THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXII • No. 1871 • May 5, 1975

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXII, No. 1871
May 5, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the function of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15
Single copy 85 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

U.S. Foreign Policy: Finding Strength Through Adversity

Following is an address by Secretary Kissinger made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington on April 17, together with the transcript of a question-and-answer session after the address.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 204 dated April 17; as prepared for delivery

I am here to sound a note of hope about the future of our foreign policy despite the fact that we are now going through a period of adversity.

A nation facing setbacks can submerge itself in acrimony, looking for scapegoats rather than lessons. It can ignore or gloss over its difficulties and fatuously proceed as if nothing serious had happened.

Or it can examine its situation dispassionately, draw appropriate conclusions, and chart its future with realism and hope.

President Ford has chosen this latter course. A week ago he called upon Congress and the American people to turn this time of difficulty into a demonstration of spirit—to prove once again our devotion and our courage and to put these into the service of building a better world.

For the entire postwar period our strength and our leadership have been essential in preserving peace and promoting progress. If either falters, major shifts in political alignments will occur all around the world. The result will be new dangers for America's security and economic well-being. The Middle East war and oil embargo of 1973 demonstrated how distant events can threaten world peace and global prosperity simultaneously. A reduction of American influence in key areas can have disastrous consequences.

How other nations perceive us is thus a matter of major consequence. Every day I see reports from our embassies relaying anguished questions raised by our friends. What do events in Indochina, the southern flank of NATO, and the Middle East signify for America's competence—constancy—credibility—coherence? How will Americans react? What are the implications for future American policy? We can be certain that potential adversaries are asking themselves the same questions—not with sympathy, but to estimate their opportunities.

It is fashionable to maintain that pointing to dangers produces a self-fulfilling prophecy, that the prediction of consequences brings them about. Unfortunately, life is not that simple. We cannot achieve credibility by rhetoric; we cannot manufacture coherence by proclamation; and we cannot change facts by not talking about them.

We can do little about the world's judgment of our past actions. But we have it within our power to take charge of our future: if the United States responds to adversity with dignity, if we make clear to the world that we continue to hold a coherent perception of a constructive international role and mean to implement it, we can usher in a new era of creativity and accomplishment. We intend to do just that.

I know that it is not easy for a people that faces major domestic difficulties to gear itself up for new international efforts. But our economic future is bound up with the rest of the world—and with international developments in energy, trade, and economic policy. Our economic health depends on the preservation of American leadership abroad.

This country has no choice. We must,

for our own sake, play a major role in world affairs. We have strong assets: a sound foreign policy design, major international achievements in recent years, and the enormous capacities of an industrious and gifted people. We have the resources, and the will, to turn adversity into opportunity.

Indochina

Let me start with our most tragic and immediate problem.

I can add nothing to the President's request for military and humanitarian assistance for the anguished people of South Viet-Nam. I support this appeal and have testified at length to that effect before congressional committees over the past several days.

The time will come when it will be clear that no President could do less than to ask aid for those whom we encouraged to defend their independence and at whose side we fought for over a decade. Then Americans will be glad that they had a President who refused to abandon those who desperately sought help in an hour of travail.

In Indochina our nation undertook a major enterprise for almost 15 years. We invested enormous prestige; tens of thousands died, and many more were wounded, imprisoned, and lost; we spent over $150 billion; and our domestic fabric was severely strained. Whether or not this enterprise was well conceived does not now change the nature of our problem. When such an effort founders, it is an event of profound significance—for ourselves and for others.

I, for one, do not believe that it was ignoble to have sought to preserve the independence of a small and brave people. Only a very idealistic nation could have persevered in the face of so much discouragement.

But where so many think that the war was a dreadful mistake, where thousands grieve for those they loved and others sorrow over their country's setback, there has been sufficient heartache for all to share.

The Viet-Nam debate has now run its course. The time has come for restraint and compassion. The Administration has made its case. Let all now abide by the verdict of the Congress—without recrimination or vindictiveness.

The Design

Let us therefore look to the future. We start with a sound foreign policy structure.

We are convinced that a continuing strong American role is indispensable to global stability and progress. Therefore the central thrust of our foreign policy has been to adjust our role in the world and the conceptions, methods, and commitments which define it to the conditions of a new era—including an America fatigued by Indochina.

The postwar order of international relations ended with the last decade. No sudden upheaval marked the passage of that era, but the cumulative change by the end of the 1960's was profound. Gone was the rigid bipolar confrontation of the cold war. In its place was a more fluid and complex world—with many centers of power, more subtle dangers, and new hopeful opportunities. Western Europe and Japan were stronger and more self-confident; our alliances needed to be adjusted toward a more equal partnership. The Communist world had fragmented over doctrine and national interests; there were promising prospects for more stable relations based on restraint and negotiation. And many of our friends in other parts of the globe were now better prepared to shoulder responsibility for their security and well-being, but they needed our assistance during the period of transition.

At home, the American people and Congress were weary from two decades of global exertion and years of domestic turmoil. They were not prepared for confrontation unless all avenues toward peace had been explored.

The challenge for our foreign policy has been to define an effective but more balanced U.S. role in the world, reducing excessive commitments without swinging toward precipitate and dangerous withdrawal.

We have come a long way.

Our major allies in the Atlantic world and Japan have grown in strength politically and economically; our alliances are firm anchors

of world security and prosperity. They are the basis for close cooperation on a range of unprecedented new problems, from détente to energy.

We have launched a hopeful new dialogue with Latin America.

We are looking to a new era of relations with Africa.

We have taken historic steps to stabilize and improve our relations with our major adversaries. We have reduced tensions, deepened dialogue, and reached a number of major agreements.

We have begun the process of controlling the rival strategic arms programs which, unconstrained, threaten global security. When the Vladivostok agreement is completed, a ceiling will have been placed for the first time on the level of strategic arsenals of the superpowers.

We have helped to ease longstanding political conflicts in such sensitive areas as Berlin and the Middle East.

And we have taken the major initiatives to mobilize the international response to new global challenges such as energy, food, the environment, and the law of the sea.

In all these areas the American role has frequently been decisive. The design still stands; our responsibilities remain. There is every prospect for major progress. There is every reason for confidence.

The Domestic Dimension

If this be true, what then is the cause of our problem? Why the setbacks? Why the signs of impasse between the executive and the Congress? What must we do to pull ourselves together?

Setbacks are bound to occur in a world which no nation alone can dominate or control. The peculiar aspect of many of our problems is that they are of our own making. Domestic division has either compounded or caused difficulties from the southern flank of NATO to the Pacific, from the eastern Mediterranean to relations between the superpowers.

Paradoxically, herein resides a cause for optimism. For to the extent that the causes of our difficulties are within ourselves, so are the remedies.

The American people expect an effective foreign policy which preserves the peace and furthers our national interests. They want their leaders to shape the future, not just manage the present. This requires boldness, direction, nuance, and—above all—confidence between the public and the government and between the executive and the legislative branches of the government. But precisely this mutual confidence has been eroding over the past decade.

There are many causes for this state of affairs. Some afflict democracies everywhere; some are unique to America's tradition and recent history. Modern democracies are besieged by social, economic, and political challenges that cut across national boundaries and lie at the margin of governments' ability to control. The energies of leaders are too often consumed by the management of bureaucracy, which turns questions of public purpose into issues for institutional bargaining. Instant communications force the pace of events and of expectations. Persuasion, the essential method of democracy, becomes extraordinarily difficult in an era where issues are complex and outcomes uncertain. A premium is placed on simplification—an invitation to demagogues. Too often, the result is a disaffection that simultaneously debunks government and drains it of the very confidence that a democracy needs to act with conviction.

All of this has compounded the complex problem of executive-legislative relations. In every country, the authority of the modern state seems frustratingly impersonal or remote from those whose lives it increasingly affects; in nearly every democracy, executive authority is challenged by legislators who themselves find it difficult to affect policy except piecemeal or negatively. Issues become so technical that legislative oversight becomes increasingly difficult just as the issues become increasingly vital. The very essence of problem-solving on domestic issues—accommodation of special interests—robs foreign policy of consistency and focus

when applied to our dealings with other nations.

Statesmen must act, even when premises cannot be proved; they must decide, even when intangibles will determine the outcome. Yet predictions are impossible to prove; consequences avoided are never evident. Skepticism and suspicion thus become a way of life and infect the atmosphere of executive-legislative debate; reasoned arguments are overwhelmed by a series of confrontations on peripheral issues.

America faces as well the problem of its new generation. The gulf between their historical experience and ours is enormous. They have been traumatized by Viet-Nam as we were by Munich. Their nightmare is foreign commitment as ours was abdication from international responsibility. It is possible that both generations learned their lessons too well. The young take for granted the great postwar achievements in restoring Europe, building peacetime alliances, and maintaining global prosperity. An impersonal, technological, bureaucratized world provides them too few incentives for dedication and idealism.

Let us remember that America's commitment to international involvement has always been ambivalent—even while our doubts were being temporarily submerged by the exertions of World War II and the postwar era. The roots of isolationism, nourished by geography and history, go deep in the American tradition. The reluctance to be involved in foreign conflicts, the belief that we somehow defile ourselves if we engage in "power politics" and balances of power, the sense that foreign policy is a form of Old World imperialism, the notion that weapons are the causes of conflict, the belief that humanitarian assistance and participation in the economic order are an adequate substitute for political engagement—all these were familiar characteristics of the American isolationism of the twenties and thirties. We took our power for granted, attributed our successes to virtue, and blamed our failures on the evil of others. We disparaged means. In our foreign involvement we have oscillated between exuberance and exhaustion, between crusading and retreats into self-doubt.

Following the Second World War a broad spectrum of civic leaders, professional groups, educators, businessmen, clergy, the media, congressional and national leaders of both parties led American public opinion to a new internationalist consensus. Taught by them and experience of the war, the nation understood that we best secured our domestic tranquillity and prosperity by enlightened participation and leadership in world affairs. Assistance to friends and allies was not a price to be paid, but a service to be rendered to international stability and therefore to our self-interest.

But in the last decade, as a consequence of Indochina and other frustrations of global engagement, some of our earlier impulses have reasserted themselves. Leadership opinion has, to an alarming degree, turned sharply against many of the internationalist premises of the postwar period. We now hear, and have for several years, that suffering is prolonged by American involvement, that injustice is perpetuated by American inaction, that defense spending is wasteful at best and produces conflict at worse, that American intelligence activities are immoral, that the necessary confidentiality of diplomacy is a plot to deceive the public, that flexibility is cynical and amoral—and that tranquillity is somehow to be brought about by an abstract purity of motive for which history offers no example.

This has a profound—and inevitable—impact on the national mood and on the national consensus regarding foreign policy. In the nation with the highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures in the world, in the nation that is certainly the most secure in the world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the ideals of civil liberty and pluralist democracy, we find a deep and chronic self-doubt, especially in the large urban centers and among presumptive leaders.

Will the American people support a responsible and active American foreign policy in these conditions? I deeply believe that they will—if their leaders, in and out of government, give them a sense that they have

something to be proud of and something important to accomplish.

When one ventures away from Washington into the heart of America, one is struck by the confidence, the buoyancy, and the lack of any corrosive cynicism. We who sit at what my friend Stewart Alsop, a great journalist, once called "the center" tend to dwell too much on our problems; we dissect in overly exquisite detail our difficulties and our disputes.

I find it remarkable that two-thirds of the Americans interviewed in a nationwide poll in December, at a time of severe recession, still thought an active role in the world served their country's interests better than withdrawal. Even as other nations are closely watching the way we act in Washington, I suspect they marvel at the resiliency of our people and our institutions.

There is a great reservoir of confidence within America. We have the values, the means, and we bear the responsibility to strive for a safer and better world. And there is a great reservoir of confidence around the globe in this country's values and strength.

Where Do We Go From Here?

So, let us learn the right lessons from today's trials.

We shall have to pay the price for our setbacks in Indochina by increasing our exertions. We no longer have the margin of safety. In the era of American predominance, America's preferences held great sway. We could overwhelm our problems with our resources. We had little need to resort to the style of nations conducting foreign policy with limited means: patience, subtlety, flexibility. Today, disarray, abdication of responsibility, or shortsightedness exact a price that may prove beyond our means.

