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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXIII, No. 1880
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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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The United States and Japan in a Changing World

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

America's ties with Japan are strong, close, and full of promise. Tonight I want to describe the importance of this relationship—for America, for Asia, and for the world. This occasion comes as a welcome opportunity. The tragic end of our involvement in Indochina has stimulated questions, among Asians as well as Americans, about the future of U.S. foreign policy. But paradoxically, these events have also driven home the recognition, among Asians as well as Americans, of how essential a strong and purposeful United States is to global peace and progress.

As we and Japan seek to shape the future together, we face a world profoundly different from that in which our relationship was forged.

The bipolar world of the 1950's and 1960's has disappeared. The reemergence of Europe and Japan, the rivalry among the Communist powers, the growth of military technologies, the rise and increasing diversity of the so-called Third World, have created a new international environment—a world of multiple centers of power, of ideological differences both old and new, clouded by nuclear peril and marked by the new imperatives of interdependence.

American policy has sought to shape out of this a new international structure based on equilibrium rather than domination, negotiation rather than confrontation, and a consciousness of global interdependence as the basis of the ultimate fulfillment of national objectives.

As the members of this society have long recognized, the relationship between the United States and Japan is crucial to this design. It is central to the continued stability, progress, and prosperity of the international community, and it is fundamental to American policy in Asia.

—Our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security reflects an enduring sense of common interest in the peace of Asia. Through many changes in conditions and alignments, our ties have proven their continuing and indispensable validity for our two countries and for global stability.

—As maritime trading nations with complementary economies, the United States and Japan account for 52 percent of the production and 26 percent of the trade of the entire non-Communist industrialized world. We possess the world's most dynamic economies. As economic superpowers, our respective policies profoundly affect each other and the world at large.

—Our nations share an enduring commitment to the political values of free societies and an abiding concern for the well-being of our fellow men.

Japan's evolution over the last 30 years into a major factor on the world scene inevitably has brought changes in the style of our relations even as the community of our mutual interests has grown. Adjustments in U.S. economic policies and a new policy toward China in 1971 led to painful but transitory misunderstandings to which—let us be frank—our own tactics contributed. We have learned from experience; these strains are behind us; our policies are mov-

[1] Made before the Japan Society at New York on June 18 (text from press release 338).

ing in harmony in these areas; our consultations on all major issues are now close, frequent, and frank.

U.S.-Japanese bilateral relations, I am pleased to say, have never been better in 30 years.

It is a fitting symbol, therefore, that in his first trip abroad as chief of state, President Ford visited Japan last November. We look forward to the visit of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, whose presence will lend further dignity and strength to the ties between us. And before the Emperor's arrival, Prime Minister Miki will come to Washington for consultations on the foreign policy and economic issues facing our two countries.

I cannot refer to this series of consultations without paying tribute to Eisaku Sato, a great leader of Japan, a great champion of Japanese-American friendship, and one of the world's great statesmen. I sought his counsel on each of my five visits to Japan, even after he had left office. I was privileged to know him as a colleague and a personal friend. I shall miss him greatly.

The Foundations of Our Partnership

Japan and the United States have known each other for a century and a quarter. Our relationship has passed through an incredible range: from curiosity to competition, conflict, occupation, reconciliation, to alliance and mutual dependence. This long, complicated, and varied experience has taught us that our close association is more essential than ever and that the dramatic differences in national styles and situations are a strength to be husbanded rather than a weakness to be overcome.

We Americans are a disparate people—heterogeneous in our origins, constantly striving to redefine what we have in common. Japan, on the other hand, is a country of unusual cohesiveness and homogeneity. For Americans, contracts and laws are prime guarantors of social peace. The Japanese depend less on legal and formal rules to preserve social harmony than on the quality of human relationships and on unstated patterns of consensus and obligation.

Our language is designed for categorization. It invites logical distinctions and value judgments. The Japanese have lived together for so long and shared so many experiences that they frequently communicate through intuition and indirection, occasionally without need of words. The Japanese prize form and mood as well as content. We honor content above all and frequently exhibit impatience with emphasis on style.

The United States is blessed with vast land and ample resources; abundance is taken for granted. Japan is a great industrial power, but its prosperity is more recent and—because of the dependence of its industry on imported food, energy, raw materials, and external markets—more vulnerable.

In foreign policy, the United States has assumed global security responsibilities. Japan has devoted its energies to the growth of its economy and commerce, while—alone among the world's great powers—forswearing large military forces or assertive diplomacy.

Communication between cultures is always difficult. But the United States and Japan have achieved an increasing sensitivity, sometimes fascination, with our national differences. Our two nations supremely demonstrate the possibility of close and enduring association between two different cultures and two distant continents. It is an extraordinary achievement, and we too often take it for granted.

We formed a political alliance and security relationship in a period of Japanese dependence. War had shattered her economy and political system. Japan accepted American leadership in that difficult period and only gradually began to reassert an autonomous diplomacy and active political involvement in the world around her.

Japan's emergence as a major economic power and international force has substantially transformed our relations in recent years.

The reversion of Okinawa eliminated the last major vestige of the war from our

bilateral agenda. We have made significant progress in removing the trade imbalance which was so often an irritant in our relations. In response to Japanese concerns, the United States has reaffirmed its specific commitments as supplier and purchaser of important goods and materials.

Our relationship, which was forged by the necessities of security, has flourished as well on the other contemporary challenges: improving relations with the Communist countries, advancing the prosperity of the industrial democracies, and building a new era of cooperation among all nations.

Our most immediate shared interest, naturally, is in Asia.

The United States and Asia

The security interests of all the great world powers intersect in Asia, particularly in Northeast Asia. China comprises the heartland of the continent. The Soviet Far East spreads across the top of Asia. The Japanese islands span 2,000 miles of ocean off the mainland. America's Pacific presence encompasses the entire region. Western Europe has important economic links with Asia and feels indirectly the effects of any disturbance of the equilibrium in the area.

Asia's share of the world's population and resources is immense. In the last two decades, the Asian-Pacific economy has experienced more rapid growth than any other region. It is here that the United States has its largest and fastest growing overseas commerce. We have as vital an interest in access to Asia's raw materials as Asia has to our markets and technology.

The ties between Asia and America have a deeper philosophical and human dimension. The influence of America and the West stimulated the transformation of much of Asia during the past 100 years. From the days of the New England transcendentalists to the modern period, Asian culture and ideas have significantly touched American intellectual life, thereby reflecting the universality of human aspirations.

The role of Asia, then, is potentially decisive for the solution of the contemporary agenda of peace and progress and the quality of life.

This is why, in spite of recent events, the United States will not turn away from Asia or focus our attention on Europe to the detriment of Asia. Our relationships with Europe and Japan are equally vital; each is essential to global peace and security. In the modern world the problems and opportunities of each area overlap and are inseparable from those of the other. Our fidelity to our commitments will be as strong in one part of the globe as in the other.

Nor can we confine our Asian policy to Japan without destroying the underpinnings of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. The interests that bind Japan to Asia are no less vital than those binding it to America and the other nations of the West. The value of our political and security relationship depends on its contribution to a broad balance of security in Asia. This is decisive for Japan as well as for us.

The basic principles of America's foreign policy find their reflection and necessity in Asia:

—First, peace depends on a stable global equilibrium.

While an effective foreign policy must reach beyond the problem of security, without security there can be no effective foreign policy. A world where some nations survive only at the mercy of others is a world of dependence, insecurity, and despotism. This is why the United States will continue to oppose the efforts of any country or group of countries to impose their will on Asia by a preponderance of power or blackmail.

We have learned important lessons from the tragedy of Indochina—most importantly that outside effort can only supplement, but not create, local efforts and local will to resist. But in applying these lessons we must take care not to undermine stability in Asia and, ultimately, world peace.

We will permit no question to arise about the firmness of our treaty commitments. Allies who seek our support will find us constant. At the same time, if any partner

seeks to modify these commitments, we will be prepared to accommodate that desire.

In fulfilling our commitments we will look to our allies to assume the primary responsibility for maintaining their own defense, especially in manpower. And there is no question that popular will and social justice are, in the last analysis, the essential underpinning of resistance to subversion and external challenge. But our support and assistance will be available where it has been promised.

Specifically, we are resolved to maintain the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula, for this is of crucial importance to Japan and to all of Asia. We will assist South Korea to strengthen her economy and defense. But we shall also seek all honorable ways to reduce tensions and confrontation.

We place the highest value on our relationship with our ANZUS partners, Australia and New Zealand, and on our historic relationship with the Philippines. We will maintain our treaty obligations throughout Asia and the Pacific. And we welcome the growing influence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand—as a force for self-reliance, stability, and progress in the region.

—A second basic principle of our foreign policy is that peace depends ultimately on reconciliation among nations.

All of us, friends, neutrals, or adversaries, exist on a small planet threatened with extinction. The ultimate aim of our alliances has always been to ease, not intensify, divisions and tensions. We will continue our effort to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China in the spirit of the Shanghai communique.

Similarly, we will continue our effort to regularize and improve our relations with the Soviet Union and to make further progress in the control of arms, especially strategic arms.

We have no illusions. We recognize that our values and social systems are not compatible with those of the Communist powers and may never be. But in the thermonuclear age, when the existence of mankind is at stake, there is no decent alternative to the easing of tensions. Should these efforts fail, at least our peoples will know that we had no choice but to resist pressure or blackmail. There can be no conciliation without strength and security, but we would be reckless if we forget that strength without a spirit of conciliation can invite holocaust.

New regimes have come to power in Asia in the last few months. They have flouted international agreements and flagrantly violated accepted international standards, and that we cannot ignore. But we are prepared to look to the future. Our attitude toward them will be influenced by their conduct toward their neighbors and their attitude toward us.

—Finally, peace depends upon a structure of economic cooperation which reflects the aspirations of all peoples.

The problems of the world economy—insuring adequate supplies of food, energy, and raw materials to consumers and markets and stable income to producers—require global economic arrangements that accommodate the interests of developed and developing, consumers and producers. We have consistently taken the view that a necessary first step is close cooperation among the industrialized countries. On the basis of unity and mutual support, we welcome a dialogue with the developing countries in a spirit of sympathy, realism, and cooperation.

These are the principles which guide America's actions in the world and in Asia.

Japan's role and the U.S.-Japanese relationship can be decisive.

The United States and Japan

The Challenge of Peace and Security

Japan's contribution to a peaceful world is unique. Despite its industrial prowess Japan elected to forgo the military attributes of great-power status, limiting itself to modest conventional self-defense forces and relying for its security on the support of the United States and the good will of others.

In this framework, Japan has thrived. Its security has been assured; its democratic institutions have flourished. Its economy has

achieved unparalleled growth, partly because through much of this period Japan enjoyed assured access to imported raw materials and food at reasonable prices. Japan has been able to develop constructive economic and political relations with its neighbors, thereby contributing to regional stability and growth.

The events of recent years have transformed this relatively simple universe. The interaction among the major powers has become much more complex than in the fifties or early sixties. The oil crisis of 1973 confronted Japan with its economic vulnerability. Today suppliers of raw materials are presenting a variety of new demands that are not easily accommodated in the context of existing world trade and monetary structures.

These changing circumstances have required both Japan and the United States to rethink old premises and devise new, creative approaches. By their nature, these problems require collaborative, not separate responses. Japan and the United States must relate national security to international reconciliation and national growth to international cooperation.

The Challenge of Reconciliation

Both our countries seek to move the world beyond equilibrium toward reconciliation. The United States has attempted to normalize and improve its relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Japan has made the same effort. For some time the Japanese Government has pursued what it has described as "peace diplomacy," a diplomacy designed to ease Asian confrontations.

Japan normalized its relations with the Soviet Union in 1956; recently it has been intensifying its economic relations with that country. Japan has been a trading partner of the People's Republic of China for decades. In 1972 Japan granted full recognition to Peking and since then has been broadening her bilateral relations. We have welcomed these developments.

As each of us engages in this more complex interplay among the major powers, we have faced a common problem: How to preserve a sense of priority among our international relationships? This government has stated on many occasions—and I will state again—that we make a clear distinction between our allies and our adversaries. "Equidistant diplomacy" is a myth. For us, Japan is not an occasional interlocutor, but a permanent friend—a partner in building a world of progress.

Of course, we do not expect to pursue identical policies—toward China, toward the Soviet Union, or toward all Asian issues. But we should seek to maintain compatible approaches. In our bilateral relations we should recognize a higher standard of mutual concern than normally obtains between states—accepting a greater obligation to consult, to inform, and to harmonize domestic and external policies that impinge on the interests of the other.

We believe that both our countries share this approach. To implement it, we have jointly developed channels for more intensive consultation and used them with growing frequency and frankness. The United States intends to propose a semiannual review of policies at the foreign ministers level, alternately in Washington and Tokyo, to assess the present and to chart the future.

The Challenge of Economic Cooperation

The prosperity which Japan and America have achieved in the course of the past three decades is one of the great successes of the postwar world. The economic power we possess as a result imposes on us special responsibility for the health of the global economy and for its ability to satisfy the thrust of human aspirations. Today that responsibility is under severe challenge. A major recession, an energy crisis, global food shortages, unprecedented inflation, and a trend toward politicizing economic issues have subjected the world economy to serious stress.

We have three major objectives:

—We must spur the stable growth of our economies.

—We must strengthen cooperation among the industrialized countries.

—We must respond to the aspirations of the developing world.

All our objectives—domestic well-being, security, unity, relations with the Communist world and the developing nations—require economic strength and growth. Few can be realized by stagnating economies. The stability of our institutions and the self-assurance of our societies will benefit from the earliest possible recovery of sustained and noninflationary economic growth.

In the global economy, no nation can hope to achieve sustained growth by its own efforts alone. In a world of interdependence, the experience of 30 years has shown that the industrialized nations prosper or suffer together. Coordination of effort is essential for any economic objective—whether it be growth, energy, food, or raw materials—and also to maintain the conditions of well-being that underpin our political and security cohesion.

It is encouraging that over the last year the United States and its major partners are beginning to harmonize their national policies to combat recession and promote expansion. This was a central topic of the President's discussions in Tokyo last November. These consultations should be continued systematically and deal particularly with a common analysis of the requirements of global economic growth.

We have no reason to apologize for the economic system we have built since the war. It has spread progress far beyond the industrialized world; in fact, it has contributed to the political evolution and diffusion of economic power that have now brought that system under challenge. Nevertheless it is important to recognize that no set of economic relationships can flourish unless its benefits are widely shared; it must be perceived as just.

It is in the self-interest of the advanced industrialized countries that global economic arrangements embrace the aspirations of the majority of mankind. Reality makes us a global community; if world order breaks down over economic conflicts, we face the specter of chronic global civil war.

The Japanese Government, acutely sensitive to this problem, has made an imaginative proposal to the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]—that the industrialized democracies undertake a joint long-range examination of how the progress of the advanced societies can be pursued to foster the progress of the developing countries. We welcome this initiative and have supported it; it is a subject of profound importance. We will work closely with the Japanese Government as the study proceeds.

Let me now turn briefly to a number of crucial economic issues, first in terms of Japanese-U.S. relations and then in terms of their impact on the global order.

Our two nations have a special concern and responsibility in *trade*. We have succeeded in resolving most of the bilateral problems in our trading relationship; we must now turn our attention to what we can jointly do to improve the global trading system which has nourished the world's prosperity for a generation.

The current round of the multilateral trade negotiations is called, appropriately, the Tokyo Round; for Japan's extraordinary dependence on commerce gives it a unique stake in the outcome. Our purpose in those talks must be to reach agreement on a reduction of tariffs, the removal of nontariff barriers, assuring more reliable access to supplies as well as markets, the renunciation of the use of restrictive trade measures to cover deficits brought about by recent economic difficulties. We must pay special attention, as well, to the needs of the developing countries for improved trade opportunities. With respect to all of these issues, we will proceed on the basis of close consultation with Japan.

