# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# Constancy and Change in American Foreign Policy

*Address by Secretary Kissinger* [1]

We meet at a time when America, as so often before in its history, is turning a time of testing into a period of renewal.

Less than three months ago, under the impact of our disappointments in Indochina, some were questioning the very nature of our involvement in world affairs. The executive and the Congress seemed to be heading for a stalemate on foreign policy. But paradoxically, our setbacks have brought home to us —as well as the rest of the world—how essential America is to the peace and prosperity of mankind. And at home the dialogue between our two coequal branches of government is taking place in a more constructive atmosphere.

We have every reason to face our future with confidence. The United States still stands as the greatest democracy the world has ever known. Our institutions have withstood extraordinary turmoil and dissension and have emerged vital and strong. Whatever our disappointments, we have reason for pride in our achievements. If there is peace in the world today, our sacrifice has been decisive; if there is to be progress, our contribution will be essential.

We have learned irrevocably the central fact of the modern world: our security, our well-being, our very existence, are intimately bound up with the kind of international environment we shall succeed in building. If the weakness of free peoples tempts aggression, the lives of Americans will be in danger. If the disunity of free peoples invites economic chaos, the well-being of Americans will be in jeopardy. As the energy crisis surely has taught us, we live in an interdependent world—a world in which words such as "isolation" and "withdrawal" grow ever more anachronistic.

Thus we are not about to reverse the course of the last 30 years, retreat from our commitments, and leave our friends and allies to fend for themselves in the vacuum our actions would inevitably create. We shall not invite chaos. On the contrary, before us is a new opportunity to achieve peace and progress greater than even in our recent past.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has undertaken a role of world leadership which has had the support of both parties and all Administrations. That policy has preserved peace and freedom; it has sustained global stability and the global economy. Indeed, it is our very accomplishments that have created the new conditions, and problems, which we must now face.

—America's assistance to the postwar recovery of Western Europe and Japan, and our defensive shield, promoted the resurgence of those allies as strong and independent pillars of the free world.

—The international economic system, the trading and monetary relationships created by American leadership at Bretton Woods in 1944, has fostered economic progress not only in the industrial democracies but in every quarter of the globe.

—The inexorable process of decolonization, which we encouraged, and our pioneering efforts in technical and economic assistance for development have helped scores of

[1] Made before the Southern Council on International and Public Affairs and the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce at Atlanta, Ga., on June 23 (text from press release 342).

new nations launch their own national progress.

Foreign policy is a process. It knows no plateaus. What does not become a point of departure for a new advance soon turns first into stagnation and then into retreat. Thus the achievements of the past generation have created the agenda for the next decades:

—The growing strength and self-confidence of our allies requires the adaptation of our alliances from American tutelage to equal partnership.

—The growing destructiveness of nuclear weapons requires an alternative to policies of confrontation and an easing of international tensions.

—The interdependence of the world economy must lead to increased cooperation among the industrialized nations and a greater recognition of the concerns of the developing countries.

This agenda is vast. But there are not many periods of history when man can see clearly the outline of his own future and shape it to his ends. We have it in our power to lay the foundation of a new international structure in which nations no longer fear domination, in which negotiation replaces confrontation, and in which the fulfillment of basic human needs becomes a central concern on the agenda of international diplomacy.

A world of over 140 nations is a world of unimagined diversity and complexity. But it is also a world of enormous potential. A world of pluralism, of spreading ideas, of independent states free to choose their destiny, is a world of hope and an opportunity for fresh creation.

And the United States will always be mindful of its responsibilities. We have learned our limits, but we have not forgotten our possibilities. We are the world's largest democratic nation; we are the greatest single concentration of economic and military power; we are the nation with the most experience in organizing international cooperation; we are the major influence in global communication. If we do not lead, no other nation that stands for what we believe in can take our place.

### The Elements of America's Strength

What, then, is required of us? What are the elements of our strength?

*First of all*, we must maintain the bedrock of our security. While foreign policy must reach beyond military concerns, there can be no substitute for maintaining our own defenses and the objective conditions of our security. An equilibrium of power is essential to any stable international order. A world in which the survival of nations is at the mercy of others is a world of insecurity, instability, and oppression.

America's military strength has always been used to defend, never to oppress. At home, we have already adapted our defense budget to accord with our national priorities. In terms of its portion of the Federal budget and of the gross national product, our defense spending is at the lowest level in 25 years. Yet the trend of military programs of our potential adversaries is in the direction of expansion. Therefore there is an irreducible minimum below which we cannot go without allowing important interests of the United States and its allies to be endangered. We will seek prudent measures of arms control to enhance our security. But this Administration is determined never to allow the military defenses of the United States to be dismantled.

We strive to create the conditions for accommodation and reconciliation of differences with adversaries. But conciliation must not flow from weakness; flexibility is a virtue only in those who are thought to have an alternative.

*Secondly*, we have also learned that all our objectives—our security, our well-being, the cohesion of our alliances, and the health of the international environment—depend to a remarkable degree on the health of the American economy. This is, rightly, an immediate concern of every American; it is also the engine of economic growth worldwide and therefore an international responsibility.

The recession and inflation of the last two years have had ominous international consequences—which now we are on the way to remedying. Recession and inflation eat away at the well-being and hopes of groups on the margin of prosperity. They breed disunity at home, drain the energies of nations away from international concerns, and complicate the harmony of international relations. At home, they undermine social peace, confidence in government, and the vitality of democratic processes. Abroad, economic strains tempt the governments of the industrial nations into protectionism or measures of rivalry and threaten an era of bloc economic warfare between rich nations and poor.

Yet no government acting alone has a possibility of correcting the fundamental economic conditions that beset it. In the modern world, our economies are tied together; we prosper or decline together. The restoration of growth offers our best hope of accommodating the aspirations of all who compete for betterment of their own future. It frees resources for meeting all national needs. It restores faith in democratic institutions and democratic leaders.

The position of the American economy is central. As the President said in his state of the Union address in January:

> A resurgent American economy would do more to restore the confidence of the world in its own future than anything else we can do.

We shall do what is required.

*Finally*, our national strength depends on our unity as a people. There is no limit to what free men can accomplish acting together.

In the last quarter of this century, we are no longer preponderant. We can no longer overwhelm our problems with our resources; the diversity and complexity of the world no longer offer moral simplicity. We are therefore called upon, as never before, to show purpose, coherence, flexibility, and imagination in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

We must be one nation, one government. Our institutions must moderate special interests in the definition of a national interest. We must have the self-discipline to shape our domestic debates into a positive, not a destructive, process. We must attack our problems, and not each other. We can no longer afford disunity, disarray, or disruption in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

The consensus which sustained an enlightened involvement in foreign affairs for more than a generation is one of our most precious national resources. We are on the way to restoring our unity and therefore our capacity to act as a confident nation. We shall spare no effort to continue this process so that we will face our third century and its challenges as a united people.

Let me now turn to our agenda and describe the design of our policy.

### Alliances

Our allies and friends remain our first international priority.

What unites us and our allies are not simply the treaties signed a generation ago but the inescapable necessities of the present world. In recent weeks we have reaffirmed our commitment to our alliances. We have made clear that the United States will stand by its obligations in Asia as well as in Europe. But what gives life to our alliances is not verbal reaffirmation, but the reality of common action in response to common problems. We must find common purpose in challenges beyond the necessities of military defense.

This is why last week I outlined, on behalf of the President, the agenda for our close relationship with Japan and Asia. This is why on his trip to Europe the President outlined the issues facing all the nations of the Western alliance. The tasks which the President set before the NATO summit could serve as the agenda for all our alliances:

—We must maintain a strong, modern, and credible defense; an alliance that does not have the vigor and dedication to defend itself fails in its primary purpose.

—We must improve the quality and integrity of our political relations; participation and responsibility must be unqualified if they are to be credible.

—We must improve our political consultation to develop common policies to deal with common problems.

—We must work together in setting a productive and realistic agenda for the easing of tensions.

—We must look to the health of our democratic institutions.

—We must understand that the industrialized societies hold the key to the world's new problems of population, food, energy development, raw materials.

Urgent, cooperative action is needed on all these issues. Alliances must be adjusted to changing security requirements, or they will disintegrate. They must reflect common political objectives and a common strategy for attaining them, or their defensive capability will lack a sense of purpose. Therefore we attach great importance to improved political consultations. And we must never forget that strong domestic institutions ultimately provide the best protection against subversion as well as the sinews for defense against aggression.

Progress has been made, but much work remains. On the central problem of economic growth, allied leaders have begun to coordinate national economic policies to an unprecedented degree.

On the vital subject of energy, the industrial nations created the International Energy Agency to pool the efforts of the major consumers. We have agreed on safeguards against new oil emergencies; we have established a $25 billion solidarity fund to insure against monetary dislocations due to the massive payments imbalances caused by energy costs; we have launched new programs of conservation of existing supplies and the development of alternative sources. We are building the foundation for a constructive dialogue with the energy producers looking toward a fair and equitable long-term economic relationship.

This remains a priority concern. We are determined to end our vulnerability to external decisions or external pressures. As the economies of the industrialized nations begin again to expand, the necessity for energy conservation and development of new energy sources becomes more urgent. Without determined efforts now, the expansion of demand will give free rein to the producers' ability to maintain or raise the price of oil or to use the supply of energy for political purposes.

The national interest demands a comprehensive and effective energy program. The President will work with the Congress to obtain it, but if that effort fails he will exercise the authority he has to reduce our dependence on foreign energy sources.

In our political relations, we and our allies both have an obligation to a common interest. We do not assist others in their defense as an act of charity, but in our mutual interest. For us to terminate military assistance or even sales to an ally is basically self-defeating. We weaken the political ties, endanger our collective defense, and also fail to achieve whatever purpose the aid restriction was meant to serve. For this reason, the President has strongly opposed the congressional cutoff of military aid to Turkey and is now working hard with the Congress to bring about its immediate restoration.

By the same token, no country should imagine that it is doing us a favor by remaining in an alliance with us. Any ally whose perception of its national interest changes will find us prepared to adapt or end our treaty relationship. No ally can pressure us by a threat of termination; we will not accept that its security is more important to us than it is to itself.

We assume that our friends regard their ties to us as serving their own national purposes, not as privileges to be granted and withdrawn as means of pressure. Where this is not the mutual perception, then clearly it is time for change. Where it is the common view, the United States will remain a steady friend. We regard our alliances as the cornerstone of our foreign policy and the essential pillars of the structure of international stability.

### Easing of Tensions

However fundamental our alliances, we recognize that a peace that rests solely on a balance of forces and offsetting blocs is fragile and sterile. We are committed, therefore, to continue the effort to improve relations with the Communist powers. In the thermonuclear age, there is no alternative to a serious effort to ease tensions on a reliable and reciprocal basis.

Therefore in the past few years we have taken a number of practical steps to regularize our relations with the Soviet Union. The objective has been, in our own interest, to reduce the danger of war and to encourage new patterns of relations and international conduct.

This process proceeds on several levels. We have negotiated balanced and effective agreements to limit strategic weapons on both sides and in other areas of arms control.

In our bilateral relations, we have reached a number of agreements for economic and technical cooperation, agreements that provide benefits to both sides and give both sides a stake in the continuation of a positive relationship.

In resolving political conflicts in vital areas where we are both engaged directly, such as Europe, we have reached an agreement, in 1971, to make Berlin more secure. We are now engaged in comprehensive negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions and on the broader questions of security and cooperation in Europe.

In other areas of the world, such as the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, the course of U.S.-Soviet relations has been uneven. There have been cases where tensions have, in our view, been exacerbated needlessly. Thus, while we have made significant progress in our relations with the Soviet Union over the past six years, we have done so without illusion. The U.S.S.R. remains our ideological and political rival. Should it seek to use détente as a device for selective exploitation of strategic opportunities, the entire fabric of our evolving relationship will be brought into question.

At the same time, it is vital to maintain our perspective. We must never lose sight of the fact that war between nuclear superpowers risks the extinction of mankind. We are ideological opponents; technology drives our competition; political conflict around the world pulls us into rivalry. If humanity is not to live constantly at the edge of an abyss and eventually to be consumed by its technology, we must take care to nurture mutual restraint which has been so painfully built up, guarding against the tendency to use our improving relationship with the U.S.S.R. as the whipping boy for our frustrations.

