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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXIII, No. 1893

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The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Global Peace, the Middle East, and the United States

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*¹

Ohio has been described as the heart of Middle America and the breeding ground of Presidents. So it is not surprising that we have here today such outstanding representatives of the people of the Midwest as Congressmen Clancy, Kindness, and Gradison and two Senators who have so distinguished themselves in public service as to merit mention as potential nominees for the highest position in the land.

It is a great honor to be here with Senator Taft, who in every respect brings credit and added distinction to his esteemed family and his beloved city.

John Glenn made a great contribution to his country and to mankind before he came to Washington and is destined for another distinguished career in the service of the nation.

And as for me, the privilege of talking to five Members of Congress who have no opportunity either to talk back or to question me makes the trip alone worthwhile. [Laughter and applause.]

As America enters its 200th year as a free nation, our role has grown central to the peace and progress of the world. We have become the engine of the global economy, the rock of security for those who share our values, the creative force in building international institutions, and the pioneer in science and technology.

Americans have carried the burdens of world leadership for a generation. They have done so with dedication and good will but, understandably, they ask when and if their labors can cease. They want to know what our purposes are in international affairs. They sense that the world needs us, but they ask: Do we need the world?

The past three decades have taught us that our commitment to global leadership is not an act of choice, but a recognition of reality. Awesome weapons can span continents in minutes. The international economic system thrives or declines as one. Conflict in faraway regions has vast political, security, and economic repercussions here at home. Communication makes us instantly aware of developments in every corner of the globe—of the travels of diplomats, the movement of troops, or the hunger of little children. World peace and American security, global well-being and American prosperity, have become virtually inseparable.

The past three decades have also taught us that our contribution is indispensable. We cannot solve every problem, but few solutions are possible without us. Other countries must do more, but we cannot ignore the responsibility that rests on us. If we do not help resist aggression, if we do not work for a dynamic world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no other nation can—at least no other nation that shares our values.

Americans have a right to be proud of how they have met this challenge. Through five Administrations of both political parties we

¹ Made on Sept. 16 at Cincinnati, Ohio, before a dinner meeting sponsored by the Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce and 11 other area organizations (text of the four introductory paragraphs from press release 482A; balance of address from press release 482).

led in assisting Europe and Japan recover from the devastation of the Second World War. We helped create a trading and monetary system that has spread prosperity in our own land and around the world. We forged alliances with the major democracies that have kept the global peace for a generation. We have mediated and helped resolve conflicts. We have fed the hungry, educated men and women from other lands, and welcomed those who fled oppression to our shores. With all humility we can say that no other nation in history has made comparable efforts on such a scale.

The Design of Global Peace

But history has rewarded our exertions with new challenges. The world has been transformed over the 30 years since World War II partly because of the success of this nation's policies.

In the early years of the postwar period, we were militarily and economically the world's predominant power. Our allies were recovering; new nations were just coming into being; potential adversaries were restrained by our nuclear supremacy.

Today's world is radically different. The industrialized nations are strong and self-confident; our alliances are cooperative endeavors between equals. We have preserved the world balance of power—but in the process both superpowers have acquired the capacity to destroy civilized life in a matter of hours. The growth of the world's economic system has spread economic power more widely among the new nations; they seek a greater role in international affairs and a larger share of the world economy.

The United States remains the largest single factor in international affairs. But we must learn what most other nations in history have known: that one country can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. We can no longer overwhelm problems with our resources. We no longer have the luxury of simple choices.

Thus, beyond the issues that make daily headlines, we have sought to conduct a foreign policy that takes account of the fundamental changes in the international order.

We cannot afford oscillation between extremes of crusading and isolation. We must maintain a steady course which offers hope for long-term international stability and progress, a course which Americans can support, which gives courage to our allies and pause to our adversaries.

Our first priority is the vigor of our alliances with the great democracies of the Atlantic community and Japan. We formed these ties a generation ago to protect weaker friends against military danger. Today we work together as equals on issues going far beyond security. We have coordinated our efforts to ease tensions with the East; we have built new institutions of energy cooperation; we have developed common approaches to the developing countries. And we have begun to harmonize our economic policies to move together toward noninflationary economic recovery. The vitality of Western democracy and the solidarity of our alliances are an essential factor of global stability.

On the basis of allied cohesion and strength, we have also sought to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable and long-term basis. For 30 years, mankind's hopes for peace and its fear of war have turned on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Today strategic nuclear parity has transformed international politics. Your government—in any Administration—must manage a basic conflict of values and interests with the Soviet Union in the shadow of nuclear holocaust. Never before in history have the weapons of war been so devastating—and so ill suited to the pursuit of specific policy objectives. Therefore the United States has engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments. We have solved political disputes such as Berlin and restrained great-power conflict in the Middle East to give both sides a continuing stake in positive political relations. We have begun more normal contacts in trade and scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges. And we have regularized our consultations at the highest level.

The necessity of coexistence in the shadow

of nuclear peril does not mean a coincidence of moral purpose. This country knows the moral difference between freedom and tyranny. But we shall also never lose sight of the fact that in the age of nuclear weapons, peace, too, is a moral imperative. We shall insist on reciprocity, but we believe that incentives for cooperation and penalties for intransigence are more effective than rhetorical posturing. We shall keep our military strength second to none; but we will not succumb to the illusion that military power offers the final answer to international problems.

On the basis of firmness and flexibility, strength and willingness to negotiate, we shall strive to moderate conflicts and to bring a more secure world to future generations.

As we have maintained alliance cohesion and begun to ease tensions with the Communist powers, a new dimension has been added to the spectrum of international issues before us: the future of the relationship between developed and developing countries. The vast and growing problems of energy, food, raw materials, and economic development now face us in all their complexity, as the fundamental issues of the last quarter of the 20th century.

These problems are not technical, or at bottom even economic. They go to the heart of the question of international order: whether the world can accommodate the needs of all nations, whether countries will regulate their affairs by cooperation or by confrontation, whether international relations will reflect the search for mutual benefit and common progress or turn into tests of strength. The United States is in a better position than any other nation to go it alone or to face such a test of strength, but we know that ultimately the whole world will suffer.

The United States has made its position clear. At the U.N. special session called to discuss these issues two weeks ago, I pledged our country to a cooperative, understanding approach. I said that we are prepared to work with other nations to put the technological and economic genius of the modern age into the service of all mankind. The United States is convinced that the developed and the

developing nations working together can achieve through cooperation what neither can extort through economic warfare or ideological pressure—economic advance for all our peoples.

In this spirit, the United States presented a comprehensive and detailed program for economic and social cooperation to the special session. These proposals and this attitude will guide us in future discussions with the less developed nations. The results at the special session which just concluded today were constructive. Discussions took place in a conciliatory spirit, and the final document produced considerable convergence between the developed and the developing countries and the outlines of a consumer program of action.

Cooperation must remain a two-way street. If nations wield their special strengths as weapons, the promise of global progress will give way to the perils of global confrontation.

The most critical immediate issue, of course, is the question of the price of oil. We and our partners in the International Energy Agency have already taken major steps to conserve oil and to establish financial structures that will help us cope with the impact of rising oil prices. Much still remains to be done; but the United States, in cooperation with other industrial nations, will make a determined effort to reverse the conditions that have enabled oil prices to be set unilaterally. The United States can not and will not entrust its political and economic destiny to decisions made elsewhere.

At the same time, we are ready to seek a new relationship with the oil-producing nations. We ought to be partners, not adversaries. Consumers must have reliable access to oil supplies at reasonable prices. To invest their new oil wealth, the producers must become major importers of our products. We are ready to cooperate with the oil producers in linking our economies on equitable terms.

Next month the oil producers, developing countries, and industrial countries will meet to launch a dialogue on energy, raw materials, development, and finance first proposed by President Giscard d'Estaing of France. We have worked hard to make these meet-

ings possible. We will work hard to make them a success. They provide us the opportunity to shape new constructive relationships in the world economy.

But another oil price rise would severely jeopardize these hopes. It could set off a relentless sequence of action and reaction, to the detriment of all countries, developed and developing. This vicious cycle must be avoided. The possibilities of a cooperative world order depend upon it.

Peace in the Middle East

There is no more vivid example of the stake that we have in the world around us, and the decisive contribution that this nation can make, than the conflict in the Middle East.

The Congress is now deliberating on the recent Egyptian-Israeli agreement. As it does so, it is important for the American people to understand why the United States is involved, what strategy we have pursued, the significance of the agreement, and where we will go from here.

The Middle East lies at the crossroads of three continents. Because of the area's strategic importance and because it provides the energy on which much of the world depends, outside powers have continued to involve themselves in its conflicts, often competitively.

For the United States a diplomatic role in the Middle East is not a preference, but a matter of vital interest:

—Because of our historical and moral commitment to the survival and security of Israel;

—Because of our important concerns in the Arab world, an area of more than 150 million people and the site of the world's largest oil reserves;

—Because perpetual crisis in the Middle East would severely strain our relations with our most important allies in Europe and Japan;

—Because upheaval in the Middle East jeopardizes the world's hopes for economic recovery, threatening the well-being of the industrial nations and the hopes of the developing world; and

—Because tension in the Middle East increases the prospect of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation with its attendant nuclear risk.

Each successive Middle East crisis has presented us with painful choices between our many commitments and interests. And each successive crisis accelerates the trends of radicalism in the area, putting greater pressures on America's friends in the moderate Arab world, and heightening all the tensions and dangers.

The stake of every American in peace in the Middle East was dramatically and concretely illustrated by the Middle East war of 1973:

—The oil embargo, coupled with the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] price increases, cost Americans half a million jobs and over \$10 billion in national output. It added at least five percentage points to the price index, contributing to the worst inflation since World War II. It set the stage for a serious worldwide recession, from which we are only now recovering two years later.

—Partly because of their greater dependence on Middle East oil, our principal allies in Western Europe and Japan separated from us over Middle East policy, in the most serious strain in our alliances since they were founded.

—The 1973 crisis tested the course of U.S.-Soviet relations, leading us briefly to the verge of confrontation in the October 24 alert.

The October war also set in train momentum that is now irreversible. Events can be channeled toward diplomatic progress, or they can pull us headlong toward another war.

This is why the United States since October 1973 has been actively engaged in promoting a peaceful solution.

We have no illusions about the difficulties. The Middle East has seen more than its share of dashed hopes and disappointment. But progress depends crucially—even decisively—on the United States. Time and again the parties have turned to us for mediation. Time and again we have acceded

to these requests because we are convinced that stagnation invites disaster. The next Middle East war will pose greater risks, complexities, and dangers and cause more dislocations than any previous conflict.

What, then, has been our approach?

For nearly three decades it was axiomatic that *all* issues pertaining to *all* the countries involved had to be addressed comprehensively: the final frontiers of Israel and the reciprocal guarantees of peace of the Arab states, the future of the Palestinians, the status of Jerusalem, and the question of international guarantees should all be considered together.

But for 30 years it proved nearly impossible even to begin the process of negotiation. Every attempt to discuss a comprehensive solution failed—from the partition plan, to the Lausanne conference [1949], to the Rogers plan and the Four-Power talks of 1969 and 1970, to the U.N. Security Council deliberations. To discuss simultaneously issues of such complexity, between countries whose deep mutual mistrust rejected even the concept of compromise, was futile until a minimum of confidence had been established. In the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is a new and relatively recent development that opinion in the Arab world has begun to think in terms of recognizing a sovereign Israel and that Israel has begun to see peace as a tangible goal rather than a distant dream.

The United States therefore concluded that instead of seeking to deal with all problems at once, we should proceed step by step with the parties prepared to negotiate and on the issues where some room for maneuver seemed possible. We believed that once the parties began a negotiating process they would develop a stake in success. Solutions to problems more easily negotiable would build mutual confidence. On each side a sense would grow that negotiations could produce benefits and that agreements would be kept—agreements that could become building blocks for a final peace.

Ultimately we expected that the step-by-step process would bring about, for the first time, the basic political conditions needed for the overall settlement called for by Security

Council Resolution 338. This remains our goal.

Progress since the October war has been without precedent since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Security Council Resolution 338 launched a negotiating process and the first Geneva Conference. Agreements to separate the opposing forces and establish U.N. buffer zones to strengthen the cease-fire were successfully negotiated between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and between Syria and Israel in May 1974.

The role of the United States was crucial in helping the parties reach these agreements. It reflected the fact that only we had developed strong relationships of trust with all parties. Major Arab countries that broke diplomatic relations with the United States in 1967 moved in 1973 and 1974 to restore their ties with us, creating a new climate of confidence and thereby the conditions for progress. And our traditional friendship with Israel has been reinforced in the crucible of crisis and the long months of close association in negotiations.

The momentum of progress was interrupted in the summer and fall of 1974: first by our Presidential succession, then by the decision of the Arab summit at Rabat which made negotiations over the West Bank impossible.

When negotiations were resumed in March of this year, they first ended in deadlock. We therefore reexamined our approach, asking whether we should continue the step-by-step strategy or move directly to the Geneva Conference and a comprehensive approach. The imminent crisis we feared as a result of the March deadlock did not materialize—almost solely because everyone expected that the United States, in one way or another, would resume its effort.

The President consulted widely—with congressional and civic leaders, with our Ambassadors from the area, and with the Middle East parties. He met with King Hussein, President Sadat, Prime Minister Rabin, and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam. We benefited from the views of the new Saudi leadership, which is continuing the policy of the highly respected late King Faisal.

The President concluded that the time was

still not ripe for a comprehensive approach. In the wake of an apparent failure, the intractability of the issues would only be compounded by their being combined. Bringing all the parties, including the most irreconcilable, together in one dramatic public negotiation was an invitation to a deepened stalemate. This could discredit the whole process of negotiation and create a slide toward war. It was widely understood that the momentum of diplomatic progress had to be restored before Geneva was convened to consider the broader issues.

New Egypt-Israel Agreement

Therefore, at the request of both sides the United States resumed its step-by-step effort. The result was the new agreement between Egypt and Israel which was signed in Geneva on September 4.

The agreement is fair and balanced:

—Territorially, it provides for withdrawal of Israeli forces from the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez and from the strategic Sinai passes. Egypt recovers a significant portion of its territory, including the economically important oilfields.

—Militarily, the agreement reaffirms the cease-fire. It widens the buffer zone and extends the limitations of forces that were negotiated in the disengagement agreement of January 1974. These balanced provisions markedly reduce the danger of surprise attack that figured centrally in the wars of 1967 and 1973.

—Politically, the agreement, which remains in force until it is superseded by another one, commits both sides to a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict and to refrain from use or threat of force or of military blockade. It permits nonmilitary Israeli cargoes to go through the newly reopened Suez Canal.

Both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat have hailed the agreement as a possible turning point. It represents the most far-reaching practical test of peace—political, military, and psychological—in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time, Israel and an Arab state have taken a

step not just to halt fighting or to disentangle forces but to reduce the danger of future war and to commit themselves to peaceful settlement of the conflict. The effort that went into it and the inhibitions that both sides had to overcome reflect a serious determination to end a generation of violence. And both sides have affirmed that the agreement is a significant step in a process that must be continued toward a just and durable peace.

The achievement owes much to the courage of leaders on both sides.

President Sadat and his government moved Egypt on the path of moderation and development; they have understood that a political process offered the only realistic hope for the achievement of *all* Arab interests.

Credit is due equally to the courage of Prime Minister Rabin and the Government of Israel. Israel's dilemma is that to obtain peace it must give up tangible assets such as territory for intangible concessions such as assurances and recognition. Israel's leaders realized that only negotiation offered a hope to achieve what Israel has sought for 27 years—new political conditions that would mean acceptance by its neighbors, in return for withdrawal from territory. They had the wisdom to recognize that the time had come to start this difficult, even painful process.

The presence of 200 civilian Americans to assist with the early-warning system in the small area of the passes is a limited—but crucial—American responsibility. It was not a role we sought. We accepted it at the request of both sides only when it became totally clear that there would be no agreement without it and only on carefully limited terms. We agreed because failure would have posed grave risks for the United States.

In the aftermath of Indochina the concerns of some Americans about this presence are understandable. But the two cases are totally different. The American presence in the Sinai is not a step *into* conflict; it is a move which gives added insurance *against* conflict. It is limited to 200 volunteer civilians by agreement with both sides. They will be stationed in a small but important sector of the U.N. neutral zone. They are not combat personnel or advisers engaged on *one* side

of an ongoing war. They serve *both* sides at their request and complement the U.N. presence from such countries as Canada, Sweden, Austria, and Finland.

Our presence in the area is not new. Indeed, 36 Americans are at this moment serving with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East. Americans have been serving in this capacity for over 25 years.

The agreement provides the President the right to withdraw the American personnel if they are in jeopardy. We are prepared, as well, to accept a congressional proposal making the withdrawal mandatory in case of hostilities.

In short, what we have proposed to the Congress and the American people is not an engagement in war, but an investment in peace.

Military and Economic Assistance

There will also be deliberation in the Congress over military and economic assistance to the parties. We will submit our recommendations within a month. This assistance is not part of the agreement itself. Indeed, most of the assistance we shall request would have been sought even if there were no agreement. But in the present context our aid takes on new significance; it is central to our policy and vital to the chances for a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Economic and military support for Israel's security has been American policy during five Administrations. Last May, 76 U.S. Senators wrote to President Ford urging that the United States "be responsive to Israel's urgent economic and military needs." The Administration's request for new assistance to Israel is responsive to this call; it will reflect longstanding criteria of assistance; only a small part grows out of new requirements arising from the agreement.

