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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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NEW AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL NEGOTIATED
THROUGH SECRETARY KISSINGER 457

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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New Agreement Between Egypt and Israel Negotiated Through Secretary Kissinger

Secretary Kissinger left Washington August 20 for the Middle East and returned September 3. Following are his remarks at Andrews Air Force Base upon his departure, remarks upon his arrival at Jerusalem on August 21 by Foreign Minister Yigal Allon of Israel and Secretary Kissinger, a statement by President Ford issued on September 1, remarks by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and Secretary Kissinger following the initialing of the Egypt-Israel agreement at Jerusalem that day, a news conference held by President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt and Secretary Kissinger following the initialing of the agreement at Alexandria, and remarks by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger upon his arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on September 3, together with the texts of the agreement and annex and the U.S. proposal for an early-warning system in Sinai.¹

DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AFB, AUGUST 20

Press release 423 dated August 21

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you feel as you depart on this journey?

Secretary Kissinger: The President has asked me to undertake this mission because we believe that after long and serious negotiations an agreement between the parties is possible. Obviously no area is more in need of progress toward peace than the Middle East, which has known four wars in

two decades and whose upheavals affect both the well-being and security of the United States.

We will spare no effort; but of course, ultimately, the outcome depends upon the good will and determination of the parties. I am confident that if they continue with the attitude of recent weeks then we can continue the progress.

Q. Do you expect a settlement, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am very hopeful, but important issues still remain to be settled and will require detailed examination.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think is the maximum level at which the United States can extend further military and economic aid to Israel, assuming a settlement?

Secretary Kissinger: We have always been committed to the survival and security of Israel, and we are now engaged in technical studies to see what is needed to do this at an appropriate level. No final decision has been made, but we are coming closer.

Q. Military talks were suspended for the reassessment. Is the United States about to resume talks with Israel regarding the F-15, Lance missiles, and other sophisticated equipment they claim they need?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, the pipeline to Israel has remained open throughout the reassessment. There were certain items that were kept for an examination of all of the issues, and I am confident that these items will be dealt with to the mutual satisfaction as we settle on an aid level.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

¹ Press releases issued by the Department of State containing other remarks and news conferences by Secretary Kissinger and foreign leaders during his trip are listed on p. 459.

ARRIVAL, JERUSALEM, AUGUST 21

Press release 424 dated August 21

Foreign Minister Allon

I would like to welcome Secretary of State and Madame Kissinger, Mr. Sisco, and their team upon their arrival after a long interval. It is self-understood that the time which passed since March to this day was not wasted. All parties concerned did their best to contribute their share in getting the political momentum revived. Everyone who is interested to avoid stagnation and to achieve progress toward peace, just and lasting peace, based on mutual interests of our neighboring countries and Israel—and since we are concentrating on a possible interim agreement between Israel and Egypt, everyone who is interested in that should really do his best to find out whether such an agreement is possible or not.

Well, I was never good in mathematics, not good in mathematics, not to be too modest, and I cannot judge what are the prospects percentagewise. I am afraid that my American friends are better in mathematics than I am, but somehow I have the feeling, and I think that I can safely [say] that progress has been achieved more than ever before.

Nevertheless there is a lot of work to be done through the shuttle. We shall do our best to see to it that the shuttle will be crowned with success, because if such an agreement can hold it will serve the interests of Egypt and Israel and the rest of the world, in which the United States of America is occupying a leading position.

So welcome again and all the very best.

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Foreign Minister, thank you for your warm and generous comments.

I am very pleased to be back in Israel and at the renewed prospects for peace which have brought me here.

I left Israel last March with a heavy heart, fearing that still another horrible tragedy was in store for the people of Israel and the Middle East.

I return today with the same concerns but with renewed hope that a strong desire for peace will prevail over tendencies toward war. All parties have had an opportunity to reconsider their attitudes; sufficient progress has been made in the discussions during the interim to warrant a more intensive diplomatic effort in the days ahead.

President Ford has sent me here to provide the strongest possible U.S. support for progress toward peace and to consult with Israeli leaders on how best to do this in a manner which will protect Israel's security and maintain the closeness of U.S.-Israeli relations.

Americans know firsthand, from five years in Washington, Prime Minister Rabin's commitment to peace and his vigilance in protecting Israel's security. Joined by Foreign Minister Allon and Defense Minister Peres, I can recall the conviction and firmness with which they conducted discussions last March. Now five months later, the gap in the negotiations has been substantially narrowed by concessions on both sides. Israel's contribution reflects not a weakened resolve, but the conviction that Israel's strength, to which we have contributed and to which we shall continue to contribute, gives it the possibility to dedicate itself to peace without fear.

There are still issues to be resolved; but with good will, patience, and understanding on both sides, it should be possible to bring to a close this phase of diplomacy in the Middle East with positive results serving the interests of both sides and the cause of peace in the area.

I know these are not easy times for Israel. The striving for peace carries with it exertions and responsibilities no less awesome than sacrifices for war. Every course has risks. Together with our friends the Government of Israel, we believe that the risks of inaction are the gravest of all.

I know also that relations between Israel and the United States have gone through a difficult period. This has ended, and we have emerged from our dialogue strengthened in our friendship and determined to pursue common policies. Israel and the United States are bound together in com-

mon purposes—a world envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations, a world in which the resort to force becomes unnecessary and disputes are resolved by peaceful

means. Such a world is unthinkable without a secure Israel.

Peace in the Middle East depends on many factors, and both sides must make a contri-

The following remarks and news conferences by Secretary Kissinger and foreign leaders issued during his August 20–September 3 trip are not printed in the BULLETIN.

August 22

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon of Israel following a meeting (press release 426).

Alexandria. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger upon arrival at Ras el-Tin Palace (press release 427).

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt (press release 428).

August 23

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting with Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi of Egypt (press release 429).

Damascus. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger upon arrival (press release 430).

Damascus. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger upon departure (press release 431).

August 24

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 432).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 433).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 435 dated August 25).

August 25

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat before a meeting (press release 436).

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat prior to the Secretary's departure (press release 437).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 438).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 439).

August 26

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 442).

August 27

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 444 dated August 28).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 445 dated August 28).

August 28

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 446 dated August 29).

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat before a meeting (press release 447 dated August 29).

August 29

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 448).

Jerusalem. News conference by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 449).

August 30

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 451).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 453).

August 31

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger (press release 454).

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon following a meeting (press release 455).

Alexandria. News conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat before a meeting (press release 456).

September 1

Jerusalem. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger following a meeting (press release 457).

September 2

Taif. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Prince Sa'ud ibn Faisal of Saudi Arabia prior to the Secretary's departure (press release 460 dated September 3).

Amman. Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Zaid Rifai of Jordan upon the Secretary's arrival (press release 461 dated September 3).

bution. At the same time, we know very well that one of the principal ingredients of peace must be the steadfastness of the American-Israeli relationship, a steadfastness that contributed decisively to the creation of the State of Israel, a steadfastness which has helped protect Israel's security for over a quarter of a century, a steadfastness on which Israel can rely in the future.

It is in this spirit that we will be conducting our discussions with your governmental leaders, as equals joined in the common objective of achieving practical progress toward peace in the Middle East, as friends who only want the best for each other, as partners toward the goal which no people want more and deserve more than the people of Israel, whose heroism and suffering have created and preserved their state through all vicissitudes.

I fervently hope that when I leave Israel we can both say with pride that our talks have contributed to the security of Israel, to the strengthening of U.S.-Israeli relations, and to peace in the Middle East.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD, SEPTEMBER 1

White House press release dated September 1

The interim agreement being initialed by Egypt and Israel this evening reduces the risk of war in the Middle East and provides fresh opportunities for further progress toward peace for a troubled area whose turmoil has affected the lives and prosperity of peoples of all nations.

Under the agreement, Israel will withdraw its forces from the Sinai passes and oil-fields, both parties agree not to resort to force and to continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace settlement. I have consistently worked for this outcome. I am deeply gratified by it and proud of the contribution America has made. By reducing the dangers of military and economic warfare, this agreement is of great significance for the well-being of every American.

The parties have taken an important and indispensable step on the long and hard road

to peace. The countries concerned made clear that they wanted America's effort to continue. Following my meetings with President Sadat in Salzburg and with Prime Minister Rabin in Washington, the United States intensified its active mediation.

The agreement is fair and balanced, and we hope that as a further practical test of peace on the ground it will contribute to building the confidence between the two sides which is required if ultimate peace is to be achieved.

The United States does not consider this agreement an end in itself, and it is strongly committed to continue to help make progress on all aspects of the problem.

I will be speaking personally with Prime Minister Rabin of Israel and President Sadat of Egypt to congratulate them on their leadership and statesmanship which in large measure made the agreement possible.² I commend Secretary Kissinger for his tireless efforts in bringing about a successful conclusion to the negotiations.

REMARKS FOLLOWING INITIALING OF AGREEMENT AT JERUSALEM, SEPTEMBER 1

Press release 458 dated September 1

Prime Minister Rabin

My colleagues from the Israeli team have just initialed in the name of the Government of Israel the agreement between Egypt and Israel. We hope that this agreement and what will follow it will open a new chapter in the relations between these two countries and in the Middle East. We believe that the cause of peace needs to take risks for peace achievements. I believe that by this agreement we are embarking on the road that might be a long one but will lead to what all the people in the area want: a real peace between the countries, the Arab countries and Israel.

We know that the negotiations were not

² For transcripts of President Ford's telephone conversations with Secretary Kissinger, with Prime Minister Rabin, and with President Sadat on Sept. 1, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 8, 1975, p. 930.

easy. The differences were wide in the beginning, then they narrowed, and now we have initialed the agreement. We have had to overcome the experience of the last 28 years which has built up backlogs of suspicions, mistrust, and I hope by signing it—initialing it—today, we have overcome some of these problems.

Mr. Secretary, I would like to thank you personally, to thank the role that the U.S. Government has played in the achievement of this agreement. We know that you have spent a lot of effort. You have traveled all over the area. You have tried your best to help this agreement to be initialed, and you have succeeded. I would like to thank you in the name of the Government of Israel and myself for the role you have played in the achievement of this agreement.

I hope that, realizing the difficulties of the shuttle diplomacy, in the future you will encourage direct negotiations, and it will save you a lot of effort and a lot of time. [Laughter.]

Thank you very much.

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, members of the Israeli negotiating team: On behalf of my colleagues, I would like to congratulate you on the successful completion of these negotiations. We have spent really months together on the very complicated and often painful process of beginning the road toward peace in the area. As you pointed out, Mr. Prime Minister, it is particularly difficult because of the legacy of historical experiences which all of the people in this area share which has produced such great destruction. It is also difficult because it is so hard to compare the tangible quality of territory against the intangible quality of political progress and yet the road to peace had to be traveled at some point. The first step was bound to be difficult.

We spent, in the last 10 days, many hours together in complicated and tenacious negotiations, but my colleagues and I never forgot what it means for the people of Israel and for the Government of Israel to find security and peace and how difficult it is for

a small country to make its decisions when it knows that it cannot afford to make any mistakes.

