THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXII • No. 1877 • June 16, 1975

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

VOL. LXXII, No. 1877
June 16, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

"A Conversation With the President: A European Perspective"

Following is the transcript of an interview with President Ford on May 23 by Robert MacNeil of the British Broadcasting Corporation, Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times, Marino de Medici of Il Tempo, Adalbert de Segonzac of France-Soir, and Jan Reifenberg of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The interview was taped for broadcast on the BBC that day as well as broadcast on networks in a number of other countries and was shown on the Public Broadcasting System in the United States that evening.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 26

Mr. MacNeil: Next week, Gerald Ford makes his first visit to Europe as President of the United States. It is an omnibus mission: a summit with NATO heads of government, talks on the Middle East with Egyptian President Sadat, and meetings with the Governments of Spain and Italy.

Today, Mr. Ford has invited us to the White House to discuss the issues facing the West. It is the first time an American President has met European journalists in a television program of this kind.

My fellow reporters are Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times, Adalbert de Segonzac of France-Soir, Jan Reifenberg of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Marino de Medici of Il Tempo of Rome—all Washington-based correspondents of long experience.

Mr. Ford's travels come at a pregnant time. He leaves an America somewhat doubtful about its world role as it absorbs the sudden, final collapse in Indochina. He faces a Western Europe hungry for reassurance, but again somewhat doubtful of America's present will and capacity to back up that reassurance.

Mr. President, we are gathered in the room from which Franklin Roosevelt delivered his famous fireside chats to rekindle the American spirit during the Great Depression of the thirties. Do you see your travels to Europe as necessary to rekindle the spirit of the Atlantic alliance?

President Ford: I think the trip has a perhaps broader aspect or implication.

First, I should say that the closeness between the United States and the Western European countries has a long history and an important future. The trip, as I see it, is aimed at solidifying and making more cohesive this relationship economically, diplomatically, and militarily.

I also see it as an opportunity for us to take a look at the past and consult about the future and to make our personal relationships even better.

And if we approach it with that attitude or with those viewpoints, it is my opinion that we, as well as the other allies, can make substantial progress.

Mr. MacNeil: So many commentators see the Europeans in need of some reassurance. Do you feel that is part of your mission?

President Ford: I am sure that my presence there, and what we intend to say, and what we intend to indicate by our actions, will be very, very helpful in this regard.

Mr. MacNeil: Has your handling of the Mayaguez incident, in effect, done some of that work for you by reaffirming America's will to respond when challenged?

President Ford: I am sure that both domestically in the United States, as well as worldwide, the handling of the *Mayaguez* incident should be a firm assurance that the United States is capable and has the will to act in emergencies, in challenges. I think this

is a clear, clear indication that we are not only strong but we have the will and the capability of moving.

Mr. Brandon: Mr. President, it seems to me that the handling of the Mayaguez incident proved your own determined character but not necessarily the American will. It was short, and it didn't need any congressional decisions. What has weakened the credibility of the American commitments, I think in the eyes of the allies, are these restrictions and limitations that Congress has put on the Presidency. And then there is also feeling that a kind of neo-isolationism is rising in Congress. I was wondering how you would deal with this doubt in American credibility.

President Ford: There has been a tendency during and as an outgrowth of the American engagement in Viet-Nam—one after another, limitations placed on a President by the Congress.

Now, I believe there are some new indications that indicate that Congress is taking another look, and perhaps the *Mayaguez* incident will be helpful in that regard.

There were some limitations, but we lived within them, but it was rather short, and it didn't require an extensive commitment. But there are some things taking place in the Congress today that I think ought to reassure our allies that the United States—the President, the Congress, and the American people —can and will work together in an extended commitment.

Let me give you an illustration. This past week the House of Representatives, in a very, very important vote, defeated an amendment that would have forced the withdrawal of 70,000 U.S. military personnel on a worldwide basis. And of course that would have affected our commitment to NATO. And the vote in the House of Representatives was 311 to 95, as I recall. It was a much more favorable vote this year than the vote a year ago.

I think this is an indication that the American people are getting out from under the trauma of our problems in Viet-Nam. As a matter of fact, another indication: Senator Mansfield—the Democratic leader in the United States Senate—has always, in the past, been demanding and favoring a withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from NATO. Just the other day, he publicly stated that he was reassessing his position and wondered if it was not now the time to perhaps keep our strength there until certain other circumstances developed.

During the debate in the House of Representatives, the Democratic leader, Congressman O'Neill of Massachusetts, said this was not the time or not the place or not the number for the United States to withdraw troops from overseas.

What I am saying is, we may be entering a new era, an era that will be very visible and very substantive in showing the United States capability and will to not only do something in a short period of time but to stick with it.

Mr. Brandon: Are you taking a congressional delegation with you to Brussels?

President Ford: No, I am not.

Mr. Brandon: I was wondering whether from the European point of view—I mean, I don't want to butt into Presidential business —it might not be very helpful for Members of Congress to explain the situation in Congress, and it may also have some advantages vice versa.

President Ford: Let me answer it in this way: We have a continuous flow of Members of the Congress, Senators and Congressmen, traveling to Europe, and I think it is good. They meet periodically with their counterparts in various European countries. So there is no doubt that the attitude of Congress will be well explained to heads of state and to other parliamentarians. I don't think it is necessary to take on this trip Members of the House and Senate.

Mr. de Medici: May I focus one moment on the shade of difference between the political and the military type of assurances the United States can give to Europe? Europeans are concerned not as much as the link between the American security and the European security but between American security and what we may call the future of European democracies, which are in trouble in some

cases. How do you look at the all-political problem from this point of view?

President Ford: We, of course, have to be most careful that we don't involve ourselves in the internal politics of any country, European or otherwise. We, of course, hope that there is stability in any and all governments, in Europe particularly, and that the political philosophy of the party that controls the country is one that as a relationship to our own political philosophy, not in a partisan way but in a philosophical way. And when we see some elements in some countries gaining ground, the Communist element, for example, it does concern us.

I think Portugal is a good example. We, of course, were encouraged by the fine vote of the Portuguese people. I think the Communist Party got only 12½ percent of the vote and the non-Communist parties got the rest. But, unfortunately, that vote has not as of this time had any significant impact on those that control the government, but nevertheless we approve of the political philosophy of the people of Portugal. We are concerned with some of the elements in the government.

Mr. MacNeil: Mr. President, could I come back to the congressional question for a moment. Are you saying that as a result of the trends you see now in the Congress that you are no longer, as you were at your press conference on April 3, frustrated by the restrictions Congress has placed on the Chief Executive?

President Ford: I said this was the beginning perhaps of a new era.

Mr. MacNeil: Could it lead to the Congress reversing itself on the War Powers Act?

President Ford: I doubt that. I think the Congress felt that the War Powers Act worked reasonably well in the *Mayaguez* incident. But there are some other limitations and restrictions imposed by Congress which I think are counterproductive or not helpful, for example, the aid cutoff to Turkey. Turkey is a fine ally in NATO. We have had over a long period of time excellent political and diplomatic relations with Turkey. I am working very hard, for example, to try and get the Congress to remove that limitation on aid to Turkey.

We have been successful in the Senate. We hope to do so in the House. But there are some others plus that that I hope we can modify or remove in order for the President to act decisively, strongly, in conjunction with the Congress, but not hamstrung by the Congress.

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. President, the Europeans have been deeply struck by a poll recently indicating that the American people would only accept military intervention to defend Canada and no other country. Now, this seems to indicate a deep sense of isolationism or at least neo-isolationism, and I wonder what you feel about that question, what you think of that poll, and how you think you can react against that trend in your own country?

President Ford: I am positive that that poll was an aftermath of our involvement in Viet-Nam. I believe that the United States, the American people, will completely live up to any international commitments that we have. That poll was taken in isolation, so to speak. It was not related to any crisis or any challenge. I think the record of the American people in the past is one that clearly indicates we will respond to a challenge, we will meet a crisis and will live up to our commitments. The history is better than some poll taken in isolation.

Mr. de Segonzac: You don't feel that there is, then, an isolationist mood in America at this stage?

President Ford: I think there was one developing during and even to some extent after the war in Indochina or in South Viet-Nam. But now that we are freed of that problem, it seems to me that the American people will feel better about their relationships around the world, will want me as President—and will want the Congress as their Congress—to live up to the commitments and be a part of an interdependent world in which we live today.

Mr. MacNeil: Mr. President, could we move on to the relations with the Communist world and the question of détente. It seems to many

that the United States is moving into a new emphasis in its foreign policy away from détente, toward more support for the allies. In fact, Secretary Kissinger has even used the word, of a need for a new abrasive foreign policy. How would you describe the post-Viet-Nam foreign policy, and is it shifting away from détente?

Detente and Easing Tensions

President Ford: I don't think there is a contradiction between reaffirmation and strengthening of our relationships with our allies and a continuation of détente.

The United States, through many Administrations following World War II, has had a consistent foreign policy. It is my desire, as President, to build on this foreign policy that has been developed over the years.

It does encompass working with our allies in Europe, in the Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America, in Asia, and in other parts of the world; and I think by strengthening those relationships it gives us a better opportunity to use détente for the purposes for which it was designed.

Détente was not aimed at solving all the problems. It was an arrangement—and still is—for the easing of tensions when we have a crisis.

Now, it can't solve every crisis, but it can be very helpful in some, and it can have some long-range implications, for example, SALT One [Strategic Arms Limitations Talks] and, hopefully, SALT Two.

What I am saying is that our policy can be one of working more closely with our allies and at the same time working, where we can, effectively with our adversaries or potential adversaries.

Mr. Reifenberg: Mr. President, Secretary Kissinger has just repeated the American commitment to West Berlin. He called it, as I recall it, the acid test of détente. Now, the Soviet Union has recently challenged the four-power status of Berlin by raising some questions about East Berlin. Do you think that this is helpful for détente or that this is something which goes into the general area that you just described?

President Ford: It would seem to me the broad description I gave can be very applicable to the problem raised involving Berlin. If the allies are strong, that will have an impact on any attitude that the Soviet Union might take, and at the same time the existence of détente gives the Soviet Union and ourselves an opportunity to work in the solution of the problem in an atmosphere with less tension.

Mr. Brandon: Do you get the feeling in Congress that there is a certain suspicion that the Russians are getting more out of détente, as some of the leading Members of Congress have said, than the United States?

President Ford: I think there are some Members of Congress—and perhaps some in the United States in the nonpolitical arena—who have the impression that the Soviet Union has been a bigger beneficiary than the United States.

I strongly disagree with that viewpoint. I think détente has had mutual benefits. And I would hope that as we move ahead, the mutuality of the benefits will continue. I don't believe that those who challenge détente and say it is one-sided are accurate. I think they are completely in error.

Mr. de Medici: May I put the question differently. Since détente is a way of looking at current affairs, do you subscribe to the argument that the United States should only do what it finds in its own interests, no matter how appealing détente may look at times?

President Ford: I am not quite clear—

Mr. de Medici: Should the United States stick only to what it finds in its own interests, no matter how appealing détente may look?

President Ford: You mean in the United States interest vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or the United States vis-a-vis its allies and friends around the world?

Mr. de Medici: Also, in terms of, say, the European Security Conference, for instance, where the question has been raised as to what the usefulness of this whole exercise would be for the Europeans and the Americans without a counterpart?

President Ford: I would hope that détente would have a broader application than only in our own self-interest. But I must say that we have to be very certain that what we do does not undercut our own security. Détente has been used on some occasions, if my memory serves me correctly, to ease tensions on a broader area than just in U.S.-Soviet Union relations.

Mr. Brandon: Could you tell us whether the recent talks between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Gromyko have helped to overcome some of the obstacles that you encountered on SALT?

President Ford: They, of course, went into the status of our SALT Two negotiations. I don't think I should discuss any of the details. I would simply say that the talks were constructive. I think they will be helpful in the resolution of some of the negotiations that had to follow after the Vladivostok meeting last December.

Mr. de Segonzac: Dr. Kissinger has said that détente should not be selective. Do you feel that from now on, when there are certain problems going on the periphery of the Western world and of détente, you should take the Russians to task on those subjects in a harsher way than you have done up to now in Viet-Nam, for example, and the help they gave to the North Vietnamese?

President Ford: We have indicated quite clearly that we didn't approve of the supplying of Soviet arms to the North Vietnamese. We have clearly said that détente is not a fishing license in troubled waters. I think that the implication of that statement is very clear.

We intend to be very firm, but détente gives us an opportunity to be flexible, and flexible in a very meaningful way.

So, it will be orchestrated to meet the precise problem that is on the agenda. We can be firm when necessary, and we can be flexible when that attitude is applicable.

Mr. Reifenberg: Mr. President, on SALT, one more question, if I may. Do you think, sir, that to solve the problems that have come up in SALT Two, it requires a political impetus and decision by the two leaders involved, namely, yourself and the General Secretary?

President Ford: We found from the meeting in Vladivostok that there were certain issues that had to be solved at the very highest level, and Mr. Brezhnev and myself did do that. I suspect that as we move into the final negotiations it will be required that the General Secretary and myself make some final decisions. And therefore I would hope that the preliminaries can be gotten out of the way and most of the issues can be resolved, and then the final small print, so to speak, can be resolved when Mr. Brezhnev and I meet, hopefully, this fall.

The Atlantic Alliance

Mr. MacNeil: Mr. President, you said a moment ago, talking about détente, if the allies are strong, détente will work. A lot of commentators—and one noted one in Newsweek this week—see a perceptible sliding among the allies in Western Europe with the growth of pacifist spirit, a growth of Marxist philosophy in certain governments in the West, and wonder and are asking whether they are not going to end up in the embrace of the Soviet Union in making an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Do you have any slight fears as you set out for Europe that that is what is happening to the Western alliance and you need to do something about it?

President Ford: My impression is that the Western alliance is very strong and there is no reason why it can't be made stronger. I have followed the recent meeting of the secretaries of defense, so to speak, and the report I got back was encouraging. We do have to upgrade, we do have to modernize, our military capability in the alliance, and I think we will. I am convinced that in the political area the meeting we are going to have will be helpful and beneficial in that regard.

So although I see some problems in one or more countries internally, I think basically the alliance is strong. And as long as our allies in Europe see that the United States is

not going to pull out, that the United States will continue to be a strong partner, I think this will strengthen the forces favoring the alliance in our European allies.

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. President, there are quite a number of problems in the alliance at this stage all along the Mediterranean border—in Portugal, in Turkey, in Greece. You say, however, that the alliance is strong. Therefore you believe that these problems can be settled without too much difficulty?

President Ford: I certainly recognize the problem between Greece and Turkey involving Cyprus. It is a tragic development, unfortunate. But I am encouraged. There have been some recent talks between the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey.

There are to be both Karamanlis and Demirel in Brussels, and I hope to meet with both and see if we can in any way be helpful. I think this is a solvable problem and there is a beginning of the negotiating process that, hopefully, will lead to a solution. We have to recognize that everything is not perfect, but that does not mean we cannot solve those problems that are on our doorstep.

Mr. de Segonzac: Now, Mr. President, there is another problem, which is perhaps more important still, which is the one of Portugal. It is going to make, I suppose, discussions in NATO very difficult with a Portuguese Government which is dominated by the Communists. How do you feel that this can be handled? Do you think that eventually a new law or new regulation should be made so that countries who don't follow the ideology of the Western world can leave NATO or should be encouraged to leave NATO such as the pro-Communist Portuguese Government?

President Ford: I am concerned about the Communist element and its influence in Portugal and therefore Portugal's relationship with NATO. This is a matter that I will certainly bring up when we meet in Brussels. I don't see how you can have a Communist element significant in an organization that was put together and formed for the purpose of meeting a challenge by Communist elements from the East. It does present a very serious matter, and it is one that I intend to discuss while I am in Brussels.

Mr. MacNeil: Mr. President, it has been reported that when the Portuguese elections were approaching and it looked as though the Communists were going to do much better in the elections than they actually did that you were in favor of some action by the United States to reduce the possibility of their success and possibly using the CIA in some form. Could you tell us about that?

President Ford: I don't think I ought to discuss internal matters that might have involved another country. The elections turned out very well. We had no involvement. So I think I should leave it right there.