We are still the largest single factor in international affairs, but we are one nation among many. The weight of our influence now depends crucially on our purposefulness, our perseverance, our creativity, our power, and our perceived reliability. We shall have to work harder to establish the coherence and constancy of our policy—and we shall.

We must give up the illusion that foreign policy can choose between morality and pragmatism. America cannot be true to itself unless it upholds humane values and the dignity of the individual. But equally it cannot realize its values unless it is secure. No nation has a monopoly of justice or virtue, and none has the capacity to enforce its own conceptions globally. In the nuclear age especially, diplomacy—like democracy—often involves the compromise of clashing principles. I need not remind you that there are some 140 nations in the world, of which only a bare handful subscribe to our values.

Abstract moralism can easily turn into retreat from painful choices or endless interference in the domestic affairs of others; strict pragmatism, on the other hand, robs policy of vision and heart. Principles without security spell impotence; security without principles means irrelevance. The American people must never forget that our strength gives force to our principles and our principles give purpose to our strength.

Let us understand, too, the nature of our commitments. We have an obligation of steadfastness simply by virtue of our position as a great power upon which many others depend. Thus our actions and policies over time embody their own commitment whether or not they are enshrined in legal documents. Indeed, our actions and the perception of them by other countries may represent our most important commitments.

At the same time, diplomacy must be permitted a degree of confidentiality, or most serious exchange with other governments is destroyed. To focus the national debate on so-called secret agreements which no party has ever sought to implement and whose alleged subject matter has been prohibited by law for two years is to indulge what Mencken called the "national appetite for bogus revelation." It goes without saying that a commitment involving national action must be known to the Congress or it is meaningless.

One lesson we must surely learn from Viet-Nam is that new commitments of our nation's honor and prestige must be carefully weighed. As Walter Lippmann observed, "In foreign relations, as in all other relations, a policy has been formed only when commitments and power have been brought into balance." But after our recent experiences we have a special obligation to make certain that commitments we have made will be rigorously kept and that this is understood by all concerned. Let no ally doubt our steadfastness. Let no nation ever believe again that it can tear up with impunity a solemn agreement signed with the United States.

We must continue our policy of seeking to ease tensions. But we shall insist that the easing of tensions cannot occur selectively. We shall not forget who supplied the arms which North Viet-Nam used to make a mockery of its signature on the Paris accords.

Nor can we overlook the melancholy fact that not one of the other signatories of the Paris accords has responded to our repeated requests that they at least point out North Viet-Nam's flagrant violations of these agreements. Such silence can only undermine any meaningful standards of international responsibility.

At home, a great responsibility rests upon all of us in Washington.

Comity between the executive and legislative branches is the only possible basis for national action. The decade-long struggle in this country over executive dominance in foreign affairs is over. The recognition that the Congress is a coequal branch of government is the dominant fact of national politics today.

The executive accepts that the Congress must have both the sense and the reality of participation; foreign policy must be a shared enterprise. The question is whether the Congress will go beyond the setting of guidelines to the conduct of tactics; whether it will deprive the executive of discretion and authority in the conduct of diplomacy while at the same time remaining institutionally incapable of formulating or carrying out a clear national policy of its own.

The effective performance of our constitutional system has always rested on the restrained exercise of the powers and rights conferred by it. At this moment in our history there is a grave national imperative for a spirit of cooperation and humility between the two branches of our government.

Cooperation must be a two-way street. Just as the executive has an obligation to reexamine and then to explain its policies, so the Congress should reconsider the actions which have paralyzed our policies in the eastern Mediterranean, weakened our hand in relations with the U.S.S.R., and inhibited our dialogue in this hemisphere. Foreign policy must have continuity. If it becomes partisan, paralysis results. Problems are passed on to the future under progressively worse conditions.

When other countries look to the United States, they see one nation. When they look to Washington, they see one government. They judge us as a unit—not as a series of unrelated or uncoordinated institutions. If we cannot agree among ourselves, there is little hope that we can negotiate effectively with those abroad.

So one of the most important lessons to be drawn from recent events is the need to restore the civility of our domestic discourse. Over the years of the Viet-Nam debate rational dialogue has yielded to emotion, sweeping far beyond the issues involved. Not only judgments but motives have been called into question. Not only policy but character has been attacked. What began as consensus progressively deteriorated into poisonous contention.

Leaders in government must do their share. The Administration, following the President's example, will strive for moderation and mutual respect in the national dialogue. We know that if we ask for public confidence we must keep faith with the people.

Debate is the essence of democracy. But it can elevate the nation only if conducted with restraint.

The American people yearn for an end to the bitterness and divisiveness of the past

decade. Our domestic stability requires it. Our international responsibilities impose it.

You, in this audience, are today in a unique position to contribute to the healing of the nation.

The Coming Agenda

Ralph Waldo Emerson once said "No great man ever complains a want of opportunity." Neither does a great nation.

Our resources are vast; our leadership is essential; our opportunities are unprecedented and insistent.

The challenges of the coming decades will dwarf today's disputes. A new world order is taking shape around us. It will engulf us or isolate us if we do not act boldly. We cannot consume ourselves in self-destruction. We have great responsibilities:

—We must maintain the vigor of the great democratic alliances. They can provide the anchor of shared values and purposes as we grapple with a radically new agenda.

—We must overcome the current economic and energy crisis. A domestic energy program is thus an urgent national priority. Looking ahead, we envisage a fundamentally reformed international economic system, a Bretton Woods for the 1980's and beyond.

—We must stand up for what we believe in international forums, including the United Nations, and resist the politics of resentment, of confrontation, and stale ideology. International collaboration has a more vital role now than ever, but so has mutual respect among nations.

—We must meet our continuing responsibility for peace in many regions of the world, especially where we uniquely have the confidence of both sides and where failure could spell disaster beyond the confines of the region, as in the Middle East. We will not be pushed by threats of war or economic pressure into giving up vital interests. But equally, we will not, in the President's words, "accept stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks to peace and prosperity." [1]

—We must stop the spiral, and the spread, of nuclear weapons. We can then move on to a more ambitious agenda: mutual reductions in strategic arms, control of other weaponry, military restraint in other environments.

—We must overcome two scourges of mankind: famine and the vagaries of nature. We reaffirm the food program announced at the World Food Conference last November. Our fundamental challenge is to help others feed themselves so that no child goes to bed hungry in the year 2000.

—We must continue to reduce conflict and tensions with our adversaries. Over time, we hope that vigilance and conciliation will lead to more positive relationships and ultimately a true global community.

—We must insure that the oceans and space become areas of cooperation rather than conflict. We can then leave to future generations vast economic and technological resources to enrich life on this earth.

Our nation is uniquely endowed to play a creative and decisive role in the new order which is taking form around us. In an era of turbulence, uncertainty, and conflict, the world still looks to us for a protecting hand, a mediating influence, a path to follow. It sees in us, most of all, a tradition and vision of hope. Just as America has symbolized for generations man's conquest of nature, so too has America—with its banner of progress and freedom—symbolized man's mastery over his own future.

For the better part of two centuries our forefathers, citizens of a small and relatively weak country, met adversity with courage and imagination. In the course of their struggle they built the freest, richest, and most powerful nation the world has ever known. As we, their heirs, take America into its third century, as we take up the unprecedented agenda of the modern world, we are determined to rediscover the belief in ourselves that characterized the most creative periods in our country.

We have come of age, and we shall do our duty.

---

[1] For President Ford's address before a joint session of the Congress on Apr. 10, see BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1975, p. 529.

Q. Arnold Rosenfeld, the Dayton Daily News. After the last round of Middle East talks, the Administration gave the impression that the burden of the failure of the talks rested mostly with Israel. If that implication was deliberate, on what specific points was Israel less forthcoming than Egypt; and what has been your personal recommendation to the Administration concerning the large grant of military aid subsequently asked by Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: The Administration statement had emphasized the fact that the responsibility for negotiations that are completed is rather difficult to apportion because it leads to very complicated assessments. And I don't think any useful purpose is served now by rehearsing all the complicated elements that went into this negotiation.

The major thrust of the assessment that is now going on concerns the direction of our diplomacy in the Middle East as we have to prepare, as a result of the suspension of these talks, for a more multilateral diplomacy. We have to develop a position for the Geneva Conference, when it takes place, and we have to approach the problem of relationships with many of the participants in the Middle East crisis.

The problem of assistance to Israel will be seen in that context. But as I have pointed out in my first press conference after I returned from the Middle East, the American commitment to the survival of Israel will not be affected and cannot be affected by this reassessment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Charles Withers, Rochester, Minnesota, Post Bulletin. We had two prominent Democratic Senators who spoke to us this morning. One of them, Senator [Lloyd M.] Bentsen, was asked in a question how would he conduct foreign policy if he were elected President. He said the first thing he would do would be to put an end to one-man, personalized foreign policy. A bit earlier than that, Senator [Henry M.] Jackson was asked how he thinks the Middle East crisis should be settled or what should be done about it, and he said we should end this "Mickey Mouse" shuttle diplomacy and get the parties to the conference table. I wonder if you might have any comment on these observations by the Senators? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I understand the problem of the two gentlemen having to campaign for 18 months. [Laughter and applause.]

With respect to the last point, of getting the parties around the conference table—during World War II somebody suggested that the way to deal with the submarine problem was to heat the ocean and to boil them to the surface. [Laughter.] So he was asked how to do this. He said, "I have given you the idea. The technical implementation is up to you." [Laughter and applause.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'm Bill Mullen, Pompano Beach, Florida, Sun Sentinel. Do not the events in Southeast Asia attest to the tightening of Communist encirclement of the free world and the shrinking of our influence?

Secretary Kissinger: Events in Southeast Asia indicate many things. But they include the fact that the question of whether a terminal date should be put to assistance was obviously not asked by the Communist allies of Hanoi as insistently as it was asked in the United States. And this was certainly a factor in the development of the situation.

Now, we can ask a measure of restraint from the Communist countries. But I don't think détente has yet reached the point where we can ask them to reduce their aid to their allies when we reduce our aid to our allies.

But the impact of events is as I tried to describe it in my speech. It will require greater efforts from us and a greater determination to achieve a coherent foreign policy.

Q. Secretary Kissinger, my name is Dick Smyser, from the Oak Ridger, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Senator Jackson, in his remarks

this morning, referred to the high Administration official who always seems to be on the Secretary of State's plane. In all seriousness, I would like to ask you how you think the comments that come from this high Administration official serve the Secretary of State, the press, and most of all, the public.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, my experience is that that high official almost always agrees with the Secretary of State. [Laughter.] And therefore it serves the coherence of the public presentation of American foreign policy.

The problem that exists when 14 or 15 members of the press travel with the Secretary of State is quite different from the relationship of the Secretary with the press here in Washington. When there has to be a daily briefing, it can be done in two ways—either by a spokesman on the record or by some of the chief actors on background. And in the particular circumstances of a delicate negotiation, I think that this arrangement has worked reasonably well, as long as the senior spokesman and the Secretary agree with each other. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am John McCormally, of the Burlington, Iowa, Hawkeye. The PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government] has charged there are as many as 25,000 Americans in South Viet-Nam. The Secretary of Defense has put the figure at about 3,800. How many are there, and are you satisfied with Ambassador [Graham] Martin's handling of the situation?

Secretary Kissinger: First, the number that was there before we started reductions did not exceed 6,000. The number is now somewhat below 4,000. We are, as the President pointed out yesterday, attempting to reduce nonessential personnel. Ambassador Martin has an extraordinarily difficult job—to maintain the morale and the confidence of the government to which he is accredited and at the same time to reduce to the greatest extent possible the risks to the Americans in South Viet-Nam. He is discharging this responsibility with great skill and with great dignity in an extraordinarily difficult situation. And he has my full support.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been rumors of late pertaining to your possible resignation. There indeed has been some suggestion from editorial writers that you do that. My question is, today is it your intention to serve at least until after the 1976 Presidential election?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as far as editorial writers are concerned, I can understand that even editorial writers cannot be right a hundred percent of the time. These stories of my resignation arise from time to time to sustain the morale of some of my closer associates [laughter] and even of some of our Ambassadors. But I have no intention of resigning. And I will serve as long as this is considered useful by the President.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Hodding Carter of Delta Democrat-Times of Greenville, Mississippi. You said very eloquently that the Viet-Nam debate has now run its course—we must look to the future without recrimination and vindictiveness. Do you agree that anyone who attempts to make it a good campaign issue in 1976 would be doing a disservice to the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Vice President Rockefeller, whom you are referring to, is a close friend of mine whom I admire enormously. I do not believe that he intends to make it an issue in the 1976 campaign. I have only seen fragmentary reports of comments. I think he was stating a general view of what might happen. I have stated the view of the Administration, which is shared by all high officials.