I share your hopes, Mr. Prime Minister, that the agreement initialed today will have a significance beyond its terms and that in its implementation the people of this area and the people of Israel will find an opportunity to begin, for the first time in a generation and for the first time in the history of Israel, to live in peace. My colleagues and I are thankful for the reception we have received here, and we leave with a feeling of friendship and commitment—both to the security of Israel and to the progress of peace in the Middle East.

No one is more dedicated, after these experiences, to direct negotiations than I. I shall do my best to foster them as you suggested, Mr. Prime Minister, but we will be available to be helpful—not me personally, don't be afraid [laughter]—at least as a government, and in any event, I hope that the implementation of this agreement and the documents that we have initialed today will be remembered as that point when peace at last began in the Middle East.

NEWS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING INITIALING OF AGREEMENT AT ALEXANDRIA, SEPTEMBER 1

Press release 459 dated September 1

Q. [To President Sadat.] How will we, Mr. President, know, during the next three, four, or five months, that both sides are genuinely and honestly living up to the specifics of the agreements? What should we look for?

President Sadat: Well, for our side, there has been a previous agreement that took place in 1974, and we were up to our word, and more than that, even after March—last March, we have proved on the ground, by opening the Suez Canal and taking the measures we took, that we are aiming at peace. I think this is the guarantee that you asked for.

Let us look forward for a new era, because I think this agreement that we have concluded today marks a turning point in the

conflict—in the Arab-Israeli conflict—and that is really what has always concerned me. It is not a bit of land there or here or a few kilometers there or here, but what concerned me always is that we should hit to peace. I think this is a very important turning point in the history of this conflict.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is the importance of this agreement to the American Government and the American people and to the peace in the world?

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with the President that this agreement can mark a turning point in the conflicts of this area and could be a very important step toward a just and lasting peace.

The U.S. Government has a very profound interest in contributing to the achievement of a just and lasting peace in this area because of its interest and longstanding friendship with all of the people of this area and because the conflicts in the Middle East have affected the peace and the well-being of many other parts of the world. It is for this reason that the United States is glad that it was able to contribute to this agreement and stands ready to continue its efforts until a just and lasting peace is achieved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can the outcome of the Congress' deliberations on the agreement hamper it and is the United States committed to the peace movement in the Middle East irrespective of the outcome of Presidential elections?

Secretary Kissinger: The congressional deliberations can of course have an effect on the immediate situation, but we have consulted with enough congressional leaders to be confident that they will support the agreement that was made today. Secondly, the foreign policy of the United States is conducted on a bipartisan basis, and we expect that the main lines of the foreign policy would be continued no matter what Administration is in office.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us about the clause concerning the annual renewal of the U.N. mandate? A U.S. official was quoted this evening as saying it is understood that Egypt would agree to at least two renewals

of the mandate. Can you comment on that please, Mr. President?

President Sadat: Will you please repeat the question?

Q. Yes, sir. The question, Mr. President is, the agreement refers to annual renewals of the mandate. Have you given an understanding to Dr. Kissinger that there will be at least two renewals during the period of the life of the agreement?

President Sadat: Well, we have agreed upon the yearly renewal of the mandate of the U.N. forces. The first year starts from the 24th of October. It will end on the 24th of October, 1976. This will be a few weeks before the elections. We know that the year of the elections, especially those few weeks at the end of it, is very critical. So there is really an understanding that we shall appreciate and renew for another year to give the American President the opportunity to prepare the—what we call—the home inside.

Q. [Translated from Arabic.] Mr. President, does this new disengagement agreement help Egypt in the open-door economic policy and development?

President Sadat: [Translated.] Egypt has actually begun, ever since the first disengagement agreement, has begun implementing the open-door economy. We have begun building the new basis of the society as stipulated by the October paper. We have begun reconstruction on the Canal Zone, and we have begun repairing and renovating the destroyed and damaged utilities—

President Sadat: [Interrupts translation.] infrastructure.

President Sadat: [Translation continuing.] —infrastructure. Certainly this agreement is a new push to help this matter.

Q. [Translated from Arabic.] Mr. President, could you please clarify the early-warning points run or operated by American technicians? Do they serve one side or both sides and, hypothetically, if Egypt should launch an attack on Israel, would Israel be warned and, vice versa, if Israel should launch an aggression on Egypt, would we receive a warning?

President Sadat: [Translated.] When I met with U.S. President Gerald Ford in Salzburg, we discussed the matter, and I take this opportunity to say that my theory or my view lies in two points that have been achieved. Optimism. I have always been optimistic; I was before and after March and now, and before and after Geneva. Secondly, I said that the cards of this game, if not all, but at least 99 percent of them, are in the hands of the United States. Some were worried against this, but today it is clear that I was proven right. We discussed—that is, myself and U.S. President Ford—we discussed the early-warning positions or bases at Salzburg. And the idea behind the early warnings is that the United States is a witness to it—

President Sadat: [Interrupting translation.] It started like this. I added first the U.S. President to be witness between me and Israel. This is before raising the whole question of the stations—

President Sadat: [Translation continuing.] —to be a witness between us. Israel has an early-warning station, but we do not have or did not have, and I do not even have or did not have a place to find someone to sell me a base. I previously asked for it but I did not get it—

President Sadat: [Interrupting translation.] No, I was denied, I asked something on a very low level, but I was denied this.

President Sadat: [Translation continuing.] I asked for something much less than that, but I was denied that.

President Sadat: [Interrupting translation.] Quite right.

President Sadat: [Translation continuing.] U.S. President Ford agreed to sell me a station like the one Israel has. And the one that we have, if I may point out, is at the highest technological level, and it is very costly. But the U.S. President Ford agreed to sell this station to me to be a witness between us and Israel. Now the early-warning stations in Israel, it has Israeli technicians and U.S. technicians. In Egypt, it is manned by Egyptians plus U.S. technicians. Now in case of attack on Israel, the U.S. technicians would warn the Israelis, would warn us, and would notify the United Na-

tions. The same thing applies to the base in Egypt. Some have claimed that this is an American electronic base. But it is an Egyptian station sold to Egypt, and it is stipulated in the agreement that should Egypt wish to withdraw the civilian American technicians, then it can do so. Thank you.

Q. Mr. President, can you see a day, in your lifetime, in which there might be peaceful trade, tourism, or the exchange of government officials between and among all the states of this region?

President Sadat: Well, we repeat again, the same theory—as I told you before, we cannot jump to conclusions. This problem is a very difficult and complicated problem and needs time. You cannot come suddenly, after 27 years of hatred, violation, blood, wars, bitterness, all this, and ask me for tourism and economic relations or so.

What I say is this—let us create a new atmosphere. Up to this moment, neither of us have any confidence in the other, and I assure you, Dr. Kissinger had a hell of a time, here and there—really. Because of this, let us create a new atmosphere, and let us reach the state of nonbelligerency officially and with guarantees. Am I to live to reach the day you asked for, I do not know. This is in the hands of God.

Q. Can I ask you to clarify two of your previous answers? First the one on the surveillance—are you saying that Egypt has the right to unilaterally withdraw from the surveillance system? As I read the proposal, it would require an agreement by both Israel and Egypt to have a withdrawal from the surveillance system. The other clarification—I am still not certain—is Egypt promising to guarantee the U.S. mandate for another two years beyond the present current year?

President Sadat: For the second question, I have already answered, and I have answered quite clearly. We shall be renewing the mandate for a year starting next October up till October '76, and I said it will be a few weeks before the election and for that we are planning to renew another year.

Q. Excuse me, sir, what would be the termination date for the U.N. mandate under that formula?

President Sadat: Twenty-fourth of October, 1976.

Q. The first year. Then what happens after the first year is the question. Will there be another automatic renewal?

President Sadat: It will be. There is an understanding between us and the United States—not between me and Israel, because I do not know their conduct—but between me and the United States. Yes.

Q. And then on the surveillance system, do you understand that Egypt has the right to unilaterally withdraw from the surveillance system if it chooses?

President Sadat: It is a matter of sovereignty. Sure. It is a matter of sovereignty. How could I ask this when I asked first President Ford to be a witness. Didn't you hear the question I answered before?

Q. Yes, Mr. President, I did. I was referring, however, to the proposal which says "if both parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such request conclusive"—the operative word being "both parties."

President Sadat: My agreement is with the United States. I have nothing to do in this matter with Israel.

Q. Mr. President, a few days ago you said you would like to see the Geneva Conference reconvene at the earliest possible date. Would you name specifically those parties that you would like to see participate in the Geneva Conference and the maximum amount of time that you think could pass before the Geneva Conference must be convened to consider an overall settlement in the region?

President Sadat: Well, I had a telephone call from President Ford this afternoon, and I thanked him, and I showed our gratitude. I commended also the sincerity and tireless efforts of Dr. Kissinger. I told him that, in spite of the fact that I am not completely

satisfied with what we have already reached, I consider this a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict and a step toward peace based on justice.

And I told him to keep the momentum that he has already done his best, with Dr. Kissinger, to regain it after it has been delayed last year because of the incidents, the domestic incidents there in the United States. To keep the momentum, parallel step should be taken on the Syrian front. And then I urged him—I have great esteem and confidence in him—I urged him to start a dialogue with the Palestinians, because it is a fact that without the Palestinians we cannot reach the final peace that we are still after.

President Ford himself has proved to me in Salzburg that he dedicated himself to this cause. Have I answered your question?

Q. Yes, Mr. President, but is there a maximum period of time that you believe can go by before Geneva could be or should be reconvened?

President Sadat: Well, as I told you, now we must keep the momentum. To keep the momentum, there should be a parallel step on the Syrian front. After that comes Geneva.

Q. Secretary Kissinger, did your negotiations in the area this time contain any talk about another disengagement in the Golan Heights, and if not, what are your plans?

Secretary Kissinger: I visited Syria and had extended talks with President Asad. As I pointed out earlier, the United States will continue its efforts to promote a lasting peace in the area. We will be prepared to help to contribute to another step between Syria and Israel, and we will begin explorations with the parties as soon as both are ready to begin talking.

Q. Secretary Kissinger, what are the guarantees you feel that the United States can give to keep this momentum concerning peace in the Middle East, particularly if you have further steps concerning Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians, and how long do you think this operation will take?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, we are talking about a process and, as President

Sadat pointed out, the distrust is deep, and as we have been in this negotiation, the issues become progressively more complicated. The United States has been in the position of being able to talk to both parties and being trusted by both parties. And that is the best guarantee we can offer for a continuation of the process.

Q. Mr. President, if I can pick up two questions that emerged as a result of your replies. Number one, could you share with us some of the views that President Ford may have replied to you when you suggested that the United States start a dialogue with the Palestinians? And number two, you have made a central point of describing the American presence in the Sinai passes. You have used the word "witness." As you know, this issue is now under debate in the United States. Would you, sir, like Congress to pass, to approve that concept so that the American presence can be established as quickly as the protocols stipulate that this happen?