Mr. de Medici: Mr. President, you and your mission in Europe will be very close to Portugal. You will be stopping in the Iberian Peninsula, in Madrid. Spain is one country which does not belong to the NATO community, and it does not belong to the Europe of Nine, either. The Spanish people have been asking for a long time to be more closely associated with the European defense—collective defense setup—and your government perhaps has looked with even more sympathy of recent to the Spanish request. How do you view this policy by the Spanish Government at this time?

President Ford: Well, the United States has had a long and friendly relationship with Spain. In 1970, we signed a friendship agreement. In 1974 we had a Declaration of Principles that involved our relationship in many, many areas on a broad basis.

We think Spain, because of its geographical location, because of other factors, is important in the Mediterranean, in Europe. We believe that somehow Spain should be eased into a greater role in the overall situation in Europe.

Mr. MacNeil: Actual membership in NATO?

President Ford: I am not sure that is something that has to be done at the present time, but it does seem to me that Spain, for the reasons I have given, ought to be brought

more closely as far as our relations in the alliance.

Mr. Reifenberg: Has the Portuguese development, Mr. President, speeded that thinking?

President Ford: I don't believe so, consciously. It may have subjectively.

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. President, in your first speech when you became President, first important speech, you talked of Europe, you talked of alliance, and you never mentioned the word "Europe," and you were criticized for that in Europe and you still since have given the impression that, for you, Europe is more the NATO organization than the Community. I would like to ask you, do you consider Europe as an entity? Do you think it should have its own independence and its own unity? What are your views on that?

President Ford: I do consider Europe as an entity. On the other hand, we have direct relationships with the major nations in Europe through NATO.

On the other hand, we do in the future and have in the past worked within the economic system with Europe as a whole. For example, we have worked very closely with the International Energy Agency, which is a very important part of our efforts to avoid future problems and to develop some solutions in the field of energy.

We look upon Europe as an entity, but on the other hand, we deal in a specific way with Europe, or major nations in Europe, through our NATO alliance.

Mr. Brandon: How vital do you think is Britain's participation in Europe?

President Ford: I think it is very important. I don't believe I should get involved in how the vote is going to turn out on June 5, but I think Europe is strengthened by Britain's participation. I think our overall Western world economic strength is likewise improved and strengthened by Britain's participation.

Mr. Brandon: You mentioned the international energy organization, and there is a good deal of dissatisfaction among European governments that they have done much more in reducing the consumption of petrol than the United States has. I know you have tried, and I was wondering now, in view of the fact that Congress did not come up with a bill, are you going to raise the import tax by another dollar?

Energy Policy

President Ford: I agree with you entirely. The European nations have done a much better job in reducing the consumption of petrol, or gasoline as we call it, and I admire them for it. As President, I have tried to convince the Congress that they ought to pass a comprehensive energy program that would aim at conservation on the one hand and new sources of energy on the other.

Now, I am going to make a decision in the next 48 hours as to whether or not I will increase by one dollar the import levy on foreign oil. The Congress has failed very badly. They have done literally nothing affirmatively to solve our energy problem.

Perhaps the imposition of the extra dollar will stimulate the Congress to meet the problem that is important from the point of view of not only ourselves but the consuming nations—those in Europe, ourselves, Japan. I am very disturbed, I might say, about Congress' lack of affirmative action.

Mr. Brandon: The statement by the Shah that he is going to increase the price again by 25 percent has not helped you in Congress, has it?

President Ford: I think it probably has helped us, because if the price of oil is increased and we have no defense against it, it proves the need and necessity for the United States to have the kind of an energy program that I have proposed.

If we had that program in place, the one I recommended to the Congress in January, the threat of an increase in the oil price would be far less. It is the lack of action by the Congress that puts us more and more vulnerable to price increases by OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations.

So, I hope this prospective or threatened oil price increase will get the Congress to do

something such as what I have recommended. Then we would not have to worry about that.

Mr. MacNeil: Did you try and persuade the Shah not to raise the price of oil, as he is quite influential in the group of OPEC nations?

President Ford: We talked about it. He indicated that there might be an increase. I did point out that it could have very adverse economic impacts, not only on the consuming nations, like Western Europe, the United States, Japan, but it could have very, very bad effects on the less developed nations, who are more of a victim than even ourselves.

I would hope that there would be a delaying action, but in order to make ourselves less vulnerable for this one and for other threatened increases in the future, the United States has to have a strong energy program, an energy program that is integrated with that of Western Europe through the International Energy Agency. And I can assure you that we are going to keep urging and pressuring and trying to move the Congress so that we end up with a kind of a program that will preclude these increases.

Mr. MacNeil: Could I ask one other question on energy? Defense Secretary Schlesinger said in an interview this week that if there came another oil embargo, the United States would not be so tolerant this time and could act, and he even mentioned military action.Now, could you explain what that means?

President Ford: I would rather define our policy this way. We have sought throughout the Middle East to have a policy of cooperation rather than confrontation. We have made a tremendous effort to improve our relations with all Arab countries. And we have continued our efforts to have good relations with Israel.

If we put the emphasis on cooperation rather than confrontation, then you don't think about the potentiality that was mentioned by the Secretary of Defense. Since we do believe in cooperation, we don't consider military operations as a part of any policy planning that we have in mind.

Mr. MacNeil: But it is a contingency not entirely ruled out if things should go wrong?

President Ford: Well, we put emphasis on cooperation, not confrontation, so we in effect rule out the other.

Mr. de Medici: In the spirit of cooperation, we are looking at the United States for leadership in the area of development of alternate sources of energy. We are particularly looking at you for obtaining a nuclear fuel—enriched uranium, natural uranium—and, very important for us, access to technology. What do you plan to do in this area, in this critical area for many countries of the world?

President Ford: It is very critical. I will be making a decision in the relatively near future as to how we can move affirmatively in this area to provide adequate sources of enriched uranium. We must do it. The basic problem is whether you do it through government on the one hand or private enterprise on the other. We will have a decision; we will get going because we cannot tolerate further delay.

Mr. Brandon: Mr. President, there is a great concern in the world about the proliferation of nuclear matter, and the more nuclear power plants are going to be built—the more the United States is going to supply them—the more of that material will be available in the world. I was wondering whether—the question is the reprocessing of this material. I wonder whether it would be possible to find a multilateral way of trying to reprocess this material, because there is a question of prestige with so many governments involved.

President Ford: We are concerned about the proliferation of nuclear capability. We are trying to upgrade the safeguards when power plants are sold or made available. We think there has to be continuous consultation on how we can do it technically and how we can do it diplomatically.

We are going to maximize our effort because if the number of nations having nuclear armaments increases significantly, the risk to the world increases; it multiplies. So this Administration will do anything technically, diplomatically, or otherwise to avert the danger that you are talking about.

Mr. MacNeil: Mr. President, the oil and energy race is intimately tied up, of course, with the Middle East. You and Secretary Kissinger have said recently that your reassessment of policy in this most explosive and dangerous area, which has been going on for two months, is not yet complete. It is a little difficult to understand how you could have spent two months and are, as you say, meeting President Sadat next week with no new policy.

President Ford: I think my meeting with President Sadat is a very understandable part of the process. He, of course, has a deep interest and concern in a permanent peaceful solution in the Middle East. I want to get firsthand from him his analysis, his recommendations. Of course, that meeting will be followed by one with Prime Minister Rabin here on June 11 where I will have the same intimate relationship, where he can give me his analysis and his recommendations. And sometime shortly thereafter we will lay out what we think is the best solution.

Mr. de Medici: Mr. President, it has been some time since there was an authoritative statement of U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Middle East with reference to U.N. Resolution 242, which calls for secure boundaries and withdrawal from occupied territories. Would you care to state the policy once again?

President Ford: Of course, the United States voted for U.N. Resolution 242 and 339, so we do believe that within the confines of those words any policy in the long run has to fit. But the details, because they were quite general in many respects—the details will be set forth in the policy statement that I will make sometime after meeting with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin.

Mr. de Medici: Do you think that the question of Russian policies and overtures in the Middle East should be duly linked perhaps to other areas?

President Ford: The Soviet Union, as a cochairman of the Geneva Conference, obviously has an interest in and a responsibility for progress in the Middle East. I notice that they have been meeting officially, diplomatically, with representatives from Israel, and they have been meeting in the same way with many Arab nations. I think this could be constructive, and I certainly hope it is.

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. President, Mr. Schlesinger has again stressed the possibility of using force in case of an embargo in the Middle East, and he said that if there was another embargo, the United States would not have so much patience as last time. How do you feel about that, and in what case do you think military force could eventually be used?

President Ford: As I said a moment ago, the policy of this government is one of cooperation, not confrontation. And if you put the emphasis on cooperation, then you don't include within any plans you have any military operations.

I don't think I should go beyond that, because everything we are doing in the Middle East—the numerous meetings I have had with heads of states, the many consultations that Secretary Kissinger has had with foreign ministers—it is all aimed in trying to, in a cooperative way, solve the problems of the Middle East. And none of those plans that we have incorporate any military operations.

Mr. Brandon: Mr. President, if you could give us a longer perspective of history. Some of your aides believe that the West is in decline. And I was wondering whether you share that outlook?

President Ford: I certainly do not. I think the West is in a very unique situation today. The West, so to speak, by most standards is technologically ahead of any other part of the world. The West, I think, under our system of free governments, is in a position to move ahead, taking the lead in freedom for people all over the world. It seems to me that whether it is substantively or otherwise, the West could be on the brink of a leap forward giving leadership to the rest of the world. So, I am an optimist, not a pessimist.

Mr. MacNeil: There is one aspect to the Middle East, Mr. President, which possibly concerns your visit to Europe this next week.

Some of your officials have said that one of your concerns was possibly to suggest to the alliance that it widen its sphere of attention and interest. Does that mean into the Middle East, and what exactly do you have in mind?

President Ford: I don't think the alliance, as such, ought to involve itself in the Middle East. Of course, every one of the countries in Western Europe, including the United States and Canada, have an interest in a permanent peaceful solution in the Middle East. And each of the countries will have an impact—some, for one reason or another, more than other nations. But I don't think the alliance should, as a unified body, move into these very delicate negotiations.

Mr. MacNeil: What is this initiative that you are reported to be considering to suggest that it does widen its sphere of attention?

President Ford: Well, it would be in a broad but not substantive way. The impact of each nation, if we could all agree, whether it was done through the alliance, would be extremely beneficial and most helpful in getting the Arab nations, as well as Israel, to resolve some of these longstanding volatile questions.

Mr. MacNeil: Do you mean asking individual members of NATO to do more in the Middle East?

President Ford: Right, and to not officially coordinate their efforts, but unofficially work together.

Mr. de Segonzac: Back in NATO—I would like to move back to Europe very briefly, I would like to come back to your answer on your attitude toward the Common Market. I had a feeling by what you were saying that you have a slightly cool attitude toward the Common Market. Do you still believe and support the unity of Europe in the same way as President Kennedy supported it but which was less strongly supported by President Nixon? Where do you stand exactly?

President Ford: I give full support to the Common Market, the European Community efforts in trying to resolve some of the difficult economic problems. Under this Administration, under my time as President, we will work together, I hope. And there have been some recent illustrations where we have been able to resolve some very sticky problems in the field of agriculture in a very constructive way.

I think this will be our attitude. And I have some good evidence, I think, by recent developments that will be the attitude of the Community.

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. President, are you apprehensive of European rivalry?

President Ford: Rivalry in the broadest sense?

Mr. de Segonzac: Yes, in the broadest sense.

President Ford: I am not apprehensive, because I think America is strong and we have the will and we have got the technical capability. I think we can compete with any segment of the globe. And I happen to think competition is good. I don't like to discount it, but I think competition is beneficial to everybody.

Mr. MacNeil: Mr. President, could I just conclude—as we have come to the end of our time, could I just conclude by asking you a quick personal question? Since you have spent your first nine months in office cleaning up messes and reacting to things that were left on your plate as you took over the office, do you now feel yet that you have put a Ford stamp on the Presidency?

President Ford: I think we have made a tremendous amount of progress in achieving that. Let me take two or three examples. We have a Ford energy program developed entirely under my Administration. We have a Ford economic program which will be successful. We are making substantial headway in building on past foreign policy, but as we work toward a SALT Two agreement, as we work toward some of the other problem areas in foreign policy, I think you will see a Ford Administration imprimatur. And therefore I am optimistic that we can see as we look back historically that before this date there was clear and convincing evidence both at home and abroad there was a Ford Administration.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of May 24

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger in the Old Executive Office Building on May 24.

Press release 297 dated May 24

Secretary Kissinger: Let me begin with the trip and deal with the European portion first and then discuss briefly the meeting with President Sadat. And then we will follow the procedure that Ron [Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford] outlined and I will take questions on the trip and on the Sadat portion and then any general questions that you might want to raise.

The basic purpose of the trip was outlined by the President in his speech to the Congress in early April. It was to have an opportunity to exchange views with the other leaders of NATO, to assess the current state of the alliance, to determine where the alliance should go in the period ahead, and to use this opportunity as well to discuss a number of special problems that may have arisen.

With respect to the NATO summit, it is obvious that in the post-Indochina period certain questions have arisen with respect to how the United States will react to accept that and what this means to its other alliance relationships.

But apart from this special problem, there is also the fact that the President has not had an opportunity to discuss with his colleagues as a group the future of the Western alliance and that the future of the Western alliance requires consideration quite apart from whatever special problems may have arisen for the United States.

I would put these in perhaps three categories: The problems that are inseparable from modernizing the original concept of NATO; that is to say, how to bring the defense arrangements of the Western alliance in line with current realities; the second is to discuss the new issues that have arisen as a result of changing circumstances and of different emphases that must be given as a result of these changing circumstances; and the third is to use this opportunity to discuss a number of special problems that exist together with the relationship with the East European countries and the Soviet Union; that is to say, the relationship between détente and security. These will be the major issues that the President will address.

With respect to the military issues, they, of course, will have been discussed in some detail by Secretary Schlesinger [Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] with his colleagues in the DPC [Defense Planning Committee], and there will be no need for the President to go into the technical details of all of these issues.

But the basic fact is that the alliance was conceived in a period of American nuclear monopoly, and it has to be adapted to conditions of effective nuclear parity. The alliance was developed in a period when the nature of the military threat seemed relatively clearcut, and it has to be adapted to circumstances when the military threat can take on many more complicated forms. The alliance was developed at a period of great American material preponderance, and it has to be adjusted to conditions more in keeping with the realities of the emerging European economic strength and therefore the balance that has to be achieved between the two sides of the Atlantic.

I repeat, those issues will have been discussed in specific terms by Secretary Schlesinger, but they will be discussed in their conceptual aspect by President Ford together with his colleagues; because while security is not enough as a basis for the Western alliance, without security there is no basis for the Western alliance at all.

The second set of issues concerns the new problems that have arisen growing out of the interdependence of the world economy and the impossibility of founding cooperation entirely on military measures.

Two years ago, when this was put forward in the proposal for the year of Europe, it led to rather intense debate. Today, the interrelationship between economic, political, and security elements is a fact. In fact, two years ago, there were some who argued that the Western alliance had no role except in the military field. Today, most of our allies insist on the proposition that the economic policies of the industrialized countries must be brought into some relationship with each other if there is to be any effective future. It is no accident that the summit is occurring at the end of a week that begins with the meeting of the IEA, goes through a meeting of the OECD, and culminates in the summit.

The IEA—the International Energy Agency, which we consider one of the success stories of the recent period—links together most of the consuming nations into an organization designed to enable the consumers to take some control over their economic destiny by cooperative programs of conservation, alternative sources, and financial solidarity. This will be the first ministerial meeting since the Washington Energy Conference, and it will take stock of the past and look into the future.

The OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], comprising most of the industrial nations of the world, will address the problem of industrial growth and the relationship of the industrial nations to the less developed nations, so that the summit of the Western alliance is coming at the end of a period in which the Defense Planning Committee has looked at the security side, the other meetings have addressed the economic and energy aspects—so that the leaders of the Western alliance can look at the whole architecture of their relationship and develop a concept of security transcending the purely military aspect.