The case for aid to Egypt is equally strong. Egypt has taken important steps toward peace and closer relations with the West. Egypt deserves our encouragement. American technology and capital, public and private, can strengthen all the constructive tend-

encies in the Middle East. The symbolic and substantive significance of American support to Egypt is immeasurable.

Thus, the additional burden of U.S. assistance is modest, infinitely smaller than the demonstrated costs of another war—which in 1973 required direct appropriations to Israel of \$2.2 billion in addition to the indirect costs. But its role is crucial. It reduces the incentives for war; it, too, is an investment in peace.

Continuing Process Toward Peace

Where do we go from here?

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement is a step in a continuing process. The agreement states explicitly that the parties shall continue the negotiating efforts to reach an overall final peace settlement in accordance with Resolution 338.

The path ahead will be difficult. In the immediate future, we must begin the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement. This must await the deliberation and decision of the Congress. When this is settled and if the agreement goes into effect, we will start our consultations with all concerned to assure that there is consensus on the next step. We will not move precipitously, because we want confidence to build. We will not move without careful preparation, because we want the process to continue to succeed.

But the effort to achieve a lasting peace must resume. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement has created new opportunities for the future—but these opportunities must be seized, or they will disappear. The United States did not help negotiate this agreement in order to put an end to the process of peace, but to give it new impetus. There can be no stagnation, for the area remains tense and volatile.

For our part, we stand ready to assist as the parties desire. We will seriously encourage a negotiation between Syria and Israel. We are prepared to consult all countries concerned, including the Soviet Union, about the timing and substance of a reconvened Geneva Conference. And we are fully aware that there will be no permanent peace

unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

The United States seeks no special advantage in the Middle East. It has always been our policy that the nations of the region should be free to determine their own relationships with any outside power. Therefore the United States would not understand, and would be obliged to oppose, efforts by any outside power to thwart the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

In the search for a final peace, the United States is prepared to work with the Soviet Union. We are cosponsors of the Security Council resolutions that launched this hopeful course of negotiation; we are cochairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference, which met at an early crucial phase. While we have had important differences with the Soviet Union over the substance of a settlement, our two countries have held parallel views that the Middle East situation poses grave dangers and that partial steps must be part of, and contribute to, progress toward a comprehensive solution.

In the Middle East there is a yearning for peace surpassing any known for a generation. Let us seize this historic opportunity. The suffering and bravery of the peoples of the Middle East demand it; the highest interests of the United States require it.

This is why the American people, their Congress, and the President are, to an extraordinary degree, united on the course of our Middle East policy. And this is why we will not cease our effort.

American Leadership and American Unity

Ladies and gentlemen, we Americans have spent the better part of a decade apologizing to ourselves and the world for what we thought we had become. We have spent most of the last three years enmeshed in a national tragedy that caused many to lose sight of what our country has meant, and continues to mean, to the billions abroad who look to the United States as a beacon of freedom and hope.

Today the issues that threatened our unity and confidence are in the process of being put behind us. A world of turmoil, danger, and opportunity cries out for our purposeful leadership. There is no doubt of our physical capacity and technical skill. But we must put them in the service of a common purpose.

After a decade of challenge and crises, we must strive to insure that our government will be united, that our people will have confidence, that our country will be strong, and that our freedoms will flourish. As we enter the year of a political campaign at home—in an era of unprecedented challenge abroad—a spirit of unity and bipartisanship becomes our international as well as national duty. We cannot afford a year and a half of partisan warfare. Our foreign policy must be a common enterprise of all Americans, for what we do—or fail to do—will inevitably affect events for many years to come.

If the past two years of effort in the Middle East have lessened the dangers of war and set that part of the world on the road to peace—as I pray they have—it is the United States that has made the difference. It is the United States alone among the world's nations that Israel and its Arab neighbors were prepared to trust. It has been deeply moving for me to observe, after all the travails and self-doubts of the last decade, the confidence that others have in us. The nations of the Middle East have thus done *us* a service, in reminding us of how in serving our international responsibility we also serve our own highest goals.

In the final analysis it is our own principles and hopes that define our obligation. America has always stood for something beyond our own material success: we have always believed—correctly—that we meant something to others. Our Founding Fathers spoke of the rights and hopes of *all* men. Our belief in the inalienable rights of man is no less compelling today—no less worthy of sacrifice—than it was 200 years ago when a few dreamers came together in Philadelphia to proclaim history's only truly permanent revolution.

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Cincinnati Address

Press release 482B dated September 16

William M. Liggett, president of the Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce: Dr. Kissinger has now kindly consented to field your questions. If we can have the first question, we will proceed with the question period.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems the Portuguese situation may be in the process of solving itself without too much U.S. help. May we conclude from this that it represents a new direction in the U.S. foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: If you are Secretary of State, you take credit for whatever happens, even if it is not done with U.S. help.

The situation in Portugal has had a long history. It arose out of a protracted colonial war and an authoritarian regime that failed to respond to popular wishes. When the revolution occurred last April, the Communist Party, which had been in opposition, emerged as the best organized, though not the most numerical, party. In addition, many of the officers who had served in Africa had also come back with authoritarian ideas, partly because military service does not always inspire ideas of democracy.

The result has been that for the greater part of this period the Communist Party acquired a disproportionate influence. And for a while it looked as if they would become the dominant force.

In recent months, our West European allies and we have made it clear to the moderate forces in Portugal and to the political parties in Portugal that we supported their effort to create a democratic pluralistic society. This may have encouraged them to resist more strongly and to bring about a better evolution. But the problem is far from solved and will continue to require substantial efforts on everybody's part.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my question is: With the economy of the country as it is today, where will the dollars come to support your Mideast policy, and what will be the ongoing effect on the economy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the points that I made in my speech are that the additional costs of the settlement in the Middle East are negligible and that the cost of a conflict in the Middle East would be enormous. It is not that aid to Israel and Egypt are new charges on our budget as a result of this agreement. It is rather that these have been figures which we have been appropriating year after year. Last year the total aid voted for Israel amounted to \$2.5 billion, which is more than we will be asking for this year after the agreement. So the sums that we are talking about for the Middle East are this time in the context of a move toward peace rather than to continue an endless stalemate, and they are a better investment than would be the case under conditions of stalemate, and a much better investment than if it drifted toward war.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the recently negotiated treaty between Israel and Egypt puts the United States in a more powerful bargaining position with the OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]; and if so, why?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the primary reason why we have been involved in these negotiations in the Middle East is because the demonstrated consequences to the United States of a conflict in the Middle East have immediate effects on our security and a major effect on our economy. In addition, it may be that the United States is in a somewhat better bargaining position with at least some of the OPEC countries that are interested in this conflict.

But I want to make clear that our motivation is not the pressure from the oil-producing countries and that we do not let our foreign policy be determined by the price of oil. If there are any benefits, they are indirect, and they were not the basic motivation of our negotiations.

Q. Dr. Kissinger—

Secretary Kissinger: I think this group is more disciplined than the one on my left. [Laughter.]

Q. George Ball, writing in Newsweek, has taken the position that the interim agreement between Egypt and Israel precludes the possibility of a long-range settlement with the other Arab nations because all possibilities for compromise have been exhausted now. What is your reaction to Mr. Ball's position?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am not in complete agreement with Mr. Ball. [Laughter.] He seems to be saying that we should not make the agreements that we could be making, in order to reserve their possibilities for some future time.

The problem of making a permanent peace in the Middle East has the same elements with or without the agreement. But with this agreement the tension is less, the pressures of an imminent war are reduced, and the other Arab countries, after the period of turmoil that inevitably followed this agreement, may come to realize—and we hope will come to realize—that the process of moderation is the only hope of bringing the conflict to a conclusion and achieving their goals.

So I cannot fully accept all the arguments made by Mr. Ball. In fact, I cannot accept any of them. [Laughter and applause.]

Q. Do you agree that it is time we lifted the embargo against Cuba?

Secretary Kissinger: Our policy toward Cuba is that we are prepared to move gradually toward an improvement of relations on the basis of reciprocity.

There have been two kinds of embargoes against Cuba. There have been the American sanctions; there have been the OAS [Organization of American States] sanctions. An increasing number of OAS countries have gone ahead to ignore the OAS sanctions; and as a result, we agreed to an OAS resolution in Costa Rica in July which leaves each country free to do what it wants to do—which was exactly the situation before the resolution, except that it now makes it legal.

As far as the United States is concerned, we will not lift the sanctions as the first step in the process; but we are prepared to discuss an improvement of our relationship that could in time lead to a lifting of the sanctions.

Q. Hello, Dr. Kissinger, it's nice to see you in Cincinnati.

Secretary Kissinger: Nice to see you.

Q. And I apologize for my long question.

What can we, as patriotic Americans and inheritors of a humane, democratic tradition, do to foster understanding among our fellow men and give constructive aid to our elected representatives so that the programs which promote equality and peace among the nations will not get bogged down in selfish misrepresentation by the media, slanted interests, and political power plays? [Laughter and applause.]

Secretary Kissinger: I think what you are doing here is a very good way of going about it. [Laughter.]

Q. I saw you last Monday in Washington.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you please explain the Russian sporadic grain buying, and can we get them to trade oil for grain?

Secretary Kissinger: The Russian sporadic grain buying is explained by the fact that in the past they have only purchased American grain when their own harvest fell short; and this seems to have happened in cycles of every three or four years. In the interim, they did very little buying.

We feel that the massive entry of the Soviet Union into our grain market at irregular intervals puts an excessive burden on our consumers and makes it very difficult for us to take account of all the requirements both of our consumers and of other traditional customers.

It is for this reason that we have proposed to the Soviet Union that they negotiate with us a long-term grain agreement with lower and upper limits, which would enable our farmers to do their planning and which would minimize the impact on the American consumers and still keep us free to supply our traditional customers such as Japan.

We are now in the process of negotiating such an agreement, which is of benefit to us, even on its own merit, unrelated to anything else.

At the same time, we are having prelimi-

nary discussions about the purchase of some Soviet oil. These discussions are not yet advanced to a point where we can draw any conclusions about their feasibility, but they are being undertaken.

Q. Mr. Secretary, many people regret the lack of attention to our Latin American neighbors in your own administration of the State Department, and, in truth, in all recent U.S. foreign policy. Would you explain this inattention? Our hope is that you and Nancy will take a shuttle weekend down there sometime. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Of course you will never find an official who will admit that his policy is anything than the best that can be pursued. [Laughter.]

I would not agree that there has been inattention to Latin America. It is, of course, true that not every policy in every area of the world can be pursued with equal intensity. But in fact we attach great importance to our relationships in the Western Hemisphere. In fact, two years ago we started something called the new dialogue between Latin America and the United States, because of our conviction that if the relationship between developing and developed countries is going to work anywhere, it ought to work in the Western Hemisphere, where we are dealing with countries of comparable background, comparable aspirations.

There have been setbacks—some of them caused by some legislative actions here, some of them caused by the tendency of Latin American countries to seek their identity in opposition to the United States—so that the process has not been smooth. But we are committed to improving relationships in the Western Hemisphere. We are trying to develop a new relationship, and it is a process, as in all relations between the developed and developing countries, that runs up against prickly self-esteem and a historical legacy—but on which perhaps not very dramatic, steady progress is being made.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I am interested in the question of: What is the effect of continuing Federal Government borrowing on the money market, and also the creation of new capital?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it used to be said that my knowledge of economics was an argument against universal suffrage. [Laughter.] And I tended to believe that until I started dealing with the economists. [Laughter and applause.]

But for the sake of good relations with my friend the Secretary of the Treasury, I had better not make policy pronouncements about the impact of his borrowing on the capital market—though experts have told me that it is not healthy. [Laughter and applause.]

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in light of your remarks this evening and with the new interim settlement between Egypt and Israel, can we look forward in the near future to any significant movement toward a new shuttle between Syria and Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: My colleagues and I leave every shuttle with the iron determination never again to be caught in such a situation. [Laughter.] And having gone through a 30-day shuttle between Syria and Israel once before, I am sure that I speak for all of my colleagues if I say we first must restore our sanity after the last one before we contemplate a new one. [Laughter.]

But having said all of this, we will encourage—as I said in my speech—negotiations between Syria and Israel. In the first instance, they should take place as they did in the case of Egypt—through diplomatic channels. If the parties narrow their differences, and if they should think it helpful, we will of course be prepared to do what is necessary to help them reach a final settlement.

But we are still some time away from that point.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have already answered part of my question, but nevertheless I would like to ask this: Why can't we trade our wheat or other foodstuffs to the Soviet Union, or other oil-producing countries, for oil at the going world price for oil and food?

This is not part of the question: Dr. Kissinger, I would like to thank you for the great work you are doing for our country and the world for peace. [Applause.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have already

explained what we are attempting to do in relation to the Soviet Union. You have to remember that the Soviet surplus of oil is not great in relationship to our needs. But within this margin, we are having preliminary discussions.

With respect to other countries, those countries with the largest surplus of oil also have relatively small requirements for the import of food, requirements which they can meet elsewhere.

But as a basic proposition, we believe that we are managing our food surplus responsibly, keeping in mind the requirements of all of humanity. We think that the oil producers should apply a similar standard in managing their scarce commodity. [Applause.]

Q. Dr. Kissinger, back to Egypt. As part of the economic assistance to Egypt, will the Administration ask for most-favored-nation status for this country?

Secretary Kissinger: I suspect that Egypt already has most-favored-nation status. The overwhelming majority of countries have most-favored-nation status. There is a special prohibition with respect to Communist nations that was passed in the 1950's in the aftermath of the Korean war. Incidentally, the Soviet Union had most-favored-nation status before the Korean war, but Stalin never took advantage of it. I suspect—I would have to check this—that Egypt already has most-favored-nation status; and therefore we would not have to ask for it.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, obviously, you endure as one of the most successful negotiators of the century. I sincerely mean that. To which personal attribute do you most attribute this? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: The morale of my staff requires frequent absences from the country. [Laughter.]

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I see the United Nations as an even greater potential for interaction between nations and a greater peace tool. However, many of our residents in the Midwest seem to be very lukewarm toward the United Nations. What is your assessment of the real value of the United Nations to the

United States and to the rest of the world, currently?

Secretary Kissinger: I spoke about the United Nations a few months ago in Milwaukee [July 14]. I think the United Nations in many areas is doing important work. In many technical areas, in some areas of development, its contribution is quite crucial. In the area of peacekeeping, as for example in the Middle East, Cyprus, and elsewhere, the United Nations plays an indispensable role.

On the other hand, I am frank to say that there have been certain tendencies in the United Nations recently that have filled us power. It was our concern that if these tendency by the nations of the so-called Group of 77 to form a rigid bloc of their own and, because they have a numerical majority in the United Nations, to try to steamroller it into decisions that reflect neither the justice of the issue nor the actual distribution of power. It was our concern that if these tendencies continued, gradually the United Nations would lose much of its political utility.

The recent special session of the General Assembly that just concluded today, has to some extent reversed some of these tendencies. If that atmosphere, if that spirit can be carried forward, then perhaps it will be possible to give the United Nations again the significance that many people hope for it to have.

We want to avoid that it becomes the arena of sterile ideological confrontations—and that requires a spirit of compromise and a willingness to cooperate on all parts.

So we are going into the next General Assembly, which is starting this week, with an open mind and with the recognition that the United Nations has done much good in many parts of the world, but also that some of the tendencies of recent years should not be repeated—namely, bloc voting, ideological confrontations, and similar tactics. [Applause.]

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my question is: What is your opinion on the traditional manner in which the Arabs conduct their business, primarily in the area of accepting a fee that some Americans consider kickbacks, bribes, et cetera?

Secretary Kissinger: Some of these practices are not considered illegal, or even unusual, in other parts of the world.

The United States does not condone—we have made a formal statement in which we have told our corporations that we do not approve of illegal or unethical conduct in their activities abroad. In some of the more flagrant cases which have come to our attention, we have used our moral influence—because we have no legal jurisdiction beyond the United States—to stop practices which are not in accord with basic American convictions.

So I can confine my remarks to the conduct of Americans, rather than to the conduct of foreigners. We think that American companies are, on the whole, best served to conduct themselves within the American legal and ethical norms—even if other conduct is condoned in other parts of the world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, someday your power will be diminished—

Secretary Kissinger: Begin again—I did not get that. [Laughter.]

Q. Obviously, someday your power will be diminished. That happens to all of us.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought I heard that. [Laughter.] I thought I heard you say that.

Q. When this happens, do you feel your programs will be continued?

Secretary Kissinger: I was so shocked by the first sentence— [Laughter.] Could you repeat the second one again?

Q. Obviously, I think a great deal of what you are doing, and I am asking you—after you no longer wield the power you wield now—do you think the programs that you have in motion will continue, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: That first part of your sentence has given enormous hope to my associates. [Laughter.]

I think any foreign policy to be valid has to transcend the individual. And the reason—whatever successes are achieved by our foreign policy—is importantly due to the fact that we have now, at the top level of

the State Department, the ablest younger group that has been there in three decades. I am confident that after I leave, these individuals will be able to serve my successors with equal dedication and equal ability, and that the main lines of the foreign policy will be continued. [Applause.]

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is being done to solve the problem of the missing in action in Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: In Viet-Nam, with the North Vietnamese, we are dealing with a country that ever since we have started dealing has systematically used the anguish of American families to achieve its political ends and to attempt to blackmail us.

Under the Paris Agreement, there was supposed to be a full accounting of the missing in action. That has not been carried out.