Energy is a key element in the structure of global interdependence. Each industrialized country has a choice: to permit increasing vulnerability to arbitrary price rises and political pressures or to impose conservation and spur the development of alternative supplies. But individual efforts are almost certain to be ineffective. To reduce dependence, the major consumers must pool their efforts.

This is why Japan and the United States

have joined other industrialized countries in common programs to transform the energy market through the International Energy Agency (IEA). Together we are working to protect against new embargoes, to maintain financial solidarity, to conserve energy, and to develop new sources. Japan's dependence on energy imports means that it cannot end its energy vulnerability by conservation alone. It has a major stake, therefore, in research and development of new sources.

For the next 10 years nuclear energy will be increasingly important. The United States has pioneered the development of uranium enrichment processes for nuclear energy; Japan has been our largest market. As Japan's use of and dependence on nuclear energy expands, so too does our obligation to be a reliable supplier of fuel. The United States therefore pledges to continue to provide nuclear fuel, appropriately safeguarded, under long-term contracts. We will shortly add enrichment capacity to insure adequate supplies to meet domestic and foreign needs.

Over the long term, more exotic energy sources must be emphasized. Our two countries are in a unique position to focus capital, skill, and the most advanced technology in their development. We are ready to begin a large-scale energy research and development effort with Japan. Japanese capital is welcome to participate and will receive in turn a proportional share of our expanded production of conventional and synthetic fuels.

But energy, of course, is not simply a technical issue. It goes to the heart of our political relationship with the developing world. Japan has been insistent that we must proceed by cooperation rather than confrontation, a view which we share. We and Japan together with the other members of the IEA are prepared to resume the dialogue with the energy producers and search for cooperative solutions of mutual benefit.

Japan and the United States both recognize the desire of raw material producers for a dialogue that goes beyond the issue of energy. Together with our other partners in the IEA, we have expressed our readiness to discuss these concerns. We and Japan and other importing nations have an interest in reliable supplies. The producers need long-term stability of incomes for their development programs. It is in the joint interest of producers and consumers to discuss how drastic price fluctuations can be alleviated in order to encourage timely investment in the development of new supplies and to give reality to the development plans of producers. Both Japan and the United States have a political stake in promoting a healthy commodities trade which serves the interests of both producers and consumers.

No issue on the economic agenda is more vital than *food*. It is a dramatic example of the links between bilateral and global issues and between relations with our allies and relations with the developing world.

Japan is our largest market for agricultural exports, and we are Japan's principal external provider of food. The world's dependence on the United States for foodstuffs imposes upon us an obligation to be a reliable supplier. The United States therefore pledges that in times of tight markets it will take account of the needs of our longtime customers, such as Japan. We will seek to prevent a repetition of the unfortunate experience of 1973 when we were forced suddenly to restrict the export of soybeans to Japan and other countries.

In a broader context, the United States and Japan bear a special responsibility because they are among the world's largest producers and consumers of agricultural goods. We both are in a position to apply technical innovation and skill to the expansion of food production in developing countries. And as a hedge against the feast-and-famine cycle of global harvests, we should both help in creating an international system of nationally held grain reserves by the end of this year.

These areas do not by any means exhaust our joint agenda. We attach great importance to our *scientific and technical* exchanges. This fall we expect to conclude a comprehensive joint review of all our exchanges. We will then be able to plan our efforts more efficiently and identify new areas for cooperation.

As two of the most advanced industrial

nations, we have a special awareness of what progress has done to the *environment*. The bilateral accord we are about to conclude for environmental protection is therefore of great potential importance not only for us but for others in the process of industrialization.

The talents and joint efforts of our two gifted peoples will surely be a unique contribution to the wider world community. To strengthen this bond, the United States intends to augment our *cultural relations* with Japan—an endeavor in which the work of this society, and through it, the U.S.-Japan Cultural Conference, has been crucial. The Administration will seek to integrate and obtain approval this year of proposals now before the Congress to establish a Japan-U.S. friendship fund which would make substantial new funds available for cross-cultural programs between our two countries.

The great Japanese writer Saikaku, who lived in another era when the old order was breaking down and the shape of things to come was not yet clear, said that to experience "this modern age, this mixture of good and ill, and yet to steer through life on an honest course to the splendors of success —this is a feat reserved for paragons."

Our times demand as much of us. We may not be paragons, but our assets are great. No two nations are so different yet so close; none have a more direct and wide experience of the best and the worst which the modern age offers; and none have constructed a more intensive and effective relationship of consultation and cooperation. Our mutual interest has brought us together, but our mutual understanding has enabled our friendship to thrive to a degree which would have been unimaginable two decades ago.

Americans and Japanese can take pride in what we have achieved and use it as a point of departure for greater efforts still. We are seeking the crucial balance between diversity and common purpose that is the best hope for building a creative, just, and productive international community. With the good will and good sense, the high hopes and hard work which have so far marked our journey, we will continue to strengthen our relations—for ourselves and for mankind.

United States Mourns Death of Eisaku Sato

Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan from 1964 to 1972, died at Tokyo on June 2. Following is a statement by President Ford issued on June 3 at Rome.

White House press release (Rome, Italy) dated June 3

I was deeply saddened to learn of the death of Eisaku Sato. The passing of this great statesman, Nobel laureate, who did so much for his nation and for the cause of peace, is a loss to the world. His service as Prime Minister of Japan won the respect of all nations; his counsel was sought and valued. He was a close friend of the American people and devoted his life to strengthening the ties of understanding and friendship between the United States and Japan. I speak on behalf of all Americans in expressing our deepest sympathy to Mrs. Sato and the Japanese people.

Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Washington

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the State of Israel made an official visit to Washington June 10–13. Following are remarks made by Prime Minister Rabin and Secretary Kissinger upon the Prime Minister's arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on June 10, an exchange of toasts between President Ford and Prime Minister Rabin at a dinner at the White House on June 11, and the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at the White House on June 12.

REMARKS UPON PRIME MINISTER RABIN'S ARRIVAL, JUNE 10

Press release 326 dated June 10

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Rabin: On behalf of President Ford and his Administration I would like to welcome you to the United States. You are among friends here. We have many problems to discuss, including the problem of progress toward peace in the Middle East and our bilateral relations. For two countries whose destiny has been closely intertwined for decades, these talks will be important, and they will be conducted in the spirit of friendship and cordiality and confidence that has marked our relationship.

As I have said before, you are among friends. Welcome.

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen: I am very pleased to come back to visit the United States. I am very glad that President Ford has invited me to take a part in the talks that I am looking forward to.

I believe that Israel is interested in participating in every effort to move toward peace and will do whatever is possible to participate with the United States and the countries of the area in the movement toward peace.

I come here, as the Secretary said, knowing the deep ties and the special relations between our two countries. And I am really looking forward to the talks that will take place with the President and the Secretary. Thank you very much.

TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER, JUNE 11

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 16

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister: I am very delighted to have you here and to welcome you back to Washington.

You have been here a number of times, plus your long service as a member of the diplomatic corps, and we are delighted to have you here on this occasion. I think it also gives to all of us an opportunity to thank you for your very generous hospitality on behalf of many Members of the Congress and others, as well as many Americans, who have visited Israel. I thank you on their behalf.

I think your visit comes at a very important moment in the history of both of our countries. As Americans, we face our nation's 200th anniversary and, in the process, of course, we are reviewing the past in search of some of the fundamental human values which characterize, as I see it, the very best in America.

The most basic of this, of course, is the desire for freedom and the desire for independence and the right of each individual to live in peace. Fortunately, Israel shares this

view with us. It is this sharing which is the basis of our fundamental relationship—of the United States strong and continuing support of the State of Israel and Israel's understanding of the essential interests of the United States.

Mr. Prime Minister, when we met in Washington nine months ago, at the very outset of my Administration, we jointly reaffirmed the need to continue our intensive efforts for peace. We then recognized the importance of maintaining the momentum of negotiations toward this end.

Having admired you as an Ambassador, we found it easy, I think, to establish a good working relationship. We agreed that it was in our mutual interest that these efforts succeed and it would be a tragedy if they failed. I think we recognize that stagnation would be most unfortunate in our work for peace.

We met today to insure that this does not occur, to seek progress toward a truly just and durable peace, a settlement that is in the best interest of all of us, in the Middle East. I consider the meeting this morning very constructive and our conversations here tonight equally so. I think with perseverance we can be successful.

Gentlemen, let me ask that you join me in a toast to the success in these efforts to obtain a just and durable peace in the Middle East, to the close relationship between our two countries, and to an individual of dedication and courage in the service of his country, the Prime Minister of Israel: Mr. Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. President, Members of the Congress, members of the Administration: Mr. President, I would like to thank you very much for inviting me to Washington in the efforts to do whatever is possible to move toward peace in the Middle East. I believe that your interest, your determination to do whatever is possible and to explore all the possibilities that will lead these complex conflicts in the area toward peace are a sign of the great leadership of you and a few great countries in the free world.

I would like to assure you in the name of my country and my people, that if there is something that we are really eager to achieve, it is a real peace in the area. We have tried for 27 years to do whatever is possible, or was possible, to achieve peace. Unfortunately, peace has not been achieved.

But we believe that peace must be reached in the area. It is in the interests of all the people who live there and will serve to their interests. And therefore whatever is done to move toward peace is more than appreciated by us, by the people of Israel.

I am sure that in the course of the talks that we have had and we will have, we will try to find what are the best ways in which we can cooperate with you, Mr. President, with the U.S. Government, to move toward peace.

But allow me to say that peace, a real one, can achieve only by understanding—can be achieved by compromise, but must be achieved when the two sides that are involved in the conflict would decide to put an end to it and to establish the structure of peace.

The United States has served—and I am very pleased and grateful to you that you are determined to continue to play—a major role in the achievement of peace. Israel has learned to admire, to appreciate the United States and American people. In the last 27 years, we have gained the support, the understanding of the American people, and we are more than thankful for what has been done by the United States in supporting Israel and helping the cause of peace.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, very much, for your understanding of the problems of Israel and the need—the urgency—to move toward peace. And I hope that through your efforts we would achieve what has not been achieved by now, a real move toward a real peace.

Therefore allow me to raise my glass to you: To the President of the United States and to the friendship between our two people.

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE, JUNE 12

Press release 332 dated June 12

Secretary Kissinger: I really don't have a very long statement to make. As we pointed out after the meeting between President Sadat [of Egypt] and the President, the purpose of these meetings is not to reach any definitive conclusions or to engage in any detailed negotiations but, rather, to enable the President to establish a personal contact with the principal leaders in the area, to review the alternatives, and to clarify the positions.

The meeting between the Prime Minister and the President was conducted in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere. We evaluate the results as very constructive. I think the alternatives have been brought into sharper focus, the implications of the various roads that can be pursued are seen more clearly.

We will now continue consultations with other interested parties. As you know, the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here next week. And we will of course be in touch with other parties in the area. We will stay in close touch with the Government of Israel. And we hope that within the next few weeks we can reach a final clarification of the best course that could be pursued, on the basis of consensus among all the parties concerned.

Now I will take some questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the President does not yet know enough to go forward with his policy statement as he said he would?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the President is not likely to make a policy statement within the next week or two. But I do believe that the meetings that have just concluded mark a considerable step forward, and we evaluate them in a positive manner.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you evaluate the chances for a resumption of negotiations between Israel and Egypt on another partial settlement in the Sinai?

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are chances, but we cannot yet make a final decision.

Q. The tendency seems to be becoming aware that an interim settlement is a preferred solution, rather than a return to Geneva. Is that correct?

Secretary Kissinger: No. As I pointed out at Salzburg [on June 2], the United States is not pushing any one particular approach. The United States is committed to progress in the negotiations. The United States believes that a stalemate in the diplomatic process in the Middle East would not be in the interest of any of the parties or in the interest of world peace.

We have found in the talks that this conviction is shared by all of the principals, and it is clearly and emphatically shared by the Prime Minister of Israel.

So, we are not pushing any particular approach, but we will support whichever approach seems most promising.

Q. Have you found in your talks with the Egyptian and Israeli leaders any signs that either or both are willing to adjust their positions that existed at the end of March?

Secretary Kissinger: We have told both sides that if an interim agreement is to be reached, both sides would have to modify their positions.

I call your attention to the decision of the Israeli Cabinet last Sunday in which the Israeli Cabinet pointed out the Israeli willingness to modify their position if Egypt were prepared to modify its own position.

We have the impression that therefore there is a certain parallel approach on both sides. What remains to be seen now is when one goes into the details, whether that permits a sufficient concreteness.

Q. You really haven't gotten into the details yet?

Secretary Kissinger: We have gone into the parameters, but not into the details.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, when you speak of touching base with other representatives, other groups, do you include the Palestinians?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were you able to assure Mr. Rabin that the United States will continue its military and economic aid to Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: There has never been any question about the United States continuing economic and military aid to Israel. The question has been within the framework of the very large request that we have before us, how to relate it to all the other considerations.

So, about the principle of economic and military aid, there is no debate at all. But there were some discussions on that issue, and I will continue them at lunch, if you let me get there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been—

Secretary Kissinger: This will keep the Israeli journalists from asking questions. [Laughter.]

Q. There has been a reported holdup of deliveries of certain military equipment, including the Lance missiles, and I think the F–15. Has the decision been made to go forward?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The F–15 was a question of a technical evaluation team coming over here. It had not been a question of holding up any equipment. But the point is, it has always been clear that these particular items were related to the whole process of a free assessment. And as this process is coming to a conclusion, these decisions will be made with respect to these items.

Q. Will you make another trip to the area before the reassessment is completed, or how soon do you plan another trip to the area?

Secretary Kissinger: Whether I make another trip to the area depends on which of the approaches that are open to us is going to be pursued. But a trip is not excluded.

Q. Do you have any opinion, Dr. Kissinger, as to what they would prefer? Do you get a feeling from either one or both that they would prefer you to start shuttle diplomacy again?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is too soon to say this precisely, but I would say that nothing that has happened in the discussions between President Sadat and President Ford, and between Prime Minister Rabin and President Ford, has made the prospect less likely, and much that has happened has made it perhaps more possible.

Q. So you sort of expect to resume sometime?

Secretary Kissinger: That would be premature to say. But certainly neither side has precluded a reexamination of the interim approach.

Q. How will you get into details—through diplomatic channels, or do you have to go out there yourself?

Secretary Kissinger: I think through both, if we go beyond a certain— We will start through diplomatic channels, and at that point we will decide whether—

Q. You just want to know whether there is enough for agreement before you go out, so you have to know the details?

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. As I pointed out, we will now stay in close consultation with the Government of Israel, and we will also be in close touch with the other interested parties. And after we have all their views, we will then be in a position to make the decision whether they are close enough for me to take a trip to the area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the other parties that you have been talking about that you are going to consult with before you make a decision?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as I said before, the Foreign Minister of Syria is coming here next week. We are obviously going to be in touch with the Government of Egypt. And we will be talking to other Arab countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you know very well what the particular issues were that held up the March agreement. Are you really—

Secretary Kissinger: After I read a lot about it, I didn't know any more whether I knew. [Laughter.]