The third element that will be discussed at Brussels is the relationship between the Communist and the non-Communist world, or between the Western alliance and the Communists.

As the Administration has repeatedly pointed out and as the President again emphasized yesterday, we consider the easing of tensions, where it can be honorably done, an essential goal of Western policy and we will make every effort to pursue the same.

We do not believe that the easing of tensions is an alternative to alliance policy. We think that both of these elements of policy are integrally related to each other. Without the strength of the alliance there would be no basis for détente that is based on equivalence.

But without demonstrating to our people that serious efforts are being made to improve international conditions, that confrontation is not an end in itself, we will also not be able to maintain the strength that is needed for realistic détente.

There are before the West three major areas in which negotiations are at this moment going on. The negotiations on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], which concern the alliance indirectly but which are being conducted primarily between the United States and the Soviet Union; the negotiations on the mutual balanced force reductions, in which NATO is negotiating with the Warsaw Pact; and the negotiations on European security, in which all European nations—NATO, Warsaw Pact, as well as the so-called neutrals—participate.

No doubt the President will review with his colleagues, in plenary sessions and in the bilateral meetings, the status of these negotiations and will discuss how they can best be promoted.

While in Brussels, the President will have a series of bilateral meetings; indeed, after the completion of the Brussels meetings, he will have had bilateral meetings within the month with every leader of the Western alliance. You will have the schedule of those meetings, and therefore I will not go through them.

It is obvious that particular attention will be paid to his meetings with the Greek and Turkish leaders. He will see Prime Minister

Karamanlis and Prime Minister Demirel on Thursday morning.

As you know, the United States has played an active role, at the request of the parties, to be helpful in bringing about a solution of the Cyprus dispute as well as of the other issues that exist between Greece and Turkey.

It is a complex set of issues in which a long historic legacy profoundly complicates the solution and in which the domestic situation of the participants does not always facilitate progress, not to speak of our domestic situation.

Nevertheless we believe that the two sides, both in the communal talks and in the talks that have now begun between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, are beginning to grope their way toward positions that may prove to be negotiable; and insofar as we can make a contribution to this, we will do so. After all, our international involvement in the postwar period began with the Greek-Turkish aid program. We value our relations with both of these countries.

We believe that their tensions are a tragedy for the Western alliance and, in the long term, a tragedy for the countries concerned; and we will do our utmost to facilitate a solution.

But we must also keep in mind that it is not the United States that can produce a solution. The solution must be produced by negotiations among the parties. We can help, we can use whatever influence we have, but we cannot substitute for the parties concerned. But the President will give a considerable amount of attention to that problem.

You know that he will meet with the British Prime Minister and with the German Chancellor. He will also meet with the Prime Minister of Portugal, and there will be, as I pointed out, individual appointments with all of the leaders that he has not seen recently as a result of their visits to Washington.

Let me now turn to the visit to Spain. The United States believes that the relationship of Spain to Western Europe and to the Atlantic alliance is in a sense an anomaly. Spain is one of the principal countries of Western Europe. Its security and its progress is closely linked to that of the rest of the continent, and the United States has believed that a relationship ought to be established between Spain and NATO. For a variety of reasons, that has not proved possible.

Therefore the President thought it desirable to visit Spain to discuss with the Spanish leaders their conception of the future evolution and the relationship of that to Western security and progress. We believe that through such conversations we can participate in what we will hope will be a beneficial evolution for all of the parties concerned.

The President, while in Western Europe, will also visit Italy, a country with which we have close ties and for which we have very special concerns, to exchange views with the leaders of Italy about their many complicated problems and to reaffirm a relationship to which we attach great importance.

Of course, he will see His Holiness the Pope, for his first meeting with His Holiness, to discuss his general conceptions of how peace can be promoted in this period and the many humanitarian concerns of the Vatican.

Let me say a word about the meeting with President Sadat.

As we have repeatedly pointed out, as indeed we have not been permitted to forget, we are engaged in a reassessment of American policy in the Middle East.

This is an effort that is not directed against any country or on behalf of any country. It was made necessary by the suspension of shuttle diplomacy and of the last attempt to achieve an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt. In the new circumstances that that fact created, with a high probability of the Geneva Conference being reconvened, it has been imperative for the United States to assess its policy in the light of these new conditions.

This process is going on, and in this process, personal meetings between the President and various of the leaders of the area play an essential role.

We intend to discuss with President Sadat, as we shall do later with Prime Minister Rabin, our conception of the alternative

routes toward peace as they present themselves to us.

We will be eager to hear President Sadat's view as to what he considers the most effective means of promoting peace in the Middle East.

After we have completed these discussions, one of two things is likely to happen. Either it will appear that the view of the two parties about method and perhaps about substance is sufficiently close so that negotiations can be encouraged, or it will appear that they are still so far apart that it may be necessary for the United States to suggest a procedure or a way to proceed.

In either event, the President has repeatedly stated that the United States believes that a stalemate in the Middle East cannot lead to anything other than a catastrophe for all of the parties concerned, and the United States is determined that diplomatic progress be resumed. The principal purpose of the reassessment is to devise means and to explore approaches that might facilitate this progress.

This, then, is the basic purpose of the President's trip. It is part of a foreign policy which, whatever recent disappointments, is based on the proposition that a major American role is essential to maintain the peace and to promote progress in the world. And the United States will play this role both in a general sense and in a particular sense in certain regions.

This is the attitude with which the President is undertaking this trip, and he is hopeful that it will contribute to the objectives that I have outlined here.

Now, if you agree, let us take the questions in the sequence that we suggested—first about the trip, the West European part of the trip, then about the Middle East part of the trip, and then any general questions that you might have.

Q. Will the President find, Mr. Secretary, in Western Europe widespread doubts about U.S. will and purpose in the world now as a result of the Mayaguez and the things the President talked about yesterday?

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't think that as a result of the *Mayaguez* the President is going to find widespread—

Q. No, I mean, will the doubts be dispelled or partly dispelled by that?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that there are questions in many West European countries —not necessarily in all, but in many—about the impact on the United States of the events of recent months and about the significance for other areas of the way in which our involvement in Indochina, and I think these questions exist whether they are formally articulated or not.

They can be removed to some extent by words, and to a greater extent by actions, but in this atmosphere it is important for the President to have an opportunity to sketch out a direction in which we can move together.

Mayaguez should not be overdramatized. It was important that the United States demonstrated that there was a point beyond which it could not be pushed, and it was a useful thing to have done. It will not of itself create the conditions that are necessary to deal with the situation that I have described.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, were you able to tell Foreign Minister Antunes last week that he could expect the NATO summit meetings to discuss, among other things, the conditions under which Portugal might have to be excluded from NATO, as the President alluded to yesterday, or were you as surprised as some of your colleagues in the State Department by the firmness of the President's remarks on that subject?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know about my colleagues in the State Department, but if they had been talking to me, which is not always guaranteed, then they could not have been surprised.

I share the President's views on this matter, and what the President was pointing out was the anomaly of a Communist-dominated government being part of NATO. He was not saying that the Portuguese Government now is Communist dominated. In what way this particular issue will be discussed in Brussels remains to be seen.

I would expect that it will come up more naturally in bilateral talks between the President and his colleagues at a plenary session, and I might say that I have certainly expressed our concerns to the Portuguese Foreign Minister, and our views on this matter have not been kept secret from anybody.

Q. A followup on that. Is he going to ask them to discuss conditions under which Portugal should be excluded from the alliance?

Secretary Kissinger: I doubt that this will be put formally before the alliance. I think the President was pointing out a problem which will not go away simply by being ignored. He did not say that the problem had in fact already arisen. He was speaking about trends.

He, as you know, is meeting with the Portuguese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and one other member of the Portuguese delegation.

We wish Portugal well. We hope that Portugal will have a democratic evolution in conformity with its own national aspirations. So we are not going to Brussels with the intention of producing a confrontation with Portugal or over Portugal, but we also believe that there are certain trends that will not disappear by being ignored or by assuming the most favorable possible outcome.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you implying that—you talk about bilateral discussions—that there are certain things that could not be discussed with the Portuguese and therefore must be discussed with other countries, such as secrecy in NATO military matters and other matters which are too sensitive to be treated in public?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not implying that. But it is a fact that an alliance which is designed to prevent a Communist attack on Western Europe acquires unique features if it includes in its deliberations a government of which many members are Communist. That is a fact; we are not creating this.

Whether this is the occasion to raise that issue formally I would question, but that it is an issue can also not be questioned, and what the President did yesterday was to call the attention of his colleagues to this problem.

It does not mean that it will be raised at the meeting in any explicit form.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if Portugal goes Communist in the literal sense, would you then recommend that it be removed from NATO?

Secretary Kissinger: If Portugal goes Communist, then we have obviously a situation which was not foreseen when NATO was originally formed, and then to pretend that this is something that need not be considered is an absurdity.

What exactly will be done under those circumstances requires the most intense consultation with our European allies, but that it requires intense consultation goes without saying.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at what point would you determine that this government had gone Communist? There is a nebulous situation there, with several parties involved. What I would like to know is, at what point do you decide that this government is Communist dominated?

Secretary Kissinger: When we think it is Communist dominated [laughter], and I think that there will be sufficient objective indications of that fact.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say what was the response of the Prime Minister to your observation?

Secretary Kissinger: I had a very friendly talk with him, and indeed, as we announced on that occasion, I invited him to visit the United States within the next three months, and he accepted.

Q. But did he show a will of his government to remain in NATO in any case?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, he indicated a desire to stay in NATO.

Can we talk about some other problem except for Portugal?

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the broader European questions about the American commitment, did you find in your contacts and in

your recent trips that there are doubts about the American President being able to push his foreign policy through the American Congress, and how are you planning to resolve those doubts when you go to Brussels?

Secretary Kissinger: I have the impression that the relations between the executive and the legislative are of profound concern to many other countries. I found that on this trip; I found it at the OAS meeting previously here in Washington. I say this without assigning blame for this state of affairs. This is a fact.

Now, I believe that this relationship is in the process of improvement, and that many of the conditions that produced the tensions, such as Watergate and the war in Viet-Nam, now being behind us, the possibility for a much more creative cooperation exists.

This would certainly be our attitude. In any event, the President will make clear to his colleagues what the executive conceives our proper responsibilities to be, and we believe—and we certainly fervently hope—that we can obtain the necessary congressional support.

Q. By all accounts, the European allies are not very enthusiastic about bringing Spain into a closer relationship with NATO. Does the President have any new arguments, new pressures, or do you expect any change in his attitude?

Secretary Kissinger: No, we have stated our view on the matter. I don't think that this will be an issue that we need to raise with additional intensity. We have made our view clear over the weeks, and we have made our view clear by the trip that the President is taking to Spain, and this may be a matter that will have to be left to time.

Q. What is our government's attitude toward a new security arrangement with Spain?

Secretary Kissinger: We are in the process of negotiating this, of negotiating the extension of the base agreement; and in the process of these negotiations, that will be looked at.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the President going to see any members of the opposition in Madrid?

Secretary Kissinger: The President's schedule is not yet finally settled, and we will announce it when it is.

Q. Mr. Secretary, wholly apart from the stated intention of the U.S. reassessment of Middle East policy, isn't it true that it has now taken on a life of its own? I mean, isn't it true that it is being largely viewed, particularly by Israel, as a U.S. tool, a U.S. lever, a U.S. pressure device?

Secretary Kissinger: Can I set this question aside for one moment? I will answer this as the first question on the Middle East part. Let me see if there are two or three more questions on the European part, and then I will take it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the President confer with President Giscard, and what about France's role?

Secretary Kissinger: President Giscard has agreed to come to the dinner for NATO heads of state and heads of government that is being given by the King of the Belgians. In connection with the visit of President Giscard for that purpose, the President will have a bilateral meeting with the French President, and we look forward to that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the meeting of NATO in Brussels, could this not be the beginning of the end of NATO as we knew it before, a divergence of interests between the United States and Western Europe in coming years —the social, political, economic order of things?

Secretary Kissinger: I expect the opposite to happen. I expect that this meeting of NATO will stress some new dimensions for NATO and will usher in a period of new creativity.

Let me take one more question on the West European part, and then I will take your question, if I can still remember it. I will remember it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to question why it is necessary to reassure the NATO allies of the American commitment in view of the fact that that commitment to NATO

has been solid since the end of World War II, laying aside Viet-Nam, which was not a formal treaty commitment? Why is it necessary to reassure the NATO allies when it has been the British which have been cutting back on their troops, the French which pulled out of NATO, the Greeks which pulled out of NATO, and the Turks which want to throw the U.S. military bases out of Turkey?

Secretary Kissinger: Not without provocation.

Q. Well, that is debatable with the Congress, not me, sir. I am wondering why we have to go hat in hand to reassure them.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not going hat in hand to reassure them, and I did not say we are going to Europe to reassure NATO. If you read the record of what I said, I am sure you will find that I stated three major purposes—that the question of reassurance arose in response to queries that were put to me.

I stated that NATO is in need of adaptation to new circumstances in its original purposes, that NATO is in need of adaptation to new conditions that have arisen due to the interdependence of the modern economy, and that NATO is in need of a formal consideration of the relationship between its security objectives and the attempt to ease tensions with the East.

Those are the three principal purposes. If in the process reassurance results, that is fine, but quite apart from the issue of Indochina, the President's intention was, in any event, to have a meeting with the leaders of Western Europe.

Now, let me take the question—

Q. Let me try it again, if you didn't get it the first time.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I got the point. Let me see what I remember.

Q. Do you expect to pursue the date for the European Security Conference?

Secretary Kissinger: The date for the European Security Conference does not depend on the United States. The date for the European Security Conference will be determined by the negotiations that are now going on in Geneva, in which there are a number of issues still outstanding on confidence-building measures, on human contacts, and on postconference machinery.

In each of these, the West has put forward certain initiatives and is either awaiting the responses or analyzing responses that it has just received. The date of the Security Conference cannot be settled independent of the progress of the negotiations, and the best way to speed that conference would be if the Soviet Union considered carefully some of these considerations that we had put forward.

Now, to the Middle East. The question, as I understood it, was whether reassessment has developed a life of its own and whether it is not conceived or intended as a pressure upon Israel.

Well, as I have said before, my friend Abba Eban used to say that Israel considers objectivity a hundred percent support of its position.

We did not intend this assessment either as pressure or as support for any party. It was made inevitable by the suspension of the negotiations and by the potential collapse of the interim approach. With Geneva becoming a probable outcome, it was imperative for the United States to consider procedures and substance—all the more so as it is the view of the Administration, which we have certainly not kept secret for years, that progress toward peace in the Middle East is in the interest of the parties concerned, in the interest of the West, and in the interest of the United States.

As such, it is not directed against any country. It is not intended as a pressure upon any country. It is as objective a look as we can get from our best conception of the American and world interest in this matter, of what is required to promote peace, and of course the United States has been committed to the existence of Israel as part of such a just peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as I understood you, you said the United States will be willing to put forward new proposals if neither of the principals came up with their own proposals for establishing progress.

Secretary Kissinger: At least as to procedures.

Q. Well, that was part of the question, actually. Do you mean to suggest that the United States will produce proposals in terms of its bilateral or multilateral relationships with the parties themselves or for Geneva, or in what context?

Secretary Kissinger: That depends on which route is chosen. It will be impossible for the United States to be at Geneva without expressing some view on the subject at some time.

Q. What are the chances of your renewing shuttle diplomacy, then?

Secretary Kissinger: We cannot judge which method will be most appropriate until the President has had an opportunity to talk to some of the parties principally involved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the letter from the Senators giving the broad-base support for Israel have any effect on your dealings with President Sadat or Prime Minister Rabin?

Secretary Kissinger: We will take seriously expressions from many quarters. At least some of the statements in that letter contain the ambiguities that have been at the heart of Middle East negotiations for many years, and therefore, as we move more deeply into these negotiations, we will have to discuss with the Senate as precisely what meaning is to be given to phrases such as "secure and recognized frontiers," which are also part of Security Council Resolution 242.