We must now, while this debate is going on, defend our view with respect to military and humanitarian assistance. We will accept the verdict of the Congress without recrimination and without scapegoating. And this will be our attitude.

Howard H. Hays, President, ASNE: We have time for one more question.

Secretary Kissinger: That's usually the one that destroys me. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, Robert Phelps of the Boston Globe.

Secretary Kissinger: I knew it. [Laughter.]

Q. I have what we like to call a two-pronged question. The first prong is this: Have you or has the U.S. Government directly or indirectly been in touch with the North Vietnamese regarding the possibility of evacuating South Vietnamese who have aided the United States and who would be endangered in case of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong takeover? And the second prong is this: If you have, or if you haven't, would be willing to—would you favor a termination of—would you be willing to offer this: a termination of U.S. aid, economic and military, to South Viet-Nam in exchange for a free evacuation of those who would be in danger—South Vietnamese?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the second part of your question, it is the Administration's view that we will not make the decision for the South Vietnamese as to how long and under what circumstances they should resist. And we believe strongly that it will be seen to have been the right and honorable thing to do to ask for continued assistance to a people whom we encouraged and at whose side we fought, knowing all the passions and all the difficulties involved. And we have therefore opposed a terminal date.

With respect to the first question, if the worst should come to pass and if it were not possible to stabilize the situation, we feel we have a moral obligation to help in the evacuation of many of those whose association with us now endangers their lives. How to bring this about and by what steps and at what period is an extraordinarily delicate question. And it is one that I really cannot answer in an open press conference.

Thank you very much.

U.S. Expresses Sadness at Fall of Government of Khmer Republic

Statement by President Ford [1]

The United States views the fall of the Government of the Khmer Republic with sadness and compassion.

I wish to express my admiration for the Cambodian Government leaders and people, who showed great courage until the end, and to their armed forces, who fought valiantly with their remaining supplies.

[1] Issued Apr. 17 (text from White House press release).

President Ford Interviewed at Convention of American Society of Newspaper Editors

Following are excerpts from the transcript of an interview with President Ford by a panel of editors and publishers at the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington on April 16. [1]

President Ford: I am very, very pleased to be with you today and to have this opportunity to continue a dialogue which has been my pleasure in many parts of the country with many of you in various regional meetings during the past few months.

Those exchanges and the one which will begin shortly are exceedingly valuable to me in providing an insight into the attitudes and the concerns of the people who are your readers and my constituents.

Before answering the questions put to me by the distinguished panel, let me add, if I might, a few comments to the speech that I made to the Congress last Thursday night, and to the American people.

Let me, if I might, express in broad terms some deep beliefs that I have.

First, I firmly believe that the United States must play a very major role in world affairs in the years ahead. It is a great and difficult responsibility, but it is one, in my judgment, that our nation must continue to have.

This has been my conviction, going back to my first political campaign in the fall of 1948. It was my conviction when I took my first oath of office on January 3, 1949. For a period of better than 25 years in the Congress—as a Member of the House and part of that time as a leadership role in the minority party—it has been my conviction.

As long as I am President of the United States I will seek to carry on that very important responsibility of our country. I believe to be successful in this effort, this endeavor, the Congress and the President must work together.

It is my belief that if we are to be successful in the achievement of success in the area of foreign policy, the American people, to the degree that they can, must be united.

I also believe that our foreign policy, if you look at the record—at least during the period that I was honored to be a part of our government in the Congress or in the executive branch—that our foreign policy has been a successful one.

Of course, there have been some instances where we did not achieve all that we sought, in some cases because the circumstances were well beyond our control. In a few instances where we have not been as successful as we would have liked, I think we self-inflicted some problems that helped to bring that unfortunate result.

I also believe to maintain peace and to insure it, certainly in the future, the United States must remain strong militarily. We must have a broad, strong, well-led military establishment—and I include in that an intelligence system that can be extremely helpful to me and to Presidents in the future.

I believe also that we must work with friend and foe alike. We have many, many friends throughout the world. We have some potential adversaries, and we have some that are true adversaries. But if we are to achieve what we all want, we have to work with all.

It is my strong belief that we can achieve unity at home. I see no reason why the Congress and the President cannot work together. That doesn't mean that all 535

[1] For the complete transcript, see White House press release dated Apr. 16.

Members of the House and Senate will agree with me, but I can assure you that what I have said on more than one occasion I believe and I will try to implement, that I will work with the Congress and I know many, if not all, in the Congress will try to work with me.

If we do get this unity at home and if we do develop a closer relationship between the President and the Congress, I think we can continue a successful foreign policy in building a better world and achieving, on a more permanent basis, peace for all.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Reston [James B. Reston, member of the board and columnist, New York Times].

Q. Mr. President, two points. There is a story on the ticker this morning out of Geneva that the Cambodian Government has asked for a cease-fire and that this information has been passed to Prince Sihanouk in Peking. Could you tell us anything about that, sir?

President Ford: Mr. Reston, I just received a note from one of my staff members, Ron Nessen, indicating that we had gotten the information after I had left the White House to the effect that the Cambodian Government has communicated with Sihanouk indicating that the Cambodian Government will work with the Khmer Rouge to try and negotiate a settlement.

It is my recollection, from a quick look at that information that was given to me at the luncheon table, that Prince Sihanouk is in no position to really achieve or accomplish the results that we all want; namely, a negotiated settlement in that unfortunate situation.

I can only say from our point of view we will help in any way we can to further negotiations to end that conflict.

Q. On that same point, could I ask you whether you have been in touch with the North Vietnamese about a cease-fire in South Viet-Nam or with any other governments to try to bring that about?

President Ford: Over a period of time we have communicated with all of the signatories of the Paris accords, which were signed in January of 1973. The efforts that we have made are broad and comprehensive, and when I say we have indicated our feelings to all signatories, of course that includes the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Funk [R. D. Funk, editor, Santa Monica, Calif., Outlook].

Q. Mr. President, is the United States in direct contact now, in a situation of negotiation, with the North Vietnamese for a cease-fire around Saigon?

President Ford: We are not in direct negotiations in that regard.

Q. Thank you.

Q. Mr. President, when a delegation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors was in China the last time around, there was considerable emphasis placed by the Chinese leaders, leading all the way from Premier Chou on down, that no firm relationship with the United States was possible until Taiwan, so to speak, was taken out of the picture and placed under Chinese rule. You are going back to China. Is that on your agenda?

President Ford: The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China, which was reopened several years ago, is predicated on the Shanghai communique. This relationship is continuing, I would say, on schedule.

I am going back to the People's Republic of China late this fall. I was there for about two weeks in June and July of 1972. I would say that no firm agenda for that forthcoming meeting has been established. So, I am not in a position to comment directly on the question that you ask.

Q. Mr. President, you have reaffirmed your confidence in the present American foreign policy, but I wonder if you could expand on that just a little bit. Are we committed to containing communism around the world? Are we committed to a heavy program of economic aid? Are we committed to a heavy program of military aid? Will we get into armed intervention in desperate cases?

President Ford: We are committed to a furtherance of a policy of détente with the Soviet Union. I think that policy is in our mutual interests. It won't solve all the problems where either we or they are involved, but it has helped to reduce tensions. It has helped in other ways where our joint cooperation could be helpful.

We do, as a country, at least while I am President, expect to continue our relationship with Western Europe, with NATO. We hope to strengthen it. We hope to eliminate some of the current problems, such as the problem between Greece and Turkey at the present time over Cyprus.

We do expect to continue working in the Middle East, which includes some economic aid, some military assistance for various countries in that area of the world.

I think we have an obligation to continue to have a presence in the Pacific, in Latin America, in Africa. It is my judgment that in each of these cases we will probably continue both economic and military assistance on a selective basis.

I am not saying this is the containment of communism. It is a furtherance of the policy of the United States aimed at our security and the maintenance of peace on a global basis.

Q. Mr. President, in response to Mr. Kirkpatrick's [Clayton Kirkpatrick, editor, Chicago Tribune] question, you mentioned our policy of détente in an affirmative way. The Chinese and Russian military aid to the North Vietnamese has been placed at approximately $1.5 billion. My question is, doesn't that or does that violate the spirit of détente, and if so, of what purpose is détente?

President Ford: I think it is worthwhile to point out that none of the signatories to the Paris accords have sought to enforce the violations [provisions] of those accords, including, of course, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

In the agreement that was signed in Paris in January of 1973, the United States, as part of its agreement with South Viet-Nam, agreed to supply replacement war materiel, to give economic aid.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, I assume, made the same commitment to North Viet-Nam.

It appears that they have maintained that commitment. Unfortunately, the United States did not carry out its commitment in the supplying of military hardware and economic aid to South Viet-Nam.

I wish we had. I think if we had, this present tragic situation in South Viet-Nam would not have occurred.

But I don't think we can blame the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in this case. If we had done with our ally what we promised, I think this whole tragedy could have been eliminated.

Nevertheless we hope to and are working through the countries that are a part or were a part of the Paris accords to try and achieve a cease-fire, and will continue to do so.

Q. On that point, you have asked for more than $700 million worth of military aid. There is some obvious psychological and symbolic reason for simply asking, but militarily speaking, if you could get the package through Congress and get it to South Viet-Nam, would it militarily do any good at this point?

President Ford: I am absolutely convinced if Congress made available $722 million in military assistance in a timely way by the date that I suggested, or sometime shortly thereafter, the South Vietnamese could stabilize the military situation in Viet-Nam today.

Q. Mr. President, you keep talking about commitments and promises, and we are getting hung up on these words. In the light of this controversy, why should the Thieu-Nixon correspondence not be released?

President Ford: It is not the usual custom for correspondence between heads of state, as I understand it, to be released. I can say from my own experience, not referring to the correspondence to which you refer, that if it is expected that such correspondence

will be public, I think on some occasions, or in some instances, you would have to compromise on what you would say. I think that would be true of any correspondence that I received from any other head of state. If you are going to have a frank, free exchange, I think it has to be between the heads of states.

Now, I have personally reviewed the correspondence to which you refer between President Nixon and President Thieu, and I can assure you that there was nothing in any of those communications that was different from what was stated as our public policy. The words are virtually identical, with some variation, of course, but the intent, the commitments are identical with that which was stated as our country's policy and our country's commitment.

Q. Sir, on that question of your trip to Red China that Mr. Isaacs [Norman Isaacs, president and publisher, Wilmington, Del., News Journal] raised, it seems that down the road it has been speculated that the policy or the purpose of détente is to establish normal diplomatic relations with a country that you described last Thursday as having one-quarter of the population of the world. That would assume the establishment of an embassy in Peking, which would automatically assume the de-recognition, of some kind, of Taiwan. If that is in the cards, what kind of guarantees would you seek, what kind of quid pro quo would you seek from Peking to insure the continued existence of Taiwan?

President Ford: I honestly don't believe that I should discuss, under these circumstances, any of the agenda or any of the details of the continuation of our relations with the People's Republic of China.

We have excellent relations, as I am sure you know, with the Republic of China. We value that relationship. We are concerned, of course, and will continue to be concerned about the Republic of China's security and stability.

And it doesn't seem to me at this time in this forum that I should discuss any negotiations that might take place between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Q. It is our policy for the continued existence and guarantee of the defense of Taiwan. Is that our continuing policy?

President Ford: I said, and if I might I would more or less repeat it, we do value that relationship between the United States and the Republic of China. I think that is best indicated by the high-level delegation that I sent for the funeral services of Chiang Kai-shek.[2] I believe that having sent Vice President Rockefeller there, with the others that were included, is a clear indication that we consider our relationship, our cooperation, with the Republic of China a matter of very, very great importance to us.

. . . . .

