCD session, while continuing work on the important items already on its agenda, considered a number of other disarmament issues that had not previously received close scrutiny. The committee made extensive use of technical experts to explore these topics. It held useful discussions leading to decisions on its future scheduling and organization of work. In all of these activities, the committee benefited from the infusion of the talents and fresh perspectives of five new members.

Among the new items considered by the CCD in 1975 was the question of environmental warfare. As members of this committee know, the United States and the Soviet

Union tabled at the CCD, as a basis for negotiation, identical drafts of a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.¹ In introducing the draft for the United States, I pointed out that, while environmental warfare is not at present practical on a militarily significant scale, understanding and technology in the field are advancing. For that reason, the United States believes action should be taken now to adopt effective restraints—before techniques are perfected and their potential threat materializes.

The draft convention tabled in Geneva would prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as a means of causing destruction, damage, or injury to any other state party. The draft contains an illustrative list of effects of environmental modification. Included in this list are earthquakes and tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; and changes in weather patterns, in the state of the ozone layer or ionosphere, in climate patterns, and in ocean currents.

The framing of restraints on environmental warfare presented several conceptual challenges. We believe the draft convention deals successfully with each of these:

—First, it uses general criteria to describe prohibited activities. We believe this is essential in a field that is still largely hypothetical and where any specific, exhaustive listing of proscribed actions could be made irrelevant by technological developments.

—Second, the draft convention focuses on the use of techniques which would have widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects. The draft accordingly deals with activities that are the source of the most serious concern, and it recognizes that the ability to verify compliance with treaty constraints is related to the scale of the activity prohibited.

¹ For a U.S. statement made in the CCD on Aug. 21 and text of the draft convention, see *BULLETIN* of Sept. 15, 1975, p. 417.

—Third, the draft deals with the deliberate manipulation of natural environmental processes as the means of causing damage, destruction, or injury. Thus it distinguishes between the use of environmental modification techniques as weapons, which is covered by the draft, and the incidental environmental effects of other weapons, an issue that is being dealt with by the Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict.

—Fourth, the prohibition against “military or any other hostile use” covers not only the use of environmental modification techniques to supplement other means of waging war but also the use of such techniques with hostile intent even when no other weapons are being used.

—Finally, the prohibitions would not impede the full realization of any peaceful benefits that may result from environmental modification. Because much research and development on environmental modification could have both peaceful and hostile applications, it is not possible to insure that such research and development for peaceful purposes will not have military implications. For this reason, the draft does not attempt to prohibit research and development.

We look forward to hearing the views of others on the question of environmental modification and to negotiations at the CCD next spring on the draft texts now before the committee. We hope that the General Assembly will encourage this process by adopting a generally acceptable resolution.

Limitations on Military Expenditures

Another new item discussed at the CCD this year was the question of agreed limitations on military expenditures. There is a long history of proposals to limit armaments through such agreements, but conceptual and practical difficulties have so far prevented serious consideration of this approach. As a result, arms control and disarmament negotiations have concentrated on measures to limit military forces and activities rather than expenditures.

Recently, however, useful work has been done on identifying the problems that must be solved if agreed military expenditure limitations are to become a possibility, either as an independent arms control measure or as a complement to force limitations. I refer to the experts' study of the question of the reduction of military budgets pursuant to a 1973 General Assembly resolution. The Assembly last year recognized the significance of that study and asked the Secretary General to request the views of states on the issues it raised.

In replying to the Secretary General, my government pointed out that the consultant experts' study provided a sound basis for further efforts to solve the problems of agreed expenditure limitations. At the CCD this summer, we gave our views on what we consider to be the most promising course for such efforts.² We suggested that the CCD organize a study of the questions that must be answered to determine the feasibility of agreed military expenditure limitations. These questions are:

—First, how can one measure the military spending of different countries, with their different currencies, different fiscal and financial practices, and different kinds of armed forces, so as to permit effective comparisons?

—Second, how can limitations be formulated and applied so that no country will feel that its security could be endangered by an agreement?

—And third, how can compliance with a limitation agreement be assured?

We further suggested that a study begin with the first of those three questions: the definition and comparative measurement of military expenditures. Such a study, we believe, should be carried out by a small group of highly qualified government specialists, preferably economists or budget experts. We believe the General Assembly could give valuable impetus and direction to this effort

² For a U.S. statement made in the CCD on July 24, see BULLETIN of Aug. 25, 1975, p. 282.

by adopting an appropriate resolution requesting the CCD to organize such a study and authorizing the Secretary General to provide necessary services to the experts.

Biological and Chemical Weapons

Last year Resolution 3256 invited all states that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Biological Weapons Convention and to accede to or ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The resolution further called on the CCD to continue its work on effective measures for the prohibition of chemical weapons (CW).

The Biological Weapons Convention has now entered into force, following ratification by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. as depositaries; and the United States last spring completed its ratification of the Geneva Protocol.

As for the third element of the Assembly's recommendation, it is no secret that the negotiation of a ban on chemical weapons has proved more complex and difficult than many of us anticipated. Because production and stockpiling of chemical weapons can be concealed more easily than many other military activities, particularly in countries with large chemical industries, verifying compliance with a treaty can present great difficulties. Nevertheless, the goal of finding effective solutions has been pursued in good faith, and without minimizing the difficulties ahead, I think it is fair to say that there has been some progress.