President Sadat: On the second question, yes. Yes, I should like that the Congress not raise any problems concerning it. Because, after all, it is for the sake of peace. And the United States is the superpower that is responsible for peace, especially in this region, where she has, as I told you, all the cards in the game. What was the first question?

Q. It dealt with—did President Ford in any way respond to your suggestion that he initiate a dialogue with the Palestinians?

President Sadat: Well, President Ford replied to me that the United States will do its best to reach a just and peaceful solution in the area—and he had dedicated himself to this.

ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AFB, SEPTEMBER 3

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 8

President Ford

Mr. Secretary and Nancy and the party that have spent so many hours and days in the Middle East: Let me say with great emphasis that I am delighted to welcome you,

Mr. Secretary, back from this very important mission of peace in the Middle East.

The success of that extraordinary mission is of tremendous importance, not only to the parties immediately involved but, in my judgment, all the world. The interim agreement that Secretary Kissinger negotiated with great skill and with enormous diligence provides an important contribution to our continuing efforts toward an overall settlement in the Middle East. For that all of us have great reason to be most grateful.

As far as both sides were concerned, war was an unacceptable alternative in the Middle East. Both sides felt that the risks of peace in the long run were more acceptable than the dangers of war. The agreement initialed this past week provides time that will be needed to work—and we intend to work very, very hard—toward concluding a lasting peace agreement in the Middle East.

America can be very proud of its role as peacemaker in these negotiations, a role which demanded the respect and the trust on each side, a role which demonstrated again America's credibility. We can be confident that the civilian American technicians who will help monitor the agreement will be making a similar contribution to peace. I trust that the Congress will agree that this very small contingent is an altogether proper contribution for the United States to make a stabilizing and secure situation in the Sinai.

Tonight, however, our thoughts are primarily centered on welcoming Secretary Kissinger back home. And welcome you are, Henry. Henry has carried the flag of peace through weeks and weeks of very difficult negotiations. His achievements on this occasion, as in the past, have been remarkable.

I am very delighted, Henry, to welcome you back with this successful negotiation. I know from personal experience how long and hard you have worked, how difficult the task and the problem has been, and I can say from a very personal point of view that I am most appreciative and deeply grateful. And I think my words are words of millions and millions and millions of Americans. We thank you very, very much.

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, ladies and gentlemen: It is good to be home again. I want to thank you, Mr. President, for the very warm words of welcome.

In these two weeks of negotiations, we have been in contact at least twice a day. And during these two weeks of negotiations, your message to me has been, as it was in the months previously to all of the parties, that a stalemate in the Middle East involved the risk of war and therefore a danger to the security of America, and it involved the danger of economic dislocation. And therefore, for the sake of the peoples of the area and for the sake of our own people, we should spare no effort to help the nations of the Middle East find the way toward peace.

I am glad that my colleagues and I could make a contribution to this effort in which the willingness to compromise of the parties played such a central role. And we all hope that this agreement will be the first step toward a lasting peace for an area whose suffering has lasted for a generation.

As the President pointed out, we are proud that America was the one country in the world sufficiently trusted by both sides to play this role and sufficiently trusted by both sides to be asked to help monitor some of the technical aspects of the agreement on a very small but central part of the area of disengagement.

So, once again, Mr. President, thank you for this very warm reception on behalf of Nancy and myself and all of my colleagues. And once again, it is good to be back.

TEXTS OF AGREEMENT AND ANNEX AND U.S. PROPOSAL

Agreement Between Egypt and Israel³

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace

Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.


(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached Annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the re-deployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement.

³ The agreement and annex were initialed on Sept. 1 at Jerusalem by representatives of Israel and at Alexandria by representatives of Egypt and signed at Geneva on Sept. 4.



ment and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

Done at _____ on the _____ 1975,
in four original copies.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt	For the Government of Israel
_____	_____

WITNESS

Annex to Egypt-Israel Agreement

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles,

which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

1. Definitions of Lines and Areas

The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000—U.S. Edition).

2. Buffer Zones

(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between E and J on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the Buffer Zone, between line E and J there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M

(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(b) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

4. Aerial Surveillance

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either Party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East.

5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between lines J and K and lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

- (1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions
- (2) Seventy-five (75) tanks
- (3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e. with caliber larger than 120 mm), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.
- (4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).
- (5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.

(6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between lines J and K, and between line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament will be:

(1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.

(2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.

(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. Process of Implementation

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the

Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within two weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than eight weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

For the Government
of the Arab Republic
of Egypt

For the Government
of Israel

WITNESS

Proposal

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.

a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1 a. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the nature of the operations of

the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1 b. above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

c. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force agreement of February 13, 1957.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude

its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
Secretary of State

Accepted by:

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Reductions in Supplemental Requests for Indochina and Additional Requests for Supplemental Appropriations for Assistance to Indochina Refugees. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting reductions in fiscal year 1975 supplemental requests for Indochina and additional supplemental appropriations requests for assistance to Indochina refugees. H. Doc. 94-133. May 6, 1975. 2 pp.

Construction at Diego Garcia. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report that he has evaluated all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia, and certification that the construction of such facilities is essential to the national interest of the United States, pursuant to section 163(a)(1) of Public Law 93-552. H. Doc. 94-140. May 12, 1975. 1 p.

Security Assistance to Spain. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting notice of his intention to exercise his authority under section 614(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to waive the restriction of section 620(m) of the act as it applies to security assistance to Spain for fiscal year 1975, pursuant to section 652 of the act. H. Doc. 94-142. May 12, 1975. 2 pp.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of September 9

Press release 475 dated September 9

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of Soviet unhappiness over your latest peace mission in the Middle East, and in view of what appears to be growing skepticism at home about détente, I wonder whether you would tell us how you feel today about détente, whether you are satisfied that it works or perhaps disappointed by the interpretation in Moscow.

Secretary Kissinger: Détente has become almost a slogan in our public debate, and I think it is important to summarize again what it means to the United States.

The policy of relations with the Soviet Union, and of attempting to ease the tensions between the two great nuclear superpowers, derives from the conditions in which we find ourselves.

The United States and the Soviet Union have the capability of destroying humanity. Their conflicts, therefore, are different from the conflicts between nations throughout history. They have a special obligation to conduct their affairs in such a manner that the risk of war is minimized if this is at all possible.

It is this conviction that has led successive Administrations in attempting to find a relationship with the Soviet Union less prone to the dangers of conflicts that can arise sometimes even without the direct intentions of the two countries.

Now, this attempt to ease tensions takes place at several levels:

First, it takes place on the level of the control of arms, especially nuclear arms, and in that connection the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—the agreement that has been concluded and the agreement that we are attempting to conclude—are of prime

significance. The problem of the nuclear arms race is a problem that must be dealt with that will be solved at some time—and the sooner the better.

Second, we are attempting to bring about restraint in areas of direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as in Central Europe. That has been reasonably successful.

Third, there is the problem of conflicts, disagreements, tensions in areas where there is no direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, such as the Middle East. In such areas, the conflict can develop as a result of the tensions that are inherent in the area, the lack of restraint of the superpowers, and other factors. In the conflict in peripheral areas, the process of relaxing tensions has not made as much progress as in the area of the control of armaments and in the areas where there has been a direct confrontation. In those areas, further efforts and mutual restraint are necessary.

We do not believe that relations with the Soviet Union are idyllic. We are ideological opponents. We have conflicting national interests in addition to the ideological differences. Nevertheless we believe we have an obligation to attempt to ease tensions, if only to demonstrate to our own people that if there is a conflict we have done everything in our power, honorably, to avoid it.

So, on the whole, we believe that the policy of relaxation of tensions is essential, that we are going to continue to pursue it, and that it can be done only on the basis of reciprocity. We will not give up vital American interests. We will resist attempts to exploit it, but we will cooperate on the basis

of reciprocity with any effort that can ease tensions on both sides, on the basis that the process is a two-way street.

Defusing of Middle East Tensions

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to this easing of tensions in the Middle East, you say that the United States won't give up any of its vital interests, and presumably the Soviet Union won't give up any of its vital interests. In peripheral areas such as these, is it not possible that what is considered progress by one side may be considered dangerous provocation by the other and thereby have an adverse effect on your general picture?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, when you assess vital interests, you also have to remember that in order to vindicate them you have to survive. So that the definition that "both sides have a vital interest" must take into account the realities of the contemporary period.

I believe that it is—

Q. I wasn't talking about that.

Secretary Kissinger: I will come to your question in a minute—or in five minutes. [Laughter.]

In the Middle East, I do not believe that the essential interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are in any sense incompatible. I do not believe that the recent agreement between Egypt and Israel is in any sense detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union or a unilateral advantage for the United States.

The significance of the agreement is that it defuses the tensions in the area and if it is implemented properly will open, or can open, a door to general peace in the area.

And if we consider that every war in the Middle East has involved the danger of confrontation of the two nuclear superpowers, it is in the mutual interest of both the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the tensions of war.

The United States seeks no unilateral advantage in the Middle East. The United States recognizes that in a final settlement in the Middle East, a Soviet role will be important; and therefore we are debating now

certain procedural questions about the Soviet role in the recent negotiations—rather than a unilateral advantage gained by the United States at the expense of the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a number of Pentagon officials have been saying that there is no military role that can be played by the 200 American civilian technicians in monitoring the agreement that could not be played by either airborne or satellite intelligence. Can you say, apart from the political or psychological effect of having these Americans in the Sinai passes, whether there is any monitoring function that is essential to their being there—in other words, that they have to be physically in the passes?

Monitoring Stations in the Sinai

Secretary Kissinger: These "Pentagon officials" have not shared their judgments either with me or with the President. And therefore I don't know who they are and on what their opinion is based.

The monitoring that is going to be done in the limited area in the Sinai—that is, the area that is geographically bounded by the Giddi Pass in the north and the Mitla Pass in the south—it is about a distance of roughly 20 miles. The monitoring has two strategic warning stations, one by Israel and one by Egypt, under American custody; and there will be Americans stationed at each of these stations.

And secondly, three manned tactical warning stations.

In the negotiations extending over several weeks that we participated in, neither of the parties thought that either of these types of stations was dispensable.

And I might also point out that there was a unanimous vote in the National Security Council before I left, which included the participation of the Defense Department, that agreed that as a last resort, if it was necessary to make the agreement, we should go ahead with the American technicians.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what about the risks that may emerge as a result of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] threat that the "Palestine revolution regards the U.S.

military presence in the Sinai as an enemy target and should be shot by every struggler and every nationalist in our Arab nation"? How do you plan to handle that?

Secretary Kissinger: There aren't that many strugglers in the Sinai, because it is a substantially unpopulated area; and the American warning stations are located in an area between the two armies, in an area that contains several thousand of the United Nations personnel and in which there is no civilian population of any kind.

Secondly, we believe that once the immediate passions have died down and the various Arab nations and the various groupings look at the agreement, they will realize that it was the only step possible toward peace that could now be taken and that, compared to the alternative of a stalemate, it was the best course for all of the parties in the area. So we believe, when a more sober calculation is undertaken, that all of the parties in the area will return to the realization that the process of negotiation is the only road by which peace can be achieved.