Q. Mr. President, there have been some conflicting news stories out of Viet-Nam about the possible, if it is necessary, evacuation of not only Americans but of South Vietnamese nationals from Saigon. Is there any plan or policy about such evacuation?

President Ford: I have ordered the evacuation of all nonessential U.S. personnel in South Viet-Nam, and we are phasing down on a daily basis such U.S. personnel who have no responsibilities either for the government or for whatever other purpose they are there.

The present plan is to keep those there who have a position of responsibility, a meaningful job. I am not in the position to speculate as to how many that will be or when there might be a change in the situa-

[2] Vice President Rockefeller headed the U.S. delegation to the funeral of President Chiang. Other members of the delegation were Senators Barry M. Goldwater, Arizona, and Hiram L. Fong, Hawaii; Representative Roy A. Taylor, North Carolina; Anna Chennault of Washington, D.C., vice president for international affairs, Flying Tiger Lines, Inc.; Jack M. Eckerd of Clearwater, Fla., chairman of the board, Jack Eckerd Corp.; Dr. Arnold O. Beckman of Newport, Calif., president, Beckman Instruments; Walter P. McConaughy of Atlanta, Ga., former Ambassador to the Republic of China; Dr. Walter H. Judd of Washington, D.C., former Representative from Minnesota.

tion. I think it is too fluid at this moment to make any categorical comment.

Q. That is speaking about Americans, and I think we understand that. But is there any policy about the potential evacuation of South Vietnamese?

President Ford: Excuse me. In my speech last Thursday, I indicated there are a number of South Vietnamese who, over a period of almost two decades, have stood with us in various official capacities—longtime employees of the Federal Government, our government, who have been dedicated to the cause that not I, but a number of Presidents, have pursued.

I think we have an obligation to them. To the extent that I can under the law or, hopefully, if the law is clarified, I think we have a responsibility to them. But I don't think I ought to talk about an evacuation. I hope we are in a position where we can clarify or stabilize the situation and get a negotiated settlement that wouldn't put their lives in jeopardy.

Q. Mr. President, you have talked a great deal about the moral obligation of this country to provide more military arms for South Viet-Nam. But what about the moral obligation to the suffering people of that country, the moral obligation to end that war?

President Ford: Mr. Reston, the agreement which was signed, I think, by 12 nations in January of 1973 in Paris—and I was there, I saw the signing—was accomplished with the expectation that that war would end. If the agreement had been lived up to, the war would not now be going on.

We have continued in various ways to try and achieve a cease-fire, and I can assure you that we intend to continue those efforts.

But it is tragic, in my judgment, that what everybody thought was good in January of 1973 has been violated and now we are faced with a terrible catastrophe at the present time.

Q. But would we not then a year from now, or five years from now, still have the same moral obligation you speak of?

President Ford: It is my best judgment, based on experts within the Administration, both economic and military, that if we had made available for the next three years reasonable sums of military aid and economic assistance that South Viet-Nam would have been viable, that it could have met any of its economic problems, could have met any military challenges.

This is another of the tragedies. For just a relatively small additional commitment in economic and military aid, relatively small compared to the $150 billion that we spent, that at the last minute of the last quarter we don't make that special effort, and now we are faced with this human tragedy. It just makes me sick every day I hear about it, read about it, and see it.

. . . . .

United States Mourns Death of Chiang Kai-shek

Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China, died at Taipei April 5. Following is a statement by President Ford issued that day at Palm Springs, Calif.

White House press release (Palm Springs) dated April 5

I was deeply saddened at the death of the President of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek. His passing marks the end of an era in Chinese history.

President Chiang was a man of firm integrity, high courage, and deep political conviction. The last surviving major Allied leader of the Second World War, he will be remembered by people from all walks of life and from every part of the world for his dignity and dedication to principles in which he believed.

Mrs. Ford joins me in behalf of all Americans in expressing our sincere condolence to Madame Chiang, to President Chiang's family, and to his countrymen in this time of sorrow.

The National Interest and National Strength

Address by President Ford [1]

This year especially, as we prepare for the celebration of our Bicentennial, it would be good for all Americans to do some soul-searching about where we are going as a nation and what we are doing with the precious heritage of freedom that we inherited. This is a good time both to look backward and to look forward—a good time to take stock.

In so doing, we should not fall into the trap of blind nostalgia—of persuading ourselves that America's best years are behind us. There is a lot of negative talk like that going around in Washington and elsewhere. I think it can best be answered in one word: Nonsense.

The truth is that if we were to somehow travel back in time together to the American Revolution, we might be more shocked by the similarities than by the differences. If anything, times were tougher then.

We were a divided people. Many historians estimate the colonists were split into three factions: those who favored independence, those who supported the royal cause, and those who straddled the fence waiting to see which side would win.

Inflation was more than a serious problem during the American Revolution. It was a near-fatal disease. Printing-press money, the so-called Continental dollar, was only worth a fraction of its paper value. Many farmers and merchants refused to accept it even from hungry American soldiers trying to buy provisions.

Too often, American armies were defeated, defeated in battle, and driven to humiliating retreats. Disease, lack of equipment, and lack of training were chronic. We were dependent on foreign assistance for many of our weapons, uniforms, and equipment—and even for foreign advisers to train our troops.

If the French Government had not spent millions to help equip American forces and if we had not been assisted by a French army and a fleet at Yorktown, the American Revolution might have dragged on inconclusively for many, many years.

Yet, out of all of the suffering and uncertainty, a new nation was born and grew up into one of the biggest and most powerful nations in the history of the world.

Character had a lot to do with it—the courage and vision of men like Washington, shared by thousands of soldiers and the valiant, patriotic women who sustained their fighting men, as they have in all struggles, with their work and with their prayers.

Values were also very, very important—the moral imperatives and political ideals that were expressed with such eloquence by Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson and with such clarity by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison.

And divine providence also had something to do with it. Nor were our forefathers ashamed to acknowledge their debt to this source of strength in their dire time of trouble. Call it divine providence or call it destiny, 13 small colonies clustered along the Atlantic coast somehow managed to produce one of the most brilliant generations of leaders known to history—the soldiers and

[1] Made before the 84th Continental Congress of the Daughters of the American Revolution at Washington on Apr. 15 (text from White House press release; introductory paragraphs omitted).

the statesmen we know as the founders of this great country.

But even more remarkable than the genius of the founders themselves is the fact that generation after generation of Americans have continued to build on the foundation that they left us. Fortunately for us and for the world, we have never lost sight of their great dream.

Other countries, of course, have had brilliant leaders. But no other country can point to two centuries dedicated to expanding and perfecting a continuing revolution in a free society.

This is what makes America unique in the history of nations.

And that is why, although our experience in Indochina has been one of heroic sacrifices and great disappointments, I am convinced that we can and will emerge from this ordeal stronger and wiser as a nation, just as we have from others even greater in the past.

This brings me to the soul-searching—the inventory of opportunities, of challenges before us today. How do we stand today? Are we still on the right course?

It would be impossible for me in the time here to go over every single issue—political, military, diplomatic, and economic—that this question raises, so let me focus, if I might, on just one of them—our national defense.

I ask this question: Are we strong enough today? And, just as important, will we be strong enough tomorrow?

The Importance of a Strong Defense Posture

According to a recent poll, some Americans have questions about our world position and the cost of maintaining that position. The poll indicated that Americans want the United States, and I quote, "to play an active role in the world." Yet, at the same time, they believe the defense budget should be reduced. Some want it emasculated. Americans still believe that being strong militarily is important. They want, in the words of the poll's report, "a powerful and militarily secure standing for the United States in the world." What they don't like is the price tag that comes with it.

This is a basic dilemma. When a nation wants to achieve contradictory goals, such as military security and less defense spending, sooner or later citizens must make a choice.

It is becoming fashionable in some quarters to charge that military force is outmoded in the modern world. It is argued, for example, that modern weaponry, especially nuclear armaments, are too destructive to use and that therefore they won't ever be used.

Further, it is argued, when we have applied military power it has not produced the results we wanted, such as in Southeast Asia.

Finally, it is said that we are unlikely to be attacked in any event. Détente, according to this kind of reasoning, guarantees that future conflicts will be nonviolent ones which may be settled by negotiation.

It is my judgment that these arguments ignore a basic fact of international politics, one that has been proven repeatedly throughout history: National interest can be guarded only by national strength. In a conflict-ridden world, national strength in the broadest sense must be supported by military strengths.

It is often overlooked that détente—the process of reducing tensions with the U.S.S.R.—has been possible only because of U.S. strength and U.S. resolve.

It was after a prolonged period of cold war testing and confrontation, during which the United States and the rest of the Western world stood fast, that it became possible to move forward with the U.S.S.R. in negotiations aimed at reducing the chances for grave miscalculations and reducing the risk of nuclear war.

In these negotiations, we have safeguarded our vital defense interests. To weaken our defenses is to weaken one of the foundations of détente.

A posture of deliberate weakness is most dangerous when the worldwide military balance threatens to deteriorate, but at any time weakness would be folly for the United States, a great nation with interests spanning the globe.

If we were to cut ourselves back to such a

weak posture, as some recommend, we would soon find ourselves paying an unacceptable price. We cannot shrink our economy back to pre-1939 dimensions. We cannot turn our back on the rest of the world as we foolishly sought to do in the 1930's.

Like it or not, we are a great power, and our real choice is whether to succeed or fail in a role we cannot shirk. There is no other nation in the whole free world capable of stepping into our role.

If we conclude, as I believe we must, that we still need a strong national defense, the next issue is quite obvious: How much and what kind?

The answer depends on continuing vigilant assessment of the defenses needed to safeguard this great nation, an assessment measured in terms of the intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries and the common strength forged by our alliances.

Strategic Arms Balance

Our nuclear deterrent must be gauged against the nuclear capabilities and intentions of others and, in particular, the Soviet Union. It is for this reason that the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations and the Vladivostok agreements I signed with General Secretary Brezhnev are of such importance. We are working responsibly to put a cap on the nuclear arms race. Similarly, the amount and the type of conventional forces required will depend on our continuing ability to maintain a truly effective national defense.

It will also depend on our ability to meet our security commitments and on our ability with our allies to work with the Warsaw Pact nations toward reduction in forces, which will increase the prospect for international stability.

It is of fundamental importance to both the United States and to the world that the strategic balance be maintained, and strategic nuclear forces are the foundation of our defense.

We will work toward further strategic arms limitations. We will maintain a strategic arms balance.

Neither we, nor our allies, can afford the consequences if this fundamental balance shifts against us. I promise you that no defense budget I submit to the Congress will ever sell us short or shift the balance against the United States of America.

I respectfully call upon each and every Member of the Congress, House and Senate, to make the same pledge; for our survival as a nation could well depend upon it. I call upon you to let your Senators and Congressmen know how you feel individually and collectively. Let us never forget this: that our Pledge of Allegiance is to "one nation indivisible," not one nation indefensible.

NATO Security and Conventional Forces

In the area of conventional forces, we also confront some difficult challenges. Our troops in Europe, for example, are a key element in shielding Europe from military attacks or pressures of one kind or another. Present force levels are necessary to maintain a satisfactory conventional military balance between the alliance on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact nations on the other.

Unilateral reductions by the United States would upset that balance and constitute a major political change. The United States has agreed with our allies that there will be no unilateral troop reductions, except through mutual negotiations.

Our troop levels in that part of the world are not an obstacle to improved East-West relations in Europe. On the contrary, a stable military balance has been the starting point for hopeful new diplomacy.

For their part, the Europeans contribute the largest part of the conventional defense of the alliance. Unilateral U.S. reductions would undercut their efforts and would undermine confidence in the United States for the support of the alliance.

There are two other crucial areas of conventional forces necessary to maintain our side of the strategic balance: one, our long-range air capability, and sea power.

If we are to sustain our ability to react appropriately to threats to our interests from faraway shores, we may need to in-

crease our already considerable abilities to airlift troops and supplies long distances.

The United States and its allies depend heavily on the freedom of the seas for trade and for commerce. Thus, it is vital for us to maintain a full range of capabilities on the many oceans of the world.