Détente can never be a substitute for our own efforts; where our own efforts flag, we should not blame the resultant setbacks on our adversaries. International events in a turbulent world, and domestic conditions in many countries, are sufficient explanation for many problems. We should not exaggerate Soviet influence by blaming all difficulties on them.

The experience of Indochina should have taught us that it is easier to start confrontations than to sustain them. Tough rhetoric is not the same as sustained strong action. We will defend our vital interests and those of our allies uncompromisingly. But we can do so effectively over an extended period of time only if our people know that we have first pursued untiringly all conceivable alternatives to confrontation.

The principal item on the U.S.-Soviet agenda today is SALT, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. We are actively engaged in working out a new agreement based on the principles already agreed by the President and General Secretary Brezhnev in Vladivostok last November. If we can resolve the issues that still remain between us —and I believe we can—we will for the first time in history have placed a ceiling on the nuclear arms race.

Our new relationship with the People's Republic of China is now a durable feature of the world scene. It serves our respective interests and the broader interests of peace and stability in Asia and around the world. No stable international order is conceivable without the participation of this one-quarter of the human race. As you know, President Ford plans to visit China, thereby confirm-

ing the durability of our relationship and further advancing the ties between our two countries on the basis of the Shanghai communique.

### The Middle East

Our present agenda necessarily includes those areas of crisis which pose a danger of wider conflagration. To help moderate conflicts where our good offices are desired is an American tradition that goes back at least to the beginning of this century. History has shown that the breakdown of peace around the globe can touch our lives directly, and there are some disputes for which we have a special responsibility, such as the Middle East crisis.

That troubled area still poses grave dangers of war and of worldwide economic dislocation. The mistrust of decades is not easy to overcome. The international implications of chronic crisis in the area and the moral and strategic commitments of outside powers compound the basic intractability. They also require continued movement toward a lasting settlement. An active American role is imperative:

—Because of our historical and moral commitment to the survival and well-being of Israel;

—Because of our important interests in the Arab world, an area of more than 150 million people sitting astride the world's largest oil reserves;

—Because the eruption of crisis in the Middle East would severely strain our relations with our allies in Europe, and Japan;

—Because continuing instability risks a new international crisis over oil and a new setback to the world's hopes for economic recovery, threatening the well-being not only of the industrial world but of most nations of the globe; and

—Because a crisis in the Middle East poses an inevitable risk of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation and has done so with increasing danger in every crisis since the beginning.

We can never lose sight of the fact that U.S. foreign policy must do its utmost to protect *all* its interests in the Middle East. Given our inescapable involvement—economic, political, and military—there is no alternative to the full and active engagement of the United States in the diplomacy of peace in the Middle East.

Since October 1973 we have made major efforts to help the warring parties to resolve their differences. Unprecedented progress has been made. Disengagement agreements have been negotiated between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria which have been carried out by all sides. While deep suspicions remain, these agreements may have demonstrated to the parties that there is an alternative to war. We welcome the opening of the Suez Canal; we believe the Syrian decision to extend the U.N. mandate for six months was helpful; and the recent decision of the Israeli Government to thin out and withdraw some of its forces and equipment in the Sinai is a constructive move.

But we must not be lulled into inaction by the relative quiet of recent weeks; the fundamental issues remain unresolved. It would be imprudent to view recent steps—valuable as they are—as an indication that further progress is no longer urgent. Events have been calmed in the last few months in considerable part by the expectation, and our pledge, that the American effort would resume. We are now at a point where there must be a turn either toward peace or toward new crises.

We consider diplomatic stagnation an invitation to confrontation. We will not be deflected from our course by temporary disappointments or strong passions. The President has stated repeatedly that the United States will not accept stalemate or stagnation. We urge all parties to take seriously these words which were carefully chosen.

In recent weeks President Ford has held important consultations with King Hussein [of Jordan], President Sadat [of Egypt], Prime Minister Rabin [of Israel], and Deputy Prime Minister Khaddam of Syria. We expect to come to an early judgment on how best to proceed.

The United States will pursue whichever course seems most promising. We are open-

minded whether interim agreements or an early convening of the Geneva Conference offers the best method. Each course has its recognized advantages and pitfalls and risks. We are not committed to a particular approach; we are committed to progress.

Our ultimate goal is clear: to find solutions that will take into account the territorial integrity and right to live in security and peace of all states and peoples in the area. To reach that goal will require concessions by all parties. We are determined to persevere in pursuit of what we consider the fundamental national interest of the United States: the security and economic well-being of our country, of our allies, and above all, of the peoples in the area that demand it.

### The Developing Nations

In recent years, the problems of the new nations of the developing world have grown more urgent.

The strength of the dollar, the expansion of trade, the free flow of investment, the supply and price of energy, food, and other vital raw materials all depend on the vitality of the international economic system. But no economic system can be stable if scores of nations consider themselves outside of and hostile to it. The present global economic system is large enough to encompass the well-being of consumers and producers, rich and poor. But if it does not, we face a generation of economic warfare. The United States is prepared to work, with understanding and imagination, for change. But there must be a process of mutual accommodation that safeguards the interests of all nations. We will not submit to blackmail, bloc pressures, or ideological rhetoric. We will defend our interests. But we will listen to reasoned debate and consider carefully productive suggestions for reform.

The United States has already taken the lead with new proposals on a range of issues vital to the developing world:

—To fight the scourge of hunger, this government, recognizing that America's food aid cannot provide a long-term solution to the global food problem, called for the World Food Conference which met last November in Rome. At that conference we engaged other nations in a multilateral commitment to raise food production, to improve agricultural financing and distribution, and to establish an international system of nationally held grain reserves.

—Some 140 nations are now engaged in an unprecedented negotiation on a comprehensive new law of the sea. At stake are the reach of territorial sovereignty, the safety of the shipping lanes, and access to vast resources. Success in these negotiations would represent an unprecedented achievement in international cooperation affecting three-quarters of the surface of our planet and enormous mineral and other wealth. The United States will make a major effort to bring it to a successful conclusion at the final session next March.

—On the broader question of raw materials, the developing countries seek a stable and fair income from commodities which are central to their development programs. We in turn seek reliability of supply for our industries. The United States has therefore proposed new international rules and procedures on access to supplies and markets, discussions on new arrangements for commodity trade on a case-by-case basis, and new ways of financing commodity development in producing countries.

All these issues will be raised at a special session of the U.N. General Assembly this September. Working closely with Congress, we are now preparing concrete, detailed, and—we hope—creative proposals for that session. We intend, while fully protecting our nation's interests, to deal with controversial issues with realism, imagination, and understanding. We hope that others will meet us in the same spirit.

### Challenge at Home

We have before us a vast agenda. The peace and prosperity of future generations depend on decisions we make now. The choice is relatively straightforward: either we use our strength and opportunities for

good, or others will surely use their own strength for ends incompatible with our values. The problems we face are of such magnitude, their answers so complex—and the opportunities so far-reaching—that the last quarter of the 20th century will either be remembered as another period of American leadership and creativity or as a time of growing chaos and despair. Therefore it is time to put an end to the self-doubt and cynicism which have marked, and marred, American life for so much of the past decade. It is time to remind ourselves that America has accomplished great things in the past and that there are still greater things to be accomplished.

In our pluralistic society, national action depends on the support of citizens everywhere—not only in government but in the professions, in business and labor, in the universities, in the cities and on the farms all over America. These people, in their millions, have supported an enlightened international involvement for more than a generation; for they knew in their hearts that the greatest nation on earth could no longer remain isolated from the world around it. Again today, at another time of decision, it will be the American people who will decide, as they should, the direction their country will take.

There can be no doubt about the outcome. The American people will decide to keep their country the pillar of stability and the vision of hope that it has been for two centuries. They will support our leadership in the search for a new, lasting, just and peaceful international order.

Throughout our history America has proved capable of renewal and greatness. The colonists who came to the shores of a wilderness, the Founding Fathers who created the world's only revolution that never declined into tyranny, the pioneers whose eyes never left the horizon, the men of enterprise who made American productivity and efficiency the world's standard, the soldiers and statesmen of our century who built a world power both great and constructive, and the creative minds of a democratic society who have given the breath and inspiration of freedom of men and women everywhere—these are the foundations on which we build and the traditions we seek to emulate.

"Equal and exact justice to all men"—this was how Thomas Jefferson defined the goal of our national destiny, at home and abroad. And he added, ". . . should we wander . . . in moments of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety." We are at one of those moments. We will not miss our road.

## Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Atlanta

Press release 342B dated June 23

*The chairman [Ivan Allen III, president, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce]: Mr. Secretary, we have several questions from the audience, and if it meets your pleasure, I am prepared to give them to you if you would like to respond.*

*The first question is this: If Israel is to concede occupied territory to Egypt, should not Egypt provide the means for common civilian access between the two countries so that a common understanding can be achieved?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are basically two ways for going at the peace settlement, or the prospects of peace in the Middle East. One is to attempt to make a final peace. The other is to take a series of individual steps.

Under conditions of final peace, the totality of the issues must be settled, and the end process must be that the relations between Israel and its neighbors will be as normal as the relations between countries at peace generally are. In that case, there should of course be free movement of people between Israel and its neighbors.

If, however, it proves too difficult to negotiate a final peace settlement all at once, then the best approach is to take a series of individual steps in which less than total peace is balanced against less than total

Israeli withdrawal. Under those conditions, at any one step total peace will not have been achieved.

Each of these approaches, as I said in my speech, has its advantages and its risks. We had in the past favored the step-by-step approach because it enabled the problem to be divided into individual elements and because these elements seemed more manageable than an overall settlement.

But the United States is prepared to support any approach that leads to a solution, and we will not push one if it proves to be unworkable.

*The chairman: With the transfer of significant amounts of tangible wealth to the Arab countries, does this economic disruption pose a problem of soeial disruption that will tip the balance of power to the Communist countries?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I am not sure whether that question refers to the balance in the Arab countries or the balance in the countries which are transferring the wealth. But in either case, I do not believe that the transfer of wealth by itself will tip the balance toward the Communist countries. The transfer of wealth on the scale in which it occurs places sudden and very large resources into the hands of countries which heretofore did not have it and therefore gives them a capacity for disruption, even unintentionally, that requires the closer cooperation of the industrial world.

Secondly, the monopoly on energy by the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries gives them a capacity to manipulate prices and to bring political pressure that over an extended period of time should be our effort to end. The energy policy of the United States is designed to bring about conditions in which this monopoly can no longer be exercised. This is why we are so strongly supporting the energy program within the United States and the cooperation among energy-consuming countries.

*The chairman: In view of the recent developments in Portugal and the Italian regional elections, what do you think that the future holds for the North Atlantic alliance and the democratic governments on the continent of Europe?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The domestic situation in Portugal creates a serious problem if present trends continue. If Portugal slides in the direction of a neutralist or even Communist-dominated government, we will face the problem of how that can be compatible with an alliance designed to prevent Communist aggression or of how you can have the most confidential talks and the frankest consultations when one of the governments has such close association with the potential adversary.

This is why we have called the attention of our allies to these events and why we shall be watching them carefully. We do not believe that this point has yet been reached. But the tendencies are disquieting.

With respect to Italy and other countries, the electoral results, of course, reflect the public judgments on essentially domestic issues. And again, we hope that the conditions which have produced the dissatisfaction can be overcome, because a democracy in which the opposition parties are all essentially nondemocratic is one that is very vulnerable to shifts in the public mood.

*The chairman: I think this is a Chamber of Commerce question. Atlanta is the second busiest airport in the United States. Do you anticipate international connections between Atlanta and Europe, and if so, are bilateral treaties being negotiated now?* [*Laughter.*]

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was going to ask the Mayor after this meeting why he praised the airport for people wanting to go someplace else than Atlanta. [Laughter and applause.] But the negotiation of international air routes is outside of my direct responsibility. [Laughter.]

I think I'll blame Ambassador Reinhardt [John E. Reinhardt, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs] for that, too.

*The chairman: For détente to work in the long run, must the Soviet Union become a more free soeiety?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There is a certain paradox in the situation that it is the ideological rivalry that creates the tensions but it is paradoxically also the ideological rivalry that makes efforts at relaxing tensions so important.

What creates the necessity for this effort is that war with modern weapons will have consequences for which there is no historical precedent. No leader has ever faced the prospect that tens of millions of people could be annihilated in a matter of days. And therefore the question of war and peace between the two great nuclear powers, regardless of ideology, must be a preoccupation and indeed has been a preoccupation of every President, of whatever party, however different their personalities and, I may say, whatever their views before they entered the Presidency.