Q. Are you really telling us you are no further along on understanding whether

either side has changed its position to make an agreement possible?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I am saying that obviously there has been an evolution in the thinking of both sides. I am saying that we are not yet at a sufficient degree of detail for me to be able to say whether an agreement is possible and that we have not been engaged in an actual detailed process of negotiation. Neither side has been asked to put forward a specific position at this moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President has stated that he was going to make a definitive statement or a statement about this when the reassessment is complete. Could you tell us how definitive that is likely to be, how long? Does it include reexamination of the whole question?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it depends in part on which of the options before him, of those that he has described, he is likely to pursue. And I think obviously when the President states the direction in which we are going, he will do it with sufficient concreteness to explain what we hope to achieve and where it is likely to take us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President made reference to the desirability of Israel being more flexible. I have asked several times at the White House and can get no definition of any specific of how Israel could be more flexible. I was wondering if this request that it be more flexible means that Israel should give up Mitla and Giddi in exchange for nothing but Egyptian words, not even guarantees of shipping in the canal or diplomatic recognition.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you are way ahead of me in the precision of the negotiation. I don't believe that the President has said that Israel should be more flexible. There was one reference to his evaluation of the March negotiations.

I don't think that it would serve any purpose now to apply adjectives to the various positions of the parties. The issues that led to the breakdown, as Mr. Kalb [Marvin Kalb, CBS News] said, are clearly understood. I think the two sides know in which area the major concerns of the other are. We have done our best to explain the positions of each side to the other as we understand it. We have found a general receptivity to looking at the prospects for making progress. And I can assure you, as someone who has negotiated with Israeli negotiating teams, the danger of their giving away something for nothing is extremely remote.

Mr. Koppel [Ted Koppel, ABC News].

Q. Mr. Secretary, I can understand why it was necessary for President Ford to establish some kind of personal contact with Mr. Sadat, whom he had never met before. I'm a little harder pressed to understand why it is necessary with Mr. Rabin, who he knows quite well. Is it then a fact that this is the only need for that meeting, to establish personal contact?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The need for this meeting was the necessity of reviewing the positions and options of all sides in the Middle East and of the American relationship to it.

Since this involves rather fateful decisions for Israel and very crucial decisions for the United States, it was imperative for the Prime Minister and the President to meet, not just to exchange ideas on technical details but to gain an understanding of their perception of the Middle East situation. I think the meeting was extremely important from that point of view as well as from others. And I don't believe either of these two leaders would have been prepared to make the decisions that need to be made without having a full opportunity to understand not only the technical but also the intangible aspects of the other side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President said the other night that if step-by-step does not work, he would have a comprehensive plan of his own to present possibly at Geneva. Did he reveal to Mr. Rabin what the outlines of that comprehensive plan would be?

Secretary Kissinger: The two leaders had an extremely frank and detailed review. The President's habit is always to put forward

his thinking as fully as he can, and he did put before the Prime Minister his best judgment of the situation in some detail, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, following the breakdown there was a widespread impression—and I can understand your unwillingness to engage in use of adjectives—there was a widespread impression left as a result of official statements on the record and background record, that the Israelis were stubborn and arch and were responsible for the breakdown. As a result of today's meeting, is that impression not justified any more? Has that been wiped off?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, an Israeli friend of mine has once defined objectivity as a hundred percent approval of the Israeli point of view. And maybe some of these impressions that you describe arose from that particular definition of objectivity. Be that as it may, we are now looking to the future; and we believe, as I pointed out before, that all the parties with whom we have talked are interested in making progress toward peace.

As the Prime Minister pointed out in his toast last evening, no country can have a greater interest in peace than Israel. Therefore we will work with the parties concerned with the attitude of seeing how we can help ease tensions and help them to achieve what is above all in their overwhelming interest.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have spoken to both sides now, and it has been made public by the Israelis that they would like an agreement of long duration, defined as three to five years. Now that you have spoken to both sides, is this a likely prospect?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to go into any of the details of the various aspects. But as I pointed out, from what I have seen of the positions of the parties, the possibility of progress is by no means precluded.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one last question. When will the aid program be presented to the Congress on the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: We don't have a precise date yet, but I have stated our general view with respect to aid.

Secretary Names Five to Board of Governors for East-West Center

The Department of State announced on June 13 (press release 334) the appointment by the Secretary of five prominent Americans to the newly created Board of Governors of the East-West Center in Hawaii.

Named to the Board of the corporation to administer the Center were former Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas; Edgar F. Kaiser, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Kaiser Industries Corporation, Oakland, Calif.; John K. MacIver, attorney and civic leader of Milwaukee, Wis.; Lucian W. Pye, Ford Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Mass.; and Eleanor H. B. Sheldon, President of the Social Science Research Council of New York City. (For additional biographic data and information about the East-West Center corporation, see press release 334.)

The full Board of the new corporation will be comprised of 18 persons. The Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Governor of Hawaii, and the President of the University of Hawaii are ex officio members. The Governor of Hawaii is to appoint five members, and the remaining five seats will be filled by election of the board.

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for U.S. News and World Report

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger which was published in the June 23 issue of U.S. News and World Report.

Press release 335 dated June 16

Q. Mr. Secretary, a year ago everyone was hailing American foreign policy as a great success story. Now everything seems to be coming apart at the seams. What's gone wrong?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I don't think everything is "coming apart at the seams." Our foreign policy is, I believe, effective and strong.

Our relations with Western Europe and Japan have never been better. Our relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are essentially on course. With respect to the Third World, we have developed new initiatives at the recent meetings of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and the IEA [International Energy Agency] in Paris. We have had a temporary setback in the Middle East, but I expect that momentum will soon be restored. Further interim discussions or some form of overall discussions are inevitable. What has been done previously has laid the basis for what is being done now.

The collapse of Indochina was, of course, both a setback and a tragedy—and, we believe, an unnecessary one. But it has nothing to do with the architecture of our foreign policy.

Q. How then do you explain the widespread criticism of American foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that many of these criticisms reflect a turmoil in our domestic situation and not the reality of our foreign policy. I have consistently said that you cannot have foreign policy without authority and that to the extent that the central authority is undermined for whatever reason—even if it's the fault of the central authority—it will ultimately affect the conduct of foreign policy.

Curiously enough, the price we paid during Watergate, while harmful, was not extreme. While Watergate was going on, debate on foreign policy was muted. But then, after Watergate was over, there suddenly was an orgy of criticism. Pent-up concerns about Chile, Turkey, and Viet-Nam all crystallized into extremely controversial issues. All of them, coming together, produced a serious multiplier effect.

I have the sense that this phase was terminated with the collapse of Viet-Nam. While Congress is now not in an uncritically accepting mood, it is also not in an uncritically contentious mood. The position of the Presidency—which is, after all, the central element in foreign policy—has been considerably strengthened in recent weeks. The dialogue between the executive and the Congress is now on a healthier basis. Therefore the effectiveness of our foreign policy is on a healthier basis.

Q. Why did the collapse in Viet-Nam bring that change in Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, because no one can debate anymore that there was a "domino effect." This is self-evident. Secondly, no one can deny that it has had a shocking impact even where there was no domino effect. Thirdly, I believe that the American public is not in a mood to see the country's world position decline. Whatever the public's reaction was to the merits of our involvement in Viet-Nam, the public reaction to its aftermath is that the United

States should not be seen to be retreating in the world.

The support for the handling of the *Mayaguez* incident and the general public attitude, which are reflected in the votes on the defense bill, seem to indicate that the American public now feels that the period of turmoil—of the Viet-Nam debate, of the Watergate debate—should be ended.

Q. As you see it, are the American people still prepared to accept the defense burden and other sacrifices necessary to support a world role for this country?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. That is my impression. I think our biggest asset is widespread public support—which was never as weak as the noise level in Washington would have indicated.

Q. What effect has the Viet-Nam collapse had in the rest of the world?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the sudden collapse of Viet-Nam brought home to a lot of countries the central role of America and its foreign policy. It led to a profound concern in many countries about the conclusions we might draw from that event.

Basically, what happened in the NATO meeting [summit conference in Brussels May 29–30] was what we were hoping to achieve in the Year of Europe in 1973. Our basic argument then—in 1973—was that security, political, and economic factors are all related, and that the Atlantic nations, together with Japan, had to deal with them simultaneously and with a concept of what kind of future we wanted for ourselves and our children.

Frankly, our allies were not ready for this approach in 1973. But in 1975—at Brussels—Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada put forward as his own idea, and without any previous discussion with us, exactly this proposal. And all heads of government present accepted it, with France, which was not represented by the head of government, being the only exception.

So I think that in this sense the events in Indochina have brought things into perspective.

Q. Do you expect that our allies, as a result of this, will now do more to keep America involved around the world?

Secretary Kissinger: First, the allies have understood they cannot necessarily take America for granted and that there is a point beyond which disappointment could push us into a more isolationist position.

Secondly, the central importance of the American role for both peace and progress has been brought home to them in no uncertain terms.

And thirdly, I think that the President's calm and strong leadership has had a very positive effect.

Q. As you look to the future, what lies ahead for the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: We are moving into a new world. The kind of world that emerged in the immediate post-World War II period had substantially eroded by the late sixties and early seventies. We are in a period of adjusting the American role in the world to a new environment. Today's world is marked by multipolarity among countries, divisions in the Communist world, growth of Europe and Japan, and greater assertiveness of the underdeveloped countries. All this fragmentation has occurred at the same time that economic interrelationships are demonstrating the interdependence of the world.

So you have confrontation on a political level, and on an economic level the need for cooperation. You have on the political level continued ideological hostility, but you have on the nuclear level the realization that there is no alternative to peace.

Q. What does that mean as far as American foreign policy is concerned?

Secretary Kissinger: We had to design a much more complex strategy than the one that characterized the immediate postwar period. We are trying to design a policy that is not a response to crisis, but to the realities of the present and the hopes of the future, a policy that looks at the evolution of history and the American contribution to it. While any policy has imperfections, I think we are clearly moving in the right direction.

On the other hand, the architecture is not completed; many issues remain unresolved. There is still an unfinished agenda. But I would like to point out that if you interview a Secretary of State three years from now he, too, should have an unfinished agenda. It is an American illusion to believe that foreign policy ought to lead to a solution to all problems. Foreign policy cannot do that; it is always a dynamic process.

Relations With the Soviet Union

Q. Turning to Soviet-American détente: How do you answer the criticism that is so often heard that this is a one-way street that benefits only Russia?

Secretary Kissinger: I am certain that in Moscow whatever opponents of détente there may be are making exactly the same argument. What you get, as the result of three years of détente, is that people like all the benefits of détente, plus all the psychic satisfaction of a tough posture. There is no question that the American public prefers peace to war and anti-Communism to Communism. So the question is—and it's not an easy one—how do you bring these two into balance with each other.

Détente has not been a one-way street. The agreements we have made with the Soviet Union have been based on reciprocity; both sides have benefited. Some of the events that have happened in the world that have been against our interests have been caused by the Soviets; others have not. Some have been caused by our failure to take adequate unilateral actions—for those we have no one but ourselves to blame.

Détente is not a substitute for American action. Détente is a means of controlling the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Détente is not a substitute for American strength. But it can enable us to reduce the risks that we will ever have to make use of that strength.

Q. Do you mean that under the rules of détente, one side is free to exploit a local situation to gain an advantage?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course not. I am saying that the minimum objective of détente must be to reduce the dangers of general nuclear war. That we have certainly done with some success.

The second objective is to reduce direct conflict in areas of vital importance to both countries, such as Central Europe. That we have done remarkably well.

The third objective is to create links that will provide incentives for moderation. Progress here has been uneven, and we have been weakened by the Trade Act.

The fourth objective is to reduce conflict in peripheral areas. And here, to be frank, we have not made as much progress as we should.

Q. You mentioned the Trade Act, which made economic concessions to Russia contingent on more liberal Soviet emigration policies. How has that weakened the policy of détente?

Secretary Kissinger: Relations with the Soviet Union must have incentives for moderation and penalties for intransigence.

The penalties for intransigence are supplied mostly by our defense budget and by our foreign policy. I think that is going reasonably well.

As for incentives for moderation, the Trade Act was one of the elements we had hoped to have available. We have always held the view that to inject the emigration issue into it hurt our relations with the Soviet Union, hurt us economically and—most tragically of all—hurt the people it was supposed to help.

Q. How can you reconcile what the Russians have done in Viet-Nam, the Mideast, and Portugal with détente?

Secretary Kissinger: Let's discuss each of these. First, Viet-Nam was not caused by the Russians. Viet-Nam had its own dynamics. Secondly, the Soviet aid level in Viet-Nam remained relatively constant. But our aid level dropped—by 50 percent in each of two successive years—to the point where no equipment and very few spare parts were delivered in Viet-Nam after May 1974. The GVN [Government of Viet-Nam] even reached the point where ammunition had to

be rationed for the Vietnamese forces. Therefore, what happened had many causes, of which Soviet actions were only a part.

The situation in Portugal was not caused by the Soviets. It was caused by the internal dynamics of Portugal itself. If we have not assisted the democratic forces adequately, the reasons lie far more in our own domestic debates than with the Soviets.

Q. And the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: In the Middle East, I would not be surprised if in Moscow they made the same argument and said that we have been using détente to improve our position. At any rate it is not evident to me—in contrast to our own position—that the Soviet Union has improved its position in the Middle East in the last two years. The opposite seems to me to be the case.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied that the Russians are not cheating on the strategic arms limitation agreement that was signed in 1972?

Secretary Kissinger: When you have strategic forces on both sides in the present state of technical complexity and in the process of modernization, it is inevitable that questionable actions will emerge.

The Soviets have worried us in several areas. We have taken those up in the Soviet-American Standing Commission which is designed to deal with such complaints. With respect to a number of these issues we have received answers which—while not fully satisfactory—are moving in the right direction. One or two issues are still unsettled, but they do not go to the heart of the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement. But we will pursue them nevertheless. One or two issues that have been reported in the newspapers seem to me mischievous and special pleading.

Q. What about SALT Two? Is there going to be an agreement this fall?

Secretary Kissinger: The issues of principle with respect to SALT have been more or less settled. What now remains to be worked out is the technical implementation of issues that are very complicated. I should think that the chances are better than even that we will have a SALT Two in the fall. But we could fail, either because we just can't solve the technical issues or because political tensions rise.

Q. Is a visit to Washington by Soviet leader Brezhnev in the fall firmly set, or will that depend on a SALT agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: That will depend on SALT.

Q. In other words—no SALT agreement, no Brezhnev visit?

Secretary Kissinger: I would think that Brezhnev, too, would prefer to mark his visit with some significant result.

The Middle East

Q. President Ford recently spoke of the Middle East as the most dangerous problem in the world today. What are the prospects now of making progress toward a settlement of the conflict there?

Secretary Kissinger: Logically, the conditions should be there, either on an interim or an overall basis. As the President has said, we are determined to make progress. If we cannot get it on an interim basis, we will promote an overall settlement. We will not permit the situation simply to fester.

Q. How do you prevent it from festering?

Secretary Kissinger: By engaging in active diplomacy and using our influence, which, after all, is not inconsiderable in that area, to encourage progress.

Q. What has resulted from President Ford's meetings with President Sadat [of Egypt] and Prime Minister Rabin [of Israel] that will open the way to new negotiations for a Middle East settlement?

Secretary Kissinger: The meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin have been extremely important in helping to crystallize our thinking on how best to proceed. They have helped us understand the views of both on how they think the negotiating process might be renewed. They were both constructive, though neither meeting

was an occasion for coming to detailed decisions.

We, as well as the two governments concerned, are now reflecting on the best course to follow. We will be following up with both Israel and Egypt through diplomatic channels, as well as talking with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam here in the coming days. We will also stay in close touch with other interested governments.

From all of these consultations we hope a decision can be taken on how to move toward the negotiated settlement we all seek.

Q. Is it feasible to go for an overall settlement if you can't get Egypt and Israel to agree even on a limited settlement in the Sinai?

Secretary Kissinger: That remains to be seen. It probably won't be an extremely rapid process.

Q. Can you count on any help from the Russians in promoting a settlement—or are they mainly interested in perpetuating a conflict that they can exploit?