Last summer, the Atlantic alliance celebrated its 25th year—a quarter of a century anniversary—25 years of peace through strength on the European Continent. To mark the occasion and to reaffirm our collective resolve, we joined with other member nations in a Declaration of Atlantic Relations. I will be meeting personally with allied leaders in the very near future to seek further progress toward our common goal—a peaceful and a secure free world.

But neither NATO nor the United States can guarantee a peaceful and secure free world if we allow our defenses to erode.

Keeping America Strong

Now, what about the price tag? What is it costing us to maintain our military strength? Critics of a strong defense say that the defense budget is higher than ever. But the truth is—and this we must understand and we must tell others—in terms of what each dollar will buy, the defense budget is now lower than any time since 1964, prior to our Viet-Nam buildup.

The reason for this is that inflation has taken just as high a toll of the defense dollar's purchasing power as it has from every family, from every business, from every community. Take away the effects of inflation and real pay increases, which are necessary to recruit our new all-volunteer forces, and what is left of the defense budget has actually declined in purchasing power during the last four years.

For example, in 1968, defense spending represented about 60 percent of our total Federal Government spending. Today, it is down to about 27 percent.

We cannot afford, as I see it, to let our defense strength slide down while other nations build up their forces. It is the obligation, as I see it, of each of us to keep America strong—the obligation of the Congress, of this Administration, and of each American concerned about the future of his or her great country.

And I pledge to you as solemnly and as strongly as I can that I will do my part, and I am sure each and every one of you will do your part.

A great hero who led our people both in war and in peace, Dwight Eisenhower, once said that "a true posture of defense is composed of three factors—spiritual, military, and economic."

We have the economic and industrial strength it takes to keep America a first-rate power.

Spiritual strength is less tangible. It is hard to measure in any exact way. But I can tell you this: I have traveled to just about every corner of America since becoming President, and everywhere I found the same confidence, the same good spirit, and the same willingness to pull together to make this an even greater and better country.

That is the American spirit that we can be proud of today, as we have in the past.

Yes, we have our problems, our doubts, and some have many questions. Yet, we also have the strength to ask tough questions and to seek honest answers, painful though they may be. And the American people still have the character and the vision that was tempered in the forge of the Revolution 200 years ago.

Finally, there is our actual military establishment. I have already talked this morning about some of the hardware and some of the costs. I will just add that I don't think we have ever had finer, better motivated men and women serving under the American flag than we have today—and I have met a lot of these fine young people, and you and I should be very proud of them. They are of the stock which George Washington would have been proud to command. The commanders of today are proud of them.

George Washington made the point that I have tried to put across today. To be prepared for war, George Washington declared, is one of the most effective means of preserving the peace.

Peace is what we are really talking about, the building of peace and the preserving of peace. And only a strong America can build a strong and durable peace.

And as I conclude, let me say this: As children of the American Revolution, we owe this both to the patriots who came before us and to the generations who one day will inherit from us all that we have achieved together in two centuries of struggle.

Thank you very much.

Geneva Protocol of 1925 and Biological Weapons Convention

Following is a statement by President Ford issued on January 22 upon signing the instruments of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention,[1] together with the text of an Executive order signed April 8.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated January 22

I have signed today the instruments of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent on December 16, 1974.

With deep gratification, I announce the U.S. ratification of the protocol, thus completing a process which began almost 50 years ago when the United States proposed at Geneva a ban on the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases."

While the ratification of the protocol has been delayed for many years, the United States has long supported the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol.

The protocol was submitted to the Senate in 1926 and again in 1970. Following extensive congressional hearings in 1971, during which differing views developed, the executive branch undertook a thorough and comprehensive review of the military, legal, and political issues relating to the protocol. As a result, we have defined a new policy to govern any future use in war of riot control agents and chemical herbicides. While reaffirming the current U.S. understanding of the scope of the protocol as not extending to riot control agents and chemical herbicides, I have decided that the United States shall renounce as a matter of national policy:

1. First use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters.

2. First use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives, such as, use of riot control agents in riot situations, to reduce civilian casualties, for rescue missions, and to protect rear area convoys.

This policy is detailed in the Executive order which I will issue today. The order also reaffirms our policy established in 1971 that any use in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents must be approved by me in advance.

I am very pleased to have signed a second international agreement, entitled the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. This is the first such agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons. As you may recall, the United States had already unilaterally renounced these weapons before the convention was negotiated. Our entire stockpile of biological and toxin agents and weapons has been destroyed, and our biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses.

The convention provides that it will come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by the three depositaries—the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.—and at least 19 other coun-

[1] For remarks made by President Ford upon signing the instruments of ratification, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 27, 1975, p. 73.

tries. Thirty-seven countries have already ratified the convention. The United Kingdom has completed the parliamentary procedures for ratification, and the Soviet Union has announced its intention to ratify very soon. While I have signed the U.S. instrument of ratification today, its deposit will be deferred until we have coordinated that action with the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.[2]

It is my earnest hope that all nations will find it in their interest to join in this prohibition against biological weapons.

TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11850[3]

RENUNCIATION OF CERTAIN USES IN WAR OF CHEMICAL HERBICIDES AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:

(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.

(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.

(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.

(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations.

I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to ensure proper implementation and observance of such national policy.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *April 8, 1975.*

[2] The U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. instruments of ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention were deposited Mar. 26; the U.S. instrument of ratification of the Geneva Protocol was deposited Apr. 10.

[3] 40 *Fed. Reg.* 16187.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.

Security Council

Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (for the period May 23 to December 5, 1974). S/11568. December 6, 1974. 21 pp.

Seventh report of the Security Council committee established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia. S/11594. January 9, 1975. 48 pp.

Special report of the Security Council committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia on external participation in the expansion of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company, Ltd. S/11597. January 15, 1975. 68 pp.

Special report of the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus. S/11624. February 18, 1975. 18 pp.

General Assembly

Letter dated January 20, 1975, from the Permanent Representative of Portugal addressed to the Secretary General transmitting the text of the agreement between Portugal and the three liberation movements of Angola, aiming at the establishment of the self-determination and independence of Angola. A/10040. January 22, 1975. 13 pp.

The Nonproliferation Treaty and Our Worldwide Security Structure

Address by Fred C. Iklé
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [1]

It seems particularly appropriate that we should meet here on Capitol Hill to discuss nuclear proliferation. Congress has shown leadership on this issue since the first Atomic Energy Act, the McMahon Act of 1946. And Congress provides the necessary continuity and long-term concern. U.S. efforts to negotiate the Nonproliferation Treaty were given strong impetus by the Pastore resolution of 1966. Of the 56 original sponsors of that resolution, half continue to serve in the Senate today.

To prepare a new arms control initiative can take months; to negotiate it can take years. If agreement is reached, its effects may be felt over decades. The history of the Nonproliferation Treaty has already spanned the Administrations of three Presidents. Next month's Review Conference involves the fourth.

The role of Congress is also critical in backing up our policies, such as through legislation in behalf of export controls and financial support for international safeguards. Congress understands full well why it must give continuing attention to nuclear proliferation. The way this problem is managed will have the deepest impact on America's future. Our political system, our open society, could not survive in a world where the threat of nuclear destruction would be an everyday tool for political ends.

Now that I have pleaded for your active participation, I want to be frank and open with you. The news on nuclear proliferation is bad.

Several countries not now nuclear-weapons states appear to be making determined efforts to acquire a capability that would enable them to build their own atomic bombs. How far they will go, and how many others will join them, are still open questions. And in the future we will have to face the fact that some governments might not be able to defeat all attempts of criminal groups to acquire the materials to make bombs. Unless we find new ways to cope with this risk, it will increase because of the growing spread of peaceful uses.

Indeed, today the spread of nuclear-weapons capability is riding on the wave of peaceful uses of the atom. The world's first five nuclear-weapons states clearly started out with a military program. Now it is peaceful technology that provides not only the means but also the cover in all cases where we fear that a new weapons program might be on the way. At the same time, we must of course recognize that beneficial uses of the atom will legitimately expand.

Many advanced industrial countries, because of their competence in technology, could have embarked on nuclear-weapons programs some time ago. Yet they held on to their decision not to do so. Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan are conspicuous examples. Capability did not automatically produce intent. But now we suspect that the intent to make nuclear weapons exists in several places even though the capability is not yet there.

We can slow down the spread of nuclear-

[1] Made at Washington on Apr. 9 before a conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty sponsored by the Arms Control Association (text from ACDA press release).

weapons capability from country to country. We cannot stop it by ourselves. In a way, the United States has contributed to this spread, starting in 1954 when we abandoned the strict secrecy and tight controls on nuclear technology and began to help other countries acquire nuclear reactors and know-how.

Today we have to rely mainly on political incentives and political constraints to prevent nuclear arms competition from infecting country after country—to preserve a world in which nuclear weapons will not be used. This fact is what makes the Nonproliferation Treaty so important.

What does this treaty do?

It is true that the treaty does not include all the critical countries. For example, India, Israel, Brazil, and Argentina have indicated that at this time they will not be parties. Further, any party to the treaty could legally withdraw in three months if its supreme national interests are jeopardized, or a government could simply violate the treaty. But any arms control agreement can be abandoned by a determined, independent nation. The Nonproliferation Treaty is about as binding as most other treaties and is adequately verifiable. In this treaty, a common vision unites over 80 countries: they all look to a world so ordered that man's most destructive invention will threaten no one.

However, some have argued that the benefits of the treaty are unconvincing to nonnuclear-weapons states, since the principal nuclear powers have so far failed to undertake genuine nuclear disarmament. The treaty, they say, is merely a device for the superpowers to maintain their dominance.

This argument is wrong. While progress in nuclear arms control has been much slower than one would wish, the two major nuclear powers have imposed important arms limitations upon themselves. Indeed, through the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed not to build armaments precisely in the area where their worldwide monopoly was beyond dispute; no other country could build an ABM system in the foreseeable future.

Another criticism of the Nonproliferation Treaty (pressed mostly by less industrialized countries) is that the nuclear-weapons states have not been sufficiently forthcoming in providing peaceful nuclear assistance and that the controls on proliferation hinder peaceful development.

This charge is totally false. The less industrialized countries have reached their present level in peaceful nuclear technology only because of the assistance they received from nuclear-weapons states or from certain nuclear-industrial countries, such as Canada, that are strong supporters of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Our efforts to prevent the export of nuclear technology from spreading nuclear arms does not infringe on any right of any country. On the contrary, the only universal treaty obligation to export technology, that I know of, is the obligation created by the Nonproliferation Treaty—the obligation to contribute to the development of peaceful nuclear applications in nonnuclear-weapons states. The importing countries can't have it both ways, no matter how rich or poor they are; they cannot denounce the Nonproliferation Treaty and yet claim the right to nuclear assistance that was created solely by this treaty.

Other objections are that the treaty is inadequate to deal with one or another of the many problems of nuclear weapons—the control of nuclear technology through export restrictions and safeguards, the management of nuclear-waste disposal, and above all, the security of nations who agree to give up nuclear arms. The answer is not to discount the value of the treaty, but to supplement it.

We must continue efforts to separate nuclear exports that safely serve peaceful purposes from those that will proliferate weapons capabilities. But the U.S. Government cannot do this alone. The International Atomic Energy Agency must play a critical role here. We should give this Agency our fullest political and financial backing. It faces a gigantic task with quite limited means. As a contribution to this end, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency has developed a number of instruments to assist international inspectors in detecting theft or diversion of dangerous materials.

Unhappily, shortsighted commercial interests sometimes militate against the application of effective controls. It is essential that supplier nations agree not to undercut each other on nuclear safeguards. You would think that all nations willing to export nuclear materials or equipment would be anxious to prevent proliferation. Even the largest nations would suffer grievously if nuclear explosives became widely available, and the welfare and independence of medium-sized or smaller industrial nations might be even more threatened. Thus, I hope all the exporters of nuclear technology will keep their own long-term self-interest in mind.

Another problem we face is that of nuclear wastes. At the present time, these wastes—spent fuel from reactors—are simply accumulating, and of course they will accumulate increasingly as more reactors come into use. They are dangerous now from the standpoint of possible permanent contamination of the environment; but they might become far more dangerous still if there were a widespread effort to reprocess them and thus extract plutonium which could be used for weapons as well as for reactor fuel. Several imaginative solutions have been suggested, which seem promising on technical and economic grounds. But there are still great gaps in our knowledge.