So if the domestic structures were more compatible, there would be less of an urgency. But also, since our domestic structures are not compatible, there is still a great need to make these efforts.

*The chairman: There has recently been an increased expression of concern over North Korea emanating from various government officials. Can you comment on the basis for this increased concern, and how real is a threat from North Korea at the present time?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, North Korea belongs to a small and select group of the most aggressive regimes in the world, and it is an extremely nationalistic and, at least vocally, a very bellicose government.

The collapse of the American effort in Indochina undoubtedly contributed an element of insecurity among all our allies who have depended on our support. And we have been concerned lest it create the wrong impression on the part of potential aggressors, particularly of countries like North Korea, which constantly affirm that they are going to unify their country, if necessary by force.

We do not believe that North Korea can now be under any misapprehension about the determination of the U.S. Government to honor the treaty commitments which were ratified by the Congress and have been reaffirmed in every Administration since 1954. And as long as we can maintain this conviction, we believe there is no immediate danger of attack.

*The chairman: Mr. Secretary, we have two more questions. Is the United States likely to use its strength as a food-producing nation in negotiations with other nations relying on their natural resources as their basis of strength and power?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We believe that the model we have put forward on how food should be organized and how surplus food should be shared should be a model for how other nations that have scarce resources should dispose of them within the international community.

*The chairman: And after your response to this question, we will call on Mr.* [*Dean*] *Rusk to close the evening.*

*In light of Africa's increasing political and economic influence throughout the world and the Third World community more specifically, can we anticipate a more open effort at cooperation with the newly liberated and emerging countries? And is our policy taking into consideration that over one-third of the untapped mineral natural resources are there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are attempting to give greater emphasis to our African policy. There is, however, a perplexity on how this can best be done, because most of the African governments, while they welcome increased American interest, also are very concerned with maintaining their independence of decision and very concerned not to be involved too much in great-power rivalry emanating from outside of Africa.

Our new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs is at this moment traveling in east Africa and has just completed a trip in west Africa. And we are trying to define a basis for a creative relationship with Africa. We have a mission in Zaïre at this very moment.

But I must be honest to say that we have not yet found all the approaches that we think will be needed in the years ahead.

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Atlanta June 24

Press release 344 dated June 24

*Mr. Richard Miles, president of the Atlanta chapter of Sigma Delta Chi: Thank you for coming here this morning for this news conference. Before we begin the press conference, in recognition of his fine-honed news ability—that ability to travel around the world to find any story, to chase any story—we of the Atlanta Society of Professional Journalists would like to honor the Secretary of State with an honorary membership in our organization and to present him a symbol of our profession: a green eyeshade.* [*Applause.*]

*Secretary Kissinger:* Mr. Miles, the only thing that is lacking in this picture are some electric wipers for my glasses, which somebody gave me for my birthday.

I am very flattered to receive this award and to join the only remaining profession in the United States that can still protect its sources of information. [Laughter.] And with this, why don't I take your questions?

*Q. Mr. Secretary, last night—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Who is this ringer here? [Laughter.]

*Q. Last night in your speech you advised our allies that we will not be subjected to pressure and, indeed, treaties are two-way streets and if they have other interests, so be it. This was taken by some people as a warning, particularly to Turkey. Is that accurate, or is it a more general warning—perhaps including Greece and a lot of Asian countries as well?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It was intended as a general observation to all of our allies. It was not directed at any one particular country.

We have reaffirmed in recent weeks—the President, the Secretary of Defense, and I—our commitment to our allies. But I think it is important to understand that these alliances have to be two-way streets, that they must reflect a common interest, and that they cannot be used as pressure against the United States. It was not directed at any one particular country, but it was a general observation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke last night about the treaty relationships, but you also spoke about the Middle East. Are you planning a new trip through the area at any time in the near future?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not made any precise decision as to which method would most serve progress toward peace in the Middle East.

At the moment we are engaged in diplomatic exchanges with all of the interested parties. After these diplomatic exchanges are somewhat further advanced, we can make a decision whether there is enough promise in any particular interim approach or whether we should attempt to promote an overall solution. That decision has not yet been made.

Yes, sir.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it is said by some local observers that you are doing this trip to Atlanta not only just because you like our city but because you are trying to help the President's image in "George Wallace country." What is your feeling about this? What is the purpose of this mission?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, there's one thing to be said. No one will consider my accent a Yankee accent. [Laughter.]

I am taking these trips for a number of reasons. One was that a few months ago I made a speech in Washington in which I pointed out that the heartland of America,

in my judgment, supported American foreign policy. So when I got through, one of these cynical Washington newsmen—a type that does not exist here, I am sure [laughter]—came up to me and said, "When were you last in the heartland of America?"—which was not a bad question. So I decided to go around the country and find out for myself.

But more seriously, the purpose of these trips is to bring to various parts of the United States a description of our foreign policy—a discussion of where we are going—and at the same time to meet with local groups to hear what concerns them. The foreign policy problems we now face are so complex and the challenges before us are so grave that only with a strong public support, on a bipartisan basis, can we hope to master what is ahead of us.

I want to make absolutely clear that I do not consider, nor does the President consider, foreign policy a partisan issue and we have no intention of making it a partisan issue. The great periods of American foreign policy have had nonpartisan support. That is what I am aiming for in these trips.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could I follow that up just a moment? The President has announced that he will be a candidate for President next year, and I wonder if that is likely to change the working relationship between you and him. Is he likely to be under pressures to make decisions in foreign policy for political reasons rather than reasons which you think may not be in the best interests of foreign policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My impression is that he has not quite announced it yet, and I have never seen an announcement shaved into so many little pieces. But my impression is that he is very seriously considering running—to put it mildly.

When he does announce his candidacy, I am certain it will not change our working relationship. I know that he considers the national security of the United States beyond partisan politics, and I am convinced—in fact, I know—that he will conduct his office for the best interests of the country, and that in our relationship we will not discuss what helps him as a candidate, but what helps the nation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the U.S. position on Russia's proposal to make Indochina a neutral zone and remove all military bases?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I must tell you the truth: I am not familiar with a formal Russian proposal to remove all military bases from Indochina, because there are no foreign military bases. I am familiar with the Asian security scheme of the Soviet Union.

Well, our view is that Asia—Southeast Asia—should be kept as free as possible of great-power rivalry. As far as we are concerned, we have withdrawn from Indochina. We have no interest in achieving bases there or having any military influence in Indochina. And therefore it is not an issue on which we need to take a position. We have no diplomatic relations with Cambodia and Viet-Nam, and our diplomatic presence in Laos is being harassed. So this is really not something addressed to us.

Yes, sir.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in recent weeks there have been reports of clashes in Cambodia and along the Cambodian borders, and today there are reports again of fighting within Cambodia between the Khmer Rouge and the rightwing Cambodians led by an uncle of Prince Sihanouk. Do we know what's happening in Cambodia since we pulled out?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We know much less what is happening in Cambodia than, obviously, we did before. No foreign country has any diplomatic missions in Cambodia today, so all of our information is secondhand or it comes from intelligence sources.

We do know that there has been a rather terrible toll of civilians that was inflicted on the Cambodian people when the population of all the towns was evacuated into a countryside that will not have a harvest until November; and the death toll, according to all estimates that we have heard, is very great.

We have also had rather firm reports of clashes between the South Vietnamese and the Cambodians along the border and on some of the offshore islands—including the

island near which the *Mayaguez* was originally captured.

I have not seen any hard evidence of fighting within Cambodia, and therefore I cannot confirm that.

Yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there is increasing speculation that we are near some kind of official change in our relationship with Cuba. And Premier Castro's return of $2 million to Southern Airways, of course, heightened that kind of speculation. Is there any definitive kind of change that we can expect in the near future—let's say, two or three months?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Our policy toward Cuba is that we are prepared to improve our relationship, depending on what steps Cuba is prepared to take. And, of course, ultimately Cuba will have to negotiate this with the U.S. Government and not with individual legislators that may be invited to Cuba.

There have been some gestures on the part of Cuba, such as the return of the $2 million, which we welcome. And we are prepared to conduct a dialogue with a positive attitude. We have no fixed timetable when improvement can take place, and of course, the Organization of American States is meeting next month on the general issue of the sanctions. So the conditions exist in which a discussion can take place.

Yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in this last year, with the fall of South Viet-Nam and the failure of the Mideast talks, and just recently a high-level staff member of yours resigned criticizing the State Department, do you have any intention of reorganizing the State Department in any way to make it more efficient? Do you plan to delegate some of the work that you are currently doing to any other officials?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, there are several myths in Washington which I will not be able to eliminate, no matter what I do. One of them is that I do not delegate enough responsibility.

Now, it is true I am not the most retiring Secretary of State that has existed. But I am sure that most of the Assistant Secretaries in the Department—and especially their wives—would be astonished to find out that responsibility is not being delegated, because if it is not, they are working 15 hours a day for nothing.

I feel that the Department of State today is staffed in its top levels by the ablest, the most dedicated group that has been there in many years. The decisions are being taken on the basis of very close consultation between the Assistant Secretaries and myself. Of course, it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to provide the leadership and the sense of direction, and that is a function I do intend and attempt to exercise. But it is not fair to the really dedicated and extraordinarily able group of top officials to imply that they are not given major responsibilities—and I think more responsibility than has been the case in a very long time.

Now, it always happens that there are some individuals who feel that their talents are not sufficiently recognized. And it may even be true, because in this vast spectrum of decisions that have to be taken, it is sometimes not possible to give equal priority to all of the issues.

I have very high regard for Dixy Lee Ray, and I wish her well. But I do not think one can make a generalization from one particular case to what has, after all, been a very stable group of Assistant Secretaries who have worked with great dedication and in a very collegial atmosphere.

But in addition, though, you asked a question—am I planning any changes? I am planning some changes in the organization of the overall management structure of the Department of State and also in the selection and training programs of the Foreign Service in order to push the ablest people to the top more rapidly, to make sure the ablest people are being selected, and to make sure there is greater flexibility as between the various regional bureaus.

We have already required that people have to be transferred between regional areas in order to develop a broader perspective. And

we will announce these changes within the next two weeks.

Yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your address last night, you made the statement that our national strength depends on our unity as a people. How can you expect Americans to be unified in support of the government when a substantial number of Americans still look on the government with suspicion and sometimes even fear? What plans does the Administration have to clear up these suspicions?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, I am not sure I completely agree with you that a substantial number of Americans look on their government with suspicion—and even less do I agree with you that a substantial number of Americans look at their government with fear.

I do believe, however, that the government has a responsibility to the public to explain itself as fully and as honestly and with as much description of the underlying trends as it possibly can. We have an obligation to have a serious dialogue so that the public feels that when their lives and well-being are involved the decisions reflected a serious democratic process.

That is what we are trying to do—partly, in a limited way, by these trips such as I am taking now, partly by inviting leaders from various parts of the country to Washington, and by sending officials of the Department of State into the country.

The President is making a major effort himself—not only in the foreign field but in the domestic field—to explain our position. And I believe, as I said in my speech yesterday—I believe that we have gone through a tragic decade. I have the sense that we are coming out of it and that we are going—that we are on the way to recovering our unity. I think that the problem which I mentioned yesterday is on the way to solution.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said recently that the United States may have to issue assurances to Israel in order to achieve a Middle East settlement. Can you get a little more specific about that? Are you talking about assurances that would require congressional approval or would these kinds of assurances win the support of the public today?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was speaking in the context of a final settlement and in a final settlement which will have to address such issues as boundaries, refugees, the Palestinian issue, the future of Jerusalem, and the Arab peace obligations—that is, specific Arab commitments as to the content of these. This whole package will undoubtedly require for its reinforcement some international and —in my view, very probably—some American guarantees.

Now, these guarantees cannot be effective unless they have congressional support. It is very hard to say now whether the Congress would support them when the outline of a settlement is not clear yet and when one cannot say what it is that the Congress is being asked to support. But I believe that the importance of peace in the Middle East is so great that the Congress would look very seriously at the recommendations of an Administration that thought that its guarantee might be the necessary element to bring about a final settlement. But we are not anywhere near that point yet.

Yes, sir.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, with all the attention that is being paid to Southeast Asia and the Middle East in recent weeks and years, it seems that our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere have sort of been ignored. Have our relations with our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere improved or deteriorated since you became Secretary of State in 1973?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that relations within the Western Hemisphere have improved in recent years. We have paid more attention to the Western Hemisphere. I think I have met with more Foreign Ministers of the Western Hemisphere than any of my predecessors. And we consider Western Hemisphere relations as absolutely crucial.