At the time that North Viet-Nam applied for membership in the United Nations, they notified us that they had the remains of three Americans whom they would turn over. When we voted against their membership in the United Nations, they withdrew this offer.

We voted against their membership in the United Nations not as an anti-North Vietnamese gesture, but as a question of principle. We did not see why we should vote for the admission of Communist countries to the United Nations when South Korea, which has been a nation for a longer period, and which fulfills the criteria of U.N. membership at least as well as North Viet-Nam, had been denied admission. We do not accept the principle of “selective universality.”

So this was not directed as an act against North Viet-Nam. Nevertheless, North Viet-Nam rejected this offer, withdrew its offer. We consider this a cynical exploitation of the anguish of people who have already suffered too much, and we cannot let ourselves be pressured by these tactics.

We are appealing to North Viet-Nam at regular intervals for this accounting. We have appealed to their allies. We have appealed to neutrals that have helped them. But I regret to say, it has not been effective.

I think that over the years we are prepared to improve our relationships with the Vietnamese; and when that happens, perhaps

some progress will be made on the missing in action. All I can say is, we will continue our efforts. But in the short term, I am not too optimistic.

The chairman: Mr. Secretary, let me again tell you how grateful we are for these hours you have spent in Cincinnati today. I know you go back to Washington with the feeling that the Greater Cincinnati area does have an interest in world affairs. We thank you for being here.

President Ford's News Conference of September 16

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the Oval Office at the White House on September 16.¹

Q. I think you probably read the [Washington] Post today, and also Jack Anderson, concerning secret accords with Israel for supplying the newest technology, including missiles that could be armed with nuclear warheads and so forth. Is this true?

President Ford: That material has all been submitted to the responsible committees in the Congress. The announcement concerning the F-16 and the Pershing missile—those are not firm commitments.

They do involve negotiations between the United States and Israel. They are on a shopping list, and they will be discussed with representatives of the Israeli Government.

Q. Do you really think you should arm one power in the Middle East at a time when you are moving toward peace with the potential of offensive weapons in that—

President Ford: We have for a long, long time supplied Israel with very substantial amounts of military hardware. This was a policy established a good many years ago,

and we have always felt that the survival of Israel in the Middle East was very important, and the military hardware that we have in the past and will in the future provide for that survival—as I indicated at the outset, these items were on a list open for discussion between the United States and the Israeli Government.

Q. Mr. President, is the United States moving toward a security treaty with Israel? This document which we read in the Post suggests quite a close, more formalized defense relationship with Israel.

President Ford: I wouldn't say a security treaty. I would simply reiterate what I have said before: that historically the United States has supplied Israel with very substantial military weaponry and it is our plan to do so in the future.

But there is no firm commitment on any of the weapons that I think got in the headlines this morning. They are merely open for discussion.

Q. Sir, part of this agreement with Israel involves our providing them with oil either through foreign credits or giving oil to them from our own supply. We don't have enough for ourselves and can't afford to pay for what we are getting. How can we supply Israel over several years?

President Ford: We believe there are sources available to Israel to keep Israel secure after they have given up the oilfields in the Middle East. We are not concerned that these supplies will be turned off, and therefore it will have no adverse impact, as we see it, on our own supplies.

Q. But we will pay for this oil, will we not? We will pay for this through foreign credits?

President Ford: This is a part of the overall military economic agreement with Israel, and it is a step, I believe, in maintaining the peace. I think it is fair to point out that several months ago 76 Senators sent me a letter actually urging that I recommend to the Congress more money for Israel and no guarantee of peace, whereas at the present

¹ For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 22.

time we have made this agreement—or Israel and Egypt have made this agreement—and the prospective cost to the United States is less than what the 76 Senators recommended that we propose to the Congress for Israel.

So we not only have peace and a step toward a broader peace, but it is also at a lesser cost than what the 76 Senators promoted.

Q. Mr. President, as you know, a good many congressional offices are receiving mail which runs contrary to your proposal for the Middle East peace settlement, particularly objecting to the use of American civilian technicians in the Sinai. I was wondering, sir, if as you say that is worth the risk? How long are those Americans going to be there, and is that not an open-ended commitment?

President Ford: They will be there during the term of the agreement unless I, or another President, withdraw them because of any danger to their lives. It is a case of not more than 200 American civilians performing a highly technical warning-station responsibility in a U.N. buffer zone. I think it is a good contribution by the United States to the establishment and permanency of peace in the Middle East.

Q. May I follow up, please? I would like to ask what you would do if in the course of their term in the Sinai, the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] moves in and kidnapped some of them, captured them, or if perhaps they were killed? Would you then use American intervention—the question being then, can you flatly rule out there would be no American intervention to protect those technicians?

President Ford: I am not going to speculate on something I do not anticipate will happen. I think I or any other President would use utmost caution in the protection of the lives of any Americans.

Yes?

Q. Mr. President, to follow that up, if you are committed to the use of Americans on the

Egyptian front, would you also, later perhaps, be committed to the principle of using Americans on the Jordanian or the Syrian front?

President Ford: I don't think I should speculate about any negotiations or agreements that have not yet begun. It is a very valuable contribution to peace in the present agreement, but I would not want to make any commitment concerning any other.

Q. Mr. President, was President Sadat aware before he initialed this agreement, signed the agreement, that the U.S. would be discussing with Israel the missiles and the other shopping list of things you have mentioned, in specifics?

President Ford: I think they were familiar with the fact we anticipated a commitment to Israel for sizable military hardware. I can't indicate to you whether they knew the precise weapons or not but they knew, of course, we were going to make a substantial commitment in weapons to Israel.

Q. Mr. President, in this agreement published in the Post today, it refers to the United States viewing with particularly gravity threats made against Israel by a world power and goes on to say that the United States would promptly consult with Israel on support or assistance that it could lend.

Now, does this go forward toward a security treaty, or does it not, and, if so, doesn't it have to be taken to the Congress first to be approved?

President Ford: That language does not constitute a treaty. The words speak for themselves.

Q. Mr. President, does the potential agreement between Israel and Egypt with the U.S. participation make your job easier on the Turkish aid matter in Congress? Is there a parallel that you can draw, that your legislative people can draw for the Congressmen?

President Ford: I don't believe there is any

neat analogy between the two, but the fact that we have made headway in the Middle East and achieved it through negotiation ought to be helpful in convincing the Congress that negotiations in the Turkish aid embargo is the way to solve the problem.

But, there is no direct connection between the two problems as such.

Tenth Round of U.S.-Spain Talks Held at Washington

*Joint U.S.-Spain Communique*¹

The tenth round of negotiations took place in Washington September 15-17. As in the past, the Spanish Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Juan Jose Rovira, headed the Spanish Delegation and Ambassador-at-Large Robert J. McCloskey led the United States Delegation.

The two delegations met in plenary sessions September 15-17 and continued to examine their positions in a spirit of mutual

determination to lay the basis for a new agreement. While the present agreement expires September 25, 1975, it provides that, in the event it is not renewed, U.S. forces may remain in Spain for one year in accord with and in the form prescribed by Article 39 of the present agreement.² It is understood that this provision will be applied in a way which would permit the two sides to continue to work on a new agreement without interrupting the cooperative defense arrangements which serve the interests of both countries, and both sides expect that negotiations looking toward a new agreement will continue beyond the expiration date.

The working group set up to study the problems arising in connection with the implementing annexes of a new agreement will remain in Washington to continue its work. In addition, Spanish representatives to the working group on customs and fiscal matters will come to Washington for talks on September 23 and 24.

¹ Issued on Sept. 17 (text from press release 486).

² For text of the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United States and Spain signed at Washington on Aug. 6, 1970, see BULLETIN of Aug. 31, 1970, p. 237.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Cincinnati September 17

Press release 490 dated September 18

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said last night that the U.S. aid to Egypt and Israel is not part of the agreement. As a practical matter, what would it do to the agreement if Congress will not approve the amount of aid Egypt expects?

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, as part of the agreement Egypt does not expect any particular amount. And I would think that the agreement would be implemented even if Congress does not appropriate the amount we are going to be requesting, actually from either side.

Nevertheless, as I pointed out yesterday, the prospects of peace in the Middle East, the whole evolution in the area, would be adversely affected if the Congress would not agree to the general range of figures that we are going to be proposing. But it is not tied to the agreement, and the agreement itself would almost certainly go forward—would certainly go forward. But since we have always considered the agreement as only one step in the progress, the process would be adversely affected.

Q. Mr. Secretary, along that same line—and this seems to be one of the most sensitive areas of the Sinai accord—if the Congress does not go along with the idea of placing 200 technicians in the Sinai, what will happen to the agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: The technicians are linked to the agreement; and if Congress does not go ahead, then at the minimum there would have to be a renegotiation of the agreement.

The American proposal is technically in the form of a proposal although we did it at the request of the parties; the document

that establishes the American presence is an organic part of the overall agreement; and therefore, if the Congress did not approve it, the agreement, at a minimum, would have to be renegotiated. It certainly would not be automatically implemented the way it is not foreseen.

One point that I would like to stress is that there will never be 200 Americans in the Sinai at any one moment. Two hundred is the total number of Americans that are assigned to that mission. Since they will have to operate in three shifts, as a practical matter there will never be more than 60 or so—60 to 70—in the pass area at any one moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in addition to the agreement signed in Geneva several weeks ago, the New York Times reports that there is a separate agreement involving an amount of American aid totaling somewhat, I think they speculated, \$2.5 billion. Now, contrasted with the alternative, a new Middle East war, do you think this amount is justified?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, the separate agreement between Israel and the United States was submitted by us to the Congress. This is not something that we obscured from the Congress. It was submitted by us to the Congress in a classified form and then leaked to the newspapers, and it raises questions of how one can handle these documents in the future.

Now as for the amount, we have also told the Congress the approximate order of magnitude that we are going to request, which would be less than \$2.5 billion.

There are two considerations with respect to this aid. One, the 1973 war required nearly \$2.5 billion in appropriations for the war alone in addition to the regular appropria-

tions that Israel was getting. In addition, it cost us beyond \$10 billion for the direct costs of the oil embargo, together with the intangible costs of a 5 percent rise in our price index, large unemployment, and so forth. So there is no question that the amounts we are thinking about now would be trifling compared to what a war would cost us.

Secondly, if I may just make one other point. One should not have this debate on the issue that the agreement is producing the need for this aid. A substantial amount of aid has been voted by the Congress year after year without an agreement. Last year the Congress appropriated nearly \$3 billion for Israel, some of it emergency aid, without an agreement. As I said yesterday, 76 Senators had already asked us to meet Israel's needs before the agreement. So the reasonable debate is to do it in terms of additional cost and not to take the whole package, the overwhelming part of which would have been submitted to the Congress even without the agreement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will this agreement include Pershing ground-to-ground missiles and the F-16?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the Pershing missiles, all the United States has agreed to do is to study the problem. We have not made a commitment. With respect to the F-16, this is a modernization of the F-4's. There, too, we have not yet made a commitment, as the President pointed out yesterday.

You have to remember also we are talking about weapons here—in the F-16—that could not be delivered before the late seventies or early eighties. We are talking here about a long-term relationship, and not about something that is going to happen tomorrow.

The Israel Defense Minister is arriving in Washington—I think he arrived last night—and there are going to be technical discussions with him. The next thing that will happen is a technical study of what can be done.

There have been no commitments made with respect to either of these weapons, but especially there have been no commitments made with respect to the Pershing.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your speech last night you mentioned the future of the Palestinians and the final resolution of the Middle East crisis. Do you foresee the creation of a Palestinian state? And do you anticipate a role for yourself in any negotiations that might go into the creation of that Palestinian state?

Secretary Kissinger: Anyone who has been on a shuttle leaves with the determination not to get involved in another negotiation if he can possibly help it.

The future of the Palestinians has many aspects. It has the aspect of the future of the West Bank, the relationship of the West Bank settlement to those Palestinians who are not living on the West Bank, and similar matters.

The U.S. preference prior to Rabat had been that the issue should be settled in a negotiation between Jordan and Israel. That was the position we supported, and that is still basically our preference.

With respect to the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization], until the PLO accepts the existence of the State of Israel and accepts Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the United States has no decision to make, because we cannot encourage a negotiating process between parties one of which wants to destroy the other and has it as its avowed policy to destroy the other. But a settlement of the Palestinians and a settlement of the West Bank will have to be part of an overall settlement. As we discuss it, the United States would be prepared to be helpful.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, did you sign with Israel an agreement refusing to allow the Palestine Liberation Organization to take part in Geneva peace talks unless Israel approved? And did you agree not to have the United States recognize the PLO unless the PLO recognized Israel's rights as a sovereign nation?

Secretary Kissinger: Technically we have not signed any agreement with Israel. We have agreed on some documents that we might agree to.

Secondly, you have to remember that in every previous negotiation and at every previous critical point we have had what are

called memoranda of understandings between us and Israel that up to now have guided our policies and have not been made public. In this particular case, because of the American presence that we have recommended, we felt morally obliged to submit to the Congress the whole record of our commitments, and this is why these things are becoming public in a more absolute way than would otherwise be the case.

Our position vis-a-vis Israel is exactly the one I have publicly stated today; that is, vis-a-vis Israel and the PLO. Our position is exactly what I have stated; it is neither more nor less. Unless the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel and the relevant resolutions, we cannot make a decision. After that, we will see. That is not a secret agreement; that is a public statement. We have also expressed it as a formal statement to the Israelis, but it is merely codifying what we have repeatedly said publicly and what I have said again publicly this morning.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I believe you said last night the Administration would agree to provisions to withdraw Americans from the Sinai if hostilities should begin there.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. Americans would be manning the early-warning system. Wouldn't such a withdrawal in part defeat their purpose of being there? And how would they get out once hostilities did begin?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you have to remember that the Americans are in an area in which there are now 5,000 U.N. troops, and in which there may well be more because the area is now larger. So practically, it is almost impossible for hostilities to begin unless something has previously happened to the U.N. forces.

The American presence is not designed as an early-warning system for one side. The American presence is designed to give both sides assurances in periods of relative stability that there are no surprise attacks being planned by the other. Under conditions of extreme tension—where a war is imminent—we have a new situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, from your perspective what do you think the chances are that Congress will approve sending the 200 technicians?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to speak for the Congress. My impression in talking to many Congressmen and testifying before many committees is that the Congress will approve the 200 technicians with the same enthusiasm with which the Administration agreed to them in the first place.

Q. How much enthusiasm is that?

Secretary Kissinger: Minimum.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel positive about the concept and goals of the new economic order agreed on by the United Nations, yesterday I believe?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not seen the explanations the various parties have given of that document. We do not consider this a statement of a new economic order. Indeed, the theme of my speech to the United Nations was to forget the debate on slogans—that we would declare a moratorium on our favorite slogans and we want the developing countries to declare a moratorium on their favorite slogans, among which the “new economic order” figures prominently.

We submitted 41 proposals of various orders of significance to the United Nations as our idea of where progress could be made. I think about 14 of them were adopted. The others are still being studied. We think that the results of the special session, whatever title you give them, ended a period of confrontation for the time being between the developing countries and the developed countries and at least created an opportunity for the process to go forward on a cooperative basis. If that turns out to be the case, then the special session will have been a watershed in our relationships to the developing world.

We do not accept the phrase “new economic order.” We are trying to get the debate on concrete specifics that we have supported, and on that basis I think both the atmosphere and the results of this special session were a definite step forward.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in two speeches yesterday—one here last night and one in Florida—you warned the oil-producing nations of consequences if they again raised the price of oil. What is the United States prepared to do? How far would we go if that eventuality took place?

Secretary Kissinger: We have to keep in mind that the basic thing that the United States can do is to adopt an energy policy of our own that shifts the market power away from the producers. In the absence of this, we are not in a position to do something dramatically immediate.

On the other hand, if the oil-producing countries insist on policies that, in our judgment, impair the economic progress of the industrialized nations, sooner or later it is bound to have some effect on the political relationships. At what point that would occur, I do not now want to say. But we believe it is essential that a cooperative relationship develop between the producers and consumers, and we will make a major contribution to that effect.

Q. There was speculation about some military-type action—

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think—

Q. —in some eventuality.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that would be inappropriate in any of the contingencies now foreseeable.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the Washington Post reports that in the memorandum of agreement the United States agrees to undertake conservation measures in order to make available oil to Israel should both the United States and Israel be placed under an oil embargo. Would you yourself support gas rationing in the United States in order to keep Israel supplied? And if not, what sort of conservation did you have in mind?

Secretary Kissinger: Rather than debate what the Washington Post said, the United States agrees that in case of a general embargo, the United States would apply to Israel the same general formula that already

exists within the IEA [International Energy Agency] with respect to Western Europe and Japan and the other members of the IEA.

This means that all of the members of the IEA have agreed that in case of an embargo against any one of them, there would be certain percentage cuts in consumption and a certain percentage sharing of imports. This is to prevent selective embargoes and to make sure that an embargo against one is an embargo against all. Therefore the issue will never come up in the form of American gas rationing so that Israel can have oil; that way the issue will never come up. If there is an embargo against the United States—whether or not Israel is affected—the United States is obliged by its agreement with the other countries to accept certain cuts in consumption that would enable us to share in everybody's pool of oil. These would be the principles that would be applied.

You have to remember, also, that the total requirement of Israel is about 120,000 barrels a day while our total imports are about 7 million barrels a day. So we are talking about an infinitesimal portion that could not possibly affect the American consumer.

But I repeat, the United States is under no obligation—just because Israel is embargoed—to do anything to its own consumption. The consumption requirements arise when there is a general embargo and there is a general sharing of oil with Western Europe and Japan primarily.