Q. If President Sadat brings up this letter, queries what effect it has on you and American policy, what is your answer?

Secretary Kissinger: Our answer will be that we are taking into account the views of many groups and, of course, congressional views with considerable seriousness, that after we have made a decision, we will discuss it at great length with the Senate and with the whole Congress, and that in the meantime we have to proceed according to our best judgment of the situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you believe the Syrians moved to extend the U.N. mandate for six months, which puts them out of synchronization with the Egyptians, and what will the impact of that action be on the next three to six months?

Secretary Kissinger: I will answer that question, but if we could leave non-Egyptian-and-Israeli questions out until I get through the second part of my answers—but I will answer that question.

Q. On the Egyptians?

Secretary Kissinger: The impact is that it gives some more time for a development of peace initiatives less closely geared to imminent deadlines than seemed possible a few weeks ago, and therefore we welcome this step.

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International], did you have a question?

Q. Yes, I did. On the question of overdramatizing Mayaguez, don't you think that the Administration had a big part in that? Also, you were the one who said it was a bonus and benefits.

Secretary Kissinger: That it was what?

Q. A bonus and benefits.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I said our purpose was to free the ship and the crew, and if there were any collateral benefits, that was a bonus, but not the primary purpose. That is a different thing from saying that that was the exclusive purpose.

Q. Don't you think that it is being magnified into a major foreign policy representation?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that it was explained in response to very intense queries. I have stated our view and what has happened previously. I don't want to—

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the two superpowers will inevitably impose a settlement on the sides in the Middle East if both sides will not come with new proposals?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not thought it wise to impose a settlement, and our policy has been designed to enable the parties con-

cerned to negotiate the structure of a just and lasting peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the President plan mainly to listen during the Sadat and Rabin meeting, and if so, what is your expectation for any new position, new concessions, being made by either man? The reason I ask the question is that it suggests that the reassessment may hinge on the outcome of those talks.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I think the President will both talk and listen. He will give to both sides our assessment of the situation, and it will be as close to identical to both sides as we can make it.

He will then obviously ask their views on their assessment of the situation; and our reassessment, or at least the conclusions we will draw, will depend obviously to an important extent on the answers we receive.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Sadat has said publicly now several times that he intends to press President Ford for an answer to what the American position is on supporting Israel, either in the present situation or back to the 1967 borders. What will the President say to President Sadat, or what do you think about that question?

Secretary Kissinger: If I tell you that, maybe President Sadat won't come to the meeting. [Laughter.]

I think we are in no position to give answers to final settlement until we have completed the assessment we are now making.

Q. Since we have already had no assessment on Mr. Gromyko, can you tell us a little bit of what he indicated to you was the Soviet position on the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the Soviet Union realizes that it is one thing to start a conference, it is another to bring it to a conclusion. And I think every party concerned so far has realized that it was less complicated to talk about Geneva than to bring it off.

Now that Geneva has become a very probable outcome, I think it behooves the two cochairmen to discuss what steps they can take to bring about the best atmosphere for talks and the best possible outcome for such talks, and this is the spirit within which we had our preliminary exchanges.

As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko and I plan to meet again in July, and I think at that time, after we have substantially completed our assessment, we will be in a position to be more specific.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you say Geneva is a probable outcome, but as you also point out, it is a lot of trouble getting it off the ground. First, we thought it was going to meet early in the summer. Now it appears that it may not be until late in the summer, and the Egyptians are saying possibly not until the end of the year. Do you have any estimate of when Geneva will be?

Secretary Kissinger: I think I will be in a better position to answer that question in July, after I meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and after the President has met with President Sadat and with Prime Minister Rabin and after we have talked to some of the other interested Arab parties.

Q. When you talk about Geneva, are you talking about it in the context we understood it when it first began, that this would be a negotiation, or would it simply be a framework within which some variation of shuttle diplomacy might be able to work?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think I can add anything to the three possible options that the President outlined yesterday.

Mr. Nessen: Why not take just a couple more minutes, Mr. Secretary? You have been at it for about an hour.

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't even gotten started yet. I will take two or three more questions.

Q. How would you define the main stumbling block to an interim settlement between Israel and Egypt? Is it the issue of nonbelligerency?

Secretary Kissinger: The issue of the last interim negotiation has taken on the form of the Japanese movie "Rashomon"—there are so many versions of it around now that

I don't want to add to the general confusion.

I don't think there is any purpose served by reviewing the last negotiation, which takes on more epic proportions the longer one hears the various accounts. The major problem now is to focus on the future. That requires some stocktaking as to what the parties now conceive to be the essence of the problem as they now see it.

Once we understand that, then we can make some suggestions as to whether or how the deadlock might be broken, rather than go over again the last positions they had at that time, which under the pressure of events may now look somewhat different.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said that we have not thought it wise to impose a settlement. Do you have any reason to believe that we could impose a settlement that would be accepted unless it was acceptable to both sides?

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that a settlement must emerge out of a process of negotiation between the two sides in some form, either directly or indirectly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your meeting with Gromyko, was there any progress made on what appeared to be some differences on the Vladivostok SALT agreement, or is that coming along? And do you expect to have something final this year, yet?

Secretary Kissinger: The Vladivostok agreement settled most of the conceptual problems. It left open many of the technical issues in the implementation of the basic concepts. Being technical, these issues become extremely complicated. I believe that we are making progress in clarifying the issues and in narrowing the gap between the two sides.

I believe that the chances of completing the agreement this year are good, but it is a highly technical negotiation in which—I don't want to disillusion you—there is an enormous amount of consensus within our government as to what is required, and we are moving in that direction now.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: I think, Bernie, you had a question.

Q. The other Bernie.

Mr. Nessen: Bernie Kalb.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, Bernie Kalb [Bernard Kalb, CBS News]. I didn't even see him.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this immediate post-Viet-Nam era, do you believe that the firmness of your reiterations to outstanding American commitments is matched by an equal firmness of the will of the American people to follow through on those commitments?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I believe it is. I believe that the American people will support an American foreign policy designed to preserve global peace and to bring about conditions of progress which reduce international tensions and general tensions.

I think this is a question in part of the leadership of the Administration, which we intend to exercise, and I believe also that with the end of some of the divisive debates which this country has been subjected to in recent years we are in a better position to obtain public support and, indeed, we have a very large degree of public support for the kind of foreign policy that we have outlined.

The Press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Kissinger Meets With Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at Vienna; Visits Bonn, Berlin, and Ankara

Secretary Kissinger visited Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, and Turkey May 18–23. He met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at Vienna and headed the U.S. observer delegation to the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) at Ankara. Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger and foreign leaders, his address before the Berlin House of Representatives, his statement before the CENTO Council, and the texts of a joint statement issued following his meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko and the final press communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting of the CENTO Council.

ARRIVAL, VIENNA, MAY 18

Press release 267 dated May 19

Mr. Chancellor [Bruno Kreisky], ladies and gentlemen: I would like to express my pleasure at being in Vienna. The friendship between the United States and Austria means a great deal to us, and the independence and neutrality of Austria are firm principles of American foreign policy.

I have come to Vienna to meet with the Soviet Foreign Minister. The problems that concern the Soviet Union and the United States affect the peace of the world and the well-being of mankind. We will make every effort to improve prospects for peace. The United States, while firmly determined to defend its principles, its interests, and the principles and interests of its allies, will make every effort to bring about a more conciliatory and more peaceful world, and I hope that my talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister will help in this effort.

I would like to take this occasion to tell Chancellor Kreisky how much we have appreciated his visit to the United States and how much we have always valued his friendship and advice.

The President looks forward to seeing him in Salzburg in two weeks. I think it is a symbol of the importance of Austria, as a neutral independent state, that these meetings should be taking place in such a short period in this country.

I look forward to my stay in Austria. Thank you.

REMARKS FOLLOWING MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KREISKY, MAY 19

Press release 268 dated May 19

Ladies and gentlemen: As I indicated yesterday, we consider the Chancellor and Austria good friends of the United States. Whenever we have an opportunity we try to get the benefit of the thinking of Chancellor Kreisky and of his associates.

Austria is a small country, but it is located centrally in Europe, with a long tradition, and its security depends importantly on the maintenance of peace and good relations. Therefore we always try to take advantage of every opportunity to exchange views.

We had a very good and detailed talk about the world situation and particular problems that Foreign Minister Gromyko and I plan to discuss here. It is, of course, symbolic that we should be meeting here 20 years after the [Austrian] State Treaty, and we want to express our appreciation to Chancellor Kreisky, the Austrian Government, and to the Austrian people for the very warm reception we have had here.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, MAY 19 [1]

Q. Mr. Kissinger, did you make any progress on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]?

Secretary Kissinger: The Foreign Minister and I had a general review of the situation. We also discussed the European Security Conference, and we began a discussion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The talks were constructive and were conducted in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. We will resume tomorrow morning at 9:30. I would say that on the topics we discussed some progress was made.

Q. Will you go to the Middle East on your next discussions, Dr. Kissinger?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no plans to go to the Middle East tomorrow.

Q. How do you feel about it, Mr. Gromyko?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I agree with the Secretary, the conversation was useful. Well, I do not want to repeat. You were very precise, and (the talks were held) in a constructive and friendly atmosphere.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, MAY 20 [2]

Secretary Kissinger: The Foreign Minister and I had very good and useful discussions in a cordial atmosphere. We are going to issue a communique at 7:00 tonight, but I can say now that we agreed to meet again in the near future for a further detailed review of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, prospects of peace in the Middle East, and other matters of mutual interest.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I agree with the Secretary. We discussed several problems. All of them are important. I think, I am convinced, discussion is useful and it is necessary. We agreed, of course, to have further discussions with each other, how many of them we do not know, but at least one in the near future.

Q. Has any compromise been reached, sir, on the issue of verification, could you tell us?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It's a small detail.

Q. Verification is a small detail?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It's a small detail.

Q. It's been taken care of?

Secretary Kissinger: We can't go into the details of the various issues that were discussed, but as I said, the talks were useful and constructive, and we will meet again in the near future to go over any items that will still be unresolved at that point. Thank you.

Q. Did you discuss the Middle East, Dr. Kissinger?

Secretary Kissinger: The Middle East was discussed in detail.

Q. Did you agree on any date for the Geneva Conference?

Secretary Kissinger: We will meet again before that.

Q. Could the next meeting be in Vienna?

Secretary Kissinger: It hasn't been decided yet.

JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. STATEMENT, VIENNA, MAY 20

Press release 270 dated May 20

In accordance with an earlier agreement, a meeting was held on May 19–20, 1975, in Vienna between the Secretary of State of the United States and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, and Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., A. A. Gromyko.

The two sides were unanimous in emphasizing their determination to continue to adhere firmly to the course of further improving and developing U.S.-Soviet relations in the interests of the peoples

[1] Made at the conclusion of their meeting at the Hotel Imperial, Vienna (text from press release 269 dated May 20).

[2] Made at the conclusion of their meeting at the Soviet Embassy, Vienna (text from press release 273).

of both countries and of strengthening peace.

An exchange of views took place on bilateral relations including those pertaining to a further limitation of strategic offensive arms. Also discussed were a number of international problems of mutual interest—the progress of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its speedy conclusion; the situation with regard to a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East, including the question of resuming the Geneva Peace Conference; and other matters. In these discussions both sides proceeded from the agreements and understandings reached as a result of the U.S.-Soviet Summit meetings held in Moscow, Washington and Vladivostok.

The conversations which proceeded in a constructive spirit were, in the opinion of both sides, useful.

DEPARTURE, VIENNA, MAY 20

Press release 274 dated May 20

Ladies and gentlemen: I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Austrian Government and Chancellor Kreisky for having arranged our visit here in such a warm and technically excellent manner. The talks themselves were useful and were conducted in a friendly atmosphere, and progress was made on the issues that were discussed.

Of course, the work of peace is never finished, and therefore Foreign Minister Gromyko and I will meet again in the near future to review outstanding issues, especially on the Middle East and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, but also on other matters of bilateral concern.

On the whole I am satisfied with the visit here, and I leave with the conviction that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are essential for the preservation of peace and for the progress of mankind and that we will do our utmost to keep them on course.

Thank you very much.

ARRIVAL, BONN, MAY 20

Press release 275 dated May 20

Ladies and gentlemen: I would like to say that the relations between the Federal Republic and the United States are so excellent that it is not necessary, for that reason, to have periodic meetings of the Foreign Minister [Hans-Dietrich Genscher] and the Chancellor [Helmut Schmidt] and leading American officials. On the other hand, we consider the Federal Republic one of the key countries in the preservation of peace and in the achievement of progress in Europe, in the Atlantic area, and all over the world.

It is therefore necessary, from our point of view, that we consult regularly with the Federal Republic, and I look forward to an opportunity to exchange views with my friends the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor, whose views mean a great deal to us. I will report to them fully about my just-concluded meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko and talk to them also about East-West relations, the situation in the Middle East, the NATO summit, and any other matter of mutual interest.

It is for me always a great pleasure to visit the Federal Republic, where I know I am among friends, and a country which I know is a close ally and close associate.

Thank you very much.

DEPARTURE, BONN, MAY 21

Press release 279 dated May 21

Secretary Kissinger

I had very satisfactory talks in a very friendly atmosphere with the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor. We discussed all problems of Western relations and also our bilateral relations, which, as I said already yesterday, could not be better.

I am flying now to Berlin in order to express American ties to this brave city and to emphasize again our commitment to this city.

Foreign Minister Genscher

The talks with the American Secretary of State have again confirmed that the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States are in agreement in their assessment of all important world political questions.

We feel especially happy and grateful that the American Secretary of State is traveling to Berlin today. For us that is another confirmation of the ties of the United States to Berlin.

ARRIVAL, BERLIN, MAY 21

Press release 282 dated May 22

Ladies and gentlemen: I wanted to express the great pleasure at being able to visit Berlin. I am here to tell you on behalf of our President and of the American people that the close connection between the people of Berlin, between the security and freedom of Berlin and America, remains as valid today as it has throughout the postwar period.

No American can visit Berlin without a feeling of pride for what our people have together accomplished and a feeling of respect and admiration for the determination of Berlin to live in freedom and in security. So I look forward to being able to spend some hours in your city and to be inspired as we always are by the spirit of Berlin.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS AT THE U.S. MISSION, BERLIN, MAY 21

Press release 286 dated May 22

General Walker [Maj. Gen. Sam Walker, U.S. Commandant Berlin], ladies and gentlemen: I would like to tell you first of all how proud I am to be here in Berlin, a city which has been a focal point of American postwar efforts, a city in which Americans have every reason to be proud of their fortitude and of their association with the brave people who have stood for freedom throughout the postwar period. In America, in recent months, we have gone through some difficulties, and there are many, or at least there are some, who have questioned the role of America in the postwar period. I think that all of those who doubt what America has stood for should visit Berlin.

We remain committed to a strong foreign policy. We remain committed to defending our principles and our values, and we do not forget that the peace of the world has been preserved through American efforts and American cooperation with our allies, and we intend to maintain this.

You here in this city have had a very special role to play throughout the postwar period. The freedom of Berlin has become a test case of American commitments and of American purposes.

We are now in a period in which we are negotiating with the Soviet Union and with other countries of the Communist world. We sincerely attempt to ease tensions. Any responsible leader has an obligation to avoid the dangers of war, and no group has a greater interest in this than the military personnel that will have to bear the brunt of a conflict or people in a city such as this that would be exposed to changes in international climate. But never in this effort to relax tension will we give up our principles, and never will we sacrifice the values or the interests of our allies.

In this somewhat more complex world that exists, more complex than the early postwar period, we will not forget the city of Berlin. And the Americans here in their dedication, their reporting, play a very special role. I want you to know how honored I felt by the ceremony I was privileged to participate in, want you to know how much it means to me to come to this city, where the basic issues do not require so much explanation and where all of you are performing a great task for your country, for the free peoples, and indeed for the peace of the whole world.

Thank you very much.

ADDRESS BEFORE THE BERLIN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 21

Press release 276 dated May 21

Mr. Governing Mayor, Mr. Foreign Minister, ladies and gentlemen: It is an honor to be in this city whose fortitude has preserved the peace and whose devotion has inspired all who love freedom. The people of West Berlin know better than anyone what freedom means. They know—and have proven—that peace requires security as well as conciliation, courage as well as hope. They have experienced that freedom can be preserved only by those who have faith in themselves and in the dignity of man.