Secretary Kissinger: On the one hand, you can argue that they like the tension in the area because it creates a chance for enhanced influence. On the other hand, it can be argued that tensions which force a country to take positions which it then cannot implement do not, in the long run, enhance its influence.

So I would think that as a result of the events of recent years, the Soviet Union could come to the view that it is running risks disproportionate to what it is getting out of it. And if that is true, perhaps conditions for a more constructive relationship will develop. Certainly in recent months the Soviet Union has not been as aggressive about the Middle East as they might have been.

Q. How is your negotiating position in the Middle East affected by the fact that 76 Senators have signed a letter in support of Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not recommend the letter be sent. But we will take it into account. We will study it.

Q. Six Presidents have declared a commitment to the survival and security of Israel. In practical terms, what does that really mean?

Secretary Kissinger: We have a historic commitment to the survival and the well-being of Israel. This is a basic national policy reaffirmed by every Administration. But we are in no way committed to the status quo. Israel itself has said that it does not insist on the existing territorial arrangement for a final peace.

The art of our foreign policy is to reconcile as many of America's interests as we can, and not to emphasize one to the exclusion of all of the others. We have many interests that need to be accommodated: we have an interest in good relations with the Arab countries; we have an interest in the economic well-being and security of Western Europe and Japan; and we have an interest in not having unnecessary confrontations with the Soviet Union. We believe all these interests can be reconciled with our traditional friendship for Israel.

Q. What do you think of suggestions that an Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967 borders would tend to lower oil prices?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it would be extremely dangerous for the United States to let its foreign policy be determined by oil price manipulation. We have refused to discuss our political objectives in relation to the price of oil and will continue to do so.

The Energy Problem

Q. More generally on the oil problem: Can we live with another $4-a-barrel increase that's being talked about for the fall?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know that there will be a $4 increase in the price of oil. That would be an increase of over 30 percent. We are strongly opposed to an increase. We believe that the increases of '73 and '74 have been so inflationary and so disruptive of the world economy that another rise is clearly not justified. To impose a $4 increase on top of the present precarious world situation is not even in the interest

of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries. We would certainly strongly oppose it.

Q. But what can we do to oppose any increase that OPEC chooses to make?

Secretary Kissinger: Basically we cannot fight unilateral increases effectively until we create the objective conditions which will transform the market forces. It is another area where it is easy to strike a tough verbal stance. But a tough verbal stance unrelated to objective factors is not going to do us any good.

We are attempting in the International Energy Agency to create the objective conditions which will transform power in the marketplace by reducing consumption and developing alternative energy sources. At the same time, the capacity of OPEC to cut production in order to sustain prices will diminish as development programs in other countries grow and the producers' need for real resources mounts. Therefore, some point inevitably will be reached where the market must shift. How quickly it is reached depends on the decisiveness with which the industrialized consumer countries cooperate. This is the effort in which we are now deeply—and reasonably successfully—engaged.

Q. A year ago the Administration was talking about getting the price of oil down. Now you're talking about keeping the price from going up. Why has the objective changed?

Secretary Kissinger: The policy has not changed. But policy and rhetoric need to be kept separate. We would like prices to come down. But we cannot get them down until after we have succeeded in keeping them from going up. At a time when OPEC is threatening to increase prices, it's senseless to talk about getting them down. We are opposed to the current prices. We are even more opposed to higher prices. We will work with determination to bring about conditions in which this cannot continue.

If OPEC insists on raising its prices, I have no doubt that it will lead to increased consumer solidarity and a speeded-up program to shift market conditions. This is our policy—to change market conditions—and I think it will succeed.

We are pursuing the only sensible policy available to bring about a price cut. You can talk about embargoes and counterembargoes. But when you analyze them you will find they usually hit the countries that politically give us the strongest support and whose role may not be decisive. Furthermore, these measures generally would not be backed by the other consuming countries. So if we pursued them we would be putting ourselves at a political and probably economic disadvantage. But we are determined to bring about an improvement in the market conditions of oil.

Q. Why is it so difficult to get the industrial consuming countries to cooperate on the kind of joint policy that you advocate?

Secretary Kissinger: Because none of the consumer countries want to risk a confrontation. Therefore, to some extent the producer countries can blackmail at least some of the consumer nations. Another reason is that independence requires difficult domestic efforts. Consumption cuts are unpleasant and occasionally painful. So, many countries—including ours—are using the fact that there is a recession which imposes oil conservation as an excuse to avoid policy-induced conservation.

Q. How much will the success or failure of this whole program depend on action by Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: The role of the Congress is absolutely pivotal. The United States consumes 50 percent of the world's energy; many of the resources for alternative programs must come from American technology. Without a major American program, there can be no effective policy among consumer nations.

Q. Is the energy program that Congress appears likely to approve sufficient to do the job?

Secretary Kissinger: It is sufficient to make a start on the policy. It is not, however, adequate to do the whole job.

Q. Have you been surprised at the ability

of the OPEC countries to cut production as deeply as they have to maintain their price?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I think they are beginning to approach a point where production cuts will become more and more painful.

Q. But isn't pressure on OPEC countries to cut production going to ease as we get economic recovery here as well as in Europe and Japan?

Secretary Kissinger: It is going to be a very serious problem. The recovery will increase our need for oil, but it will not affect the ability of the OPEC countries to make further production cuts.

Q. Do you anticipate another oil embargo by the Arabs?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it would be a very rash action, and—outside the context of a Middle East war—I would not anticipate it.

Asia Policy

Q. Getting back for a moment to the aftermath of Viet-Nam: We keep hearing that China wants the United States to stay in Asia. Is that based on any direct assurance you've had?

Secretary Kissinger: It is based not on assurances, but on fairly hard evidence—that is, on what Chinese leaders have told Asian leaders and some of our leaders.

Q. Why do they now want us to stay after agitating for so many years to get us out of Asia?

Secretary Kissinger: The Chinese are extremely realistic. They realize that their security depends on a world equilibrium. They understand that the United States must inevitably be a major part of such an equilibrium. For this reason, they do not want to open up Asia to the aspirations of other countries whose intentions toward them might be less benevolent.

Q. In that connection, is there any truth to reports that China has tried to dissuade North Korea from going to war against the South?

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot confirm those reports. But our general impression is that the People's Republic of China is not interested in an exacerbation of tensions in Asia.

Q. What, in your judgment, are the chances of war in Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: In the immediate aftermath of Viet-Nam, we were profoundly concerned that the leaders in North Korea should not misread the American position. We were also concerned that a collapse of South Korea would have a disastrous impact on Japan.

The events of recent weeks are beginning to make clear that the United States is prepared to defend its interests in the world and that it would be a wildly rash adventure to use military force in Korea. Many of the problems that existed with respect to Viet-Nam do not exist with respect to Korea.

Q. Because the United States has a mutual security treaty with South Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: That's right.

Q. In view of the Viet-Nam debacle, is President Ford still planning to go to China this fall?

Secretary Kissinger: That is still the plan.

Q. Is it possible for him to go without discussing the Taiwan situation?

Secretary Kissinger: No, but it is possible for him to go without bringing that situation to a conclusion.

Q. Will the United States be obliged to change its relations with Taiwan?

Secretary Kissinger: Not in order for the President to go to China.

Q. Looking a bit further ahead: Do you expect the triangular Soviet-American-Chinese relationship to survive after Mao Tse-tung and Leonid Brezhnev are gone?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem in foreign policy is to be able to discern the realities of the situation and not to tie it to personalities. The realities could shift to some extent—and all foreign policy is subject to change. The reality of Asia is the geopolitical

impact on each other of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, plus the memory of what has happened.

We are not exploiting this. We are not encouraging it, and we didn't create it.

To some extent the reality will continue. There may be shifting accents that will affect us, and we must be aware of these. It is also important not to be so obsessed with immediate threats that one forgets long-term threats. But the essential architecture of our foreign policy is sound and will be seen to be sound. The fact that it has survived some of the shocks of this past year proves that it is sound.

Western Europe

Q. A final point concerning Europe: Why is it left to this country to deal with major problems in Europe while Europeans turn their backs—such problems as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey?

Secretary Kissinger: It is left to the United States because fate has put us in the position where we are the only non-Communist country that is strong enough and domestically cohesive enough to play a world role. Therefore, if certain things are not done by us, they will not be done by anyone. And while it might be fairer if somebody else took some of the responsibility, the fact is that a catastrophe is no less real for having been brought about by attempts to shift responsibility to others.

Portugal, of course, is primarily a Portuguese problem. Many of the European countries are extremely active with respect to Portugal. However, as the strongest country in the alliance, we have to state a position with respect to Portugal and particularly its relationship to NATO. This is all we have done, in addition to some economic aid which we have given.

With respect to Spain, we are the only Western country that has a defense relationship with Spain. For some European countries there is a domestic problem with respect to dealings with Spain. But it is also clear that if Spain is left totally isolated, the evolution there could take very traumatic forms, and this is what we are attempting to deal with.

Greece, Turkey—again, we have a problem of the eastern end of the Mediterranean, of the domestic evolution in both of these countries, and of the world equilibrium. We were perhaps projected into it somewhat more dramatically than we might have desired by certain domestic events in the United States, and we have been forced to stake more on this than might have been thought desirable from an abstract consideration of foreign policy.

But we do have an interest in retaining both of these friendly countries in NATO, in maintaining our traditional friendships with both countries and not have the eastern end of the Mediterranean turn into uncontrolled chaos—or, for that matter, controlled chaos.

Q. Why does the United States seem so much more concerned about the Communist influence in Portugal than the Europeans?

Secretary Kissinger: All we are saying is that at some point the evolution in Portugal will have reached a stage where we will have to make a decision whether this is still an allied government or a neutralist government. At that point, we will have to consider the implications of our actions for Italy, Spain, and the other European countries.

We have told our European allies that this is not something to be determined in the abstract. We are continuing our economic aid program to Portugal for the time being. But we do not believe that we have to delude ourselves about what is going on there.

Q. Outside Portugal, do you get the feeling that neutralism is spreading in Western Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I have the sense that with the present governments, the awareness of the importance of the Atlantic alliance is increasing. However, in many of the European countries neutralist forces are growing—not in the governments, but in political life. And that is a worrisome phenomenon for the middle and longer term. It is one of the factors we are keeping in mind with relation to Portugal.

Q. All in all, Mr. Secretary, are you optimistic about the future?

Secretary Kissinger: I'd like to repeat: We're moving into a new world, and I think that we are moving in the right direction. There will always be unfinished business, and the more effective you are the more unfinished business you will have.

President Ford's News Conference of June 9

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the Rose Garden at the White House on June 9.[1]

. . . . .

Q. Mr. President, at a recent news conference you said that you had learned the lessons of Viet-Nam. Since then, I have received a letter from Mrs. Catherine Litchfield of Dedham, Mass. She lost a son in Viet-Nam; and on her behalf and on behalf of many, many parents with her plight, I would like to ask you, what are those lessons you learned from the Viet-Nam experience?

President Ford: I think, Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International], there are a number of lessons that we can learn from Viet-Nam. One, that we have to work with other governments that feel as we do—that freedom is vitally important. We cannot, however, fight their battles for them. Those countries who believe in freedom as we do must carry the burden. We can help them, not with U.S. military personnel but with arms and economic aid, so that they can protect their own national interest and protect the freedom of their citizens.

I think we also may have learned some lessons concerning how we would conduct a military operation. There was, of course, from the period of 1961 or 1962 through the end of our military involvement in Viet-Nam, a great deal of controversy whether the military operations in Viet-Nam were carried out in the proper way. Some dispute between civilian and military leaders as to the proper prosecution of a military engagement—I think we can learn something from those differences and, if we ever become engaged in any military operation in the future—and I hope we don't—I trust we've learned something about how we should handle such an operation.

Q. Does that mean that you would not conduct a limited war again with a certain amount of restraint on the part of our bombers and so forth?

President Ford: I wouldn't want to pass judgment at this time on any hypothetical situation. I simply am indicating that from that unfortunate experience in Viet-Nam, we ought to be able to be in a better position to judge how we should conduct ourselves in the future.

. . . . .

Q. I wonder if I can change the subject to Europe and the future. There are reports in Europe, sir, that both the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be less and less interested in the Security Conference that is due up this year. Could you tell me something about the future timetable, when that might come up, how SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] is doing, when you might be seeing Mr. Brezhnev, and so forth? There seems to be some slippage in this.

President Ford: While I was in Europe, I discussed with many European leaders the status of the European Security Conference, their views. It appears that there are some compromises being made on both sides between the Warsaw Pact nations and European nations, including ourselves, that will potentially bring the European Security Conference to a conclusion. Those final compromises have not been made, but it's getting closer and closer.

I hope that there will be sufficient understanding on both sides to bring about an ending to this long, long negotiation. If it does, in the near future we probably would have a summit in Helsinki.

[1] For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 16.

The negotiations on SALT Two are progressing, I think constructively. The technicians are now working on the problems of verification and other matters that are very important but can be better outlined and put together by the technicians.

I'm optimistic that we can have a SALT Two agreement. But I can assure you, as I have others, that we are going to make sure, make certain, that our national security interest is very, very adequately protected. And I think it can be, as I look at the overall picture.

Q. To follow up, sir, when do you think Mr. Brezhnev might be coming here? Would you give a ballpark guess on that?

President Ford: I would hope, if negotiations go the way they are, sometime in the fall of 1975.

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. President, to follow on Helen's question, sir, do you believe that the language of our mutual defense treaty with South Korea requires the presence of American troops there, or can the United States fulfill its commitment short of that?

President Ford: I believe it is highly desirable under our mutual defense treaty with South Korea to maintain a U.S. military contingent in South Korea. We have now roughly 38,000 U.S. military personnel in South Korea. I think it's keeping the peace in Korea, and I think it's important for the maintenance of peace in the Korean Peninsula that that force stay in South Korea.

Q. Are you thinking of keeping them there indefinitely, or do you hope to review that question next year?

President Ford: It's constantly under review.

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Q. The Prime Minister of Israel is coming on Wednesday, I believe, and you met with Egyptian President Sadat a week ago. As you go into this next phase of consultations, are you any more prepared to give Israel stronger guarantees?

President Ford: Well, my meeting with Prime Minister Rabin of Israel, which is to be held on Wednesday and Thursday of this week, will be a meeting where I will get his personal assessment of the overall situation in the Middle East.

We will discuss the options that I see as possible: either a resumption of the suspended step-by-step negotiations, or a comprehensive recommendation that I would make to probably reconvene the Geneva Conference, or a step-by-step process under the umbrella of the Geneva Conference.

I'm going to go into these alternatives or these options in depth with Prime Minister Rabin; and when we have concluded our discussions, I'll be in a better position to know how our government should proceed in trying to achieve a broader peace, a more permanent peace, with fairness and equity in the Middle East.

. . . . . .

Q. Mr. President, when you were in Salzburg, you appeared to be especially friendly with Egyptian President Sadat. Was this public display of friendliness with him designed in any way to pressure Israel to make new concessions toward a Middle East settlement?

President Ford: I did enjoy my opportunity to get acquainted with President Sadat. And I not only enjoyed his company, but I benefited from his analysis of the Middle East and related matters. But I have the same relationship with Prime Minister Rabin. I have known him longer; and this will be the second or third opportunity that I've had a chance to meet with him, plus my opportunities when he was the Israeli Ambassador here.

I think I can be benefited immeasurably by meeting face-to-face with people like Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat. This judgment by our government in this area is a major decision, and we have to get the broadest possible information to make the best judgment. And in both instances, as well as others, I am glad to have the help and assistance of those who come from that area of the world.