Q. Do I understand, then, that there is no specific energy agreement between the United States—

Secretary Kissinger: There is a specific energy agreement to apply the IEA criteria, which are another agreement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spent your time, apparently, chiefly on the Middle East and before that, Viet-Nam, with détente, disarmament, and China thrown in for fringe benefits. Now last night you said that the fundamental issues of the last quarter of a century are issues of energy, food, raw materials, and economic development, and more, more steam is surrounding those issues.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Q. Treasury has a piece of that action. Mr. Butz [Earl L. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture] has a piece of that action, and, indeed, resulting in the kind of excessive burdens upon consumers as you mentioned last night.

The State Department is active and interested, but the whole American policy seems uncoordinated. Is there a need in your estimation for greater coordination of American policy in diplomatic activity on these great issues of the last quarter of the century? And would you accept the nomination of taking that on as your next great priority?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, you know I will be glad to handle foreign countries, but for me to announce that I want supervision of the Treasury and Agriculture Departments may mean that I have to stay in Cincinnati. [Laughter.] In fact, there are going to be many State Department officials who will also vote for that. [Laughter.]

You must not judge the amount of time that a senior official spends on a problem by the amount of news coverage it gets. You take the Middle East negotiations. They have received, because of their drama and because of the impact of a failure on the United States, an enormous amount of attention in the press. This does not mean, however, that I am spending most of my time on the Middle East. In fact, between May and the end of August, until I actually went on the shuttle, I spent relatively little time on the Middle East because the positions were well known. Until one or the other or both parties moved, there was not really very much that I could do. Then I spent a very intensive two-week period.

On the other hand, if you asked on what did I spend most of my time between May and the end of August, it was probably on the preparation of the message for the special session, because as you pointed out, this required a tremendous amount of coordination within our government between Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, OMB [Office of Management and the Budget], and other agencies and it required an enormous amount of congressional consultations. That, how-

ever, did not lend itself to newspaper coverage day after day until the whole process was completed. So there were only one or two newspaper stories about it, and those reported a speech.

Now it is true that our government has not been, on the whole, organized for the conduct of major strategic economic foreign policy because of the fragmentation. This has been enormously improved in recent months. The cooperation between Treasury and the State Department is really intimate. Secretary Simon [William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury] participated actively and supported our approach at the special session. On agriculture policy, too, such as the grain sale negotiations with the Soviet Union, there is now an effective coordination. So that I think that what you are referring to is substantially coming into being at this moment.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said in your speech last night that the American people, the Congress, and the President are united to an extraordinary degree on the Middle East policy. The White House reported last week that the mail was running 10 to 1 against the Sinai agreement and the Congressmen from this area report that their mail, although light, is overwhelmingly negative. What is your evidence of such overwhelming public support, and do you think you can get favorable action out of Congress without a greater expression of public support?

Secretary Kissinger: I think there is strong support for a peace effort in the Middle East. I think that the American public under the impact of the events in Indochina is suspicious about an American presence anywhere in new areas, and I am not saying that the American public supports every individual idea that is put forward. But I have the sense, both from editorial support and from general public support, that they are behind the general effort.

I believe that the Congress, as I have said, will support this agreement, because I believe they will come to the same conclusions that we did—while we were not looking for an opportunity to establish an American

presence and while we would have preferred to do without it, it turned out that no agreement could have been negotiated unless this happened. And so I believe that the Congress will support it.

My impression in the mail that is not addressed to specific provisions is one of overwhelming support. That does not mean that every last idea has equal support. But the idea of bringing about peace in the Middle East has, in my judgment, the strong support of the American public.

Q. Mr. Secretary, he asked the same question I had, so let me ask you this: What contact have you had with former President Nixon concerning the Middle East agreement between Egypt and Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: President Nixon did me the honor of appointing me to two very responsible positions, including my present one. Therefore I call him about once a month for a general chat. I did not have any discussions with him about the particular negotiations. And he is given briefings by the White House, from time to time, of an intelligence nature. He did not participate in advice on these negotiations, and I did not consult him about these negotiations, but I did call him after they were concluded and gave him a general rundown of what had been done.

Q. And what was his reaction?

Secretary Kissinger: It was generally supportive. I did not ask for his support. I just told him what had been done. It was not asking him to support it, it was just a brief conversation in which I told him what had been done.

Q. Did his resignation have any bearing on the holdup in the agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: His resignation produced a hiatus in a whole number of initiatives, because in the last month of his period in office and in the first months of President Ford's being in office, there was an inevitable

transition period which made it difficult to act with the coherence and decisiveness that would have occurred—it happens at the beginning and end of every administration.

Q. Wouldn't the Israelis have signed the interim agreement without the suggestion that the United States would ultimately supply them with the Pershing missiles and the F-16 fighter-bombers?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has not agreed to supply them with Pershing missiles. The United States has agreed to study the problem of Pershing missiles, and therefore that issue is totally separate from the agreement.

The F-16 is the next-generation plane after the F-4, which by 1980 will be about 20 years old, so this is not a new realm of technology. This is more a logical evolution. There, too, no commitment has been made as to any specific numbers or rate of delivery, and the United States has an ongoing military-supply relationship with Israel that has been renewed at periodic intervals. Sometimes this is in relationship to major events such as an agreement, but there is not that degree of organic relationship. In fact, this particular paragraph to which you are referring, was submitted to the Congress—it was really a marginal case. It was not in any basic document. We extracted it from something else in order to lean over backward to make sure that nothing would turn up later that could be construed as an American commitment. It was not directly, organically related to the agreement.

Q. Then are you saying that the Israelis would have signed the interim agreement even if we had not suggested that we would study the matter of the Pershing missiles and the F-16's?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that is hard to say. That would be hard to say.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I understand that you have a very tight schedule. On behalf of all of the assembled news media, I want to thank

you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you take another one? Mr. Secretary, I detected from you a sense of less than enthusiasm about the whole question of leaks. Can you tell us how you see leaks complicating your negotiations and why, on the reverse side, are you not in favor of such leaks on the theory that the more everybody knows, the easier your job will be?

Secretary Kissinger: We are in favor of the public knowing the nature of our commitments, and therefore, we made the fullest disclosure that has been made of any record of a negotiation to the congressional committees.

Secondly, we were working with the congressional committees on a document that would have been published later this week or early next week that would have stated the essence of these commitments, but perhaps in a manner that would have created fewer diplomatic problems.

A balance has to be struck between the need of disclosure, which is to say that the public has to know what the major commitments are of the United States. But then, there has to be an area of diplomacy which has to be kept confidential because of the necessity of confidence between governments, because some things are expressed in a way that is perfectly clear in terms of the action that has to follow but if it is published will force the kind of debate and the kind of clarification and explanation that will make things extremely complicated and, sometimes, extremely difficult for the various parties.

So the problem we have is to strike a balance between the necessity of the public knowing what it is the United States is

obliged to undertake and, at the same time, providing enough leeway for diplomatic flexibility.

Letters of Credence

Burma

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, U Tin Lat, presented his credentials to President Ford on September 3.¹

Guinea-Bissau

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Gil Vicente Vaz Fernandes, presented his credentials to President Ford on September 3.¹

Lesotho

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Lesotho, Teboho J. Mashologu, presented his credentials to President Ford on September 3.¹

Mali

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Mali, Mamadou Boubacar Kante, presented his credentials to President Ford on September 3.¹

South Africa

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa, Roelof Frederik Botha, presented his credentials to President Ford on September 3.¹

¹ For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Sept. 3.

Secretary Kissinger Appears Before Southern Governors Conference

Following are informal remarks made by Secretary Kissinger before the Southern Governors Conference at Orlando, Fla., on September 16 and the transcript of the questions and answers which followed.

INFORMAL REMARKS

Press release 481 dated September 16

America's active role in the world is not a matter of preference or a favor to others, but a reflection of interdependence and a recognition of our own vital interests. Peace for us is inseparable from global tranquillity. Prosperity for us is bound up with the progress of the rest of the world.

No challenge on the contemporary agenda illustrates these propositions more dramatically than energy.

America's factories and farms, our transportation and housing, the pace of our growth, and the prospects for our environment are all centrally affected by energy. The 1973 oil embargo and price increases accelerated inflation and exacerbated recession around the world. They cost this country half a million jobs and over \$10 billion in national production. In many industrial countries economic decline threatened political instability, and our allies' vulnerability to the oil crisis had significant foreign policy effects. In the developing world, hopes for economic expansion have been shattered by the dramatic rise in the costs of basic imported goods, food and fertilizer as well as fuel. Thus the energy crisis affects not only the standard of living of Americans but the basic conditions of international relations. It has become, inescapably, an urgent priority of national policy.

What is the energy crisis, and what must we do to resolve it?

The crisis results from two fundamental shifts in the world economy. First, for the last quarter century the United States and the industrial nations have become increasingly dependent upon foreign oil. The growth of our domestic energy production has not kept pace with the demand for energy that our growing economies need. In 1950, the United States was virtually self-sufficient; in 1960, we produced 93 percent of the energy and 84 percent of the oil we required; in 1974, we produced only 85 percent of our energy and 65 percent of our oil. If this trend continues, we may produce only 75 percent of our energy and 50 percent of our oil 10 years from now.

Second, the growing dependence on imports has enabled the oil-exporting countries to raise oil prices some 500 percent in the past two years. As a result of the huge financial resources they have amassed, they have even been able to meet a decline in demand—primarily caused by recession—by cutting production rather than price. Before the 1973 embargo OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] members produced at virtually full capacity. Now they are producing at only 72 percent of capacity. In 1973 the price was about \$3 a barrel; now it is over \$12, and OPEC is considering additional large price increases.

Thus, for the first time the supply and price of energy—a central element in the economies of all countries—can be manipulated by nations that do not necessarily have an interest in our well-being. And the vast financial weight the oil producers are acquiring gives them a new capacity for influencing the world monetary system and financial practices according to their own political objectives.

By the end of last year producers had already accumulated some \$75 billion in for-

eign assets. Each new dollar added to the price of oil increases their revenue by \$10 billion. This is a transfer of wealth and power unprecedented in suddenness and scale and carried with it great political leverage.

The producers' market power will remain unchallenged so long as the United States and other consumer nations do not drastically reduce their dependence on imported oil.

To deal with this crisis our country has developed a sound and comprehensive energy strategy. It has four elements:

—First, we must defend ourselves against short-term dangers. This means protection against another oil embargo, against sudden shifts in the assets held by oil countries, and against the threats to development in the poorer countries buffeted by price rises.

—Second, we must make America invulnerable to external energy pressures over the longer term. This requires reducing our annual increase in energy consumption, massive development of new sources of energy, and stocking oil on a scale large enough to replace imports in case of a new embargo.

—Third, we must join our efforts with the other industrial consuming countries. Collective action on conservation and development will reinforce our individual efforts.

—Finally, we must forge cooperation between consumers and producers of oil. We must create conditions under which we all help shape the price of oil through the world market and we all benefit from an expanding world economy.

The four elements of our strategy are interlinked. It does no good to make plans against a new embargo if each year the industrial countries grow more dependent on imported energy. Cooperative arrangements with other consumers will be ineffective if American vulnerability grows with every passing year. Conservation will prove a stop-gap unless we act now—and massively—to develop alternative sources of energy.

If all these elements of our strategy are vigorously pursued, we will gradually shift the balance in the world energy market. The cartel members will have to share with each other progressively greater production cut-backs in order to maintain the price. At the

same time, their need to pay for imports for consumption and for development and security programs will grow. At some point OPEC will lose its exclusive ability to determine the price of oil.

Short-Term and Longer Term Measures

We have made considerable progress in carrying forward our strategy, especially with respect to near-term dangers.

Acting rapidly in the early stages of the energy crisis, the United States and 17 other industrial nations joined in the International Energy Agency (IEA) for mutual assistance in the event of future oil embargoes. We agreed to build up oil stocks, to reduce consumption by the same percentage in the event of a new emergency, and to share available oil. Thus an embargo against one would be an embargo against all.

Early this year, at U.S. initiative, the industrial countries agreed on a \$25 billion support fund, to offset abrupt or predatory shifts of funds by OPEC, as well as balance-of-payments problems induced by high oil prices. The existence of this fund should enable industrial countries to resume their economic expansion without fear of financial disruption.

Also at U.S. initiative, the International Monetary Fund will create a special Trust Fund for concessional loans to developing countries hit hardest by oil price increases.

These steps are useful. But much remains to be done, especially for our longer term position.

First, we must intensify our effort to conserve energy in general and imported oil in particular.

Second, we must initiate now the measures needed to insure the availability of major amounts of new energy by the end of this decade and into the 1980's.

The impact of conservation measures will be immediate. We have already seen a reduction in oil consumption in response to the massive rise in prices. But more rigorous programs are required.

New energy production from fossil fuels and from nonconventional energy resources must be energetically fostered.

Decontrol of oil prices will both promote conservation and spur domestic oil production. Further legislative action is now needed to carry out the President's program—to insure greater supplies of natural gas, to open up our nation's vast energy reserves, and to fund the development of new nonconventional sources such as synthetic, solar, and geothermal energy.

Finally, to protect us from the threat of another embargo, the President has asked Congress to authorize the establishment of a strategic storage program and provide him with standby authority to take rapid conservation measures in future emergencies. These proposals, too, require urgent approval.

Collective Consumer Action

But action by the United States alone is not enough. We must proceed in parallel with other major consuming countries. For only by acting together can we end the oil producers' power to set prices unilaterally.

We and our partners in the International Energy Agency must set firm overall targets, divided equitably among us, and continue to verify each other's performance.

We must also join to accelerate production of new energy. Development costs will be enormous. We must work together to insure that financial resources are available. We must greatly expand our joint research and development, pooling national programs. Finally, we must assure participating energy-deficient countries that they will directly benefit from the development programs.

We must assure a common basis for all industrial countries to develop alternative supplies by agreeing that none of us will permit imported oil to be sold in our economies below a certain minimum price level. This will provide incentives for investment in new energy sources. And it will protect those who invest in higher cost energy from suffering a competitive disadvantage if the oil importers engage in predatory pricing.

We must enable energy-deficient countries to participate in such programs in other industrial countries with some assurance

that they will directly benefit from the development programs.

All these actions are part of a comprehensive package for long-term energy cooperation the IEA is developing with a deadline of December 1. We and our partners must meet this deadline. Unless consumer nations take joint action, no balanced dialogue with the producers is possible.

Relations with Producers

At the same time, we will seek a new relationship with the oil-producing nations. We are natural partners, not adversaries. Consumers must have reliable access to oil supplies at reasonable prices. To invest their new oil wealth, the producers must become major participants in the global financial and economic system. And to convert their new wealth into goods, they must become major importers of our products. We are ready to cooperate with the oil producers in linking our economies on equitable terms. We are prepared to shape new constructive relationships.

But another oil price rise would severely jeopardize these hopes. It could set off a relentless sequence of action and reaction, to the detriment of the entire world community. The expansion of the economies of the industrial countries would be inhibited by fears of further price rises and permanent inflation. OPEC oil exports would stagnate, leading to demands for even further price hikes. The most seriously affected victims would be the developing countries; their exports would plunge, their energy costs would soar, and their crippling debt burden would mount even higher. All nations have an interest in avoiding this.

Whatever the decision of the oil producers, the United States cannot entrust its political and economic destiny to decisions made elsewhere. Congress and the Administration must cooperate in a determined energy policy so that this country will recapture control over our future. Together with our allies, we will work to reverse the conditions that have enabled oil prices to be set unilaterally. As the largest energy consumer, our leadership is decisive. We will not fail our responsibility.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Press release 481A dated September 16

Governor Mandel of Maryland: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. As I said earlier, the Secretary has agreed—and as he has indicated—to answer any questions. And we'd like to get into the question-and-answer period.

Governor Busbee.

Talks With U.S.S.R. on Grain and Oil

Governor Busbee of Georgia: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask a question concerning two basic commodities: food and oil. With the United States having the greatest potential of any nation as far as production of food, and recognizing the fact that every few years Russia suffers a severe food shortage, what do you think of the possibility of some long-range trade agreement on food, grain, et cetera, from the United States and Russia on oil?

Secretary Kissinger: It is true that the United States is the largest producer of surplus foods in the world. The United States has made a number of proposals to indicate how a rare commodity can be used in a responsible manner and to the benefit of everybody.

At this moment we are negotiating with the Soviet Union about a long-term agreement with respect to the sale of grain. We have Under Secretary [for Economic Affairs Charles W.] Robinson in Moscow—he has just returned from Moscow—with a view to preventing the sudden incursions into our market and to stabilize the demand.

We are also having some discussions, in a more preliminary stage, with the Soviet Union about oil.

And so we are addressing both of these problems. Of course, the Soviets' capacity to export oil is limited.

Price Floor for Imported Oil

Governor Mandel: Governor Briscoe of Texas.

Governor Briscoe: Mr. Secretary, you men-

tioned a floor on the price of imported oil. Could you indicate what you think that floor should be or when that policy might be implemented?

Secretary Kissinger: We are now negotiating with our allies in Europe and in Japan on a floor that would be set to protect at least the cheaper alternative sources of energy. And this would be part of the general package that will be concluded—that we hope will be concluded by December 1.

This floor can operate in several ways. It does not have to be a fixed price—that is, each country could be—it could be set, for example, by import levies so that imported oil could be bought at lower prices but then would be sold at the minimum price. But if we do not do this, we may be in the position of having made huge investments for alternate sources which could then be undercut by predatory pricing. We hope that we will have an agreement on this by December 1.