Following their summit commitment to consider a joint initiative on chemical weapons at the CCD, the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union made contacts during 1975 with a view to finding an appropriate means of carrying out such an initiative. In addition, as I reported to the CCD last August, the United States has concluded that an initial CW measure should deal with all lethal chemical weapons. In the months ahead, my government will continue its efforts in this field, with the hope that they will point to promising approaches to a possible joint initiative at the CCD during 1976.

Reducing the Threat of Nuclear War

The United States attaches the utmost importance to reducing the threat of nuclear war—both by limiting and reducing nuclear arsenals and by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to additional states.

The 29th U.N. General Assembly identified these two related issues as being of greatest concern to the world community and made several constructive recommendations for action. Since then important steps have been taken in various specialized forums. Nonetheless we must again make these vital issues the center of the General Assembly's attention and the object of our most determined efforts in the years ahead.

My government places particular importance on the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT). We fully recognize that all members of this body have an important stake in the outcome of these negotiations, which affect both the strategic balance between two countries and the security of the world at large. We intend to keep the General Assembly fully informed of the results of these negotiations.

The United States hopes to conclude in the near future the negotiation of a SALT Two agreement based on principles set out in the summit meeting at Vladivostok a year ago. By imposing equal limits on the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles on each side, the new agreement will eliminate many of the uncertainties that have driven the competition for nuclear arms.

But curbing this competition will not be enough. We must work vigorously to reduce the nuclear arsenals that have already been assembled. Therefore my government intends to proceed as soon as possible to follow-on negotiations aimed at achieving further limitations and reductions.

Last year Resolution 3261 D expressed the General Assembly's concern that six states had engaged in nuclear testing and called on the CCD to consider the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the context of its report on the

elaboration of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban (CTB). Thus, the closely related issues of nonproliferation, nuclear weapons testing restraints, and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's) were brought into a single focus.

The U.S. Government fully recognizes the importance of restraints on nuclear-weapons testing for curbing the nuclear arms race. We remain committed to the objective of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty. In view of the longstanding deadlock on means of achieving that objective, we agreed with the Soviet Union in July 1974 to take a practical step forward by signing the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

The U.S.S.R. recently submitted to the Assembly a draft treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. While we can agree that a complete halt to all nuclear-weapons testing by all countries must certainly be our objective, the Soviet draft does not appear to solve problems that must be solved if we are to achieve that objective.

In particular, reliance on national means of verification is not, in our view, an adequate basis for clearing up uncertainties as to whether ambiguous seismic signals are caused by an earthquake or by a nuclear explosion.

Moreover, the draft does not specify verification measures for PNE's but merely states that such explosions would be governed by a separate agreement. This approach leaves unresolved the critical question whether, under a comprehensive test ban, an adequately verifiable accommodation for PNE's can be worked out. At the CCD this summer the U.S. delegation pointed out that if PNE's were to be accommodated under a CTB, a verification system would have to be devised that, at a minimum, could provide adequate assurance that PNE's did not involve the testing of a new weapon concept, the use of a stockpiled weapon to verify its performance, or the carrying out of nuclear-weapons-effects studies. No solution to this problem has yet been found.

Further consideration of this complex and

difficult problem could provide a better understanding of how it might be possible to achieve adequate assurance that nuclear-weapons-related benefits would not be obtained if PNE's were permitted under a comprehensive weapons test ban. We look forward to the meeting of test ban experts at the CCD next spring, which we expect will consider CTB verification problems.

A second aspect of the PNE problem was examined last summer at the CCD; namely, the implications of PNE's for nonproliferation. As can be seen in the special section on PNE's in the CCD annual report, there was a very wide measure of agreement in the committee based on evidence presented by technical experts, that acquisition by a non-nuclear-weapon state of a capability to conduct PNE's is incompatible with the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Consequently, there was wide support for the idea that, if PNE's were to be pursued, they should be conducted in a manner consistent with article V of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

An important step was taken recently when the Board of Governors of the IAEA established an ad hoc advisory group on PNE's. My government is participating actively in that group. In our view it should not only achieve a fuller understanding of the economic, technical, legal and treaty, and health and safety aspects of PNE's but should also make substantial headway in laying the legal and procedural foundation for the international service that would be required if the remaining questions concerning the feasibility and utility of PNE's should be resolved.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

The possibility of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world has recently attracted much interest. It is the view of many governments, including my own, that nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute to regional and global security and that such zones could also make a significant regional contribution to non-proliferation. Depending on the specific arrangements, a nuclear-weapon-free zone

could effectively complement the Nonproliferation Treaty.

At the request of the 29th General Assembly, a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was carried out under the auspices of the CCD. We believe that the study, prepared under the able leadership of Professor Keijo Korhonen, of Finland, merits serious consideration by governments and particularly by those actively considering nuclear-weapon-free-zone projects.

The experts carrying out the study outlined areas of disagreement as well as agreement, reflecting their national positions. This made it possible to explore problems that otherwise would not have been considered. As a result, we believe this study provides a more realistic and complete assessment than heretofore existed of the prospects for and potential value of nuclear-weapon-free zones. My delegation would favor a resolution commending the study to the attention of U.N. members and requesting their comments on it, with a view to further discussion of the issues at the 31st session of the General Assembly.

I will reserve comments on specific nuclear-weapon-free-zone proposals for the discussion of those individual items later in our committee's schedule. However, I would like to make the general observation that, while nuclear-weapon-free-zone projects can be given an initial impetus by General Assembly resolutions, there is no substitute for the development of concrete zone arrangements by the states concerned. The Treaty of Tlatelolco [Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America] would never have prospered by relying on resolutions rather than on the persevering efforts of its founders. Therefore, while my delegation will follow the debate here with interest, we will also look at followup actions in the months ahead in measuring the prospects of particular projects.

Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers

Among the foremost challenges of our time is the need for nuclear power to help meet expanding energy requirements in a

safe, environmentally sound, and economic manner. This challenge becomes acute, particularly insofar as nonproliferation is concerned, in the stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that involve storage, transportation, and reprocessing of spent fuel.

One of the most critical steps in the final stage of the fuel cycle is reprocessing, which involves the recovery by chemical means of plutonium from spent reactor fuel. Although it is evident that nuclear power can be generated without reprocessing—and indeed, advanced and large-scale nuclear power programs currently exist without it—the potential value of reprocessing derives from the possibility of recycling plutonium as reactor fuel.

However, many uncertainties remain. Difficulties have been encountered in constructing plants that can be operated on a sound commercial basis. More generally, the economic benefits, as well as the feasibility and public acceptability, of plutonium recycling are yet to be proven on a commercial scale. It is impossible to project with confidence the impact of plutonium recycling on the cost of generating electrical power since several unpredictable variables are involved, such as the costs of uranium, enrichment, reprocessing, and fuel fabrication. We do know, however, that nuclear fuel costs represent only a small portion of total nuclear electricity costs and recycled plutonium will satisfy only about 20 percent of total reactor fuel requirements. Therefore the impact on total nuclear electricity-generating costs is likely to be extremely small.

These uncertainties have clearly affected the development of reprocessing capabilities in the United States. Although there are about 55 nuclear power reactors on line in the United States, no commercial reprocessing facilities are in operation.

If the recovery and recycling of plutonium does eventually prove to be economically advantageous, it will almost certainly be for large reprocessing plants which will service many reactors. It has been estimated that more than forty 1000-megawatt light water reactors would be required before reprocessing could be an economically viable opera-

tion. For smaller nuclear power programs, the construction of small, inefficient reprocessing plants would be a costly enterprise. Nor is it likely that such plants would make an appreciable contribution to a country's independence from outside sources of fuel.

In addition, the construction of many small plants, however legitimate the motivations, can only accentuate widespread concerns over the growing availability of plutonium throughout the world.

Therefore, in the interest of promoting the most economical use of nuclear energy resources as well as in the interest of assuring that future developments do not detract from our nonproliferation objectives, a better approach should be found than building many small national reprocessing plants. One approach—which the International Atomic Energy Agency considers promising and is studying in depth—is the establishment of multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle centers. Secretary Kissinger, speaking to the General Assembly on September 22, expressed strong U.S. support for this idea. The multinational approach appears to be economically preferable to constructing small national facilities, since it would pool the talents and interests of several nations and take advantage of economies of scale. It would also reduce the risks of theft and diversion of nuclear material and facilitate the application of international safeguards.

The possible economic benefits as well as the environmental and safety advantages of multinational fuel centers merit serious consideration by all states. Certainly no less important to the world community—and of particular concern to this committee—are the implications for nonproliferation and international security.

As Secretary Kissinger pointed out in his statement to the General Assembly:

The greatest single danger of unrestrained nuclear proliferation resides in the spread under national control of reprocessing facilities for the atomic materials in nuclear power plants.

The United States therefore strongly urges all states in a position to do so to assist the IAEA in a thorough and expeditious

analysis of the multinational regional fuel cycle center concept, and we also encourage states to explore the possibilities for such fuel cycle cooperation in their own regions.

U.S. Pledges Continued Efforts in Drug Abuse Control

Following is a statement by Congressman Donald M. Fraser, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly, made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on October 28.

USUN press release 130 dated October 28

We meet this year with increased awareness of the gravity and widening extent of the problem of drug abuse. It is indeed unfortunate that each year such awareness is purchased with the lives and futures of those thousands more people who have died from drugs or who have become slaves to them. Drug abuse continues to cloud the lives of millions of the world's inhabitants, of every nationality, every ideology, and every economic condition.

Experience has shown that no nation acting in isolation can successfully combat drug abuse within its national frontiers. The international narcotics control conventions, starting with the 1912 Hague Convention, testify to the international community's realization of this fact. So, too, international participation in the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and in discussions here in a committee of the General Assembly, represents the latest links in a chain forged by the concern of the people of the world with the menace of drug abuse and its attendant social ills.

This past year has seen the nations of the world take significant steps toward achieving closer cooperation in the struggle against the illicit drug traffic. The entry into force of the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is an encouraging development; but for the protocol to realize its full potential as an instrument for narcotics control, it must, like the single convention it amends, be universally ac-

cepted. The United States is a party to the protocol and urges all countries not yet parties to adhere to it as promptly as possible.

As noted in the statement of the International Narcotics Control Board, the protocol expands the authority of the Board, a body charged with critical responsibilities under the 1961 single convention and other, earlier, treaties. The protocol also gives the Board new tools with which to work. It stresses the need for the Board to maintain a continuing dialogue with governments and with the specialized agencies, with the objective of promoting the most effective compliance with the provisions of the conventions. The Board may now recommend that financial assistance be accorded governments encountering difficulties as they attempt in good faith to meet their treaty obligations. As the Board's statement observes, the innovations are in addition to more stringent alternative courses open to the Board under the single convention.