Making U.S. Undertakings Public

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a good deal of backing and filling going on at the Hill about the issue of what is classified and what is "secret" and how to handle it, involving the U.S. commitment. And there does seem to be some confusion about secret or classified commitments made by the United States—either verbally or written—in the interim agreement, and I wonder if you could clear this up with answering two simple questions.

First, will the American people know every detail of any U.S. commitment to the parties? And will all of Congress know these commitments in toto, or will full disclosure be made only to committees or to certain members of certain committees?

Secretary Kissinger: We have made an unprecedented effort to put before the Congress any American undertaking, to either of the parties. We have gone not only through any written undertakings that may exist but through the entire negotiating record to extract from it any undertaking of the United

States. We have put those before the relevant committees.

Q. [Inaudible.]

Secretary Kissinger: Let me finish—I will answer both of your questions.

We have put those before the relevant committees.

In addition, we have gone over the negotiating record with other members of the committees in order to make sure that their definition of what constitutes an undertaking does not differ from ours. Now, with respect to—And if there is a disagreement, we will work it out.

Now, with respect to what we consider to be undertakings, we are now working out with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and we will work out with the House International Relations Committee, a form in which these undertakings can be made public—the difficulty being that a few are not really "undertakings" in the strict sense, but general diplomatic statements of intention.

But any "undertaking" will be put before the entire Congress and before the public in a manner agreed to between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee, and the Administration.

Q. Do I get from that that there is a portion of—what? the diplomatic intent?—that is not going to be made public under any circumstances?

Secretary Kissinger: Any undertaking of the United States will be made public.

There is, however, an area of diplomacy that no country has ever made public and that does not involve undertakings, commitments, of the United States.

We will go to the absolute limit, and we have made an absolutely unprecedented effort in making available documents that have never been made available to congressional committees before. We will then work with these committees on an agreed method of publication. And it will be the fullest disclosure of a diplomatic record that has ever been made.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you told these committees of Congress that the United States

will pay for 55 to 75 percent of the oil supplies of Israel for years to come?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, that is not a correct statement of—

Q. What is a correct statement in regard to what we will pay for Israeli oil for years to come?

Secretary Kissinger: May I answer the first question?

We have put before these committees—and no doubt we will make public—any commitment, any undertakings of the United States with respect to the oil supply of Israel.

The United States has not committed itself to a separate funding of the oil purchases of Israel. The United States has agreed that it would take into account in its total aid package the additional sums that Israel has to spend for foreign purchases of oil.

There is no precise sum—in fact, there is no sum—attached to this general proposition, as will become apparent when the documentation becomes available.

Further Negotiations in the Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said repeatedly—you have said repeatedly on this last trip—that the momentum now toward peace must be maintained. What does that mean in a specific practical way, beyond the rhetoric?

Secretary Kissinger: We have maintained—and, indeed, it is part of the agreement—that the agreement between Egypt and Israel is not a final peace settlement. The agreement states it is considered a significant step toward peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

It has always been understood that a final settlement must involve the question of frontiers, must involve the question of reciprocal Arab commitments to peace, must involve some solution of the Palestinian question, and it must involve international guarantees of some sort. This can be pursued either by step-by-step policy—for example, through negotiations between Syria and Israel—or by a reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or by both efforts being pursued simultaneously.

The United States has repeatedly stated

its commitment to promote a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

We will be prepared to help the parties either in a multilateral framework or in a bilateral framework. And we believe—and we believe that the parties agree—that the process toward peace cannot be arrested.

Q. What is your appraisal of the Syrian and Israeli interest in another step along this process?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in the immediate future Israel and Egypt will have to negotiate the practical arrangements involved in their current agreement. That will take some weeks. Then the process of implementation will have to begin. But somewhere in this process, if Syria and Israel are prepared to start negotiations, and if it is their judgment that the United States can be helpful, we will be prepared to play a role.

Visit of General Secretary Brezhnev

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the interim agreement had any visible effect on other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations? And in addition to that, whether it has or not, could you give us an assessment of the current state of SALT negotiations in particular—what obstacles there are, if you can tell us—and what the prospects are for the visit by Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] to the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko is going to visit the General Assembly and on that occasion will pay his customary visit to Washington. I expect to meet with him several times while he is here. The President will meet with him for an extended review of the situation. On that occasion we will certainly review the situation in the Middle East, and at least from our side, we will make every effort to overcome whatever misunderstandings may exist.

As far as SALT is concerned, the basic issues of principle were settled at Vladivostok. Several other issues of great consequence have been settled in the meantime. We

are now down to two or three issues of great importance on which agreement has not yet been reached but on which, if agreement were reached, the negotiation could be concluded within six to eight weeks after that.

We expect to discuss those issues with Foreign Minister Gromyko when he is here, and we still expect to receive the General Secretary in Washington before the end of this year.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is somewhat—

Q. Mr. Secretary, that timetable would seem to run awfully late into the year. You say six to eight weeks after a breakthrough. And what is your estimate of a foreseeable date, even if all things would go somewhat—

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot give an estimate of a date, but I have said that we still expect to see Mr. Brezhnev here before the end of this year.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the somewhat unprecedented intervention of your African desk with the Governor of Delaware on behalf of two members of ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union], an African terrorist group without U.N. diplomatic credentials—did this have anything to do with the widely reported resignation of Ambassador Davis [Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs]?

Secretary Kissinger: No, because I don't even know what you're talking about.

Q. It's been reported on page 1 of the Star and the Post, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Kissinger: Well—

Q. You don't read those papers, or—

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to offend the press, but I regret to say that I am not familiar with this particular incident—but I will be within 15 minutes of leaving here. [Laughter.]

Issues in Middle East Policy Reassessment

Q. Mr. Secretary, in a memorandum of understanding some months ago the Administration announced there was a policy reassessment taking place regarding the Mid-

dle East. Are we ever to hear of that again—or if we're not, can you give us some tentative conclusions that may have been drawn as the result of this months-long reassessment?

Secretary Kissinger: The reassessment had two aspects. It had the aspect of the diplomatic framework within which progress toward peace could be pursued in the Middle East in the wake of the failure of the March shuttle. And, secondly, it had the aspect of the aid levels that were requested for both Israel and some of the Arab countries. Both of these issues were clearly related to each other.

In the wake of the March failure, we had to assess whether the step-by-step approach was still valid or whether a more comprehensive approach offered the only possibility. I think that the diplomatic framework of the reassessment has been settled by the recent negotiation between Egypt and Israel.

Similarly, the problem of aid levels is in the process of being settled. It's been substantially settled. And these will be submitted to the Congress before the end of the month, I would expect.

Q. Yes, but to follow for a minute, in response to a question a while back I got the impression that we still have not made a decision whether step-by-step from here on in is the preferred approach. Is that correct?

Secretary Kissinger: Which approach should be pursued depends not only on the preferences of the United States but on the preferences of the parties, and the issue was not only which of these should be approached but in what manner it should be approached.

I believe that as a result of the examination here of recent months and of the events of recent weeks there is now a much greater clarity of the limits and the possibilities that exist in moving the process forward toward peace.

Similarly, as I pointed out, we will submit aid levels. And, of course, we had the benefit, during the reassessment, of learning the congressional judgment of appropriate aid levels in the letter of the 76 Senators and in other

approaches. And therefore, in assessing the aid levels, as I pointed out previously, what one has to consider is the difference between what would have been submitted or voted anyway and what is being requested as a result of the agreement. And we do not think that that is a very significant figure.

U.S. Personnel in the Sinai

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there an intergovernment study underway now concerning the recruitment of American personnel to be sent to the Sinai? And if so, will these personnel be recruited from the Defense Department, from any of the government intelligence agencies—or if not, will these personnel reflect that work experience? And will the organization established to administer the monitoring function in the Sinai be a private corporation—perhaps like the Vinnell Corporation—or more like Air America?
[Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I am not sure that I quite get the implication of that last remark. And I don't want you to explain it.
[Laughter.]

We are undertaking a study, on an urgent basis, of all of these questions. Our preference is to recruit people out of civilian life. We have not yet made a decision as between a private organization or a governmentally sponsored one. It is clear that the personnel will not be under the Defense Department, because we do not want to give them a military role. The personnel will report to both sides and to the United Nations as well as to the U.S. Government.

But the questions you ask, which are important ones, we will be able to answer within about 10 days.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said—

Secretary Kissinger: You have to remember, incidentally, that American personnel will not begin manning these stations for five months after the implementing protocol has been signed, and that is about two to three weeks away. So we have about five and a half months to work out all the details.

Events in Portugal

Q. I was going to ask you to evaluate the recent developments in Portugal with regard to your earlier statements on that country, also with regard to the role of the Soviet bloc in Portugal and with regard to the possibilities for American assistance to Portugal, economic assistance.

Secretary Kissinger: I have made so many statements about Portugal that I'm not absolutely sure which ones you are referring to.

I was concerned, as were my colleagues, that events in Portugal might be dominated by a minority group—the Communist Party—distinguished primarily by its discipline and its dogmatism, against the expressed wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese people. And the United States, together with its West European allies, repeatedly pointed out its dismay at an evolution in which such a small minority would take over the effective control of Portugal.

Now, recent events have reduced at least some of the manifestations of this dominance. We are not yet clear what will emerge out of the deliberations, both with respect to the formation of a new government and with respect to the organization of the Revolutionary Council.

The Communist Party still remains a significant political force in Portugal—probably out of proportion to its numerical strength—and we cannot yet fully assess what is taking place within the military movement. But on the whole, we believe that the events of the last two weeks have been encouraging. The United States supports the emergence of a pluralistic system there reflecting the public's views as they were expressed in the election to the constitutional assembly. And we are working in the closest harmony on this problem with our European allies.

With respect to the Soviet Union, we have made clear our view about possible Soviet intervention in Portugal, and those views have not changed.

Q. Will it be a matter of U.S. policy that

any aid to Portugal will depend on whether or not we still think that the Communist Party remains a force beyond its numerical strength?

Secretary Kissinger: That will certainly influence our judgment.

Soviet Role in Middle East Settlement

Q. You said the Soviet Union would continue to play a procedural role in the Middle East. Will it be just procedural? Could it be more than procedural?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I did not say the Soviet Union would play only a procedural role. I said that the Soviet objection to the recent negotiation between Egypt and Israel seems to me to have concerned procedure more than substance. And I also said that in a final settlement in the Middle East, Soviet participation would be important—and not only procedural but substantive.

Q. I meant to ask whether you could conceive of the possibility that the Soviets could play an actual peacekeeping role in the Middle East in the same way we will be in the Sinai passes.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the role that the United States is playing is at the request of both parties. It was not proposed by the United States. In fact, I am giving away no secrets if I point out that we were not particularly anxious to play this role.