If we cannot establish close relationships with countries that stand somewhere between the developing and the developed part of the world—countries with a similar his-

tory and a comparable culture—then the whole relationship between the industrialized and the developing world will be problematical.

Of course, since Latin America is itself in a state of transition, this relationship is bound to be uneven, and this process of transition is bound to create occasional tensions and the inevitable problems of adjustment. But I think we are on a good course in the relationship with the Western Hemisphere.

The recent meeting of the General Assembly of the OAS was conducted in the least polemical way, in the most constructive manner, that any observer can recall. I believe we are on the way to solving some of the outstanding problems in the Western Hemisphere, and we plan to go on to some constructive achievements.

## Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for CBS-TV Evening News

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by Walter Cronkite broadcast on the CBS television Evening News on June 19.*

*Mr. Cronkite: A current question, Mr. Secretary, on the day's news regarding the Middle East. There is a story out of Israel that the majority party is sticking by a map or at least its plans, which make clear that it has no intention of giving up the Golan Heights or the Gaza Strip—an old position, but it has been restated today. Have they stated that that is a nonnegotiable position?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course we are dealing with the Government of Israel and not with a party. The Government of Israel, when Prime Minster Rabin was here, indicated flexibility with respect to negotiations. We did not attempt to draw any final lines. But we did have the impression that they were ready to negotiate in a flexible manner.

*Mr. Cronkite: President Ford told the Minneapolis Tribune that the drift is still toward war in the Middle East, a statement made after the meetings with Rabin, and, of course, with Sadat in Europe. Do you agree?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think you are trying to get me into trouble, Walter. I think that the President was trying to emphasize that, as long as there is no progress either toward an interim settlement or an overall settlement, there will be a drift toward war and that this drift must be arrested. We believe that there are possibilities of negotiations, but until they have been achieved, the drift toward war will continue.

*Mr. Cronkite: What are the prospects now for reversal of that drift?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think we have a chance to reverse that drift.

*Mr. Cronkite: Could you give us a timetable?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I can't give a timetable, but I think we are trying to do it within the next months.

*Mr. Cronkite: The Secretary of State, in addressing the Japan Society in New York last night, seemed to further define U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the sticky area of military support for nondemocratic regimes. He said the lesson of Viet-Nam was that outside military support was not enough —that there was not a popular will to resist. Nonetheless, he added, the United States, in the interest of peace and security, will meet treaty obligations to support governments that do not reflect the "popular will" and social justice. I asked him if that meant that American foreign policy put expediency above principle.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is a very extreme statement. There are situations in which the collapse of a country could have drastic consequences for world peace. For example, in World War II, the United States and Great Britain supported the Soviet Union even though we had fundamental disagreements with their internal system. On the other hand, wherever the United States can do so, and to the maximum extent possible, we must support democratic institutions, humane governments; and before

there are pressures, we should use and intend to use our influence in that direction.

*Mr. Cronkite: You mentioned specifically Korea last night, and obviously this is what you had in mind in much of this discussion. Are you saying that we will keep our treaty commitment even if we know from the Vietnamese experience that popular will is lacking and we therefore are likely to lose the ball game in the end anyway?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't think that the judgment is correct that we will lose the ball game in the end in Korea or that a willingness to defend against attack from North Korea is lacking. There are some disputes regarding the internal situation in South Korea, and the United States basically supports a liberal evolution toward democratic forms. But the will to resist certainly exists in Korea; and it does not have to be created, as was the case in Viet-Nam.

*Mr. Cronkite: On another point from last night's speech, sir, you said that our attitude toward the new regimes in Indochina —and I assume you mean South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and I suppose Laos along with that—"will be influenced by their conduct toward their neighbors and their attitude toward us." I wonder what specific signs you are going to be looking for that would signal the possibility of détente with those Communist nations of Southeast Asia.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, as far as Laos is concerned, we still have diplomatic relations with it. With respect to Viet-Nam and Cambodia, we would look for particularly the implementation of the Paris agreement, especially with respect to the missing in action; and we would expect that they maintain peaceful relations without pressure or subversion with their neighbors. Under those conditions, we would be willing to consider our relationships to them.

*Mr. Cronkite: How long a time do they have to prove themselves—that they will not have aggressive intentions toward their neighbors? That could be a long time in proof, wouldn't it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, but I think one can determine over the next months or year what the basic pattern of their behavior is going to be. And I think we'd be openminded looking for signals.

*Mr. Cronkite: A story that has just crossed our desk from Zaïre—that the U.S. Ambassador has been declared persona non grata, at least has been asked to leave the country, presumably over the allegation that Americans were involved in a plot against President Mobutu's life. Have you any reaction to that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, these allegations are totally unfounded, and we regret that this decision has been taken. We do consider Zaïre one of the key countries of Africa with which we would like to maintain cordial relations. And the action was based on totally wrong information that fell into the hands of the Government of Zaïre, probably as a result of forgery.

*Mr. Cronkite: As a result of what, sir?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It must have been forgery, because we had absolutely no connection with any plot, nor did we know there was a plot.

# President Walter Scheel of the Federal Republic of Germany Makes State Visit to the United States

*President Walter Scheel of the Federal Republic of Germany made a state visit to the United States June 15–20. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington June 16–17. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and President Scheel at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on June 16, their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening, and an address made by President Scheel before a joint session of the Congress on June 17.*

## EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, JUNE 16

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 23

### President Ford

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: It is a very great honor and a personal pleasure, Mr. President, to welcome you here on behalf of the American people. Although this is your first visit as a Federal President, you have been welcomed to our country on many previous occasions. I therefore greet you not only as Federal President but also as an old and very dear friend of America.

Over 17 years have passed since your distinguished predecessor, Theodor Heuss, paid us a state visit. In that year, 1958, the Federal Republic was in the early stages of a remarkable economic recovery and growth which can now be seen as an economic miracle.

The Federal Republic was on its way to becoming one of our strongest allies, one of our most important trading partners and closest of friends.

We have seen many, many changes since the late 1950's. Mr. President, today we face new challenges of unparalleled complexity, including those of energy and international economics. Yet the basic principles of our foreign policies and of our relationship remain sound and constant.

We are as strongly committed as we were 17 years ago to safeguarding the freedom of the West. We have remained committed to the freedom and security of Berlin. We see the peace and security of Central Europe as a true test of the process known as détente.

Only a few days ago I made my first visit to Europe as President of the United States. In Brussels, the heads of government of the North Atlantic nations met and reaffirmed the continuing solidarity of our alliance and the continuing strength of our commitment to the goals that unite our peoples.

In the era now before us, I can say with confidence that Americans are committed to this alliance with renewed dedication, vision, and purpose.

It is my intention, Mr. President, to work in close concert with you to serve our peoples' common objectives. Together, our strong, free, and prosperous nations can achieve much for our own peoples and for mankind.

Your visit, Mr. President, bears eloquent testimony to the friendship and partnership of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. In this spirit, I bid you a most cordial welcome on this occasion, and I look forward to our discussions of the problems of mutual interest and concern.

### President Scheel

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford: My wife and I should like to express our sincere thanks for your friendly words of welcome.

Today, I come to the White House for the first time as President of the Federal Republic of Germany. What is, after all, the purpose of such a state visit?

Firstly, by its very character, it is intended to mirror the state of mutual relations. These relations are—I know of no doubt about it—excellent. We are showing people both at home and abroad how close are the ties which unite us.

This is a good thing, and important, too. It is something the world should, indeed must, know.

Such a visit also enables us to take stock. We look back at the past.

The bicentenary of the founding of the United States is near at hand. The 30th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe is just over. Both anniversaries play an important part in our relations.

The U.S. Constitution gave birth to modern democracy based on freedom and thus to the democratic family of nations, to which the Federal Republic also belongs.

For us Germans, the 30th anniversary of the end of the war calls forth ambivalent feelings, but it also reminds us of the debt of gratitude we owe to the people of the United States for the generous help they afforded their former enemy. I need not press the point that this help will never be forgotten.

But we must not only dwell on the past; we must also face up to the present. No one, Mr. President, has a clearer picture than you and the government you lead of the problems of worldwide dimensions which confront us today.

The free Western world has taken up this historic challenge. I am convinced it has enough courage, perception, imagination, and initiative to solve the pending problems.

Of course, this cannot be done unless we join forces. Alone, everyone for himself, we shall not succeed. This means that we need European unification. We need the Atlantic partnership between a united Europe and the United States of America.

This Atlantic partnership must comprise not only our common security policy, which will continue to be vital, but also all political spheres of importance for both sides. In particular, it must include a common approach to the crucial economic and monetary problems facing the world today.

Every step toward more solidarity, I believe, is a step to strengthening our free democratic system.

Your impressive visit to Europe underlined once more these fundamental truths. The countries joined in the Atlantic partnership do not cut themselves off from the outside world. Indeed, one of the reasons for uniting has been to contribute with our combined strengths toward a solution of the global social problem of our time—that of development.

The chances for the survival of democracy are, as I see it, crucially dependent on the forces of freedom all over the world finding the right answer to this problem.

Mr. President, I am pleased to feel that I am a welcome guest in your country. Let me say here and now that you, too, would be a highly welcome guest in our country. I do hope that I will be able in the not too distant future to welcome you in Bonn as the guest of the Federal Republic of Germany. But right now, Mr. President, I am looking forward to my talks with you.

**President Ford**

Thank you very much. I look forward to coming there.

## EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, JUNE 16

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 23

**President Ford**

Mr. President, Mrs. Scheel, ladies and gentlemen: On your first visit to Washington as President of the Federal Republic of Germany, we extend, Mrs. Ford and myself, our heartiest welcome.

Your first year on the job has shown you have brought to the highest office of your land the same energy and the same dedication that you displayed throughout your long career in the parliament of your country.

You are no stranger, Mr. President, to our

American officials. You served with great distinction as Foreign Minister. You have shown a remarkable breadth and expertise in economics, as well as in politics, and you have a very firm grasp—and we are most grateful—in the Third World as well as in our industrial communities.

We have also noted, Mr. President, your rise to stardom in another important field—popular music—and I refer specifically to a piece that you recently recorded, which became a smash hit, as we call it, throughout your country.

Your musical success contributes to your overall accomplishments as you seek harmony at home and in concert with Germany's neighbors, both West as well as East. You have dedicated yourself, Mr. President, to the cause of European unity, as we discussed this morning, as well as Atlantic solidarity. I know these goals are vital to you, as well as to your country.

At the same time, your contribution to better East-West relations has been most significant. Recent experience has demonstrated there can be no domestic tranquillity or stability and prosperity in any country without cooperation with other nations.

My Administration has been extremely proud to work closely with the Federal Republic on important international problems facing both of us in today's world. Your country has made an important contribution to international peace, Mr. President, not only through its steadfast cooperation with its friends as well as its allies but also in the example set by your government and your people in meeting the new challenges of the modern world.

The Federal Republic today is in many, many ways a model of the development of the modern industrial state—thriving in freedom as well as in democracy, earning its role of eminence by hard work of its people, and finding its successes in common endeavors within the European Community and with its allies.

This is the real challenge for the leaders of the West. I am inspired, Mr. President, by the determination that I sense in the Federal Republic and its leaders not to let our democratic way of life be undermined.

I continue to be impressed by your nation's ability to meet the tasks of today's world—whether in the fields of economics, trade, energy, national defense, or East-West relations—through the effective democratic government and creative diplomacy.

This tradition, Mr. President, is the most encouraging aspect of our friendship today. We cooperate very closely on the practical problems facing us, sharing the conviction that these solutions will mean nothing if our political and social institutions are not simultaneously preserved. A confident role in the world depends upon confidence in ourselves.

Mr. President, earlier today it was a pleasure to participate with you in the ceremony creating the John J. McCloy Fund,[1] a fund established through a very generous contribution from the Federal Republic to our Bicentennial celebration, a fund which will be used to further German-American exchanges, conferences, contacts across the broad spectrum of our relations. I think this fund symbolizes anew the very close relationship between our peoples.

In this spirit, Mr. President, I raise my glass and welcome you to our country: Mr. President.

**President Scheel** [2]

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I am glad to be visiting the United States just at a time when the whole country is preparing for the great jubilee of its history, the Bicentennial.