The United States believes that the Board must be independent to perform its treaty-mandated functions. An independent Board with quasi-judicial responsibilities requires a *distinct* secretariat separate from the Division of Narcotic Drugs, which services a political organ, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

As important as the international control instruments are, they rely on, and can only serve to supplement, the efforts of each national administration within its own borders. The U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control is now assisting many countries to increase the effectiveness of their national drug controls. I would like to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to congratulate the Fund's new Executive Director, Ambassador de Beus [J. G. de Beus, former Representative of the Netherlands to the U.N.], on his appointment and to wish him every success. At the same time, let us express our appreciation to the retiring Acting Executive Director, Dr. Sten Martens, for his dedication and leadership during a critical period in the development of the Fund.

The United States is pleased to note the

Fund's activity in support of the Government of Turkey in carrying out that government's decision to harvest unincised poppy capsules rather than opium and thus reduce the risk of diversion into illicit channels. It appears encouragingly clear that the Government of Turkey, with U.N. assistance, has successfully controlled the cultivation and harvest of this year's poppy crop. We commend the Government of Turkey's very considerable efforts to control this production and the determination of the government, expressed here by its representative, to control future crops.

Now that the Fund has come of age and is proving itself an effective instrument for promoting narcotics control and treatment, we hope that more nations will perceive it in their interest to contribute or contribute more generously to it. The United States is proud of its past support of the Fund; we consider our contributions money well spent, and we will continue to support its activities. But as more countries seek assistance from the Fund—that is to say, as the Fund becomes steadily more effective—its financial resources stretch thinner and thinner. Already the Fund has had to pare down its early ambitious plans, and it is not yet five years old.

Drug abuse will not disappear of its own accord, nor will fervent hopes keep it at bay. Action, both national and international, is required; and the U.N. Fund provides a vehicle for action. Those countries with drug problems know that they have good reason to support the Fund: for they have seen what drug abuse does to the individual, his family, and his community. Countries, like individuals, can learn from the experience of others. A generous annual contribution to the U.N. Fund, inasmuch as it may help keep drug abuse from spreading, represents but a small fraction of the cost of coping

with drug abuse after it has gained a foothold in a society.

The United States echoes the recent call of the President of Bolivia before the General Assembly for international cooperation against the illicit drug traffic. We commend Bolivia for joining action to its words, as demonstrated by its recent accession to the single convention and the amending protocol.

We wish to take this occasion to single out for expressions of our admiration the actions being taken by the Governments of Mexico and of Burma to cope with the major amounts of opium and its derivatives illicitly produced in those countries. Their plans to intensify their efforts are to be warmly commended. Many governments are active in the worldwide struggle to bring drug abuse under more effective control, but time does not permit us to cite them all here.

Before concluding these remarks I would like to stress the importance the United States attaches to the earliest possible entry into force of the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

I wish to reaffirm my government's pledge to continue its efforts—bilateral, multilateral, and national—to reduce the demand for illicit drugs through treatment and prevention programs and to reduce the traffic in illicit drugs which feeds this demand.

The United States has cosponsored the four draft resolutions before this committee. Taken together, they propose a course of action designed to maintain the momentum developed in recent years by nations committed to the struggle against drug abuse.¹

¹On Oct. 28 the committee, without a negative vote, recommended to the General Assembly the adoption of resolutions on the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, adequate priority for narcotics control, and the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control.

Department Discusses Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation of Weapons

Following is a statement by Myron B. Kratzer, Acting Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on November 5.¹

It is a privilege to appear before your committee today on behalf of the Department of State to offer testimony on the important subject of nuclear proliferation and, specifically, on House Concurrent Resolution 371.

At the outset, I should like to reaffirm the strong commitment of the Department of State to the policy of avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Secretary Kissinger has expressed personally, on a number of occasions, the importance of this goal and has proposed for international consideration several important measures designed to reduce the risks of further proliferation.

While House Concurrent Resolution 371 deals with several aspects of the control of nuclear weapons, I should like to concentrate my testimony today on the problem of nuclear proliferation as that term is generally used; that is, the acquisition by additional nations of a nuclear-weapons or nuclear explosive capability. In particular, I will deal with the question of the proliferation risks arising out of the application of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes.

Before commenting on the specific features of House Concurrent Resolution 371, I be-

lieve it may be useful to review the historical background of the proliferation issue, as well as some of the technical considerations which bear on it.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. policy has been to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons. The Baruch plan, put forward by the United States at the United Nations in the days immediately after World War II, foreshadowed the efforts we have made for the past 30 years to lessen the likelihood of proliferation. This plan proposed the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the placement of sensitive peaceful nuclear activities under international ownership and control.

When the plan was rejected by the Soviet Union, we moved to a policy of strict secrecy as a means of containing proliferation. In less than a decade, it became evident that this approach would not succeed.

By 1953, both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom had developed nuclear weapons. Major peaceful nuclear programs had been established by Canada and France and were beginning in many other countries. These facts made it clear that, like all scientific knowledge, nuclear science, which indeed had its origins in Europe, could not remain an American monopoly.

Late that year, President Eisenhower, in a speech before the United Nations, laid the foundation for the approach that has governed our nonproliferation policy ever since. In brief, he proposed worldwide cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This was to be accomplished under effective controls so as to insure that other countries could receive the peaceful benefits of the atom without establishing independent programs which could lead to the development of nuclear weapons.

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

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The Congress endorsed this approach in 1954 by fundamentally amending the Atomic Energy Act to permit our engaging in nuclear cooperation under strict procedural and substantive controls, including congressional review and oversight.