If both parties should ask the Soviet Union in some other area to play a similar role, that would be for both parties to discuss with the Soviet Union. I do not see that this is the most immediate foreign policy problem before us, however.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there in the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Israel any sort of formal commitment to consult with Israel on the nature of assistance in the event of an attack by an outside power, and if so, why is it necessary?

Secretary Kissinger: The memorandum of understanding between us and Israel—which is not, incidentally, unprecedented, because this has been concluded after many previous

diplomatic watersheds—has traditionally been classified.

We will make public, as I have stated before, all of the essential undertakings, and I would rather deal with them as a unit than to deal with speculative clauses before the committees have fully considered them. This will be fully discussed.

Attitudes Toward Egypt-Israel Agreement

Q. Mr. Secretary, why, in your judgment, has the Middle East agreement been such a hard sell for you and the Administration, especially in the Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let me state my judgment of the agreement. I consider this agreement more significant than the previous two disengagement agreements that received much less criticism. It certainly gained some time for the peace process, and it may open the door to a general peace settlement.

Now, why has it been more difficult to present?

I think part of the reason is that it involves—in the year of the collapse of our Indochina effort—a commitment of some American personnel in a faraway part of the world. To be sure, the commitment is different from the Indochina commitment. It is for a peacekeeping role, and not for participation in a military conflict. But I think there may be a sort of subconscious rebellion against this.

Secondly, it coincides with our submission to the Congress of a substantial aid bill at a time when our country is undergoing a recession. And it may not be fully realized, first, that a substantial aid bill would have been submitted in any event, even without the agreement, and that, secondly, the costs of a war have been demonstrated to be incomparably higher than any aid bill that will be submitted this year.

So, for all these reasons, it has been a somewhat more complex case to make. And there may be the general attitude of suspicion that has befallen this town as a result of Watergate and other events.

But I must say, in fairness, that the questioning before the congressional committees has been very constructive. We have no complaint about harassment or negativism. I think serious people have made an effort to look into the implications for the United States of a major foreign policy move, and we think that the debate is, on the whole, a healthy one.

Proposed Sale of Hawk Missiles to Jordan

Q. Mr. Secretary, on a related part of the Middle East, do you think there is a compromise possible between the Administration and Congress on the projected sale of 14 Hawk missile batteries to Jordan?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, the issue is not between the Administration and the Congress so much as between Jordan and the Congress, in the sense that a compromise must be acceptable to the Government of Jordan in order to be viable.

We are prepared to discuss with the congressional committees whether we can find some formula that would ease their concerns.

There are definite limits to what can be done, because King Hussein has pointed out on innumerable occasions that he will not compromise on the numbers.

Now, whether any compromise is possible with respect to deployment, rate of delivery, or similar matters, we are now exploring with the congressional committees in both the House and the Senate; and then, of course, we will have to discuss it with the Government of Jordan.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any basis for a new German-American offset agreement now that the deficits and the American balance of payments have disappeared?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is no secret that your Chancellor is not an unqualified admirer of offset agreements. We have had some discussions on that subject, and we have not yet reached any conclusions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects now for the normalization of relations with Cuba, especially in view of the recent forum

being held in Havana for the so-called independence of Puerto Rico?

Secretary Kissinger: We have pursued a policy with respect to Cuba of moving by reciprocal steps toward an improvement of relations. This policy has shown some progress, and we are prepared to continue this policy.

At the same time, the meeting in Havana can only be considered by us as an unfriendly act and as a severe setback to this process and as a totally unwarranted interference in our domestic affairs.

Soviet Purchases of U.S. Grain

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union's grain shortfall is estimated by U.S. Government agencies as anywhere from 20 to 50 million tons, and there has already been considerable opposition to shipping the 10 million tons that they have purchased. How do you see the Soviet grain deals relating to our foreign policy and détente as you have described it this morning?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, 50 million tons is a wild exaggeration. I have not seen any estimate like this. But at this moment we are not undertaking any new contracts for sale to the Soviet Union until the crop returns for October are in.

We are also interested in discussing with the Soviet Union the possibility of a long-term agreement which would avoid the fluctuations and the sudden invasions of our market and which would enable our farmers to plan over a more extended period of time and which would therefore have less of an impact, or a minimal impact, on our prices.

All of these are now under consideration, and they are not directly related to détente. They are being discussed on a general level.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there some consideration being given to a long-term agreement which would involve a trade-off for oil or other Soviet resources?

Secretary Kissinger: There has been a very general discussion on that subject. There are no negotiations on that subject

going on right now. In fact, there are no negotiations going on either about the long-term agreement or about a possible use of Soviet resources. But if a long-term negotiation should begin, that is one of the factors that might be considered.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Church committee [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities] claims to have evidence that the CIA violated a Presidential directive on the destruction of biological toxins. What are the diplomatic consequences of this, and when did you first learn about it?

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, I first learned about it on television this morning.

Q. Ambassador Helms [Richard Helms, former Director of the CIA] apparently has been recalled to testify tomorrow.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. I would assume that there has been some discussion between the White House and the Church committee on this subject, but I have been away for recent weeks.

I would have to know the quantities that are involved before I can make a judgment. We committed ourselves by treaty to destroy biological warfare agents.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have talked an awful lot about the momentum, of the need for momentum, and certainly the Egyptians are discussing the need for momentum. On the other hand, the Israelis, in all of their public statements since the agreement, have indicated they have virtually nothing more to give; Premier Rabin talked about a few hundred yards in the Golan. In this case, have you perhaps simply postponed the inevitable, or do you think perhaps the Israelis are posturing at this stage?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want to speculate about a negotiation that has not even been agreed to in principle at this moment and in which I have not heard the detailed position of either side.

Inevitably, somewhere along the line there must be further progress toward peace. And therefore any progress that has been made, even if it gains only time, permits time for

the peace process to occur under conditions of less pressure and less tension. What will develop in the Syrian-Israeli negotiation, I would have to leave to the beginning of such a negotiation, and I do not want to prejudge it now.

Secretary Kissinger Holds Meeting With U.N. Secretary General

Following are remarks made to the press by U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and Secretary Kissinger following their meeting at U.N. Headquarters on September 5.

Press release 467 dated September 5

Secretary General Waldheim: Ladies and gentlemen, the Secretary of State informed me in the conversation we had just now of the Sinai agreement. As you know, the United Nations will have to play an important role, an enlarged role in the implementation of that agreement, and it was therefore very helpful for me to hear from the Secretary of State the details about the agreement. I consider this exchange of views very helpful. It is evident that the United Nations has to do everything possible in order to contribute to a peaceful development in the area.

Secretary Kissinger: The Secretary General and I had an extremely cordial and very constructive talk. I explained to the Secretary General the aspects of the agreement in which the United Nations will be involved. The role of the United Nations will be very crucial in this, the first agreement that involves the restoration of civilian activities in an area that is being vacated and that has many elements of great complexity.

My impression of the conversation was that the Secretary General and his assistants believe these problems to be soluble and that they share our conviction that the United Nations can play a very important and very decisive role in moving the Middle East toward peace. So I have been very pleased by this meeting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the

Soviets to express their criticism of this agreement in the Security Council and to delay or to complicate the necessary deliberations in the Council?

Secretary Kissinger: I expect that when the Soviet Foreign Minister comes to New York he and I will have an extended conversation on the subject. I believe that at the end of that conversation we will reach an understanding about the relationship between the U.N. activities and the really rather small U.S. activities, which are not part of the U.N. mandate but which will nevertheless be related to the U.N. activities. So I do not expect that we will say it is an insoluble problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect any real problem with Congress on approving of this plan for civilians?

Secretary Kissinger: I had the impression in my congressional briefings yesterday that, when the Congress understands, as it is beginning to, that this is not comparable to Viet-Nam but is, rather, comparable to peacekeeping activities that many other nations have carried out, like Sweden, Finland, or all the nations that are part of UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force], that the U.S. warning system will actually be within the UNEF zone—when all of this is understood, it will be clear to the American public that this is a peacekeeping function carried out at the request of both parties, and not an attempt by the United States to support one party in a military operation against the other.

Q. This morning, Mr. Secretary, when you replied briefly to a question, you said you would be talking to others besides the Soviet Representative in getting this straightened out in the Security Council. What did you mean by that?

Secretary Kissinger: I have two reasons for being here: one, the conversation just concluded with the Secretary General about the Egyptian-Israeli agreement; the second is to show U.S. support for this session of the special Assembly. Therefore I will be meeting with several of the Foreign Minis-

ters, mostly of the less developed countries, during the day to discuss with them their view of the special session. I intend to sit in for one of the speeches during the special session. So the rest of my conversations here will concern the work of the special session and not the recently concluded negotiations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of dissatisfaction expressed by the underdeveloped nations as to the speech which you prepared and that Mr. Moynihan delivered, mainly because your speech did not deal with the problem of massive debts of the underdeveloped nations. Now, what are your thoughts on the Swedish proposal for outright cancellation of debt burdens of the underdeveloped nations?

Secretary Kissinger: The reports that I get about the reaction of the less developed countries—maybe from an intimidated staff—are not as negative as you describe. What we attempted to do in this speech is to put before the less developed nations our conception of how the problem of development would be dealt with in a conciliatory, cooperative, and constructive manner. We put forward a series of proposals. We do not consider them exhaustive. We are prepared, either within the framework of the United Nations or within the framework of the producer-consumer dialogue which is going to start in the fall, or in any other forum, to talk in what we hope is a constructive attitude about the problems of the developing nations. The particular Swedish proposal, I have not had a chance to study, but we did not present our program on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Quite frankly, we did not think that the reaction was as uniformly negative as you describe—in fact, quite the opposite.

Q. Would you consider a moratorium on debt for the Third World nations?

Secretary Kissinger: Debt rescheduling has been a part of our policy. On the whole, we prefer it not to take place on a general basis, but to be related to specific development objectives. So we would probably not favor a complete cancellation of all existing debts, but the problem of the accumulated debts is a subject we are prepared to discuss.

Secretary Reaffirms U.S. Approach to U.N. General Assembly Issues

Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger on September 5 at the swearing-in of the U.S. delegation to the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Press release 468 dated September 5

I am not quite sure what the status of this delegation has been during the first week of the special session, and I do not know whether everything they have done is illegal because they were not sworn in. [Laughter.] At any rate, I am delighted to participate in this ceremony.

The two sessions that are taking place this year, the special session and the General Assembly that is the part to follow, belong to the most important that the United Nations has had.

The special session, in which we are now engaged, responds to the call for development by the less developed nations—a call which the United States is taking extremely seriously. If the problem of peace is to build a world in which all of the participants have a sense of sharing, then it cannot be that the world remains divided among those who are prosperous and those who are at the margin of existence. But at the same time, if development is to succeed, it can only be on the basis of cooperation and not of confrontation. One cannot extort a moral duty.

And so the United States has put before the special session a program of some scope that we are prepared to discuss not on a take-it-or-leave-it basis but in a spirit that of developing a cooperative structure not based on slogans but on mutual respect.