One could reflect at length on whether the United States is an old or a young country. It is no secret that there is a rather uncritical school of thought in Europe that arrogantly thinks it can dismiss the United States, despite its 200 years, as a "country without a history." True, in my country, too, we have cities and towns that were a thousand years old when America gained

[1] For remarks made at the ceremony by President Scheel, President Ford, and Mr. McCloy, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 23, 1974, p. 635.

[2] President Scheel spoke in German.

its independence, but there is no merit in age alone. The tortoise reaches a ripe old age, but it is not the most noble of creatures. And how old is the Federal Republic of Germany? It is 26.

And this brings me to the main point: The United States is not simply 200 years old. In an unbroken historical tradition, it has been a liberal republic from its very beginning. Two hundred years of uninterrupted republican democratic tradition—where else in the world is there a republic which for two centuries has made liberty and equality for all citizens its law of life, which has not even shirked a civil war in order to remain true to the ideals upon which it entered world history? And those ideals are today still the most important, the most topical, and the most vital of all. Europe is, who would doubt it, the mother of the United States, but the United States is, and who could doubt that, the mother of European democracy.

Over the centuries, many German immigrants have come to this country. We Germans were gratified at the result of a public opinion survey carried out by your Bureau of the Census. Of the 205 million questioned, 30 million said their heritage was Anglo-Saxon, but 25 million, the next largest group, said their heritage was German. They had left their native country because they wanted to escape religious oppression, because economic necessity left them no choice, because the accelerating process of industrialization had uprooted them, or because they were persecuted on political grounds.

Well, they all quickly became Americans, even though many of them still cherished their native country. But their loyalty they gave unshakably to the land whose citizens they were proud to be.

Many of them returned to our country as American soldiers after the war and brought with them, together with their fellow citizens, the message of the free America. We hungrily threw ourselves upon everything that came from the other side of the Atlantic. Our writers were inspired by William Faulkner and Ernest Hemingway, our young architects stood in awe at the tremendous strides made in the meantime by architecture in America, our newspapers modeled themselves upon their American counterparts, and young Germans fell for jazz. In short, one cannot imagine the cultural life of our country without the stimuli it received from this country.

Today, Mr. President, our two countries are closely linked with each other, but those ties are based not only on the identity of our political, economic, and security interests but on the interplay of cultural and historical developments that have been of such great importance to both countries. History shows us the way to each other.

And that is why the American President's appeal to us to join in the celebrations has met with a broad-based response in the Federal Republic of Germany. It gives me great pleasure, Mr. President, to be able to announce on this festive occasion some of the contributions the Federal Government will be making on the occasion of your jubilee year.

Those contributions are intended to symbolize the close relationship between our two countries, to help make both peoples even more conscious of its many facets.

We have therefore established a fund which will be known as the John J. McCloy Fund for German-American Exchanges. The fund will enable young politicians, journalists, and representatives of trade unions and employers organizations to undertake information trips and participate in German-American seminars. There was hardly any need to search for a name of the fund, because John J. McCloy, whom I am delighted to see with us here tonight, has become a symbol of German-American friendship and cooperation over the past 30 years.

In the purely academic sphere, the New School for Social Research in New York will be endowed by the Federal Government with a new chair. The New School is a university founded by German emigrants, and the years of close cooperation with the school have shown that by dint of mutual effort it has been possible to bridge a dark chapter of the past.

At Georgetown University here in Washington, D.C., a guest professorship will be created with a view to deepening the close

relations between the university and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The new Air and Space Museum in the Smithsonian Institution is to have a large-scale projection apparatus for the planetarium to be known as the Einstein Spacearium. That great physicist, who was director of the most outstanding research establishment in his field, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics in Berlin, was expelled from Germany on racial grounds. The dedication of the Einstein Spacearium on 4 July 1976 will again link his name, which belongs to both countries, with Germany. One of the best known modern composers of my country, Karl Heinz Stockhausen, will be composing special electronic music for the occasion.

I have mentioned some of the contributions that will be made by the Federal Government. But the *Länder* of the Federal Republic of Germany and many cities and organizations, too, are making preparation to mark the bicentenary of German-American ties. All this adds up to a token of gratitude to a nation which refuses to be excelled where generosity is concerned. We Germans have every reason to remember this, and I can assure you that we shall never forget it.

As the President of a parliamentary democracy who was himself for many years a member of the German Bundestag, I wish on this occasion to convey another kind of thanks to the American people—the thanks of the German parliamentarians for the generous hospitality they have received in America when they came here to get to know the parliamentary work of this country and to see for themselves what life here was really like. I myself was in the first group of members of the state parliament of North-Rhine Westphalia which visited your country in 1951. The friendly and generous reception we were given then, so soon after the war, had a profound effect on my view of America, I will not deny it. And all my colleagues at that time had the same experience.

When the independence of the United States of America was proclaimed, men whose daring matched their circumspection demonstrated to the world that internal and external freedom require each other. Freedom can only be preserved if it is linked with the readiness to defend it both internally and externally.

Precisely that is the purpose of the alliance in which we are united, the purpose of Atlantic partnership, to which we again committed ourselves during your visit to Brussels a few weeks ago, Mr. President.

But we should not content ourselves with defending our own freedom, our own prosperity. We cannot tolerate a situation in which the dignity of man is the privilege of but a few nations whilst the majority sink in hunger and misery.

In the year 2000, the world population will be 7,000 million. Even now agricultural production can hardly keep pace with population growth. And as the population grows, so too do the import requirements of the developing countries, very many of whom are the poorest nations on earth. If social development in the Third World is not to get completely out of control, some 300 million new jobs will have to be created there by 1980. But these countries have not the resources to be able to achieve this by themselves. They have to be helped. But this objective can only be attained through sacrifices and imagination.

This is where the members of the Atlantic alliance are called upon to make a big joint effort. If anything can fill us with the courage to face this problem squarely and coolheadedly, it is that belief in the inalienable dignity and freedom of man which inspired the founders of this mighty Republic 200 years ago.

For the American democracy is old, but its message is eternally young and great—like this country, the United States of America.

## ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT SCHEEL BEFORE THE CONGRESS, JUNE 17 [3]

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker: You have invited me to address you. I appreciate this special gesture. I respond by expressing the deep respect which every democrat owes to this outstanding assembly. I am glad of this opportunity to express some thoughts

[3] Reprinted from the *Congressional Record*, June 17, p. H 5578.

on questions that are of concern to all people in the free world.

The world is fraught with unrest and problems, and I am grateful to be able to discuss them with you.

Today all governments with a sense of responsibility unavoidably find themselves competing to save mankind from misery and anarchy. The leaders in that contest are not automatically the powerful ones, but rather those who can come up with convincing answers to the problems of modern society.

We have had to learn that not only the individual is mortal but the whole of mankind. It can perish in a few days through arms of destruction. It can perish in a few generations through environmental pollution and the wasteful exploitation of its natural resources.

The words of St. Matthew still hold true for the whole of mankind: No town, no household that is divided against itself can stand. The community in this situation has nothing more to fear than the passions of egotism. It needs nothing more than the voice of reason which reconciles the different elements and forges them into a whole.

That voice has often been raised on this side of the Atlantic. When Europe began to break up the old feudal systems with new democratic ideas, the American Revolution turned the theory of democracy into practice.

When the nations of Europe picked themselves up from the debris in 1945, it was the United States who through its inspired leadership galvanized the forces of the old continent into a coordinated recovery operation.

That action was perhaps the most generous in the history of mankind. It will be associated forever with the name of Secretary of State George Marshall.

My country was included in it as early as 1947. Indeed in 1946 already a great American statesman, Secretary of State James Byrnes, in his historic speech in Stuttgart held out a hand to the former enemy. The tests and dangers we had withstood together let this understanding grow into a well-tried political partnership. That partnership has rendered us capable of great achievements. It has made our ostpolitik possible and has enabled us to defuse the complex and dangerous Berlin problem.

But the freedom of Berlin is not based on international agreements alone. Berlin remains free by virtue of deeds ever since American citizens risked, indeed, sacrificed, their lives during the airlift. It remained free by virtue of the words by which President Kennedy called himself a "Berliner." That city remains a decisive hinge of East-West relations in Europe. Here the strengths of any policy of détente and our alliance are put to the test day by day.

It is true, I speak to you as the representative of a divided nation. We have not succeeded in overcoming the artificial and unnatural division of Germany by peaceful means. Other than peaceful means have never been thought up, nor will they be. No one will understand better than you, Senators and Congressmen, that a nation can never forgo its unity as a political goal.

The first essential is this: If a rational and sincere policy of détente is to have any meaning for us, it must surely be to make it easier for the people in divided Germany to live together.

After the darkest years in our history, the United States gave us generous support. But let me also say that nothing of what you have done for us since has been in vain. You have gained a good ally who makes its full contribution toward the defense capability of the alliance, a contribution that is second to none but that of the United States—an ally for democracy, a partner for the efforts which Europe and America will have to make together in order to enable all people to live in conditions worthy of man.

But the partners of the Atlantic alliance, who include the oldest democracies on Earth, must not shirk the question, "Can our democratic way of life survive?" Has it not already been overtaken by the accelerating rate of change in the world? Do we still have the moral strength to find for ourselves and others the way through the uncertain?

These questions lead us back to the ideas of which our democracies were born.

I am convinced that they will stand scrutiny. They make us alive to the reliable, the constant elements of our policy: the Atlantic alliance, on which our freedom and our freedom of action rests, and the common values in which our partnership is rooted.

The meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels and the prominent role which President Ford played there have confirmed that these are joint beliefs and vital links. The political responsibility of the world power America extends beyond the Atlantic area. Wherever world peace is threatened, this country places its enormous weight on the scales of peace. And at this present time as well the world hopes that the courage and perseverance of its political leaders will give them the strength to forge peace in the Middle East bit by bit. For what use are the dignity and freedom of man if they lack the ground of peace in which to grow?

Belief in these very values, the dignity and freedom of man, has inspired our best political minds for over two centuries. When my own generation entered upon the political scene, we considered the model offered by America as proof that the concept of Western democracy was a fitting basis from which to cope with the problems of this, the most difficult of all worlds.

I realize that for 12 years those ideals were treated with shocking contempt in Germany, and yet freedom ultimately prevailed. Exactly 22 years ago today, on the 17th of June 1953, it showed its elemental strength when East Berlin workers, heedless of the risks to life and limb, hoisted the black,

red, and gold flag on the Brandenburg Gate.

Totalitarianism may use arbitrary means; yet in the end freedom will triumph. Nevertheless, freedom can preserve its strength only if each generation anew makes it its own. In the European Community democratic forces openly vie with one another and with the Communists, but we have learned that our idea of freedom will be cogent only as long as it is the motive force of social change. If this is not so, it remains a hollow word.

The catchword of our time is "détente." It is a fundamental objective of our foreign policy. It is a great hope of our nation. But the peaceful existence side by side of East and West knows of no cease-fire on the ideological front. And the fronts in this ideological battle run right through the German nation, which has been divided for decades. We shall be the losers in that struggle unless we see why Communist ideologies are effective in Europe or in the Third World. We see communism succeed where injustice and misery predominate, and we have to sharpen our conscience.

It is my belief that political freedom cannot prevail where the social conscience remains silent. In our two countries we have been able to humanize working conditions without revolution and bloodshed.

Our political leaders have rated human dignity and freedom higher than the rights of the powerful in the free market. They know that political freedom becomes a farce unless the individual has the material means of self-realization. Freedom and social justice go together. Social peace is the prerequisite for a nation's inner strength. Without that inner strength it has no strength internationally.

Our Constitution upholds the concept of ownership as the basis of a free economic order. But at the same time, it postulates the social obligation inherent in ownership. That is what our Constitution, the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany, prescribes, and this has been the approach of all governments of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Ten million refugees from the lost regions of eastern Germany found a new homeland in the destroyed and overpopulated western part of our country. Generous legislation and the sacrifices made by the people gave those expellees equal opportunities. My country is proud of that achievement.

Today we are trying to achieve a balance of interests and opportunities on a much larger scale. The entire world economic order must be given the chance to develop further, but in the process, nothing should be given up that has proved its value.

We are called upon to share responsibility for answering vital questions from five continents: Tomorrow's grain and rice deficit, the interplay of population pressure and economic development, the mounting cost of military security. The starving in many parts of the world still need our help. Young nations who hoped to achieve industrial prosperity overnight with the aid of our capital and technology are disappointed and put the blame on us. The industrialized countries can only meet these challenges if their economic constitution is sound.