The revised act provided that certain forms of nuclear cooperation should take place under agreements for cooperation between the United States and each cooperating country or group of countries. Each agreement, including any amendments, must be personally approved by the President in writing on the basis of a determination that the agreement will promote, and not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Subsequently, each agreement is submitted to the Congress and referred to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which must report on it to the Congress. The Congress may prevent the agreement from coming into force by adopting a concurrent resolution to that effect within a 30-day period thereafter.

Application of International Safeguards

I noted earlier that the approach we have followed since the early 1950's has been nuclear cooperation under "effective controls." These controls consist, basically, of assurances by other governments with whom we have agreements that materials and equipment provided by the United States will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or for other military purposes, with these assurances being independently verified by measures which we designate "safeguards."

Thus, this much-misunderstood term refers to the mechanism which has been developed to assure and demonstrate the observance of governmental guarantees against the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment to military purposes. They rely upon independent and objective measures, including onsite inspection, applied by personnel from outside the inspected country and designed to detect any diversion of nuclear material to unauthorized purposes.

This concept of independent verification

of sovereign undertakings through such measures as inspection by foreign personnel was a novel one at the time; and the rights to make these inspections were achieved with considerable difficulty through vigorous use of the bargaining power the United States could exert as a provider of nuclear assistance

In the early days, and indeed up until the mid-1960's, safeguards were applied by U.S. personnel. For the past decade the responsibility for the application of safeguards was assumed largely by the International Atomic Energy Agency, located in Vienna. The need for such an international safeguards system was accentuated by the growing number of nuclear supplier countries. Today more than 50 IAEA inspectors are applying safeguards, including onsite inspection, to more than 60 major facilities in some 50 countries.

One of the common misconceptions concerning safeguards is that they involve only a system of materials accountability, or "bookkeeping." In fact, the safeguards system of the IAEA includes three basic elements: materials accountability, containment, and surveillance.

All three elements are necessary for an effective safeguards system; and each of them depends upon the actual physical presence of safeguards inspectors, supplemented in many instances by instruments, seals, and other technical measures. As an example, at nuclear power reactors, not only are discharged fuel rods accounted for through physical inventories by visiting inspectors, but seals may be installed on reactors (containment) to insure that there has been no unauthorized fuel removal between inspection visits and cameras may be employed (surveillance) to detect any unauthorized fuel movements in the spent-fuel storage area.

National Physical Security Systems

It is important to recognize that international safeguards have a different and more difficult task to perform than do domestic control systems. The former cannot rely on the presumption that no massive con-

spiracy directed by the government itself exists. At the same time international systems can and do rely on the fact that a government itself has an overwhelming self-interest in insuring that nuclear material in its possession is not diverted by unauthorized persons. The two systems therefore complement each other.

Safeguards, as I have attempted to make clear, are designed to verify the faithful observance by governments of their assurances against diversion of materials to unauthorized uses. However, the objective measures which they employ for this purpose are equally effective in detecting diversion arising from any source—national or subnational. However, safeguards do not possess the capability of preventing theft, seizures, or diversions of nuclear material by unauthorized groups or individuals, in contrast to detecting such actions. This is the role of physical security systems employing guard forces, physical barriers, and related measures applied by national authorities.

The United States is engaged in an active and extensive program of consultation with nations which receive U.S. nuclear material to strengthen physical security measures. We have found that our partners are well aware that their own interests in preventing the theft or seizure of materials within their borders is at least as strong as our own and they are cooperating fully in this endeavor. The International Atomic Energy Agency is also assisting in this effort by developing authoritative advice on the establishment of effective national physical security regimes.

Effectiveness of Nonproliferation Measures

How effective have our measures been against proliferation resulting from peaceful cooperation in nuclear energy? Today, more than 30 years after the commencement of large-scale production of fissionable materials by the United States, five additional countries have developed and tested nuclear devices. Only one country, India, has detonated a nuclear explosion making use of

material produced under a program which was substantially assisted by outside sources under arrangements for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the Indian case, the plutonium utilized was produced in a research reactor and was separated in a reprocessing plant built by India. These facilities were supplied under peaceful uses assurances that were not sufficiently clear to rule out the use of material for a nuclear explosion which was described as being for peaceful purposes. While there were provisions for inspection and reports, these did not have the effectiveness of current safeguards.

While the diversion of materials produced in the nuclear power fuel cycle is one possible route to proliferation, the facts I have cited indicate that the way employed so far has been the construction of simple facilities specifically designed for the production of fissionable materials. It was partly in recognition of this problem that the United States formulated, proposed, and actively supported the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires non-nuclear-weapon states which are parties to the treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons from any sources and to subject even their independent and indigenous nuclear programs to peaceful use undertakings verified by safeguards.

We can conclude from the experience of the past that peaceful nuclear cooperation undertaken under sufficiently strong assurances and safeguards need not lead to proliferation. The one case where such cooperation contributed to the development of a peaceful explosive device, as I have indicated, involved arrangements made at a very early stage of international nuclear cooperation which have not been duplicated in later arrangements.

Nevertheless, we cannot afford to be complacent about a risk of the magnitude entailed by possible further proliferation. Accordingly, we and other leading nuclear nations have been engaged in a thorough and fundamental review of policies relating to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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Technologies for Reprocessing and Enrichment

Much of the concern in this respect has centered on the acquisition of facilities for reprocessing or enrichment of nuclear fuel, since it is these steps in the fuel cycle which allow the production of material of immediate usability in nuclear explosives.

Because there has been so much current discussion of the proliferation risks involved in the international transfer of facilities or technology for reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear fuel, I believe we should clearly understand the differences between them.