As for the level, since this is at the moment being negotiated, I would rather not give an answer; but we have it down to a range that is now the subject of negotiations.

Governor Briscoe: Thank you.

Economic Impact of OPEC Oil Price Increases

Governor Mandel: Governor Bond.

Governor Bond of Missouri: Mr. Secretary, one of the most obtuse and difficult concepts for the average American to understand, I believe, is the balance-of-payments problem. And we, I think, can explain to them the dangers of suffering another Arab oil embargo. But how do you explain to someone who has never been abroad what impact the continuing and increasing outflow of dollars for OPEC oil would have on the American consumer? How is the American consumer likely to be affected if we continue to increase our payments abroad?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the payments abroad will sooner or later have to be translated into the purchase of goods and services, and it gives leverage to the producers in two ways.

One, by the end of last year they had already accumulated \$75 billion in foreign assets, and every dollar in increase in the price of oil adds \$10 billion to this in addition to the annual gross. This year it will be substantially higher than \$75 billion, at the end of this year. Shifting these funds around is already a source of considerable leverage. In 1973, a run on the dollar was started, I think, by a shift of \$3 or \$4 billion. That happened normally, and not as the result of a deliberate policy by any particular country. So when you have \$75 billion, you have a very substantial sum.

Secondly, when these holdings are converted into goods and services, they will undoubtedly contribute to the inflationary pressure, in addition to the fact that the increase in the price of energy contributes to the inflationary pressures even before these assets are disposed of.

So the overall impact of the constant rise in the price of oil is to compound all inflationary pressures in the industrialized world, and it is one of the significant reasons for the stagnation of the economies of the industrialized countries.

Governor Mandel: Governor Tribbitt, Delaware.

Governor Tribbitt: Mr. Secretary, two questions. You couldn't or wouldn't want to limit all your questions to the subject of energy, so the first question: When the OPEC countries meet later this month, do you expect them to raise the price of crude?

Secretary Kissinger: I have a view on the subject. I just do not want to be accused of having made come true what I predict. [Laughter.] They're certainly talking in this direction. The United States is opposed to any further increase in the price of oil, and we believe it is unjustified. But many of them are talking in the direction of increasing the price. I will keep my private expectations to myself. [Laughter.]

North Vietnamese Use of MIA Issue

Governor Tribbitt: The other question is not related to energy. Mr. Secretary, what

negotiations are going on with the MIA's with respect to the Viet-Nam conflict?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I negotiated with the North Vietnamese for four years, and they have used the anguish of Americans for blackmail for all this period.

First they used the prisoners; now they are using the missing in action. At the time when they applied for membership in the United Nations, they suddenly agreed to produce three bodies—gave us the names. When we vetoed their membership they withdrew their offer for those—for the remains.

We vetoed their membership only because we did not want to accept a double standard in the United Nations. We are prepared to let North Viet-Nam enter the United Nations if South Korea would also be admitted into the United Nations; but we did not accept the concept of "selective universality," where our friends are barred from the United Nations and Communist nations are admitted. So this was not directed as such against North Viet-Nam.

Nevertheless, as a result of a totally unrelated issue, the North Vietnamese have withdrawn their—withdrew the offer that they had already made. We are approaching them periodically through many channels and now, most of the time, directly.

I feel that they will use the missing in action for their political purposes, and we do not believe that American foreign policy should be shaped by the holding of hostages—and even less by the remains of Americans who died in action.

Conduct of Foreign Economic Policy

Governor Mandel: Governor Waller of Mississippi.

Governor Waller: We all had the pleasure of taking about six trade missions to different parts of the world—particularly the Orient and the Middle East in April of this particular year. And the missions were staffed, Mr. Secretary, with businessmen who were selling. And I was along to help make appointments and contacts for long-range sales, contracts on food and fiber products, consumer goods, and so forth. And from the

discussion which I had with Ambassador Helms in Tehran and other places, it appears to us from the outside looking in that our staffing in the foreign offices are woefully inadequate, based upon the new trade efforts where the dollars are.

Secretary Kissinger: You mean in our Embassies?

Governor Waller: Yes, sir. And, also, the fragmentation between Commerce and Agriculture and State. And I just wondered if you were aware of this and if any plans were underway to give us the tools that the Japanese have, that the French have, in many of the marketplaces. We believe that the staff could be as little as 25 percent of the size and configuration needed to help the American businessman meet the competition in different markets.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think you are right that our economic representation abroad has not always kept pace with the realities of the modern world. We used to operate largely through one or two commercial or economic counselors, and that view is not to be considered to be the most promising career within the Foreign Service.

Secondly—those of you who know Washington will agree—the various departments sometimes deal with each other as sovereign entities, making short-term diplomatic treaties of coexistence. [Laughter.] They do not always develop the most coherent policy.

Now, we have attempted to improve the situation, and it cannot be done as rapidly as one would like. We have in Washington now, in the Economic Policy Board and elsewhere, I think the most cohesive organization for the conduct of foreign economic policy. For example, in the approach to the United Nations—and, in fact, on the whole range of foreign economic policy—the cooperation now, especially between the Treasury Department and the State Department, is very intimate. The Secretary of Treasury and I meet at least once a week, and our subordinates meet daily.

In addition, we have staffed the economic divisions of the State Department with the

ablest people that we could find. The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. Enders, has certainly not been a shrinking violet in international negotiations; and he has been largely responsible for the energy program that I have mentioned.

In the field—there will be a time lag before all of this can be translated into the field.

I agree with your comment; I hope that we are aware of it. We are certainly trying to move in this direction because—you are right—the economic dimension of foreign policy is becoming increasingly important and we have not in the past been organized in Washington or staffed in the field to carry it out.

Energy Research and Development

Governor Mandel: Governor Pryor, Arkansas.

Governor Pryor: Mr. Secretary, we talk a great deal about finding and exploring new ways for seeking alternative sources of energy. I talk about it in speeches, and I guess all of us talk about it in speeches, and you talk about it in speeches. It sounds very good. But it's beginning, I think, to have a hollow ring, because I don't know, in fact, that we are really making a wholesale effort to seek alternative sources of energy. And from time to time we hear about developments.

For example, the University of Nebraska recently came forth with a type of fuel made from grain, I understand, and it powers an automobile much less expensively than our traditional methods. And suddenly we don't hear of those things any more.

I remember back in the late forties we had a tougher automobile that came out, and it worked so well and did so splendidly and got so many miles to a gallon of gasoline; and, before you know it, it was off the market—it worked. And the reason it was off the market was because it worked. And, really, are we doing our part? And are we really doing any more than talking about it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as I said in my introductory remarks, there are people in

this room who will tell you that excessive humility is not my province. [Laughter.] I am not an expert on the domestic energy program.

As I understand it, we are spending over \$10 billion in research and we are encouraging investments in alternative sources.

The difficulty is that it will take three to five years—or five years, really, before any substantial results can show. And in the interval, much of the emphasis will have to be placed on conservation.

I am certain that other proposals will be made in the course of this year to encourage investment in alternative sources; but we are now at a stage where much of it is in research and development and the result will not show up for two or three years.

International Cooperation on Energy

Governor Mandel: Governor Edwards of Louisiana.

Governor Edwards: Mr. Secretary, I would not presume to give you any advice on diplomatic relations, because that would be like an atheist trying to teach the Pope catechism. [Laughter.] You are in the southern part of the United States. I think it's important for those of us in positions of leadership to express our opinions.

I must say to you that I listened in awe and amazement at some of the statements you made about what we were going to do for the developing countries and the developed countries in the First World, the Second World, the Third World, and the Fourth World about economic stability and industrial development, employment, and what have you. And I simply suggest to you that I hope we can do it for them a helluva lot better than we have been able to do it for ourselves, because we haven't done it in this country yet. And I think Americans and the world ought to come to grips with that reality. And I suggest—I know you spend a lot of time in Washington and other foreign cities [laughter], but America has serious problems. And unless we get independent in this country insofar as the production of energy is concerned, we're never going to be able to help other countries and we're never going to be

able to help ourselves. And I would certainly like to see the American thrust on this thing beamed toward making America the independent country it ought to be in the field of production and use of energy.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Governor, I do not know exactly what you were referring to, if you refer to these remarks here. My basic point, with respect to energy is that the energy crisis affects us and it affects our principal allies. And it therefore affects the security of the whole free world.

Now, we consume about 50 percent of the energy of the world. And therefore it is clear—and I agree with you—that we must exercise a position of leadership; that if we do not make ourselves invulnerable, if not independent, or substantially invulnerable to oil pressures, nobody else can do it.

At the same time, if we do not cooperate with our allies in Europe and Japan, their sense of impotence will be enhanced, and their vulnerability to pressures—not just from the producers but from their neighbors—will also increase. And, therefore, since the cohesion of the free world must be one of our principal foreign policy objectives, we have to cooperate with them.

Now, this cooperation, in fact, does not involve any significant outlays for the United States. For example, we are trying to establish common conservation targets with them in order to multiply the efforts that we may make in conservation. We are trying to pool research and development efforts to some extent so that we can share in each other's technology. We are not talking here about a giveaway program, because we are talking of the cooperation of countries at a substantial level of economic well-being.

As far as the developing world is concerned in energy, they are being to a considerable extent—or to some extent, at least—financed by the oil producers themselves; and therefore in international forums we have never been able to get the support of the so-called Third World on the energy question.

So what I was talking about here is primarily the relationship between the United States and the industrial countries of Western Europe and Japan, and not in the form

of American financial outlays but in the form of political and economic cooperation.

The second general observation I would make is: I agree with you that it is important for us—crucial for us—to deal with our domestic problems. But I do not believe—and that may be a professional bias—that we can choose between our domestic and foreign problems. I think we are now in a position where, if we cannot solve both, we will not be able to solve either.

Detente and Human Rights

Governor Mandel: Governor Boren.

Governor Boren of Oklahoma: Mr. Secretary, I have two interrelated questions. The first is this: The Helsinki statements and other recent statements appear to give only broad lipservice to the concept of doing something about freedom of emigration out of the Soviet Union and religious freedom for both Christians and Jews and intellectual freedom within the Soviet Union. Are we in fact, really, trying to exert any real leverage on this situation—or have we really, as a matter of fact, decided to treat that as a matter of internal affairs for the Soviet Union?

That's the first question. The second question is: If we could draw a distinction between coexistence and détente—détente being a somewhat more intimate, friendlier, or closer relationship than mere coexistence—how much can the arguments for détente be founded strictly upon economic justification as opposed to political justification?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, "détente" is a French word, and it means something like relaxation of tensions. It has not, in our view, any moral significance. And if it suggests to you anything more intimate than coexistence, then this must be because it may have been used too loosely in rhetoric.

Let me state what our policy is toward the Soviet Union, and then I can get to your specific question.

We recognize that the Soviet Union is ideologically opposed to us. Secondly, we recognize that the Soviet Union is a superpower whose geopolitical interests are often at variance with ours. And therefore we

conduct the policy of coexistence, détente, relaxation of tensions—whatever you want to call it—with no illusions about the structure of what we are dealing with.

At the same time, we recognize we are living in a world that is different from our historical experience. Until the end of World War II, the United States could be secure behind two oceans, and changes in the world balance of power had to be of an enormous magnitude before we were affected.

For about a generation after World War II, we had such an overwhelming military superiority that we could overwhelm most of our problems with our resources. But today we live in a world in which, while we are still the single strongest factor, we are no longer predominant.

We also are in a situation of effective nuclear parity, in which neither side will be able to gain a decisive strategic advantage unless one side simply quits.

Under these conditions, we have to conduct a policy in which we try to limit or contain the power of other countries through creating balances, backed by our military strength around the world. We also face the fact that under current conditions nuclear war would be an extraordinary calamity.

Therefore we are attempting to create a situation where we will not give up our vital interests but where we will also not unnecessarily run the risk of confrontation; where we give an opportunity to the Soviet Union to pursue a more moderate course but where, when challenged, we act with great firmness, as we did at the time of the building of a submarine base in Cuba, as we did during the Jordan crisis of 1970, as we did during the Middle East alert of 1973.

We must have a military strength which does not tempt aggression. Without that, no policy of coexistence—relaxation—is possible. But beyond that, we must have a diplomacy that gives an opportunity for settling disputes by peaceful means. And we have the problem of balancing incentives and penalties for the Soviet Union in the correct way.

Now, there are endless disputes of what the correct balance of incentives and penal-

ties is. I, for example, do not believe that economic relations should be conducted for their own sake. I have always believed that they should be linked to progress on foreign policy issues.

Now, on the Helsinki declaration, there was a great deal of—there were many misconceptions. One, for example: It was not primarily an American show. It was agreed to by 34 heads of government, or 34 governments; and in fact the United States did not play the dominant role in shaping it. Secondly, the Helsinki declaration recognized nothing that had not already been accepted in previous international conferences to which we were a part. Thirdly, insofar as there was anything new in the Helsinki declaration, it was in the area of human rights and human contacts—not as far as you would wish it, but nevertheless there were formal declarations.

Now, our view with respect to human rights has been this: We have believed that we could be more effective by quiet, undramatic representations than by turning them into tests of prestige. And I think our experience with Jewish emigration proves this. We had increased the emigration from 400 in 1969 to 38,000 in 1973, when by making it a formal test, it dropped again to 10,000.

But this is a question of tactics; this is not a question of objectives or purpose. And our test over the next decade is whether we have the strength to pursue both a policy of relaxation of tension and keep up our military defenses, whether we are prepared to be flexible in our diplomacy and yet firm in our purposes and avoid oscillating between extremes of intransigence and extremes of conciliation—which had been the case in previous periods. This is what I would define to be the basic problem.

Panama Canal Negotiations

Governor Mandel: Governor Wallace of Alabama.

Governor Wallace: Mr. Secretary, after the unfortunate conclusion of the matter of Indochina, do you feel that the United States now

can afford to give up control of the Panama Canal?

Secretary Kissinger: On the issue of the Panama Canal, the question is what is meant by control of the Panama Canal and how we define our vital interests in relation to the Panama Canal.

The United States must maintain the right, unilaterally, to defend the Panama Canal for an indefinite future, or for a long future. On the other hand, the United States can ease some of the other conditions in the Canal Zone.

Our problem with respect to the Panama Canal is this: How do we best defend our defense requirements that are vital in the Panama Canal area? Do we do it most effectively by digging in, turning Panama into a potential area of guerrilla conflict backed by all of Latin America, and turning it into an issue of permanent confrontation between all of Latin America and the United States in which military force may have to be used for an indefinite period? Or is it possible to make arrangements in which our defense interests can be maintained for many decades and our operating interest can also be maintained for several decades and thereby defuse the immediate situation?

Nobody is in favor of turning over our defense of the Panama Canal, and nobody is in favor of turning over the essential operating requirements. What we are talking about is whether we can develop a status for the Panama Canal—and we're not sure yet that this can be done—that meets our essential defense requirements and avoids a situation in which we may have a Viet-Nam-type situation in Central America for the indefinite future backed by all of Latin America.

If we can find an honorable way of doing it, we would like to explore it. As we explore it, we will consult closely with the interested members of the Congress, and there will not be any secret negotiations that are sprung on people unexpectedly. This is really the issue. We are in the process of exploring it, and I do not know whether it is possible to achieve what I've described. If it isn't, then there can be no agreement.

Purpose of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain and Oil Talks

Governor Mandel: Governor Godwin of Virginia.

Governor Godwin: Mr. Secretary, I was wondering if you could comment—if it would be appropriate for you to make any comment—on what impact, short-term-wise or longer, that the Soviet-American negotiations, in reference to our export of wheat and their making available to us oil, would have on our energy situation.

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to stress that the negotiations on grain and oil are technically separate negotiations; they are not organically linked, though there is a conceptual connection between the two.

Our interest in a long-term agreement on grain is to prevent these fluctuations in Soviet demand, which can have a profound effect on our prices and in which the Soviet Union enters our market only in periods of severe shortage in the Soviet Union.

So we would like—and we are in the process of negotiating—a longer term agreement, which would at one and the same time stabilize prices in the United States by giving our farmers an opportunity for long-term planning and put a ceiling on what can be bought in periods of difficulty in the Soviet Union.

With respect to what is available in terms of energy from the Soviet Union, I do not think it would have a decisive impact on our energy situation, but it would have a symbolic impact. And therefore we are pursuing the negotiations.

The Soviet Union and the OPEC Nations

Governor Mandel: Governor Edwards, South Carolina.

Governor Edwards: Mr. Secretary, just prior to your speech, Admiral [Elmo R.] Zumwalt said that the Russians were using economic factors to their benefit and that they had participated in urging the unity of the OPEC nations—that they had urged the embargo and had urged the OPEC nations to quadruple prices and raise prices a second time and promise them help, military aid in

ease of need, and urge the OPEC nations to remove their assets from free-world banks. Could you comment on the part that you feel the Soviet Union played in our energy crisis with OPEC?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to disagree with the admiral, with whom I was associated for many years in Washington. I have stated that I recognize that the Soviet Union is impelled by ideological hostility. I do not doubt that Radio Moscow from time to time makes the claims that were mentioned. At the same time, in terms of systematic policy, I am not aware that the Soviet Union has formally or systematically made the suggestion. I am aware of occasional radio broadcasts from Moscow to selected Arab audiences that use some of these arguments, but so far the Soviet Union has benefited from the OPEC increase; but I think we should not exaggerate the Soviet influence by saying that they have engineered it.