In the General Assembly that is about to follow, we have the problem not only of development but of peace. There again the United States will approach the issues with the attitude that in our time the threat of war—and even more the conduct of war—is an absurdity and that we must find means

of regulating relations among countries and solving international problems based on some other principles than those that have characterized international relations traditionally.

This will be our attitude in the General Assembly, and we are proud to have so distinguished a delegation. I am delighted to be able to be present at the swearing in. I look forward to working closely with them.

I would like to take this opportunity also to thank the members of Congress who are here who have not been sworn in, who have acted as advisers to us in the special session and whose advice and cooperation played a large role in shaping the program we have put forward and whose assistance is essential in putting it through the Congress. Maybe we should swear them in, too. [Laughter.]

Death of Eamon de Valera, Former President of Ireland

Eamon de Valera, former President of Ireland, died at Dublin on August 29. Following is a statement by President Ford issued that day.

White House press release dated August 29

It is with profound regret that I have learned of the death of Eamon de Valera, the former President of Ireland. I extend my deepest sympathy and that of the American people to his family and to the people and the Government of Ireland. For half a century, Mr. de Valera was a symbol of Ireland's ideals and aspirations. He served the Irish people devotedly and unstintingly, as parliamentarian, Prime Minister, and as President for 14 years. Mr. de Valera also personified the ties of kinship and friendship between Ireland and the United States. Together with the Irish people, we mourn his passing.

Under Secretary Sisco Discusses Middle East in Public Television Interview

Following is the transcript of an interview with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco for "Martin Agronsky: Evening Edition" broadcast on public television on September 10. Interviewing Under Secretary Sisco were Martin Agronsky and John Wallach, diplomatic correspondent for the Hearst Newspapers.

Press release 480 dated September 12

Mr. Agronsky: . . . in Israel a gamble for peace. The question is, will the gamble succeed? And if it does, will Syria and Jordan then make peace with Israel? And how will the dangerous problem of the Palestinian Arabs be settled?

Tonight on "Evening Edition," a discussion of the prospects for peace in the Middle East and the new interim agreement with one of the key American negotiators of that agreement, Joseph Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Joining the discussion is John Wallach, diplomatic correspondent for the Hearst Newspapers, who accompanied Secretary of State Kissinger and Mr. Sisco on the mission to the Middle East.

Mr. Under Secretary, the first question is the obvious one. If it is a gamble for peace, how good is the gamble, and what next?

Mr. Sisco: I think it's a good one, Martin. I think that we've avoided stagnation and stalemate. I think it gives us time, and it gives us time to pursue further diplomacy. I think one of the greatest dangers in the Middle East is a situation where there may exist a diplomatic void. So I think that one of the strongest reasons why I'm very pleased that we've achieved this interim agreement is that I think that it provides

the basis for further diplomatic opportunities in the future.

Mr. Agronsky: Let's carry it to a negative prospect, too. Suppose it had not succeeded.

Mr. Sisco: Martin, that's a very good point, because my own feeling is that (1) the risk of war within the next year in the Middle East would have been very great indeed; and (2) even if one could take an optimistic view and say, well, perhaps some way or another we might have muddled through and there was no war, I think there was a great danger that there would at least have been an embargo applied with all of the economic dislocation in America and in the world generally, a worldwide depression. I just think that the significance of this agreement, with all of its risks, is very considerable indeed.

Mr. Wallach: Joe, the fire apparently has gone almost completely out of the Arab campaign to kick Israel out of the United Nations or to have it suspended from the General Assembly. Do you think part of that is due to the Secretary's success in reaching this agreement in the Middle East?

Mr. Sisco: There isn't any doubt in my mind, John. I said quite frankly before we'd achieved this agreement that the question of expulsion or suspension of Israel in the United Nations would become largely academic if we were able to achieve this agreement. And I believe it to be so at the moment.

Mr. Wallach: I'd like to get into another area, Martin, if we could for a moment. That's the area of the secret commitments and assurances, understandings, "undertakings," as the Secretary called them, that have apparently been given to Israel and communicated to Israel from Egypt through

the United States. In what form, Joe, will these be made public?

Mr. Sisco: Well, first of all, the Secretary of State has made very clear, John, that any commitments that have been undertaken by the United States in connection with this agreement will be submitted to the appropriate committees of the Congress. We have done so already with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I will be submitting these undertakings to the House International Relations Committee tomorrow morning. We will be talking to both of these committees as to how these undertakings can be made public, because as far as the Administration is concerned, we have nothing to hide.

We think that the American people, as well as the Congress, should be fully cognizant of any undertakings that we have assumed; and I think it's important because, as you well know, we have all in this country suffered from the anguish of Viet-Nam, the concern that perhaps we were getting into something here that the American people might not go for. For this reason I think it is essential—and the Administration is approaching it in this way—that the information get to the American public.

Mr. Wallach: *The Secretary said that there are some undertakings that no country in the world would ever make public, that part of the diplomatic process must, by its very nature, remain confidential. Will the language of the commitments itself be made known to the American public?*

Mr. Sisco: We're discussing the form in which these commitments will be made public with the committees, so I don't really want to pronounce on that in any direct way. I think the important thing from the point of view of the Administration, from the point of view of the Congress, and from the point of view of the American people is that they should know what commitments have been undertaken, and I am confident that they will.

Mr. Agronsky: *Mr. Under Secretary, every word you say makes good sense; no one could argue with the whole attitude that*

everything should be made public. But as you noted yourself, in the very recent past secret commitments have been made that involved this country [inaudible].

As you know, that was the motivation for the War Powers Act that was passed by the Congress of the United States. And so these concerns persist, no matter what you say.

Now, there is one central point, for example, in the agreement from the Israeli point of view that many of us who have followed the progress of these negotiations feel it is inconceivable for Israel to have accepted—that some kind of an agreement, up front from the United States—and I speak of oil. They gave up the Abu Rudeis fields, which provided them with more than 50 percent of their oil. If Israel were to be involved in a war, they could not exist without oil. They have now a three-month supply. That isn't sufficient for them to go to war. Their survival would be at stake. Therefore it seems inconceivable that Israel could have concluded this interim agreement with Egypt without some kind of a guarantee from the United States that that oil, if they were at war, would be made available to them through the auspices of the United States.

Now, questions have been raised: Would American warships convoy oil to Israel, which of course raises the prospect that the Soviets might object, and you then face a Soviet-American confrontation? How would Israel get its oil? What commitment has the United States made to Israel on this question?

Mr. Sisco: Let me try to say a few things on this—

Mr. Agronsky: *You would agree that that's central.*

Mr. Sisco: Oh, it's central, of course. We've been told, by the way, that the Israelis have a six-month reserve of oil and frankly they would like to increase it. But be that as it may—

Mr. Wallach: *We're committed to help them increase it, aren't we?*

Mr. Sisco: Let me say a word both with

respect to the reserve, as well as really the central question that you have posed.

Mr. Agronsky: Survival is what they're worried about.

Mr. Sisco: Absolutely. We have made an undertaking with respect to being helpful to Israel, and the precise undertaking will be made public. But I think I can give you some indication. The reason why I am not going to be as precise as I would like is that we are discussing with the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the present time just what form these undertakings will be made public. Therefore I don't want to scoop, obviously, either of the committees.

But I can say this to you: that we have discussed with the Israelis how we can be helpful in their purchasing oil in circumstances where they might not be able to buy oil but there is no particular restriction on us. That's one set of circumstances where we have indicated that we might be helpful in their being able to purchase oil.

Another circumstance is the circumstance that you have described; namely, what if there were an embargo and what if that embargo, for example, were applied to Israel and likewise on the United States? That's another set of circumstances on which I don't want to be precise; but I think there are ways in which the United States can be helpful, and has indicated that it will be helpful, to Israel without doing any serious jeopardy to our own oil supply.

Now let me say one other thing.

Mr. Agronsky: Not the jeopardy of our oil supply. I'm talking about raising the prospect of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, which might attempt to intercede on behalf of Arab countries to prevent Israel from getting the oil.

Mr. Sisco: Well, first of all, the only source of supply for purchase of oil is not, as you know, only the Arab countries.

But let me put at rest one thing, because there have been news articles on the very point that you've raised, the implication being that somehow or another we would be-

come directly involved, involved, for example, in escorting vessels in order to actually supply Israel. Notice that I used the phrase "to help them buy oil." I can say to you categorically that there is no such assurance that the United States has undertaken to help escort vessels in order to actually supply oil to Israel. And I can say that quite categorically.

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Under Secretary, I can say to you categorically I find it inconceivable that Israel would place itself in that kind of jeopardy.

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think I'll stand on what I had to say, Martin. As I say, I think we've indicated how we can be helpful in terms of the purchase of oil. We have undertaken no commitment whatsoever in terms of escort or—

Mr. Wallach: Mr. Sisco, do you think the American people would support emergency shipments of oil to Israel when an oil embargo was actually in effect against this country?

Mr. Sisco: Depends on the circumstances, John. For example, you know that one of the things that we have done with our European allies, who, after all, are the principal consumers of oil—we have entered into, in the context of the International Energy Agency, not only a conservation program but a sharing program. What would we and they do in circumstances where, say, the embargo were in effect? And there are procedures and sharing arrangements that have already been worked out that this government has agreed to with our European allies. For example, one element in that formula is that we would all, in those circumstances, apply a 7–10 percent reduction in our own consumption.

But there are arrangements that are possible, and I think that I've probably gone into this thing as much in detail as I can at this juncture. But quite frankly the American people are going to know what—

Mr. Wallach: But, Joe, what I'd like to get at is the nature of some of these secret commitments, if I could for a minute. I mean, it's—

Mr. Sisco: John, I object to the phrase "secret commitments." This is good newsworthy phraseology. This is not secret commitments. These are commitments that have been undertaken. They are private commitments in the sense that they are confidential exchanges between two governments. This is not a situation where the Administration is trying to make some secret agreement that it's going to hide from the American people. And I think this phrase is such a misnomer that I think that frankly we ought to—

Mr. Wallach: But Joe, it's a misnomer because of statements such as the following: Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres saying 24 hours after the agreement that the secret assurances in the agreement represent to most far-reaching American commitment to Israel's survival short of an actual mutual defense pact.

Mr. Sisco: John, look—

Mr. Wallach: Don't the American people deserve to know what in fact he is talking about?

Mr. Sisco: But, John, I've agreed with you. And my answer is, yes, they will be told. And so there is no argument.

Mr. Wallach: But then why are you arguing with my talking about specifics here and—

Mr. Sisco: Simply because of the fact that, as I explained here a moment ago to Martin, we are in a discussion with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee as to how these undertakings will be made public. I—

Mr. Wallach: Aren't you talking about sanitizing the assurances for the American public? I come back to my original question: Are you going to make public the language of these commitments so the American public will know, for example, whether the United States is committed simply to consult with Israel in the event of a third-power or Soviet attack, or whether we are committed to coordinate military strategy—whatever that may mean—in the event of a third-power attack?

Mr. Sisco: I—

Mr. Wallach: This is a semantic difference but an important difference.