The big question remains: Will nations agree not to acquire nuclear weapons?

The answer is this: A country will agree if, in its judgment, its security is served by doing so. The Nonproliferation Treaty, basically, ties together many countries into a multilateral commitment not to start nuclear arms competition with each other. Many nations understand that such competition would exacerbate existing conflicts in their area, raising new instability and the chances of nuclear war. Yet these countries will also consider whether their self-denial of nuclear arms might not adversely affect their security from nuclear blackmail, or from armed attack, by the present nuclear powers.

Given the ideological and national conflicts in the world, nations forgoing nuclear weapons for defense will naturally seek protection by other means. Protection through a strong alliance, for many nations, is now the alternative to a desperate search for security by getting their own nuclear bombs. And let us face this fact squarely: Alliances protecting most of these countries at this time would not survive without continuing American support.

So we are presented with two choices. One is to prepare for an autarkic America, which, by terminating alliances, has in effect resigned itself to further nuclear proliferation, an America that tries to rely on its own resources only, an America that tries to protect itself behind barriers of air and missile defenses and a tightly guarded border. Our standard of living would be lower and our personal freedoms severely curtailed. But we could claim to be free of foreign entanglements, without troops and bases overseas, and no demands from allies to worry about.

The second choice hopefully open to us is to play a leading role in maintaining a worldwide security structure that will give non-nuclear nations the confidence to forgo their own nuclear forces. Unless we play this role, we will lose both our right and our capability to act against nuclear proliferation.

We can't have it both ways; we can't be free from foreign involvements and be effective against nuclear proliferation.

U.S. Alternate Executive Director of IDB Confirmed

The Senate on March 11 confirmed the nomination of Yan Michael Ross to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank.

President Ford Names Commission on International Women's Year

White House press release (Palm Springs, Calif.) dated April 2

President Ford on April 2 announced his intention to appoint 33 persons as members of the National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year, 1975. The President is also designating Jill Ruckelshaus to chair the Commission. The members are:

JILL RUCKELSHAUS, of Rockville, Md., Director, Organizational Relations, National Center for Voluntary Action, Washington, D.C.

ETHEL ALLEN, of Philadelphia, Pa., physician, surgeon, and Philadelphia city councilwoman.

ANNE L. ARMSTRONG, of Armstrong, Tex., former Counsellor to the President.

MARGARET LONG ARNOLD, of Saugerties on Hudson, N.Y., executive assistant to the executive director, National Retired Teachers Association, Washington, D.C.

ELIZABETH ATHANASAKOS, of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., attorney.

BARBARA R. BERGMANN, of Bethesda, Md., professor of economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Md.

PATRICIA T. CARBINE, of New York, N.Y., publisher and editor in chief, Ms. Magazine.

WESTON CHRISTOPHERSON, of Lake Forest, Ill., president, Jewel Companies, Chicago, Ill.

MARY STALLINGS COLEMAN, of Battle Creek, Mich., justice, Michigan Supreme Court, Lansing, Mich.

HELEN K. COPLEY, of LaJolla, Calif., chairman and chief executive officer of the Copley Newspapers.

AUDREY ROWE COLOM, of Washington, D.C., coordinator of the D.C. Child Advocacy Office, Children's Defense Fund.

RICHARD CORNUELLE, of New York, N.Y., author.

WINFIELD DUNN, of Nashville, Tenn., consultant, business and government, former Governor of Tennessee.

CATHERINE CLAIRE EIKE, of Lawrence, Kans., assistant to the dean of women, the University of Kansas.

PAULA GIBSON, of Four Lakes, Wash., student, Gonzaga University, Spokane, Wash.

GILDA BOJORQUEZ GJURICH, of Montabello, Calif., president and senior partner, Los Amigos Construction Co., Santa Fe Springs, Calif.

ELLA T. GRASSO, of Windsor Locks, Conn., Governor of Connecticut, Hartford, Conn.

HANNA HOLBORN GRAY, of New Haven, Conn., provost, Yale University.

MARTHA GRIFFITHS, of Farmington Hills, Mich., attorney, former Congresswoman.

LENORE HERSHEY, of New York, N.Y., editor in chief of the Ladies Home Journal.

VELMA MURPHY HILL, of New York, N.Y., assistant to the President, United Federation of Teachers.

PATRICIA HUTAR, of Glenview, Ill., U.S. Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women.

RITA Z. JOHNSTON, of Bethesda, Md., U.S. Delegate and Vice Chairman of the Inter-American Commission of Women, Organization of American States.

ELLEN I. KIRBY, of Petersburg, W. Va., public health nurse for Grant County, W. Va.

DOROTHY VALE KISSINGER, of Mesa, Ariz., coowner and manager, Sahuaro Lake Guest Ranch.

CLARE BOOTHE LUCE, of Honolulu, Hawaii.

WILLIAM CRAWFORD MERCER, of Wellesley Hills, Mass., president, New England Telephone and Telegraph, Boston, Mass.

ERSA H. POSTON, of Loudonville, N.Y., president, New York State Civil Service Commission, Albany, N.Y.

JOEL READ, of Milwaukee, Wis., president, Alverne College, Milwaukee, Wis.

BETTY SMITH, of Eugene, Oreg., member, National Board of Directors, YMCA.

BARBARA WALTERS, of New York, N.Y., cohost of the Today Show.

ANNIE DODGE WAUNEKA, of Ganado, Ariz., member of the Navajo Tribal Council, Window Rock, Ariz.

GERRIDEE WHEELER, of Bismarck, N. Dak., president, National Association of Mental Health.

The Commission shall consist of not more than 35 members to be appointed by the President from among citizens in private life.[1] The President shall designate the presiding officer, who may designate from among the members of the Commission as many vice presiding officers as necessary.

The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives may designate two Members of each House to serve on the Commission.[2]

The Commission shall promote the na-

[1] President Ford announced on Apr. 14 (White House press release) two additional members of the Commission: Katherine Hepburn, of Old Saybrook, Conn., actress, and Alan Alda, of Leonia, N.J., actor and writer.

[2] The congressional members of the Commission are Senators Birch Bayh and Charles Percy and Representatives Bella Abzug and Margaret Heckler.

tional observance in the United States of International Women's Year. To this end, it will focus attention on the need to encourage appropriate and relevant cooperative activity in the field of women's rights and responsibilities.

The Commission shall conclude its work by the end of the year 1975 and make a report to the President within 30 days thereafter. The Commission shall then be terminated.

United States and Colombia Review Hemispheric Matters

Following is the text of a joint communique issued on April 9 at the conclusion of a visit to Washington by Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Foreign Minister of Colombia.

Press release 188 dated April 9

The Foreign Minister of Colombia Dr. Indalecio Liévano Aguirre and the Secretary of State Dr. Henry A. Kissinger announced that they met on April 8 in Washington for the purpose of reviewing matters of common interest in the hemisphere. The Foreign Minister traveled to Washington at the invitation of the Secretary of State for consultations prior to the Secretary's Latin American trip. They discussed the forthcoming General Assembly of the OAS and the major agenda items for that meeting. They also reviewed the current state of the hemisphere and perspectives for U.S.-Latin American relations over the longer term. The Foreign Minister of Colombia delivered to the Secretary a letter to President Ford sent jointly by the Presidents of Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela.

The two principals also discussed preparations for the forthcoming state visit of President Alfonso López Michelsen scheduled for the fall.

The talks were helpful and constructive. They served to confirm the warm and cooperative spirit which characterizes relationships between the two countries.

The Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of Colombia agreed that they would maintain an active exchange of views on the issues discussed in the months ahead and especially prior to the OAS General Assembly in May.

Presidential Determination for Generalized Tariff Preferences

MEMORANDUM OF MARCH 24, 1975[1]

Determination Under Section 502(b) of the Trade Act of 1974

[Presidential Determination No. 75-11]

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 24, 1975.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "the Act"), I hereby determine on the basis of a review conducted by interested agencies of the Executive Branch of each of the relevant investment disputes that, in the case of each country listed below, good faith negotiations to provide prompt, adequate, and effective compensation under the applicable provisions of international law are in progress, or such country is otherwise taking steps to discharge its obligations under international law, as prescribed in Section 502(b) (4) (D) (ii) of the Act:

Afghanistan	Ethiopia
Argentina	India
Bangladesh	Morocco
Bolivia	Pakistan
Central African Republic	Sri Lanka
Congo (Brazzaville)	Sudan
Dahomey	Syria
Egypt	Tanzania
El Salvador	Zaire

In accordance with Section 502(b) (4) of the Act I am furnishing a copy of this determination to the Senate and House of Representatives.

This Determination shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

[1] 40 *Fed. Reg.* 15377, Apr. 7.

Military and Humanitarian Assistance to South Viet-Nam

Following are statements made before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on April 15 by Secretary Kissinger and before the House Committee on International Affairs on April 15 by Daniel Parker, Administrator, Agency for International Development, and on April 18 by Secretary Kissinger.[1]

SECRETARY KISSINGER, SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, APRIL 15

Press release 199 dated April 15

The long and agonizing conflict in Indochina has reached a tragic stage. The events of the past month have been discussed at great length before the Congress and require little additional elaboration. In Viet-Nam President Thieu ordered a strategic withdrawal from a number of areas he regarded as militarily untenable. However, the withdrawal took place in great haste, without adequate advance planning, and with insufficient coordination. It was further complicated by a massive flow of civilian refugees seeking to escape the advancing North Vietnamese Army. Disorganization engendered confusion; fear led to panic. The results, as we all know, were tragic losses—of territory, of population, of material, and of morale.

But to fully understand what has happened, it is necessary to have an appreciation of all that went before. The North Vietnamese offensive, and the South Vietnamese response, did not come about by chance—although chance is always an element in warfare. The origins of these events are complex, and I believe it would be useful to review them briefly.

Since January 1973, Hanoi has violated—continuously, systematically, and energetically—the most fundamental provisions of the Paris agreement. It steadily increased the numbers of its troops in the South. It improved and expanded its logistics system in the South. It increased the armaments and ammunition of its forces in the South. And as you know, it blocked all efforts to account for personnel missing in action. These are facts, and they are indisputable. All of these actions were of course in total violation of the agreement. Parallel to these efforts, Hanoi attempted—with considerable success—to immobilize the various mechanisms established by the agreement to monitor and curtail violations of the cease-fire. Thus, it assiduously prepared the way for further military actions.

South Viet-Nam's record of adherence to the agreement has not been perfect. It is, however, qualitatively and quantitatively far better than Hanoi's. South Viet-Nam did not build up its armed forces. It undertook no major offensive actions—although it traded thrusts and probes with the Communists. It cooperated fully in establishing and supporting the cease-fire control mechanisms provided for in the agreement. And it sought, as did the United States, full implementation of those provisions of the agreement calling for an accounting of soldiers missing in action.

But perhaps more relevant to an understanding of recent events are the following factors.

[1] The complete transcripts of the hearings will be published by the committees and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

While North Viet-Nam had available several reserve divisions which it could commit to battle at times and places of its choosing, the South had no strategic reserves. Its forces were stretched thin, defending lines of communication and population centers throughout the country.

While North Viet-Nam, by early this year, had accumulated in South Viet-Nam enough ammunition for two years of intensive combat, South Vietnamese commanders had to ration ammunition as their stocks declined and were not replenished.

While North Viet-Nam had enough fuel in the South to operate its tanks and armored vehicles for at least 18 months, South Viet-Nam faced stringent shortages.

In sum, while Hanoi was strengthening its army in the South, the combat effectiveness of South Viet-Nam's army gradually grew weaker. While Hanoi built up its reserve divisions and accumulated ammunition, fuel, and other military supplies, U.S. aid levels to Viet-Nam were cut—first by half in 1973 and then by another third in 1974. This coincided with a worldwide inflation and a fourfold increase in fuel prices. As a result almost all of our military aid had to be devoted to ammunition and fuel. Very little was available for spare parts, and none for new equipment.