This means for our countries we must continue along the paths we have taken in fighting unemployment and worldwide recession. Our economic policies must give sufficient impulses to domestic demand.

One thing is certain: Only through close cooperation between North America and Europe and by harmonizing interests have we any prospect of mastering such tasks. It is certain that our combined energies will not provide the solution without the contributions of other nations. And it is certain also that we would be betraying the old fundamental ideas of democracy if we were always to be found on the side of those who defend property and privilege against social demands, demands born of hunger and distress.

It is our task to find evolutionary solutions, but this is no easy matter. The welfare of our peoples which we have to guard did not come to us overnight. We owe it to the hard work and privations of whole generations. It would be politically meaningless and economically impossible just to transfer our assets and our social achievements to others, as some developing countries would like it.

Our aim is not to maintain the status quo, but to seek harmonization of interests. The readiness to accept change is the prerequisite for the pursuit of happiness, and in that context it is the spirit we adopt in our relations with the partners from other camps that will be decisive.

Our diplomatic tools shall not include threats and intimidation. In a spirit of partnership without mental reservation, it is possible to reconcile even sharply conflicting interests. In everything we do we must start from the fact that in the decades ahead there is only one rational course open to us, that of cooperation.

The nine European states have, with much good will, worked out an overall modus of economic cooperation with the nations of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. In protracted negotiations, sharply differing points of view and interests of many sovereign partners have been harmonized. Here we have a promising example of multilateral cooperation with the Third World. It also shows that the European Community can have a stabilizing influence on the world economy.

At the same time, it becomes clear that the European Community is capable of helping to ease the burden of the United States, once it finds its way to joint action. The European union to which we have committed ourselves has not yet been completed, and to be frank, in this respect we are still a long way behind our hopes and our promises. But Europe is needed, and we shall build it, and in so doing, we need the understanding of the United States.

We need long-term European-American cooperation. It must be based on mutual trust. It must be candid. It must not again make the mistake of

emphasizing divergent secondary interests at the expense of primary common interests.

We need not only the willpower and the technical capability of the United States which President Ford referred to in Brussels but also, to quote him again, "its spiritual drive and steadiness of purpose."

Not as some may have feared and others may have hoped, recent developments have not loosened the ties of European-American solidarity. On the contrary, more energies have been set free for the alliance which will be concentrated on its tasks. The awareness of our interdependence is deeper than ever. It has above all become clear to us that it is the common fundamental democratic beliefs which distinguished the alliance from others and which nourished its strength in each member state.

I believe in a Europe committed to the human rights that were embodied for the first time in the constitution of Massachusetts, a Europe which fills these principles with a sense of social justice of our generation. Only with a deeper understanding of our spiritual heritage will the democracies on either side of the North Atlantic be able to assert themselves and thus effectively serve the cause of world peace.

Together with you, we shall recall the concepts and ideals of the American Revolution. May our age find us as resolved, as realistic, but also as idealistic as those men and women who made this great country.

## U.S. Grants Egypt $40 Million for Suez Canal Area Reconstruction

AID press release 75-47 dated May 30

The Agency for International Development is providing two additional grants to Egypt totaling $40 million for reconstruction projects in the Suez Canal area. One grant for $30 million will finance electrical equipment, materials, and related services to help the Egyptian Government reconstruct the electrical distribution systems in Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez City. The other grant of $10 million will finance heavy equipment, spare parts, and related materials for the reconstruction of roads, city streets, and structures in the Suez Canal area.

The grant agreements were signed in Cairo May 28 by U.S. Ambassador Hermann F. Eilts and Egyptian Minister of Economy and Economic Cooperation Muhammad Zaki Shafa'i.

Last February, AID signed an $80 million loan to Egypt to finance imports of agricultural and industrial equipment, spare parts, and other essential commodities to aid the Egyptian economy. In addition, AID provided a $14 million grant to help clear the 103-mile-long Suez Canal of sunken ships, wreckage, and explosives and a $2 million grant for technical assistance.

The AID loans and grants are part of the $250 million economic assistance program approved by the U.S. Congress for fiscal year 1975. The U.S. Government also donated about $5 million for Food for Peace commodities in fiscal year 1975.

## U.S. Gives Views on Use of Funds by UNICEF for Indochina Program

*Following is a statement by Michael N. Scelsi, U.S. Representative on the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), made in the program committee of the board on May 27.*

USUN press release 52 (corr. 1) dated May 27

The U.S. delegation does not believe additional funds from the general resources budget should be committed to the Indochina Program in view of the limited resources and needs in other parts of the world. There is ample opportunity for countries wishing to expand UNICEF assistance to Indochina to do so by contributing to the Secretary General's special appeal.

The U.S. delegation wants it explicitly noted in the records of this committee that it has reservations with regard to this proposal.

# U.S. Policy in the Area of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

*Statement by Joseph J. Sisco*
*Under Secretary for Political Affairs* [1]

Mr. Chairman [Representative Lee H. Hamilton]: My statement will address itself to U.S. policy in the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula—an area of major importance to the United States in political, economic, and strategic terms.

It is timely to take another comprehensive look at this region, and I want to commend the chairman and the members of the committee for having launched this useful review and dialogue in 1972—a dialogue which has been carried on with regularity since then. Our policies impact on both regional and global interests, and I hope to show that our military sales program, in which I know you have a special interest, is an integral part of that overall policy, pursued carefully and with balance, with a view to promoting the interests of the United States.

In the Persian Gulf-Arabian Peninsula area are 10 countries which are related geographically, religiously, and for the most part, ethnically, but which present sharp and distinctive economic and political contrasts. Some have long histories as independent nations with established interests and influence in and beyond the area, while others have achieved independence as recently as 1971. All have strong economic ties with the outside world. Several are among the world's wealthiest in terms of per capita GNP, while others are still among the poorest. Their political systems range from absolute monarchy based on Koranic law through gradations of parliamentary democracy to a Marxist-Leninist-style People's Republic. Except for the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, where we have had no diplomatic relations and no official presence since October 1969, and Iraq, where despite the absence of diplomatic relations we maintain a small U.S. Interests Section in the Belgian Embassy, our relations with all the countries in this region are good. With many of these countries, the depth and variety of our relationship have grown significantly in recent years.

It remains an area where a spectacular transition is underway:

—Where new political institutions have been formed and tested and where traditional values are subject to modern social change;

—Where there has been a dramatic evolution in relationships between international oil companies and oil producer states;

—Where a technology transfer is being greatly accelerated as the oil-exporting countries seek help from the developed countries to diversify and industrialize their economies; and

—Where concerns for security and stability have loomed large since Britain's termination in 1971 of its protective treaty relationships with a number of gulf states and as the countries in the area have moved toward greater regional cooperation.

[1] Submitted to the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations on June 10. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

It also remains an area where developments affect the relationships among and policies of major world powers. With the shift in world oil market power from consumer nations to the producer countries, the application in 1973 of the oil embargo, and the quadrupling of oil prices, the global strategic equation has been affected by what happens in the gulf. The increasing world focus on the gulf has been marked by a growing Soviet presence in its periphery as the Soviets have sought to increase their position and military presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Somalia, and Iraq. Since 1967 and particularly since the October 1973 war, the major Arab oil producers in the peninsula have become the principal financial support for the Arab states more directly involved in the Middle East conflict. While they are not directly part of the process of reaching a Middle East settlement, their views are very important, and they are regularly consulted by the Arab parties to the negotiations as well as by the Palestinians.

### Current Overview

Before examining our policy, it is important to look briefly at where we were in the area four years ago—when there was uncertainty about the region's future stability with Britain relinquishing its security responsibilities in the gulf and small newly independent states in the region about to emerge.

Just four years ago, we were concerned about whether any federation of small gulf states could hold together, about the numerous unresolved boundary disputes, about the impact of the growing Communist-supported insurgency in Oman's Dhofar Province, and finally about the dearth of technicians and nation-building institutions needed for the area's development. In short, only four years ago there were real concerns as to how and indeed whether the area would be able to benefit from rapid change without falling prey to the instability inherent in such change.

While the rapid political and social transition now underway still leaves a number of uncertainties, there has been a substantial degree of progress and stability. Recently, we have seen the smooth succession of power in Saudi Arabia. The seven-member United Arab Emirates has solidified and is building up its federal structure. The wealthy gulf riparians are attracting a growing number of foreign technicians and companies to help with their development. The significant rise in the price of oil has made several gulf states capital-surplus nations, enabling them to increase sharply their level of foreign assistance and to become attractive markets for our goods and services as they seek to accelerate their own development.

At the same time, there has been a perceptible trend toward greater regional cooperation. For these countries, the gulf remains the key communications link to the outside world for most of their imports and exports, and this circumstance has required them to deal with each other in seeking to resolve issues contributing to area tensions. The Shah's recent visit to Saudi Arabia has highlighted the closer cooperation among the two principal gulf riparians.

Progress has been made on a number of boundary issues. Iran has settled its boundary dispute with Iraq. Iraq in turn has reached a preliminary boundary settlement with Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates has settled its boundary problem with Saudi Arabia and negotiated a median line in the gulf with Iran.

In the poorest but most populous state on the peninsula, North Yemen, we have seen strong Saudi financial support for a new government which is earnestly trying to put centuries of tribalism and factionalism behind it and to get on with the business of development and progress for its people. The insurgency in Dhofar supported by the radical South Yemen regime has failed to gain its objective, and one of the principal reasons has been the military and economic assistance Oman has received from friendly regional states.

Finally, the reopening of the Suez Canal provides opportunities and incentives to the South Yemen regime to moderate its ideological bent if it plans to put Aden's unique

bunkering facilities to use once again for world shipping. Whether it will perceive its interests in this light, of course, remains to be seen.

### Objectives of U.S. Policy

Our main policy objectives for the gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, which we have set forth before to the committee, have remained constant since we developed a comprehensive policy framework in anticipation of the termination of the special British role there in 1971. They are:

—Support for collective security and stability in the region by encouraging indigenous regional cooperative efforts and orderly economic progress. Being responsive to requests from the regional states for advice regarding the types and quantities of military equipment and services they need to meet their defense and internal security needs as they perceive them, and responding on a case-by-case basis to their requests to purchase such equipment and services from us, have served this purpose;

—Continued access to the region's oil supplies at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities to meet our needs and those of our allies;

—Encouraging the states in the area to resolve by peaceful means territorial and other disputes between them and widening the channels of communication between them;

—Expanding our diplomatic, cultural, technical, commercial, and financial presence and activities; and

—Assisting oil exporters to employ their rapidly growing incomes in a constructive way, supportive of the international financial system.

### Regional Security

Mr. Chairman, we must remember that the nations in the gulf region have a primary interest in stability and orderly progress. The littoral states of the gulf are aware that they sit on what is probably the world's most valuable energy asset, valued at something over $4.5 trillion at today's oil and gas prices. They know there is little in history to suggest that resources of this magnitude, of such critical importance to every nation of the world, will go unmolested very long unless there is a degree of collective security. They know that any implicit big-power guarantees that they feel might have existed in the past have now disappeared with the British relinquishing their former protective role in the gulf and the gulf states themselves acquiring control and ownership of their own petroleum resources.

It is our view that the major burden for assuring security in the region must be borne by the gulf states themselves and in particular by the major nations of the region, Iran and Saudi Arabia. We have had a long tradition of military cooperation with those nations through the provision of training and furnishing of military equipment which dates back to World War II. When the British announced in 1968 they would end their protective treaty relationships in the gulf, we carefully reviewed our policy. We decided on an approach which incorporated the following guidelines:

—To continue to promote regional cooperation by encouraging the two strongest riparian states, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to assume increasing responsibilities for the collective security of the region;

—To establish direct U.S. relationships with the new political entities in the area where they had not existed before, including the establishment of diplomatic representation in the lower gulf states; and

—To develop plans for technical and educational assistance and cultural exchange, through private as well as public programs, for the purpose of promoting orderly development.

This approach recognizes the role which the British will continue to play as adviser on security and economic development, but it is a course which has relied increasingly on a varied mix and growing nexus of relationships—in which military supply for regional security is one aspect. It is a policy approach which we have since periodically reexamined in our review of the most desirable basis for

maintaining stability in the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula.