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Secretary Kissinger's Remarks at PBS Luncheon

Following is an excerpt from Secretary Kissinger's remarks at a Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) luncheon honoring the British Broadcasting Corporation at Washington on June 16. [1]

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At this time, when the policies of all nations, and especially the experiences of our nation, are undergoing such a revolutionary change, it is difficult to present to the public the nature of the problem and the essence of the answers. The news reports, in the nature of things, emphasize the spectacular and the tactical. They emphasize the urgent very often rather than the important. What is badly needed is what PBS and other programs around the world are attempting to do —to explain the context of events, to have some analysis of their significance not necessarily geared to the headlines of the moment.

I had some discussion with Mr. Gunn about this many months ago concerning how to conduct foreign policy in an environment in which the real issues can very often not be discussed on some of the media because of pressures of time and the nature of the medium.

I would like to say that what PBS has done in many of your programs is a major contribution to the understanding of international affairs, and therefore I am glad to accept this opportunity to come and meet with you. Now I think we can proceed most usefully if I answer your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, my question is: Will the United States use troops to defend South Korea if it is invaded by the North Koreans?

Secretary Kissinger: There are American troops in South Korea, and an attack on South Korea would be barely possible that did not involve American forces. And we have a security treaty. Of course we would follow constitutional procedures and the provisions of the War Powers Act, but we are bound by international obligations that have been ratified by the Congress to come to the assistance of South Korea.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you tell us the differences, as you see them, between serving as Secretary of State under President Ford as compared to serving as Secretary of State under former President Nixon?

Secretary Kissinger: I think this is not a question that I should now answer, or perhaps should ever answer. Obviously each President has his own style and has his own intellectual cast. I think that both have made a major contribution to American foreign policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question from President Ford's home town for you. Would you please comment on the role of Congress and the President in international affairs—how much should its members be informed; how much is your personal diplomacy; how much of it is the domain of Congress and the President?

Secretary Kissinger: There are several parts to that question. First, should the Congress be informed? Secondly, of what should it be informed? And third, who shall be informed?

Now, I have always believed—and of course President Ford as a longtime member of the Congress feels this equally strongly —that it is essential to keep the Congress informed of the nature of our foreign policy. The issue is not only of keeping the Congress informed but what information it should be

[1] For remarks by Hartford N. Gunn, president of PBS, introducing Secretary Kissinger and the opening paragraphs of the Secretary's remarks, see press release 337 dated June 16.

given and who can handle that information.

The Congress, in our view, should be consulted on all the main lines of American foreign policy; that is, the major decisions and those that effect changes of course or fundamental commitments. The Congress is in a poor position to handle the day-by-day details of American foreign policy—although, of course, of those, too, they should be informed in a general way. But if you consider the mass of information that comes into the Department day after day, there is no staff in the Congress that could possibly absorb all this information.

The third problem is, who in the Congress should be informed. When I started out as Secretary of State, I established a very close relationship with the leadership of the House and the Senate, and with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and what is now called the International Relations Committee in the House. In the last two years, however, there has been a revolution in the Congress, especially in the House, so that the traditional leadership can no longer speak for the members as it did in the past. And the traditional committees that concerned themselves with international relations no longer represent the group that is primarily or that is exclusively concerned with foreign policy. So that the requirements of briefing now become enormous. I must say I spend at least 25 percent of my time on the Congress, and my associates spend more. One of the problems we face is to identify a leadership group in the Congress which we can keep informed and with which we would share all relevant information.

So the problem of informing the Congress is soluble if the Congress can organize itself to receive it.

The next question is the degree of congressional supervision in the conduct of policy. Again, I believe that the main lines of policy should be developed on the basis of the closest consultation between the Congress and the executive. But again, even though the line cannot be clearly drawn, for the Congress to get into the tactical issues is likely to be extremely counterproductive. We have seen it with the Trade Act, which hurt relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and hurt the very people it was supposed to help. We have seen it with respect to the cutoff of military aid to Turkey, which could have very serious repercussions. And we have seen it in a number of other instances.

On the other hand, we are prepared to take into account congressional concerns and to set up a system of consultation so that legislative actions don't become necessary.

I recognize that some of this is a reaction to what is conceived in the Congress as excesses of executive authority, and some of those congressional concerns are quite justified. We will do our best to meet them.

Indeed, I must say that in recent weeks, in fact in recent months, the problem which seemed so acute earlier this year has improved enormously, and the cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches is now going along much more smoothly than earlier.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think the CIA is important to the conduct of our foreign policy, or do you think it has damaged our foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the CIA is important to the conduct of our foreign policy, and I do not believe that it has damaged the conduct of our foreign policy. I believe, at least in my experience, the CIA has acted within Presidential authority.

I think it is essential for the United States to have a first-rate intelligence organization under strict control by the political leadership and under such controls as the Congress can now establish. There obviously have been some abuses that have been described in the Rockefeller report and others that may come out in the reports of the various congressional committees. But I consider the CIA essential for the conduct of our foreign policy, and I hope that it will not be damaged by these various investigations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think you can really get the Middle East situation calmed down permanently without further full-scale wars?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the Middle East

has been torn by tensions throughout most of its history and certainly through the last generation. Therefore it would be a rash man to say that it can be calmed down permanently. We will make a major effort to make progress toward a peace settlement, either in the form of an interim agreement or in the form of an overall agreement.

I am hopeful that it can be done without war. I think another Middle East war would be a catastrophe for all of the parties. It would settle none of the issues that are now before them, and at the end of it they would be exactly at the point they have reached now, which is how to negotiate progress toward a lasting peace.

I think we can make progress, and we are working very hard to promote some progress. I think it is imperative that it be done without war.

Q. Mr. Secretary, California is a region of the country where many of the recent Vietnamese refugees, now immigrants to the United States, are being concentrated. Many of our citizens out there are asking what can the Federal Government do, what can the Ford Administration do, to ameliorate the economic impact on our region from this group of new immigrants.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course I am not an expert on the domestic economy, as my colleagues would be eager to tell you. I can't make that point emphatically enough. So quite frankly, I don't know what specific steps we can take to ameliorate the impact of refugees in various communities.

My impression has been that the number was relatively small in terms of the overall labor market; that the number in any one location would not be decisive. I am sure that an effort will be made to ease it. But I cannot give you an answer, because I don't know what these efforts are. It is not in the province of my Department, and everyone knows how meticulous I am not to step over that boundary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has recently been alleged that the strength of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil cartel is due in some part to your Middle Eastern policy of conciliation of both the Arabs and Israelis. If there is any substance to this allegation, is peace in the Middle East worth the price that we must now pay for oil—that is, world inflation?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't agree with the allegation. It is easy to take a verbally tough stance.

First of all, conciliation of the Israelis, which is not what I have been accused of in the last few months, has nothing to do with the oil price.

Secondly, with respect to the oil price, it will not come down by a tough declaration. It will come down only when the objective conditions are created which shift the forces of the market or which create political incentives to reduce the price.

This is what we are working on with great energy. We have created over the last year the International Energy Agency, which brings together all of the consuming countries in joint programs of conservation, in developing alternative sources, and in joint research and development programs. It will take some time to take full effect.

But even today the market forces have already shifted somewhat in favor of the consumers, though not yet in a decisive manner. Until they have moved in a more clear-cut manner, no amount of verbal tough talk is going to change this; all the more so since the victims of this are usually the countries that will not join an oil embargo—which we have to keep in mind, in view of Middle East tensions—and that have otherwise cooperated with us.

So I believe that the policies we are pursuing are designed to bring the oil price down and that they cannot be described as conciliating those who want to bring the price up.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your policies obviously are based on your perceptions of the world we live in today and were formed, I think, as we heard, nearly 20 years ago. I wanted to know if they are still valid or have they really in fact changed?

Secretary Kissinger: My views?

Q. Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: Since they were elaborated 20 years ago? I'll tell you, I have not read anything that I have written since I came down here. And there is good reason for that, because there is a British reviewer who wrote about one of my books, "I don't know whether Mr. Kissinger is a great writer, but anyone who finishes this book is a great reader."

I think it is possible—at least I leave open the theoretical possibility—that I might have changed my mind on something in my life, but don't press me too hard.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has been recently accused of buying the friendship of other countries with gifts, which kind of resulted in a loss of credibility. I was wondering how we are going to counteract that.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe it would be a valid criticism to say that we are trying to purchase the good will of other countries with gifts.

Q. I don't believe so, either. But it seems like other people think that.

Secretary Kissinger: I think basically relations between countries have to be based on their perception of common objectives and their perception of parallel interests.

Through the immediate postwar period, when the United States was economically and militarily the dominant country all over the world and when other countries were either just getting started or were in disarray, it is true that the United States material contribution was quite essential and that this might have created some of the atmosphere that you describe. I don't think this is the situation today.

Today the big problem is to bring the nations of the world together in a recognition of the fact of interdependence and to deal in a cooperative manner with the issues of energy, raw materials, food, that none of them can solve by themselves—that no nation can solve for any other—and that require a cooperative effort. This, I would say, is our big problem. And to the extent that there are vestiges of the previous state of affairs, we are trying to overcome them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how have the recent accusations of CIA meddling in policies of foreign countries affected our foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no other country in the world in which an intelligence agency would be exposed to the public scrutiny that has been the case here in the last six months. In some parts of the world these accusations of meddling have been able to be used as propaganda against our foreign policy.

I think it is safe to say that in most parts of the world, leaders do not consider the substance of the charge as unusual as some Americans do or are not as shocked by these accusations as we like to think—or some of us like to think. I think these reports have been on the whole not helpful to our foreign policy. They have above all not been helpful to the conduct of intelligence operations abroad. But they have not been a major impediment to the conduct of foreign policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the recent rash of press criticism against you bother you?

Secretary Kissinger: Totally unjustified.

Q. Do you feel they are unfair?

Secretary Kissinger: Do I think they are unfair?

Q. The recent criticism of you in the press.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, unless there was some hope for a terminal date to my efforts, the morale of my associates would disintegrate completely. Are those some of my associates applauding?

I think there was a period where, for understandable reasons, when everything seemed to be disintegrating domestically, praise for me was excessive. This was then balanced by another period in which perhaps criticism was excessive. I tend to think any criticism of me is excessive. I don't think it was unfair.

I have to say this about criticism. One way I keep the press here in control is that my father keeps a scrapbook of anything that is written about me. And he has, I think, 34 volumes. Every author is given

two chances. After he has written two unfavorable articles, he becomes a non-person and is eliminated from the scrapbook. There are few journalists willing to take that risk.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what would you consider positive steps that Castro would have to take before the United States started to change our policy toward Cuba?

Secretary Kissinger: We have indicated that we would respond to the positive moves that Castro might take. And he has recently moderated the tone of Cuban propaganda and even taken some limited steps. I don't want to give a precise list of our requirements, because I think we should discuss those first through private channels.

But we are prepared to reciprocate Cuban moves, and we do not consider that an animosity toward Cuba is an essential aspect of our foreign policy.

World Environment Day Marked by President Ford

Statement by President Ford [1]

On this day, the third anniversary of the opening of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, it is appropriate that we join our neighbors throughout the world to reflect upon efforts being made to improve the quality of our global environment.

Today there is growing recognition of mankind's interdependence, of our relationship with nature's other handiworks, and of the danger to our planet which environmental degradation poses.

An active concern for the environment is the first essential step toward restoration and preservation of environmental quality. We in the United States, and the citizens of many other countries, have taken that first giant step, but we have far to go.

Through local, national, and international efforts, we have already begun to redeem the works of destruction which man has visited upon the earth for generations.

We recognize that these efforts can succeed on a global scale only if every nation becomes involved. Since participating in the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm in 1972, the United States has joined in international efforts to implement the recommendations formulated by that conference and adopted by the United Nations.

The United States has strongly supported the United Nations Environment Program. We have participated in the development of international conventions to protect the planet, its settlements, and its species. We have entered into bilateral environmental agreements with other countries.

As the United States approaches the beginning of its third century, our desire to maintain and enhance the quality of life in this country and throughout the world remains undiminished. This nation is committed to striving for an environment that not only sustains life but also enriches the lives of people everywhere—harmonizing the works of man and nature. This commitment has recently been reinforced by my proclamation, pursuant to a joint resolution of the Congress, designating March 21, 1975, as Earth Day, and asking that special attention be given to educational efforts directed toward protecting and enhancing our lifegiving environment.

In support of the action of the United Nations General Assembly, I am happy on this day, World Environment Day, to express the dedication and deep concern of Americans for the goal of achieving a better world environment.

[1] Issued on June 5 (text from White House press release).

Department Discusses U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

Statement by William D. Rogers
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs [1]

Mr. Chairman [Representative Jonathan B. Bingham, chairman, Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce]: I welcome this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce and the Subcommittee on International Organizations.

You have asked for the views of the Department on H.R. 6382, introduced by yourself, a bill that would lift the embargo on U.S. trade with Cuba by removing the legislative authority for it. You also asked for a report on recent developments within the Organization of American States with respect to the Cuban question and a statement on current U.S. policy. I shall cover these questions first. I will then turn to certain others that directly affect U.S.-Cuban relations and which have been commented upon earlier during the joint hearings of your subcommittees, including Cuba's economy, the problem of compensation for expropriated properties, and human rights.

First, I would like to say a word about Cuba in the context of our overall interests in Latin America. Cuba is the subject of intense media interest and in the U.S. Congress. Several members of this body have visited the island recently.

I should not like to be understood as being uncomfortable with congressional study visits anywhere in Latin America. Nor am I concerned that the press should focus such lively attention on this part of the Caribbean. But, as Assistant Secretary in charge of our relations with the entire hemisphere, I cannot begin a discussion of Cuba without emphasizing that there is a great deal more to Latin America—a great deal which likewise deserves the most serious attention of the American press, the Congress, and the public.

Cuba should not distract us from the fact that there are some two dozen other nations in this Western Hemisphere, with over 200 million people. The nations of this part of the world share with ours a common Western tradition and culture and a common origin in the struggle for liberty from European colonialism. All are developing. Many share a truly firm commitment to the open society—to the right of political dissent and political competition and to the free creative spirit. Such nations as Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Mexico, democracies all, are just a few examples of other nations in the same region which deserve the sympathetic interest of this Congress and the American people.

Economically, the Latin American nations are generally more advanced than other developing countries. Policies to deal with hemisphere issues are becoming more complex. Raw materials, investments, technology transfer, upgrading of articles in our bilateral trade—these familiar issues must be thought through again as the environment in the hemisphere evolves. They are mammoth issues which will require the best thinking

[1] Made before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Affairs on June 11. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

of our people in the executive and in Congress.

I like to hope that as we move toward more normal relations with Cuba the attention of the American people, of the press, and of the Congress will be drawn more strongly to the struggling democracies of this hemisphere, with whom we share such strong traditions and interests.

Let me now turn to the process of normalization.

Multilateral Character of Trade Constraints

The problem is, in the first instance, a multilateral problem.

You will recall that a resolution adopted by a two-thirds vote at the meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States in 1964 mandated that the member states of the OAS should terminate diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba. Our denial program antedated that resolution. But the 1964 resolution, in effect, made it a matter of international law that we not reinstate trade or diplomatic relations with the island until the resolution is changed.

The issue whether to reinstitute trade is therefore for the moment a multilateral issue. For us to resume bilateral commerce now, while the 1964 resolution is still on the books, would be to violate a resolution of the OAS. We take the resolution seriously. A number of other OAS countries have resumed relations, of course. But we consider that the United States has a particular responsibility to honor international legal commitments and that a breach by us would have particularly grave consequences for the integrity and legitimacy of the general peace-keeping structure of the Rio Treaty.

The difficulty with the multilateral character of the present constraints on trade with Cuba is that the other nations of the hemisphere are not of one mind. Some strongly favor a repeal of the 1964 measures. Others oppose. The split within the hemisphere was reflected at the abortive meeting at Quito, Ecuador, last November, where an Organ of Consultation proposal to lift the multilateral measures got 12 votes—not the necessary two-thirds. The United States adopted a neutral attitude at Quito.