I do not come to Berlin to lecture to you

on the requirements of peace and freedom in the modern world. It is we who have learned, and you who have taught:

—You have endured and prevailed during the darkest days of confrontation between East and West.

—You have experienced in the cruel division of your own city the consequences of ideological hostility.

—You survived and prospered because the solidarity of the Western allies has buttressed your security and the security of Western Europe.

—And now, in a new era of eased confrontation in Europe, the fate of Berlin will determine the future of the efforts to insure security through negotiation and cooperation. As Berlin was the greatest symbol of the heroism of the immediate postwar period, it is also the acid test of the period we now hope to enter.

Throughout the postwar era, the United States has stood shoulder to shoulder with this city, in times of crisis and in times of hope. The strength of our commitment thus derives not from formal documents alone but, above all, from our perception of our own objective interest and of a generation of shared experiences.

The security of West Berlin remains a vital interest of the United States. For us, much more is at stake here than the security of a city. To us you symbolize man's unquenchable yearning for freedom; you represent the capacity of democracy to summon the strength to defend its values. This is the cement of our tie with you, our sympathy for you, and our admiration for you.

My visit does not come in the midst of crisis; rather it takes place at a moment when this city is enjoying greater security than at any time in the last 30 years. But we shall not slacken our resolve or neglect our security, for we know that it has been our determination and our strength which have made the present opportunity for progress possible. By working to make restraint and negotiation the only realistic option, we have created conditions for a more rational, hopeful, and reliable relationship with the East.

In the thermonuclear age, there is no alternative to peace. In the general interest —most of all of those whose homes would be the focal point of crisis—we seek just and reasonable solutions to outstanding issues. But America will never seek peace by abandoning principles or sacrificing friends.

In the delicate balance of relations between East and West, Berlin's position is pivotal. Throughout the period of détente the United States and its Western allies have shared the conviction that the hope of wider security and cooperation in Europe had to be vindicated in Berlin above all. We agreed that efforts to normalize relations in Central Europe had to begin with normalizing West Berlin's existence in safety and dignity.

Therefore we pressed for reliable, practical improvements in the conditions of access to Berlin and in life in this city; we made a major effort to remove Berlin as an issue in East-West confrontation. We consider the effectiveness, durability, and scrupulous observance of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of September 1971 a crucial test of the process called détente.

Given the complex history of the issue, we cannot expect the Quadripartite Agreement to work every day without flaw. But no one, East or West, can deny the practical benefits which have accrued to both sides from the agreement and the arrangements which followed .

Before 1972, traffic on the vital access routes between Berlin and the Federal Republic was vulnerable to harassment on a variety of pretexts. The relationship between Bonn and West Berlin was subject to continuing dispute. And cruelly and tragically, the human connections between the people of West Berlin and their friends and families in the surrounding area were being stifled by Eastern controls.

Today, by contrast:

—Vital surface access routes are guaranteed in an international agreement; unim-

peded and preferential civilian traffic is enshrined in formally agreed procedures.

—Communications between West Berlin and East Berlin, between West Berlin and the German Democratic Republic, have been improved. Direct telephone links now exist. Visits to the East now number in the millions annually, nearly 300,000 during the recent Easter holiday alone.

—The Western allies' rights and responsibilities to safeguard the status of the Western sectors of Berlin have been specifically reaffirmed.

—The Soviet Union has formally accepted that the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic "will be maintained and developed." It has agreed that Berlin's interests abroad be represented by the Federal Republic and that the Federal Republic provide consular protection and representation for Berlin in international organizations. Berlin is also included in the increasingly important web of agreements governing intra-German ties.

While these legal guarantees are not necessarily self-implementing, they represent a significant achievement. We shall never relax our efforts to insure the strict implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement. We shall deal with challenges with the same determination to resist pressures and with the same spirit of readiness to negotiate that produced the agreement. Thus only if Berlin flourishes will détente flourish; only if you are secure will Europe be secure. This has been America's attitude for 30 years; it has not changed. On behalf of President Ford and the American people, I reaffirm our historic relationship today.

Mr. Governing Mayor, Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished ladies and gentlemen: In this House resides the democratic tradition that gave Berlin the moral strength and resiliency to withstand the hardest trials of the last 30 years. And you embody the democratic ideals which represent Berlin's future.

The tradition of this House began in 1946 with an election which, tragically, remains the only free vote held in all sectors of Berlin since the war. In 1975 you mark the 25th anniversary of the Berlin Constitution, which has provided the framework for your growth and progress in freedom.

In the world today, democratic principles are under grave challenge on many continents. Over the next decade we will learn whether—in the face of economic stresses, military peril, and political change—free men have the will and imagination to vindicate the values they believe in. For these values, however vital, do not defend themselves nor do they grow without dedicated effort.

All great achievements were an ideal before they became a reality. What the free societies need above all is the confidence that they can shape their own future. Our material strength is undisputed and unmatched; what is required now is to summon our reserves of faith and dedication. The Atlantic nations have shown in countless endeavors in 30 years the tremendous strength of the free association of free peoples.

At moments of difficulty, it is well to remind ourselves of what we have achieved —the reality of security and progress to which men and nations have aspired throughout history. The preservation of these achievements, and the world's hope for wider sharing, depend crucially on what we do together.

I have come to Berlin to tell you that America remains committed to the building of a just and peaceful, secure, and free world. We know our moral compass. We shall be true to the belief in freedom, progress, and human dignity which reflects America's best hopes.

This is why this city means so much to us. For 30 years you have symbolized our challenges; but for 30 years also you have recalled us to our duty. You have been an inspiration to all free men.

As we face a new era, with challenges more subtle and complex, Berlin will continue to be a symbol of freedom. We shall stand with you, and we are confident that history will record Berlin not merely as a great city but as a great principle in the story of man's struggle for freedom.

TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, BERLIN, MAY 21 [3]

Mr. Governing Mayor, Mr. Foreign Minister, ladies and gentlemen: I appreciate your eloquent words and warm welcome. I have been coming to Berlin at infrequent but regular intervals since 1946. In general I have come from a westerly direction, where people sometimes feel the need of reassessment and are inclined to pull out their trees to see if the roots are still there.

This city has always been an inspiration to me, in difficult as well as calm times, because Berlin has always known where the fundamental values were and has always known the differences between freedom and terror and has always known that there are certain concessions that cannot be made.

The interdependence of the peoples of the West has found its major expression in Berlin, politically and strategically. As you said, Berlin is really in an impossible situation, but morally and politically we know—because we are reminded of this fact every day by the existence of Berlin—that there are things which are of fundamental value even though they cannot be measured by a computer.

One of these things is the freedom of Berlin. Were this to be impaired, the freedom and the self-respect of the West would receive a blow from which it could probably not recover.

Your courage is an inspiration for us. Our commitment to Berlin is partly legal. But neither in the United States nor in any country of the West is Berlin called into question.

Our fate is indivisible. We need your courage and determination just as much as you need our support. That is why it is important for me to be able to visit you now after some difficult times in America which, however, have not caused our contribution to the security of the world, the peace of the world, to lessen. The peace of the world has been maintained due to this American contribution.

I thank you also on behalf of Mrs. Kissinger for your warm reception in the spirit of the Berliners. I raise my glass to the Governing Mayor and Frau Schuetz and to the people of Berlin.

[3] Delivered at a luncheon given by Governing Mayor Klaus Schuetz (text from press release 285 dated May 22).

DEPARTURE, BERLIN, MAY 21

Press release 283 dated May 22

I want to say, ladies and gentlemen, that I would like to thank the Governing Mayor for the very warm reception that we have had here. As always, I leave Berlin with more courage, and I want to assure you that the commitment of the United States to Berlin not only remains unimpaired but will grow as our experiences together develop.

ARRIVAL, ANKARA, MAY 21

Press release 287 dated May 22

Ladies and gentlemen: I want to say first of all what a pleasure it is to be back in Turkey. I remember my reception here last March with the greatest warmth and the very useful talks I had with your government at the time.

My basic purpose in coming here is to attend my first meeting with the Central Treaty Organization. It happens at an important moment, and it gives me an opportunity to exchange with our allies their perception of the international situation under current conditions and also to affirm to them the basic theme of our foreign policy: that the United States will defend its interests and its principles and that it will stand by its friends in a forceful and understanding manner.

I also look forward to discussing with our host—with the Prime Minister [Süleyman Demirel] and the Foreign Minister [Ihsan Caglayangil]—the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. I will have an opportunity to express my gratification and the gratification of the President at the recent vote in the Senate for restoring

aid to Turkey. We will review the negotiations on Cyprus and other matters of common concern in the spirit of friendship and cooperation that characterizes our relationship.

STATEMENT BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF CENTO, MAY 22

Press release 289 dated May 22

Mr. Secretary General [Umit Bayülken], Mr. Prime Minister, Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, delegates, ladies and gentlemen: I am privileged to be here for the first time representing my country at the 22d meeting of Foreign Ministers of the nations of the Central Treaty Organization.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Turkey for the characteristically warm reception we have received and for the excellent arrangements they have made.

We meet at a timely moment when the United States is determined to reaffirm its ties to its allies. We meet at a moment when this region—at the crossroads of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and South Asia—has taken on an ever greater strategic, economic, and global importance.

We live in an era of rapid economic change and political turbulence. There have been disturbing tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. The Middle East stands poised on the brink either of new upheaval or of a hopeful process of movement toward peace. This region reflects, therefore, all the problems and hopes of a new era of international affairs. If our nations can thrive and maintain our collaboration, we will achieve much for ourselves, and we will contribute even more for the resolution of issues far wider in their impact and implications. We will demonstrate to our peoples and set an example for all peoples that even in an era of change men remain the masters of their own future.

President Ford has repeated before the Congress that "We will stand by our friends, we will honor our commitments, and we will uphold our country's principles." [4] The American people have learned, through experience that is irreversible, that our fate is closely linked with the rest of the world.

The world faces a new agenda—of economic progress, of relations between consumers and producers, of relations between developed and developing countries, of issues such as the law of the sea—in which the United States is in a unique position to make a vital contribution and determined to do so. And at this moment, after some months of trial, the American people are perhaps more conscious than in the recent past of the need to reaffirm our steadfastness of our dedication toward international peace, progress, and security.

Central to our foreign policy is the close relationship with our allies in NATO, of which Turkey is such an important member, and in Japan, and with our friends in other treaty relationships. Our relationships are based on considerations beyond security. Next week the Foreign Ministers of the International Energy Agency and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] will meet in Paris to underline the importance of economic cooperation and economic progress. At the end of the week President Ford will meet with his colleagues at a summit in Brussels to emphasize America's ties to its friends.

In today's world our associations aim at peace and not confrontation. We seek to engage the Communist powers in constructive relations on the basis of our continued strength and security, individual and collective. But as we strive for peace we shall never give up our principles or abandon our friends.

In recent years the United States has attempted to build a more durable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, as my colleagues here have similarly done. We have taken historic steps of strategic arms limitation, of bilateral cooperation in various fields, and of resolution of differences in such areas as Berlin—which I visited

[4] For President Ford's address before a joint session of Congress on Apr. 10, see BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1975, p. 529.

yesterday. At the same time we are determined that in areas where our interests are not parallel to the Soviet Union's there must be a practice of reciprocal restraint and responsibility. We have always insisted, and we shall continue to insist, that the easing of tensions cannot occur selectively.

The United States, as you know, has also taken historic steps in recent years to end decades of estrangement with the People's Republic of China. This new relationship has served the cause of peace not only in Asia but globally. The development and improvement of this relationship is one of the priorities of American policy.

All the members of this organization have been similarly outward-looking in their policies. We all have important relationships which have strengthened each of us and thus served a common interest.

Within this region, we face a new era of challenges more complex than those when this organization was created:

—Pakistan's economic progress since its trials of three and a half years ago has been extraordinary. The United States takes pride in having been associated with this endeavor.

Prime Minister Bhutto had a highly productive visit to Washington. The territorial integrity of Pakistan remains a principal interest of the United States. At the same time the United States strongly supports the promising process of accommodation on the subcontinent which was begun at Simla.

—The rapidity of Iran's modernization is one of the most impressive demonstrations of national dedication in the world today. The recent Washington visit of His Imperial Majesty was the occasion for deepening American-Iranian friendship and for increasing the already close economic cooperation. Iran's role for peace and stability in the region is vital. We welcome the improvement in its relations with its neighbors, including Iraq.

—The United States regards Turkey as a valued friend and ally. We will make every effort for further progress in restoring our normal defense relationship with Turkey. The United States strongly supports efforts aimed at ending the disputes between Turkey and Greece; for we consider their relationship important to the security of both countries, to the security of the Mediterranean, and to the security of Europe. We also will continue to do our utmost in the Cyprus dispute to encourage a just and durable solution that promotes the welfare of the people on the island and maintains the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Cyprus.

—The Arab-Israeli conflict remains a dangerous problem for the entire world. The two disengagement agreements established a momentum toward peace that the United States is committed to sustain. The challenge to diplomacy in the Middle East is to achieve agreement among the parties that will assure the territorial integrity, security, and right to national existence of all the states of the region and that will be seen to take into account the legitimate interests of all its peoples. Since the suspension of negotiations in March, we have reviewed the various approaches of assisting the parties to continue their progress. Our reassessment is still underway. But we are convinced that the present stalemate must not be allowed to continue. The United States has every intention of remaining actively involved; we shall promote practical progress toward a just and durable peace pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Our challenges—as previous speakers have pointed out—are not confined to the political field. Indeed, in an era of interdependence, peace must be built on many pillars.

—Energy is an area of increasing importance to all of us. This organization embraces countries which are consumers, others which are producers, and developing nations seriously affected by the recent crisis of shortage and increase in price. The well-being of all our countries is affected in different ways. My government believes that a fair solution can be found serving all our interests—the consumers in a reliable supply at reasonable price, the producers in reliable long-term income for development, and the poorer nations' need for special consideration. This promise cannot be realized through tactics of confrontation or by taking advantage of

temporarily favorable market conditions; such tactics will produce counter organization, and by undermining the world economic structure, will ultimately hurt producers as well as consumers. The United States will spare no effort to find a cooperative solution.

The accomplishments of CENTO in the political, security, and recently, economic fields are considerable. The cohesion of this organization, now in its third decade of existence, is a remarkable testimony to the common interests and values of the nations comprising it.

With the wise leadership of our distinguished new Secretary General, and with renewed determination that this alliance shall be a vehicle for close collaboration in all fields, CENTO can make a fresh contribution to this region's security and economic progress.

The President has asked me to underscore the continued commitment of my country to these fundamental aims. The United States is deeply conscious of our responsibility. We know that the future of the world depends very much on our contribution and perseverance. We will remain fully engaged because of our own self-interest, because of the responsibility our wealth and power confer upon us, and because only by standing by our friends can we be true to the values of freedom that have brought progress and hope to our people.

TEXT OF CENTO FINAL PRESS COMMUNIQUE

ANKARA, *May 23, 1975*—The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) held its 22nd Session in Ankara on May 22–23, 1975.

The delegations were led by:

Iran	H.E. Dr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Pakistan	H.E. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs;
Turkey	H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
United Kingdom	The Rt. Hon. Roy Hattersley, M.P. Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
United States	The Hon. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State.

The meeting was opened by H.E. Mr. Umit Halûk Bayülken, Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organization.

The Session was inaugurated by the message of H.E. Mr. Fahri Korutürk, President of the Republic of Turkey.

Following an address by H.E. Mr. Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey, opening statements were made by the leaders of delegations and the Secretary General of CENTO, expressing their thanks for the gracious message of the President of the Republic of Turkey and for the warm hospitality extended to them by the Turkish government.

H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister of Turkey, as representative of the Host Government presided at the Session.

In their discussions, held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, the Council examined the international situation since their meeting last year in Washington and noted with satisfaction that peace, stability and economic and social progress were maintained in the CENTO Region. The Ministers noted with regret, however, that many problems posing a threat to world peace still remained unresolved. During these discussions, particular attention was given to matters of interest in the CENTO Region and the Ministers reviewed intensively the prospects for further promoting co-operation within the Alliance in all possible fields.