The execution of a regional policy based on these general guidelines has required that our actions be tailored to the specific country concerned, taking into account its human resources, size and geography, degree of development, and the security threats which it believes it faces. There are in the gulf at least four entities that need to be addressed separately.

### Iran's Security and Development Programs

Iran shares a lengthy border with the Soviet Union. While seeking cooperation with the powerful northern neighbor, any prudent Iranian leader has to remain concerned about long-term Soviet intentions. Looking east and west, he can see substantial Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq; to the south he sees growing Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean. Possessing half of the shoreline of the Persian Gulf, a waterway of vital importance to its burgeoning economy and oil exports, Iran has a natural strategic interest in maintaining free passage through the gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which pass all of Iran's and two-thirds of the world's oil exports, and the Indian Ocean, through which the gulf is reached.

Iran's size, harsh terrain, relatively limited transportation network, and great distance from foreign suppliers of military equipment have required it to develop comprehensive defense plans which correspond to these conditions. The result has been a concept that keeps the standing armed forces relatively small in number (about 350,000) while providing advanced equipment for air, naval, and armored forces and the means to move ground forces by air rapidly from one location to another.

While using a portion of its oil wealth to equip itself for its defense, Iran has sought to develop a cooperative approach to regional security among states. It has recently been able to settle a longstanding territorial dispute with Iraq. At the same time, it has offered support to its gulf neighbors in dealing with radical threats. Iranian units are presently in Oman to help the Sultan end the insurgency in Dhofar, which has its sanctuary and base in the Soviet-backed People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

The size of Iran's population, coupled with its rapid social and economic development, gives it a capability to exercise leadership in the gulf. The United States has welcomed Iran's taking on greater security responsibilities. We have agreed to sell it a substantial quantity of defense material, especially aircraft and naval craft. The progress which Iran has made in improving its military capability has given Iran a credible deterrent, enabled it to play a more active role in protecting the vital trade routes of the gulf, and was undoubtedly a factor in the recent decision of the Iraqi and Iranian leadership to resolve a major bilateral dispute by negotiation. I would note it is only recently that Iran's armed forces have drawn level with Iraq's military capabilities and strength.

Much has been said regarding the resources which the Iranian Government is putting into building its defense military capacity. But too little has been said about the impressive strides which the government has made in economic development and in improving the welfare of its people. Iran's domestic investment program is more than twice what it spends on defense. The Iranian five-year plan (1973–78) calls for the expenditure of roughly $70 billion in the civilian sector. A substantial portion is for industrial growth, but $19 billion is earmarked for housing, free education, urban and rural development, and a massive increase in medical facilities.

### Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Lower Gulf States

Saudi Arabia is also greatly concerned about its security. It, too, covers a vast land area, almost as big as the United States east of the Mississippi, with 2,000 miles of coastline. On its southern perimeter, it sees a continuing insurgency festering in western

Oman supported by the radical South Yemen regime and to the north an Iraq with significant ideological differences. We tend to forget that Saudi towns were bombed by Egyptian aircraft in 1963 and South Yemen forces struck Saudi outposts in 1969 and 1973. Lightly populated, with military and paramilitary forces of only about 80,000, Saudi Arabia has much to protect but relatively little to protect it with.

In the security and defense field, we have conducted for the Saudis comprehensive surveys of their military requirements on two occasions in recent years, taking into account the threat they perceive to their national security and their limited manpower resources. Our cooperative effort has been to assist the Saudis to achieve several objectives which they see as critical to their own defense and stability in the Arabian Peninsula: Development of a credible air defense system, modernization and training of their ordnance corps, upgrading of their air force through acquisition of F–5E aircraft, building a small force of naval patrol craft, modernizing elements of the National Guard to improve its capabilities to protect key installations, and construction of military infrastructure facilities.

Our programs have been clearly related to Saudi Arabia's capacity to absorb the equipment it purchases. Because training, maintenance, and the construction of the physical plant to use the equipment are such a major portion of our defense-related activities in Saudi Arabia, and because these programs are stretched out over a period of many years, the cost figures involved are often many times higher than would be the case in a purchase of hardware.

Kuwait's primary concern has been the absence of any acceptance by Iraq of the present boundary between the two countries. Kuwait has made a reasoned analysis of what it can do with its limited territory and its small army to take the steps necessary to equip itself with a modest defense against air and armor attack. After a survey which they asked us to make in early 1972 and after several years of discussion, marked by several Iraqi border incursions and the continued Iraqi occupation of some Kuwaiti territory, Kuwait recently contracted for the purchase of a number of Hawk air defense missiles, A–4 aircraft, and TOW antitank missiles. These weapons systems have been purchased by Kuwait for the purpose of reinforcing its defense in order to have sufficient force to slow down an aggressor long enough for either friendly regional forces or diplomacy to come to its aid and bring an end to the fighting.

Except for Oman, which is faced with an active insurgency, weapons requirements for the lower gulf states have been small. What little they have purchased from us has been mainly from commercial sources. Other than the recent sale of a small number of TOW's to Oman to defend against the possible use by South Yemen of Soviet-supplied tanks (Oman itself has no armor) and some antipersonnel mines, our foreign military sales to lower gulf states have been limited thus far to training courses. These states have continued to meet their more limited requirements from other friendly sources.

While we are prepared to make available on a sales basis modest amounts of training or equipment as may be appropriate to their real internal security needs, we have no intention of encouraging an arms race among these smaller states. Instead, we have encouraged them to cooperate closely among themselves and to look for their security in a regional context by cooperating with their larger neighbors.

### Military Programs and Overall Objectives

Given our mutuality of interests, it is reasonable and sensible for us to support the policy goals of these friendly countries where such goals parallel our own. Their concerns are in the political, economic, cultural, as well as defense fields: political, in a desire for cooperative and friendly relations with us; economic, in a desire for us to play a role in helping them carry out their plans for eco-

nomic development and diversification which also brings benefits to us; cultural, in a desire for U.S. cooperation in rapidly building their educational resource bases in technological and other fields; and defense, in a desire that we assist them to train and equip the forces necessary to insure their own security and that of the gulf area.

These elements of policy are closely linked, and an effective policy cannot be realistically pursued by divorcing the defense-related aspect of our policy from other aspects. This is true because the leaders of the gulf states do perceive threats to their stability and well-being and see cooperation in defense matters as part of the totality of our relationship. They would consider any U.S. policy which purported to be helpful and cooperative but which ignored their security needs to be unrealistic and irrelevant to one of their principal preoccupations.

Therefore we see no practical way to separate the military and defense aspects of our policies from the diplomatic, political, economic, and other ties we maintain. We cannot claim friendship and interest in one breath and deny goods or services which have life-or-death importance with the next.

### Nonmilitary Aspects of Relations

The impression that our military relationships with the gulf nations have dominated all other aspects of our relations is as erroneous as it seems to be persistent. It persists, I suppose, because the sale of military hardware and services is highly visible and generally carries a large price tag. It is erroneous because we have carried out a vigorous and effective program of broadening our ties to the gulf states in a number of fields, in specific and conscious execution of the policies we have decided to pursue. Our growing diplomatic, trade, and financial ties, our growing technical assistance and educational and cultural exchange, bear witness to the importance of the nonmilitary aspects of our relationships. In the case of Saudi Arabia and Iran, these have further been widened through the recent creation of Joint Commissions which are establishing a more systematic framework for our long-term relationships in many fields of common interest.

Under the auspices of the Iranian Joint Commission, we expect to stimulate a substantial increase in trade—over $20 billion in non-oil, nonmilitary items from now until 1981—and are currently discussing a variety of projects in the fields of agriculture, fertilizer uses and production, manpower training, and housing and urban development, all of which could result in the sending to Iran of scores of technical specialists on a totally reimbursable basis.

In Saudi Arabia, the Joint Commission office has recently gone into operation. Within the next year, we expect the Joint Commission will be responsible for more than 100 U.S. experts in Saudi Arabia in the fields of agriculture, science and technology, statistics, education, and manpower utilization. These are the priority areas established in almost a year of planning and discussion of Joint Commission goals between ourselves and the Saudis.

All of this activity will be funded by the Saudi Government, primarily via an innovative technical cooperation agreement which we concluded with the Saudis earlier this year. That agreement provides, in effect, for a massive aid program for Saudi Arabia—but an aid program financed by the recipient. In short, the Saudi Joint Commission promises to become a major element in our relations, an important new channel for cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and a significant factor in the development and industrialization of that country.

### Diplomatic Actions

As I mentioned above, one specific decision which flowed from our policy review in the late sixties was that as the lower gulf countries became responsible for the conduct of their foreign policy we should establish full diplomatic relations with them. Late in

1971, we began to open Embassies in these countries and in the past year have assigned resident Ambassadors who are Arabic-language qualified—an accomplishment, I might add, which was made easier by your strong support, Mr. Chairman. Let me emphasize that in the lower gulf, we have lean, hard-working, "shirtsleeve" Embassies, staffed with some of the best young talent we have, whose mission is to represent the United States to nations and peoples who know little of us firsthand. One of their primary goals is to promote trade with those nations, and as I will mention later, the commercial opportunities are attractive and fast growing.

Another responsibility of our Ambassadors is to maintain a direct dialogue with the leaders and people of the lower gulf on such matters of vital interest to us as peace in the Middle East, the continuing supply of oil, and producer-consumer cooperation. This they are doing. They are helping to expand the horizons both of our interests in these nations and of these nations' perceptions of the United States. And they are only just getting started. Contrast that to the situation only four years ago, when we had no resident representatives at all in the sheikhdoms, and you will readily see that we have come a long way in a short time.

### Trade and Finance

There are exceptional market opportunities for the United States in the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Most of these countries have to import practically everything they consume as well as the capital goods to carry out their ambitious development plans. In 1973, their imports totaled $8.7 billion. This total is based on the import figures of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and North and South Yemen. Preliminary estimates are that their imports rose to over $13.5 billion in 1974 (about 15 percent of which was security-related equipment), making the area the fastest growing market for our goods and services in the world. By 1980, imports by gulf countries could well reach $50 billion.

As I mentioned, one of the primary tasks of our Embassies is to facilitate access to this market for U.S. business. In a number of cases, we have to overcome longstanding traditions of reliance by these countries on European suppliers. The Department of State, on a daily basis, is directly involved in advising and assisting U.S. businessmen interested in the area. The Commerce Department, which has primary responsibility for trade promotion, has established a special action group which each day helps U.S. businessmen seeking to do business in the Near East. Also, on any given day, hundreds of American businessmen are in the gulf states actively exploring the possibilities.

The policies of the gulf states themselves, being by and large free market in nature, encourage expanded trade relations with the most favorable suppliers. We believe we are on the threshold of a major expansion in this area. Our market share in the region has grown to 25 percent in the last two years, with $3.4 billion in exports in 1974. We believe that with appropriate effort and support American businesses will be able to further increase our market share.

The financial reserves of the gulf states today total about $50 billion; by 1980, they may be several times this figure. Obviously, the sheer weight of these resources involves a potential for disruption of international monetary and financial systems. By the same token, these resources cannot be of value to the nations which hold them unless they have access to investment opportunities in the industrialized world and unless that world also prospers.

So there is a very definite common interest between the United States and the industrialized economies of Western Europe and Japan on the one hand, and the gulf states on the other, in promoting the productive and profitable placement of gulf moneys abroad. It is widely acknowledged that the gulf nations have by and large used their emerging enormous financial power with prudence and

responsibility, making it clear that they recognize both its potential for good and its potential for damage. We have developed close and mutually advantageous relations in this critical area with most of the gulf nations.

### Cultural Exchanges and Technical Assistance

The scale of activities in educational and cultural exchange has grown rapidly in the last few years. A new aspect of life in many American universities is the growing number of students from the gulf countries. Iranian students alone are now estimated to number 13,500, and the Iranian Government has instituted a new scholarship program which could double this figure.

The number of students from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has doubled since 1970, now totaling 1,400 and 900 respectively, and both governments have had to expand their official support staff here for these students. Although the number of students from the lower gulf states is still small (about 210), it was virtually zero only four years ago. These countries have sought and are receiving educational counsel from American private organizations and consultant firms. They are entering into university-to-university relationships (there are 12 with Iran alone) and are embarking on a major upgrading of their own institutions of higher learning through faculty development programs.