Reprocessing technology has long been unclassified, and there is much general information about it available. Our ability, therefore, is not unlimited as to how effectively we can restrain the spread of reprocessing capabilities.

On the other hand, the technology of uranium enrichment has remained for the most part classified and is not generally available. Furthermore, unlike reprocessing, the processes and equipment employed in uranium enrichment are far from conventional. Thus there is no readily available basis for undertaking uranium enrichment in most countries.

There are also significant differences among various enrichment processes and reprocessing as to the readiness with which weapons-usable material is obtainable. One of the purposes of reprocessing is to recover plutonium in usable form. An enrichment plant for producing light water power reactor fuel, however, need not produce highly enriched uranium. The conversion of enrichment plants designed to produce low-enriched uranium to the production of highly enriched material is not impossible; but it is, for some processes, very difficult and probably quite detectable.

Reducing Proliferation Risks of Reprocessing

Much of our current effort in the field of nonproliferation is directed toward restraining the spread of reprocessing facilities under national control, while seeking concurrently to develop arrangements under which

this step of the nuclear fuel cycle can take place with a minimum risk of proliferation.

Toward this end, in his U.N. speech of September 22 of this year, Secretary Kissinger called for the establishment of multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle centers, which would reduce the incentive for small and inefficient reprocessing facilities, limit the possibility of diverting peaceful nuclear materials to national military use, and create a better framework for applying effective international safeguards.

The IAEA is currently studying this concept, including the economic and technical factors related to such regional centers. The establishment of such centers involves difficult technical, economic, and political issues which cannot be resolved quickly. Nevertheless, their potential advantages, not only to the achievement of nonproliferation but to the economic development of nuclear power, clearly justify the most determined possible effort.

Another important and constructive development in reducing the proliferation risks of reprocessing is the proviso in recent agreements the French and Germans have negotiated with their nuclear customers that applies safeguards to the transfer of nuclear technology. Under this approach, the recipients of sensitive nuclear technology are required to place under safeguards not only the facilities which they receive from a nuclear supplier but any future facilities, including those built entirely on their own, which incorporate any of the sensitive technology originally supplied to them. This approach thus could bring under safeguards sensitive fuel cycle facilities which might otherwise come into existence without outside assistance.

The United States strongly favors this restraint on the export of any technology in sensitive areas, when such export takes place. At the same time, we believe additional restraint which will avoid the spread of sensitive fuel cycle facilities under national control is called for at the present time. It is for this reason that Secretary Kissinger, in his address to the U.N. General

Assembly, made the proposal for the establishment of multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle centers, a concept which, of course, is explicitly endorsed in House Concurrent Resolution 371.

Another area of importance is the evolution of international safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency has done an impressive job in establishing and implementing an effective safeguards system—the first of its kind in the world. As additional facilities and materials become subject to IAEA safeguards and especially as the more complex and sensitive facilities such as reprocessing plants are brought under safeguards, vigorous efforts will be required on the part of the Agency and its members to insure that effective safeguards are devised and applied. While the safeguarding of reprocessing plants and similar fuel cycle facilities is a technically difficult task, we believe there is no reason in principle why safeguards of a practical nature cannot provide a high degree of assurance that significant diversion will be detected.

While our policy of nuclear cooperation has as its primary goal the avoidance of nuclear proliferation, nuclear cooperation has other important goals. The economic and technical interdependence which results from the supply of U.S. reactors and nuclear fuel to other nations can strengthen political ties and can have an important stabilizing influence on international relations. Additionally, the sale of nuclear equipment and services is of substantial economic benefit to the United States, with sales to date estimated at more than \$2 billion and cumulative sales through 1990 estimated at over \$40 billion.

House Concurrent Resolution 371

Let me turn now to House Concurrent Resolution 371, introduced by you, Mr. Chairman [Clement J. Zablocki], (and the similar Senate Concurrent Resolution 69). First of all, I would like to reaffirm the commitment of the Department of State to the principles underlying both these resolutions.

With specific reference to the House resolution, operative paragraph 1 urges that after the provisos of the Vladivostok accord of November 1974 are embodied in a treaty, immediate negotiations take place looking toward a further verifiable 20 percent reduction in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and in the number of strategic missile launchers equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

The Department of State does not believe it desirable or prudent to specify in advance a particular degree of reduction, since the size of the reduction would itself be one of the principal subjects of negotiation. The Department of State suggests the resolution be amended to urge a "substantial" reduction rather than specify a particular percentage to be achieved. (This same reservation applies to operative paragraph 1 of the Senate resolution.)

Operative paragraph 2 urges an adequately verifiable comprehensive agreement ending underground nuclear explosions, provided all nuclear-weapon states enter into such an agreement. The relevant paragraph in the Senate resolution omits the adherence question.

As you know, the United States is committed to the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty provided adequate verification measures can be achieved. The executive branch, however, has not determined that the adherence of all nuclear-weapon states is a prerequisite for the conclusion of such an agreement. The Department of State therefore would prefer that the resolution note the U.S. commitment to an adequately verifiable comprehensive test ban but leave open the adherence issue in order to avoid prejudging our position.

Operative paragraph 3 of House Concurrent Resolution 371 urges a halt on further transfers of nuclear fuel, technology, and equipment to any country which has not accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear programs or which by January 1976 has not become a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty if all other major nuclear suppliers agree to a similar halt on such transfers.

(The language of the comparable paragraph in Senate Concurrent Resolution 69 is virtually identical.)