The Ministers, affirming that their efforts for peace and stability would also contribute to world peace, confirmed their support for all constructive steps that would help strengthen the cause of peace.

Members of the Council also made statements regarding problems of peace and security which are of special interest to their countries.

The Ministers reiterated their firm support for respect for the principles and the purposes of the United Nations and stressed the necessity of strengthening its role in the service of world peace and stability.

The Council took note of the recent developments in the relations between Iran and Iraq, conducive to the settlement of their disputes.

Having reviewed the situation in the Middle East, the Ministers agreed that the prolonged conflict in the area continued to constitute a grave threat to world peace and emphasized the urgent need for the establishment of a just, honourable and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with the principles and provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 of November 22, 1967 and 338 of October 22, 1973.

The Council of Ministers exchanged views on developments in Europe, especially with reference to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). They expressed the hope that the CSCE would complete its work successfully in the near future and that there would

soon be corresponding progress in MBFR. In this context, the Ministers stressed that security in the CENTO Region constituted an important element in European security.

The Ministers noted the progress made during the past year towards the normalization of the situation in the South Asia Region. They expressed their appreciation of the efforts made by Pakistan despite difficulties, and expressed the hope that these efforts would continue between Pakistan and India with a view to paving the way towards a durable peace and security in the Region.

The Ministers re-affirmed the vital importance they attached to the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of each of the member states in this region.

The Council reviewed the Report of the Military Committee. They took note that combined forces of the Member Countries had gained valuable experience during the year from naval, ground and air exercises, successfully carried out under the auspices of CENTO. The Ministers emphasized that the sole purpose of these exercises was to enhance the ability of their countries to safeguard their security and legitimate national interests.

The Council reaffirmed its agreement that the economic programme constitutes an important element of the CENTO partnership.

The Council, bearing in mind the important contributions made by CENTO to the strengthening of the economic links between the Regional Countries, endorsed the recommendations of the Economic Committee to consider support for activities related to rural development, agriculture and agro-industries.

The Council approved the Report of the Twenty-third Session of the Economic Committee and noted that the programme of scientific cooperation and cultural exchanges continued to create still better understanding among the peoples of the region.

Reviewing the work of the Multilateral Technical Cooperation Programme and of the CENTO Scientific programme, the Council noted that their projects were increasing in number and diversity and were making significant inputs to the technical and scientific advancement of the region. The Council noted that contributions to the Multilateral Science Fund would be increased for the coming year.

The Ministers considered the continuing threats of subversion directed towards the region and expressed the determination of their Governments to meet any such subversion with all the means at their disposal.

Concluding their review, the Ministers noted with appreciation the Annual Report of the Secretary General and extended a warm welcome to him on his first attendance at the Ministerial Council as the Secretary General of CENTO.

The Ministers were received by the President of the Republic of Turkey.

The Council accepted the invitation of the Government of the United Kingdom to hold the next session in May 1976 in London.

REMARKS FOLLOWING OPENING SESSION OF CENTO MEETING, MAY 22 [5]

Mr. Koppel: (Question unclear, but concerns Syrian renewal of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force.) . . . did this surprise you and does it strengthen your hand?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am pleased by this result, and I think it gets us some more time to see whether progress can be made.

Mr. Koppel: Did you know this was going to happen?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not know it through the whole period. I think Syria decided this in the last two weeks.

Mr. Koppel: Why do you think the Syrians agreed to go ahead, in effect, of the Egyptians? The Egyptians have given only three months' mandate. Now the Syrians' mandate will go through until November.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to speculate on Syrian motives, but I think it is a constructive development which we hope will give us an opportunity to work for progress in a calmer atmosphere.

Mr. Koppel: Does it in any way strengthen your hand unilaterally, or would it have to be still within the Geneva context?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have always maintained the position that we will proceed on whatever course seems most promising, and we do not insist on any particular formula—whichever will work best. I intend to go to Geneva, and we are prepared to use other means.

Mr. Koppel: May I ask another question on a different subject? There were reports today that the United States is beginning to evacuate people, as of tomorrow, out of Laos. Can you enlighten us on that?

Secretary Kissinger: We have been reduc-

[5] Made in response to questions by Ted Koppel, ABC–TV (text from press release 290).

ing our personnel in Laos to make it conform more with the new political situation that has developed there, and in which, in the light of the harassment of our AID personnel, a reduction of at least regional offices is indicated. So there will be a very substantial reduction of our presence in Laos.

Mr. Koppel: Is this a complete evacuation?

Secretary Kissinger: It is not a complete evacuation at this point.

Mr. Koppel: Thank you very much.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL, MAY 22 [6]

Q. (First part unintelligible) . . . are you optimistic about any movement?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, the Foreign Minister has just returned from a conversation with the Greek Foreign Minister. The President will meet both the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers at Brussels, and there will be many other occasions for exchanges, and no doubt the Turkish Government will evaluate the results of its conversations. But basically, I am always optimistic that progress can be made.

Q. Did you also discuss, sir, the lifting of the arms embargo?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We discussed the lifting of the arms embargo. As both the President and I have stated on many occasions, military aid to Turkey and the sale of arms to Turkey is not an act of American charity. It is something that is in the mutual interest of two allies. And therefore we oppose using the sale of equipment or military aid as a form of pressure. When the Congress reconvenes, we will pursue our proposals with the House of Representatives, and we hope that we will achieve a recognition of our point of view.

Q. Sir, there was a report in the Turkish press today—one newspaper—that you would mediate between Mr. Demirel's government and Mr. [Bulent] Eçevit on the Cyprus issue.

Secretary Kissinger: [Laughter.] Well, as you know, Mr. Eçevit is a student of mine, and I respect him very much, and I am having breakfast with him tomorrow morning. I am not mediating, but I will express my views to him, and we will have a good exchange as always.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I have nothing more to add to what Mr. Kissinger said. He summed up our talks very well.

Q. Will [Greek Prime Minister Constantine] Karamanlis and Demirel meet? Is there anything scheduled?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: There will be a talk between Demirel and Karamanlis in Brussels.

Q. Mr. Caglayangil, did you inform the Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, what the Turkish Government would do if the arms embargo was not lifted?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: We do not make any hypothetical comments.

Q. In your talk you said that if the embargo is not lifted in the near future, Turkey would be left in a position where she would have to reconsider her relations with the United States. What do you mean by "near future"?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Near future means the near future.

Q. Does this mean in summer or by the end of the year?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Naturally, it will be up to the decision to be taken by the government. It is not up to me to decide this period.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND BULENT ECEVIT, MAY 23 [7]

Q. Well, we were wondering about the Prime Minister's statement to Le Monde. It

[6] Made following their meeting at the Turkish Foreign Ministry (text from press release 291 dated May 23).

[7] Made before and after a breakfast meeting at the home of Mr. Eçevit, Republican People's Party leader and former Prime Minister of Turkey (text from press release 294).

seems to have been taken by surprise in Athens (sic). Do you have any comments on that speech?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I do not think I should make any comment on the Prime Minister's statement. I had a talk with him yesterday, and I will see him again today about the possibilities of negotiations. But I better wait until I see him again.

Q. You do not think that it has been detrimental to a summit meeting in Brussels between Karamanlis and Demirel?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that has to be decided by the individuals primarily concerned. But I think that Turkey will make a serious effort to negotiate.

Q. Do you think that this time it will be more successful than the Rome meetings?

Secretary Kissinger: I just do not want to speculate. I am always hopeful that progress can be made.

Q. Do you have the impression that the opposition parties in Turkey are actually being more difficult about the Cyprus case now than they did before?

Mr. Eçevit: It is not fair asking that question while I am here. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I have not even had a chance to talk to Mr. Eçevit. But I cannot imagine that he will be difficult or do anything which is not in the best interests of Turkey.

Q. (In Turkish to Mr. Eçevit) It is being said that the RPP [Republican People's Party] has separated itself from the government on the Cyprus issue and that the RPP is not of the same opinion as others on this. Would you please comment?

Mr. Eçevit: (In Turkish) As I have explained to you on many occasions, a political party cannot conduct a country's foreign policy when not in power. And if it tries to conduct this policy, it would be both an error and a presumptuous action; and the fact is that the government has not yet made a detailed announcement of its policy.

It would be a mistake if the opposition takes the lead and announces its view before the government has announced its own policy or explains its policy to the opposition. This is something which can never take place in a democratic country. For this reason we are waiting to see what position the government will take.

Q. (In Turkish) Would you please explain why Mr. Necdet Uygur (RPP leader in Parliament) was not sent to lobby in the United States with other parliamentarians?

Mr. Eçevit: (In Turkish) We do not believe that this issue can be solved with such lobbying. And our parliamentarians and diplomatic friends could not be as convincing as Mr. Kissinger—

Secretary Kissinger: Steady now—

Mr. Eçevit: (In English) I will tell you what I said. (In Turkish)—in explaining to the Congress the reason the arms embargo on Turkey should be lifted. (In English) You see, she asked me, Mrs. Yalcin asked me, a question of the Foreign Ministry and suggested that we should send a small group of parliamentarians for lobbying in your Congress. We thought it would be useless—it could not be the right way—and she asked the reason why. I said, after all we cannot expect our parliamentarians to explain the reasons for lifting the embargo to the Congressmen better than Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger is in a much better position to explain the situation, and so we thought it would be a futile task. I am sure the Administration is doing everything to explain to the Congressmen that the embargo should be lifted.

Secretary Kissinger: As I said yesterday, we will do our utmost when the Congress reconvenes early in June to secure a lifting of the embargo.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you believe that the Congressmen will be satisfied that the dialogue has started but that it will take a long time to come to an agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want to speculate on what the Congress will do. The President and I will present our strong convictions to the Congress, and we will present our view that aid to Turkey is not

given as a favor to Turkey but in the mutual interest of the United States and Turkey, and we hope they will see it the same way. Maybe we will answer the rest afterwards.

Mr. Eçevit: Yes, yes, I think the coffee is getting cold.

[Following breakfast.]

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Eçevit and I had a very good talk. As you know, we are old friends, so we can talk very frankly and very completely. It was, of course, not an occasion to make any decisions. But we had a very good review of international affairs in general and of the Cyprus question in particular.

Mr. Eçevit: (In Turkish) My wife, myself, and my friends have been most pleased to welcome Mr. Kissinger and his esteemed friends at my home. At times of very important developments, my old friend and esteemed statesman Mr. Kissinger and I had found opportunity to talk even if this was over the telephone, and in this meeting we have taken the opportunity to discuss both the Cyprus issue and world issues in general.

It was a very useful meeting for me. Naturally, since we are not in power, reaching any agreement or taking a decision was out of the question. We only discussed our views on important issues. It was a very frank discussion. (Begin English) It was very nice of you to come.

Secretary Kissinger: Very nice to see you, too.

Mr. Eçevit: Give my best regards to Mrs. Kissinger.

Q. Has he given you any assurances about the role of the opposition on the Cyprus question?

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed the Cyprus question, and I am certain that it will be a responsible role as he has always said it would be.

Q. Did you like your breakfast?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, it was a Turkish breakfast. It was very good. It was a little fattening, I would say. [Laughter] Goodby. It was very nice to see you again.

Mr. Ecevit: Goodby.

Q. Will you come to Turkey again?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know. I always like to come to Turkey.

REMARKS AT THE U.S. EMBASSY, ANKARA, MAY 23

Press release 296 dated May 23

Mr. Ambassador [William B. Macomber], ladies and gentlemen: Wherever I have appeared the Ambassador has warned me that I must be extremely serious, and he has particularly warned me that the Foreign Service personnel here, not being used to my flatulations, must not be teased or criticized in any way whatsoever. So I have to tell you, however, that when Wells Stabler was sworn in as Ambassador to Spain, he said that the highest praise he ever got in the Department of State was the absence of abuse and that one day after he had worked for 24 straight hours I told him to go home and get some rest. He was elated that I paid any attention to him. But when he got home he had second thoughts and said, well, maybe I had lost interest in him. So he had another sleepless night and came in. And only after I made him rewrite a 10-page memorandum five times in two hours did he feel reassured, and then he went home and had a good night's sleep.

But I know the Ambassador doesn't treat you like this. And I wanted to reassure the Foreign Service officers that are assembled here that I am slowly getting housebroke. That is, I sign without question one out of five cables that are submitted to me, and in another year or two, I will sign most of them like good Secretaries of State should.

But, seriously, I want you to know that I have followed the work of this post with special interest. You have been here, and you are here, at a very difficult period. I think all of you here know how important our relation with Turkey is, and all of you know that that relationship is undergoing some strains as a result of decisions not recommended by the Embassy nor approved of by the Department of State, and so you have to navigate

under difficult circumstances and make progress in a complex situation here and, I may say, in a complex domestic situation in America.

We consider Turkey one of the key countries with which we are associated and one of our key allies. And with the extraordinary assistance of Ambassador Macomber, we are trying to get through this period in a way that hopefully even strengthens the long-term relationship.

I read the reports from this post with greater care than from many, and I want you to know that I consider that the work that has been done here has been extraordinary.

Beyond the relationship with Turkey, our entire international position has undergone some extraordinarily difficult months. No one should kid himself that the way the war in Indochina ended did not mortgage American foreign policy all over the world, whatever one may think or may have thought of various phases of our involvement earlier. But I also wanted you to know that the President, the senior members of the Administration, are determined that the United States continue to play a major role in the world.

We do this not out of any vanity, but because, if you look back at the postwar period beginning with the Greek-Turkish aid program, I think you will agree that—the fact that global peace has been preserved and that has been due importantly to American efforts. And most of the progress that has been made has been—in other fields—has been due to initiatives or at least American participation.

For us to withdraw into ourselves would invite conflict and chaos, and we have absolutely no intention of permitting this to happen. So with all the difficulties that America has experienced, we are determined to conduct a strong and a forward-looking policy, and we want to conduct ourselves with self-assurance and with conviction.

And posts such as this can make a major contribution, and I want you to know that what you do here is appreciated and that we depend on you and count on you.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS, ANKARA, MAY 23 [8]

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, we consider Turkey a good friend and a close ally, and we want to retain this relationship of friendship and alliance.

We are aware of difficulties that have arisen as a result of actions that our executive in America has opposed. And I have told the Turkish leaders and the Prime Minister, with whom I had a good and constructive talk, that we would do our utmost to restore all the relationships that should exist between Turkey and the United States.

In that spirit of friendship, we reviewed the relationships on all levels between our countries and also international affairs, including the Cyprus problem. The United States is not acting as a mediator, but whenever it can be helpful to bring about a just solution, it is willing to give whatever help it is asked to do.

I would like to thank the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister for the very cordial reception we have had here, for the very good talks we have had, and I look forward to seeing them both in Brussels next week with our President. Thank you, Mr. Foreign Minister. Thank you, see you next week.

Q. Mr. Minister, would you take a few questions?

Secretary Kissinger: Go ahead.

Q. There are reports in the American press this morning that you are not very optimistic—or rather, pessimistic about the voting in the House of Representatives on the lifting of the embargo.

Secretary Kissinger: The reports have no basis. And after the President returns from the NATO summit, he will submit his recommendations to the House of Representatives.

DEPARTURE, ANKARA, MAY 23

Press release 296A dated May 23

As I leave a very useful meeting of CENTO, I would like to express my appre-

[8] Made following a meeting with Prime Minister Demirel (text from press release 295).

ciation and that of my colleagues to, first, the Secretary General of CENTO for having conducted the meetings in such an efficient and thoughtful manner and, secondly, to the Government of Turkey for the excellent arrangements that were made.

We consider Turkey an old friend and ally, and we greatly value our relationship with Turkey. We will do our utmost to remove any impediments to good relations, and when we return to the United States after the meetings at the summit, we will talk to our Congress in that sense.

The talks I have had here have been useful, and I hope that they will help promote a peaceful evolution in this area. The United States is prepared to give whatever help is requested. We are not acting as mediators, but we are willing and ready to assist any of the parties who think we can be of use.

So I would again like to express my appreciation to the Government and people of Turkey and the Secretary General.

Thank you very much.