Since then, however, as the Secretary has said, we have been searching with the member states for a solution to this divisive issue which could commend itself to an effective majority.

The Cuban measures must be dealt with under the procedures established in the Rio Treaty itself. Cuba was therefore not on the OAS General Assembly agenda last month. The Rio Treaty functions through the Organ of Consultation. However, the matter did move forward.

As part of the effort to speed the process of OAS reform and modernization, the May General Assembly agreed to convene a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in San José, Costa Rica, from July 16 to 28 to refine the OAS Special Committee's recommendations on a protocol of amendment to the Rio Treaty, approve and open this protocol for signature. The work is far advanced. We expect the conference will reach agreement on a number of useful reforms, including the change in the voting requirement to lift sanctions from two-thirds to a majority. As you know, the United States has supported the change in the voting requirement. We are confident this change will be in the protocol of amendment.

Once a protocol of amendment is approved, it is likely there will be an effort to end the mandatory OAS sanctions. As the Secretary indicated at Houston, the United States stands ready to cooperate in reaching a generally acceptable solution.[2] We are continuing our consultations with other members of the OAS on how to handle the issue. There is considerable sentiment among the member states that a way should be found to implement the principle of majority rule, which will be in the revised treaty, with respect to the existing measures against Cuba and without waiting for the lengthy process of ratification to run its course. If the members can translate that view into a resolution, we can anticipate action at the meeting at San José which will finally and

[2] For Secretary Kissinger's address at Houston on Mar. 1, see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1975, p. 361.

effectively take Cuba off the multilateral agenda and leave each nation free to decide for itself whether or not to conduct trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba.

A related development at last month's OAS General Assembly has some bearing on the question of Cuba sanctions. Mexico sponsored a declaration—best described as something akin to a sense-of-Congress resolution—which stated that the members, once a protocol of amendment to the Rio Treaty had been approved, would proceed to leave the sanctions without effect.

The resolution has no legal effect. It passed, but without the vote of enough parties to make a similar move effective under the Rio Treaty. We abstained, along with a number of other countries, on the sound juridical grounds that this particular resolution was improper for the General Assembly since it did not accord with the procedures of the Rio Treaty. In abstaining, we made clear our desire to reach a generally acceptable solution. The indecisive result on the Mexican resolution illustrates the divided views among the OAS members and the importance of moving carefully within the OAS to construct a solid consensus at San José.

In all this, a principal objective has been to find a way to clear the multilateral decks of this issue in a manner that helps restore the integrity of the Rio Treaty. The treaty, we think, is a useful mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes, particularly in respect of conflicts within the hemisphere. It serves as a deterrent to aggression from beyond the seas as well. We want to preserve and nurture it, as do the other countries of the hemisphere. Hence, our efforts not to permit the transient Cuban question to threaten the Rio Treaty system.

Resolving Issues Through Diplomatic Process

As for future bilateral U.S. policy, Secretary Kissinger has made clear that we do not favor perpetual antagonism with Cuba. We have noted forthcoming and conciliatory statements by high Cuban Government officials recently. There is a change of mood in Havana toward Washington.

By the same token, the United States has made several gestures on its part toward Cuba recently. These include, for example, the permission for Cuban diplomats accredited to the United Nations to travel 250 miles from New York. Cuba has not reciprocated these gestures. Nevertheless, as the Secretary has said, "We have made clear to Cuba that we are prepared to improve our relations." [3]

The several recent unofficial visitors to Cuba have not attempted to, and could not, substitute for the process of conventional diplomatic negotiation. We do not consider them, or the public media of TV or newspapers, as a method of communication to and from Cuba. The process of improving and normalizing relations, in the case of Cuba as in other instances, is first and foremost a process of negotiation. That negotiation can only be conducted by direct contacts between representatives of the two governments concerned. It cannot be done indirectly through third-party intermediaries, or through public statements to the press.

As to our policy, when and if the multilateral measures against Cuba are repealed by the OAS, there are a considerable number of issues on both sides. Trade is one. We are also concerned with the question of family visits in both directions; we are concerned with prisoners now in Cuban jails; we are concerned with the return of aircraft-hijack ransom money which found its way to Cuba and which Cuba has retained; we are concerned with the question of compensation for expropriated U.S. property; we are concerned with Cuba's attitude about Puerto Rico; and we are concerned whether Cuba is prepared to follow a clear practice of nonintervention everywhere in the hemisphere.

Cuba, on the other hand, is interested not only in resuming trade. It is also concerned with the reinstitution of diplomatic relationships; it is concerned with Guantanamo; and it is concerned with expanding athletic

[3] For an interview with Secretary Kissinger broadcast on the NBC–TV "Today" show on May 7, see BULLETIN of May 26, 1975, p. 671.

and cultural relations among other things.

This agenda of interrelated and sensitive national interest issues can only be addressed through a diplomatic process which can deal with the total agenda coherently. That process, at best, will be long and intricate. For the Congress to concentrate on one issue only, to mandate the premature dismantlement of the present ban on Cuban trade and to open the U.S. market to Cuban imports and permit quite free export from the United States to Cuba without regard to the other circumstances of our complex relationship, would be a mistake. It would take away an important element of executive discretion in the conduct of our foreign relations. This should further complicate the task of putting relations with Cuba on a solid and mutually satisfactory basis. Congress should speak to the rules of the game. But it should not try to play each hand. For this reason we would not support H.R. 6382.

Cuba's Economic Performance

I now turn to Cuba's economic performance and trade prospects. These subjects will be covered more thoroughly, I understand, by Deputy Assistant Secretary [Arthur T.] Downey of the Commerce Department. I do wish to make some comments particularly as they bear on foreign policy and possibilities for normalizing relations with Cuba.

Cuba's economic performance after 1959 was largely shaped by two circumstances: the economic denial policy and ineffective and inconsistent economic planning. Our percentage of Cuba's total foreign trade dropped from 66 percent in 1959 to 2 percent in 1961 and zero in 1962, creating obvious adjustment consequences. At the same time, indecision and false starts in market and production planning, perhaps best illustrated by the early decision to diversify out of sugar and the later impractical target of output of 10 million tons in 1970—the consequence was limited growth in product.

From a review of this experience stemmed reorganization and the beginning of better performance. Material incentives were substituted for moral ones. Improved national planning was instituted, and cost accounting techniques were adopted. Even before the price of sugar soared in 1974, the Cuban economy had entered into a period of more rapid growth. Then the bonanza of soaring sugar prices in 1974 brought Cuba its first trade surplus under Castro.

Although sugar prices already have come down, it is likely they will remain at levels higher than in the 1960's, owing to a steadily growing demand for sugar throughout the world, particularly on the part of developing countries. To some extent this will be offset by increased planting of cane and beets and the development of substitutes. But some stabilization of sugar prices is a possibility.

Cuba's other exports are minerals (mainly nickel), citrus fruits, rum, tobacco, and seafood. Cuba is trying to increase these exports to lessen its heavy dependence on sugar as a foreign exchange earner.

Development of tourism is another potential source of foreign exchange. Although there has been some ambiguity in the past in Cuba about welcoming large numbers of tourists from the rest of the hemisphere, recent indications point to a cautious move in the direction of refurbishing hotels to attract a share of the sunshine tourist trade.

Our estimate is that the Cuban economy will continue its recent growth. Internally, diversification is proceeding. Externally, Cuba is in the process of shifting part of its trade from the Communist world to the industrialized countries of the West and Japan. If it proves possible to achieve normalization of U.S.-Cuban bilateral relations, some share of this trade would probably be diverted to the United States.

Considerations Affecting Trade Prospects

With the above in mind, I would like to devote a few words to prospects for U.S. trade with Cuba. More than 100 U.S. companies have asked us about the prospects for trade relations with Cuba. To our knowledge there have been few if any surveys by business of the potential. Most companies tell us they do not know the prospects but they do not wish to be the last to enter an opening market.

Our reading of the situation leads us to caution on the immediate prospects. The legacy of over a decade of antagonism and diversion of trade relations elsewhere, together with the complex question of Cuba's attitude toward and respect for private enterprise and private property, as reflected in the vexed issue of compensation for claims, will restrain any great expansion of business.

I believe a number of witnesses here have also advised to avoid extravagant expectations. In the long run, there may be greater opportunities, perhaps in yet-to-be-developed industries and mining processes. Indications now, however, are that the Cubans are uncertain how to face the prospect of American tourists and businessmen, notwithstanding a respect for American advanced technology and familiarity with an industrial infrastructure largely of American origin.

An additional consideration of importance to us is that since our economic sanctions against Cuba were instituted we have developed other trade relationships. As some Cuban leaders have said, geography dictates that there should be trade between the United States and Cuba. In principle we agree. But if relations are normalized, trade with Cuba would have to be phased so as not to disrupt our trade relationships with countries from which we have been buying sugar and cigars for the past decade. And we would imagine that Cuba would have similar concerns about its trading partners.

Condition of Human Rights in Cuba

I would now like to address briefly the other subject of these hearings: the question of human rights in Cuba.

During the OAS General Assembly last month, I made a statement in the context of Chile. I said that no issue is more fundamental to the business of the hemisphere than the humane tradition which is common to us all—the sustenance of human freedom and individual dignity. If we are concerned about human rights in Chile and elsewhere in the hemisphere, we should be no less so about human rights in nextdoor Cuba. As the Deputy Secretary of State wrote to Chairman Morgan on June 27, 1974: [4]

> No matter where in the world violations of human rights occur, they trouble and concern us and we make our best efforts to ascertain the facts and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

We do not regard human rights as an exclusively domestic concern. The OAS member states have subscribed to international standards in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man signed in Bogotá in 1948. The present Cuban Government has never renounced the standards established in the American Declaration although, as you know, Cuba has been excluded from participation in the Organization of American States since 1962.

Three reports by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission issued in 1963, 1967, and 1970 detail the cases, and incidents brought before the Commission and additional denunciations are contained in the Commission's annual reports. The Commission has addressed the Government of Cuba on numerous occasions requesting information on the events denounced. In view of the silence of the Cuban Government, the Commission, in accordance with its procedures and on the basis of other factors, concluded in its 1970 report:

> 1. That there are many persons in Cuba, including women and children, who have been jailed for political reasons and executed without prior trial or after a trial in which the accused did not enjoy the guarantees of due process.
>
> 2. That the situation of the political prisoners in Cuba sentenced to imprisonment after having been arbitrarily arrested and subjected to trials in which the guarantees of due process have not been observed, continues to have extremely serious characteristics incompatible with the principles set forth in the Charter of the OAS, the American Convention of Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We condemn violations of human rights anywhere, including in Cuba. We regret the failure of the Cuban Government to cooperate with the Commission.

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[4] For text of the letter, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1974, p. 310.

Mr. Chairman, two questions have arisen in these hearings: the current status of human rights in Cuba and the relationship between the human rights problem and U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Previous witnesses before your subcommittees have estimated that there are between 100,000 and 200,000 political prisoners incarcerated in Cuba. The U.S. Government does not have a definite number, and we are not able to confirm these estimates. Cuban leaders have been reticent about this subject both publicly and in private discussions with visiting Americans.

The only occasion we are aware of when a Cuban leader cited a number publicly came in 1965 when Prime Minister Castro told Lee Lockwood, a journalist, that there were 20,000 political prisoners. In his October 1974 interview with CBS television, Mr. Castro said that 80 percent of Cuban political prisoners had been released. These are the only public references by Cuban leaders that have come to our attention.

If the numbers are unclear, what is certain is that there continue to be political prisoners in Cuba. They include eight U.S. citizens serving 20-to-30-year sentences.

Parenthetically, I might add that there are also 765 American citizens and 1,177 Cuban-national relatives of our citizens presumably still seeking to leave Cuba and registered with the Swiss Embassy in Havana. Cuba claims that of these only 89 are American citizens. The Cuban Government states that the other 1,853 who registered to leave are Cuban-national and dual-national relatives. Only a handful of these persons has been permitted to leave Cuba annually since termination of repatriation flights.

Let me turn now to the key question of our policy and human rights in Cuba. Since the break in diplomatic relations between our two countries 14 years ago, mutual antagonism characterized our official attitudes until recently. Nonetheless two understandings were reached by our governments. One established the airlift which enabled 265,000 Cubans to come to our country. The other contributed to the near-elimination of hijackings of U.S. passenger aircraft—a measure which, incidentally, we regard as a major step forward and which represented, in our view, a significant gesture on the part of the Government of Cuba.

The airlift is our major achievement in the general area of human rights during this entire period. In fact, it could be argued, as it has by some scholars, that the policy of international hostility increased the propensity of the Cuban Government to internal repression. For example, thousands were arrested in the wake of the Bay of Pigs.

It has been suggested in these hearings by some that reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba could have the effect of ameliorating human rights problems in Cuba or at least of providing a channel for the better expression of our concern. Others have suggested that resumption of diplomatic and commercial relations would countenance the human rights practices of the present Cuban administration and thus violate all moral principles.

With regard to the first view, I would only say that the policy of hostility and of seeking Cuba's isolation had, so far as we can ascertain, no significant positive impact on Cuba's record in the human rights field.

With regard to the second suggestion, I note that the United States has diplomatic and commercial relations with many countries whose forms of government are contrary to the democratic principles which guide our own nation. Senate Resolution 205, passed in 1969, states that the recognition by the United States of a foreign government and exchange of diplomatic representations does not imply that the United States approves the form, ideology, or policies of that government. We share this view and would emphasize that maintenance of relations does not imply either moral approval or condemnation of its governmental practices.

In conclusion, we continue to be concerned with the condition of human rights in Cuba and to have a humanitarian interest in seeing families reunited. You may be assured that in any future negotiations with Cuba this concern and interest on our part will be conveyed.

Department Summarizes U.S. Policy Toward Namibia

Statement by Nathaniel Davis
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs [1]

I am happy to have the opportunity to represent the Department of State before this subcommittee which is examining U.S. policy toward Namibia. The recently concluded U.N. Security Council meeting on Namibia has focused international attention on the Namibian question and on the policy of a number of countries, including the United States, toward the territory.

I would begin by stating that the past year has seen no change in basic U.S. policy toward Namibia. We have reiterated publicly our support for U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2145 of October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia, and for the conclusions of the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of 1971.

We have made clear to the South African Government our deep concern over violations of human rights in the territory and have emphasized our position that although the mandate has been revoked, South Africa continues to have obligations to insure the observance of basic human rights.

One example of our concrete concern in the human rights area was our persistent effort during the first half of 1974 to seek information from the South African Government on the detention of some 15 SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization] and SWAPO Youth League members arrested in late January and early February 1974.

Efforts by our Embassy in South Africa to obtain particulars on these detentions, such as charges and planned charges, the legal basis of detention, access to counsel, places of detention, et cetera, began on February 22, 1974. After repeated oral and written inquiries on our part, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs replied on June 25 by supplying us with the answers to some but not all of our questions.

Our efforts to obtain further information continued until all of the 15 detainees were either released without being charged or brought to trial. Officers from our Embassy in South Africa attended all three trials which were eventually held, involving five detainees. One detainee was found not guilty; two detainees, including SWAPO National Chairman David Meroro, were found guilty but received light suspended sentences. The remaining two detainees, David Taopopi and Joseph Kashea, were found guilty of attempting to incite people "to commit murder or to cause public violence or malicious damage to property in South West Africa" and sentenced to five years with three years suspended.