For our part, we have measurably expanded our cultural and informational activities in these states. We have, for example, an English Language Center in Riyadh (which is financed by Saudi Arabia) and another in Jidda. We hope to have one soon in Abu Dhabi. In Iran, there are six binational centers which we have established in collaboration with Iranian authorities. In Kuwait and the lower gulf, we have mounted an active USIA-sponsored speaker and cultural program. We have tripled the number of persons coming from the smaller gulf states under the educational exchange program administered by the State Department's Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau. The number of independent travelers from the region is rising even faster. In short, we are seeing a rapidly growing human interchange. We put a high value on this increasing exposure to American customs, education, and technology, and we believe it should facilitate U.S. cooperation with these countries over the longer term.

The gulf states are striving to convert their principal natural resource—oil—into a complex of financial, industrial, commercial, and other assets which will outlast their petroleum supplies and promise a secure and prosperous future. To do so, they will be indeed heavily dependent on the technical expertise of the developed nations, and they are keenly aware of this.

We have taken a number of steps to provide the kind of assistance they need, because it is entirely consistent with our policy of promoting friendly and cooperative relations and because it helps to promote U.S. business opportunities. As I noted above, in Saudi Arabia and Iran, we have in recent months concluded agreements to promote the provision of technical expertise in development-related fields on a fully reimbursable basis. In Bahrain, whose oil income is relatively modest and whose reserves are limited, we expect to have a jointly funded technical assistance program. Elsewhere in the gulf, we are also providing reimbursable experts in a variety of fields.

As in the commercial field, the opportunities for reimbursable technical assistance are tremendous, and we are pursuing them as actively as the situation permits.

### Mutuality of Interests

Mr. Chairman, I know of the concerns in the Congress and of your personal concerns about our arms supply programs in the gulf region, and I believe it is important to get these concerns out on the table and discuss them. These are valid questions for Americans who are troubled at seeing their country in the arms supply business. The image of the "merchant of death" dies hard.

I hope I have been able to put this issue into proper and realistic perspective and to demonstrate that we are dealing with it in

the context of an overall and carefully developed policy concept. The fact is that foreign relations are a whole piece. We cannot pick up elements with which we feel comfortable and ignore others. For every country in the world, its ability to defend itself is the most important thing to its national survival. If we do not take this into account in our relations with that country, the totality of our relationship with that country will suffer, as will our political and economic objectives.

In the gulf, we have developed over the years meaningful relationships with most of the states of the region. The importance of the region's energy resources and its growing financial wealth dictate an American interest in the security as well as the political and economic progress of the states located therein. They in turn recognize a community of interests with us and with other Western industrialized states, and they want to build on that relationship without outside intervention in their affairs. Our relationship therefore has been one based on a mutuality of interests. We stand ready to provide advice and technology where needed and wanted, to expand our trading relationship, and to support regional efforts at cooperation.

We believe that these states have the will, financial resources, and growing capability to assure their security, and we feel that this aspect of our relationship should remain one geared to encouraging regional security. To this end, we are convinced that we should continue to provide military equipment and training. The success of these countries in achieving a degree of cooperation and in maintaining the tranquillity that has prevailed in recent years is serving broader U.S. interests in world peace and a relaxation in world tensions.

Our close relationships with most of these countries also facilitate our efforts to play an influential role in pursuing new paths toward a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict. In the final analysis, a resolution of that conflict which will be seen as just and equitable by all the states and peoples of the area is essential both to the well-being of the entire region and to the maintenance of cooperative, mutually beneficial relations between that strategic region and the United States.

## OECD Financial Support Fund Legislation Sent to Congress

*Following is the text of identical letters sent by President Ford on June 6 to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and President of the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9

JUNE 6, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) I am today transmitting legislation to authorize participation by the United States in a new, $25 billion Financial Support Fund. This Fund would be available for a period of two years to provide short- to medium-term financing to participating members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which may be faced with extraordinary financing needs.

The proposal for a Financial Support Fund originated in suggestions put forward independently by the United States and the Secretary General of the OECD as part of a comprehensive response to the economic and financial problems posed by severe increases in oil prices. Establishment of the Support Fund has been agreed upon, subject to necessary legislative approval, by all members of the OECD except Turkey, which has not yet signed the Agreement. The Support Fund represents, in my view, a practical, cooperative and efficient means of dealing with serious economic and financial problems faced by the major oil-importing nations.

A Special Report on the Fund, prepared by the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, accompanies this legislation.[1] I fully endorse

[1] The texts of the draft legislation and the special report of the Advisory Council are printed in H. Doc. 94–178, 94th Cong., 1st sess.

the Council's strong recommendation for U.S. participation in the Fund, and I urge prompt Congressional action to authorize that participation.

The financial problems arising from the oil price increases are expected to be transitional, although the real costs imposed by those price increases will remain. These financial problems do not reflect the inability of oil-importing nations as a group to obtain needed financing, because the investable surpluses of the oil-exporting nations are available to them in the aggregate. Rather, the problems arise from the possibility that despite satisfactory operation of the system as a whole, an individual nation will not be able to obtain, on reasonable terms, the external financing it needs to maintain appropriate levels of domestic economic activity. This inability might also lead to imposition of inappropriately restrictive policies on international trade and capital movements. If permitted to begin, recourse to such policies could spread quickly, severely disrupting the world economy and threatening the cooperation of oil-importing nations on energy matters and broader economic issues.

The private financial markets and other existing sources of financing are expected to continue to perform well, and it is our hope that these potential dangers will never materialize. However, this risk remains. It is common to all countries, and it must be faced. The Support Fund is designed to encourage cooperation among the major countries in energy and general economic policies, and to protect against this common risk by assuring fund participants that needed financing will be available on reasonable terms.

In essence, the Financial Support Fund represents an arrangement under which all participants agree to join in assisting one of their members if an extreme need develops. As such, the Financial Support Fund will serve as an insurance mechanism or financial "safety net," backstopping and thus strengthening other sources of financing. Its objective is to provide assurance that financing will be available in a situation of extraordinary need, rather than to supplant other financing channels or to provide financing on generous terms.

Participants must make the fullest appropriate use of other sources before turning to the Support Fund. Loans by the Support Fund will be made on market-related terms and will require specific policy conditions in the energy and general economic areas. Support Fund loans will thus contribute directly to cooperative energy policy and to correction of the borrower's external financial difficulties. A further provision, of major importance in such a mutual support arrangement, requires that all risk involved in loans by the Support Fund will be shared equitably by all participants on the basis of pre-determined quotas, as will all rights and obligations of members with respect to the Fund. The terms of the Financial Support Fund therefore assure it will not become a regular operating part of the world's financial machinery or be used as a foreign aid device.

The proposed United States quota in the Support Fund—which will determine U.S. borrowing rights, financial obligations, and voting power in the Fund—is 5,560 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR), or approximately $6.9 billion. This quota represents 27.8 percent of total quotas in the Fund. The legislation I am proposing today will permit the United States to participate in the Fund up to its SDR quota, by authorizing the issuance of guarantees by the Secretary of the Treasury. It is intended that any United States contributions will be primarily, if not exclusively, in the form of guarantees to permit the Support Fund to borrow in world capital markets as necessary to meet its lending needs. Most other members also intend to use this guarantee technique. This approach removes the need for the $7 billion in 1976 appropriations for the Support Fund, as proposed in the budget, and will also reduce outlays by $1 billion.

Only if a borrower from the Support Fund failed to meet the payments on its obligations would the United States be required to transfer funds as a result of its guaran-

tees. In that unlikely event, the resources of the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) would be used to fulfill the requirements of immediate payment on the guarantees. Should it appear desirable, in light of economic and other conditions, for the United States to make direct loans to the Support Fund, these could also be provided from the ESF in accordance with existing statutory authority. This new legislation provides for appropriations to be used to replenish ESF resources to the extent the Stabilization Fund is used for these purposes. In no event will U.S. financial obligations to the Support Fund exceed the dollar value of its quota.

The Financial Support Fund Agreement was signed on April 9. OECD member countries are now seeking legislative and other authority needed to enable them to participate. While the problems the Support Fund is designed to deal with are temporary, the need for the Fund is nonetheless real and immediate. I urge the Congress to act promptly to enable the United States to join in this major instrument of international financial cooperation.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

## TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.
*Ratification deposited:* Ethiopia, June 26, 1975.

#### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
*Notification of succession:* Zambia, June 16, 1975.

#### Energy

Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperative information exchange relating to the development of solar heating and cooling systems in buildings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 1–4, 1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975, with respect to those signatories which have signed the memorandum of understanding on or before that date.
*Signatures:* United States, May 13, 1975; Greece, May 30, 1975.

#### Finance

Articles of agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank, with annexes. Done at Manila December 4, 1965. Entered into force August 22, 1966. TIAS 6103.
*Admission to membership:* Gilbert and Ellice Islands, May 28, 1974.

#### Health

Amendment of articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 1975.
*Acceptances deposited:* Chile, Cuba, June 17, 1975.

#### Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331.
*Extended by United Kingdom to:* Bermuda, April 1, 1975.

#### Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975.
*Accession deposited:* Lebanon, June 5, 1975.

#### Privileges and Immunities

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.
*Notification of succession:* Zambia, June 16, 1975.

#### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
*Extended by United Kingdom to:* Bermuda, April 1, 1975.

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea at London May 17 to June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.
*Acceptance deposited:* Republic of China (with a reservation), June 2, 1975.

### Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.
*Accession deposited:* Portugal, June 24, 1975.

### Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.[1]
*Signature:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 17, 1975.

### Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.[1]
*Acceptance deposited:* Belgium, June 2, 1975.
*Accession deposited:* Hungary (with a statement), May 23, 1975.

### Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.[2]
*Accession deposited:* Tanzania, June 19, 1975.

## BILATERAL

### Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS 7949). Effected by exchage of notes at Dacca June 5, 1975. Entered into force June 5, 1975.

### France

Agreement concerning settlement of U.S. claims in connection with the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel, supplies, and equipment from French territory following decisions of the French Government in 1966, with related letter. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris June 12, 1975. Entered into force June 12, 1975.

### India

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington May 2, 1975.
*Entered into force:* June 13, 1975.

### Saudi Arabia

Technical cooperation agreement. Signed at Riyadh February 13, 1975.
*Entered into force:* May 12, 1975.

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[1] Not in force.
[2] Not in force for the United States.

## PUBLICATIONS

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements—Texts and History of Negotiations.** A compilation of texts of agreements and lists of signatories, including the most recent agreements and introductions providing background and context. Pub. 77. 159 pp. $1.80. (Stock No. 044-000-01565).

**Energy and International Cooperation.** This pamphlet is based on a speech delivered by Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, before the annual combined luncheon of the Yale-Harvard-Princeton Clubs at Washington, D.C., February 13, 1975. Pub. 8804. 8 pp. 35¢ (Cat. No. S1.71:8804).

**Memorandum to: U.S. Business Community From: Department of State Subject: Assistance in International Trade.** This booklet briefly describes services and sources of information which the Department offers the American businessman, and provides some information on Department activities which help U.S. citizens in general. Pub. 8807. 16 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S1.2:T67/5).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Bangladesh amending the agreement of October 4, 1974, as amended. TIAS 7973. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10: 7973).

**Mutual Defense Assistance.** Agreement with Norway amending Annex C to the agreement of January 27, 1950, as amended. TIAS 7975. 3 pp. 25¢ (Cat. No. S9.10:7975).

**Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973.** Agreement with El Salvador. TIAS 7979. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7979).

**Fisheries—Shrimp.** Agreement with Brazil modifying and extending the agreement of May 9, 1972, as extended. TIAS 7980. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10: 7980).

**Fisheries.** Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics extending the agreement of February 21, 1973, and of June 21, 1973. TIAS 7981. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7981).

*Name Index*



**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 23–29**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

| No. | Date | Subject |
|---|---|---|
| 342 | 6/23 | Kissinger: Southern Council on International and Public Affairs; Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. |
| *342A | 6/23 | Kissinger: introductory remarks preceding Atlanta address. |
| 342B | 6/23 | Kissinger: questions and answers following Atlanta address. |
| *343 | 6/24 | Steigman sworn in as Ambassador to Gabon (biographic data). |
| 344 | 6/24 | Kissinger: news conference, Atlanta. |
| †345 | 6/25 | Possible oil exchanges between U.S. and Canada. |
| *346 | 6/25 | Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, July 23–24. |
| †347 | 6/26 | U.S. appoints members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (biographic information). |
| †349 | 6/27 | Kissinger: remarks to Foreign Service officer class. |
| †350 | 6/27 | "Foreign Relations," 1948, vol. I, General; United Nations, part 1, released. |

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.