The Shah of Iran Makes State Visit to the United States

His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran, made a state visit to the United States May 14–18. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington May 15–17. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and His Imperial Majesty at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on May 15, their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening, and their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the Embassy of Iran on May 16.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, MAY 15

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 19

President Ford

It is an honor to welcome our distinguished guests, His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran and Her Imperial Majesty the Shahbanou, once again to our national capital.

The visit of Your Imperial Majesties reflects the cordial personal and close governmental relations between the United States and Iran through many administrations. Ours is an old and tested friendship; it will continue to be so in the future.

Since Your Imperial Majesties last visited Washington, the world has seen many changes. But throughout this period the U.S. commitment to peace and progress for the world has remained firm. Our commitment to a continuity of relations and constructive cooperation with friends such as Iran has remained constant, even while the world has changed.

We continue to build on the longstanding foundation of our mutual interests and aspirations. The United States and Iran have expanded and intensified cooperation on many fronts. Together, we can create an example for others to follow in the new era of interdependence which lies ahead.

Iran is an amazing country—an ancient civilization that through the centuries has retained its distinctive national identity and culture. In recent years, Iran has achieved remarkable progress, serving as a model of economic development. Its extraordinary achievements have been inspired by one of the world's senior statesmen, our distinguished visitor, His Imperial Majesty.

I look forward, Your Imperial Majesty, to the talks which we shall have during your visit to review what has been accomplished by our two nations and to explore new dimensions for harmonizing the interests of our two nations and increasing the coopera-

tion between us in the cause of peace and prosperity for our two peoples and for the world.

On behalf of Mrs. Ford and the American people and our Government, it is my pleasure to welcome Their Imperial Majesties to Washington.

His Imperial Majesty

Mr. President: It is indeed an honor for the Shahbanou and myself for being the guests of President Ford and Mrs. Ford. This is not our first visit to your country—it dates back a long time ago when, for the first time, I set foot on this land of the free and the brave.

Since that day, and even before, very solid relations of friendship existed between our two countries. In the old days, we were looking to America as our friend and also the friend of all people who were striving for liberty and dignity. That feeling of my country toward yours and your people is today stronger than ever.

We would like to let you know that this friendship will never change on our part, because it was based not on selfish interest, but more on the basis that we share common ideals. I am sure that you will stand for those ideals as we will stand by them.

As you mentioned, Mr. President, the world is changing, and very rapidly—sometimes for the better and sometimes, I hope not, for the worse. But in that changing world, those who remain faithful to the principles of human dignity and human liberties will have, in a spirit of interdependence, to try to, if necessary, create that new world.

The new world must not be created by just a succession of events, but it must be created by the good will of countries deciding to create that world on a basis of more equality and justice.

My country will be alongside the United States in the creation of that new world. I am sure that during the privilege of my meetings with you, Mr. President, and the talks that we will have, we shall forge the way for this better world in the most harmonious possible way between our two countries.

I bring the greetings of the people of my country to the great people of America, wishing you the best of luck and ever more prosperity and happiness.

Thank you, Mr. President, for your very kind invitation.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS AT A DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MAY 15

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 19

President Ford

Your Imperial Majesties the Shahanshah and Shahbanou: I warmly welcome the Imperial Majesties to the White House this evening, and I am sure by the reception that has been indicated here, everybody joins me on this wonderful occasion.

Your visit here is, of course, a tribute to the long legacy of a very close and very cooperative tie between Iran and the United States, and I hope, on the other hand, that you will think upon this as a visit between old friends.

I am the seventh President, Your Imperial Majesty, to have met with you on such an occasion. The facts speak volumes for the continuity and the duration of our bilateral relations and the importance that we attach to the broadening and the deepening of those ties and those interests of peace and progress throughout the world. These are objectives to which the United States remains deeply committed. These objectives Iran shares with us.

Our nations have thus brought together a very unique relationship, working together cooperatively for the past several decades on the basis of a mutual respect, and I am looking forward to continuing this great tradition with yourself, and this country and your country. And it is, as I see it, a living and a growing tradition.

Recently, our common bonds have acquired a new scope as Iran, under Your Imperial Majesty's wise leadership, has made extraordinary strides in its economic de-

velopment and its relationships with other countries of its region and the world.

The progress that you have made serves as a superb model to nations everywhere. Iran has moved from a country once in need of aid to one which last year committed a substantial part of its gross national product to aiding less fortunate nations.

Iran is also playing a very leading role in what we hope will be a very successful effort to establish a more effective economic relationship between the oil producers, the industrialized nations, and the developing nations.

As an indication of Iran's economic importance to the world scene, I am impressed that civilian non-oil trade between the United States and Iran is expected to total over $20 billion by 1980.

The present period will be seen by historians as a very major milestone in Iran's ancient and very glorious history. The leader whose vision and dynamism has brought Iran to this stage, His Imperial Majesty, is clearly one of the great men of his generation, of his country, and of the world.

Just as Iran's role and potential goes far beyond its own border, so, too, His Imperial Majesty is one of the world's great statesmen. His experience of over 30 years as Iran's leader has been marked by dedication to progress and prosperity at home and significant contributions to the cause of peace and cooperation abroad.

We deeply value our friendship and our ties with Iran, and we will remain strong in that friendship, now and for the future. In an interdependent world, we remain deeply grateful for the constructive friendship of Iran, which is playing a very important role in pursuit of a more peaceful, stable, and very prosperous world. And we, for our part, remain constant in our friendship with this great country. We pledge ourselves to insuring that our ties are creatively adjusted to meet the pressing problems and changing realities of the present world.

On a more personal note, let me add that Mrs. Ford and I have felt great pleasure in welcoming Her Imperial Majesty the Shahbanou of Iran on this visit. Your Imperial Majesty's dedication to progress within your country is widely known, as is your warmth and your beauty and your graciousness. Your presence is a high honor for us on this occasion.

Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome our distinguished guests, Their Imperial Majesties, and I ask that you join me in proposing a toast to Their Imperial Majesties the Shahanshah and Shahbanou of Iran.

His Imperial Majesty

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, distinguished guests: It is difficult to find words to express our sentiments of gratitude for the warm welcome that you, Mr. President and Mrs. Ford, have reserved for us today.

I wanted to come to this country that I knew before to meet the President of this country for whom we have developed, since he assumed this high office, a sentiment of respect for a man who is not shrinking in front of events. And may I congratulate you for the great leadership and the right decisions that you took for your country and, may I add, for all the peoples who want to live in freedom.

This is precisely what this world needs—courage, dignity, and love of the other human being. We are proud of being a good and, I believe, a trusted friend of the United States of America, and this will continue because this friendship is based on permanent and durable reasons—these reasons being that we share the same philosophy of life, the same ideals. And I could not imagine another kind of living which would be worth living.

Your country has been of great help to us during our time of needs. This is something that we do not forget as what Iran can do in this changing world and this world of interdependency. In addition to our continuous friendship with you, we will try to be of any utility and help to other nations which would eventually need that help.

I have got to look to the future of the world—with all the seriousness of the situation—with hope because, without it, it will

be very difficult to work and to plan.

In that future, I know that we are going to walk together, work together to uphold the ideals in which we believe—for a world which will be rid of its present difficulties, a world which will not know again the word of famine, illiteracy, sickness, and disease.

Thank you again, Mr. President, for the warm sentiments of friendship that you have shown toward my country and my people. I only can reciprocate the same feelings for yourself and the great people of the United States and, in doing so, I would like to ask this distinguished audience to rise for a toast to the health of the President of the United States of America, of Mrs. Ford, and the people of America.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS AT A DINNER AT THE EMBASSY OF IRAN, MAY 16

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 19

His Imperial Majesty

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: Will you rise for a toast to the health of the President of the United States of America and Mrs. Ford.

President Ford

Your Imperial Majesties Shahanshah and Shahbanou of Iran: Let me say that it has been a great experience becoming well acquainted with you, discussing matters of great importance to our respective countries and to the many problems that we mutually face, and others face, throughout the world.

I have been impressed, Your Majesty, with the friendship that you have long shown to our country. And I have been greatly impressed with the long friendship between our peoples and the mutual dedication that all of us have from our respective countries to a betterment for your country and for ours and for the world at large.

Your Excellencies, and others, will you join me, please, in a toast to the Shahanshah and Shahbanou of Iran.

U.S. Regrets Misunderstanding With Government of Thailand

Following is the text of a diplomatic note delivered by U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Edward Masters to the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Chatchai Choonavan, at Bangkok on May 19 (formal introductory and closing paragraphs omitted).

The United States regrets the misunderstandings that have arisen between Thailand and the United States in regard to the temporary placement of marines at Utapao to assist in the recovery of the SS Mayaguez. There is a long tradition of close and warm relations between the United States and Thailand, a tradition which has helped our two countries face many difficult periods together.

To inform the Royal Thai Government of the facts surrounding the seizure and recovery of the Mayaguez, there is enclosed an account of the incident [1] drawn substantially from the report President Ford submitted to the United States Congress on May 15. As this account demonstrates, speed of action was essential. The actions and public statements of the new Cambodian regime indicated to us that any delay in recovering the ship and rescuing the crew could have had the most serious consequences.

It is clear that by its action the United States was able to counter a common danger to all nations and to the world's ocean commerce presented by this illegal and unwarranted interference with international shipping routes in the Gulf of Thailand.

The United States Government wishes to express its understanding of the problem caused the Royal Thai Government by these procedures and wishes to repeat its regret. The policy of the United States continues to be one of respecting the sovereignty and independence of Thailand. The unique circumstances that have led to the recent turn of events do not alter this traditional relation-

[1] Not printed here.

ship, and are not going to be repeated; the Government of the United States looks forward to working in harmony and friendship with the Royal Thai Government.

Public Corporation Established To Operate East-West Center

Statement by John Richardson [1]

On behalf of the Department of State, I welcome the news from Hawaii that Governor George Ariyoshi has signed legislation establishing a public corporation to administer the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West, known as the East-West Center.

Since its establishment by Congress in 1960, the East-West Center has played an increasingly significant role in intercultural understanding, bringing together more than 27,000 students and experts from nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. Incorporation is a logical step in further development of this unique national institution so well designed to contribute to the human dimension of our international relations.

The Department of State is grateful to the members of the University of Hawaii Board of Regents, who have rendered outstanding service to our country in governing the East-West Center from its beginning, and we wish to express appreciation also to the President and faculty of the university for their continuing commitment to the success of the Center.

I believe incorporation will help the East-West Center continue to grow in distinction and to serve even more effectively the broad interests of the nation in achieving mutual comprehension and respect between the peoples of the United States and of Asia and the Pacific.

[1] Issued on May 14 (text from press release 256); Mr. Richardson is Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. For further details on the legislation, see press release 256.

Foreign Service Examination

Press release 152 dated March 17

More than 11,800 persons took the written examination for the Foreign Service on December 7, 1974, in cities throughout the United States and at many Foreign Service posts abroad.

The written examination, given once a year in December, is the first step in the competitive selection of new Foreign Service officers and Foreign Service information officers for appointment to the Department of State and the United States Information Agency (USIA). The 1,750 who passed the most recent written examination are now eligible for an oral examination given by panels of examiners in Washington and in a number of other large cities in the United States. Candidates who are recommended from the oral examination undergo further processing after which a final review of their qualifications is made. From those who successfully complete the entire examination and selection process, the Department of State plans to appoint some 200 new officers and the U.S. Information Agency about 25 during the next fiscal year.

In recent years the Department of State has increased its efforts to recruit more junior officers who not only have the broad general background required of all Foreign Service officers but whose interest and skills lie in the economic/commercial and administrative fields. The Department and USIA also are making positive efforts to increase the proportion of women and members of minority groups entering the Foreign Service and have conducted specialized recruiting for them.

The Foreign Service is open to U.S. citizens 21 years of age and over. There are no specific educational requirements, and although most successful candidates are college graduates, no formal college degree is required. Information about the December 1975 examination will be available in July and may be obtained by writing to the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Post Office Box 9317, Rosslyn Station, Arlington, Virginia 22209.

Department Gives Views on Proposed Legislation Concerning Executive Agreements

Statement by Monroe Leigh
Legal Adviser [1]

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to consider with you an issue of fundamental importance both to the constitutional system of the United States and to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The subject of executive agreements has recently been the focus of very considerable interest and study in the Congress, and we welcome this examination as a means of further strengthening the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in a vital area of government decisionmaking.

Similar hearings held by this subcommittee in 1972 on the question of executive agreements were, in my view, extremely valuable. Since recent U.S. practice with respect to international agreements was set forth in some detail in our statement to the subcommittee in 1972, I do not wish to review that material again.[2] However, I think it might be useful to begin this morning by touching on two recent developments that relate directly to executive-legislative relationships in this area.

As the subcommittee is aware, on August 22, 1972, the President signed into law Public Law 92–403, known as the Case Act, under which the Secretary of State is required to transmit to the Congress the text of any international agreement other than a treaty, to which the United States has become a party, no later than 60 days after its entry into force. Since the adoption of the Case Act, the Department of State has transmitted the texts of 657 executive agreements to the Congress. In addition, although not required by law to do so, the Department has also transmitted with each agreement a background statement setting forth in some detail the context of the agreement, its purpose, negotiating history, and effect.

The Case Act makes special provision for transmittal of agreements "the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States . . ." These agreements are transmitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on International Relations under "an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President." Since the adoption of the Case Act, the executive branch has entered into and the Department has transmitted to the Congress 29 agreements under this category.

A second development of major importance in the three years since hearings were

[1] Made before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on May 13. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

[2] For a statement made before the subcommittee by Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson on May 18, 1972, see BULLETIN of June 19, 1972, p. 840.

held on this subject has been the revision of the Department's Circular 175 procedure.[3] The revised procedure has two objectives: (1) to meet requests by members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to clarify the guidelines to be considered in determining whether a particular international agreement should be concluded as a treaty or as another form of international agreement; and (2) to strengthen provisions on consultation with the Congress.

With respect to the consultation provisions, section 723.1(e) of the Circular 175 procedure now requires those responsible for negotiating significant new international agreements to advise appropriate congressional leaders and committees of the President's intention to negotiate such agreements, to consult during the course of any negotiations, and to keep Congress informed of developments affecting them, including especially whether any legislation is considered necessary or desirable for the implementation of the new treaty or agreement.

The procedure also requires consultation with the Congress when there is a question whether an agreement should be concluded as a treaty or in some other form.

Mr. Chairman, in my view, further development of our procedures for consultation with the Congress remains the most fruitful approach to an acceptable institutional framework for executive-legislative cooperation in the making of international agreements. Perhaps using the new Circular 175 procedure as a starting point, we might be able to develop better institutional methods for achieving the common goal of enhancing the role of Congress without unduly constraining the effective conduct of U.S. foreign policy. After examining with you the bills before us as one possible approach toward this goal, I shall return to this theme.

Constitutional Deficiencies of Proposed Bills

Mr. Chairman, the bill introduced by Senator [Lloyd M.] Bentsen on February 7 (S. 632) would require that all executive agreements made on or after the date of the bill's enactment be submitted for congressional review. Such agreements would enter into force only after a 60-day waiting period from the date of transmittal, unless within that period both Houses agreed to a concurrent resolution stating that both Houses do not approve of the agreement.

Section 5 of the Bentsen bill provides that these requirements "shall not apply to any executive agreements entered into by the President pursuant to a provision of the Constitution or prior authority given the President by treaty or law." This section, as we read the bill, would limit the bill's application since all executive agreements are negotiated by the President under the authority of the Constitution and all are entered into pursuant to the Constitution or prior statute or treaty. My interpretation of section 5 is that it excludes from application all categories of executive agreements. Even if a different interpretation were placed on section 5, only a tiny fraction, at most, of such agreements would be covered by the bill.

The Glenn bill (S. 1251), introduced on March 20, is much broader. It contains a similar 60-day waiting period, but it provides that executive agreements, very broadly defined, are subject to a one-House veto—by the Senate alone—rather than a two-House veto.