Our Embassy in South Africa also made strong representations to the South African Government in November 1973 and again in April 1974 when we became aware of press reports that people in Ovamboland, northern Namibia, were being publicly flogged because of their political opposition to the South African administration of Namibia. On both occasions our Ambassador to South Africa made clear to high South African Department of Foreign Affairs officials our deep concern over these reported floggings and emphasized the ultimate responsibility which the South African Government bore for the actions of tribal authorities in Namibia. Since that time the appellate division of the South African Supreme Court, on February 24, 1975, has enjoined such political floggings in Ovamboland.

Regarding U.S. investment in and trade with Namibia, we continue to inform prospective U.S. investors in Namibia who come to our attention by letter, and in some cases orally, of our policy of discouraging investment in the territory. They are also informed that the U.S. Government will not undertake to protect investments made on the basis of rights acquired from the South

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations on June 10. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

African Government following the 1966 termination of the mandate against the claims of a future lawful government in Namibia. In addition, Export-Import Bank facilities are not made available for trade with Namibia. U.S. firms having investments in Namibia are informed by letter of U.S. support for U.N. Security Council Resolution 310 (1972) and of our hope that they will seek to conform their employment practices to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We have also sent to all U.S. companies having interests in Namibia a pamphlet prepared by the Department of State in February 1973 entitled "Employment Practices of U.S. Firms in South Africa." This pamphlet describes the initiatives taken by various firms in South Africa to improve the employment conditions of non-white workers and urges other countries to follow suit. In addition these U.S. firms have received a September 1974 statement in which we call upon U.S. firms to persist in their efforts to insure that their employees and their families have the means available to lead decent and productive lives.

We are encouraged by Newmont Mining Corporation's public statement in its 1974 annual report of its policy to adhere to fair employment principles and to seek application of these principles by its subsidiaries and affiliates. The annual report also states that the Tsumeb Corporation in Namibia, mostly owned by Newmont and another U.S. firm, American Metal Climax, Inc., has received permission from the de facto authorities to build an initial 100 houses for black workers and their families.

We believe that our present policy on investment reflects our concern over South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and our desire that the people be permitted to exercise their right of self-determination. We would hope that our investment policy, together with our efforts to encourage U.S. firms in Namibia to utilize enlightened employment practices, would result in a future lawful Namibian government being favorably disposed toward U.S. investment. However, at this stage, it is difficult to predict what position such a government would take regarding U.S. investment.

At this point I wish to reiterate the Department's position on the granting of tax credits for U.S. firms doing business in Namibia. While the U.S. Government regards South Africa as illegally occupying Namibia and considers the official actions of the South African Government to be invalid, the Treasury Department has determined that these factors are not governing in determining whether payments to the South African Government are creditable under section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code; thus tax credits are granted. In the Treasury view, the current law provides for a credit in the event of any payment of taxes upon income to a governing power without regard to its legality. We do not consider the granting of the tax credit to imply any recognition by the U.S. Government of the legality of the taxing power, in this case the South African Government.

The U.N. Council for Namibia decree of September 27, 1974, for the protection of the natural resources of Namibia has generated considerable interest. This decree asserts that no person or corporate body may explore, process, or export any Namibian natural resources without the permission of the U.N. Council for Namibia and declares that concessions granted by the South African Government in Namibia are null and void. Furthermore, under the decree, natural resources taken from Namibia without the consent of the U.N. Council for Namibia, and the ships carrying them, are subject to seizure by or on behalf of the U.N. Council for Namibia, and persons and corporations contravening the decree may be liable for damages by a future independent Namibian government. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3295 of December 13, 1974, inter alia, requested all states to insure full compliance with the provisions of the decree. The United States abstained on the resolution, essentially because it contained a veiled call for chapter VII action by the Security Council. The Department of State takes the position that enforcement jurisdiction regarding this decree rests not with the executive branch

but rather with the courts and parties involved.

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2248 of May 19, 1967, which established the Council for Namibia, directed the Council to proceed immediately to Namibia and granted it broad administrative powers, all of which were "to be discharged in the territory." We have interpreted this provision to mean that the Council can exercise its administrative powers only after it gains admission to the territory. However, we cannot judge what position the courts would take should the Council seek legal recourse to enforce the decree.

The Department of State periodically reviews the question of U.S. membership on the U.N. Council for Namibia. The United States abstained on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2248, which established the Council, because we believed the stated functions of the Council, such as traveling to Namibia to take over the administration of the territory from the South African Government, were beyond the U.N.'s available means to achieve. We therefore declined to serve on the Council and have maintained this position ever since.

Mr. Chairman, you have also requested the U.S. position on support for the U.N. Fund for Namibia and the Institute for Namibia. In 1974 the United States made a voluntary contribution of $50,000 to the U.N. Fund for Namibia. In making this contribution, we stated that further U.S. contributions to the Fund would be conditional upon the cessation of allocations from the regular U.N. budget to the Fund. The 29th U.N. General Assembly in December 1974 authorized the appropriation of $200,000 from the U.N.'s general budget for the Fund for Namibia. Therefore we have not proposed to make a voluntary contribution to the Fund in 1975. However, on March 21, 1975, the United States pledged, subject to congressional approval, $50,000 to the U.N. Education and Training Program for Southern Africa to be earmarked for the training of Namibians.

With regard to the Institute for Namibia to be established in Lusaka, we agree in principle with the purpose of its creation. We are awaiting further details, particularly budgetary, regarding its establishment and functions. We will then be in a position to decide what concrete assistance, if any, we are prepared to offer.

Regarding the future of Namibia, we hold the following views:

a. All Namibians should, within a short time, be given the opportunity to express their views freely and under U.N. supervision on the political future and constitutional structure of the territory;

b. All Namibian political groups should be allowed to campaign for their views and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the course of the process of self-determination;

c. The territory should not be split up in accordance with apartheid policy; and

d. The future of Namibia should be determined by the freely expressed choice of its inhabitants.

Over the past year the U.S. Government has made known its views on the future of Namibia both directly and indirectly to the South African Government. In late November and early December 1974, we conveyed to the South African Government our belief that South Africa should make plans in consultation with the U.N. Secretary General for speedy self-determination within the whole territory and issue a specific statement of its intentions toward the territory. On December 17, 1974, we joined in the unanimous adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 366, which demanded that South Africa take a number of actions including the necessary steps to transfer power to the people of Namibia with U.N. assistance. On April 22 we joined with the British and French in a tripartite approach to the South African Government to express our views on the future of Namibia.

The South African Government issued virtually identical responses to the April 22 tripartite approach and to Security Council Resolution 366 on May 27. In these responses the South African Government emphasized its standing policies on Namibia. It did state that unitary independence was one of the

options open to the inhabitants of the territory who would determine freely their own political and constitutional future and that it would administer the territory "only as long as the inhabitants so wish."

The South African Government asserted that while it ruled out U.N. supervision of Namibia, it expressed Prime Minister Vorster's willingness to discuss the Namibian situation with a mutually acceptable representative of the U.N. Secretary General, African leaders, the President of the U.N. Council for Namibia and the OAU [Organization of African Unity] Special Committee on Namibia (composed of the seven African members of the U.N. Council for Namibia). These responses did not indicate that South Africa was willing to withdraw from Namibia in accordance with U.N. resolutions, nor did they give significant details for proceeding to self-determination along lines stipulated by these U.N. resolutions.

The U.S. Government approached last week's Security Council debate on Namibia believing that there had been some forward movement in the Namibian situation over the preceding six months, but clearly not enough. We were disappointed at the pace of movement toward genuine self-determination.

However, in order to deal realistically with the present situation, we believe that South Africa's offer to resume a dialogue with a representative of the U.N. Secretary General and to hold discussions with various African leaders, the President of the U.N. Council for Namibia, and the OAU Special Committee on Namibia should be explored and South Africa should be induced to move from general statements of purpose to specific implementing action. We reiterate our belief that U.N. supervision of the self-determination process is necessary to assure the international community that Namibians will be able to choose freely their political future.

Efforts to negotiate an acceptable resolution in the Security Council debate were unsuccessful. As I have said, we condemn South Africa's continued and illegal occupation of Namibia, and we made this clear during our participation in the Council's debates. However, we believe that the most effective way to bring about the genuine exercise of the right of self-determination for all Namibians is through continued efforts to induce South Africa to move more quickly to implement its agreement to such a right. There were serious and good-faith efforts to work out a meaningful compromise text during the negotiations at the United Nations last week, but in the end the African group decided to press for a vote on its text. We shall continue to work through the U.N. and with interested parties for the implementation of U.N. resolutions regarding Namibia.

Corporate Payments Abroad Discussed by Department

Statement by Mark B. Feldman
Deputy Legal Adviser [1]

In recent weeks, the media have carried a number of stories dealing with reported political contributions and other payments by U.S. firms to foreign government officials. Such payments and their disclosure can have important ramifications for our foreign relations and economic interests. It would not be appropriate for the Department of State to comment on the details of individual cases which are currently under investigation by other U.S. Government agencies; I would, however, like to discuss with you the effects some of these developments have had on our foreign relations, and what the State Department believes the U.S. Government should do about it.

At the outset, I want to make clear that the Department of State cannot and does not

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the House Committee on International Relations on June 5. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

condone illegal activities by American firms operating in other countries. We condemn such actions in the strongest terms. Illicit contributions and their disclosure can adversely affect governments, unfairly tarnish the reputation of responsible American businessmen, and make it more difficult for the U.S. Government to assist U.S. firms in the lawful pursuit of their legitimate business interests abroad.

Let me give a few examples of events related to the disclosures of the last weeks which have impacted on our foreign relations:

—The head of a friendly government has been removed from office and other friendly leaders have come under political attack.

—Both multinational enterprises and U.S. Government agencies have been accused of attempting to subvert foreign governments.

—A firm linked with payments in one country has had property in another country expropriated, not because of any alleged improprieties in that country, but simply on the grounds that it was an "undesirable firm."

—Several governments have presented firms suspected of making payments with ultimatums of economic retaliation or criminal prosecution.

These are certainly disturbing developments. They underscore the reason that the U.S. Government urges our enterprises to respect the laws of all the nations in which they operate and to conduct themselves as good corporate citizens of those nations. Yet companies cannot operate in a vacuum, and it is the responsibility of host governments to set out the rules under which firms and public officials deal with each other.

Regrettably, governments, as well as firms, have not always exercised their responsibilities in this area. Investors frequently find themselves in countries where the laws dealing with political contributions, agents' fees, or other payments are unclear or unenforced. In countries where small payments are a necessity for getting things done at the lowest echelons of the bureaucracy, larger payments may be solicited or demanded by high-level officials. It should also be noted that these problems are not confined to American enterprises. Foreign competition frequently contributes to these pressures.

By describing such conditions, I am not trying to excuse improper activities by U.S. firms. Far from it. Corruption weakens the fabric of government, erodes popular support, and jeopardizes the important interests we share with our friends abroad.

The free enterprise system is a vital factor in world economic growth upon which social progress, economic justice, and perhaps world peace depends. There are many opponents eager to restrict free enterprise, and every American businessman who invests or sells abroad holds an important trust for the integrity of the system.

What, then, should be done?

First, it is important that all U.S. investors and foreign governments clearly understand that we condemn payments to foreign government officials and that any investor who makes them cannot look to the Department of State to protect him from legitimate law enforcement actions by the responsible authorities of either the host country or the United States.

Second, the U.S. agencies investigating these cases should cooperate with responsible foreign authorities seeking information consistent with the requirements of our laws and procedural fairness. However, these agencies cannot act on the basis of rumor or speculation.

Third, the U.S. Government will provide appropriate diplomatic protection to American nationals abroad who are not treated fairly in accordance with international law. We are concerned at threats of extrajudicial sanctions which may be disproportionate to the offense and based on unproved allegations. We do not believe that economic retaliation is an appropriate response to payments which, although controversial, are either lawful under the foreign law concerned, or if unlawful, are subject to specific civil or criminal penalties prescribed by that law.

Beyond these clear statements of policy,

however, I believe that we need to move carefully. Some have suggested that we should enact legislation making it a criminal act for U.S. companies to engage abroad in what we regard as improper activities here at home, such as corporate political contributions. Although investors operating in foreign lands would be wise to avoid even the appearance of impropriety in those countries, we believe it would not be advisable for the United States to try to legislate the limits of permissible conduct by our firms abroad. It would be not only presumptuous but counterproductive to seek to impose our specific standards in countries with differing histories and cultures. Moreover, enforcement of such legislation would involve surveillance of the activities of foreign officials as well as U.S. businessmen and would be widely resented abroad.

Extraterritorial application of U.S. law, which is what such legislation would entail, has often been viewed by other governments as a sign of U.S. arrogance or even as interference in their internal affairs. U.S. penal laws are normally based on territorial jurisdictions, and with rare exceptions, we believe that is sound policy.

There are other actions that can be taken, however. The Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulatory agencies have the authority to protect specific American interests in foreign transactions, such as the disclosure of material information necessary to protect the investment of shareholders in public companies. The SEC has demonstrated that it is prepared to act forcefully in these cases, and that demonstration should have a positive effect on U.S. businessmen and on those they deal with abroad.

In addition, the executive agencies responsible for administering programs abroad which may provide temptations for such activities need to review their procedures to see whether additional measures might be effective. The Department of State and the Defense Department have begun such a review of the foreign military sales program, and we expect improved procedures to result that should be helpful.

Another possible approach could be to reflect our position in a code of conduct concerning multinational corporations (MNC's). The U.S. Government has indicated in a number of international fora that it is willing to examine the possibility of development of guidelines relative to MNC's, provided that such guidelines take into account the responsibilities of host states as well as those of enterprises. If other governments are agreeable, such a code might include a specific provision to the effect that foreign investors should neither make nor be solicited to make payments to government officials or contributions to political parties or candidates. This would be a modest step, but international acceptance of this principle might help to relieve pressures for questionable payments.

I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that all of the members of this committee appreciate the complexities of this problem. Corruption of friendly foreign governments undermines the most important objectives of our foreign relations. But experience shows the United States cannot police foreign societies. In the final analysis the only solution to corruption lies in the societies concerned.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Granting an Alien Child Adopted by an Unmarried United States Citizen the Same Immigrant Status as an Alien Child Adopted by a United States Citizen and His Spouse. Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary to accompany H.R. 568. H. Rept. 94–121. March 26, 1975. 7 pp.

Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H.R. 5810. H. Rept. 94–140. April 10, 1975. 6 pp.

Congress and Foreign Policy: 1974. Prepared for the House Committee on International Relations by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. April 15, 1975. 72 pp.

Vietnam Contingency Act of 1975. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, together with individual views, to accompany S. 1484. S. Rept. 94–88. April 18, 1975. 26 pp.

Ending the Conflict in Vietnam. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Res. 133. S. Rept. 94–89. April 18, 1975. 2 pp.

U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia in U.N. Security Council

Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on June 3 and June 6, together with the text of a draft resolution which was vetoed by the United States and two other permanent members of the Council on June 6.

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

Statement of June 3

USUN press release 63 dated June 3

Last December the United States supported Security Council Resolution 366. We voted "yes" in the belief that the text, though imperfect in some ways, adequately reflected our view that South Africa should act quickly and decisively to end its illegal occupation of Namibia. We believe, moreover, that the Security Council rightly placed its views and recommendations before the South African Government and urged it to move promptly along the path indicated.

During the last six months, there has been some forward movement in the Namibian situation, but not enough. It is clear, however, that regardless of how disappointed we are at the pace of steps toward genuine self-determination, we must move carefully lest we worsen rather than improve the outlook for justice and freedom.

In this connection we hear calls for an arms embargo. The record of the U.S. Government in this respect is one of which the American people can be proud. For 12 years the U.S. Government has voluntarily refused to allow shipments of American arms and military equipment to South Africa. Our government has done this as a matter of principle. We do so out of conviction and not because we are required to do so by an international forum. If others wish, they can join us in such a voluntary policy, and we earnestly invite them to do so.