Mr. Sisco: I am confident, John, that what will be made public will be the undertakings of the United States in a very clear-cut fashion.

Mr. Agronsky: You know, John, to the Under Secretary's amazement, I want to come to his defense on this. I think that since he is in the process of discussing this with the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—the [House] Foreign Affairs is now called International Relations, I believe—I think we have to accept that the process is ongoing and that at the moment he will indeed make good on his promise to us that it will be made public.

Mr. Wallach: But, Martin, if I can disagree with you. The Administration is asking for support for stationing 200 American civilian technicians in sensitive positions—

Mr. Agronsky: Well, I'm going to come to that.

Mr. Wallach: —in fact, before the American public is aware of what the secret assurances or commitments are.

Mr. Agronsky: Fair enough—

Mr. Wallach: And in fact the vote will be taken on this very crucial part of the agreement—and don't misunderstand me; I think the agreement is a very good one—but the vote will be taken before the public is aware of what in fact the United States has entered into.

Mr. Agronsky: The Under Secretary is delighted that you and I are arguing. Let's move to that particular problem.

Mr. Sisco: I don't accept the assumption that he's just made. Both committees are and will be fully informed, and he's made an assumption about the timing of the publication of these matters that I am not prepared to make at the moment.

Mr. Agronsky: OK. Well, let's go to the point. The 200 or 150 American technicians. Now, as you know one of the criticisms and one of the analogies that has been made was the initial American commitment in Vietnam, which first was advisers, then led to

military and then to an enormous involvement that at one point reached 550,000 American troops. Do you see any kind of an analogy? Do you regard that as an inaccurate analogy, for one thing? Are those Americans going to be in jeopardy in such a sense that it could lead to an American involvement in any fighting that might break out in the Middle East?

Mr. Sisco: Martin, I am very glad you raised this, because this is certainly understandably on the minds of the American people. I might add that it was very much on the minds of the negotiators as well.

First, let me say, as John indicated, these are civilians. They will be playing a technical surveillance role in the passes, not along the whole line. They will be in the U.N. buffer zone. Actually, they will be between the two armies. Now, in Viet-Nam, as you well know, we had military rather than civilian, and their role was on one side as against another.

Mr. Agronsky: —committed to one side.

Mr. Sisco: —committed to one side. This is an impartial role between the two sides at the request of the two sides. It is not the role of one adversary as against another, but rather, it's an impartial peacekeeping role at the request of both sides.

Mr. Wallach: Is there any risk?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I'd be a fool to say to you that there was absolutely no risk whatsoever. But I think the risk is indeed very, very minimal in terms of injury to our personnel. We have written into this agreement—this is in the public domain—that the United States has the unilateral right to withdraw these minimal number of personnel if the United States, that is, if the President feels that they are in jeopardy in any way. And he can do this unilaterally, Martin, without informing anyone. Or—

Mr. Wallach: Except Senator Church's—

Mr. Sisco: —or if, in another situation, if in fact we feel that the presence is no longer necessary. And as John has indicated, we have also accepted Senator Church's suggestion that we are prepared to pull them out automatically in the event of hostilities.

Mr. Wallach: Is there any protection for them, Joe, if in the unlikely event that they get shot at, are they allowed to protect themselves?

Mr. Agronsky: The Palestinians, for example, who have already [inaudible] themselves to that.

Mr. Wallach: Have threatened, that's right, threatened to shoot them. But aside from the Palestinian threat, are the U.N. troops that are in the area assigned to protect these men in any way? Is this part of their—

Mr. Sisco: The U.N. responsibility in the buffer zone is to police that zone to prevent any hostile activity and, obviously, to play this buffer role between the two sides.

On this question of the Palestinians, Martin, you want to remember that this huge buffer zone between the two sides is unpopulated—plenty of sand, with no more than a few bedouins here and there, in the north perhaps a few fishermen. But it is a highly unpopulated area; moreover, historically, as you well know, being so close to this and being familiar with the history, there have not been serious guerrilla problems in the Sinai. The guerrilla problems have been on the Lebanese border, in Syria, Jordan, and so on.

The chances of an American being hurt by a guerrilla are infinitesimally small, in my judgment, because it's a question of getting through two armies, it's a question of getting through a U.N. army, if you will, of 5,000. And of all the risks, I think that's a very, very minimal risk—

Mr. Wallach: Would you have been able to get the agreement without in a sense volunteering or proposing this civilian force for the passes?

Mr. Sisco: John, unfortunately, I don't believe we could have. And it's no secret, as you well know, that we agreed to this role of Americans very reluctantly, very reluctantly. It was only because we came to the judgment that unless we agreed, that there would be no agreement between the two sides that we very reluctantly agreed, although it was only 200 civilians.

Mr. Agronsky: Just for the record, can I

follow up, John, on this point. Who proposed it initially? The indication is that it came from Sadat when he met with President Ford at Salzburg. Is that so?

Mr. Sisco: It's an intricate history, but I think I can answer it for you.

The Israelis, as you know, have a major strategic intelligence installation at a place called Um Khushaib, which is in the U.N. buffer zone. Now, the Israelis were very, very anxious that they not only retain that installation but that installation be operated by Israelis.

At one point in the discussion, President Sadat did indicate that his preference obviously was for the installation not to be there at all in the buffer zone. But at one point he did suggest that perhaps Americans, and even the United Nations, might man this station. The Israelis did not agree with this, and therefore the discussions evolved in such a way that it was agreed, as it's contained in the agreement, that there would be one strategic early-warning station manned and operated by the Israelis. Likewise the Egyptians would have the right to build one not too far away in the passes, and in addition there would be three small manned tactical early-warning stations which would be manned by Americans.

There will be a few Americans at this large strategic station of the Israelis; there will be a few Americans at the large Egyptian installation; but this is largely in a custodial role. The Egyptians will in fact be operating their own. Our role will be in the manned stations in early warning.

Mr. Agronsky: And this is keyed to the [inaudible] acceptance on both sides of the—

Mr. Sisco: Absolutely keyed.

Mr. Wallach: Martin, I'd like to get into the Soviet attitude toward this entire package.

But before I do, I'd like to clarify one thing that you said, if I may. You said that the undertakings that America has made will be made public. The Secretary seemed to indicate yesterday at his news conference that what we will be communicating to Israel from Egypt in terms of whether or not

Egypt will relax the economic boycott against American firms that also deal with Israel, whether Egypt will let up on its propaganda against Israel in government-controlled media, whether it will permit some of the African countries which may want to resume relations with Israel to go ahead and do so or not at least actively campaign against them. But this part of the agreement will not be made public. Is that accurate or not?

Mr. Sisco: The American commitments, our undertakings, will be made public. Wherever we have played the role of a conduit, where we've been the messenger, if you will, between one side and another, this falls, in our judgment, within the confidentiality of the conduct of American diplomacy and that record—we will respect the views of the parties and that record will not be made public.

Mr. Wallach: And that presumably includes the commitment by Egypt to renew the agreement for two years in addition to the one that—

Mr. Sisco: I'm not going to get into the specifics of these, John. But again I want to reiterate—and this is really the key point—whatever American commitments, whatever American undertakings were assumed in relationship to this agreement not only will have been submitted to both appropriate committees of the Congress but it will be made public for the American people.

Mr. Wallach: I want to go on with the Soviet thing, because I really think that's important. The Secretary met with the highest ranking Soviet diplomat here 24 hours after he got back, Mr. [Yury M.] Vorontsov. What was the meeting like, Joe? Was it icy? Was it cordial? Was it civilized? How do you assess the Soviet attitude toward this agreement?

Mr. Sisco: Let me say a few words about the Soviets. First of all, I think that there is a certain amount of displeasure which has been reflected by the Soviets—in my judgment, more with respect to the procedure than with the substance. There is no doubt, Martin, that the very fact that America has

been the one who has been asked to play this impartial third-party role between the two sides, that we've brought off this interim agreement—

Mr. Agronsky: That puts their nose out of joint. You would think they would try to throw a monkey wrench. It's a diminution of Soviet influence.

Mr. Sisco: On the other hand, I myself am pretty well convinced that in the last analysis the Soviets will not see it to be in their interests to actually be obstructive in terms of the substance of the agreement itself. I think their own interest is such that they can't really, seriously, derive any real benefit from the situation in the Middle East, which might create a crisis.

Mr. Wallach: Do they gain from the agreement, in your view?

Mr. Sisco: My judgment is that not only do the parties and the peoples in the area gain from the agreement, I think all of the major powers gain because to the degree to which this contributes to stabilization, I think it reduces the risk of confrontation between the two of us.

Mr. Agronsky: We only have a moment or two. I'd like to pursue the Russian thing further but I think this is also significant. Your predecessor, not your immediate predecessor, but George Ball, who once held the office you hold, in a very critical piece in Newsweek magazine indicated that he thought the whole step-by-step thing was wrong, that it should have been the whole ball of wax from the beginning. He made the observation, "No matter what gestures we may make in the weeks ahead, it is smoking opium to assume we can go farther with step-by-step diplomacy."

Mr. Sisco: Well, my judgment is this: that this step that we've achieved creates new opportunities for diplomacy. We don't consider it to be an end in itself. We think there has to be progress on other fronts, and we intend to proceed on that basis. If we had moved—

Mr. Agronsky: Have we proceeded with Syria, for example?

Mr. Sisco: We have begun, we talked to President Asad twice while we were on this mission, and I can assure you, Martin, that we will be consulting with all the parties concerned in order to keep the momentum going. If we had gone ahead here some months ago and tried to achieve an overall settlement, where none of the parties were really able and willing to face up to the key fundamental issues, such as final borders, Jerusalem, the whole question of the Palestinians, I think we would have had chaos here months ago rather than a reasonably favorable circumstance today.

Mr. Wallach: Joe, the Secretary said yesterday, and it was an intriguing comment, that in a final settlement Soviet participation will be important.

Mr. Sisco: I would agree.

Mr. Wallach: Can you envisage an actual physical Soviet presence in some form in helping to guarantee a final settlement?

Mr. Sisco: I don't. I think this is largely academic at the moment.

Under Secretary Sisco Interviewed on "Today" Show

Following is the transcript of an interview with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco by Douglas Kiker and Richard Valeriani on the NBC "Today" show on September 11.

Press release 476 dated September 11

Mr. Kiker: Mr. Sisco, the United States is a party to this new agreement to a considerable extent. Parts of the agreement remain classified. You are giving those classified details to Members of Congress, but why not disclose all parts of the agreement to the American people? Also, why not disclose the details of the memorandum of agreement which the United States and Israel signed?

Mr. Sisco: Doug, we are discussing this matter, as you know, with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as well as with the House International Relations Commit-

tee. We have made available the American undertakings on a classified basis to the Senate committee, and I will be doing the same this morning with the House International Relations Committee. Then we will discuss as to how these things will be made public. What I want to say to you is that any American undertakings in connection with this agreement will be made public.

Mr. Valeriani: Will, for example, Mr. Sisco, the understanding between the United States and Israel that the United States might consult with Israel if it is attacked by an outside party—will that sort of thing be made public? Public in the sense that it will be made to the American public and not just to congressional committees?