These imbalances became painfully evident when the offensive broke full force, and they contributed to the tragedy which unfolded. Moreover, the steady diminution in the resources available to the Army of South Viet-Nam unquestionably affected the morale of its officers and men. South Vietnamese units in the northern and central provinces knew full well that they faced an enemy superior both in numbers and in firepower. They knew that reinforcements and resupply would not be forthcoming. When the fighting began they also knew, as they had begun to suspect, that the United States would not respond. I would suggest that all of these factors added significantly to the sense of helplessness, despair, and, eventually, panic which we witnessed in late March and early April.

I would add that it is both inaccurate and unfair to hold South Viet-Nam responsible for blocking progress toward a political solution to the conflict. Saigon's proposals in its conversations with PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government] representatives in Paris were in general constructive and conciliatory. There was no progress toward a compromise political settlement because Hanoi intended that there should not be. Instead, North Viet-Nam's strategy was to lay the groundwork for an eventual military offensive, one which would either bring outright victory or at least allow Hanoi to dictate the terms of a political solution.

Neither the United States nor South Viet-Nam entered into the Paris agreement with the expectation that Hanoi would abide by it in every respect. We did believe, however, that the agreement was sufficiently equitable to both sides that its major provisions could be accepted and acted upon by Hanoi and that the contest could be shifted thereby from a military to a political track. However, our two governments also recognized that, since the agreement manifestly was not self-enforcing, Hanoi's adherence depended heavily on maintaining a military parity in South Viet-Nam. So long as North Viet-Nam confronted a strong South Vietnamese army and so long as the possibility existed of U.S. intervention to offset the strategic advantages of the North, Hanoi could be expected to forgo major military action. Both of those essential conditions were dissipated over the past two years. Hanoi attained a clear military superiority, and it became increasingly convinced that U.S. intervention could be ruled out. It therefore returned to a military course, with the results we have seen.

The present situation in Viet-Nam is ominous. North Viet-Nam's combat forces far outnumber those of the South, and they are better armed. Perhaps more important, they enjoy a psychological momentum which can be as decisive as armaments in battle. South Viet-Nam must reorganize and reequip its forces, and it must restore the morale of its army and its people. These tasks will be difficult, and they can be performed only by the South Vietnamese. However, a successful defense will also require resources—arms,

fuel, ammunition, and medical supplies—and these can come only from the United States.

Large quantities of equipment and supplies, totaling perhaps $800 million, were lost in South Viet-Nam's precipitous retreat from the northern and central areas. Much of this should not have been lost, and we regret that it happened. But South Viet-Nam is now faced with a different strategic and tactical situation and different military requirements. Although the amount of military assistance the President has requested is of the same general magnitude as the value of the equipment lost, we are not attempting simply to replace those losses. The President's request, based on General Weyand's [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army] assessment, represents our best judgment as to what is needed now, in this new situation, to defend what is left of South Viet-Nam. Weapons, ammunition, and supplies to reequip four divisions, to form a number of ranger groups into divisional units, and to upgrade some territorial forces into infantry regiments will require some $326 million. The balance of our request is for ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and medical supplies to sustain up to 60 days of intensive combat and to pay for the cost of transporting those items. These are minimum requirements, and they are needed urgently.

The human tragedy of Viet-Nam has never been more acute than it now is. Hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese have sought to flee Communist control and are homeless refugees. They have our compassion, and they must also have our help. Despite commendable efforts by the South Vietnamese Government, the burden of caring for these innocent victims is beyond its capacity. The United States has already done much to assist these people, but many remain without adequate food, shelter, or medical care. The President has asked that additional efforts and additional resources be devoted to this humanitarian effort. I ask that the Congress respond generously and quickly.

The objectives of the United States in this immensely difficult situation remain as they were when the Paris agreement was signed —to end the military conflict and establish conditions which will allow a fair political solution to be achieved. We believe that despite the tragic experience to date, the Paris agreement remains a valid framework within which to proceed toward such a solution. However, today, as in 1973, battlefield conditions will affect political perceptions and the outcome of negotiations. We therefore believe that in order for a political settlement to be reached which preserves any degree of self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam, the present military situation must be stabilized. It is for these reasons that the President has asked Congress to appropriate urgently additional funds for military assistance for Viet-Nam.

I am acutely aware of the emotions aroused in this country by our long and difficult involvement in Viet-Nam. I understand what the cost has been for this nation and why frustration and anger continue to dominate our national debate. Many will argue that we have done more than enough for the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam. I do not agree with that proposition, however, nor do I believe that to review endlessly the wisdom of our original involvement serves a useful purpose now. For despite the agony of this nation's experience in Indochina and the substantial reappraisal which has taken place concerning our proper role there, few would deny that we are still involved or that what we do—or fail to do—will still weigh heavily in the outcome. We cannot by our actions alone insure the survival of South Viet-Nam. But we can, alone, by our inaction assure its demise.

The United States has no legal obligation to the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam of which the Congress is not aware. But we do have a deep moral obligation—rooted in the history of our involvement and sustained by the continuing efforts of our friends. We cannot easily set it aside. In addition to the obvious consequences for the people of Viet-Nam, our failure to act in accordance with that obligation would inevitably influence other nations' perceptions of our constancy and our determination.

American credibility would not collapse, and American honor would not be destroyed. But both would be weakened, to the detriment of this nation and of the peaceful world order we have sought to build.

Mr. Chairman, as our Ambassador in Phnom Penh was about to be evacuated last week he received a letter from a longtime friend of the United States who has been publicly marked for execution. Let me share that letter with you:

DEAR EXCELLENCY AND FRIEND, I thank you very sincerely for your letter and for your offer to transport me towards freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion. As for you, and in particular for your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection, and we can do nothing about it.

You leave, and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under this sky. But, mark it well, that if I shall die here on the spot and in my country that I love, it is too bad, because we all are born and must die one day.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I suspect that neither Ambassador [John Gunther] Dean nor I will ever be able to forget that letter or the brave man who wrote it. Let us now, as Americans, act together to assure that we receive no more letters of this kind.

MR. PARKER, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, APRIL 15

I come to your committee today to ask for your assistance. We are urgently proposing and seeking your approval for a humanitarian undertaking, an undertaking which I believe does credit to the spirit of charity and sympathy—especially for those with whom we as a people have long been associated—that has in the past been a wellspring of our national character.

In the past three weeks, the people of South Viet-Nam, a generation of whom have never known lasting tranquillity, have again been faced with a disruptive cataclysm of enormous human proportions. These events are familiar to us all. In the face of an assault by North Vietnamese divisions in direct violation of the Paris peace accords, millions, motivated by a mixture of conviction, allegiance, and fear, fled the northern and central portions of South Viet-Nam. They left their villages and towns, they left their friends and sometimes their families, they left their belongings, and they left the soil from which they earned a living or the work in which they were otherwise employed. In this exodus, many died, and not all—or even most—escaped. The armies of the North rolled southward faster than those who sought to flee.

Our first thoughts and our first actions were to assist those who sought refuge in the territory still controlled by the Government of South Viet-Nam (GVN). We dispatched ships to augment the 40-odd craft made available for this purpose by the Government of South Viet-Nam and the several mercy vessels furnished by other nations. Events moved too rapidly, and we were only partially successful, but through these efforts about 150,000 people were brought to safety. Others, roughly estimated at 850,000, moved and are still moving by their own efforts on rivers and by land to the refugee sites that are under GVN control. To date, nearly 500,000 refugees have been officially registered by the government.

This process of counting by registration invariably lags behind the reality of displaced human beings, both because of the time involved in assembling data and because the movement of persons still continues. Our best estimate today—and I need not tell you that today's numbers may well be wrong tomorrow—is that the Government of South Viet-Nam will shortly face the responsibility of caring for approximately 1 million new refugees.

To assist in that effort we have allotted almost all of the limited Foreign Assistance Act resources remaining available to us; in addition, we have made 100,000 tons of rice and an additional 13,500 tons of high-protein

food supplements available on a grant basis under Public Law 480 to be distributed by both voluntary agencies and the South Vietnamese Government to those most desperately in need.

Let me note at this point that to the enormous problem of refugee relief must be added the weight of an already severe condition of unemployment and recession in the urban areas—a condition created in large measure by the withdrawal of American forces and funds—that with certainty must worsen drastically as the disruption of war takes its toll on the productive economy. Many will be without work. Any humanitarian effort must be no less concerned for those who suffer deprivation in the cities than for those displaced by the war. Suffering is made no less bearable for being once removed from its cause.

We are confident that the Government of South Viet-Nam possesses the all-too-experienced human resources to undertake an orderly and reliable relief effort, given some measure of assistance from the voluntary agencies, the international organizations, and AID personnel. (To the subject of those agencies and organizations I would like to return shortly.) We are equally certain, however, that without new financial resources from outside donors, misery and starvation and sickness, unacceptable on any human basis, will inevitably ensue.

I am here today to ask you approve the commitment by the United States of a large but by no means all-inclusive portion of those resources. Specifically, I am asking you to authorize an additional $73 million for that purpose, which, taken together with the $177 million previously authorized but not yet appropriated for assistance to Indochina, will make available $250 million to lighten the burden and ease the suffering of the refugees, the war victims, and the unemployed of South Viet-Nam. At the same time I am asking you to waive previous allocations of Indochina funds which could impede the humanitarian effort.

Let me emphasize at the outset that the program we sketch here is illustrative. Planning here and in Saigon is actively underway. Our objective is to assist the Government of South Viet-Nam to heal the human wounds of war by reuniting families, assisting them during a difficult transition period, resettling them in new homes, and bringing them back into the productive economy. The funds we seek will be contributed to meet these objectives. We will be attempting as best we can to fashion programs that adequately care for relief needs and also focus on the inextricably related objective of increasing jobs, reducing inflation, and in other ways creating an economic climate which permits the South Vietnamese people to move away from this hour of trouble toward productive, self-sufficient, and peaceful lives.

As we see the situation now, the funds we seek are not going to be expended on long-term projects. Rather, our request reflects our best estimate of the initial relief costs for the refugees and of the ongoing and elemental requirements for a period of six months of the people whom I have mentioned—the refugees, the war victims, the urban unemployed.

Let me describe briefly for you our projections of aggregate needs.

First, with respect to the emergency transportation of refugees to the temporary sites within South Viet-Nam, we have an estimated requirement of about $10 million.

Second, with respect to the care of refugees, there are four broad categories of expenditures:

Temporary Refugee Sites must be developed and constructed. At present, we foresee the need for nine sites on the mainland to accommodate about 100,000 people each and one on the Island of Phu Quoc. The locations of the nine other sites have not been determined as yet, but we would expect them to be sited on good agricultural land in the delta. A site must be cleared, roads and shelters constructed, drainage ditches dug, water supplies and sanitary facilities

formed, medical, educational and administrative facilities provided. These items and many others related to providing essential goods and services are expected to cost roughly $10 million per site, or $100 million in total.

Refugee Relief Allowances and Camp Operations Costs of roughly $10 per person per month must be provided. This will enable the refugees to buy food with which to supplement their rice ration of 500 grams per day, charcoal with which to cook, and cloth with which to clothe themselves. Additionally, these funds would pay for food handling and storage, transport, and related costs. The total cost for this for six months will be $60 million.

Work Programs to employ the refugees must also be developed, in order to permit at least one family member to supplement the family's meager income. We expect most of the laborers would be women. Our past experience tells us that we can expect that some 200,000 people would be so employed, if given the opportunity, at $1 per day. For six months this would require $30 million. These refugees will provide the bulk of nonskilled labor needed in the construction of refugee camp facilities. They will also provide the nonskilled labor required to maintain minimal standards for sanitary facilities in the camps and maintain in good repair drainage ditches, roads, fencing, water facilities, and other camp infrastructure.

Integrated Relief and Resettlement Support Teams—The voluntary agencies are ready to assist in the refugee relief and resettlement program when the security situation stabilizes sufficiently to allow staff to operate with some degree of safety. Their contribution will be the provision of support and advisory teams that would include physicians, nurses, medical assistants, and others. Their major responsibility will be to provide advisory and other support needed in the relief effort. A total of $12 million is planned for these teams.

Third, with respect to the rapidly growing needs of the urban unemployed, we would begin developing, together with the Government of South Viet-Nam, programs to provide assistance to the urban destitute and to provide work for the unemployed and underemployed wherever feasible. We propose a program costing $10 million.