As the Security Council considers what constructive steps it can take for the future of Namibia, there are four fundamental questions as we see them:

—Whether there is a commitment by South Africa to a course of self-determination for all the people of Namibia and to respect for their rights;

—The timing of steps toward self-determination once that principle is accepted by South Africa;

—The question whether all Namibians, of whatever color, political affiliation, or social origin, would have their voices heard in determining the future of the territory; and

—The U.N.'s role in the process of self-determination for all the people of Namibia.

The South African Government made public its position on Namibia in a letter from Foreign Minister Muller to Secretary General Waldheim on May 27. In this letter, the South African Foreign Minister restated many positions already put forward by his government.

My delegation believes we should explore South Africa's offer to resume a dialogue with a representative of the U.N. Secretary General and to enter into discussions with African leaders, with the Chairman of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and with the Special Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). We fully recognize the past difficulties in such dialogues and note the restrictive terms of South Africa's present offer. Nonetheless, in our view, it is important that new efforts be made to determine whether, in fact, a genuine discussion can now be initiated in these channels.

We also note that the letter of May 27,

in discussing the future of the territory, states that all options are open, including "independence as one state." We have also noted that this letter reiterates South Africa's recognition of the international status of the territory and states that it is the South African Government's wish that a constitutional conference take place in as short a time as possible.

Mr. Muller's words go somewhat beyond the assurances he gave the Secretary General in April 1973. They may reflect a more realistic appraisal of the situation in southern Africa. Ambiguities remain, and South Africa should provide clarification of its intent. We wish to know more precisely when and in what manner the planned constitutional convention will be conducted and who exactly will participate.

During the Council's debate on December 17, 1974, I called unequivocally for precision and detail in South African planning for Namibia's future. Coupled with positive action. Such clarity is called for to insure a peaceful and realistic settlement of the territory's future. Mr. Muller's most recent statements may offer hope that South Africa will allow a truly fair exercise of self-determination in Namibia.

South Africa must now move from general statements of purpose to specific implementing action. Can South Africa be in any doubt that the international community wants these steps to define Namibia's separate status and the timetable for carrying them out, and these to be stated in unambiguous terms?

At its meeting in Dar es Salaam in April, the OAU Council of Ministers reviewed the situation in Namibia and adopted a comprehensive declaration on the territory aimed at overcoming South Africa's recalcitrance. Members of the Security Council, including the United States, have also been active in seeking to encourage South Africa to move forward decisively in Namibia to allow the Namibian people to express their views freely on the political future and the constitutional structure of the territory.

The United Nations, and this Council especially, have a unique and grave responsibility for Namibia and its future. South Africa has now given us some reason to expect that it acknowledges the interest of the international community in Namibia even though it still has not accepted U.N. participation in the process of self-determination for Namibia. Once again we declare to South Africa that it is our considered view that without a role for the United Nations in the self-determination process, the international community cannot judge progress objectively and therefore cannot be satisfied that the people of Namibia will be able to exercise a democratic choice as to their future.

The United States, for its part, remains committed to the view (a) that all the people of Namibia should within a short time be given the opportunity to express their views freely and under U.N. supervision on the political future and constitutional structure of the territory; (b) that all Namibian political groups should be allowed to campaign for their views and to participate without hindrance in peaceful political activities in the course of the process of self-determination; (c) that the territory should not be split up in accordance with the policy of apartheid; and (d) that the future of Namibia should be determined by the freely expressed choice of its inhabitants.

As we continue to press for these goals, the United States will sustain its present policies with regard to the territory. We will continue to discourage U.S. investment in Namibia and to deny Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities for trade with Namibia. We will continue to withhold U.S. Government protection of U.S. investments made on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government after 1966 against the claims of a future lawful government of Namibia. This policy reflects our strongly held belief that South Africa should act in the immediate future to end its illegal occupation of Namibia.

Mr. President, the obligation of this Council is to foster a peaceful and just settlement. Our agreed goal is the exercise by the people of Namibia of their right to self-determination. As a responsible delibera-

tive body, it is our duty to encourage all the parties concerned and to explore every possible opportunity for launching the process of timely self-determination.

In view of the facts of the Namibian situation, it is difficult to find that a threat to international peace and security exists within the meaning of the charter. The party seen by some as causing the threat has agreed on some of the objectives desired by the international community and has offered to exchange views on the means of achieving them. This clearly does not add up to a crisis, peace-and-war situation at this time.

Thus, in our view, it would not be appropriate to invoke mandatory sanctions which specifically are reserved for threats to the peace. We believe the Council, in collaboration with other African states, should insist that South Africa give concrete effect to its words, give firm assurances about the issues on which it has not yet declared its position, and move forward with dispatch toward a new environment of freedom in southern Africa.

Statement of June 6

USUN press release 64 dated June 6

On behalf of my government, I have voted "no" on draft resolution S/11713 with grave reluctance and concern.

The power of the permanent members of the Security Council to cast a veto is a right that must be exercised after the most careful and solemn consideration. Indeed, this occasion marks only the seventh time in the 29-year history of the United Nations that the United States has found it necessary to do so. But my government believes that the situation in Namibia, however illegal, however unacceptable to the international community, does not constitute a threat to international peace and security.

We recognize that many of the states represented around the Security Council table have a different view. But we are obliged to make our own careful estimate of the conditions which we believe to exist and to act accordingly within the Charter of the United Nations, which all of us have pledged to uphold.

As I said on behalf of the United States in my opening statement June 3, we cannot accept the view that there exists a threat to the peace in Namibia in a situation where the wrongdoer, South Africa, has offered, even if on terms not entirely to our liking, to enter into discussions with the organized international community on the objective of self-determination for Namibia.

The United States wishes to draw attention to the praiseworthy efforts of several members of the Council in seeking to draft a resolution which all members could have supported. These delegations sought over many hours to point the way for this Council to adopt practical measures to advance the struggle for freedom and justice in Namibia. The goal of a resolution which, unhappily, never was tabled could, in our view, have led to visible progress rather than a debate ending in dispute and deadlock. My delegation is gravely disappointed that these serious efforts to find an acceptable middle way have failed.

In this situation we feel compelled to ask: Who will benefit from the inability of the Council to take the effective action which would have been possible today? Once again, in contrast to the usefulness of the Council's unanimity in the case of Resolution 366, we have today yielded to the lure of rhetoric, which should never be mistaken for effective action in the real world.

Who will find comfort in the failure of this Council? Certainly not the United States, which has a long record of working for universal recognition that Namibia is a serious, solemn international responsibility.

As I said in my speech on Tuesday, the United States for 12 long years has followed a policy of banning all arms and military supplies to South Africa. We have done so voluntarily as a matter of principle—deliberately—to avoid encouraging Pretoria to think the United States will sacrifice national principle for military or financial

gain. We will continue to uphold principle. We pray we have not lost momentum in the struggle for freedom and justice in southern Africa.

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION [1]

The Security Council,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S–V), of 19 May 1967, which established the United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974,

Recalling Security Council resolution 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 15 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 390 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972 and 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974, which confirmed General Assembly decisions,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

Taking note of the letter dated 27 May 1975, addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa to the Secretary-General (S/11701),

Having heard the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

Having considered the statement by Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),

Gravely concerned about South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

Gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violations of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia,

Reaffirming the inalienable and imprescriptible rights of the people of Namibia to self-determination, national independence and the preservation of their territorial integrity,

Noting with concern that South Africa has not made the declaration demanded in paragraph 3 of resolution 366 (1974) of the Security Council,

Further noting with the deepest concern that the demands in paragraphs 4 and 5 in the aforementioned resolution have been totally ignored by South Africa,

1. *Condemns* South Africa's failure to comply with terms of Security Council resolution 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974;

2. *Condemns once again* the continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa;

3. *Further condemns* the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia;

4. *Demands* that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of bantustans and the so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;

5. *Further demands* that South Africa proceed urgently with the necessary steps to withdraw from Namibia and, to that end, to implement the measures stipulated in resolution 366 (1974);

6. *Reaffirms* the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and demands that South Africa take appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for Namibia to establish its presence in the Territory with a view to facilitating the transfer of power to the people of Namibia;

7. *Declares* that in order for the people of Namibia to freely determine their own future it is imperative that free elections be organized under the supervision and control of the United Nations as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than 1 July 1976;

8. *Affirms* its support for the struggle of the People of Namibia for self-determination and independence;

9. *Acting* under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,

(a) *Determines* that the illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

(b) *Decides* that all States shall prevent:

(i) Any supply of arms and ammunition to South Africa;

(ii) Any supply of aircraft, vehicles and military equipment for use of the armed forces and paramilitary organizations of South Africa;

(iii) Any supply of spare parts for arms, vehicles and military equipment used by the armed forces and paramilitary organization of South Africa;

(iv) Any activities in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply of

[1] U.N. doc. S/11713; the draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of three permanent members of the Council, the vote being 10 in favor, 3 against (U.S., France, U.K.), with 2 abstentions (Italy, Japan).

arms, ammunition, military aircraft and military vehicles to South Africa and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa and Namibia;

10. *Decides* that all States shall give effect to the decision set out in paragraph 9 (b) of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution, and that they notify the Secretary-General of the measures they have taken to comply with the aforementioned provision;

11. *Decides* that provisions of paragraph 9 (b) shall remain in effect until it has been established, to the satisfaction of the Security Council, that the illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa has been brought to an end;

12. *Requests* the Secretary-General, for the purpose of the effective implementation of this resolution, to arrange for the collection and systematic study of all available data concerning international trade in the items which should not be supplied to South Africa under paragraph 9 (b) above;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council concerning the implementation of paragraph 7 and other provisions of this resolution;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter and to meet on or before 30 September 1975 for the purpose of reviewing South Africa's compliance with the terms of the relevant paragraphs of this resolution, and in the event of non-compliance by South Africa to taking further appropriate measures under the Charter.

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-Syria Sector Extended

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on May 28, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 53 dated May 28

I welcome the opportunity today to participate in the decision of the Security Council to renew for an additional six months the mandate of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force. We believe this Force is important to the maintenance of the disengagement agreements between Syria and Israel.

On behalf of the United States, I express once again our appreciation for all the efforts of the Secretary General and his associates in maintaining UNDOF in accordance with the wishes of this Council. We particularly commend those governments which contribute officers and troops to UNDOF, the men who serve there, and the Officer in Charge, Col. Hannes Philipp. We are especially pleased that the Secretary General is able to report that both parties have generally complied with the agreement on disengagement and that the cease-fire has been maintained. This is a job well done.

I congratulate you, Mr. President, for your efforts in working out this resolution for presentation to the Council and assuring its prompt adoption. All concerned are to be warmly congratulated on this constructive step.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION [1]

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11694),

Having noted the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the developments in the situation in the area,

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

Reaffirming that the two Agreements on disengagement of forces are only a step towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973),

Decides:

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

[1] U.N. doc. S/RES/369 (1975); adopted by the Council on May 28 by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not participating in the vote.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International agreement for the creation at Paris of an International Office for Epizootics, with annex. Done at Paris January 25, 1924. Entered into force January 17, 1925.[1]
Instrument of accession signed by the President: June 9, 1975.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975.
Ratifications deposited: Lebanon, June 13, 1975; Malta, April 7, 1975; Qatar, April 17, 1975.

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.[2]
Approval deposited: France, May 9, 1975.

Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Iran, January 27, 1975.
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, March 10, 1975.

Energy

Agreement amending the agreement of November 18, 1974, on an international energy program. Done at Paris February 5, 1975. Entered into force March 21, 1975.

Health

Amendment to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 1975.
Acceptance deposited: Nepal, May 20, 1975.

Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975.
Notifications from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratifications deposited: Finland, May 16, 1975; Monaco, June 13, 1975.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: France, May 12, 1975.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited: Upper Volta, June 2, 1975.

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force March 18, 1970; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: France, May 12, 1975.

Locarno agreement establishing an international classification for industrial designs, with annex. Done at Locarno October 8, 1968. Entered into force April 27, 1971; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7420.
Notifications from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratifications deposited: France, June 13, 1975; Italy, May 12, 1975.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Accession deposited: Upper Volta, May 23, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, June 18, 1975.
Declaration of provisional application deposited: Iran, June 17, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Ratifications deposited: Australia, June 13, 1975; Canada, June 18, 1975; Egypt, June 17, 1975; Korea, June 18, 1975; Pakistan, June 17, 1975;

[1] Not in force for the United States.
[2] Not in force.

Sweden, June 16, 1975; Vatican City State, June 16, 1975.

Approval deposited: Norway, June 18, 1975.

Declarations of provisional application deposited: Finland, June 16, 1975; Iran, Kenya, Syrian Arab Republic, June 17, 1975; Belgium,[3] Brazil, European Economic Community,[3] France,[3] Federal Republic of Germany,[3] Guatemala, Ireland,[3] Israel, Italy,[3] Japan,[3] Libya, Luxembourg,[3] Morocco, Netherlands,[3 4] United States,[3] June 18, 1975.

Accessions deposited: Lebanon, June 13, 1975; Panama, June 16, 1975; Denmark,[3] Greece, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom,[3 5] June 18, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Ratifications deposited: Australia, June 13, 1975; Canada, June 18, 1975; Sweden, June 16, 1975.

Declarations of provisional application deposited: Finland, June 16, 1975; Belgium, European Economic Community, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,[3] Luxembourg, Netherlands, United States,[3] June 18, 1975.

Accessions deposited: Denmark, United Kingdom, June 18, 1975.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 24, 1974, and June 11, 1975. Entered into force June 11, 1975.

Agreement for the reciprocal acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 20, 1959. Entered into force November 20, 1959. TIAS 4358.

Terminated: June 11, 1975.

Republic of China

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 21, 1975. Entered into force May 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

Egypt

Agreement relating to cooperation in the areas of technology, research and development. Signed at Washington June 6, 1975. Entered into force provisionally, June 6, 1975; definitively, on the date of receipt of the later of the two notes whereby the contracting parties inform each other that the constitutional procedures required to give effect to the agreement have been fulfilled.

Guinea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Conakry May 8, 1975. Entered into force May 8, 1975.

Indonesia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with agreed minutes. Signed at Jakarta May 30, 1975. Entered into force May 30, 1975.

New Zealand

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from New Zealand of fresh, chilled or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 14 and June 9, 1975. Entered into force June 9, 1975.

Pakistan

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 6, 1975. Entered into force May 6, 1975; effective July 1, 1974.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with exchange of letters, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 6, 1970. Entered into force May 6, 1970; effective July 1, 1970. TIAS 6882, 7369, 7598, 7640, 7724.

Terminated: July 1, 1974.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of November 23, 1974 (TIAS 7971). Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad May 27, 1975. Entered into force May 27, 1975.

Panama

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from Panama of fresh, chilled or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama April 21 and June 6, 1975. Entered into force June 6, 1975.

Singapore

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 21, 1975. Entered into force May 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

Tanzania

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities. Signed at Dar es Salaam May 23, 1975. Entered into force May 23, 1975.

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[3] With a statement.

[4] With respect to the Kingdom in Europe and to Surinam.

[5] Applicable to Dominica, Saint Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla, Saint Vincent, Bailiwick of Guernsey, Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Saint Helena and Dependencies, and Seychelles.

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No.	Date	Subject
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*336	6/16	Ingersoll: Japan-America Society of Chicago.
337	6/16	Kissinger: Public Broadcasting Service luncheon.
338	6/18	Kissinger: Japan Society, New York.
*339	6/18	Accelerated program of Vietnamese refugee processing on Guam.
*340	6/19	Study Group 7 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, July 17.
†341	6/19	U.S.-Spain joint communique.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.