The Department of State fully subscribes to the objective of universal NPT adherence and/or acceptance of IAEA safeguards and will continue to strive for this objective. As the resolution implicitly notes in the final clause of this paragraph, this objective is not currently shared by all consumers and suppliers. Hence, we welcome the resolution's recognition that an essential element is agreement among all other major nuclear suppliers on this question. In the absence of such agreement, the United States, by adopting such a policy unilaterally, would not only be relinquishing a major part of the international nuclear market to other suppliers, but also it would be seriously weakening its influence on the policies both of suppliers and recipient nations. Accordingly, we regard it as essential that we not unilaterally withdraw from nuclear supply to countries who are prepared, as the NPT requires of us, to accept safeguards on our assistance. By so doing, I think we are better able to exert influence toward the achievement of our nonproliferation objectives in countries that are non-NPT parties.

Operative paragraph 4 of House Concurrent Resolution 371 urges an agreement providing that the reprocessing of plutonium resulting from any transfer between countries of nuclear fuel, technology, or equipment be performed in regional facilities which are heavily protected and guarded under the strictest possible multinational safeguards. (The comparable paragraph in Senate Concurrent Resolution 69, while differing in language, is not substantively different.)

As I noted earlier in this statement, the establishment of such multinational centers is a U.S. objective; and we are working actively with the IAEA in studying their economic and technical feasibility. We must recognize, however, that there is no unanimity as yet on the desirability of multinational centers, and there may be formidable economic, technical, and political prob-

lems which are as yet not well or widely understood. I believe that we should continue to work toward their establishment in a diligent way but would not immediately go so far as to require their use on a mandatory basis for all plutonium reprocessing. We also need to take into account that without general acceptance of the multinational concept, such a requirement could drive nations to develop indigenous and unsafe-guarded reprocessing plants, thereby defeating our objectives. I would also note that paragraph 4 as written exempts from its provisions countries which could develop indigenous reactors utilizing indigenous fuel.

I hope these comments on the resolution will be helpful to the committee.

To return to the more general purpose of this hearing, I wish to emphasize my strong personal view that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not inevitable. But to avoid such proliferation will require diligent pursuit of a variety of complex political and technical measures which minimize the pressures for proliferation and at the same time erect effective controls against it.

We in the Department of State, along with our sister agencies in the executive branch, have been and will remain committed to such a course. I look forward to close and continuing cooperation with the Congress in this most important endeavor.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Authorization Legislation for and the Operations of the Council on International Economic Policy.

Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the House Committee on International Relations. April 15, 1975. 81 pp.

U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. Part I. April 29-30, 1975. 100 pp.

Peace Corps Authorization for Fiscal Year 1976 and Transition Quarter. Hearings before the House Committee on International Relations. May 13-15, 1975. 87 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Natural Graphite. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 7706; H. Rept. 94-296; June 16, 1975; 4 pp. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance to accompany H.R. 7706; S. Rept. 94-343; July 30, 1975; 3 pp.

Extension of Existing Duty Suspension on Certain Istle. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 7709. H. Rept. 94-297. June 16, 1975. 3 pp.

Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1975. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee. Executive sessions, June 18 and July 21, 1975. Part 1. 177 pp.

Amending the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973. Report of the House Committee on International Relations, together with additional views, to accompany H.R. 4699. H. Rept. 94-329. June 26, 1975. 20 pp.

China: One Step Further Toward Normalization. A report by Carl Albert, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, and John Rhodes, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives. H. Doc. 94-255. July 1975. 10 pp.

East-West Foreign Trade Board First Quarterly Report; communication from the Chairman of the Board transmitting the Board's first quarterly report on trade between the United States and nonmarket economy countries, pursuant to section 411(c) of the Trade Act of 1974; H. Doc. 94-210; July 8, 1975; 29 pp. Second Quarterly Report; H. Doc. 94-270; October 1, 1975; 26 pp.

Suspension of Prohibitions Against Military Assistance to Turkey. Hearing before the House Committee on International Relations. July 10, 1975. 158 pp.

International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975. Hearings and markup of the House Committee on International Relations on proposed legislation to amend Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for other purposes; July 14-30, 1975; 753 pp. Report of the committee, together with additional and supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 9005; H. Rept. 94-442; August 1, 1975; 98 pp.

Amending the United Nations Participation Act of 1945. Report of the House Committee on International Relations, together with minority views, to accompany H.R. 1287; H. Rept. 94-363, part I; July 15, 1975; 22 pp. Adverse report of the Committee on Armed Services, together with dissenting views, to accompany H.R. 1287; H. Rept. 94-363, part II; July 26, 1975; 14 pp.

Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations (Geneva 1959) with Final Protocol. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva 1959), with a final protocol containing one U.S. reservation, signed on behalf of the United States at Geneva on June 8, 1974. S. Ex. G. July 16, 1975. 542 pp.

Proposed Sales to Jordan of the Hawk and Vulcan Air Defense Systems. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations. July 16-17, 1975. 134 pp.

Middle East Agreements and the Early-Warning System in Sinai; hearings before the House Committee on International Relations; September 8-25, 1975; 77 pp. To Implement the United States Proposal for the Early-Warning System in Sinai; report of the committee, together with supplemental and additional views, to accompany H.J. Res. 683; H. Rept. 94-352; October 6, 1975; 41 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974. Entered into force October 1, 1975.
Acceptance deposited: Peru, November 11, 1975.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Ratification deposited: Brazil, September 11, 1975.