What has happened has been to the advantage of the Soviet Union, but it has not been the result of Soviet policies. It is much more due to practice organic to the Middle East and therefore more manageable within the context of our relationship to the Middle East than as an aspect of East-West relations.

Egypt-Israel Agreement and U.S. Assistance

Governor Mandel: Governor Blanton, Tennessee.

Governor Blanton: Mr. Secretary, I want to express my appreciation for your attending this conference. And I would like to ask you: In the recent peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, besides the technicians, how much money did it cost us; and how is it split between the two?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, with respect to the agreement between Egypt and Israel, first of all, if implemented—and if we can ever keep everybody quiet for a few weeks, it may even get implemented [laughter]—it will represent the most significant step toward peace that has been taken in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And our

own obligations with respect to it should be seen in that context.

Now, with respect to what it costs us: Since we had not computed exactly what we would have given without the agreement, I cannot give you an absolute figure, but I think it is important to keep in mind that substantial aid for Israel has been a part of annual appropriations, quite independent of this agreement.

For example, last year something like \$2.5 billion was appropriated for Israel—partly to pay for the cost of the 1973 war, and partly to pay for their other necessities.

Secondly, prior to the agreement, 76 Senators wrote a letter to the President pointing out that the assistance to Israel should be computed on the basis of Israel's needs and not on the basis of any political considerations, and Israel had submitted a request of \$2.59 billion before the agreement.

Now, we have not yet settled the exact figures that will be submitted to the Congress, but it will be below \$2.59 billion. It will be in the area of \$2.2 billion, \$2.3 billion. And therefore, on that level, you could not prove that there was any additional sum that has been given as a result of the agreement, though I assume this is simply very hard to compute, but we're talking about modest sums.

With respect to Egypt, here is the most significant Arab country—a country that was substantially close to the Soviet Union in 1972 and '73, that has now put more of its reliance on the West. It has chosen the path of moderation and peace. And therefore we feel that it is symbolically of great importance that the United States contribute to an opportunity of economic—not military—development of Egypt.

There again, we have not made a formal agreement with Egypt. We had planned to increase our economic aid to Egypt in any event, even without the agreement. And there, too, it may involve a slight increase over what we had planned. But if you are asking about the additional sums that the agreement cost us, we are talking of a few hundred million dollars; we are not talking about huge sums.

Prospects for Agricultural Exports

Governor Mandel: Any other questions? Governor Bond of Missouri.

Governor Bond: Mr. Secretary, what would you say are the long-term and intermediate-term prospects for our agricultural exports, particularly with the OPEC nations, or should we be looking to this—

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't hear the beginning of the question.

Governor Bond: I'm concerned about our agricultural exports. Several of the states here represented are very heavily involved in agriculture. We're interested in knowing what the potential would be for expanding America's export of agricultural products and whether you see the OPEC countries as a potentially significant market for America's agricultural exports.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as I pointed out, we are talking about a long-term agreement with the Soviet Union.

Secondly, we have an obligation—which is not formalized but which is very real—for long-term supplies to Japan.

In addition, we are encouraging the export of agricultural commodities, as we have an obligation to do since we have urged our farmers to produce at maximum capacity.

Over a period of years, we think that the markets in the OPEC countries can increase. But, of course, those with the largest surpluses also have relatively small populations, so that there is a limit to what can be done.

We think that over the next years the markets for American agricultural products will be good. And, in fact, our major difficulty will be whether we can meet the world demand rather than whether we can sell our agricultural products.

Policy on Kidnaping and Terrorism

Governor Mandel: Governor Holshouser.

Governor Holshouser of North Carolina: Mr. Secretary, could you give us any comment on the status of negotiations about the Americans in Ethiopia over the weekend?

Secretary Kissinger: When Americans are captured, we are always in great difficulty because we do not want to get into a position where we encourage terrorists to capture Americans in order to get negotiations started for their aim. So our general position has been—and it is heartbreaking in individual cases, always heartbreaking—our general position has been that we will not, as a government, negotiate for the release of Americans that have been captured.

Now, in this particular case, the only demands that have been made on us have come through totally unauthenticated sources; so we haven't any decision to make. We have heard radio broadcasts on Beirut radio of what the demands are, but they have not been tied to anything that we can do or by anybody that we can deal with. But our general position has been that we will not negotiate, as a government, with kidnapers of Americans because there are so many Americans in so many parts of the world—tourists, newsmen, not only officials—that it would be impossible to protect them all unless the kidnapers can gain no benefit from it.

U.S.-Bahamas Spiny Lobster Negotiations

Governor Mandel: Governor Askew.

Governor Askew of Florida: Mr. Kissinger, as you know, we have had a difference—the United States with the Bahamas—on the question of the taking of the spiny lobster and the jurisdiction. We have a substantial number of fishermen in south Florida dependent upon this.

The State Department conducted the negotiations, which did not prove successful, with the Bahamian Government. And it's my understanding that efforts are being made to try to arbitrate through international means the possible phasing out, if we can't get some additional understanding with the Bahamian Government, to permit us, on a reciprocal basis, to fish for these lobster.

I just wonder if you have any comment, any hope that we might have that there's anything further that the State Department might be able to do to insure access of these

traditional grounds with some cooperative agreement between the Bahamian Government and the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, since I am not running for office in Florida, I have to tell you that until fairly recently—about two months ago, I think—I never even heard there was such an animal as the spiny lobster. [Laughter.] But I have in the meantime.

And what we are going to try to do is to see—in the context of the negotiations on the spiny lobster, the Government of the Bahamas has used against us certain legal principles which we have applied with respect to the Maine lobster, so that we did not have a very brilliant negotiating position [laughter]—and what we are trying to do right now is to see whether we can find a context for that negotiation that broadens the framework somewhat beyond the immediate issue of the lobster, within which perhaps some solution can be found.

Relationships With Latin America

Governor Askew: Just one other question, and that is: On the question of South America—again, with the proximity of Florida, in particular, and the southeastern United States, where you have these Governors represented—what, really, is the posture of any particular position in regard generally to Latin America to the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Latin America is the part of the world with which we have the most, the longest, uninterrupted relationship. And it is the part of the world in which the relationship between industrial countries and developing countries is being conducted among people of at least comparable background and similar aspirations. Therefore we have always believed that our relationships in the Western Hemisphere are very important to our relationships to the rest of the world.

Inevitably, in many Latin American countries, there is a temptation to define their identity through opposition to the United States. And therefore the rhetoric of

many Latin American countries vis-a-vis the United States tends to be on occasion belligerent.

Still, we believe that we can make progress in developing a cooperative relationship. We have started what is called the new dialogue with the countries of the Western Hemisphere. And though it has had its ups and downs due to many causes, we believe that, on the whole, it is progressing. And we are prepared to make a major effort to improve our relationship with the Western Hemisphere on the basis of reciprocity.

Governor Mandel: Two other Governors have indicated they'd like to ask questions, and at the conclusion of those two questions we're going to have to terminate this part of the program. I think the Secretary has been unusually generous of his time, and we don't want to impose on him. Governor Edwards of South Carolina and Governor Busbee have indicated a desire to ask questions. And after those two we'll have to conclude this part of the program. Governor Edwards.

Reopening of the Suez Canal

Governor Edwards: Mr. Secretary, I understand the United States paid most of the cost for opening the Suez Canal. I may be mistaken, but this is what I've been told. What are the advantages to opening the Suez Canal? It seems to me that it gives access to that great modern Soviet fleet through the Dardenelles into the Mediterranean and down into the Indian Ocean, where our shipping lanes are so vital to keep our energy supplies open for the industrial world. Would you comment on that, please?

Secretary Kissinger: As long as you are talking about the Soviet Navy, I have to say I have seen statements that in 1973 the United States was affected in the conduct of the Middle East crisis by its fear of the Soviet Navy. This may have been true of our Navy; it wasn't true of our government. [Laughter.] We all suffered from the illusion that our Navy was far superior to the Soviet Navy, and we conducted ourselves accordingly. [Laughter.] We may have been

wrong, but we acted as if we were superior. [Laughter.] We believed it, too.

Now, as far as opening of the Suez Canal is concerned, it is clear that opening of the Suez Canal makes it easier for the Soviets to move ships from the Mediterranean into the Indian Ocean. Of course, there is no law that prohibits the American Navy to follow any Soviet ship into the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal if we want to. But the major argument for opening the Suez Canal was, first of all, of course, the desire of Egypt to do it; and, secondly, because of the general assessment that it would contribute to the stabilization of the Middle East by creating additional inhibitions against the opening of hostilities. And therefore, balancing the advantages of peace in the Middle East against the strategic disadvantage of permitting—shortening the Soviet travel time, it was decided to go ahead with it, especially since it was really substantially out of our control.

Whether we, in fact, paid the greatest part of this, I would have to look into this. I know we paid something for it. I know other countries also did. But I'd have to check whether it is, in fact, true that we paid the largest part of it.

State Department Regional Representative

Governor Mandel: Governor Busbee of Georgia.

Governor Busbee: Mr. Secretary, this might be a good one to conclude on.

You're heard a lot of interest by the Governors in international affairs. Governor Waller just alluded to the involvement we're all engaged in, in economic trade missions, investment, and so forth with other countries and our dealings with them. We found it necessary that we be provided relevant information on the interpretation of State Department policy in these various areas—and also the necessity for arranging for the visits of our economic missions to other countries. And we have just passed, unanimously, at the Southern Governors' Conference, a formal request to you that we be provided a State Department regional representative in the

southeastern area on a pilot basis to see how it works. And we've had a lot of discussion on bureaucracy and our position with bureaucracy, but I think that the State Department is the only Department that's not represented on a regional basis; we need you, we want you, and we would just like some response in our request to you that we try this.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I saw that. I read the resolution, and I welcome it. I have to look into what the bureaucratic aspects are of appointing a regional representative. And given the way the State Department operates, it will take at least 10 years. [Laughter.]

Governor Busbee: Thank you. I don't think this is a fatal response. I brought you down to Georgia and fed you my grits—and I thought you would give a more favorable answer. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Quite seriously, I am very sympathetic to the resolution. And we will either appoint a regional representative or we will establish some liaison with the Southern Governors' Conference so that we can meet the request of this resolution.

We welcome the resolution, and we will work with it to realize its objectives. I just want to look into the best method to do it, because the first time I saw it was last night and I could not talk to any of my associates about how to implement it.

Governor Mandel: Governor Holshouser just can't restrain himself. Go ahead.

Governor Holshouser: Marvin, I think we ought to assure the Secretary, though, that we don't intend this as any encouragement for some of those people in Washington who

already think the South is a foreign country anyway. [Laughter.]

Governor Mandel: On that note, I think on behalf of all of the Governors here today I'd like to express our deep appreciation to the Secretary for not only coming here but for the candor and the manner in which he responded to all of the questions that were asked him. And on behalf of all the Governors, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. We deeply appreciate having you. [Applause.]

U.S. To Assist in Airlift From Angola to Portugal

*Department Announcement*¹

In response to Portuguese President Costa Gomes' urgent appeal for support on humanitarian grounds for the airlift of Portuguese citizens from Angola to Portugal, the U.S. Government is providing two U.S.-flag chartered civilian aircraft with civilian crews for an indefinite period of time. We anticipate that the aircraft will begin flying within 72 hours, after logistical and other arrangements have been completed with the Portuguese Government.

The U.S. Government has already contributed \$200,000 to an appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross for relief assistance to Angolans displaced by the fighting. We are prepared to respond to further appeals by international agencies for relief assistance within Angola.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Sept. 2 by Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Relations.

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Firing Line"

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by William F. Buckley, Jr., on September 10 broadcast on the public television and radio program "Firing Line" beginning September 13.

Press release 479 dated September 11

Mr. Buckley: When President Nixon and his party traveled to Peking in 1972, Art Buchwald wrote that he had come into possession of captured Chinese Communist documents indicating that Chinese intelligence had unearthed a supersecret U.S. agency called the State Department; that indeed the head of that Department, called by insiders the Secretary of State, was actually traveling with the President—a white-haired gentleman who mingled discreetly with a crowd of reporters, cultivating inconspicuousness, while the business of state was handled ostensibly and ostentatiously by Presidential aide Henry Kissinger. Art Buchwald having blown the operation, President Nixon in due course surfaced the Department of State by naming Henry Kissinger as its head.

He is, I guess it is safe to say, the most conspicuous Secretary of State in American history. And although, as every schoolboy knows, the authority to write foreign policy is the prerogative of the President, the reliance of the incumbent President on the advice of Mr. Kissinger is widely advertised by the President himself.

The paradox is that Mr. Kissinger's huge personal successes are not reflected on the historical record. It is as if everyone at the Olympic stadium joined in carrying an athlete on their shoulders in an endless triumphal procession without pausing to realize that in fact he had won no gold medals at all. Perhaps he struck the fancy of the crowd because they knew that he was fated to lose

but admired the brilliance of his performance. Perhaps in the great seizure of auto-hypnosis, the crowd thought he was winning even as inconspicuous musclebound little athletes were busily scoring in one event after another. Moreover, the allure of the champion is strengthened, not weakened, by his own refusal to declare himself the winner. Sometimes he seems to be saying that there are no such things as diplomatic victories. Sometimes he seems to be saying even darker things, such as that the end of Western civilization is in sight and our descent should be dignified and perhaps even good-natured.

I should like to begin by asking Secretary Kissinger why he thought to give President Nixon to read a one-volume edition of Spengler's "Decline of the West."

Secretary Kissinger: Well, because I had discussed my early interest in philosophy of history with President Nixon, I pointed out to him that I thought that Spengler—with many of whose conclusions I did not agree—nevertheless, in his perception of the rise and fall of civilizations as integrated units—that is to say, in which politics, art, architecture, science were all part of the same perception—was an interesting way of looking at the problem of civilization, not necessarily a prediction of our civilization.

Mr. Buckley: Well, did you expect that he would learn to see more acutely what was happening to our civilization simply by mastering Spengler's technique or by sharing in Spengler's weltschmerz?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all I think it is incorrect to say that Spengler suffered from weltschmerz. I think that what Spengler attempted to do was to show that civilizations follow a certain rhythm and a certain sequence of events, and it is there-

fore wrong to say it is optimistic or pessimistic. It is more important to understand whether his perception had some validity.

The reason, however, that I discussed this with President Nixon was to emphasize that the manifestation of events which had come up in the form of tactical decisions are very often quite misleading and that a statesman has to understand what the trend of events is—whether it is in a positive or in a negative direction—and has to understand that there are many seemingly unrelated manifestations of a total culture that affect the scope of policy and the direction that it can take.

Mr. Buckley: Well, but it's—

Secretary Kissinger: I was much less interested in the predictions of Spengler than in his perception.

Mr. Buckley: Than in his technique?

Secretary Kissinger: Besides, he had read Toynbee, so I had to give him another approach.

Mr. Buckley: Well, there is a certain irreversibility, isn't there, in Spengler's view of things, which I take it you did not want to suggest to the President?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that there is an irreversibility in events, but I do believe that to reverse a trend requires more than proclamations. It is important to understand what the trend is before one can reverse it.

Mr. Buckley: Well, I think most people would agree, although sometimes trends are accidentally reversed even by people who fail to understand them, just as they are unintentionally accelerated.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but if you make policy, you cannot do it in the expectation of a miracle or of an accidental reversal. The problem of policymaking is to get some conscious control over events. Now, if an accident helps you, you are lucky; but you cannot conduct affairs on the basis of the expectation of winning at roulette.

Mr. Buckley: No, but doesn't the making of policy sometimes call simply for the buy-

ing of safe time? I remember when Mr. Churchill, speaking in 1949 at MIT—perhaps you were there—said that perhaps the death—he did not name him, but his allusion was clearly to Stalin—would give to the West the same advantages that the death of Genghis Khan gave us. And there's a sense in which policy can be understood as hoping that things will change for the better, meanwhile simply playing it as safe as you can. Is that correct?

Secretary Kissinger: Sometimes you have to play for time in the expectation of some change, such as the one to which Churchill referred. But to the extent possible, there has to be some rational explanation of what you are waiting for; you cannot simply conduct policy waiting for a favorable accident. It was a perfectly rational expectation that the death of Stalin would bring about important domestic changes in the Soviet Union; therefore playing for that time was a reasonable course of action.

Mr. Buckley: Is it rational to expect that the collision of Marxist ideology with historical reality will affect—in such a way as to be advantageous to the West—Soviet policy in the future?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, no system of government and no ideology has ever remained unaffected by time. And it would be an extraordinary event if Marxist ideology were to remain unchanged as the only ideology in history. So I believe the evolution of history will inevitably bring about a change in Marxist ideology.

Now, whether that change of Marxist ideology will be for the benefit of the West, whether it will lead to a possibility of a more conciliatory foreign policy, or whether instead it will lead to a gradual spread of Marxist perceptions around the world—this depends not only on time, but it depends on the nature of the opposition. It depends on the vitality of competing values and on the ability to prevent major foreign policy successes by countries that profess the Marxist ideology.

Mr. Buckley: But isn't there a sense in which the vitality of the opposition to the

growth of Marxist doctrines plays into the theoretical hands of the tablet-keepers of Marxism—because this of course is what they predicted: that we would resist and resist, even at bayonet point, inasmuch as we were dominated by our fascination and greed for property and domination of the ruling class—of the working class?

Secretary Kissinger: So you think that the fact of resistance fuels Marxist ideology?

Mr. Buckley: Yes; I say it can, yes.