Mr. Sisco: Whatever constitutes an undertaking will be made public—I do not want to comment specifically on any one element, but I am quite confident that when all of this is made public that it will be fully understood and I think that we will go ahead and complete these discussions with the two committees and, hopefully, move on to that.

Mr. Kiker: It has been said that we don't really know how much new economic and military aid is involved in this—we do know it is going to be considerable and that it is going to both sides, especially to Israel. Critics say that the United States bought this agreement by sweetening the pot, by throwing, in effect, billions of dollars or more additional aid to Israel. Are we buying peace in the Middle East?

Mr. Sisco: Not at all, Doug. First let me say that the figures I have seen in the press for Israel—that we will be committing well in excess of \$3 billion—these figures are highly exaggerated. That is the first point I want to make. Secondly, the figure will be substantial. We will be submitting a figure—the President will—as part of the overall aid package, as well as assistance figures for the Arabs.

When I hear the word that we are “buying” this agreement I ask myself a couple of important questions: What would be the alternative if this agreement were not achieved? I happen to believe that if this

agreement had not been achieved there would be a high degree of possibility of war in the Middle East and the costs absolutely astronomical; even if there were not a war in the Middle East there would be circumstances of high tension, of the likelihood of the possibility of an embargo, for example, with all of the repercussions in this country, a worldwide depression. I think that as soon as we submit this figure, I think quite frankly, it is going to be a real bargain for peace.

Mr. Kiker: But you are going to have a hard time getting Congress to approve this much money, aren't you?

Mr. Sisco: Not on the basis of consultations that the Secretary and I have been involved in. Yes, understandably, we as well as the members of the Congress realize that when substantial amounts of money are involved, we—all of us as citizens—have to pay for this. But I see, first of all, strong support for the agreement itself, and I see a good deal of understanding in terms of what is necessary in order to be helpful to the countries in the area.

And I would add one other thing, particularly with reference to the Israeli aspects. You go back a few months ago; shortly after the suspension of the negotiations last March, you will recall that 76 Senators signed a letter emphasizing the importance of assistance for Israel. We have been, as you well know, committed to the survival of Israel for a long time.

And I think the other question one would ask is: What would have been appropriated by the Congress in any circumstance?

Mr. Valeriani: Do you have a fallback position? What if Congress does not approve the stationing of American technicians in the Sinai, or what if Congress approves only a billion dollars instead of \$2 billion for Israel?

Mr. Sisco: On the first aspect, I expect overwhelming support of the Congress for the U.S. involvement in the surveillance system in the passes. Therefore I think this question is very academic indeed. Secondly, while a number of these discussions with respect to assistance have been in the environs

surrounding the discussions with respect to the negotiations, there is no preconditionality involved. I am confident that the right kind of action is going to be taken by the Congress on both counts.

Mr. Kiker: Tell us about these technicians. We are told that they will not be provided by the CIA; we are told they will not be provided by the Defense Department. So I would like to ask you two things. Where are they going to come from? And secondly, we are also told it will cost upward of \$200 million to station men and equipment in those passes. How much will it cost, and where will the technicians come from?

Mr. Sisco: The second question I can't give the answer to in precise terms because we are looking at the financial costs at the present time, and again, I think that figure is excessive.

These are going to be civilians. We haven't made up our minds as to how they will be recruited. They are people that will have to have, obviously, a technical competence because what is involved here are three manned early-warning stations and you have got to have people who have this kind of technical capacity. But you are right: they are not going to be Defense Department people. However, we just haven't made up our minds where these will come from. We are looking into it right now.

Mr. Kiker: The PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] already has said they will go in and kill them, that that is what should be done. Critics of this thing say we are going right into another Viet-Nam, starting out with technicians and ending up who knows where. Do you want to talk about that?

Mr. Sisco: I do, because, first of all, so far as any danger to the Americans in these passes from guerrillas or Palestinians, I think it is very far-fetched and very minimal indeed. The U.S. personnel are located in the U.N. buffer zone between two armies. As you know, Doug, there has never really been the guerrilla problem in the Sinai. It has

always been on the Lebanese side and the Syrian side. And therefore the possibility of some guerrilla activity getting at the Americans is most minimal indeed. I think it is as little a risk as one can imagine, and so I can't get really too concerned.

I am also very glad that you raised this question of the analogy to Viet-Nam, and it is understandable. The Americans say to themselves, having gone through the anguish that we have—what about this, we are starting out with 200 civilians and is this going to grow as was the case in Viet-Nam? You have got to remember that in Viet-Nam these were military forces, military advisers on one side committed to one adversary as against another and very directly involved. This is an impartial peacekeeping role of 200 civilians there at the request of both sides—they are not military forces, and they are going to be performing a technical surveillance function. I think the analogy is completely different.

Mr. Valeriani: Doesn't the agreement, in effect, make the United States a guarantor of peace, with the technicians, with the promises communicated to both sides, with the promise of aid?

Mr. Sisco: "A guarantor" is much too strong a term. Obviously we are involved on the basis of a presence. Obviously we are involved as the result of the fact we have been the principal negotiators at the request of both sides. But I want to stress with respect to this presence, we have written into the agreement, as you know, that the United States has the unilateral right to withdraw if the President decides that any American is in jeopardy, and for that matter, he has the right to withdraw the Americans if he feels our role is no longer necessary.

Mr. Kiker: Let me ask you a couple of things about what happens from this point on. For example, Sadat now says that ships bearing Israeli goods which are not military goods may go through the Suez Canal. When do you expect that to happen and do you really expect that to happen? Secondly, I gather that the withdrawal of the Israeli

forces will take place during the next five months. Do you think that Israel will really meet this force deployment on time?

Mr. Sisco: On your second question, I do. I have no reason to believe that the implementation of the agreement will not take place within the time frame that has been agreed to. As you know, the working group of Egypt and Israel is meeting in Geneva right now. What they are doing, they are working out the details of implementation. Our hope and expectation is that they will wind up these discussions in roughly about 10 days.

Once they sign this protocol that gives all the details of implementation, very much the same as in the disengagement agreement of 1974, then the implementation will begin. The implementation, I think, will begin in the first instance in the south as it relates to the oilfields, and then subsequently as it relates to the north, getting at the key question of the movement of the Egyptian forces into the U.N. zone as well as the withdrawal of the Israeli forces out of the passes. This is to be completed within five months, and I have no reason whatsoever to doubt that this will take place in that time frame.

Mr. Valeriani: And the Israeli cargoes?

Mr. Sisco: On the Israeli cargoes, as Doug rightly has said, that is an explicit commitment in the agreement itself. It has been made public. I can't give you a specific time in terms of when that will be exercised. I have every confidence that any commitment made in the agreement by one side or the other—that each side has gone into this agreement, as difficult as it was to negotiate, in good faith.

Mr. Valeriani: Apart from the agreement itself, has the United States made any kind of a commitment, or have any kind of an understanding with Syria that we will now make a major effort to arrange negotiations between Syria and Israel on the Golan Heights?

Mr. Sisco: Understanding, no. But we have made it very clear to all concerned that we

are prepared to undertake a further serious effort to try to get negotiations going between Syria and Israel, either within diplomatic channels in the first instance—which was the way we prepared the groundwork for this latest agreement—and we don't even preclude the possibility of a Geneva conference before the end of the year.

The point is that we do not believe that the momentum can be lost. We think it is important that there be no diplomatic void, and as far as we are concerned we are ready to be helpful to the parties either in a multi-lateral framework or a bilateral framework, if this is their desire.

Mr. Valeriani: So there will be another shuttle in March is what you are saying?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I wouldn't make that kind of a rash prediction, Dick.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933; for the United States October 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000.

Accessions deposited: Iran, July 8, 1975; Sudan, February 11, 1975.

Notifications that they continue to be bound: Bahamas, May 15, 1975; Lesotho, April 29, 1975.

Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement 1968. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973. TIAS 7809.

Notification of separate membership: Australia for Papua New Guinea, June 23, 1975.

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and

extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.¹

Applicable to: Papua New Guinea, March 26, 1975.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹

Acceptance deposited: German Democratic Republic, August 15, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.

Proclaimed by the President: August 29, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.

Ratification deposited: Panama, July 31, 1975.

Corrected entry-into-force date: August 30, 1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.²

Ratification deposited: Monaco, August 21, 1975.

Postal

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), as amended by additional protocol, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

Accession deposited: Haiti, May 27, 1975.

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881). Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

Ratification deposited: Nepal, June 6, 1975.

General regulations of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol and annex and the Universal Postal Convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

Approval deposited: Nepal, September 19, 1974.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284.

Acceptance deposited: Oman, August 20, 1975.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement amending and extending the technical cooperation program agreement of June 30, 1953. Effected by exchange of notes at Kabul July 7 and August 12, 1975. Entered into force August 12, 1975; effective June 30, 1975.

Bahrain

Agreement implementing articles 8 and 11 of the agreement of December 23, 1971 (TIAS 7263), relating to the deployment of the United States Middle East Force in Bahrain. Effected by exchange of notes at Manama July 31, 1975. Entered into force July 31, 1975.

Chile

Agreement regarding the consolidation and re-scheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed or insured by the United States Government and its agencies, with annexes and statement. Signed at Washington July 3, 1975.

Entered into force: September 8, 1975.

Dominican Republic

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from the Dominican Republic of fresh, chilled or frozen meat of cattle, goats and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo April 21 and June 6, 1975. Entered into force June 6, 1975.

Egypt

Agreement relating to the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance from the Port Said area pursuant to the agreement of April 13 and 25, 1974 (TIAS 7882), on the clearance of mines. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo July 6 and August 21, 1975. Entered into force August 21, 1975.

International Labor Office

Agreement relating to a procedure to reimburse the International Labor Office for reimbursement of personnel subject to payment of United States income tax. Effected by exchange of notes at Geneva April 15 and May 16, 1975. Entered into force May 16, 1975, effective January 1, 1975.

Pakistan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of November 23, 1974 (TIAS 7971), with minutes. Signed at Islamabad August 7, 1975. Entered into force August 7, 1975.

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**Checklist of Department of State
Press Releases: September 8-14**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†469	9/8	U.S. and Portugal terminate textile agreement.
*470	9/9	U.S. National Committee for International Radio Consultative Committee, Boulder, Colo., Oct. 14.
*471	9/9	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC) Oct. 14.
*472	9/9	SCC, Oct. 15.
*473	9/9	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on radio communications, Oct. 16.
*474	9/9	SCC, U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, working group on reception facilities, Oct. 9.
475	9/9	Kissinger: news conference.
476	9/11	Sisco: interview on "Today" show.
*477	9/12	Lorenz receives Director General's Award for Reporting for 1975.
*478	9/12	Soviet media representatives visit U.S.
†479	9/12	Kissinger: interview on "Firing Line" recorded Sept. 10.
480	9/12	Sisco: interview on "Agronsky: Evening Edition," Sept. 10.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.