Fourth, with respect to the refugees located on the Island of Phu Quoc, we believe that circumstances permit the immediate initiation of resettlement efforts. We should keep in mind that temporary camps give only some relief to human misery. Resettlement permits people to move into tolerable and productive lives.

The Phu Quoc resettlement program should move rapidly. The refugees have been given access to 18,000 hectares of land on the island. Clearing the land for agriculture use, grading for roadways and drainage ditches, and providing water wells and other structures await the necessary funding. The onset of the rainy season in June and July of 1976 is the critical target period for gaining access to the land if a December 1976 harvest is to be realized. The Norwegian Government has recently grant-financed a fishing project on Phu Quoc which will provide boats and fishing gear for 4,000 families (some 20,000 persons). Experts estimate this is the maximum-sized fishing enterprise that should be undertaken at this time. We have not yet received estimated GVN cost data. However, we anticipate that as a minimum, the Government of South Viet-Nam will provide teachers for the 250 classrooms we envisage for the Phu Quoc resettlement program as well as administrative and technical personnel for the refugee and resettlement site. We propose $28 million for this resettlement program.

It is clear that the funds we seek are but a fraction of the total costs which will be incurred in South Viet-Nam. Our best present estimate is that approximately $750 million to $1 billion will be needed to carry a relief and resettlement program for refugees through to its conclusion. We are requesting $250 million now to begin the job as quickly as possible. We hope and expect

that others will contribute to the effort.

American voluntary agencies with which AID has been working in both Cambodia and South Viet-Nam have assured us that they stand ready to respond to human need in any area where they are at liberty to operate. They are prepared to undertake relief and rehabilitation as well as their ongoing programs. Although their U.S. personnel have been reduced, those remaining, along with local staffs, are assisting with the refugee problem. And they have highly experienced staff standing on call in nearby countries awaiting the opportunity to assist once the situation stabilizes.

The foreign assistance dollars we provide will perform double duty. We estimate that 80 percent of our funds will be used to finance local piaster costs of the relief effort. The dollars will be available to the Government of South Viet-Nam to finance imports of essential commodities needed to keep the economy of Viet-Nam in balance by matching the increased money supply generated by the relief program with imported goods. Our objective is to require that the dollars be spent in the United States under the Commodity Import Program to the extent consistent with our primary objective of providing prompt financing for relief efforts and avoiding the general human suffering which can be caused by hyperinflation.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by frankly admitting that I cannot tell you what will happen to South Viet-Nam in the coming weeks and months. We think it has a chance. But I can tell you what will happen to the people of South Viet-Nam if we and others do not provide the needed humanitarian resources. Hundreds of thousands will starve. They will have no shelter, no schools, no medical facilities. They will live—some of them will live, for a while anyway—in unmitigated human misery. We must act urgently. The rains come in less than two months; as much of the infrastructure for refugee life as possible must be in place by then.

We believe that AID—through its long experience and working relationships with the vast machinery of the South Vietnamese Government and with the voluntary agencies and organizations (which have performed a truly priceless service to the people of that embattled land)—is up to the task. I hope that we will have your quick support.

SECRETARY KISSINGER, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, APRIL 18

Press release 206 dated April 18

I welcome the opportunity to appear now before this committee. My remarks will be very brief in order to let you get directly to questions.

The tragedy in Viet-Nam has been discussed at great length in recent weeks, and my own views are well known to you.

Although we are no longer fighting in Viet-Nam, we are still involved there, and what we do—or fail to do—can still influence the outcome. Thus, we are faced with a difficult national decision.

The question before us now is what can be done and should be done to restore some prospect of a negotiated settlement such as we sought so earnestly in Paris and to provide for the safety and well-being of the people of South Viet-Nam caught up in this turmoil.

The President's request includes the provision of adequate military and humanitarian assistance. He has also asked the Congress to clarify existing provisions of law regarding the use of U.S. forces in the evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese should the worst come to pass.

The request for military assistance was made to provide the people of South Viet-Nam the means to defend against those who seek to impose their will by force. If South Viet-Nam is unable to continue its struggle, it should not be by virtue of the cessation of U.S. support so long as the will to resist remains.

No aspect of the situation in Viet-Nam touches the hearts of Americans today as

much as the enormous human tragedy represented by hundreds of thousands of uprooted refugees. They have our compassion, and they need our immediate help. The President's request for humanitarian assistance was to provide the food, shelter, and medical care these unfortunate victims of the war must have.

In this regard, I want to acknowledge the serious and urgent efforts this committee has engaged in to adopt legislation for the kind of humanitarian and evacuation effort, if that should become necessary, which is consistent with our responsibilities. I commend the committee for its conscientious and expeditious accomplishment. I urge your colleagues in the other committees of the House and Senate to act as swiftly as you have.

Report on Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Evacuation From Cambodia

Following is the text of a letter dated April 12 from President Ford to Speaker of the House Carl Albert. [1]

The Honorable the SPEAKER,
House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: As you and other members of Congress were advised, in view of circumstances in Cambodia, the United States had certain contingency plans to utilize United States Armed Forces to assure the safe evacuation of U.S. Nationals from that country. On Friday, 11 April 1975, the Khmer Communist forces had ruptured Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) defensive lines to the north, northwest and east of Phnom Penh and were within mortar range of Pochentong Airfield and the outskirts of Phnom Penh. In view of this deteriorating military situation, and on the recommendations of the American Ambassador there, I ordered U.S. military forces to proceed with the planned evacuation out of consideration for the safety of U.S. citizens.

In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed on this matter, and taking note of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93–148), I wish to report to you that the first elements of the U.S. forces entered Cambodian airspace at 8:34 P.M. EDT on 11 April. Military forces included 350 ground combat troops of the U.S. Marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting tactical air and command and control elements. The Marines were deployed from helicopters to assure the security of helicopter landing zone within the city of Phnom Penh. The first helicopter landed at approximately 10:00 P.M. EDT 11 April 1975, and the last evacuees and ground security force Marines departed the Cambodian landing zone at approximately 12:20 A.M. on 12 April 1975. The last elements of the force to leave received hostile recoilless rifle fire. There was no firing by U.S. forces at any time during the operation. No U.S. Armed Forces personnel were killed, wounded or missing, and there were no casualties among the American evacuees.

Although these forces were equipped for combat within the meaning of Section 4(a)(2) of Public Law 93–148, their mission was to effect the evacuation of U.S. Nationals. Present information indicates that a total of 82 U.S. citizens were evacuated and that the task force was also able to accommodate 35 third country nationals and 159 Cambodians including employees of the U.S. Government.

The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's Constitutional executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of U.S. Armed Forces.

I am sure you share with me my pride in the Armed Forces of the United States and my thankfulness that the operation was conducted without incident.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *April 12, 1975.*

[1] Released Apr. 14 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 21); an identical letter was sent to Nelson A. Rockefeller, President of the Senate.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Israel of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 5723, 5909, 6091, 8019), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna April 4, 1975. Entered into force April 4, 1975.
Signatures: Israel, International Atomic Energy Agency, United States.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975.
Proclaimed by the President: March 26, 1975.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973.
Ratifications deposited: Canada, April 10, 1975; Chile, February 14, 1975; Ecuador, February 11, 1975; Uruguay, April 2, 1975.
Enters into force: July 1, 1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.
Ratifications deposited: France, Sweden, United Kingdom, March 17, 1975.
Accession deposited: Norway, March 21, 1975.
Enters into force: June 19, 1975.[1]

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971.[2]
Ratifications deposited: Norway, March 21, 1975; Sweden, March 17, 1975.
Accession deposited: Syria, February 6, 1975.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.[3]
Notifications of approval: Central African Republic, Fiji, January 3, 1975; New Zealand, December 4, 1974.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.[3]
Notifications of approval: Central African Republic, Fiji, January 3, 1975; New Zealand, December 4, 1974.

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.[3]
Ratifications deposited: Canada, January 20, 1975; Ecuador, January 24, 1975.
Accession deposited: Maldives, January 16, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Signatures: Argentina, Canada, Cuba (with statement), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Vatican City State, Venezuela, April 14, 1975.
Declarations of provisional application deposited: Argentina, Cuba, April 14, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.
Signatures: Australia, Finland, April 11, 1975; Argentina, Canada, Japan (with reservation), Sweden, Switzerland (with statement), April 14, 1975.
Declaration of provisional application deposited: Argentina, April 14, 1975.

BILATERAL

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo April 1, 1975. Entered into force April 1, 1975.

Israel

Agreement extending the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 5723, 5909, 6091), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington January 13, 1975.
Entered into force: March 24, 1975.

Jordan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of November 27, 1974

[1] Will not enter into force for the United States on this date.
[2] Not in force.
[3] Not in force for the United States.

(TIAS 7995). Effected by exchange of notes at Amman March 20, 1975. Entered into force March 20, 1975.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul March 13, 1975. Entered into force March 13, 1975.

United Kingdom

Agreement extending the agreement of March 30, 1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7594, 7832), relating to implementation and enforcement of civil aviation advance charter rules. Effected by exchange of notes at London April 2 and 3, 1975. Entered into force April 3, 1975.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 8, 1974 (TIAS 7952). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 13, 1975. Entered into force March 13, 1975.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—$23.10; plastic binder—$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Ecuador . . . . . Cat. No. S1.123:EC9
Pub. 7771 6 pp.
French Territory of Afars and Issas . Cat. No. S1.123:88AF
Pub. 8429 4 pp.
The Gambia . . . . . Cat. No. S1.123:G14
Pub. 8014 4 pp.
Jordan . . . . . Cat. No. S1.123:J76
Pub. 7956 4 pp.
Lebanon . . . . . Cat. No. S1.123:L49
Pub. 7816 5 pp.
Lesotho . . . . . Cat. No. S1.123:L56
Pub. 8091 5 pp.
Maldives . . . . . Cat. No. S1.123:M29/4
Pub. 8026 4 pp.
Nicaragua . . . . . Cat. No. S1.123:N51
Pub. 7772 4 pp.

Nuclear Science and Technology Information. Memorandum of understanding signed by the United States, EURATOM, Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. TIAS 7939. 70 pp. 85¢. (Cat. No. S9.10: 7939).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Viet-Nam. TIAS 7952. 15 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7952).

Transfer of Military Scrap. Agreement with the Republic of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of November 8 and December 14, 1972. TIAS 7953. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7953).

Nonscheduled Air Services. Agreement with Jordan. TIAS 7954. 45 pp. 65¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7954).

Narcotic Drugs—Provision of Helicopters and Related Assistance. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 7955. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7955).

Narcotic Drugs—Detection of Opium Poppy Cultivation. Agreement with Mexico amending the agreement of June 10 and 24, 1974. TIAS 7956. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7956).

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards Pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol with the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency suspending the agreement of July 15, 1968. TIAS 7957. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7957).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of August 29, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7958. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7958).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of November 9, 1973, as amended. TIAS 7959. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7959).

Whaling—Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention of 1946. TIAS 7960. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7960).

Parcel Post. Agreement and regulations of execution with Macao. TIAS 7961. 33 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10: 7961).

Parcel Post. Agreement and regulations of execution with Cyprus. TIAS 7962. 33 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7962).

Grants of Military Equipment and Materiel. Agreement with Tunisia. TIAS 7964. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7964).

Cooperation. Agreement with Iran. TIAS 7967. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7967).

Name Index

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 14–20

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to April 14 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 188 of April 9.

No.	Date	Subject
*197	4/14	ANZUS Council meeting, April 24–25.
*198	4/15	Fine Arts Committee, May 19.
199	4/15	Kissinger: Senate Appropriations Committee.
*200	4/16	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, May 14.
*201	4/16	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, May 15.
*202	4/16	Archeological exhibit from the People's Republic of China to visit San Francisco June 28–Aug. 28.
*203	4/16	Equal Rights Amendment ratification adopted as top priority of International Women's Year Commission.
204	4/17	Kissinger: American Society of Newspaper Editors.
*205	4/18	Shipping Coordinating Committee Meeting, U.S. National Center for the Prevention of Marine Pollution.
206	4/18	Kissinger: House International Relations Committee.
*207	4/18	Dr. Nag Chaudhuri, Vice-Chancellor of India's Jawarlharlal Nehru University, named Lincoln Lecturer.
†208	4/19	Kissinger: L'Express interview.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.