Secretary Kissinger: But, surely, the opposite could not be true—that the absence of resistance would weaken Communist ideology. I cannot accept this proposition. It depends on the nature of the resistance, and it depends on the adaptation that Marxism itself has to make to contemporary realities.

Mr. Buckley: Well, are we prepared for either contingency? There is the possibility, as you say, that the evolution of the Communist idea will go in the direction—in a beneficent direction, in a direction conducive to the interest of the West—and there is the alternative possibility. We seem to be preparing almost exclusively for the latter rather than for the former.

Secretary Kissinger: That they are going in a beneficent—

Mr. Buckley: In a beneficent direction.

Secretary Kissinger: Not at all. It is my view that whether it will go in a direction beneficial to the West or whether it will confirm existing stereotypes depends very importantly on the performance of the West, or on the performance of the non-Communist world, and on the adaptations that Marxist ideology has to make to reality—and to a reality that we ourselves have to be instrumental in creating.

I do not agree with you at all that our policy is based on the proposition that without effort on our part history will do our work for us and that Marxist ideology will change without effort on our side and without our resistance to foreign policy pressure.

Mr. Buckley: Well, I believe you—to begin with—and it seems to me that your record

makes this plain. But it also seems to me that here you are not in harmony with the American establishment. The American establishment seems to subsidize anti-Communist efforts up to a certain point—at which point attrition takes over and they pull out. It seems to be plain that the disaster of Indochina, against which you struggled, was a disaster nevertheless. And it has certainly confirmed those Marxists who believe that the imperialist world, as they call us, is soft and lacking in purpose. Now, to what extent is this a realistic historical judgment, or to what extent is it simply a capricious application of ideological theories?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have always considered Indochina a disaster, perhaps partly because we did not think through the implications of what we were doing at the beginning—

Mr. Buckley: Does “we” mean you included?

Secretary Kissinger: Well—

Mr. Buckley: Which was it?

Secretary Kissinger:—pre my being in office; those decisions were made in the previous Administration—and partly because the magnitude of the task we had set for ourselves was not clear when it was set. And then the American public was not prepared to stick with it.

So it failed for a variety of reasons, but none of them was that any of the policymakers—as it drew to a conclusion—thought that history would do our job for us or that failure in Indochina would help us in the general relationship with the Communist world.

Mr. Buckley: Well, do you consider that the American public is coextensive with the American Congress when you use that term? Is it the public that let us down or is it the Congress that let us down?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the Indochina problem is a very complex one because in a way you can say we let ourselves down by entering too lightly on an enterprise whose magnitude was not understood, by

methods which were inappropriate to the scale of the—

Mr. Buckley: Of the problem.

Secretary Kissinger: —of the problem and then were caught by what I would think was a minority, but nevertheless a very determined minority, in a situation in which the effective public support disintegrated.

I do not know whether I would make a distinction here between the Congress and the public. I think probably the Congress came to reflect public sentiment so that finally, in the ultimate collapse last spring, there was clearly no public support for any continuation of the American effort. All public opinion polls seemed to show this.

Mr. Buckley: Now, is it possible that your own policies and those of President Nixon and President Ford contributed to the confusion that rendered the voice of the American public or the American Congress so indecisive?

I give you one example: A question was asked of President Ford in March of this year, the answer to which I will spare you the embarrassment of reading. But the question was: "Mr. President, the question is raised by many critics of our policy in South-east Asia as to why we can conduct a policy of détente with the two Communist superpowers in the world and could not follow a policy of détente with Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. Could you explain that to us?"

The answer is he could not. Now, I'm sure you can. But it takes us some high-flying and dialectical reconciliations, doesn't it?

Secretary Kissinger: Not at all, in my view —although I would not make Indochina policy the test case of our foreign policy in general. Our policy has been firmly opposed to an expansion of the Communist sphere or to foreign policy adventures by Communist countries. Therefore, to the extent that North Viet-Nam was engaging in systematic aggression against all of its neighbors, it was absolutely consistent with our policy that we would resist that.

To us, the policy of relaxation of tensions with the two major Communist countries

does not presuppose any degree of ideological approbation. It is a practical accommodation to new realities, and it does not go so far as to acquiesce in any foreign policy adventures. Therefore, at the time of the Jordan crisis of 1970, the building of a submarine base in Cuba, the Middle East crisis in 1973, the Administration always reacted with extreme firmness to what we perceived to be foreign policy challenges by any of the Communist countries. And I think the American public will have to understand that, on the one side, in the age of nuclear superpowers and the capability of destroying tens of millions of people in a very brief time in a war, the problem of peace is of great consequence—but at the same time not to disarm ourselves where we will not resist foreign pressures.

Now, this requires a more sophisticated, a more complicated perception of the international environment than was possible in the forties and fifties. But I see no inconsistency between resisting foreign expansion and attempting to moderate the conduct of the Communist countries at the same time.

Mr. Buckley: But, Mr. Secretary, the aggression by the North Vietnamese depended for its success on Soviet and Red Chinese arms. It is an aggression that they would have had to have used slingshots to fuel if it had not been for the fact that they were clearly client states of the two great superpowers with whom we were carrying on this policy of détente. So isn't it some sort of a semantical illusion to suppose that you can prescind the North Vietnamese act of aggression as though it were not in fact sponsored by the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not think it was sponsored by the Soviet Union. I think it was supported by the Soviet Union. I think that there was a clear generic and indigenous impetus to the North Vietnamese military actions in Indochina.

Secondly, the policy of relaxation of tension began systematically only after the Indochina war was already started; and I think it was used in part, to some effect, to bring it to a conclusion on terms which, if we had sustained our effort, would have been—if we

had sustained our assistance—a tolerable outcome.

But I do not believe that the case of Indochina, which goes back to the early sixties, is a good test case of the general policy.

Mr. Buckley: Well, would you say that the activities of the Soviet Union in Portugal would be a better example?

Secretary Kissinger: I would say that we have to recognize that the Soviet Union and the United States are ideological opponents, that the relaxation of tensions has never been conceived by any of us as ending competition and the possibility of conflict. It is a means by which a competition which is inevitable—in the nature of present circumstances—is regulated while reducing the danger of nuclear war.

With respect to Portugal, the basic cause of the disintegration of the political situation in Portugal is due to factors indigenous to Portugal. It is true that the Soviet Union has given some assistance to the Communist Party in Portugal. It is also true that, until recently, this could be an important factor only because the West did not resist with the determination that it should have.

So it is not our view that the Soviet Union will not take advantage of opportunities that may be presented. It is, however, our view that they can be maintained, if we act with wisdom and determination, within manageable bounds.

Mr. Buckley: But since we operate in a free society, you really do need a thing called "public support," the lack of which made it impossible for you to stick it out in Indochina. But isn't that public support gravely threatened by shifting moral perceptions that flow out of the ideological egalitarianism that goes into détente?

Let me give you one example: The Gallup poll reported, one month after your return in 1972 from Peking, as follows: "In the period leading up to this historic event, we have seen a far more favorable image that the U.S. public has of the Chinese Communists today than they did in the mid-sixties. Respondents to the poll were asked to select from a list of

23 favorable and unfavorable adjectives, those which they feel best describe the Chinese Communists. The terms 'ignorant, warlike, sly, and treacherous' were named most often in 1966, but now the measurement taken shows them to be 'hard-working, intelligent, artistic, progressive, and practical.'"

Now, the transformation in the People's Republic of China between 1966 and 1972 was in fact a radical transformation. There is a sense in which conservative elements were defeated during the Cultural Revolution, the old Communist cadres. In any event—

Secretary Kissinger: Not your kind of conservatism.

Mr. Buckley: No, no; not mine. And I'm glad to say not yours—which is a compliment. But it is plain that the American people—as witness those who have traveled in China—people like Ken Galbraith, Scotty Reston, Barbara Tuchman—come back and, sure enough, we hear those old voices from the thirties: "The trains are running on time."

Now, how can a free society husband the moral flywheel necessary to distinguish between desirable and undesirable societies, in the wake of such relativism as is stimulated by the philosophy of détente?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first let me say that if one pushed your argument to a conclusion, one would have to say that the United States must maintain international tensions in order to make sure that its people have the correct perception of the nature of the societies with which they are dealing.

It is one of the tasks before us to enable the United States to conduct a vital foreign policy without moral relativism and also without the black and white categories with which we tended to sustain ourselves in the past.

In the past, we used to think that relations between countries were either peace or war, that wars were caused by evil people, and that if we approached relations of peace with a country, or eased relations with a country

that also indicated an improvement in the moral climate of this country.

In the world in which we find ourselves now, in the world of nuclear superpowers, in the world in which American power is no longer as predominant as it was in the late 1940's, it is necessary for us to conduct a more complicated foreign policy without these simple categories of a more fortunate historical past.

So I think we have to come to an understanding that the Communist societies are morally, in their internal structure, not acceptable to us; that their ideology is one that is not compatible necessarily with our own but that, nevertheless, on the plane of day-to-day foreign policy, we may be prepared to make those practical accommodations that preserve the peace, as long as vital interests are not threatened.

The moral quality of life in China did not dramatically change between 1969 and 1972, and in no public statement have I ever claimed that the fact that we are working out specific arrangements either with the People's Republic of China or with the Soviet Union indicates that there has been an evolution in their domestic structure toward a more pluralistic system.

We have to avoid creating the illusion that progress on some foreign policy questions—such as nuclear arms agreement—means that there has been a change in the domestic structure. So this Gallup poll in part reflects a kind of perception of the nature of the international environment that inevitably will have to be changed. I believe that it is the task of our national leaders to be able to maintain both the moral strength of the country and to do the practical steps that need to be taken for whatever national purposes we set ourselves.

Mr. Buckley: But they're not very good at it. Now, you and Mr. Nixon didn't invent co-existence. The idea of coexistence, as a matter of fact, was affirmed by Eisenhower; and he did, in fact, meet Khrushchev here in one tense day in 1959. But he sought to make it plain by those fine gestures that diplomats study that there was a continuing—indeed, a rather

heated—disapproval of the means by which Khrushchev maintained himself in power and his people subject.

I'm trying to say that in an enthusiasm for détente the American people are listening to rapturous descriptions of life in China, in the course of which—

Secretary Kissinger: Not from us.

Mr. Buckley: Not from you, but from the people with whom you have associated very closely. As a matter of fact, this may amuse you. CREEP [Committee for the Reelection of the President]—Mr. Nixon's organization—one of its items that it had was a stock letter.

Secretary Kissinger: I just have to say I do not go skiing with Mr. Galbraith—largely because I do not ski.

Mr. Buckley: You mean that's the only reason you can think of. Well, that was a diversionary maneuver, Mr. Secretary. As a matter of fact, Mr. Galbraith and I are very good friends; but when we tried to make a date for a "Firing Line" just a couple of months ago and he told me he couldn't make it on the first of April because he was lecturing at the University of Moscow, I asked him what "left" did he have to teach them.

But in any case, CREEP—an official organization devoted to the reelection of Mr. Nixon—was sending out a form letter to every newspaper in the United States that carried anything I wrote disparaging to China, and it didn't say the kind of things you said. It didn't say: "Mr. Buckley is a child, and he doesn't recognize that we can't ignore 700 million people"—and so forth. It said: "Mr. Buckley fails to understand the great achievements that Mao Tse-tung has performed for the Chinese people"—the kind of thing that they used to say about Hitler before he became truly insufferable.

Now, what I'm saying is that all of a sudden you find yourself face to face with terrible problems that issue from that confusion. They started to give you hell when they found out that you tried to "destabilize" the coming to power of Allende in Chile. I don't think that they would have given you hell for try-

ing to do that in an age, which was not so long ago, when it was understood that we had to coexist with the enemy, but that we certainly were going to do everything that we could to help people to stay free.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that the nature of our domestic debate on foreign policy has been severely affected by the upheavals of the sixties, by the assassinations, by Viet-Nam, by Watergate. And I believe that there are much more fundamental factors in the randomness of debate where one can, at one and the same time, be accused of being too tough and too soft on Communist countries than the policy of relaxation of tensions, because what is the policy of relaxation of tensions? It attempts to recognize that in the nuclear age statesmen have a responsibility not to risk nuclear war lightly. Secondly, they attempt to take into account the realities of major Communist countries and the realities of the American power position in the present world. They attempt to do this while maintaining the overall military balance and the overall geopolitical balance.

This is, without question, a much more complicated task than the one that existed in the fifties. If you look at the foreign policy of the fifties and sixties, to which you refer with some nostalgia, you will see wild oscillations between extremes of intransigence and extremes of conciliation. And as early as the summit meetings of 1954, you could find rapturous quotes of how the fact that the leaders met in an atmosphere of better human relations—how that changed the whole nature of the environment.

What we have attempted to do is to conduct foreign policy on a more sober basis and to avoid these wild swings between extremes of conciliation and extremes of intransigence—to find a policy that is geared to our national interest and to our basic values and that can be sustained over a period of time.

Now, I—

Mr. Buckley: You see, I think—

Secretary Kissinger: —I deplore this particular statement that CREEP sent out, but they were not selected for that.

Mr. Buckley: It wasn't considered a dirty trick, you see.

Secretary Kissinger: No, no; I don't consider it a dirty trick, but they were not selected for their positions because of their competence in foreign policy.

Mr. Buckley: No, no. I gave it merely as an example because they were attempting to say something that the people would find internally plausible. You see, as—

Secretary Kissinger: In an election year—under pressure of an electoral period—many ill-considered things are being done. But I do not think you will find any official statement from the Department of State since I have become Secretary of State—or from the White House, for that matter—which would make these claims.

Mr. Buckley: No. You see, I am not saying that you personally endorse this view of life in China. I am saying that certain deductions are drawn from the intimacy of the highest diplomatic contacts with China, which results in Gallup finding that the majority of the American people think of the poor Chinese as intelligent, artistic, progressive, and practical.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but I think the solution to this problem is not to generate artificial crises, but to try to overcome the simple Manichaeism—

Mr. Buckley: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: —in which one side has to assert absolute good and the other absolute evil before you can develop a practical policy, because it is precisely this attitude that leads to these wild swings that over a period of time will also demoralize our public.

Mr. Buckley: You are talking about somebody who can be excommunicated if you lose Manichaeism, so I'd be very careful not to engage in that heresy. But I do sharply understand what you are saying, what you are trying to achieve; but I am here to predict great, great troubles for you—as witness this:

In the last few months, if you had elected to go to the help of Portugal—I am not sure the American people would have, in fact, permitted you to do so. I think there would have been a standard lachrymose editorial in the New York Times and in the Washington Post weeping over lost Portuguese liberties, but saying, after all, they were used to being without liberty. But they would be much more interested in whether the CIA had dropped an unfriendly balloon over south Portugal and would haul you up and ask you if you were up to your old Chilean tricks again.

Now, my point is that schematically your policy is easier to understand in a society in which you have total power to dominate foreign policy but the difficulties that you are likely to get into are precisely those that trace to America's attempt to infuse some sense of moral purpose into their foreign policy.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but first of all I believe that there is no inconsistency between infusing a moral purpose in our foreign policy and the policies we are pursuing. I believe that moral purpose must be related to a series of practical steps that can be taken. Practical steps without moral purpose become random. And without moral purpose, no leader will have the assurance and the confidence to act in situations in which the choices are always unclear at a moment when the scope for action is still relatively wide.

So I do not accept the antithesis between moral purpose and pragmatism. I think without strong moral purpose there cannot be an effective foreign policy. At the same time, when one translates moral purpose into policy, one has to look at the realities of the situation or one runs the risk of empty posturing.

Now, in this translation, there is the danger of moral confusion that you have described; and this is particularly great if the opponents of the prevailing policy—whatever the prevailing policy is—state their case in very absolute terms because—

Mr. Buckley: It is surrealistic.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right, because they will not be responsible for the conse-

quences of their assertions, and they do not necessarily look at the alternatives that were in fact available. It is in those terms that I believe we have a problem of educating the public. We are living in a more complicated period than the one in which we formed our historical perceptions, and we have this problem of education at a time when respect for authority of whatever kind—but especially executive authority—is declining, for reasons independent of the specifics that we have been discussing but due to the upheavals of the sixties and seventies, and where the—

Mr. Buckley: An atomized ethos.

Secretary Kissinger: You have that, and you have executive-legislative difficulties. So we are in a very difficult period for the conduct of foreign policy. There is no question about this.

But if the American people develop the idea that its government is artificially creating crises or unnecessarily creating crises, we would repeat the divisions of the Viet-Nam war—which, even though I believe they were caused by a minority, contributed substantially to the demoralization of what you consider the American establishment.

Mr. Buckley: Well, if I understand you correctly, if an Allende were to come to power tomorrow, you would not feel that you could recommend such action as you thought appropriate in 1970, so that even in the last four years—

Secretary Kissinger: No, I am not saying that. And I would also go back to what you said about Portugal. I think that the realities of our situation—and not the realities of the relaxation-of-tensions policy, because that was a very minor factor—but the realities of the domestic evolution that has occurred in this country required a rather deliberate approach to the problems of Portugal, particularly because Portugal is more a West European problem than a U.S. problem, and we thought it was important to bring the West Europeans with us.

Our perception of the evolution in Portugal was always clear, was repeatedly stated, and was in fact frequently criticized for be-

ing too pessimistic. Once we had achieved an agreement with the West European countries about the nature of the danger, I do not think it would be correct to say that we were totally passive about the evolution there.

With respect to what one would do in similar circumstances, in the case of Chile—a case which has been wildly oversimplified in much of the discussion—I think our perception of the problem would not be radically different from what it was in 1970.