The Glenn bill and the Bentsen bill without section 5 would, in my view, be unconstitutional if enacted into law as presently written. They would appear to rest upon an assumption that there is no independent constitutional authority in the President to conclude executive agreements. It is true that the vast majority of executive agreements are made pursuant to statute or treaty, but some agreements are concluded under the authority of the President's independent constitutional power. With these Congress may not constitutionally interfere. This view is not peculiar to the Department of State or to the executive branch generally. Rather it has long been accepted by legal scholars and by the Supreme Court of the

[3] Department of State Circular 25, May 15, 1953, superseded in 1955 by Circular 175, codified in 11 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) secs. 700 *et seq.*

United States. I refer to *U.S.* v. *Belmont*, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and *U.S.* v. *Pink*, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).

Several provisions of the Constitution have long been held to authorize the making of executive agreements. Most generally, article II, section 1, provides that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." In the case of *U.S.* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), the Supreme Court indicated that inherent in this executive power is the power to conduct foreign relations. Quoting John Marshall, the Court said that "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations . . . ." The Court also noted that the "powers of external sovereignty" of the nation included "the power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense." The executive power clause enables the President to conclude agreements for the purpose of settling differences with other governments in order to insure the satisfactory continuation of diplomatic relations.

Article II, section 2, of the Constitution provides that "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy . . . ." Many wartime agreements concerning military matters, such as armistices, force deployments, and control of occupied areas, have been concluded under this authority.

The power to appoint and receive ambassadors and other public ministers, found in article II, sections 2 and 3, has been recognized by the Supreme Court, in the *Belmont* and *Pink* cases, as a basis for executive agreements incident to the recognition of foreign governments, such as the settlement of claims against foreign governments.

Mr. Chairman, if there is one issue upon which all observers agree, it would be recognition of the President's authority to conclude certain executive agreements, even if within a narrow category, under the powers granted him by the Constitution and without congressional interference or limitation. While the range of such agreements is narrow, and the total number thereof is no more than 2–3 percent of all U.S. executive agreements, it is nevertheless an important aspect of Presidential powers. There is no method short of constitutional amendment whereby the President's independent constitutional authority to conclude executive agreements may be limited. For this reason alone, the Glenn bill as it now reads, and the Bentsen bill without section 5, would be unconstitutional if enacted.

Legislative Veto Provisions

There is another feature of these bills which renders them defective on constitutional grounds. In those areas of foreign policy in which both the President and the Congress share responsibility, the President is frequently authorized by treaty or statute to conclude executive agreements. In my opinion such treaty or statutory authority to enter into executive agreements may not constitutionally be overridden or amended either by means of a concurrent resolution as provided in the Bentsen bill, or by the Senate acting alone, as envisaged by the Glenn bill. Such procedure would be contrary to article I, section 7, of the Constitution, which requires that:

> Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

In my view, this mandatory language of the Constitution was intended to apply to any congressional action having legislative effect, or having the force of law. Since Assistant Attorney General [Antonin] Scalia will shortly present a detailed analysis of this issue in his statement, I will not review the background and constitutional history of article I, section 7. Suffice it to say that one of the primary purposes of the provision was to insure that Congress could not, through the technique of characterizing particular enactments having legal force as "orders" or "resolutions," evade the neces-

sity of Presidential participation in the legislative process.

It is true that legislative veto provisions have been enacted into law on many occasions since the early 1930's. But there are several factors that render these enactments of little value as legal precedent to support the Bentsen and Glenn bills.

First, such laws as do exist providing for a legislative veto have been attacked on constitutional grounds by many authorities on constitutional law. There have been no court tests of the validity of any of these acts, and the constitutional law questions they raise are not settled. The Bentsen and Glenn bills would raise these questions in a very new and disturbing way. Let us take one example.

Congress has granted the President specific authority to enter into P.L. 480 executive agreements:

> . . . the President is authorized to negotiate and carry out agreements with friendly countries to provide for the sale of agricultural commodities for dollars on credit terms or for foreign currencies. (7 U.S.C. 1701.)

Now suppose that Congress, in a shift of policy having nothing to do with the merits of any particular executive agreement, decides it no longer approves of this P.L. 480 policy, but does not wish to repeal the statute directly. It would have the option, if the Bentsen or Glenn bills were constitutionally valid, of automatically passing resolutions of disapproval of each and every P.L. 480 executive agreement thereafter entered into by the President. If the option is exercised, is there any doubt that the original statutory authority has been effectively repealed without the Presidential participation required by article I, section 7?

Or suppose that the Congress decides that it no longer approves of the phrase "or for foreign currencies" in Public Law 480. The Bentsen and Glenn bills would give the Congress the option of disapproving by concurrent resolution all P.L. 480 agreements in which agricultural commodities are agreed to be sold for foreign currencies. If Congress has power to exercise such an option, the clear effect is to amend the original statutory authority without Presidential participation.

In the most formalistic sense, the original statute still stands. But in substantive effect, the original legislative authority has been rendered unusable.

Second, the legislative precedents that do exist date only from the 1930's and are inconsistent with the practice in force from the beginning of the Republic until the 1930's. Given the specificity of the constitutional provision and the long years of practice in accordance therewith, the recent and legally controversial examples of congressional lawmaking by concurrent resolution are hardly persuasive to support an even more questionable example as set forth in the Bentsen and Glenn proposals.

Third, the Bentsen and Glenn bills would carry the legislative veto far beyond those areas for which any constitutional justification has ever been advanced to date.

For example, among the first legislative vetoes by congressional resolution were those of the Reorganization Acts of the 1930's and 1940's. In justifying the constitutionality of the 1939 act, the House committee which reported the bill proceeded on the constitutional theory that the power conferred upon the President by the act was "legislative in character." (H. Rept. 120, 76th Cong., 1st sess., at 4–6 (1939)) In delegating the legislative power of reorganization to the President, Congress retained a veto to make certain that the President's ultimate reorganization plan conformed with both the letter and intent of the delegated authority.

In subsequent reorganization acts, the inclusion of a legislative veto procedure was similarly justified under this "delegation" theory. (See *e.g.*, S. Rept. 638, 79th Cong., 1st sess., at 3 (1945).) The same has also been the case in other types of legislation. In trade acts, for example, Congress has delegated to the President the power to determine tariffs, duties, and import quotas—a power initially vested in the legislative branch—but Congress at the same time has retained supervision over this delegated authority through the legislative-veto procedure.

With the Bentsen and Glenn bills, however, this constitutional argument vanishes. The conduct of foreign relations is not a legislative power. While Congress may, as a practical matter in some cases, restrict by statute the substantive concessions that the President can make to a foreign power, nonetheless the actual drafting, initiation, and negotiation of the terms of an executive agreement belong entirely to the President. As the Supreme Court stated in the *Curtiss-Wright* case:

> (The President) alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.

Moreover, unlike prior vehicles for legislative vetoes, the bills by Senators Bentsen and Glenn do not involve the delegation by Congress of any powers. The substantive concessions which the President could make in negotiating an agreement would not be at all expanded by these two bills. Thus, the constitutional theory which has been raised in support of other legislative vetoes is inapplicable here. This means that if Congress wishes to disapprove an executive agreement, Congress' only constitutional recourse is to enact an appropriate statute under article I, section 7. Even then, such a statute would apply only to an executive agreement *not* concluded and implemented under the exclusive powers of the President.

Practical Problems Created by the Bills

Mr. Chairman, quite aside from the constitutional deficiencies, these bills involve a number of severe practical problems that render them, in our view, unworkable as a means of enhancing the role of Congress without placing unduly rigid restraints upon the conduct of foreign policy by the executive branch.

The bills present a serious national security problem in that they appear to be applicable in periods of declared war as well as in time of peace. Yet in World War II, for example, the President, under his powers as Commander in Chief, made hundreds of agreements necessary to the actual conduct of the war. Among these were agreements on deployment of forces as well as armistice and cease-fire agreements whose delicate timing could not await a 60-day review period. Interference with the President's power to make such agreements as Commander in Chief would frequently be unacceptable from the standpoint of national security, and it naturally raises the most serious questions with respect to constitutional validity. This is a core area of the President's ability to make agreements solely on the basis of his authority as Commander in Chief under the Constitution.

Even in time of peace, the 60-day waiting period would make a rapid resolution of everyday practical problems impossible. Some of these are of a routine nature that require only a simple exchange of notes, perhaps to compose a small difference by adopting a minor amendment to a previously concluded executive agreement itself of a routine nature. On occasion a disaster or other emergency requires extremely rapid action. Surely an emergency agreement providing for assistance to earthquake victims, to take but one example, cannot be subjected to a 60-day delay. These bills, if valid, would substantially undermine the utility of the United Nations Participation Act, to take one specific example.

In addition, neither bill, but particularly the Glenn draft with its extraordinarily broad definition of executive agreements, distinguishes between important agreements of interest to the Congress and minor or routine items such as postal contracts, standing orders with the Government Printing Office, and educational exchanges. The efficiency of the executive, and its ability to conduct the multiple aspects of relations in a complicated world, would be significantly diminished, while the large majority of agreements transmitted would be of little or no interest whatever to the Congress. There is no benefit in this either to the executive or legislative branch.

Notwithstanding that Congress is interested in only a small number of such agreements, the Bentsen and Glenn bills would, if enacted, result in a substantial interference with the President's authority as

negotiator of almost all executive agreements. Because of the 60-day waiting period and the possibility of congressional disapproval, the United States would frequently be unable to obtain definite concessions from other governments because the President would be unable to give firm commitments on short notice, even on minor matters. And there would be a far greater risk of delicate compromises coming unraveled during the 60 days before the agreement could enter into force.

At the present time, the great majority of our executive agreements enter into force upon signature. Every foreign country enters into most of their agreements with us upon signature. Were either the Bentsen or Glenn bill to become law, the United States would be the only nation in the world unable to enter into any international agreement whatsoever either on signature or on short notice.

At best, the procedure would result in a great degree of uncertainty. In view of the congressional option procedure, the President would never be quite certain, even assuming prior consultation with Congress or prior statutory authorization, just what authority he possessed to negotiate and conclude agreements in a particular area. The uncertainty introduced into the negotiating process would clearly not be conducive to the effective conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

The Bentsen and Glenn approaches are also unnecessary and wasteful even from a congressional point of view. Any agreements involving an expenditure of funds (and most of those agreements of interest to the Congress involve such expenditures) are already subject to congressional review because Congress must authorize and appropriate the funds. This is important, for example, in the area of military base agreements. No military base can be constructed without congressional approval. Congress is intimately involved in the overwhelming majority of executive agreements on defense matters, either through authorizing legislation, such as the foreign aid legislation, or through review of programs by authorizing and appropriating committees. Status-of-forces agreements are closely monitored by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Atomic energy agreements are reviewed by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there are a number of important areas in which these bills, if enacted, would have a serious adverse impact. The bills would create confusion in the administration of existing legislative authorizations under which the President has administered programs of national importance. For example, the military assistance programs are implemented country by country under the terms of bilateral military assistance agreements entered into pursuant to prior statute. The present bills would substitute a new procedure for formalizing the international agreements between the United States and other countries with respect to these programs.

Mr. Chairman, if further legislative regulation of executive agreements is needed, which is a question requiring further study, it is our view that it would be wiser to treat directly, through legislation, particular substantive areas of agreement making, rather than attempting to control the entire range of executive agreements through a procedural device that fails in large measure because it both attempts to do too much and is constitutionally defective.

Alternative Possibilities

I think it is clear that great improvements have been made in increasing the flow of information to the Congress for purposes of enhancing its capacity to perform its functions in foreign policy. There are further ways of developing executive-legislative cooperation, and some ideas in this area have already been suggested to the subcommittee.

Perhaps building on the Circular 175 procedure, we might explore the possibility of having the several Assistant Secretaries of State provide the relevant committees of Congress with regular and detailed briefings

on developments in their areas of responsibility. This idea was put forward by Secretary of State Rogers in 1971 and repeated to this subcommittee by the then Legal Adviser, John Stevenson, in 1972.

Perhaps most important, Mr. Chairman, is the necessity to recognize that our constitutional framework concerning foreign affairs establishes, as one scholar put it, "a government of interdependent as well as separate powers." The basic meaning of this structure should be cooperation rather than conflict and a full flow of information permitting each branch effectively to carry out its functions in its areas of competence and interest.

Rigid controls of doubtful legality over a mass of agreements, most of which are of minimal or no interest to the Congress—that is simply not the best answer. Cooperation, consultation, full information, and recognition that both branches seek a healthy process of interaction in the making of foreign policy—that is the surest path toward a meaningful system of decisionmaking on behalf of the United States.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Hungary Amend Air Services Agreement

The Department of State announced on May 22 (press release 288) that by an exchange of diplomatic notes in Budapest on May 19, the United States and Hungary had agreed to amendments to the U.S.-Hungary Air Transport Agreement of 1973, implementing Pan American World Airways services between the United States and Budapest beginning May 22. (For text of the amendments, see press release 288.) Until now, there has been no direct U.S. or Hungarian airline scheduled air services between the two countries.

The new arrangements with Hungary are responsive to indications of growth in the air transport market between the United States and Eastern Europe. They set forth in some detail the scope of Pan American's commercial rights in Hungary and cover such things as ticket sales and local currency conversions. The amendments also permit the Hungarian airline, Malev, to open off-route sales offices in the United States.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975.
Ratifications deposited: Italy, May 30, 1975; Thailand, May 28, 1975.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331.
Accessions deposited: Chile, March 10, 1975; Syria, February 6, 1975.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.
Ratification deposited: Libya, May 26, 1975.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.
Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited: Hungary (with declarations), February 28, 1975.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London November 2, 1973.[1]
Accession deposited: Jordan, March 17, 1975.

[1] Not in force.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Accession deposited: Panama, May 29, 1975.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.
Signature: Intercontinental de Comunicaciones por Satélite, S.A. (INTERCOMSA) of Panama, May 29, 1975.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.
Ratification deposited: Rwanda, May 20, 1975.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969. Done at London June 23, 1969.[1]
Accession deposited: Syria, February 6, 1975.
Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany (applicable to Berlin (West)), May 7, 1975.

World Meteorological Organization

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, May 27, 1975.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 21, 1975. Entered into force May 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo May 2 and 6, 1975. Entered into force May 6, 1975.

International Committee of the Red Cross

Agreement amending the grant agreement of February 20, March 16 and 17, 1975 (TIAS 8032), concerning emergency relief and assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic. Signed at Geneva and Washington April 24 and 30, 1975. Entered into force April 30, 1975.

Japan

Agreement concerning the furnishing of launching and associated services by NASA for Japanese satellites, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 23, 1975. Entered into force May 23, 1975.

Pakistan

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 6, 1975. Entered into force May 6, 1975; effective July 1, 1974.

Poland

Agreement regarding fisheries in the western region of the middle Atlantic Ocean, with annexes and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington May 29, 1975. Enters into force July 1, 1975.

Saudi Arabia

Joint communique on the first session of the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation. Done at Washington February 27, 1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975.

Singapore

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 21, 1975. Entered into force May 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

---

[1] Not in force.

Name Index

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 26–June 1

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 252 of March 17; 256 of May 14; 267 and 268 of May 19; 269, 270, and 273–275 of May 20; 276 and 279 of May 21; 282, 283, and 285–290 of May 22; 291, 294–296, and 296A of May 23; and 297 of May 24.

No.	Date	Subject
†298	5/27	Kissinger: IEA, Paris.
†299	5/27	Kissinger: arrival, Paris, May 26.
†300	5/27	U.S. and Japan agree on reimbursable launches by NASA (rewrite).
†301	5/27	Kissinger: remarks to press, Paris.
†302	5/28	Kissinger: OECD, Paris.
†303	5/28	Americans advised to register claims against the German Democratic Republic by July 1.
†304	5/28	Kissinger: news conference, Paris, May 27.
†304A	5/29	Kissinger, Koppel, ABC–TV: interview, Paris, May 28.
*305	5/29	Study Groups 10 and 11 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, June 25.
*306	5/30	U.S. and Singapore sign textile agreement, May 21.
*307	5/30	U.S. and Republic of China sign textile agreement, May 21.
†308	5/30	Kissinger: news conference, Brussels, May 29.
†309	5/30	U.S. and Poland conclude mid-Atlantic fisheries agreement.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.