Cultural Property

Statutes of the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. Adopted at New Delhi November-December 1956. Entered into force May 10, 1958; for the United States January 20, 1971. TIAS 7038.
Accession deposited: Guatemala, September 18 1975.

Customs

Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexe and protocol of signature. Done at Geneva January 15, 1959. Entered into force January 7, 1960; for the United States March 3, 1969.
Accession deposited: Morocco, October 10, 1975.

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. Entered into force December 6, 1975.
Accession deposited: Australia, November 10, 1975.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris November 18, 1974.¹
Notification of consent to be bound deposited: United Kingdom, October 30, 1975.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.¹
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, November 10, 1975.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage and registration of marriages. Signed at New York on December 10, 1962. Entered into force December 9, 1964.²
Accession deposited: Hungary, November 6, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975.
Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, November 17, 1975.³

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.
Ratification deposited: Germany, Federal Republic of, November 18, 1975.⁴

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.¹
Signature: Hungary, October 13, 1975.

Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization. Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970. Entered into force January 2, 1975.²
Declarations of adoption deposited: Bolivia, May 21, 1975; Ethiopia, May 22, 1975; Gambia, May 6, 1975; Kuwait, August 27, 1975; Malagasy Republic, May 22, 1975; Rwanda, June 6, 1975; Upper Volta, May 16, 1975.
Associate member: Gibraltar, October 17, 1975.

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.¹
Accession deposited: Kuwait, November 11, 1975.

Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, with annex. Done at Washington October 26, 1973.¹
Accession deposited: Portugal, November 19, 1975.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972.
Acceptances deposited: Cyprus, August 14, 1975; Syria (with reservations), August 13, 1975.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, September 17, 1975.
Entry into force: December 17, 1975.

BILATERAL

Dominican Republic

Loan agreement to assist in financing a health sector program in the Dominican Republic. Signed at Santo Domingo October 1, 1975. Entered into force October 1, 1975.

Finland

Agreement amending the agreement of July 2, 1952, as amended (TIAS 2555, 3704, 4241, 4614), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Helsinki October 29, 1975. Entered into force October 29, 1975.

Haiti

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from Haiti of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince June 24 and October 10, 1975. Entered into force October 10, 1975.

Iceland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital. Signed at Reykjavik May 7, 1975.¹
Senate advice and consent to ratification: November 18, 1975.

Israel

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington November 20, 1975. Enters into force 30 days after the exchange of ratifications.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ Applicable to the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Gilbert Islands, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oneo Islands, Saint Helena and Dependencies, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the island of Cyprus.

⁴ Applicable to Berlin (West).

Poland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with related notes. Signed at Washington October 8, 1974.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: November 18, 1975.

Romania

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington December 4, 1973.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: November 18, 1975.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Dominican Republic	Cat. No. S1.123:D71	Pub. 7759	5 pp.
Egypt	Cat. No. S1.123:EG9	Pub. 8152	8 pp.
Luxembourg	Cat. No. S1.123:L97	Pub. 7856	4 pp.
Malagasy Republic	Cat. No. S1.123:M29/3	Pub. 8015	4 pp.
New Zealand	Cat. No. S1.123:N42Z	Pub. 8251	6 pp.
Singapore	Cat. No. S1.123:S16	Pub. 8240	6 pp.
Trinidad and Tobago	Cat. No. S1.123:T73	Pub. 8306	4 pp.
Uruguay	Cat. No. S1.123:URS	Pub. 7857	4 pp.

¹ Not in force.

Direct Communications Link. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics amending the agreement of September 30, 1971. TIAS 8059. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8059).

Nonscheduled Air Services. Agreement with Canada terminating reservations relating to the agreement of May 8, 1974. TIAS 8060. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8060).

Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Protocol with other governments. TIAS 8061. 12 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8061).

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons. Convention with other governments. TIAS 8062. 83 pp. 95¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8062).

Claims—Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Agreement with Japan extending the time period in article I, paragraph 2, of the agreement of April 18, 1969. TIAS 8063. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8063).

Claims—Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Agreement with Japan relating to the agreement of April 18, 1969. TIAS 8064. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8064).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan amending the agreement of November 23, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8065. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8065).

Provision of Defense Articles and Services and Establishment of Liaison Office. Agreement with Kuwait. TIAS 8066. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8066).

Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties. Convention with Other Governments. TIAS 8068. 75 pp. 90¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8068).

Cooperation in Environmental Affairs. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 8069. 23 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8069).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with Egypt amending the agreement of June 7, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8070. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8070).

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS 8071. 11 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8071).

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 8072. 13 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8072).

Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. TIAS 8075. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8075).

Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with the International Telecommunication Union. TIAS 8076. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8076).

Reimbursement of Income Taxes. Agreement with the International Cotton Advisory Committee. TIAS 8077. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8077).

Refugee Relief in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos and the Khmer Republic. Agreement with the International Committee of the Red Cross amending the agreement of February 20 and March 16 and 17, 1975. TIAS 8078. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8078).

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 U.S. Discusses Major Arms Control Issues Before U.N. General Assembly (Martin) 824

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Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: November 17-23

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*571	11/17	Kissinger: presentation of Grenville Clark Award to Jean Monnet, Paris, Nov. 15.
572	11/17	Kissinger, Simon: news conference aboard Air Force One.
573	11/19	Ingersoll: Symposium on East-West Technological Trade.
*574	11/19	Kissinger: Senate Foreign Relations Committee; security assistance program.
†575	11/20	Kissinger: death of Franco.
*576	11/20	Kissinger: Senate Appropriations Committee; security assistance program.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.