Mr. Buckley: Your perception would not be, I'm sure. But does that mean that you would feel that you could share that perception with the relevant committees of Congress and win them around—or do you think that there has been “sea change” there?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but the sea change that has occurred in America is not, in my view, caused by the policy that is being conducted vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Communist China. The sea change that has been caused in America is an almost metaphysical revulsion against foreign involvements that involve risks. And, in fact, the anomaly of the situation in which we find ourselves is that, on the one hand, there is theoretical anticommunism; on the other hand, there is an enormous practical reluctance to run any of the risks that would be associated with the rhetoric that many engage in.

It is one thing to have a crisis that lasts a day or two—such as the Cambodia incident, or the *Mayaguez* incident, but the real test is to sustain a crisis over an extended period of time. And there I would think that anything that looks to the public like a massive foreign involvement would require the most meticulous justification before it could be supported. This is our difficulty in the Congress.

And it surfaces, for example, with respect to the technicians that we are proposing, at the urgent and insistent request of the parties, to send to the Sinai, in which there is a considerable debate starting over 200 Americans in an area where there are already—

Mr. Buckley: Volunteers.

Secretary Kissinger: —volunteers—civilians, unarmed, in an area where Sweden has over a thousand troops, Finland has nearly a thousand, Austria has about 800, Canada has hundreds—troops—without any debate in their countries that it might involve them in a war.

This is the psychological environment in which we have to conduct our foreign policy and which has to be understood when one engages in rhetoric of confrontation.

Mr. Buckley: What caused that?

Secretary Kissinger: I think what has caused it is in part the experience of Vietnam, in part the experience of Watergate, in part the disillusionment of the sixties and seventies. But it is a fact that anyone in a responsible position must take into account.

Mr. Buckley: So, therefore, you would not really differentiate my pessimism from your own. You simply insist that those difficulties that you have issue from a recalcitrant public.

Secretary Kissinger: No. I am not that pessimistic. I believe that, first of all, in my travels in the country, I have the sense that the public wants to believe in its government and wants to believe that it has a sense of direction. We are going through a period of temporary difficulty, and I believe we have to adjust our perceptions to a new reality that has emerged a generation after the end of World War II. We have to explain that at one and the same time we may oppose countries and yet cooperate with them for specific limited purposes, that we have an obligation to prevent nuclear war, and that this nevertheless does not mean that a final moral reconciliation has taken place.

I believe that this can be done, depending on the willingness of the various leadership groups in this country to accept complexity.

If we insist on simplification, then we will have endless domestic “civil wars” between simplifiers on both sides of the debate.

Mr. Buckley: Do you find more resistance to complexity among hard-hats or among Harvard professors? I won't tell Galbraith what you say.

Secretary Kissinger: No. It's about equal.

Mr. Buckley: About equal. So, therefore, it is a problem. It runs right through all classes of Americans.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would think that, at least, from where I sit, the public, the general public, despite all the shocks, is less cynical in this country, basically healthier, basically more vital, than in any other Western country. And, therefore, fundamentally, we are the hope of the non-Communist world. If we do not lead, there will be no leadership. And if we do not act with confidence, no one else will.

So I am not basically pessimistic about the future of this country. We tend to tear ourselves apart in our leadership groups with some of the debates that you and I have been discussing here. But structurally, I think this country is still a very vital and very hopeful phenomenon.

Mr. Buckley: Did you find it difficult, when people come to you—Congressmen, Senators, Governors, and so on—to bring them around on points that you consider to be vital?

I think, for instance, of the difficulties that you had on the Turkish issue, which struck me as one of the few questions concerning which there is clearly a right answer and a wrong answer. Now, did you actually attempt to persuade Congressmen to permit the sale of arms to Turkey?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think one of the problems with respect to Turkish aid is that I believe there is clearly a right answer, but I also believe that public opinion at large is not greatly exercised on this issue because it is too obtruse and esoteric for them; therefore, relatively small minorities that are highly organized, very vocal, and very passionate, can have a major impact.

Secondly, the original vote on Turkish aid occurred at the absolute low point of executive authority in the immediate aftermath of—

Mr. Buckley: Of the resignation of President Nixon?

Secretary Kissinger: —of the resignation of President Nixon and at a time when the congressional leadership which was with us had lost control of its followers. And so I am certain that if that vote came up today the Congress would never override a Presidential veto.

At that time it overrode three Presidential vetoes, really out of a desire to assert itself. Then I think perhaps we made some mistakes initially in presenting the issue, and that pushed the whole debate in a wrong direction.

I do not think an event like the Turkish aid vote could be repeated today, but it is symptomatic for what can happen in a slightly disintegrated situation.

Mr. Buckley: Well, if it is as important as you say it is, and as important as it is in my opinion, why is there not a greater sense of alarm in Europe and in America over the whole thing?

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, I think in Europe there is very profound alarm. The Secretary General of NATO, for example, has invited himself to Washington—indeed, he is meeting with the President today—and I repeat, he invited himself; we did not invite him—to register—he's a good friend of ours, I must say. I emphasize the fact that he invited himself only to indicate the alarm that he is feeling about the erosion of the relationship of Turkey to NATO, which coincides with the alarm we feel about the erosion of our relationship with Turkey under conditions that are of no help to Greece and Cyprus. It is one of those decisions that help nobody.

Mr. Buckley: Is the United Nations less and less appropriately the chamber in which questions of this kind can be discussed?

Secretary Kissinger: The United Nations, in its present form, has not proved suitable for dealing with the fundamental issues of peace and war. It provides a forum for the exchange of ideas. It sometimes provides a vehicle in which parties can meet conveniently. It does a useful job on certain technical problems.

I have expressed our concern about the bloc voting that is developing there, and I must say this expression of concern may have contributed to the relative moderation that has occurred at this special session of the General Assembly which is drawing to a close this week.

But on issues like the Cyprus issue—or even more, on East-West issues—the United Nations has not proved to be the appropriate forum for their resolution.

Mr. Buckley: When you spoke rather menacingly, some people thought, about its perhaps becoming an empty shell, you meant if it continued in its general irresponsibility, in its refusal to accept the credentials of various countries?

Secretary Kissinger: If the United Nations violates its charter in order to give expressions of political approval or disapproval to certain countries, such as the refusal to accept credentials of countries, which has the practical effect of expelling them from the General Assembly—something that is reserved to the Security Council and not to the General Assembly—when the largest single group in the General Assembly always invariably votes as a bloc, then the processes of recent debate and pressure politics take over. Under those circumstances it will degenerate gradually into a confrontation from which no one will benefit and which we don't particularly have to fear—but in which, in my view, it will become an empty shell.

Now, I have to say that the warnings we have expressed have contributed to a somewhat more moderate approach in this one two-week session. How long this will last we will have to see.

Mr. Buckley: We have only a minute or two. I'd like to ask you this, Mr. Secretary: I once said to President Nixon that one of the things that I admired hugely about Ronald Reagan was that he really didn't care what the New York Times thought about him. And Nixon said, "Well, I don't care at all." [Laughter.]

Now, it seemed to be plain that he did care.

And it seems to me that most people care, because it is, in a sense, along with the Washington Post and a few others, the voice of the establishment.

On the basis of your experience with the Presidency, do you think it's possible for a President, effectively and over a prolonged period of time, to defy the American establishment?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, the test of Ronald Reagan would be whether he doesn't care—it's no great achievement not to care about the New York Times in Sacramento. The test will be how he would feel if he were in Washington.

Is it possible to define the "American establishment"? Well, I do not think the American establishment is all that homogeneous; and I think that Presidents and Secretaries of State—if they know their mind, if they can present it properly to the public—have an opportunity to carry out the policy that they think is in the national interest.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. To Hold Discussions on Grain Purchases

*Statement by President Ford*¹

The purchase by the Soviet Union of wheat and feed grains in the United States has been highly erratic over the years. The following table shows these purchases for recent years, including purchases to date for the 1975-76 season:

Years	Feed grains (in millions of metric tons)	Wheat	Total
1971-72	2.8	0.0	2.8
1972-73	4.2	9.5	13.7
1973-74	3.4	2.7	6.1
1974-75	.8	1.0	1.8
1975-76 (to date)	5.8	4.4	10.2

The considerable variation in large bulk purchases by a single state-trading company contrasts with the more steady purchases of

¹ Issued on Sept. 9 (text from White House press release).

these grains by such customers as commercial enterprises in Japan and Western Europe. Because these purchases are highly variable and uncertain, American farmers have not been able to count on this market in their planting intentions to the extent they have on other foreign purchasers. Moreover, highly volatile and unpredictable purchases emerging after the crop planting tend to contribute to price instability.

It would contribute materially to the interests of the American farmer, workers in the transportation industries, and American consumers, as well as be in the interests of our customers abroad, if we could develop a longer term and more certain purchase understanding with the Soviet Union providing, among other features, for certain minimum purchases.

It will take some time to explore the possibilities of a long-term agreement. The country must have a new procedure for the sale of feed grains and wheat to such a large state purchaser as the Soviet Union. I am sending representatives to the Soviet Union at once.² I am also establishing a Food Committee of the Economic Policy Board/National Security Council in my office to monitor these developments.

We have already sold a volume of wheat and feed grains which will take four to six months to ship at maximum rates of transportation operations. Accordingly, there is no immediate necessity to decide about further future sales at this time, and I am extending the present moratorium on sales to the Soviet Union until mid-October when additional information on world supplies and demands is available. This extended period should provide the opportunity to negotiate for a long-term agreement with the Soviet Union.

Under these circumstances, I am requesting the longshoremen to resume voluntarily the shipping of American grain while these discussions go forward, and the matter can be reassessed in the middle of October.

² A U.S. delegation headed by Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Charles W. Robinson left Washington for Moscow on Sept. 10.

It will be necessary to complete the negotiations over shipping rates in order to make it possible for American ships to carry wheat and to assure that at least one-third of the tonnage is carried in American ships, as provided by the agreement with the Soviet Union which expires on December 31, 1975, which is also under renegotiation.³

U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of Three New African Countries

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council on August 18 by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.

USUN press release 84 dated August 18

The U.S. delegation welcomes the prospect that this year there will be three new African members of the United Nations: the Republic of Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, and the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The United States is particularly pleased to support the membership application of the Republic of Cape Verde because of the very long ties of friendship between our two countries. In his letter of July 5—the day of Cape Verde's independence—President Ford stated to the President of the Republic of Cape Verde, His Excellency Aristides Pereira, how much we as a nation look forward “to the opportunity for our two nations to work together in the cause of peace, freedom and the welfare of mankind.”

There is a long history of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of our two states and, indeed, the close bond of kinship. These ties go back to the early days of our own national independence. The first American consulate in Cape Verde was established in 1816. Over these many decades a large number of Cape Verdeans have emigrated to the United States. Leaders of the Cape Verdean community estimate that between

³ For text of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters, signed at Washington on Oct. 14, 1972, see BULLETIN of Dec. 4, 1972, p. 664.

200,000 and 300,000 American citizens are of Cape Verdean descent. They have added their language, their culture, and their fine traits of energy and self-reliance to the American scene.

I am especially glad to welcome to this Security Council chamber this afternoon three distinguished Americans of Cape Verdean descent, Mr. Raymond Almeida, Mr. Anthony Ramos, and Mr. Salah Matteos. They are present in the gallery.

I must at the same time express regret that the Council has acted so hastily in the case of Cape Verdean membership as not to make it possible for a representative of the new Government of the Republic of Cape Verde also to be present on this occasion, as I understand was requested.

Mr. President, perhaps not many around this table have had the privilege, which was mine, of having visited personally the Cape Verde Islands. I well remember from that visit the busy activity in the streets of Praia, the capital; the beautiful and active harbor of Mindelo; and the verdant agricultural valleys of Santo Antão. The stalwart qualities of the people of this new republic are a vivid memory for me and a source of strength for the new state.

The United States welcomes the Republic of Cape Verde to the United Nations, and we look forward to working with its representatives in our common mission of furthering international peace, cooperation, and development. In this spirit of cooperation, the United States has responded to the appeal of the Republic of Cape Verde for assistance in alleviating the effects of a serious eight-year drought. My government is providing the islands with \$5 million in food and technical assistance.

Mr. President, the United States also supported the application of the Government of Sao Tome and Principe for membership in the United Nations. The islands of Sao Tome and Principe have a long historical tradition and a rich cultural heritage. My government was pleased to have been represented at the independence ceremonies of Sao Tome and Principe on July 12. The American delegation at the ceremonies was greatly im-

pressed with the beauty of the islands and the warmth of their people. We are sympathetic to the aspirations of the Government of Sao Tome and Principe for progress. To assist in the islands' economic development, the United States has made available scholarships in this country to help develop skilled resources for the islands. We look forward to cooperating closely with the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe in pursuing the lofty goals of the United Nations to which we are dedicated.

The United States has also voted in favor of the admission of the People's Republic of Mozambique to the United Nations. Together with Guinea-Bissau—for whose membership we voted in the 29th General Assembly—Mozambique, the Republic of Cape Verde, and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, all of whom this Council has just recommended be admitted, constitute an important addition of African states to the United Nations.¹ Their admission is another step toward the development of a worldwide organization in which we hope all those nations that desire membership and are willing and able to carry out their obligations will be represented.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. March 14–October 22, 1974. 574 pp.

Problems of Protecting Civilians Under International Law in the Middle East Conflict. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. April 4, 1974. 108 pp.

¹ The Council on Aug. 18 adopted unanimously Resolutions 372–374 recommending to the General Assembly that the Republic of Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, and the People's Republic of Mozambique be admitted to the United Nations.

United States and Chile During the Allende Years, 1970-1973. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. July 1, 1971-September 18, 1974. 677 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.
Accession deposited: Chile, September 4, 1975.

Aviation

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 1944 (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.
Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, September 16, 1975.

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.¹
Accession deposited: Zaire, August 13, 1975.

Energy

Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperative information exchange relating to the development of solar heating and cooling systems in buildings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 1-4, 1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975.
Signature: Thermal Insulation Laboratory Technical University of Denmark, August 26, 1975.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Brazil, August 28, 1975.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14,

1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, August 28, 1975.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.²

Ratifications deposited: Australia, Papua New Guinea, June 23, 1975; Japan, June 17, 1975.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974.¹

Notification of approval: Spain, July 3, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, September 15, 1975.³

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, September 15, 1975.³

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement extending the agreement of April 2 and May 9, 1974 relating to the construction, installation, and maintenance of a seismograph station at Kluane Lake, Yukon Territory. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa July 15 and August 13, 1975. Entered into force August 13, 1975.

Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of April 18, 1962 (TIAS 5043), relating to the assignment and use of television channels along the U.S.-Mexican border. Effected by exchange of notes at Tlatelolco and México August 20, 1975. Entered into force August 20, 1975.

Zaire

Memorandum of understanding concerning direct access by a Zairian ground station to data generated by U.S. Earth Resources Technology Satellites (ERTS) and availability to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the data so acquired. Signed at Washington and Kinshasa January 6 and 31, 1975. Entered into force January 31, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ Applicable to Berlin (West).

PUBLICATIONS

1974 Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law Released

Press release 441 dated August 26

The Department of State released on August 26 the "Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1974," edited by Arthur W. Rovine of the Office of the Legal Adviser.

This second annual volume includes all significant developments in U.S. practice in international law during the calendar year 1974. The digest contains chapters on the law of the sea, aviation and space law, international economic law, treaty law, peaceful settlement of disputes, legal regulation of the use of force, the position of the individual in international law, and many other subjects.

Of special interest in the 1974 volume are discussions of the Trade Act of 1974, the Agreement on an International Energy Program, current initiatives on food and population problems, the establishment of several bilateral joint cooperation commissions, revised guidelines of the Department of State on treaties and executive agreements, developments at the 1974 Caracas Conference on Law of the Sea, significant developments in arms limitation with the Soviet Union, adoption of a definition of "aggression," protection of human rights, and actions within U.N. bodies regarding principles of international economic relations for both developing and developed countries.

Orders for the digest, accompanied by checks or money orders, should be sent to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. The price of the 1974 volume (Department of State publication 8809; GPO cat. no. S7.13:974) is \$10.25. The 1973 volume (Department of State publication 8756; GPO cat. no. S7.13:973) is available for \$7.50.

Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: September 15-21

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
481	9/16	Kissinger: Southern Governors Conference: informal remarks.
481A	9/16	Kissinger: questions and answers.
482	9/16	Kissinger: Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce.
482A	9/16	Liggett, Kissinger: introductory remarks.
482B	9/16	Kissinger: questions and answers.
*483	9/16	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on subdivision and stability, Oct. 9.
*484	9/16	SCC, SOLAS, working group on container operations, Oct. 14.
†485	9/17	Myerson: seventh special session of U.N. General Assembly.
486	9/17	U.S.-Spain cooperative defense negotiations: joint communique.
†487	9/17	U.S.-New Zealand economic consultations: joint communique.
*488	9/18	Advisory Committee for U.S. Participation in the U.N. Conference on Human Settlements, Sept. 18.
*489	9/18	Study groups 10 and 11 of U.S. National Committee for International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), Oct. 15.
490	9/18	Kissinger: news conference, Cincinnati, Sept. 17.
*491	9/19	Polish agricultural minister visits U.S.
*492	9/19	Study group CMTT of U.S. National Committee for CCIR, Oct. 21.
*493	9/19	Study group 1 of CCIR, Nov. 25.
*494	9/19	Program for visit of President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of Colombia, Sept. 24-27.
†495	9/19	Kissinger: Joint Economic Committee.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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